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Feminism East and West¹

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Slavenka Drakulić, a writer from Zagreb, recently wrote an essay about an American woman who had interviewed her and later wrote asking Drakulić to submit an article on women in Yugoslavia for an anthology she was putting together. Drakulić laughed at the topics proposed in the letter, such as an "analysis about women and democracy, the public sphere, civil society, modernization, etc. A kind of Critical Theory approach." Drakulić was asked specifically about "the kinds of interventions women have made in the public discourse, e.g., about abortion, women's control over their bodies, what sorts of influence women have had in the public discourse . . ." Drakulić regarded all these questions as inappropriate, reflecting the typical American misunderstanding of post-communist women. She was also annoyed at the American woman's ease and readiness to publish about post-communist women after she just "spent several weeks in Berlin."³ And she was critical, if at points grudgingly complimentary, about the American women's persona, clothes, and hair, calling her "surprisingly, [for an American feminist, presumably] dressed with style."⁴

One can only imagine the reactions of that American woman upon reading this account. Well, not quite, since I am that American woman. I wrote that letter and the invitation was to contribute to this volume, which Slavenka Drakulić did. My reaction was only made more bitter by my desire to speak to my past, to my mother and grandmother, and all the women in my family who as Jewish women from Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union had suffered, as women as well as Jews, in those societies. I was hurt, outraged, and angry, reactions exaggerated by reading the chapter while in a hospital bed in a bitterly cold and drafty room on one of the coldest days of the year, bringing to mind the

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conditions in Moscow hospitals I had read about. Except that I was in one of the "better" hospitals in New York.

Yet I began to reflect on this interaction. Were Slavenka Drakulić's essay and my reaction only individual responses, they would not be significant. But they are symptomatic of the risks, tensions, and difficulties inherent in discourse between Eastern and Western women. In many post-communist countries contact between Eastern and Western women has only been sporadic, and the tensions have arisen only in individual instances and outbursts. But in Germany, where there is a direct confrontation between East and West, these difficulties have become systemic, playing havoc with the possibility of joint action and even dialogue between East and West German women, and causing tremendous bitterness and suspicion on both sides. It is therefore worthwhile to analyze what underlies such tensions.

I.

First, Slavenka Drakulić's comments reflect the tensions arising from the real structural power and economic imbalances between Eastern and Western women and the societies of which they are a part. In this particular case that imbalance means that publishing in the West potentially brings greater recognition and financial benefits than publishing in the East, and that some Western women will have greater access to that publishing world than most Eastern women. Paradoxically, the opposite was true in this case; this publishing project gave a voice to post-communist women, and did not speak for them.⁵ Nor is it true that Western women generally, even professional women, have such ready access to publishing.

Second, because the East is being *incorporated* into the West, both the power and status hierarchies as well as an individual's sense of worth, status, and social respect are undergoing severe dislocation. Those who are among the most respected, sometimes deservedly so, as in the case of Slavenka Drakulić, have to insert themselves in a world that plays by somewhat different rules, has different standards, and already comes complete with its own status and power hierarchies. In Germany this has resulted in strong public attacks on the literary merits of the most renowned East German writers, mainly women, including the well-known author Christa Wolf. Resentments toward the West accumulate on the part of post-communist women and form the background for their meetings with Western women.

Power imbalances also exist at the level of discourse, where Western feminist discourse is hegemonic in feminism, risking the suppression and distortion of post-communist women's concerns. Western women, in speaking their own language of feminism, do risk imposing standards of discourse, as I did, provoking intellectual and political resentment, and sometimes shattering the possi-

bilities of political cooperation, as has happened in Germany. Some questions that Western women pose are indeed inappropriate. Yet in this case the questions proposed in that letter to Drakulić became the themes of fascinating essays by post-communist women themselves.⁶

In addition, since Western standards of style, dress, and cosmetics are being imposed on post-communist women, these are the standards that Eastern women aspire to, or are being judged by, not the reverse. Faced with these structural differences Eastern women are at times resentful or self-conscious. Ina Merkel of the former GDR expressed initial feelings of insecurity at being judged by West German standards, seeing herself, her body, and her dress, suddenly quite differently and more critically through a West German lens.⁷ This is one of the many reasons that in Berlin, where the confrontation between East and West is so direct, Eastern women prefer not to venture into West Berlin, but stay behind the Wall that once was. Although it is true that Western women may have more wealth, affordable access to Western clothes, and greater experience in dealing with these standards, this is not true for all Western women—not even all professional women. In many cases, defensiveness, resentment, and retaliation are the response by post-communist women, again constrained by the need to accommodate themselves to the new hierarchies into which they are plunged.

