STATE OF THE DEBATE
Live Better by Consuming
Less?
Is There a “Double Dividend” in Sustainable
Consumption?
Tim Jackson
Summary
Industrial ecology has mainly been concerned with improving
the efficiency of production systems. But addressing consumption
is also vital in reducing the impact of society on its environment.
The concept of sustainable consumption is a response to
this. But the debates about sustainable consumption can only
really be understood in the context of much wider and deeper
debates about consumption and about consumer behavior itself.
This article explores some of these wider debates. In particular,
it draws attention to a fundamental disagreement that
runs through the literature on consumption and haunts the
debate on sustainable consumption: the question of whether,
or to what extent, consumption can be taken as ‘‘good for
us.’’ Some approaches assume that increasing consumption is
more or less synonymous with improved well-being: the more
we consume the better off we are. Others argue, just as vehemently,
that the scale of consumption in modern society is
both environmentally and psychologically damaging, and that
we could reduce consumption significantly without threatening
the quality of our lives. This second viewpoint suggests that
a kind of ‘‘double dividend’’ is inherent in sustainable consumption:
the ability to live better by consuming less and reduce our
impact on the environment in the process. In the final analysis,
this article argues, such ‘‘win-win’’ solutions may exist but will
require a concerted societal effort to realize.
Keywords
consumer behavior
consumer choice
consumer culture
evolutionary psychology
industrial ecology
symbolic interactionism
Address correspondence to:
Prof. Tim Jackson
Centre for Environmental Strategy
University of Surrey
Guildford GU2 7XH
United Kingdom
<t.jackson@surrey.ac.uk>
<www.surrey.ac.uk/eng/scripts/staff.pl?name=JacksonT>
© 2005 by the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology and Yale University
Volume 9, Number 1–2
http://mitpress.mit.edu/jie Journal of Industrial Ecology 19
S TAT E O F T H E D E B AT E
Industrial Ecology and
Consumption
Over the past decade or so, industrial ecology
has successfully focused attention on improving
the resource efficiency of the systems
of production. Reusing, remanufacturing, and
recycling end-of-life products, using the wastes
of one production process as inputs to another,
and redesigning products, processes, and
supply chains for improved efficiency all offer
clear environmental benefits to industrial society
(Geyer and Jackson 2004; Graedel and Allenby
1995; Guide and van Wassenhove 2004; Jackson
1996).
Over the same decade, it has become increasingly
clear that such interventions will not, by
themselves, deliver sustainable development. It
is not enough for us to devise ever more efficient
industrial processes. It is not enough to
engineer cleaner and more clever technologies.
It is not enough that we design greener and
more ethical products. All of these things are
clearly important. But none of them will ensure
that consumers choose to buy the greener products
or that the scale of material throughput remains
within ecological limits. Purely technological
approaches fall short of addressing the crucial
dimension of human choice in implementing sustainable
technologies and in changing unsustainable
consumption patterns (Jackson and Clift
1998; Princen et al. 2002; Rayner and Malone
1998).
Partly in recognition of this fact, attention has
turned increasingly to questions of consumption
(Jacobs and Røpke 1999; Princen et al. 2002;
Reisch and Røpke 2004). The scale and pattern
of consumption, the drivers of consumer expectations
and behaviors; the nature of consumer
decision-making processes, and the importance
of shifting consumer attitudes, behaviors, and expectations
in favor of cleaner products and reduced
environmental impacts: all of these factors
turn out to be vital in achieving sustainable
development. Reflecting this emerging interest,
the term sustainable consumption now features as
an organizing principle in a wide variety of research
agendas and policy initiatives (Cohen and
Murphy 2001; DEFRA 2003; Heap and Kent
2000; OECD 1998; UNEP 2001).
As yet no clear agreement has been reached
on what sustainable consumption actually means.
Some approaches focus on the role of technological
innovation and “getting the prices right”
and emphasize “consuming differently” rather
than “consuming less” (UNDP 1998). Others
imply a far more radical critique in which sustainable
consumption is about “the management
of greed” (Slesser 1997; Trainer 1996) in affluent
societies. Neither of these positions is
unequivocally useful: the first because it offers
little new to existing policy agendas; the second
because it underestimates the complexity of
human motivations and risks alienating those
whose behavior it seeks to change.
Nonetheless, the new agenda demands that
we resolve at least some of the critical questions
relating to consumption. In particular, we find
ourselves confronted by the very real need to ensure
that environmental gains achieved through
sustainable production are not offset by rebound
effects, that entrenched behaviors do not render
sustainable technologies redundant, and that
the continued expansion of consumer expectation
and demand does not simply swamp the efficiency
gains made through industrial ecology.
In short, we are drawn toward the need for a
clearer understanding of consumer behavior and
human choice. Why do we consume? What do we
expect to gain from material goods? How successful
are we in meeting those expectations? What
constrains our choices? And what drives our expectations
in the first place? All these questions
become vitally important in the search for an
understanding of consumer behavior to inform
sustainable development.
The problem in addressing these questions
lies not so much in a dearth of potential models
as in a superabundance of possibilities. From
the Aristotelian concept of pleonexia (the “insatiable
desire for more”) to Thorsten Veblen’s
notion of conspicuous consumption; from Pierre
Bordieu’s analysis of social distinction to Fred
Hirsch’s concept of “positional goods”; from Jean
Baudrillard’s semiotic analysis to Mary Douglas’s
“symbolic interactionism”; from the humanistic
psychology of Abraham Maslow and Erich
Fromm to the biological analogies of Edward
Wilson and Richard Dawkins; from John
Kenneth Galbraith’s sociopolitical critique of the
20 Journal of Industrial Ecology
S TAT E O F T H E D E B AT E
affluent society to Juliet Schor’s “downshifting”
and Duane Elgin”s “voluntary simplicity”: the literature
on consumption is replete with different
approaches to consumption and different models
of the ways in which consumers behave.
Each such model arises from a slightly different
set of disciplinary assumptions, adopts sometimes
radically different underlying assumptions
about human nature, and embodies different conceptions
of what it means to pursue the good
life. Making sense of this diversity is beyond the
scope of this, or indeed any single journal article.
A number of recent reviews have attempted
to review this somewhat “unmanageable” literature
(Bagozzi et al. 2002; Bocock 1993; Edwards
2000; Gabriel and Lang 1995; Jackson 2005;
Jackson and Michaelis 2003; Michaelis 2000;
Miller 1995; Røpke 1999; Sanne 2002).
