3
1. The Challenge
The 10 states of central and eastern Europe that joined the European Union in 2004 and 2007
never did like the package of energy and climate agreements agreed in Brussels in late 2008,
which passed into law in 2009. They demanded, and won, concessions allowing them slower
implementation and softer targets on some aspects of Europe’s post-2012 energy and climate
regime. They thus accepted the overall package while still, for the most part, regarding
climate change as a rich man’s concern, a legitimate goal, perhaps, for the older member
states from western and northern Europe but irrelevant and ill-suited for developing countries
such as themselves.
The general economic downturn of 2009–10 has brought temporary relief to all EU member
states – new as well as old – from the economic pressure of carbon constraints. In the current
phase (2008–12) of Europe’s Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS), most of Europe’s industrial
companies have been allocated (for free) more carbon allowances than they need. Those few,
mainly in the power sector, which are short of allowances, can buy extra CO2 permits on the
ETS at a rate of Euros 11–15 per tonne of CO2. This is generally well below the level which
would force them into less carbon-emitting types or uses of energy. The downturn has also
made it very easy for most new member states to stay within their emission targets in sectors
outside the ETS – chiefly transport, services, and agriculture. Therefore, in the fight against
climate change, Europe is treading water rather than making headway.
However, the recession has merely postponed the challenge for central and eastern Europe
(also referred to here as the EU-10 or the new member states, though two others in that
group, Cyprus and Malta, lie outside this study). Precisely because the carbon constraints are
not biting at present, there are some moves within the EU to try to ensure that they do in the
near future.
The Copenhagen climate summit of December 2009 produced no firm reciprocal offers by
other countries to match Europe’s unilateral commitment to a 20 per cent cut in overall
emissions by 2020, let alone Europe’s conditional extra offer to raise the reduction to 30 per
cent if others followed. EU governments then, in early 2010, asked the European
Commission to analyse the impact of increasing the EU reduction to 30 per cent. The
4
Commission produced a report in May 2010. The thrust of this report showed that, with the
downturn in economic activity and in emissions (which fell 11 per cent in 2009), the
recession has already accomplished some of the 20 per cent cut, and greatly reduced the extra
economic cost of raising the reduction to 30 per cent. Moreover, the report argued
convincingly that exploiting the recession and raising the EU’s level of ambition before 2020
will avoid more drastic emissions reduction action after 2020. For the time being, the report
remains a report. The Commission decided that turning it into a formal proposal for a
unilateral 30 per cent emission reduction by the EU would not win sufficient political support
among EU governments, though a few, such as the new UK coalition government, favour
this. However, sooner or later, the issue of a bigger emission reduction will return to centrestage.
It has to if Europe is to get anywhere near its ambition of pushing emissions to 85–90
per cent below the 1990 level by 2050.
‘If you didn’t like 20 per cent, you’ll hate 30 per cent’
What is significant, for this study, about any raising of the EU emission reduction goal is that
Brussels will look to the new member states to provide much of the additional increase. This
is not surprising because:
The greatest energy efficiency savings are, logically, to be found in the least energy
efficient countries, e.g. those in central and eastern Europe.
More of Europe’s renewable energy potential lies in the forests, farms, and rivers of
central and eastern Europe than in western Europe.
In its May 2010 communication,1
the European Commission made clear that it would look
east for the main physical, though not financial, contribution to a 30 per cent cut:
‘As regards the geographical distribution, the emission reduction potential for moving from
20 per cent to a 30 per cent target is proportionally higher in the poorer member states [i.e.
those in central and eastern Europe]. Several of these are projected to overachieve their 2020
targets for emissions from the non-ETS sectors without additional efforts beyond business as
usual [i.e. no further policy changes]. This means a significant emissions reduction potential
remains untapped, even after implementation of the [2009] energy and climate package.’
However, the Commission acknowledged that ‘it will be necessary to mobilize the public and
1
European Commission communication May 2010.
5
private financial resources to enhance emission reduction without jeopardizing economic
growth [in central and eastern Europe].’ In other words, the new member states will need to
be paid for doing more on climate, a point stressed by this study (see conclusion).
This study raises such questions as: how much can the poorer member states contribute to a
low carbon economy in Europe? How hard should Brussels push them on energy and climate
policy? How hard should they let themselves be pushed? Is it unfair to ask such relatively
poor countries to undertake such expensive energy policies, and to expect what are essentially
developing countries to endanger their growth rates? On the other hand, might it be in the
long-term self-interest of central and eastern Europe to have EU policies that force the pace
of their adjustment and make up for their 40 years of indifference to energy efficiency under
communism? Might it be an advantage to the general cause of mitigating climate change for
EU policy-makers to have such a large orchard of low-hanging fruit – in terms of potential
efficiency improvement and renewable energy increases – within their grasp in central and
eastern Europe?
6
2. The Context
Climate scepticism
In few of the 10 central and eastern European new member states is climate change a priority.
For instance, in August–September 2009 a Eurobarometer opinion poll asked a sample, taken
from across the 27 EU states, about what was ‘the most important problem facing the
world’.2
Across the EU an average of 47 per cent thought climate change was the global
priority. Only two new member states, Slovenia (70 per cent)3
and Hungary (52 per cent)
were above this average; the other eight were below. One of the eight, the Czech Republic,
has the famously climate-sceptic (and Euro-sceptic) Vaclav Klaus as its president.
Concern about energy security
This has been the major energy policy concern of the new member states. To their dismay, on
joining the EU, they found Brussels far more preoccupied with energy market liberalization
and climate change. The concern of the EU-10 centres on their energy dependence on Russia.
The three Baltic states rely on Russia for 100 per cent of their gas (and for most of their
electricity and oil imports). Russia is also the source of all gas for Slovakia and Bulgaria, and
for over half the gas going to the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary. At best, energy
security concerns have been a distraction from climate policies, as EU-10 states focus on
diversifying their sources of gas. At worst, energy security worries have run counter to
climate policies, with countries like Poland and the Czech Republic seeking to maximize use
of their own coal and lignite deposits (and to minimize gas and oil imports). ‘We are caught
between the rock of western Europe’s carbon obsession and the hard place of our own energy
security’ is how one Polish minister puts his country’s dilemma.
Developing country mentality
Responsible leaders in the EU-10 countries do not accuse the European Commission and
western and Nordic member states of trying deliberately to sabotage their economic growth.
However, many of them do claim that the extra cost of the EU climate programme will
2
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_322_en.pdf
3
On most of the issues in this study Slovenia is the outlier. This is not surprising given its geography and the
fact that, as part of Titoist Yugoslavia, it was never, like the others, exposed to the full centralized command
economy of the Soviet bloc. As a sort of Slav version of Austria, it has few problems in common with central
and eastern Europe. In meetings of central and eastern Europeans to coordinate a common approach on EU
climate policy, Slovenia has been described by its partners as ‘present but not active’.
7
prevent them from achieving the extra rate of economic growth which they need in order to
catch up with the older EU states. Gordon Bajnai, Hungary’s technocrat caretaker prime
minister in 2009–10, claimed that new member states need to grow consistently at 2
percentage points faster than the EU average to achieve this catch-up. In practice, he said that
this meant countries like Hungary growing at a rate of at least 4 per cent a year. A Polish
minister expressed horror, in private, at discovering that the European Commission had
modelled its climate programme on an assumed annual rate of growth for Poland of 2.9 per
cent, which he complained was far too low. A similar fear, sometimes heard, is that the
region is swapping fuel dependence on Russia for technology dependence on western Europe,
chiefly Germany. It is certainly true that assembling and installing wind turbines and solar
panels imported from Germany provides relatively little local employment. However, while
Germany is so far reaping the benefit of green technology jobs, it is also shouldering the
initial development costs of these technologies.
Complaints
It still rankles with new member states that western Europe does not pay due regard to what
happened to their economies in the painful post-communist transformation in the 1990s. That
was the period when, in central and eastern Europe, output plummeted, unemployment
soared, energy prices rose, many energy-intensive metal-bashing factories closed, and energy
consumption fell – as did carbon emissions. When the Kyoto protocol was negotiated in
1997, emission reduction targets given to central and eastern European states – not yet EU
members – were easy to meet, because the reductions were based on the years of 1988–90,
the last highpoint of communist heavy industry. However, when the EU came to re-design its
own climate programme in 2008 – now including central and eastern European within the
Union – it chose 2005 as the new base year for all future emission reductions by EU states.