Western women can be insensitive and oblivious to all these structural inequalities. They can also be arrogant in assuming that, after twenty years of a Western women's movement, they know best the "real women's issues" or "what is to be done" politically and individually. These are attitudes ex-GDR women frequently confront in West German women.

Discourse between East and West is also pervaded by negative stereotypes on both sides: of American and Western feminists as "man-haters" or of post-communist women as simply having bought into sexism and having subordinated themselves to the family. The reaction by Drakulić, in which she presumed a Western woman's ignorance of Eastern Europe or a certain style of dress for American feminists, reveals the operation of just such stereotypes and how they can be mistaken in a particular case.⁸

In addition, there are tremendous differences in culture,⁹ socialization, and personality between Eastern and Western women, and in what Habermas has referred to as the "lifeworld," that stock taken for granted of unreflected beliefs and world views. All these differences create tensions and hostility and harden into prejudices, which have provoked confrontations and fractured meetings between Western and Eastern women, especially in the united Germany. Women in state socialist countries appear to be more oriented than Western feminists toward children and the family, have different attitudes toward the individual and the collective and to authority, are more skeptical of the benefits of paid work, and have different attitudes toward men or toward collective action. Language itself is a contested issue, as illustrated by West German women's resentment of

East German women's use of male grammatical nouns to refer to all persons, a form of speech that West German women had struggled hard to overcome.

In the face of all these differences, there is a tremendous risk of misunderstanding. In particular, there is a risk of Western women's moralistic rejection of post-communist cultural differences. This moralism can be predicated on a lack of understanding of the meaning and origin of these practices¹⁰—such as the fact that a family orientation in state socialism provided an escape from state control. Western moralism itself risks provoking a resentment and defensiveness and hardened suspicion toward Western women as "know-it-alls."¹¹

Post-communist women also do not want to be dominated by the priorities of Western women, or to be swamped by debates among Western feminists that do not resonate for them. East German women already have resentments on such issues as well as toward the ignorance and lack of understanding West German women have of their lives, their daily problems, their present and past.

U.S. women like myself who are particularly concerned about Eastern European women often bring our own agenda, especially the ever-present consciousness of the Holocaust, to our dealings with Eastern Europe. We are often Jewish women confronting our own identity, our families' Eastern European and Russian heritage, and our own experiences of Eastern European patriarchy and the strengths and weaknesses of women in our families. This complex history provides Jewish women with both an empathy and identification with post-communist women and a concern about their relationship to cultures in which there was, and still is, strong anti-Semitism.

As women wanting to work together, our goal should be to lessen our prejudices, ignorance, and mutual suspicions, and to come to judgments in ways that make possible cooperation between women. One cannot enter a dialogue between Eastern and Western women without expecting disagreement, misunderstanding, and mistakes. Drakulić's comments reveal the need for a dialogue regarded as a joint enterprise directed toward understanding each other, rather than a battle to prove the other wrong. Rather than being a threat, our differences should be seen as an opportunity for mutual and collective self-reflection.

II.

However, given all these differences, one is confronted with the question of whether a fruitful and meaningful dialogue is at all possible, whether Western feminism's issues, claims and goals can be anything other than "relative," appropriate in the West but not in the East. An argument that might be made would go roughly as follows: "Eastern women want something different from western women. They want to return to the home and leave the paid work force. Western women cannot engage in an authoritarian form of cultural imperialism telling Eastern women what to desire. Eastern women have different cultural and histori-

cal backgrounds and different values from Western women. Paid work may be emancipatory and a goal of feminism in the West, but not in the East. A women's movement in the East will confront different issues, have different values, demands and goals."

In what follows I want to reject such an argument while acknowledging that it contains partial truths. I will argue that in spite of the differences between Eastern and Western women's desires and among Eastern women themselves, Eastern and Western women have much in common and women's movements East and West can share many concerns, values and goals. The preceding argument, I will argue, misinterprets the desires of post-communist women, the relationship between women's desires, and the goals of a woman's movement, as well as the goals of Western feminism. I will begin my examination by first considering the reasons post-communist women give for their desires and the values that underlie those reasons. I will focus particularly on the purported post-communist women's desire not to be in the paid labor force. The goals of women's movements East and West, it will be shown, should be similar in many ways. I will then relate this discussion to the transformation of the public and private spheres in post-communism.

1.