The purpose of this article is to explore a specific
“dialectical” tension that runs through the
literature on consumption and haunts the debate
on sustainable consumption. Most simply put, it
is the question of whether and to what extent
current levels and patterns of consumption are
or are not “good for us”—not just in terms of
environmental impact but in terms of individual
and collective well-being. Some approaches
assume that increasing consumption is more or
less synonymous with improved well-being: the
more we consume the better off we are. Other
approaches argue, just as vehemently, that the
scale of consumption in modern society is both
environmentally and psychologically damaging,
and that we could reduce consumption considerably
without threatening the quality of our lives.
The first perspective tends to regard consumers as
free to choose the best way of pursuing the “good
life” according to individual tastes and preferences.
The second perspective regards modern
consumer society as being locked into a kind of
“social pathology”—driven to consume by a mixture
of greed, social norms, and the persuasive
power of unscrupulous producers.
This second perspective is interesting in particular
because it tends to suggest that a kind
of “double dividend” might be associated with
sustainable consumption—just as industrial ecology
has argued that a double dividend is associated
with sustainable production. If the consumer
way of life is—as Paul Wachtel (1989)
has suggested—both ecologically damaging and
psychologically flawed, then the possibility remains
that we could live better by consuming
less and reduce our impact on the environment
at the same time. But how realistic is this perspective?
Is it consistent with fundamental understandings
about consumer behavior and human
motivation? Does it reflect socially achievable
and culturally relevant ambitions? Or is it simply
a delusion based on utopian understandings
of human nature? And—to the extent that it is
valid—what does this perspective imply in terms
of policies for behavioral change in pursuit of
sustainable consumption? This article sets out to
address these questions through an exploration
of the wider literature on consumption and consumer
behavior. It argues, ultimately, that the
possibility of a double dividend cannot entirely
be ruled out, but that realizing it will require considerably
more than wishful utopian thinking or
angry ecologism.
Consumption as Well-Being
The starting point for this exploration is an
elaboration of the view that, in some simple
sense, the consumption of goods and services is
an attempt to provide for our individual and (at
the aggregate level) collective well-being. This
view of consumption is, at its simplest, the one
encoded in conventional economics. All transactions
in the market are assumed to represent the
rational choices of informed consumers. In this
“rational choice model,” the consumer is visualized
as a “rational actor,” attempting to maximize
well-being or “utility” within the constraints of
the market, according to his or her own individual
preferences (Russell and Wilkinson 1979,
e.g.). This utilitarian model has become so widely
accepted that most modern economics textbooks
barely even discuss its origins or question its authenticity.
Mas-Colell and colleagues (1995), for
example, assert that “it is logical to take the assumption
of preference maximization as a primitive
concept for the theory of consumer choice.”
Begg and colleagues (2003) simply “assume that
the consumer chooses the affordable bundle [of
goods] that maximizes his or her utility.”
Economics itself tends to be silent, however,
on the nature or origins of individual preferences.
Jackson, Live Better by Consuming Less? 21
S TAT E O F T H E D E B AT E
Consumer choice theory, following Samuelson
(1938), restricted itself largely to deriving demand
functions for consumer goods on the basis
of “revealed preferences” in the market. In
other words, according to this theory, the best
we can say about consumer preferences is what
we can infer about them from the patterns of expenditure
on consumer goods in the market. If
the demand for a particular brand of car, washing
machine, or video recorder is high, then we can
infer that consumers, in general, prefer that brand
over other brands. The reasons for this preference
remain opaque within economics, as do the reasons
for choosing sports utility vehicles, tumble
dryers, and DVD players over, say, ecoholidays or
leisure activities (Schor 1998).
More sophisticated attempts to understand
the economic basis of consumer preferences were
made by Kelvin Lancaster (1966). Lancaster’s
proposed that consumer preferences for goods are
formed on the basis not of the products themselves,
but of the attributes that those products
possess and the values of those attributes for individual
consumers. The economic theory of choice
constructed from this suggestion has proved considerably
more complex than conventional preference
theory. Nonetheless, it has been widely
employed and developed to explore consumer
preferences for product attributes in sectors as
diverse as food (Crawford 2003; Philippidis and
Hubbard 2003, e.g.), luxury cars (Anurit et al.
1999), health care (Ryan and Bate 2001), and
renewable energy investments (Bergmann et al.
2004). Once again, however, the theory of consumer
choice flowing from the Lancaster model
does not attempt to unpack the underlying social
or social-psychological structure of consumer
preferences. It simply suggests that it is possible
to infer these preferences from the choices consumers
make in the market.
Consumer preference theory and its extension
to attributes were developed to apply specifically
to economic transactions, that is, basically, to
consumers’ purchasing behaviors. But the same
rational choice model has also been applied in the
attempt to understand people’s nonpurchasing
behaviors. Perhaps the best-known application of
rational choice to nonpurchasing behaviors is the
work of Gary Becker, whose (1976) Economic Approach
to Human Behavior and (1981) Treatise on
the Family won him the Nobel Prize. Becker used
the concept of human capital to understand apparently
noneconomic household behaviors such
as divorce, the increase in women’s participation
in the labor force, the distribution ofchild-rearing
and household labor between men and women,
and so on.
Consistent with their roots in anthropological
theories of social exchange (Homans 1961),
rational choice models see exchange as a fundamental
determinant of human behavior. The
trade in economic goods and services is only one
aspect of social exchange. At a broader level, according
to this extended rational choice model,
we exchange a variety of different goods (time,
gifts, labor, critical appreciation, sexual services,
and so on) in the expectation that (at least over
the long term) these exchanges will benefit our
own self-interest. As we shall see in a later section,
the importance of exchange is also emphasized
by social anthropological perspectives on
consumption.
Implicit (and sometimes explicit) within the
economic perspective is the assumption that human
wants are essentially infinite. The desire for
a particular commodity will eventually peak and
decline; but the desire for commodities in general
is taken to be insatiable. Some economists even
adopt insatiability as the conceptual foundation
for the “economic problem”: namely, the allocation
of limited resources in the face of unlimited
wants (Anderton 2000). In this way, the insatiability
of consumer desire becomes a sort of ideological
assumption at the heart of economics.
What emerges from this assumption is the idea
that the more we consume (in economic terms)
the better off we are. Conversely, if the aim of society
(and public policy) is to achieve continual
improvement in well-being, then the appropriate
way of achieving this is to pursue ever higher
levels of (economic) consumption (Vincent and
Panayotou 1997).