(The Commission had one good argument for using 2005, which was that this was the first
year for which there was reliable data on actual emissions.) The new member states
complained that basing future reductions on 2005 wiped out all recognition of their pre-2005
‘national sacrifices’, or effectively subsumed them into an ‘EU achievement’ in emission
reduction. A group of seven central and eastern European states, led by Hungary, therefore
proposed a uniform 18 per cent emission cut for each and every state, based on 1990, as the
fairest formula. However, the old member states, plus the Commission, retorted that the
1990s transformation of the eastern half of the EU could not be properly termed a ‘sacrifice’,
because there was nothing voluntary about it, merely the inevitable consequences of
8
communism’s collapse. The new member states’ counter to this was to point out that the
1990s – however termed – was a period of severe hardship for them, at a time when western
EU states of almost comparable economic level, such as Spain, were booming and, under
Kyoto, allowed to increase emissions.
This wrangle between old and new member states might have been safely left to the history
books, were it not for new pressure on central and eastern Europeans which would deny
them, as they see it, not only political credit, but also financial credit for their painful
transformation. Kyoto gave the states of central and eastern Europe (as well as Russia and
Ukraine) allowances (called Assigned Amount Units (AAUs)) to emit carbon up to their
Kyoto targets. However, they do not now need anything like their total number of AAUs. The
EU-10 states all regained their 1989–90 level of GDP by 2000–5, but have all reduced the
energy intensity of their economies and their industrial sectors. They all therefore have
surpluses of AAUs to spare, and to sell to others – such as western European countries, and
Japan – who are in difficulty with Kyoto targets. Among the more active sellers of these
credits are Hungary, the Czech Republic, Poland, and Romania. They have put, or promised
to put, the proceeds of AAU sales into green investments.
Now, however, there is pressure on the EU-10 states from Brussels, and some quarters in
western Europe, to cancel or scrap these AAUs, on the grounds that putting these allowances
on the market just adds to the imbalance of supply over demand and depresses the carbon
price. In its May 2010 communication, the European Commission said that it would prefer
the new member states to be able to draw directly on EU funds for renewable energy, energy
efficiency, and promotion of public transport ‘as an alternative to the use of surplus AAUs as
a source of funding, which undermines the environmental integrity of the carbon market’. At
present, new member states feel more secure in hanging on to their Kyoto AAUs, to which
they have a legal right, rather than in relying on the outcome of some future EU budget
negotiation, in which getting money for non-farm purposes is notoriously difficult (see
conclusions).
Concessions
The new member states were given a series of concessions in the 2008 energy/climate
package. However, some of these concessions were less generous than they might appear:
9
a. The Emissions Trading Scheme This is the most centralized part of the EU programme,
covering some 10,000 industrial emitters across the 27 countries, with a common cap or
emission reduction applying to all. In the third phase (2013–20) of the ETS, the cap is
supposed to bring emissions down to 21 per cent below the level in 2005, by 2020. The
centralized nature of the ETS made it hard to differentiate in favour of the new member
states. Moreover, most new member states still tend to have relatively larger industry shares
in their GDP than older member states (see table below); only a couple of Baltic states have
industry shares well below that of the most industrialized old member state, Germany.
Therefore, relatively more of new member states’ overall emissions is likely to be caught in
this centralized system.
Table 1: Shares of industry & services in GDP in 2008
Industry as % of
GDP
Services as % of
GDP
Bulgaria 30.5 62.2
Czech Republic 37.5 59.9
Estonia 29.1 68.0
Hungary 29.4 66.2
Latvia 22.7 74.2
Lithuania 32.8 (2007) 62.8 (2007)
Poland 30.8 64.6
Romania 35.3 (2007) 55.9 (2007)
Slovakia 38.0 58.9
Slovenia 34.4 (2007) 63.3 (2007)
France 20.4 77.6
Germany 30.2 69.0
Italy 27.0 71.0
Spain 28.9 68.3
United Kingdom 23.7 75.6
Source: World Development Indicators, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator
However, in the post-2012 ETS there are a couple of offsetting concessions to the new
member states. First, their governments will collectively be given slightly more (12 per cent)
carbon allowances to auction than their countries’ share in overall EU emissions represents
(and old member states correspondingly less). This will be a revenue boost to the EU-10.
Second, new member states – defined as those with power sectors heavily reliant on a single
fossil fuel and/or with relatively low income per head – have been granted the right to phase
in the auctioning of carbon allowances for their power sectors gradually. This was the result
of Poland’s non-negotiable demand that its electricity generators – 95 per cent coaldependent
– could not afford to start paying for all their pollution permits. Since the actual
10
cost will end up on consumers’ bills, Warsaw effectively said that it did not dare risk the
impact of a big cost rise on the competitiveness of Polish industry, and on the incomes of
ordinary Poles.
However, any free permits will be allocated administratively. After 2012 this allocation will
be performed by the European Commission, not as now by national governments. The way in
which the Commission will allocate free permits for the power sector – and for any other
sector like steel (which might get free permits on the grounds that it faces foreign rivals
without any carbon constraint) – is that permits will be free up to a technical threshold set by
Europe’s 10 per cent most efficient operators. Almost invariably these operators will be in
western Europe. Therefore, even where companies in eastern Europe appear to be getting a
free ride, the reality is that they will have to do some buying of allowances on the ETS. This
will increase if the EU decides to go for that 30 per cent emission reduction.
b. Non-ETS sectors. In sectors outside the ETS – transport, agriculture, services – the new
member states are to be allowed to continue increasing emissions, in contrast to the older
member states which will have to cut. Therefore, by 2020, the poorest of the new member
states, Bulgaria, will be allowed to increase emissions in non-ETS sectors by 20 per cent and
Romania by 19 per cent, with smaller increases as new member states go up the income
ranking, with Slovenia being allowed only a 4 per cent increase. However, as Table 1 above
shows, these increases apply to services sectors that are relatively smaller than those in
western Europe. Moreover, if the total emission cap is lowered via a 30 per cent reduction on
1990 levels, the new member states are then likely to find their non-ETS targets squeezed.
This could be a particular problem in transport, because over the past 15 years the shift from
public to private transport, from rail to road, and from bus to car has been more marked in the
new member states than in the older ones (Section 3.4).
c. Renewables. The new member states were given less demanding stretch targets, from what
their renewable share of energy was in 2005 and what it should be in 2020 than were older
member states. This was in recognition of the extra cost of renewable energy. At the two
extremes, Romania is asked to make only a 6.2 per cent point increase in its renewable share,
and the UK a 13.2 per cent point increase. At the same time, if you were looking for the most
cost effective increase in renewable energy across the EU, there is no doubt that you would
look east, where new member states have made relatively little effort so far to ‘go green’, but
11
have the best potential (mainly biomass) to do so. Over and above what was agreed in 2008,
new member states might be ready to make further increases in renewables to help meet a 30
per cent reduction goal. However, as a group they will not be enthusiastic. One advance – a
surge in solar photovoltaic (PV) installation in the Czech Republic – has been made almost
by accident, the result of setting a mistakenly high feed-in tariff some years ago, which
regulators are now desperately seeking to cut (see Section 6.2). The EU-10 group also
includes Latvia, the only country in the EU where the share of renewable power is actually
falling (though from a high level), because a large amount of hydropower capacity was built
before 1990, but none since.
12
3. The Current Situation
In the 20 years since they abandoned communist central planning, the 10 central and eastern
European member states of the EU have made enormous strides in energy efficiency. They
started, however, from a low point. The Soviet bloc economic system virtually guaranteed
energy inefficiency. Marxist economics placed little value on natural resources (the factors of
production that counted were capital and labour), and prices were set, not by the interplay of
supply and demand, but by government fiat within, and between, Soviet bloc countries. The
prices of Soviet oil and gas sold to central and eastern European allies were pegged to a
formula that lagged world price movements, and were therefore generally well below those
set by OPEC. Central and eastern European states often further subsidized prices, especially
to households who paid low, flat rates for their energy. However, it is not easy to make up for
lost time, for the 40 years of indifference to energy efficiency in central and eastern Europe.