Post-communist women's reasons for not wanting to work in the paid labor force fall into three categories: a cost-benefit analysis in which the price of paid work is too high; a greater concern for the collective family good over their own individual benefit; and an essentialist position that women's nature is different from men's, that women's nature is to be in the home.

In some post-communist countries one set of reasons predominates over others. In the former East Germany the third set of reasons appears to play a rather minor role, while it may play a stronger one in some Slavophil traditions in the former Soviet Union. In all of these rationales we can find various degrees of commonality with Western women's desires and with feminist values, in spite of the differences that may appear on the surface.

Women's desire to leave paid work depends most commonly on an implicit cost-benefit analysis. The reasoning seems to be as follows: the double burden of work and family responsibilities threatens mental and physical health and well-being (by producing exhaustion, fatigue, stress, and sickness); the long work days threaten intersubjective needs by restricting chances to be with one's family;¹² paid work requires "gender alienation," having to be "like a man"; although paid work can be meaningful, it is all too often boring and absurd and provides only limited autonomy, given low salaries. Certainly, paid work provides some benefits and satisfactions, such as friendship, solidarity, relief from boredom at home, some economic goods, and a degree of respect and autonomy. Yet in spite of these benefits, the harm it generates is above any acceptable threshold.

One immediately recognizes that this is a form of reasoning very common in the West. Further, women who reach such a conclusion (and these by no means include the majority of post-communist women) appeal to the very same qualities to which Western feminists appeal: health and well-being, respect and self-respect, dignity, self-realization, self-determination, autonomy, freedom, and justice. Relations with family are one way of trying to satisfy intersubjective needs, even when those relations are distorted by oppressive structures. One can hardly have respect and self-respect if work requires one to be "like a man". But this does not provide justification for claiming that the cost-benefit rationale reveals a *basic* difference in Eastern and Western goals, forms of reasoning, or values. Rather, the assessment of costs and benefits are different, both because of different circumstances and different expectations. This does not justify a claim that Eastern women's movements must be fundamentally different from Western feminist ones.

There are, however, those post-communist women who in such a cost-benefit analysis would give greater priority than do Western women or Western feminists to the intersubjective goal of being with children and activities in the home. But if one considers the reasons for this, it will be seen that this, too, does not provide grounds for assuming irreconcilable differences or fundamentally different priorities.

The emphasis on family pleasures by some Eastern women reflects that under state socialism, women and men had more possibilities to experience some small degree of satisfaction in the home than elsewhere. One couldn't travel; there were limited "leisure-time" activities and virtually no public sphere. Options outside the home were regularly blocked. The home was thus preferable to some women, in spite of the oppression within the home itself. It is not that being with one's family was necessarily of greater *intrinsic* worth than other goods, but that some women's expectations (even if illusory) for realizing *this* good were greater than those for any other good. Women especially turned to their children as a source of meaning.¹³ The family also became the substitute arena for activities that in the West might be found in the public sphere. For example, it was here that one could more safely discuss social, cultural, and political issues. Rather than being the antithesis of the public sphere, the family became an ersatz public sphere.¹⁴ Eastern women also used their commitments to the family as a strategy to sidestep participation in the discredited political system.

Jointly, all this vividly shows how fully the public/private distinction is not fixed and ahistorical. The fundamental dichotomy in state socialism was, in fact, between the family and state. The family thus had a very special and powerful status as the primary institution that stood in opposition to the state. Women who wanted to be in the "private" sphere wanted something different than what would be meant by a Western woman's orientation toward the family.

Women's interest in the family under these particular social and political conditions thus does not indicate an intrinsic difference between Eastern and

Western values but a difference in the historically specific social meaning of the family. Under such complex conditions, where there was more possibility for freedom in the family than elsewhere, Western women would also give more attention to the family. In addition, in the United States, there has been an emphasis among feminists in the 1980s on family and children, and on the tensions between work and the family. This renewed emphasis, however problematic, raises questions about whether the difference in actual desires between U.S. women and post-communist women is very great.

Post-communist women cannot, however, always be construed as rejecting paid work on the basis of an implicit cost-benefit analysis, with its presuppositions of weighing individual goods. In some cases they reject an emphasis on their own individual good in favor of a collective end,¹⁵ such as the good of their children and family. But here, too, to draw a conclusion that the goals of post-communist women's movements must be basically different from those in the West or that the form of reasoning is radically different is not warranted.

To the extent that this emphasis on the collective good indicates an undervaluation of the lives of women, this is the very issue the women's movement confronted in the West. It does not indicate any basic difference between the two cultures. An Eastern women's movement would not have to give legitimacy to this underestimation of the worth of women's lives any more than did the Western women's movement.