The equation of economic consumption with
well-being goes a long way toward explaining the
primacy of measures such as GDP in public policy
terms (Jackson 2002a). It does not, however, take
us very far toward an understanding of the complexity
of consumer motivations. Nor does it offer
much that is new in the way of policies for sustainable
consumption. The principal task for policy,
22 Journal of Industrial Ecology
S TAT E O F T H E D E B AT E
under this view, is to ensure that the market is
working efficiently, that external costs are internalized
in resource prices, and that consumers
have access to adequate information about their
own consumption choices. These strategies are
undoubtedly important. But they have not been
outstandingly successful in the past in achieving
behavioral change. Nor do they exhaust the
range of possible policy interventions suggested
by a deeper understanding of consumer behavior
(Jackson 2005; Jackson and Michaelis 2003).
Ironically, practitioners in the field have been
considerably more inquisitive about the nature
and origins of consumer motivations than economic
theorists have. New areas of inquiry such
as consumer psychology, marketing, and “motivation
research” have developed a rather rich body
of knowledge—a “science of desire” (Dichter
1964)—for producers, retailers, marketers, and
advertisers wanting to know how to design and
sell products that consumers will buy. Little of this
research concerns itself explicitly with the environmental
or social impacts of consumption. But
its insights are crucial to a proper understanding
of consumer behavior. Much of the inspiration
for this body of research is drawn from outside
economics, from disciplines such as humanistic
psychology, sociobiology, and anthropology. Because
these fields are discussed in more detail below,
discussion of certain key insights from consumer
research is deferred to subsequent sections.
Consumer Culture as a Social
Pathology
Though firmly entrenched in modern institutions
and policies, the conventional economic
view of consumer behavior stands only, if it stands
at all, in the face of a storm of protest. The environmental
lobby has been particularly vociferous
in denouncing the economic model both
for its failure to protect the environment and for
the oversimplicity of its underlying conception
of human nature (Schumacher 1973; Douthwaite
1992; Norgaard 1994; Daly 1996; van den Bergh
et al. 2000; Wilson 2001).
Critiques of the consumer society are not
confined to the Green lobby; nor are they entirely
modern. Even in the seventeenth century,
Hobbes had noted the pervasive anxiety of a society
characterized by unlimited materialist values;
in the nineteenth century, Marx (and many
others) decried the “fetishism of commodities”
that characterized capitalism. On the cusp of
the twentieth century, Thorsten Veblen ([1899]
1998) articulated a tendency toward “conspicuous
consumption.” In The Theory of the Leisure
Class, he contrasted the “destructive traits” of the
“pecuniary culture” with the “industrial virtues”
of earlier times. In the space of less than a century
pecuniary culture had established an iron grip on
modern social mores. But it had also generated
a host of critics, all of whom were skeptical—in
slightly different ways—of the power of increased
consumption to deliver ever higher levels of sat-
isfaction.
Murray Bookchin (writing in the 1960s under
the pseudonym Lewis Herber) argued that
human society had “reached a level of anonymity,
social atomisation and spiritual isolation. . .
virtually unprecedented in human history”
(Herber 1963, 187). Fromm (1976) was alarmed
at the alienation and passivity that pervaded
modern life, and placed the blame squarely on an
economic system predicated on increasing levels
of consumption. Ivan Illich (1977) attacked
the ideology that equates progress with affluence
and needs with commodities. In attempting to
discover why “unprecedented and fast-moving
prosperity had left its beneficiaries unsatisfied,”
Scitovsky (1976) highlighted the addictive nature
of consumer behavior and its failure to mirror
the complexity of human motivation and
experience.
These critics have to some extent been supported
by empirical evidence. In The Joyless Economy,
Scitovsky could already cite the failure
of reported levels of well-being to match the
growth in GDP (Scitovsky 1976). In 1991, Erik
Jacobs and Robert Worcester found that people
were marginally less happy than they had been
in 1981 in spite of increased personal income
(Worcester 1998). A similar result was reported
over a longer period by Myers and Diener (1996).
Oswald (1997) found that reported levels of “satisfaction
with life” were only marginally higher
than they had been in the mid-seventies. In some
countries, including Britain, they were actually
lower. The most recent evidence suggests a weak
positive correlation between increasing GDP and
Jackson, Live Better by Consuming Less? 23
S TAT E O F T H E D E B AT E
life-satisfaction in some developed nations. But
in Britain, the United States, and a number of
other countries, reported life-satisfaction has remained
almost unchanged for the last 30 years
(Donovan et al. 2002).
Meanwhile, in the United States, “rates of depression
have been doubling every decade, suicide
is the third most common cause of death
among young adults in North America, [and]
15% of Americans have had a clinical anxiety
disorder” (Wright 1994, p. 53). By a perverse
contrast, studies of human happiness reveal
that some of the poorest countries in the
world—Bangladesh, Azerbaijan, and Nigeria, for
example—are among the happiest in the world
(Worcester 1998). More recently, Kasser (2002)
accumulates an impressive body of evidence to
the effect that materialistic behaviors command
a high price in terms of human well-being.
This far-reaching social critique of consumer
society has drawn considerable strength from the
emergence of humanistic psychology and the development
of a needs-theoretic basis for human
well-being (Maslow 1954; Galtung 1990; Lederer
1980; Doyal and Gough 1991; Max Neef 1991).
Indeed, Rousseau’s early critique of industrial society
had led him to suppose that industrialization,
far from delivering societal well-being, was
in the process of creating a whole set of “artificial”
(as opposed to “natural”) needs. This position was
echoed in the nineteenth century by the critical
social theorists. Marx attempted to identify
a distinction between “human” and “inhuman”
needs, and Marcuse a distinction between “true”
and “false” needs (Springborg 1981).
Partly as a response to the discourse of needs
employed by the critical theorists, modern economics
is curiously reticent on the subject of
needs, preferring, as noted above, to cash out consumer
choice in the language of wants or preferences.
Some economists go so far as to argue that
the concept of needs is largely irrelevant to economics.
In economics, as Allen (1982, p. 23)
points out, need is a “non-word.” “Economics
can say much which is useful about desires, preferences
and demands,” he insists. “But the assertion
of absolute economic ‘need’—in contrast
to desire, preference and demand—is nonsense.”
Even John Kenneth Galbraith, whose eloquent
challenge to the “affluent society” provided the
launch pad for a flood of similar critiques, couches
his arguments in terms of “wants” rather than
needs, in deference to economic conventions.
“The notion that wants do not become less urgent
the more amply the individual is supplied is
broadly repugnant to common sense,” he writes
(Galbraith 1958, p. 124).
Nonetheless, as Durning (1992) reminds us,
the philosophical and psychological basis on
which conventional economics rests—although
deeply imbedded in modern institutions—is relatively
recent and relatively narrow. In particular,
the assumption of insatiability at the heart of economics
(Jackson et al. 2004) is directly counter
to certain classical conceptions of human wellbeing.