The new member states are certainly converging with the older member states, but closing
the gap in energy efficiency/intensity is another matter. Merely hoping that the general
application of capitalism – privatization, liberalization – will do the job is not sufficient.
As the EU-10 began to turn themselves into market economies, there was vast potential for
improvement in energy efficiency, and for the most part it has been realized. Energy
consumption has grown less fast than GDP, and this de-coupling of the input of energy and
the output of national wealth is most marked among the new member states. This is clear
from Figure 1 below (based on the ODEX index developed by the Odyssee programme and
used by the European Commission and Eurostat).
13
Figure 1: Energy efficiency improvements by country (1996–2007)
Source: Odyssee-Mure project 2009, www.odysseeindicators.org/publications/PDF/publishable_report_final.pdf,
page 25
The EU-10’s efficiency improvements are, however, just relative – relative to their
communist-era starting point, and relative to the performance of the western Europeans. What
is significant for their ability to meet the challenge of EU energy/climate policies – the
subject of this paper – is the actual level of energy intensity of their economies: the amount of
energy need to generate a euro of GDP. As Figure 2 below shows, in absolute terms (the light
colour bars) the newcomers still have energy intensities well above those of the older member
states.
The gap between eastern and western European countries in Figure 2 can be made to virtually
disappear if you make adjustments for the facts that eastern Europe generally has colder
winters (being either more northerly or more land-locked), still has a slightly higher ratio of
energy-intensive industry, and has lower prices and incomes. If you use purchasing power
parity standards to level out the prices among the EU-27 – taking into account the fact that
Euros 100 buys substantially more in Bulgaria than in Denmark and that Euros 100 worth of
Bulgarian GDP counts for more, in Bulgaria, (and will have less wage cost in it) than Euros
100 worth of Danish GDP in Denmark – then Bulgaria no longer looks five times as wasteful
as Denmark. It is these sorts of adjustments which produce a much more even result in the
darker colour bars in Figure 2. Yet while this is, in a sense, a fairer way of comparing the
relative energy efficiency efforts of the new member states with the older ones, what counts
in a competitive world is results, the actual energy efficiency or intensity results of countries.
14
Figure 2: Adjusted final energy intensities (2007)
Source: Odyssee-Mure project 2009, http://www.odyssee-indicators.org/publications/PDF/brochures/macro.pdf
Moreover, for the EU-10 and their climate commitments, what matters even more than
general energy intensity is the carbon intensity of their economies. A measure of this is
provided in Figure 3, which charts changes in the energy-related CO2 emissions of industry.
It is no surprise that, among the EU-10, the smallest decrease in this category of CO2
emissions between 1990 and 2007 has come in Poland, which is still 95 per cent dependent
on coal-fired electricity (see Section 6.1).
Figure 3: Energy-related CO2 intensity of industry per Euros 1m of output
Source: European Environment Agency, Greenhouse gas emission trends and projections in Europe 2009,
Annex 6, page 110
15
3.1. Drivers of change
Prices
In general terms, the biggest jump in energy prices during the period under consideration was
in Russian gas, and came in the 1990s as Moscow phased out the Soviet-era price subsidies.
Some countries, such as Poland, were quick to raise prices. The Czech Republic also
increased prices quite quickly. Slovakia kept its gas prices stable for almost the whole of the
1990s, and then increased the household gas price by 600 per cent between 2002 and 2006.4
Hungary, also, was slow to adjust, and indeed is only in 2010 phasing out a gas price subsidy
for households (see Section 6.3). Energy prices in the new member states are now generally
slightly below the level in western Europe, in absolute terms. However, the gap is very small
where markets between eastern and western Europe are well-connected, such as between the
Czech Republic and Germany. If adjusted, through a purchasing power parity standard, to
take account of lower incomes in the newer member states, electricity and gas prices can be
said to take the same bite out of incomes in both eastern and western Europe. Petrol and
diesel prices are also fairly equal in purchasing power terms because, roughly speaking, the
richer the country, the higher the tax on transport fuels (as in states like Finland, Denmark,
the Netherlands, Belgium, and the UK), and the poorer the country, the lower the tax (as in
Bulgaria and Romania).
Higher prices have led to less waste. In electricity, the transmission losses in high voltage
power are small in both eastern and western Europe. However, according to experts at the
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the additional losses in low voltage
electricity distribution amounted to a further 10–20 per cent in eastern Europe before
privatization, compared to 7–8 per cent in western Europe. In Bulgaria, the average
distribution loss before privatization was 22 per cent, and now is around 12–14 per cent,
largely because private owners are less willing than public owners to tolerate commercial loss
through theft, as distinct from technical losses of voltage leaking into the ether.
4
Impact of the 2004 Enlargement on the EU Energy Sector, REKK (Regional Centre for Energy Policy
Research), Budapest 2008, page 128.
16
Figure 4: electricity prices for household consumers on 1/1/2007
Source: Panorama of Energy, 2009, p.107 Eurostat
Note: Table of electricity prices in euros for household consumers on 1/1/2007, all taxes included, in purchasing
power standards per 100 kWh. (based on a standard consumer using 3,500 kWhs a year). Shows that among the
top 10 EU countries with the highest prices relative to incomes are Slovakia, Poland, Hungary, Romania, and
the Czech Republic.
17
Figure 5: gas prices for household consumers on 1/1/2007
Source: Panorama of Energy, 2009, p.110, Eurostat
Note: Table of gas prices in euros for household consumers on 1/1/2007, all taxes included, in purchasing power
standards per GJ (based on standard consumer using 83.7 GJ a year). Shows Bulgarians paying the highest
effective price for their gas in the EU, and Slovaks the fourth highest. The two countries were also the hardest
hit by the 2009 cut-off of Russian gas, because of their high dependence on Russian gas.
Fuel poverty
This cannot be ignored in the new member states. They are all relatively poor and have a
legacy of particularly inefficient housing stock, while removal of communist-era subsidies
has raised their energy prices faster than has been the case in western Europe. There is no
universally accepted definition of fuel poverty, but a commonly-used financial measure,
developed by Brenda Boardman in the UK context, is ‘the inability to obtain adequate energy
services for 10 per cent of a household’s income’, which in the UK is roughly twice the
median share (5 per cent) of household expenditure on energy. Unfortunately, there seems to
be no EU-wide survey using this financial benchmark. One of the few new member states to
make such a measurement is Hungary, where the average household spending on energy in
the period of 2000–7 was 9.7 per cent. This average is held below the 10 per cent mark
because the country’s 20 per cent richest households spend much less on energy. The result is
18
that, according to a study by researchers at the Central European University in Budapest, ‘if
the 10 per cent threshold currently in use in the UK is applied to Hungarian data, the average
of all but the two highest deciles (i.e. 20 per cent) would be defined as fuel poor’.5
Classing
80 per cent of Hungarians as fuel poor seems rather excessive, particularly in the light of
other survey material coming from the regular Income and Living Standards surveys
complied by Eurostat (see Table 2). This shows the percentage of the population who report
themselves as unable to keep their homes adequately warm, as in arrears on their utility bill
payments, and in accommodation with leaking roofs, damp walls and so on.
Table 2: Share (%) of population reporting energy-related household problems: 2008
Inadequate heat Energy bill
arrears
Energy-related
housing defects
Bulgaria 34 33 30
Czech Republic 6 3 14
Estonia 1 7 17
Hungary 10 14 31
Latvia 17 12 26
Lithuania 22 6 25
Poland 20 10 23
Romania 25 24 24
Slovenia 6 14 30
Slovakia 6 4 9
EU-27 average 9 8 17
Source: Survey on Incomes and Living Standards, Eurostat
There is nothing very scientific about these surveys, in which another group of relatively poor
EU states – the southern Europeans – also report problems on these energy issues. However,
they do, in a general sense, confirm fuel poverty as a concern of the new member states. It is
also a preoccupation of their national energy regulators, who would feel more comfortable
raising energy tariffs to reflect real market costs if they knew that the poor were better
protected from such increases. Dr Gabor Szorenyi is director of the Hungarian Energy Office,
and is also president of the Energy Regulators Regional Association (ERRA), whose
memberships stretches from central and eastern Europe into Russia and CIS states. ‘All the
ERRA regulators agree on the need for vulnerable customers to be defined and protected with
remedies such as social tariffs, so as to make governments more comfortable with market
pricing’, he says.6
5
Fuel poverty in Hungary: a first assessment, Sergio Tirado Herrero and Prof. Diana Urge-Vorsatz, CEU, 2010.