But the lesser emphasis on the individual good may also be due to a traditional culture and half-modernized state socialist culture that did not place such great value on the individual and individual autonomy. This value, however, as well as the actual individual/collective relationship, is presently undergoing transformation, and reevaluation in the East. For very different reasons, the individual/collective relationship is also under revision, if only gradually, in the West. Greater attention in the West is beginning to be given to collective goods such as the environment and, in the feminist movement, the value of autonomy is being reexamined and greater importance is being attached to relational goods. Even more attention needs to be given to these issues in the future. Neither culture is so inflexible and fixed on this issue that one can conclude they are irrevocably committed to fundamentally different values. It rather suggests that both East and West women would benefit from further reflection on these topics.

Thus, whatever the cause, the emphasis on the collective good does not entail the Eastern and Western women have *fundamentally* different values or that there must be a fundamentally different orientation of Eastern and Western women's movements.

What, then, of post-communist women who reject paid work because of an essentialist belief that it is women's nature to be in the home? Doesn't this provide evidence that there are fundamental differences between East and West? Although it is a problem many women who adopt this form of essentialism often do so to

argue that women should not be forced, either politically or economically, to enter paid work. They do not want the role of woman simply to be modeled on the male role; they want the role of homemaker to provide a legitimate alternative for women. Women who offer both essentialist and cost-benefit rationales often express their underlying desire as the desire to have a *choice* of whether to stay in paid work or not, in stark contrast to the situation in many state socialist countries. Clearly, there are strong gender-role presuppositions in speaking of such a "choice" for women. But a women's movement can recognize this desire by acknowledging that, indeed, women's role should not be modeled on men's, and that women who want to return to the home should not be castigated when society offers women only second-class positions in the paid work force, a double burden, and no meaningful position in the political sphere.

In addition, a meaningful "choice" between paid work and remaining in the home requires the social policy and structural conditions—in the home, in gender roles, at the workplace, in the labor market—that would enable women to do *either*, to stay home or not. Such a choice requires adequate day care and the absence of institutional discrimination against women in employment. But these are the same concrete demands made by Western feminism.

However, a post-communist women's movement does not have to adopt this essentialism and incorporate all women's desires into its program and advocate that women should leave the paid work force. In general, one has to distinguish between the desires some women may have, and the desires it would be appropriate for a women's movement in each country to advocate. Not to make this distinction would be to adopt a version of an unacceptable "subjective welfarism," stating that the welfare and emancipation of women is defined as a satisfaction of all women's present subjective desires. Feminism is not committed to such a position and is not necessarily representative of all women's desires, since it recognizes that existing desires have been constituted under problematic conditions. Desires formed under the absence of conditions of free and open discourse, or in the absence of consideration of relevant issues, whether in the West or the East, can hardly have the same status as those desires and beliefs women would be likely to have after fuller discussion. Moreover, a women's movement recognizes that new socioeconomic conditions demand new perspectives,¹⁶ and that women's desires and beliefs are likely to change because of these rapidly changing conditions. To recognize all this is not to dictate to women what their real needs are, creating a "dictatorship over needs." The women's movement instead would create a forum for women and encourage their participation in a discourse to form these new perspectives.

Thus, whatever reason post-communist women have for wanting to leave the paid workforce, it does not reflect an irreconcilable difference between Eastern and Western values; it does not mean Eastern and Western women's movements must have different goals.

2.

It is important to note that women's increasing unemployment has not been a matter of choice.¹⁷ Given recent projections of vast unemployment in the former USSR and projecting from the available data on unemployed women in which women make up almost two-thirds of the unemployed in several countries (such as the former East Germany) unemployment will be overwhelmingly *forced* on women. Removal of women from the labor market is one means post-communist societies are using, whether passively or actively, for the quasi-modernization under way to replace a state patriarchy with a Western form of male domination, to deal with unemployment, and to redefine the social role women. Women themselves, are not being asked.

Women might prefer to be able to choose whether or not to work, but it doesn't follow that they are *now* choosing not to work. To have the choice not to work they would have to be in stable marriages with husbands with stable jobs making a family wage. However, nothing is stable in post-communism, and *none* of these conditions generally hold.¹⁸ The economic necessity to work, the despondency at being unemployed, all form evidence that unemployment is not a choice. Many women are single mothers or are in unstable marriages, given 30 to 40 percent divorce rates. If they have husbands, the husbands are often unemployed or inadequately compensated, and more than two jobs in a family are often necessary for survival, as in Hungary or Poland.