Pleonexia, the insatiable desire for more,
was regarded in Aristotle’s day as a human failing,
an obstacle to achieving the “good life.” In the
modern consumer society, it is encoded in both
the ideological foundation and the institutional
structure of the market economy.
A similar argument was made by Fromm
(1976), who suggested that modern economic
theory finds its philosophical basis in radical
hedonism. Though practiced through history,
particularly by the richest proportion of the population,
hedonism was never until recently “the
theory of well-being as expressed by the great
Masters of Living” (Fromm 1976, p. 3). Fromm
points to an essential distinction, present in the
writings of all those concerned with human wellbeing,
between “(desires) which are only subjectively
felt and whose satisfaction leads to momentary
pleasure” and “objectively valid needs”
which are “rooted in human nature and whose realization
is conducive to human growth” (Fromm
1976, p. 4).
Modern needs-theoretic approaches to human
well-being tend to follow this distinction.
Max Neef (1991), for example, has constructed
a needs-based theory of development, within
which well-being is related to the satisfaction
of nine fundamental human needs: subsistence,
protection, affection, understanding, participation,
idleness, creation, identity, and freedom.
The Chilean economist goes on to argue that,
although the needs themselves are universal in
the human psyche, each culture adopts a different
set of satisfiers in its attempts to meet these
needs. Moreover, he points out, these different
24 Journal of Industrial Ecology
S TAT E O F T H E D E B AT E
satisfiers may be more or less successful in meeting
the underlying needs. Some kinds of satisfiers
may even violate the underlying needs that they
are attempting to meet: as an example, Max Neef
cites the arms race as a violator of the need for
protection.
Perhaps the most interesting question raised
by this framework concerns the relationship
between economic goods—consumption activities
(in the conventional model)—and needssatisfaction.
It is fairly clear that this relationship
is highly complex and often nonlinear. More consumption
of any particular good does not always
mean more needs-satisfaction. In fact, if the social
critiques of consumption are to be believed, it
is clear that some at least of the spectrum of economic
consumption fails to achieve any needssatisfaction
at all, and may even be violating certain
needs (Max Neef 1991; Jackson and Marks
1999; Kasser 2002).
Of course, it is clear that not all economic
consumption has this character. Even within the
Max Neef framework, certain kinds of needs (subsistence
and protection, for example) exist that
demand the provision of certain material goods
(foodstuffs and housing, for example). Managing
the environmental impacts associated with the
satisfaction of these “material needs” remains a
significant challenge. At the same time, it is clear
that many of the other needs (affection, participation,
understanding, idleness, and identity, for
example) are “nonmaterial” in the sense that satisfaction
of these needs implies no minimum level
of material throughput. Clearly, different cultural
satisfiers will have different material implications.
For example, attempts in Western culture to satisfy
these nonmaterial needs increasingly involve
material consumption (Jackson and Marks 1999).
If the arguments cited earlier in this section are to
be believed, however, attempts to satisfy nonmaterial
needs through material consumption will
meet with only limited success, if any at all.
Two conclusions follow from this critique—
one of them is stark, the other more hopeful.
The stark conclusion is that modern society appears
to be seriously adrift in its pursuit of human
well-being (Illich 1977; Baumann 1998; Kasser
2002). In pursuit of an inappropriate concept of
progress, we are not only damaging our environment
but also degrading our own psychological
and social well-being. That environmental damage
should turn out to be the environmental price
we have to pay for achieving human well-being
would be unfortunate. That environmental damage
is an external cost of a misguided and unsuccessful
attempt to achieve human well-being is
tragic. Consumer society, in this view, appears to
be in the grip of a kind of social pathology.
The hopeful conclusion rests in the scope for
improvement that this perspective offers. Environmental
imperatives—the demand to reduce
the material impact of human activities—are often
portrayed and often perceived as constraining
human welfare and threatening our quality
of life. In contrast, the eco-humanistic critique
suggests that existing patterns of consumption already
threaten our quality of life, not just because
of their impact on the environment, but also because
of their failure to satisfy our needs. Reducing
the material profligacy of our lives, according
to this view, will help the environment. It also offers
the possibility of improving the quality of our
lives. “Revisioning the way we satisfy our nonmaterial
needs is not the bitter pill of eco-fascism,”
argue Jackson and Marks (1999, p. 439). “It is the
most obvious avenue for renewing human devel-
opment.”
The humanistic needs-based critique of modern
development has informed a range of recent,
contemporary social movements aimed at “voluntary
simplicity” (Elgin 1993), “downshifting”
(Schor 1998), and “ethical” consumption (Shaw
and Newholm 2003). What these movements
(and the needs-theoretic critique that underlies
them) offer is the tantalizing promise that we
could live better by consuming less; that reduced
material consumption could improve the quality
of our lives, particularly where the satisfaction
of nonmaterial needs is concerned. Sustainable
consumption, in this perspective, appears to offer
a very particular kind of double dividend: the
ability to live better by consuming less, and by
the same token, to reduce our impact on the en-
vironment.
Consumer Behavior as an
Evolutionary Adaptation
But this conclusion raises an immediate and
glaring question. Why, if consumption signally
Jackson, Live Better by Consuming Less? 25
S TAT E O F T H E D E B AT E
fails to satisfy our social and psychological
needs, should we still appear to be driven to con-
sume?
One of the possible responses to this question
is to suggest that human beings possess what
McDougall ([1908] 1923) called an “instinct of
acquisition”; in other words, to suppose that we
are driven to consume by some kind of biological
imperative. The simplistic idea of a universal biological
drive to possess material goods is problematic,
as Dittmar (1992) points out, from a number
of perspectives. In the first place, a universal instinct
for material acquisition or possession per se
cannot account for the huge differences in “materiality”
both between cultures and across time.
Moreover, a good deal of evidence clearly exists,
for example, of selflessness, gift-giving, and sharing,
which would appear to run counter to such an
instinct (Belk and Coon 1993). Nonetheless, an
accumulating body of research suggests that many
of the most intractable aspects of consumer behavior
are indeed rooted in instinctive, evolved
behavior patterns.
The foundation for such a view of human behavior
was laid down by Darwin himself. In the
final chapter of On the Origin of Species, he suggested
that “in the distant future” the study of
human psychology would be based on an evolutionary
footing (Darwin [1859] 1985). He himself
ventured some way toward this project in The
Descent of Man, where he set out the notion of
sexual selection, namely, that evolutionary adaptations
were selected, in part, according to their
success in attracting mates. In The Expression of
the Emotions in Man and Animals he posited that
the development of emotions was itself an example
of an evolutionary adaptation.