6
Author interview. March 2010.
19
3.2. Technology – the case of steel
All the new member states have reduced the amount of energy going into, and the level of
emissions coming out of, their steel industries, but progress has been uneven, depending on
the level of foreign investment and the type of technology. Across all 27 EU countries, CO2
emissions from iron and steel fell by 18.4 per cent between 1990 and 2007. This is largely
due to the advance of the electric arc process, which essentially recycles scrap, at the expense
of the traditional blast furnace method, which starts from scratch with the original ore. The
former process is much less energy intensive than the latter, and as an industry average, the
electric arc process generates about 600 kg of CO2 per tonne of steel, compared to two tonnes
of CO2 (and more in some older eastern Europe plants) per tonne of steel forged in blast
furnaces. Figure 6 shows the energy savings to be made, in terms of the ratio of oil equivalent
tonnes to steel output, from adopting electric arc technology. Of the new member states only
Poland and Slovenia have switched significantly to the electric process. Hungarian steelmaking
is efficient, despite its 80 per cent reliance on blast furnaces. Other central and east
European states have stayed largely wedded to blast furnaces, leaving considerable scope for
energy efficiencies in the case of Romania and the Czech Republic.
Figure 6: New EU members mostly stick to traditional ways of making steel
Source: Odyssee data base
Note BOF = blast furnace; EAF = electric arc furnace.
20
3.3. Structural shift
Across Europe, indeed throughout the industrialized world, the general trend in energy
efficiency has been one of considerable improvement in industry, modest progress in
households, and worsening in transport. This pattern is particularly marked in the new
member states, for reasons related to their adaptation to market economics and to their reorientation
towards, and integration with, western Europe.
Quite a large part of the new member states’ energy efficiency improvement is due to a
switch of activity. They have abandoned, or reduced production in, sectors of industry such
as the making of steel, heavy machinery, and chemicals, which had been built up on cheap
Soviet energy that was no longer available – and shifted to less energy-intensive sectors.
Hungary, for example, gave up making its own aluminium – a metal that consumes electricity
in its fabrication – and shifted to the relatively energy-light activity of making or assembling,
components for electronic companies, such as GE, Samsung, Philips, and car companies like
Audi and Suzuki. However, this structural contribution to energy efficiency improvements in
Hungary and other new member states has two important consequences for this study:
Firstly, it flatters the energy efficiency improvement of the past 20 years, because
abandoning energy-intensive activities has been the easy part of the improvement. It
was not easy in a social sense – far from it, it has been miserable for hundreds of
thousands of well-qualified people across central and eastern Europe, who were
thrown out of jobs in the 1990s. However, it was relatively easy in the technical sense
that the improvement in the country’s overall energy efficiency required no change of
technology or behaviour, just cessation of certain energy-gobbling activities.
Secondly, precisely because it tends to flatter past improvement, it risks exaggerating
the potential for further energy efficiency improvements. It would be a mistake to
simply extrapolate past efficiency improvements into the future, because the structural
changes in EU-10 countries’ industry are most unlikely to continue at the pace
experienced in the last 20 years for the next 20 years.
This structural contribution to energy efficiency can be gauged by estimating what the energy
intensity would have been had the structure of industry stayed constant, and then comparing
this estimate with the actual development of energy intensity. The structural contribution
varies, according to the reports complied on the Odyssee database, from country to country.
21
In two countries, structural shifts accounted for a major part of energy efficiency
improvements. In the Czech Republic, the structural contribution to higher efficiency in
industry was dramatic. As Figure 7 shows, structural change (the very light colour bar)
accounts for almost 100 per cent of the improvement in the energy intensity in Czech
manufacturing (the dark colour bar) between 1997 and 2000, and for nearly half the
improvement between 2000 and 2007.
22
Figure 7: Impact of Structural Changes in Industry
Source: Report on Czech energy efficiency 2008, Odyssee data base.
In Romania, structural shifts accounted for about half of energy intensity improvements in the
Romanian economy over the whole period 1992–2007, as the country scaled down some of
the megalomaniac industrial schemes of the Ceausescu era. However, in neighbouring, but
less-industrialized, Bulgaria, structural shifts in manufacturing made little difference to the
country’s energy efficiency.
The part played by structural changes also varied over time. For Hungary, the structural
contribution to lower energy intensity was bigger between 1992 and 2000 (when it was
responsible for 30.9 per cent of improved energy efficiency) than it was between 2000 and
2007 (24.5 per cent). In Poland, structural shifts seem to have contributed more to efficiency
in the 2000s rather than the 1990s, which may have something to do with the gathering pace
of foreign direct investment bringing in more energy-efficient technology (see Section 6.1).
In other new member states, energy intensity – which measures how much physical energy is
used to generate a euro of GDP – has been very much influenced by growth in GDP or in
high value sectors. Latvia and Estonia showed big decreases in energy intensity when their
GDP recorded double digit growth for a couple of years in the late 2000s, while Slovakia,
largely because of its growth in high value car production, managed to reduce its energy
intensity by 57 per cent between 1993 and 2007. Energy consumption by Slovak industry has
23
remained constant, but it has been used to produce higher value goods. In contrast to the postcommunist
Czech Republic (which if anything has de-industralized), Slovakia has been
industrializing for the first time, especially in cars (its car production rose by 308 per cent
between 2000 and 2007).
3.4. Lost Opportunities
A potentially valuable inheritance left by communism to the new member states was a pattern
of collective energy consumption in transport and heating. If continued and developed, such
collective consumption could have offered economies of scale in energy use. This, however,
has not happened.
Transport
Changes in the new member states have been considerable. As central and eastern Europeans
have become richer, they have tended to abandon the bus and the railway for the private car.
This parallel growth of incomes and car ownership is part of a worldwide trend, but it has
been accentuated in the EU-10 countries because of the desire of their citizens to visit many
destinations in western Europe that were poorly linked with their Soviet-era rail system. More
dramatic has been eastern Europe’s abandonment of rail for freight transport, and its move to
western Europe’s longer-established habit of carrying almost all cargo by road. The two
middle lines in Figure 8 show eastern Europe’s progressive shift from a 50/50 split of road
and rail freight towards western Europe’s 85/15 split in favour of road (the top line) over rail
(the bottom line). This change is partly due to the inadequacy of eastern Europe’s rail links to
western Europe and to the decision to supplement this with new roads, but it is also
significantly related to the integration of central and eastern European industry into the
organization and production methods of western multinationals.
Before 1990, Comecon, the Soviet bloc economic body, organized a broad division of labour
between eastern European countries, so that Hungary, for instance, specialized in buses,
Bulgaria in fork lift trucks, and so on (though the Soviet Union itself usually maintained
some parallel production of every product). Nonetheless, in those days, Hungary’s Ikarus bus
company (once the fourth largest in the world, see Section 6.3) made most of its components
in-house or within Hungary, just as Skoda made most of its components in Czechoslovakia.
Now, however, companies like Skoda (part of Volkswagen) are part of the western
multinational pattern of production, which involves making components in specialized
24
factories in several countries and then trucking them by road back and forth across borders
for further elaboration or assembly.
Figure 8: Progressive preference for road over rail
Source: Eurostat, TERM report by European Environment Agency 2010. NB: EU-12 includes Cyprus and Malta
Evidently, multinationals prize the superior flexibility offered by ‘individual’ truck transport
above the lower unit cost in energy and emissions provided by the more ‘collective’ system
of rail transport.7
However, in terms of their EU climate commitments, the EU-10 countries,
or most of them, are paying a price. The energy intensity of their manufacturing will have
diminished, even if this is only due to the higher added value of their industrial output, but for
most of them, their transport emissions are rising faster than the EU average, as Figure 9
shows. Part of the reason for the stability of the rail/road split shown for the older member
states in the past 15 years (shown in Figure 8) is that western European industry has long
adopted the pattern of intensive cross-border road transport logistics to which eastern Europe
is still adapting.