Many women also stay home because day care is closing, conditions are poor, or children are disoriented by the massive social transformation. Since the woman is more likely to be unemployed or making a lower salary than the man, it often makes economic sense for her to stay at home. Here, of course, there is a parallel to the West. Discrimination in hiring plays a major role in women's unemployment.

There is also the simple question of whether women, in any of the senses discussed above, actually want to return to the home. In many countries there is no reliable data about this, and it most likely varies between countries and social classes. Where surveys have been done, as in the former GDR,¹⁹ Soviet Union, and Bulgaria,²⁰ only a small percentage of women say they would want to return to the home, even if they could afford to do so. In addition, Eastern women often do not want to leave the paid labor force completely, but to work "part-time" when they have children under three, where "part-time" can include a virtually full-time day according to Western standards (since the state socialist work day was typically eight and a half hours a day).²¹

III.

What is clear is that post-communism not only involves a transformation of the public sphere, but also a transformation of the family, the boundaries between

the public and private sphere, and the nature of the private sphere. Such transformations require fundamental normative changes. Women's position is central to, and symbolic of, all these changes. As the family loses the special significance it had under state socialism, women are more restricted to the family, and excluded from the new public sphere as it grows in importance. Modernization has, historically, often been harmful to women.²² One cost of the rationalization and modernization now going on is the sacrifice of women's well-being, much as occurred under communist rationalization.

Any analytic social theory of the transformation in post-communism needs to pay special attention to the family, its changed meaning, the transformation of the role of women and the way in which women's authentic participation in a newly forming public sphere could change the very nature of practices in the public sphere itself. Unfortunately this is not the case in the theory most frequently used to analyze post-communism, the theory of post-communism as the formation of civil society. In contrast to the Eastern European proponents of this theory, Western advocates of civil society theory—John Keane, Klaus Offe, Karl Hinrichs, Helmut Wiesenthal,²⁴ and Jean Cohen and Andrew Arato—do at least mention the family and include it in civil society. But even here, as exemplified by Cohen and Arato's extensively developed theory of civil society, the transformation of the family plays at best a minor role in the discussion. Although Cohen and Arato include the family in civil society, they discuss it infrequently and say that "we make the public spheres of societal communication and voluntary association the central institutions of civil society."²⁵ They do not ever raise the issue whether the political forms of the public sphere may themselves be more amenable to men than to women.

Cohen and Arato, and other civil society theorists, distinguish civil society from the economic system. By placing the family within civil society, they thereby distinguish the family from the economy. Although the family is not regulated solely by the economic consequences of actions, such a distinction between civil society and the economy seriously risks underemphasizing the way in which economic processes, considerations, and consequences do significantly regulate actions in civil society and the family in particular. Family and individual decisions—that one must work to have individual goods, or that the heterosexual, two-parent family will live where the man works because of his higher salary and greater job opportunities—are economically regulated decisions fundamental to many other family decisions. The problem of too sharply distinguishing the family from the economic reveals the general problem of the distinction between civil society and the economy.

IV. Conclusion

None of the above discussion should be interpreted as denying real cultural differences East and West and among post-communist countries themselves.

What I have argued is that in spite of the differences in tradition, culture, personality, beliefs and desires there is much in common between Eastern and Western women's issues and goals and in particular, in regard to the issue of paid work. Contemporary women's programs East and West will differ because of economic, political, and cultural differences. What a women's movement will demand will of course depend on the reconstituted socioeconomic system—whether in Romania or Bulgaria it will be an agricultural society, for example. In spite of cultural differences, the problematics are similar: Women's right to abortion, the right to jobs, and prevention of rape and violence against women are becoming important women's issues in post-communist women's movements as they have in the West. The issue of respect for sexual preference is beginning, however tentatively, to be raised in some countries.

Moreover, post-communist women's articulation of their desires and resentments about work can help to strengthen the paradigm of the employed woman for the women's movement in the West. Given the greater participation of women in the work force in the West compared to thirty years ago when the second-wave women's movement started, there is, in fact, similarity between Eastern and Western women's needs. Western women, now overwhelmingly in the work force, confront the same tensions as do post-communist women. Post-communist women's concerns should reinforce for Western feminism that work *simpliciter* is not the goal. Rather, a feminist demand must be for meaningful work in a rationally organized, humane society that reconciles the importance of the collective good and intersubjective needs of all persons with the instrumental needs of society. Work must be organized accordingly, for all persons while preserving justice.