It is only a small step from these two insights
to suggest that the form and expression of human
emotional and behavioral characteristics are determined
in no small part by their success as evolutionary
adaptations. In the hands of a whole
new generation of biologists and psychologists
these insights have become a new and powerful
theory about human nature (Cronin 1991;
Miller 2000; Ridley 1994; Wright 1994). The
complex ramifications of evolutionary psychology
need not concern us here. But a general understanding
of its implications does turn out to
be highly relevant to the question of consumer
behavior (Jackson 2002b).
Ridley (1994) sets out the evolutionary psychology
stall persuasively. Human nature, he
argues, is fundamentally influenced by the strategies
and ploys of what Dawkins (1976) called
the “selfish gene.” By definition, those genes
that have survived so far are those that convey
traits and characteristics that are conducive
to survival—or to be more precise: characteristics
that would have been conducive to genetic
succession in the ancestral environment (Tooby
and Cosmides 1990). In particular, evolutionary
forces have conditioned us continually to strive
to position ourselves in relation to the opposite
sex and with respect to our sexual competitors.
Moreover, this fundamental element of sexual
competition never abates, according to evolutionary
psychology. Rather, we find ourselves
conditioned to run faster and faster as time goes
by, like the Red Queen in Lewis Carroll’s Through
the Looking Glass, precisely because our competitors
are all engaged in the same unending struggle.
As a (male) reviewer of Ridley’s book noted
with some glee: “animals and plants invented sex
to fend off parasitic infection. Now look where it
has got us. Men want BMWs, power and money in
order to pair-bond with women who are blonde,
youthful and narrow-waisted”!
The idea that consumption may have something
to do with sex has a clear resonance with
common wisdom. Advertisers and media executives
have developed an extraordinary creativity
in using sex and sexual imagery to sell their products.
Plenty of evidence is available to suggest
that consumers themselves relate both the activity
of shopping and the products they shop for to
sexual motivations, either implicitly or explicitly
(Falk and Campbell 1997; Rosenblatt 1999). In
a recent article entitled The Fires of Desire, the
veteran consumer researcher Russell Belk and
his coauthors conducted a cross-cultural survey
in which they tested the hypothesis that desire
plays a vital role in shaping and motivating consumer
behavior (Belk et al. 2003). In all three
of the cultures examined, the authors found that
consumer motivations were (often inextricably)
entwined in the language and imagery of sexual
desire.
26 Journal of Industrial Ecology
S TAT E O F T H E D E B AT E
Among the behaviors suggested by the evolutionary
psychology of consumerism are those
concerned with display and status (Howarth
1996). We have already drawn attention to
some of these behaviors. Veblen highlighted the
“invidious” nature of social comparison and was
derogatory of the culture that encourages it. Preferring
to condemn than to condone, Veblen offered
little in the way of understanding of the
underlying motivations for consumer behavior.
Evolutionary psychology, on the other hand,
clearly has something to offer here. Specifically,
the arguments from sexual selection suggest that
at least some “conspicuous” consumer behaviors
occupy the role of sexual display. That is, they
advertise availability, fertility, potency, fidelity,
and a variety of other characteristics desirable to
the opposite sex.
Display consumption is not limited to sexual
display, however. Other kinds of display speak
less directly to sexual availability, but represent a
means of establishing social position within status
hierarchies. The notion of a status hierarchy
is an important one in evolutionary psychology.
It is derived from earlier work by the Norwegian
biologist Schjelderup-Ebbe on the now-familiar
concept of a “pecking order.” According to evolutionary
psychology, status hierarchies play a
rather complex but extremely important role in
the social organization that controls both rights
and access to resources. High positions in the
hierarchy—according to the theory—correspond
to improved access, not only to financial or physical
resources, but also to sexual resources (potential
mates), to social resources (friends, family,
community), and to information—vital in its
turn to protect the long-term social interests of
the individual and his or her progeny. This latter
view is reinforced, as we shall see below, by
research from social anthropology.
The more general notion that certain kinds of
consumption are used to advertise status, power,
and social position has been explored extensively
in the sociological discourse on consumption.
Following Veblen’s work, the French sociologist
Pierre Bourdieu (1984) has suggested that patterns
of consumer behavior provide the mechanism
for defining and maintaining class distinctions
in modern society. A more general variation
on this idea is provided by Fred Hirsch’s concept
of positional consumption.
Hirsch ([1977] 1995) suggested that once our
material needs are met, we are led to consume
“positional goods,” goods that have the characteristic
of allowing us to “position” ourselves
socially with respect to our fellows. The defining
quality of such goods is their social scarcity;
and it is this scarcity that provides the vehicle
for social positioning. If the goods were freely
available, their value in positioning us in relation
to our fellows would be diminished. Once
enough people possess these goods, moreover,
their value in positioning us ahead of the crowd
declines, and those wishing to stay ahead must
engage in a search for new goods with social
scarcity.
In this way, Hirsch argues, the positional
economy engages us in a never-ending struggle—
reminiscent of the Red Queen argument of evolutionary
psychology. “It is a case of everyone in
the crowd standing on tiptoe and no-one getting
a better view,” he suggests (Hirsch [1977] 1995,
p. 49). At the start of such a process, a few individuals
gain a better view by standing on tiptoe.
But the upshot is that others are forced to follow
just so that they can maintain their original
position. But “if all do follow . . . everyone
expends more resources and ends up with
the same position.” The vigorous pursuit of positional
consumption, according to Hirsch, turns
out to be nothing more than a kind of “zero-sum
game.”
Given the apparent futility of this Red Queen
race, it is tempting to label all such behaviors as
either pathological or morally reprehensible. This
rebuke has certainly been implicit (and sometimes
explicit) in the writings of social theorists
such as Veblen, Hirsch, and Bourdieu. Evolutionary
psychology, however, appears to have turned
the moral concern of social commentators on its
head by offering an evolutionary “legitimation”
for display consumption. From this perspective,
status-seeking consumer behavior cannot be regarded
as either irrational or pathological—at
least from an individual point of view. Rather,
it is an expression of behavioral traits that have
been successful in ensuring the survival of the
species for generations.
Jackson, Live Better by Consuming Less? 27
S TAT E O F T H E D E B AT E
Some very good arguments exist, as we shall
see below, for not taking this “legitimation” too
seriously. On the other, this should not discourage
us from acknowledging the importance of
status-seeking behaviors to an understanding of
consumer motivation. Nor should it stop us from
using that understanding to inform sustainable
consumption policies. Some interesting suggestions
along these lines have already been made.