7
For insight into the transport shifts in central and eastern Europe, I am indebted to Dr Elek Laszlo of Energia
Kozpont Nonprofit Kft, Budapest.
25
Figure 9: Trends in transport greenhouse gas emissions by country 1990–2007
Source: European Topic Centre for Air and Climate Change, 2009
District heating
This form of collective heating can be cheap and efficient, particularly when associated with
combined heat and power (CHP) systems that make use of waste heat produced in the course
of generating electricity. Such systems generally work well in Nordic countries, where the
penetration of district heating (DH) is high (see Table 3). However, in much of post-war
central and eastern Europe ‘the Soviet era, when energy was considered a right and virtually
cost-free, helped spoil DH systems and kept them pretty primitive’, according to Alexander
Lega, a DH specialist with the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD).
26
The legacy DH systems in the EU-10 often have several problems – inefficient boilers,
uninsulated pipes (compared to modern systems with pipes that are pre-insulated with a
plastic coating), and a pipe lay-out that sometimes makes temperature control impossible.
Sometimes there is just one pipe running through a building, with no parallel pipes going off
to individual radiators or apartments. The only temperature control is therefore to shut off the
entire hot water pipe system or, the usual remedy, to open the window.
Impracticable in rural areas, DH systems make sense in cities and towns, but precisely
because they are embedded in urban planning and architecture, they are complicated to build
or to renovate. However, they can be very effective in reducing emissions, either linked to
CHP, which can have an energy conversion ratio of 80 per cent, or to solar panels (as the
EBRD is discussing in Romania) or to geo-thermal energy (as the EBRD is discussing in
Hungary). Wind power is generally less used in DH systems, because sources are usually
remote from major cities. Some major renovations of existing DH systems are being carried
out. In the Bulgarian capital, Sofia, a project by the EBRD and the World Bank has saved 30–
35 per cent of heat consumption by installing thousands of control substations and better
distribution pumps, by replacing 100 km of pipes, and by changing the billing system to
paying for actual consumption. However, the process of turning a theoretical advantage of the
EU-10’s communist past – collective consumption of energy for heating – into one of
practical benefit is proving to be a long haul.
Table 3: Some examples of district heating penetration
Country Houses supplied by DH (2000) %
Iceland 95
Denmark 60 (2005)
Estonia 52
Poland 52
Sweden 50
Slovakia 40
Finland 49
Hungary 16
Austria 12.5
Germany 12
Netherlands 3
UK 1
Source: EBRD
27
4. The Way Ahead
This paper has laid the groundwork for an examination of the future energy and emission
challenges facing the new member states in meeting their EU climate commitments, by
painting a picture of the energy intensity gap that still remains between eastern and western
Europe. It has highlighted the big relative improvements made by the new member states,
especially in industry, but has also pointed out that some of this improvement is illusory. This
is partly due to the abandonment of certain energy-intensive sectors such as metallurgy and
chemicals by new member states rather than increased efficiency in these sectors. It has also
underlined that improvements in industry have largely been offset by increased energy use
and emissions in transport. We now turn to the new member states’ prospects for moving
towards a low carbon energy system in general, and for meeting their 2020 commitments in
particular.
4.1. Renewable energy
In the current economic recession, all EU targets for reducing emissions and boosting low
carbon energy have become easier to achieve. The recession has had significant
consequences for the Emissions Trading Scheme, as the supply of carbon allowances is
outstripping demand and has depressed the price of allowances. Less affected by the
recession than the ETS has been the 2020 target of a 20 per cent renewable share of overall
energy consumption – although 20 per cent of lower overall energy consumption is obviously
an easier renewable target to hit. The likely result is that renewable energy targets will play a
more important part in reducing total emissions in the European economy than was predicted
when it was thought, pre-recession, that the ETS would be more effective.
In view of the higher cost of renewables, the new member states were all given easier
renewable targets than their richer western European counterparts. Of the EU-10 states, the
Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Romania, and Slovenia predict that they will meet their
2020 targets. The other five – Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania, Poland, and Slovakia – forecast
that they will exceed their 2020 targets, giving them a surplus of green energy to sell to
western European states like Italy and Luxembourg, which expect to fall short of their 2020
targets.
28
However, this comfortable position for the new member states will not survive the ratcheting
up – which is likely to come sooner or later – of the EU climate programme from an overall
cut of 20 per cent (on 1990 levels) to 30 per cent. The Commission’s claim that the potential
for further emission reductions is ‘proportionally higher’ in the new member states is based
on the analysis shown in Figure 10. These charts measure (in the light colour bars) what had
been achieved by 2005, and what more (in the dark colour bars) could be achieved by 2020,
in renewable electricity generation. (There is some uncertainty about how much biomass
would go into electricity, because it can also be used for heat and transport in the form of biofuels.
This calculation also assumes some restraint, for environmental reasons, on EU
cultivation of biomass, made up with some imports from outside the EU.)
Given the smaller economies and populations of the new member states, the charts show their
‘proportionally’ greater potential in renewables. Up to now, they have done little. Most of the
existing renewable electricity in central and eastern Europe is large-scale hydropower, mostly
in Romania, but also with some in Latvia, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Slovenia. Since
large-scale hydro possibilities are mostly exhausted, new renewable power will be
concentrated in biomass, biogas and onshore wind, and mainly in the region’s two largest
economies – Poland and Romania. Little is expected from the maritime renewable energy
sources of offshore wind, tidal, and wave power, because many new member states are landlocked,
because offshore wind is more expensive than onshore wind, and because tidal and
wave power are still experimental.
Figure 10: The older member states can still do more in renewable energy….
29
…but have relatively less green potential than the new ones
Source: Futures-e project, 20% RES by 2020, by Energy Economics Group, Vienna University of Technology
and others, 2008
In the early 1990s there was a statistical jump upwards in the renewable share of energy in
central and eastern Europe. In the big ‘transition recession’ of the early 1990s heavy industry
collapsed, total energy consumption dropped, and conventional fossil fuelled energy
production decreased, but renewables with low running costs – such as hydro-electricity
generation and wood-burning for heat – stayed constant. This caused the new member states’
renewable share to rise from 2 per cent in 1991 to 4.5 per cent in 1994.8
However, nothing
was done to add to these traditional forms of renewables. Governments were slow to take
even the basic step of defining, and endorsing, what is renewable by issuing so-called
‘guarantees of origin’. In 2004 eight of the 10 central and eastern European countries joined
the EU, but by late 2006 none of the eight had put a guarantee of origin system in place,
despite a directive requiring them to have done so by 2003. Only once they had a guarantee
of origin system in place could they introduce renewable investment support schemes.
Biomass and wind power only begin to show up in national statistics as measurable sources
of electricity after 2005.
Not surprisingly, renewable energy progress has been modest. The new member states started
off with easy national targets for their non-ETS (i.e. non-industrial) emissions; to varying
degrees they are all allowed to increase emissions in non-industrial areas such as transport,
agriculture, and services. There is then the impact of the recession, depressing emissions
8
See REKK study cited above, page 181. Here the new member states include Cyprus and Malta, but exclude
Romania and Bulgaria.
30
further. As the Commission said in its May 2010 communication, ‘several poorer member
states are projected to overachieve their 2020 targets for emissions from the non-ETS sectors
without additional efforts beyond business as usual’. Hardly, therefore, a sense of urgency to
pursue crash renewable energy programmes.
Very occasionally, a new member state’s efforts to stimulate renewables have produced too
much of a good thing. Czech scepticism about climate change – personified in Vaclav Klaus,
the country’s famously climate-sceptic president – and Czech doubts about the feasibility of
alternatives to fossil fuels, have been reinforced by an ill-judged solar PV scheme with very
high tariffs and little legal scope for tariff reduction (see Section 6.2). At least 40 per cent of
total Czech renewable support is currently being spent on a project that so far only provides
about 7 per cent of renewable power. This scheme has brought about a surge of solar PV
investment in the country, but has added significantly to Czech electricity bills. Czech
regulators are now cutting the tariffs as fast as they can, and little new solar investment is
expected after 2010.