The problems Eastern women confront in the conservative turn in some Eastern countries or the repressive nationalist threats in others, resonate with problems women face in the West. Post-communist women's critical examination of Western feminism can provide us with fresh insights into our own history and theories.

The paradigmatic "woman" is no longer who she once was in the early second-wave women's movement in the 1960s and 1970s, the white upper middle class woman trapped on the "pedestal" or in a domestic prison. Post-communist developments also make vivid the importance of women's participation in the political public sphere. Post-communist women's needs epitomize second wave feminism, stage two.

There will continue to be many differences, and justifiably so, between women's movements in the East and the West, in methods, strategies, and intermediate goals. But none of that should preclude a fruitful, mutually beneficial dialogue or justify a conclusion of fundamental, irreconcilable differences between East and West women's movements. In spite of all the differences that have come to light between women of the West and the East, which must be kept in mind, there is much that we have in common and much that we can learn from each other.

Notes

1. I use the term "East" in this essay to refer to the former USSR and the countries of the former Eastern bloc, of Eastern and South Central Europe.
2. Slavenka Drakulić, "A Letter from the United States: The Critical Theory Approach," in *How We Survived Communism and Even Laughed* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1992), pp. 126–127.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 126.
4. *Ibid.*
5. Given that Ms. Drakulić has published extensively in the West, it would have been appropriate to temper such resentment in this case.
6. The posing of questions was itself regarded as part of a free and open dialogue in which the questions themselves could be, and were, challenged, revised, and even rejected.
7. Ina Merkel, . . . *und Du, Frau an der Werkbank: Die DDR in den 50er Jahren* (Berlin: Elefant Press, 1990), p. 7.
8. I had, in fact, not just gone to Berlin for a few weeks, but had had regular contact in Germany and parts of Eastern Europe for the last twenty years.
9. In Germany the differences even extend to how one takes leave of another person. Former GDR women shake hands, which West German women reject as unduly formal and a practice they rejected in 1968.
10. West German women see these family-oriented practices as the very same ones they had rebelled against in 1968, but they ignore the different cultural meaning these practices had under state socialism.
11. In the former GDR West Germans are ironically referred to as "Besserwessis" ("Those-who-know-better-than-the-rest-of-us-Westerners"). East German women are equally critical of West German culture, regarding West German women as anti-children, or too quickly unsettled by the presence of children.
12. The long work day sometimes required sending children to week-long overnight day care, relatives in the countryside, or almost nine hours each day in day care.
13. See Havelková and Goven in this volume.
14. See Havelková and Lissyutkina in this volume.
15. See Havelková in this volume.
16. See Joshua Cohen, "Maximizing Social Welfare or Institutionalizing Democratic Ideals? Commentary on Adam Przeworski's Article," in *Politics and Society* (March 1991), pp. 39–58.
17. See Nickel in this volume.
18. In some cases, husbands leave women because of the shame of not being able to support the family, leaving the women alone with children. There are also many single parents.
19. In the ex-GDR, when asked if they would give up their jobs if their husbands made

- more money, only 3 percent of women said they should (see Nickel, Chap. 13, this volume).
20. See Petrova in this volume.
 21. See Nickel in this volume.
 22. Krisztina Mánicke-Gyöngyösi, "Frauen Osteuropas zwischen Tradition und Moderne: Eine Einführung," introduction to lecture series, 1991-92, *Frauen und Frauenthemem in der Forschung am Osteuropa-Institut*, Free University, Berlin (unpublished program).
 23. Karl Hinrichs, Claus Offe, and Helmut Wiesenthal, "Time, Money and Welfare State Capitalism," in *Civil Society and the State*, ed. John Keane (London: Verso, 1988), p. 226. See also Christopher Pierson, "New Theories of State and Civil Society: Recent Developments in Post-Marxist Analysis of the State," *Sociology* 18, no. 4 (1984): 563-571; and Mihaly Vajda, "East Central European Perspectives," in Keane, *Civil Society and the State*, pp. 330-360.
 24. Jean L. Cohen and Andrew Arato, *Civil Society and Political Theory* (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1992), p. 411.

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Slavenka Drakulić is a well-known novelist, feminist, and cofounder of the first feminist group in the former Yugoslavia, Women in Society in 1974. She is also a cofounder of the Network of East/West Women, founded in 1991. She has published two novels and two books of essays, one of which is *Deadly Sins of Feminism* (1984). *How We Survived Communism and Even Laughed* and her