A recent report to the U.K. Prime Minister’s
Strategy Unit, for example, has suggested the
idea of taxing positional goods (Donovan et al.
2002).
It is also important to note that not all of
the behaviors that emerge from evolutionary psychology
are self-serving, sexually aggressive behaviors.
The theory also offers an account of
moral, social, and altruistic behaviors. Key theories
in evolutionary psychology suggest that such
behaviors evolved in humans precisely because
they offer selective advantages (Wright 1994).
An important body of work also shows how
the individual choice between competitive behavior
and cooperative behavior depends crucially
on the social and institutional context.
Axelrod (1984) showed how a conditional form
of altruism could flourish even in competitive societies.
In very competitive societies, self-serving
behavior tends to be more successful than altruism.
But in a society characterized by cooperation,
socially responsive behavior tends to be favored
over competition.
Some clear policy lessons emerge from all this.
First, of course, evolutionary psychology points
to the limitations of appealing to the “better nature”
of consumers. Exhortations to individual
restraint are likely to be meet with limited success,
particularly where social conditions militate
against altruistic behavior. Conversely, this perspective
highlights the crucial importance of the
social and cultural context in shaping and constraining
individual choice. The dominant view
of human nature emerging from evolutionary psychology
may be one in which, in Dawkins’s words,
“sustainability doesn’t come naturally” (Dawkins
2001). But it also highlights the importance of
policy intervention to nurture, support, and sustain
moral and social behaviors. It cannot entirely
be taken as ruling out the possibility of living
better by consuming less, but it does suggest that
achieving this double dividend will require sophisticated
understandings of and interventions
in human behavior.
‘‘Ordinary’’ Consumption and
Consumer Lock-in
Veblenesque display consumption has occupied
a central role in many of the sociological
debates on consumption over the last century.
Recently, however, the emphasis on this aspect
of consumer behavior has itself been criticized. A
handful of writers have argued that a great deal of
consumption in fact takes place inconspicuously as
a part of the ordinary, everyday decision-making
of millions of individual consumers. “Ordinary”
consumption, argue these authors, is not oriented
particularly toward individual display. Rather it
is about convenience, habit, practice, and individual
responses to social norms and institutional
contexts (Gronow and Warde 2001; Shove 2003;
Shove and Warde 1997).
The concept of “inconspicuous consumption”
is important to an understanding of consumer behavior
for several reasons. In particular, it has a
clear resonance with our day-to-day experience
of consuming. High-street shopping for fashion
goods may explicitly engage our display motivations
on selected occasions. Apart from compulsive
or addictive shoppers, however, we do not
as a rule spend our day-to-day lives engaged consciously
in this kind of consumption. Much everyday
consumption is almost invisible, even to
ourselves.
In particular, the regular payments that leave
our bank accounts to cover our mortgages, insurance
payments, utility bills, and local taxes
appear to have very little in the way of display
or status associated with them at all. Even when
they change electricity or gas suppliers, for example,
very few people tend to be motivated in their
choice of new supplier by any attempt to improve
their social standing. Indeed, there would be little
point in engaging in such a strategy. As well
as being inconspicuous to ourselves, such choices
are virtually invisible to our social peers, our sexual
competitors, and the world at large.
A closer examination reveals that some at
least of our “ordinary” consumption conceals important
display and status aspects. In particular,
28 Journal of Industrial Ecology
S TAT E O F T H E D E B AT E
of course, many everyday household consumption
decisions are shaped by a single and very
significant consumption decision with clear display
and status connotations: namely, our choice
of dwelling. A larger house in a better neighborhood
may offer social and personal advantages to
its owner or tenant. It also entails larger mortgage
(or rent) payments, higher utility bills, higher local
authority (council) taxes, heavier insurance
premiums, and a greater demand for furniture and
fittings. Having made the “critical” consumption
choice of house purchase (or rental), we may then
find ourselves locked into a variety of other consumption
decisions that have little or nothing to
do directly with status. Nonetheless, the status
component in such decisions is difficult to deny.
It is clear, however, that critical consumption
decisions—such as house or vehicle purchase—
are only one of many components that influence
everyday consumer choice. A key lesson from
the literature on ordinary consumption is that
these day-to-day choices are constrained within a
rather complex decision architecture, which includes
historical, social, institutional, and even
political components.
To take one simple and rather familiar example,
the fuel consumption associated with heating
our homes is determined (among other things)
by the available fuel supply, the efficiency of the
conversion devices, the effectiveness of thermal
insulation in the dwelling, and the level of thermal
comfort programmed into our thermostats.
These factors in their turn are constrained by
the historical development of the fuel supply and
appliance industries, the institutional design of
the energy service market, the social norms associated
with personal convenience and thermal
comfort, and our own personal responses to those
norms. The process of socialization of these norms
is itself a complex one, often involving incremental
changes over long historical periods (Shove
2003). Typically, at the point of everyday decision,
the ordinary consumer will have little or no
control over most of this decision architecture.
The message that flows from this analysis,
therefore, is that consumers are a long way from
being willing actors in the consumption process,
capable of exercising either rational or irrational
choice in the satisfaction of their own needs and
desires. More often they find themselves “locked
into” unsustainable patterns of consumption, either
by social norms that lie beyond individual
control, or else by the constraints of the institutional
context within which individual choice is
executed.
Emphasizing that these circumstances are “often
deliberately created by producer and business
interests” (Sanne 2002, p. 286), proponents
of this view have something in common with
the critical social theory of Bourdieu and others.
They also offer some support for the idea that
consumer society is suffering from some kind of
social pathology. But the later writers locate the
pathology in a different place than do the earlier
social critics. Specifically, they claim, this pathology
does not reside within the remit or control of
the individual consumer. Nor is it some disembodied
feature of “consumer culture.” Rather it is
to be located quite specifically within the institutional
architecture of everyday choice (Wilhite
et al. 1996; Ger et al. 1998). Once again, the message
of this strand of the literature is to emphasize
that wishful thinking about behavioral change
will not deliver sustainability. If there are winwin
solutions to the problem of overconsumption,
they will require intervention and change
at the societal level, rather than simplistic appeals
to the good nature of individuals to realize them.
The Symbolic Role of
Consumer Goods
Proponents of “ordinary consumption” downplay
the importance of Veblenesque explanations
about consumer behavior. But one underlying
feature of display consumption is scarcely deniable
and has much wider connotations than its
application to status-seeking behaviors. This is
the insight that, in addition to their purely functional
characteristics, material commodities possess
vitally important symbolic properties.