4.2. Nuclear
The countries of central and eastern Europe are generally well-placed for nuclear power to
contribute to emissions reduction. The one big exception is Poland, the country that most
needs nuclear power to dilute the carbon intensity of its coal-dominated energy supply, but
which is only now going ahead with its first reactors, due for completion at some time after
2020. (A initial decision to build a nuclear reactor was taken by the martial law government
of General Jaruzelski, but this was thwarted by the first Solidarity government – see Section
6.1). The new member states are also well-disposed to nuclear power, their public opinion
being generally in favour of it, according to polling surveys. The Czech and Slovak
governments competed with each other to host the European Nuclear Energy Forum – set up
by the Commission in 2007 as a talking shop to revive interest in nuclear energy issues – and
in the end they agreed that the forum should alternate between Prague and Bratislava.
Indeed, just as they feel pushed forward by the EU into renewable energy, some new member
states feel held back by the EU on nuclear power. In particular, there is lingering resentment
in Bulgaria, Slovakia, and Lithuania that the EU – more precisely a combination of some
western European governments and many members of the European Parliament – forced
them to close some of their older Russian-designed reactors as a condition of joining the EU.
Though some efforts were made in the 1990s to improve these reactors’ safety measures and
31
design, these reactors were deemed by the EU to be unsafe, largely because, like the
Chernobyl reactor, they lacked an outer containment shell. This resentment flared up again in
Bulgaria and Slovakia at the time of the cut-off of Russian gas through the Ukraine in
January 2009, because these two countries, having no other source of gas, had been hit the
hardest of all EU states by the cut-off of Russian gas. The Bulgarian and Slovak governments
both threatened to try to re-start their shut-down reactors, but were told by Brussels that this
was impossible because their reactors’ closure was written into their accession treaties, one of
the most embedded forms of EU law.
With some help from other international bodies, the EU has provided a total of Euros 2.83bn
in compensation, and in help with reactor decommissioning, energy efficiency, and
alternative energy, to the three countries. Bulgaria has found it slightly harder to get the
money out of the EU than have Slovakia and Lithuania. Bulgarian officials put this difficulty
down to what they see as their country’s ‘tactical mistake’ of closing down its Kozloduy
reactors in 2006, the year before Bulgaria joined the EU, when it would have been able to
bargain as a full member – in contrast to Slovakia and Lithuania whose reactor closures came
after EU accession. Nonetheless, on the basic issue of closure, Brussels was ultimately no
less inflexible with Slovakia and Lithuania. Two years after its EU accession, in 2006
Slovakia was forced to close down two of its six reactors at Bohunice. Lithuania long
appeared to believe that Brussels was bluffing in insisting on the shutting down of the
Ignalina reactors on which the country was highly dependent (see Table 4), but it was finally
forced to close its last remaining reactor at Ignalina in December 2009, more than four years
after it joined the EU.
Table 4: Nuclear power as % of domestically generated electricity
1999 2009
Bulgaria 47.1 35.9
Czech Republic 20.8 33.8
Hungary 38.3 43.0
Lithuania * 73.1 76.2 (0% in 2010)
Romania 10.7 20.6
Slovakia 47.0 53.5
Slovenia 37.2 37.9
Estonia - Poland
- Latvia
- *
Last reactor closed end-2009
Source: World Nuclear Association
32
Money is a major problem for any country wanting to build reactors. Nuclear costs are rising
fast, as Finland has found with its Olkiluoto reactor being constructed by the French. In the
current financial climate, credit is scarce. One reason for EU hesitance in providing
compensation money to Bulgaria is that Bulgaria may again opt for a Russian-designed
reactor, because it is cheaper and comes with an offer of credit. (EU concern relates to the
safety of Russian technology, even though it has been re-designed since Chernobyl.)
Lithuania is likely to draw Latvia and Estonia (and possibly Poland) in as partners in a new
‘Baltic reactor’ at Visaginas to replace Ignalina, but Lithuania is still finding it hard to attract
outside funding, partly because several other countries have similar plans to increase nuclear
power in its region and therefore there is some possibility of over-supply. In addition to
Finland’s Olkiluoto reactor underway, Poland is planning at least two reactors of its own, and
Russia is also planning a new reactor in its Baltic enclave of Kaliningrad.
Over the long term, nuclear power is set to generate a larger share of electricity across central
and eastern Europe, where the Czech Republic and Romania also plan new units on existing
reactor sites at, respectively, Temelin and Cernavoda, and where Hungary is extending the
life of its Paks reactor. However, in the medium term to 2020 – the time horizon of the EU’s
current energy/climate programme – it does not look as though there will be much extra
nuclear capacity to reduce the carbon content of the region’s energy systems.
4.3. Gas
As the least polluting of the three main fossil fuels, gas could play an important part in the
new member states’ energy and climate strategy. Gas would play a more important part, but
for the fact that the most sensitive energy security concerns of central and eastern European
states relate to reliance on gas, and on Russian gas specifically. There is no surprise about this
concern in the light of a) the region’s high and inflexible dependence on Russian gas
delivered through fixed pipelines, and b) the cut-off of Russian gas through Ukraine in 2006
and 2009.
This study will not rehearse the entire debate about Europe’s gas security and the role of
Russia in it. This debate has been exhaustively analysed elsewhere9
and, moreover, energy
security is relevant to this paper only to the extent that it is an obstacle to, or distraction from,
9
See The Russo-Ukrainian gas dispute of January 2009: a comprehensive assessment, OIES, February 2009,
and The April 2010 Russo-Ukrainian gas agreement and its implications for Europe, OIES May 2010.
33
progress toward low carbon energy systems. There is certainly evidence that energy security
is a distraction for central and eastern Europeans, who feel it has a higher priority than
dealing with climate change. In the consultation undertaken by the European Commission in
2008 prior to publishing its Second Strategic Energy Review (the first being on the internal
energy market, the second on energy security), people were asked what they thought
constituted ‘major threats’ to EU energy security over the next 20 years. Over half the
respondents from the new member states selected ‘impact of EU climate strategy’ as a threat
to energy security, compared to only 13 per cent from the older member states.
Equally telling were the differing priorities on ways of strengthening energy security in the
gas market; respondents from new member states stressed supply-side hardware, such as new
import pipelines and LNG terminals, which respondents from older member states thought
were less important than measures to curb gas demand. In a sense, the eastern Europe supplyside
focus on energy security is rather primitive, in that it fails to appreciate the whole EU
energy and climate package as a long-term way of replacing imported fossil fuels. However,
it is also realistic about solutions to what is perceived to be an immediate problem of energy
insecurity; it is quicker to build a new gas pipeline than to reduce gas demand.
Many eastern Europeans had hoped that EU membership would wrap them in an energy
security blanket, but they found the EU blanket nothing like as warm as they had hoped.
Indeed, after the first interruption of Ukrainian gas in 2006, Poland first took its proposal for
an ‘energy solidarity’ commitment to NATO, before eventually throwing it into the EU
negotiations in 2007 that resulted in the new Lisbon treaty. The Lisbon treaty contains, for
the first time in a EU treaty, some comforting words on energy security and solidarity.
However, it took the serious interruption of January 2009, during which the EU temporarily
lost 20 per cent of its gas (30 per cent of its imports), to galvanize the EU into some kind of
action.
34
Table 5: Gas security is a matter of volume as well as of source
Gas as % of primary fuel
(2007)
gas coming from Russia (2008) *
as % of total gas consumption
Bulgaria 15 99
Czech rep. 15 82
Estonia 13 100
Hungary 40 83
Latvia 29 85
Lithuania 32 96
Poland 13 58
Romania 32 31
Slovakia 28 117 (some re-export)
Slovenia 12 51
* Includes some central Asian gas via Russia
Source: Commission document SEC(2009)979 final; IEA Natural Gas Information
In total, 12 countries were affected by the 2009 cut-off. Within the EU, Bulgaria was the
worst hit, having no storage or domestic production, and lacking any alternative source of
imports by pipe or LNG. Its prime minister was reduced to going to Moscow to beg for
Gazprom to turn the tap back on. The other chief casualty inside the EU was Slovakia which,
frustratingly, had gas in store in the western part of the country, but lacked the technical
ability to reverse the usual east-to-west flow in order to pipe the gas to its gas-starved eastern
half. However, energy security issues and concerns do not stop at the EU border. Several
non-EU countries had their gas supplies hit in 2009, notably Serbia and Croatia. Quite apart
from the physical fact that these countries are part of the same interconnected pipeline system
as EU states, the EU is politically obliged to take their energy security into account because
the EU has persuaded them to join the EU-sponsored Energy Community. Originally set up
by Brussels to facilitate reconstruction of Balkan energy grids after the Yugoslav wars of the
1990s, the Energy Community has become a sort of pre-accession waiting room for countries
likely to join the EU. Its members are supposed to adopt the rules and procedures of the EU
internal energy market, in return for which the EU implicitly underwrites their energy
security.