Once again this idea has some resonance with
popular psychology about our relationship with
material objects. A child’s first teddy bear, a
woman’s wedding dress, the club shirt of the football
fan, the torn and frayed photograph of an old
friend, the stamp collector’s prized first-day cover,
the very latest chart CD, this year’s executive toy,
the souped-up, low-sprung sports car of the “boy
racer”: all these examples suggest that much more
Jackson, Live Better by Consuming Less? 29
S TAT E O F T H E D E B AT E
is at stake in the possession of material artifacts
than simple functional value.
Over the second half of the twentieth century,
a body of intellectual thought has emerged
that sets this popular wisdom about the symbolic
nature of consumer goods on a much more robust
and sophisticated footing. This school of thought
has arisen from the confluence of some rather diverse
intellectual influences, including the social
critiques of Simmel (1950) and Bourdieu (1984),
the semiotics of Charles Morris (1946), the structuralist
philosophy of Roland Barthes (1973), the
poststructuralist social philosophy of Baudrillard
(1968, 1970), the social anthropology of Marshall
Sahlins (1976) and Mary Douglas (1976), and
the consumer and motivation research of Ernest
Dichter (1964), Elizabeth Hirschmann and Morris
Holbrook (Hirschmann, 1980), Russell Belk
(1988), and others.
Again it would be impossible to do justice to
this enormous literature within the scope of one
short article. Nonetheless, the most important
lesson from this huge body of work is rather clear:
material commodities are important to us, not just
for what they do, but for what they signify (about
us and about our lives, loves, desires, successes,
and failings) both to others and to ourselves. Material
commodities are not just artifacts. Nor do
they offer purely functional benefits. They derive
their importance, in part at least, from their
symbolic role in mediating and communicating
personal, social, and cultural meaning. Douglas
and Isherwood ([1979] 1996, p. 40) make the
case persuasively:
Forget the idea of consumer irrationality. Forget
that commodities are good for eating,
clothing and shelter; forget their usefulness
and try instead the idea that commodities are
good for thinking; treat them as a nonverbal
medium for the human creative faculty.
One of the most obvious applications of this
broad thesis lies in the role of material commodities
in constructing and maintaining personal
identity. The idea that we tend to regard possessions
as parts of ourselves dates back (at least)
to the philosopher William James, who argued
that:
A man’s Self is the sum total of all that he
can call his, not only his body and his psychic
powers, but his clothes and his house, his wife
and his children, his ancestors and friends, his
reputation and works, his lands, and yacht,
and bank-account. All these things give him
the same emotions. If they wax and prosper,
he feels triumphant; if they dwindle and die
away, he feels cast down—not necessarily in
the same degree for each thing, but in much
the same way. (James 1890, pp. 291–292)
The implications of James’s observation for
consumer behavior have been explored in considerable
depth in consumer research and of course
employed widely in advertising and marketing
consumer goods (Fine and Leopold 1993). In
a comprehensive survey of the relationship between
possessions and the “extended self” Russell
Belk (1988) explores the functions of possessions
at different stages of human development, from
their role in enabling the infant to distinguish
between self and environment to their function
in achieving a sense of continuity and preparation
for death in older adults. He also undertakes
a comprehensive survey of the various psychological
and social processes whereby consumer
possessions are “cathected” or incorporated into
the extended self.
Perhaps the most obvious example of the role
of material artifacts in the construction of identity
is provided by the case of the car noted
above, as the following wonderful anecdote from
the New York columnist Benjamin Stein makes
abundantly clear:
Sometimes I test myself. We have an ancient,
battered Peugeot, and I drive it for a week. It
rarely breaks, and it gets great mileage. But
when I pull up next to a beautiful woman,
I am still the geek with the glasses. Then
I get back into the Porsche. It roars and it
tugs to get moving. It accelerates even going
uphill at 80 . . . It makes me feel like a
tomcat on the prowl . . . with the girls I shall
never see again pulling up next to me, giving
the car a once-over, and looking at me
as if I were a cool guy, not a worried, overextended,
40-year-old schnook writer. (Stein
1985, p. 30)
But the symbolic importance of possessions
is not confined solely to personal identity.
Symbols are by their nature socially constructed.
The value attached to symbols is constantly
30 Journal of Industrial Ecology
S TAT E O F T H E D E B AT E
negotiated and renegotiated through social interactions
within a specific cultural context. For
a symbol to serve its purpose of conveying social
meaning, as Hirschman (1980) explains, “there
must be at least two parties—the symbol possessor
(perhaps a consumer desiring to express his/her
identity to others via a display of symbols) and
the symbol observer (perhaps another individual
to whom the consumer wishes to communicate
his/her identity).”
In the hands of Baudrillard (1970) and more
recently Baumann (1998), this insight has become
the basis for a view of consumer society
in which the individual consumer is locked into
a continual process of constructing and reconstructing
personal identity in the context of a
continually renegotiated universe of social and
cultural symbols. The principal object of consumption
in the consumer society is not, according
to Baudrillard, material goods or even
economic value, but signs, symbolic value. As
Baumann (1998) argues, there are convenient
resonances between this process of perpetual reconstruction
of identity and the impermanent
transient properties of modern consumer goods.
“Aggregate identities,” he argues, “loosely arranged
of the purchasable, not-too-lasting, easily
detachable and utterly replaceable tokens currently
available in the shops, seem to be exactly
what one needs to meet the challenges of contemporary
living” (Baumann 1998, p. 29). A very
similar thesis is advanced in Lewis and Bridger’s
(2001) book The Soul of the New Consumer.
In a sense this model of the perpetual reconstruction
of identity through material goods appears
to reinforce the idea explored in an earlier
section that consumer society is in the grip of
some kind of social pathology. But as some of the
proponents of this kind of symbolic interactionism
are keen to point out, this is not a pathology
located within the individual consumer. Douglas
and Isherwood ([1979] 1996) set out a view of
consumer society that is based firmly on anthropological
studies of primitive societies. In this
view, it is entirely “rational” for consumers to
employ material artifacts in a wide range of social
contexts to provide symbolic functions. In particular,
they draw attention to the importance of
material goods in providing “marking services”—
social rituals that serve to embed the consumer
in his or her social group, cement social relations
within the group, and play a vital role in maintaining
information flows within the social group.
These information flows, claim Douglas and Isherwood,
go far beyond the invidious “display consumption”
offered by Veblenesque critiques of
consumerism. They serve a vital purpose in helping
the individual to maintain and improve social
resilience in the face of cultural shifts and social
shocks. Research from an entirely different quarter
appears to reinforce these ideas. The importance
of gift giving in exchange relations has been
widely explored in consumer psychology and motivation
research (Belk and Coon 1993).