35
Measures to improve gas security, which started after 2006 and accelerated in 2009, include:
Storage. Countries with the greatest need for storage are those with the largest
consumption. As Table 5 shows, Hungary is an exceptionally heavy user of gas;
across the EU it is only matched in terms of gas use by the UK and the Netherlands,
which are both much bigger gas producers. In 2006–9 Hungary increased its gas
storage from 3.2 to 5.5 bn cubic metres (bcm), equal to 40 per cent of its annual
consumption. Other new member states have also increased storage.
Cross-border interconnectors. The big goal is to create a North–South corridor,
running up and down central Europe, of linked pipelines and storage. Feeding into
this would be gas from many sources. From the north, Danish gas, via the Skanled
pipeline to Poland; Russian gas via the new Nord Stream pipeline from Russia to
Germany, as well as the existing Yamal pipeline across Poland; and gas coming from
various sources to Poland’s planned LNG terminal at Swinoujscie on the Baltic. From
the east, Russian gas via the existing Bratsvo pipeline across Ukraine. From the south,
Caspian/central Asian/Middle East gas coming via the possible Nabucco pipeline
across Turkey to Bulgaria; more Russian gas coming through the putative South
Stream pipeline across the Black Sea and into the Balkans; and gas coming from
various sources to Croatia’s LNG terminal on the Adriatic. In order to make this at all
possible, the new member states need to improve the interconnections between
themselves. Bulgaria is therefore working on new links with Romania and Greece;
Hungary on new connections with Romania (due for completion 2010), with Croatia
(completion due 2011) and with Slovakia (2012 or later); and Slovakia on its end of
the new Slovakia–Hungarian pipeline, on its own two-way gas transport system inside
Slovakia, on improved connections with the Czech Republic, and a possible pipeline
link to Poland. The one hitch in this seems to be Slovak indecision between going for
a long new pipeline north to the Yamal pipeline in Poland and maybe the Baltic, or
relying on improved connections with the Czech Republic to Germany. Much of
Germany’s gas, of course, comes from Russia, but there is a new tendency (see
Section 6.2) in central Europe to believe that the most reliable way of getting Russian
gas is via Germany, on the grounds that Germany would be the last European
36
customer that Russia would ever dare cut off. The idea is that central and eastern
Europe can rely on Germany, and Germany can rely on Russia.
EU funding and legislation. Under the European Economic Recovery Plan,
Euros 1bn is being spent in 2009–10 to help finance gas interconnections (and another
Euros 700m on electricity connections). This money has been spread all too thinly
across the EU (the usual unfortunate result of having to rely on agreement by
consensus), but a good portion of it has ended up where it was most needed: central
and eastern Europe. At the same time, the EU has set about revising its complacent
Gas Security Directive of 2004, which was conceived before central and eastern
Europe joined the EU and at a time when people thought energy insecurity was more
an issue for oil than for gas. When finalized, this legislation is likely to require more
stringent national contingency plans and more coordinated EU responses, in the event
of gas emergencies.
In an effort to maintain the momentum of these measures, some of the new member states
held their own energy security summit in Budapest in February 2010. The summit was
convened by Hungary as holder, in 2009–10, of the rotating presidency of the Visegrad
group, to which Poland, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia also belong. The summit also
included Austria, Romania, Bulgaria, and the non-EU trio of Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia.
(Significantly, the three Baltic members of the EU were not invited because their energy
security position is so different – being dependent on Russia for virtually all their primary
fuel, and still linked to the Russian electricity grid. This last fact creates a special climate
policy problem – see Section 5 Conclusions.)
The summit produced a Budapest declaration that endorsed all of the measures outlined
above. It, went on to say that the participants (even those outside the EU) would push for
more EU energy funding of infrastructure of common interest to the region, would come up
with their own ideas for projects, and would encourage closer cooperation between their
energy companies. According to Ambassdor Mihaly Bayer, Hungary’s ambassador for
energy security, ‘the message to Brussels was that “we are helping ourselves” and the
message to Moscow was that “we cannot be blackmailed” ’.10
He goes on to say that: ‘if we
can settle energy security, then we can deal with climate change more calmly’.
10
Author interview, March 2010.
37
Have the new member states settled energy security in a way that lets them deal with climate
change more calmly, and possibly more effectively? With more gas security measures in
place, it might be sensible for most of them to make more use of gas, the least polluting of the
three fossils fuels, as a transition to a lower carbon economy. Increasing gas in the energy
mix would not be rational for Hungary (which uses too much already), but it would make
eminent sense for Poland to increase the paltry 12 per cent gas share in its final energy
balance (to reduce the 60 per cent share of coal). This is particularly true if Poland finds any
sizeable quantity of unconventional gas of its own. However, unconventional gas in Europe is
unlikely to be the bonanza it has proved to be in north America. Prospects for a more relaxed
view to gas use therefore turn on two factors in particular – the reliable supply, and the price
of gas from Russia, which is still by far the predominant supplier to the region.
Reliability. Ukraine is still the conduit for 80 per cent of Russian gas reaching Europe.
The Russia–Ukraine agreement of April 2010 could create some stability in the rocky
gas transit relations between the two countries. On gas going to Ukraine it removes
the 30 per cent general Russian duty on gas exports, thereby effectively giving
Ukraine a 30 per cent cut in the price of Russian gas. In return, Ukraine has extended
Russia’s lease on Sebastopol for its Black Sea fleet. It is hard to see that Moscow is
getting much value for its money. However, if – and it is a purely political factor
wholly out of the realm of energy policy – the Russian state considers the loss of gas
export duty worth around $3bn a year a price worth paying for Sebastopol, then
Ukraine will at last get gas at a price that its shaky economy can afford, removing the
previous temptation to steal or divert transit gas bound for Europe.
Prices. Gazprom is currently struggling to keep its gas pricing’s traditional link with
oil or oil product prices, despite the fact that the spot price of gas, pushed down by
recession and current oversupply, has sunk to nearly half the oil-indexed price of
long-term Russian gas. For its very best customers, such as its long-time partners, Eon
of Germany, Gazprom has been willing to relent to the extent of pricing up to 15 per
cent of gas volumes at the spot market rate. Such concessions are essential where a
spot market exists, otherwise gas consumers will go straight to the spot market instead
of to Gazprom’s partners like Eon. However, Gazprom is only making concessions
where it has to. Sergei Komlev, head of Gazprom Export’s contract and pricing
division, says that Gazprom logically ‘cannot, and will not, offer spot pricing to
38
countries that don’t have a local spot price’.11
Unfortunately, such countries include
those in central and eastern Europe. Their markets are in the process of becoming
better connected, but the gas flowing through them is almost entirely under long-term
contract. Therefore, despite their best efforts to create a wider, more diversified gas
market, the new member states do not seem to have diluted Gazprom’s pricing power.
11
Author interview, May 2010.
39
5. Conclusion
Central and eastern Europe has come a long way in the past 20 years. The 10 new member
states of the EU have improved their energy efficiency vastly, and are narrowing the gap with
the older member states. However, part of that improvement was due to a one-off event, the
abandonment of Soviet-era heavy industry. Further reductions in energy intensity are harder,
and, as with development of renewable energy, will require upfront money which is currently
scarce in a region hard hit by the financial crisis. The new member states have shed that
indifference to energy waste which was a hallmark of their 40 years under communism. They
now have cost-reflective energy prices, but they have also failed to exploit, or maintain,
certain scale economies inherent in communism’s collective energy consumption habits in
transport and heating. At the request of the new member states, much of the EU’s structural
aid to the region has been spent on roads, and their railways have been neglected, while little
EU financing has gone to improve energy efficiency. On the supply side, the prospects for a
substantial increase in low carbon energy in the new member states by 2020 are good in
renewables, but poor in nuclear (essentially because of the need to rebuild safer reactors at a
time of scarcity of public cash and private credit), and still uncertain in gas.