Perhaps even more surprising insights emerge
from the literature that connects the symbolic
role of consumer goods to what Maslow (1954)
called the “higher” actualization needs for understanding,
meaning, and transcendence that
human beings experience. Fascinating research
on the sacred meaning of money (Belk and
Wallendorf 1990) and the sacred and profane
aspects of consumption (Belk et al. 1989) identifies
a “ritual substratum” of consumer behavior
in which consumers are continually engaged in
a process of sacralizing and desacralizing material
goods. McCracken (1990) argues that consumers
are engaged in a continual pursuit of “displaced
ideals” by investing symbolic meanings in consumption
goods. Campbell (1987, 2004) suggests
that consumption plays a vital role in allowing
people to “dream” and to explore fundamental
metaphysical questions about who they are and
what the world is like.
These insights are clearly vital where our understanding
of consumption is concerned. It is
already clear that no purely functional account
of material goods is going to deliver a robust
model for understanding consumer behavior, because
functionality is not the point (or at least
not exclusively the point). We consume not just
to nourish ourselves or protect ourselves from the
elements or maintain a living. We consume in
order to identify ourselves with a social group,
to position ourselves within that group, to distinguish
ourselves with respect to other social
groups, to communicate allegiance to certain ideals,
and to differentiate ourselves from certain
other ideals. We consume in order to communicate.
Through consumption we communicate
Jackson, Live Better by Consuming Less? 31
S TAT E O F T H E D E B AT E
not only with each other but also with our pasts,
with our ideals, with our fears, and with our aspirations.
We consume in pursuit of meaning.
Clearly, this view of consumption as a
vital form of social communication suggests
that simplistic appeals to consumers to forego
consumption opportunities just will not wash.
Indeed proponents of this view dismiss the ecohumanistic
idea of “living better by consuming
less” as “na¨ıve, absurd and moralistic” (Jackson
et al. 2004). In short, the symbolic interactionist
perspective on consumption appears once again
to support the argument that consumption
goods—even at very high levels of throughput—
are essential elements in the pursuit of human
well-being. It takes us, in one sense, right back
to the place from which we started.
Discussion
It should be obvious from the preceding discussion
that the various discourses on consumption
are shot through with a kind of dialectical
tension. The eco-humanist view of consumption
as a social pathology arises as a dialectical response
to the conventional economic insatiability
of wants. In place of insatiability, the ecohumanists
place sufficiency in the satisfaction of
needs, and they emphasize the social and psychological
dangers of materialism. The consumptionas-evolution
avenue warns against any simplistic
adoption of this perspective by emphasizing the
evolved nature of consumer behaviors, whereas
the consumption-as-meaning school attacks the
eco-humanist approach for failing to account for
the symbolic nature of material goods. It emphasizes
the vital social and cultural roles that consumer
artifacts are called upon to play.
A part of this dialectical tension clearly revolves
around the concept of human needs and
the role that these might play in developing alternative
views of human development. Economics
plays down needs; humanistic psychology places
them at the center of its ideas about human motivation
and behavior; and it is interesting to
note that symbolic interactionism is as scathing
about needs as economics is (Jackson et al. 2004).
Baudrillard (1968, p. 24) for example, insists that
“the desire to moderate consumption or to establish
a normalizing network of needs, is na¨ıve and
absurd moralism.” Douglas and Isherwood ([1979]
1996) are equally dismissive of this agenda.
But where do these arguments leave the double
dividend argument? How should we now construe
the idea that it is possible to live better by
consuming less? Should this simply be abandoned
as an unrealistic reading of a much more complex
situation? Or is there still room for maneuver in
negotiating a less materialistic society that is also
capable of delivering improved well-being?
The sociological rejection of the needstheoretical
framework is, at first sight, particularly
damaging for the eco-humanists’ double dividend
argument. For if material artifacts play vitally important
roles in relation to social interactions,
for example through marking services, and these
marking services play such vital roles in maintaining
information networks and protecting our
resilience to social shocks, then it becomes extremely
problematic for any set of people to suggest
to another set of people—or to society at
large—that their needs might be served by foregoing
the benefits of material artifacts. Indeed it
would appear to be a clear recipe for exploitation
of one social group by another. Unfortunately,
however, we are driven at the same time away
from the possibility that we might seek dematerialization
of these social and cultural needs.
On the other hand, it seems to me that
the symbolic interactionist approach does offer
some particularly promising insights for sustainable
consumption. At the very least, the social
anthropology and philosophy of consumer behavior
does not preclude the possibility of negotiating
or renegotiating the conditions and the
means under which “marking services,” for example,
are exchanged. Moreover, the insight that
a certain amount of consumer behavior is dedicated
to an (ultimately flawed) pursuit of meaning
opens up the tantalizing possibility of devising
some other, more successful and less ecological
damaging strategy for pursing personal and cultural
meaning.
This is not, in any sense, a simple task, nor one
that can easily be pursued by any given individual
or set of individuals. On the contrary, it is a
fundamentally social and cultural project, which
will require sophisticated policy interventions
at many different levels (Jackson and Michaelis
2003; Jackson 2005). Nonetheless, it remains a
32 Journal of Industrial Ecology
S TAT E O F T H E D E B AT E
very real possibility that we could collectively devise
a society in which it is possible to live better
(or at least as well as we have done) by consuming
less, and become more human in the process.
Acknowledgments
I am grateful for financial support from the
U.K. Economic and Social Research Council’s
Sustainable Technologies Programme (RES-3
32-27-001) during the course of this work, and for
valuable insights on some of the ideas in this article
from numerous friends and colleagues including
Blake Alcott, Russell Belk, Colin Campbell,
Nic Donovan, Paul Ekins, Birgitta Gatersleben,
David Halpern, Tom Hargreaves, Nic Marks,
Laurie Michaelis, Wendy Olsen, Sally Randle,
Dale Southerton, Ruth Thomas-Pellicer, David
Uzzell, Prashant Vaze, and Alan Warde. An earlier
version of this article was presented at the
Third Environmental Psychology U.K. conference
in Aberdeen in July 2003.
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About the Author
Tim Jackson is Professor of Sustainable Development
at the Centre for Environmental Strategy
(CES) in the University of Surrey, Guildford, United
Kingdom. He currently holds a research fellowship in
sustainable consumption funded by the Economic and
Social Research Council and leads the Ecological Economics
Research Group at CES. He is also chair of
the Economics Steering Group of the U.K. Sustainable
Development Commission and sits on the U.K. Round
Table on Sustainable Consumption.
36 Journal of Industrial Ecology