Yet, given eastern Europe’s considerable remaining potential in emissions reduction, it would
be most surprising if the region were not asked to contribute proportionately more to the fight
against climate change than it has so far. It is also obvious that an increase in the EU’s
emission reduction target to, say, 30 per cent would pose problems for the new member
states.
A tightening of the emissions cap in the ETS would have a greater effect on the new member
states as it would require their less efficient companies to buy more allowances than cleaner
industries in the older member states. In 2009, the new member states won some temporary
concessions, but the 2009 energy and climate package might be unhelpful to them in the
longer term. The reformed post-2012 ETS will create a pan-European allocation of carbon
allowances by auction or benchmarking according to technology. Either way, eastern
European companies will find themselves up against the richer treasuries and cleaner
technologies of western European companies in the competition for emission allowances. At
the same time, the 2009 package left the current system of purely national subsidy schemes
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for renewables largely untouched, and failed to create the sort of pan-European system in
which money could freely flow from the richest region (western Europe) to be invested in the
region with the most potential (eastern Europe).
A higher emission reduction target would create a very specific problem in the three Baltic
EU states. Increasing the carbon costs of Baltic electricity generators would expose these
power companies to severe competition from Russian energy companies, which will not be
burdened with any such carbon costs. This exposure exists because the three Baltic states are
still synchronized with the Russian grid, not the UCTE (Union for the Co-ordination of
Electricity Transmission) grid of the rest of Europe. More generally, too, higher energy costs
in the new member states could lead to some displacement of jobs or market share to Russia
or to Ukraine.
Central and eastern Europe was never going to be able to compete, on the basis of cheap
energy, with Russia which will always have lower costs for energy, raw materials, and
labour. As for Ukraine, the new member states of the EU should regard it less as a
competitive threat than as a policy warning. Ukraine is as energy-inefficient as Russia, but
lacks Russia’s virtually inexhaustible natural resources. It stands as a cautionary tale to the
new member states of what they might have been, had they stayed outside the EU. The new
member states’ long-term self-interest lies in having the EU set a framework for their energy
adjustment.
At the same time, the EU cannot force the pace of this adjustment. In the negotiations on the
2009 energy and climate deal, the central and eastern European states showed that they could
form themselves into a blocking minority to obtain concessions. If the new member states are
to be required to increase their contribution to emission reduction, they are perfectly entitled
to expect commensurate extra financial aid from western Europe through the EU budget or by
other means. This could be done in two ways:
EU structural funds
There is no chance, in the current fiscal climate, of funding a big increase in energy saving
and low carbon energy in the EU-10 through an increase in the overall EU budget. However,
there ought to be every chance of funding such an increase through a re-direction of EU
structural funds. These stand at a projected Euros 344bn for the 2007–13 period, or nearly a
41
third of the entire EU budget, and most of it goes to the new member states. Very little of the
total, however, will be spent on energy – only Euros 10.8bn. For instance, Poland, the most
populous of the poorer states, is due to get Euros 65bn in 2007–13, but only Euros 2.2bn of
that will be spent on energy efficiency and renewable energy.
Why so little? Part of the reason is the traditional emphasis of the structural funds on helping
poorer countries to participate in the single market – by improving cross-border
infrastructure, some of it in energy but mainly in transport and telecommunications – rather
than in funding areas seen as purely national – such as house insulation or green electricity.
In 2009 it was counted a minor triumph that the share of EU structural fund available for
energy efficiency and renewable energy in housing was doubled, but only from 2 to 4 per
cent! However, new member states are also culpable. They are seriously slow in absorbing
what EU money is earmarked for energy projects. Their politicians’ passivity is partly to
blame. They seem to feel that they get a better political return in using EU funds on road
transport rather than energy efficiency, on constructing, say, a new highway, on which they
can erect a sign proclaiming their success in getting pork barrel money from Brussels, rather
than on installing invisible insulation.
This must change., and a good opportunity to start will come in 2011. As it happens, the
rotating presidency of the EU will be held by Hungary in the first half of 2011 and by Poland
in the second half. Coincidentally, the EU will soon have to begin preliminary negotiations
on its next financial settlement for 2014–20. Budapest and Warsaw should take the initiative,
a rarity for new member states, to say that if the EU is stick to its declared priority for climate
change policies, its budget should reflect this by giving more help to the new member states
on energy. Having willed the ends, Europe must will the means.
Europeanizing national renewable energy subsidies
This was the aim of the European Commission in 2008, when it proposed a system of panEuropean
trading of guarantees of origin for renewable energy, akin to the pan-European
system of trading carbon allowances which the Commission created in the form of the ETS.
The trade was to be in the guarantees, the pieces of paper certifying the renewable energy, not
in the renewable energy (mainly electricity) itself, because there is no way of checking the
precise flows of electrons across Europe’s borders. The idea was that, for instance, a
Romanian producer of solar power could present a guarantee of origin in Germany and get
42
the German feed-in tariff on solar power, without the Romanian solar power necessarily ever
entering the German grid. However, the Commission proposal foundered in 2008 on the
opposition of member states which feared losing control of the operation and cost of their
national subsidy schemes. EU governments therefore agreed a very restrictive form of crossborder
trade in green energy, with any inflow and outflow kept tightly in their hands. States
falling short of their renewable target can buy a ‘statistical transfer’ of renewable energy from
states in excess of their national target. On current projections, this will produce a very
modest transfer of renewable energy subsidy money – with about four of the old member
states (plus energy-deficient Malta) buying small statistical slices of renewable energy from
sellers which could be western European as well as eastern European states. Older eastern
Europeans will recognize this kind of government-controlled trade as something that they had
under Comecon. Like Comecon, it deserves to be abandoned.
In the interest of developing economies of scale in renewable energy across Europe, of
encouraging wider competition for available subsidy, and of giving the market a role in
deciding where the best return on renewable investment lies – which will often be in the new
member states – the EU should reconsider the Commission’s original plan. There is now less
substance to fears that energy consumers in states with the highest feed-in tariffs would be
asked to write blank subsidy cheques to renewable producers in other states. Some of the
highest feed-in tariffs for solar power – in Germany, Spain, and Italy – are being cut to reflect
technical progress and falling production costs. Western Europe would not find itself
presented with an avalanche of renewable certificates from eastern Europe to subsidize,
because a gradual de facto harmonization of renewable support schemes is taking place
across Europe. There would be some transfer of renewable energy subsidy from west to east,
but this would increase eastern European demand for the wind turbines and solar panels of
the big western European renewable technology companies. It is unlikely that many jobs
would move east with the subsidy. Western Europe would tend to keep the skills and
manpower needed to design and manufacture wind turbines and solar panels, whose assembly
in eastern Europe requires relatively little labour; indeed that is precisely the complaint in
some new member states. Any new wave of green jobs in eastern Europe would be more in
improving energy efficiency in buildings.
Clearly a pan-European system of tradeable renewable energy certificates would be as
incompatible with any precise system of enforceable national renewable targets as carbon
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permit trading in the pan-European ETS would be with national industrial emission targets. It
would be the market, not governments or the European Commission, which would primarily
decide where renewable generation, as well as emission reductions, would take place.
However, is the precision of the current national renewable targets so important? For
instance, in purely economic terms, it is obvious that the new member states’ targets have
been set too low, and how, in the end, are national targets going to be enforced? Surely not
with the standard EU infringement proceedings and threat of fines in the European Court of
Justice. The one renewable target, on which Europe’s credibility will be judged in the court
of international opinion, is its collective goal to raise the renewable share in Europe’s overall
energy use to an average of 20 per cent by 2020. The best way to deliver that would be
through a Europe-wide green energy system, marrying western Europe’s financial resources
with eastern Europe’s natural resources.