Beyond Intrinsic Value: Pragmatism in Environmental Ethics
Anthony Weston
I Introduction
"Pragmatism" sounds like jusi what environmental ethics is against: shortsighted, human-centered instrumcntalism. In popular Usage that connotation is certainly common. Philosophical pragmatism, however, offers a theory of values which is by no means committed lo that crude anthropn-centrism, or indeed to any anlhropocentrism at all. True, pragmatism rejects the mean-ends distinction, and consequently rejects the notion of fixed, final ends objectively grounding the entire field of human striving. True, pragmatism takes valuing to be a certain kind of desiring, and possibly only human beings desire in this way. But neither of these starting points rules out a genuine environmental ethic. 1 argue that the truth is closer to the reverse: only these starting points may make a workable environmental ethic possible.
One charge of anthropocentrism should not detain us.1 Pragmatism is a form of subjectivism - it makes valuing an activity of subjects, possibly only of human subjects - but subjectivism is not necessarily anthropocentric. Even if only human beings value in this sense, it does not follow that only human beings have value; it does not follow that human beings must be the sole or final objects of valuation. Subjectivism docs not imply, so to say, subject-it'M/rjsw; our actual values can be much more complex and world-directed.
Pragmatism insists most centrally on the intei-retaledlMSS of our values. The notion of fixed ends is replaced by a picture of values dynamically interdepending with other values and will) beliefs, choices, and exemplars: pragmatism offers, metaphorically at least, a kind of "ecology" of values. Values so conceived are resilient under stress, because, when put to question, a value can draw upon those other values, beliefs, etc. which bold it in place in the larger system. At the same time, though, every value is open to critical challenge and change, because each value is also at stake precisely with those related values, beliefs, etc. which on other occasions reinforce it. We are thus left with a plurality of concrete values, in which many different kinds of value, and many different sources of value, can be recognized as serious and deep without requiring further reduction lo some single all end in itself. And there is every reason to think that respect for other life forms and concern for natural environments are among those values. The problem is not to devise slill more imaginative or exotic justifications for environmental values. We do nol need to ground these values, pragma lists would say, but rather to situate them in their supporting contexts and lo adjudicate their conflicts with others - a subtle enough difference at first glance, perhaps, but in fact a radical shift in philosophical perspective.
Anthony Weston
II   Intrinsic Value and Contemporary Environmental Ethics
We seem to lie compelled to distinguish means and ends almost as soon as we begin thinking about environmental values. Nature has certain obvious appeals: recreational and aesthetic satisfactions, "ecosystem stabilization" values (seemingly useless species may play a role in controlling pests, or fixing nitrogen), research and teaching uses, the attraction of natural objects and lifcforms simply as exemplars of survival, and so on.- In making these appeals, however, we value nature not "for its own sake," but fur a further end: because it is necessary, useful, or satisfying to 11.1. Even aesthetic appreciation does not necessarily require valuing nature for itself, since We might he tempted to say that only aesthetic experience is valued intrinsically. Beauty is in the mind of the beholder: aesthetic objects are only means to it.
The familiar next step is to ask whether nature could also be valuable in its own right. Could nature have intrinsic value, could it have worth as an end in itself, and not just because it serves human ends?'' Ibis question, of course, frames much of the debate in contemporary environmental ethics. If human beings, or some particular and unique human characteristics (e.g., a certain kind of conscious experience), are the only ends in themselves, then we have, for belter or worse, "ainhrnpoccnlrism." II some broader, but not universal class of beings has intrinsic value, and if, as usual, this class is taken to be the class of sentient or (even more broadly) living beings, then we have what might he called "sentientism" or (more broadly) "biocentrism," If all ("natural"?) beings, living or not, have intrinsic value and must not be treated merely as means, then \vc have what might he called "universalism," There is a continuum of possible ethical relations to nature, then, ranging from views which limit the bearers of intrinsic value strictly to human beings through views which progressively extend the franchise until finally it is (nearly?) universal.
This much seems perfectly innocent. No views are actually endorsed, after all: only a range of possibilities is set out. In fact, however, I think thai this "frame" is far from innocent. This seem-
ingly uncommitted range of possibilities is in fact narrowly restricted by the underlying notion of intrinsic value itself.
Consider, after all, how that range of possibilities is determined in the first place: each option is defined precisely by the set of beings to which it attributes intrinsic value. Richard and Val Rout-Icy, for instance, argue that anthropucentrist!) represents a kind of moral "chauvinism," as egregious as the egoist's blindness to values beyond his or her self or the racist's failure to look beyond his or her race;^ they insist upon the existence of'other intrinsic values besides conscious human experience, values which deserve similar respect. Tom Regan defines an environmental ethic as a view which attributes "inherent goodness" lo at least some non-human natural objects, where "inherent goodness" is an "objective properly" of objects which compels us to respect its bearers.'1
That notion of intrinsic or "inherent" value, however, is itself extremely specific and demanding. A great deal of philosophical baggage comes with it. Regan already weighs in with some of it, as Evelyn Pluhar points out, by construing inherent value as a "supervenient," "nonnatural" property, notions whose Moorean ancestry and problematic metaphysical commitments are plain to see.' Hut there is more to come. Let me try to set out the traditional requirements for intrinsic values more systematically.
(1) To qualify as intrinsic a value must be self-sufficient, (i. E. Moore - the patron saint of intrinsic values wrote that "to say that a kind of value is 'intrinsic' means. . . that the question whether a thing possesses it... depends solely on the intrinsic nature of the thing in question." In his famous thought experiment in Principia Ethica, Moore says that to decide what things have intrinsic value "it is necessary to consider what things are such that, if they existed by themselves, in absolute isolation, we should yet judge their existence to be good." While everything else is dependent and, by itself, valueless, intrinsic values hold the sufficient grounds of their worth within themselves.
Moore appears lo find it conceivable that anything ai all could be valued intrinsically. In practice, however, self-sufficiency may not be such a neutral requirement. Kvcn Moore came in the end to the conclusion that nothing but an experience
can be intrina claim that only i even if [they] ex invokes a funtlama sciousncss is aloof I failures anil ambig of affairs in the while my beliefs l something in the t have them. Perhaps J my acts too, in th damaging, or un< enjoyment of the unquestionable. Jit up the problem of It the natural and i skepticism, so the j be self-sufficient naye oral and necessary s Only a commitment toi of this sort, 1 thin unargued insistence, CT as W. K. Franker intrinsic value exo and lives of con kena just "cannot t consider uncon etc."12
(2) Philosophical! by implication, Intrinsic values arc, J thing can be initiation between special l perhaps innocenti increasingly radicals integrated as means J more general ends. | proximate ends I unified in turn und ends. Already ihis i upward, as it m proximate end pendent value at all: l the ends on a still 1 may be superseded.} we say, except the n seded ends in thj "happiness" or reached this point, t and strong impulse ti on the first and I theory tends tomj
ossibilities is in fact idcrlying notion of
t range of possibil-jbcc: each option is 7 beings to which il lard and Yal Rout-hropoeemrism rcp-.nism," as egregious ilues beyond his or to look beyond his ic existence of other ous human experi-Tliliir respect. Tom tal ethic as a view odncss" to at least ts, where "inherent ropcrty" of objects s bearers/'
"inherent" value, ely specific and ilosophical baggage .eighs in with some out, by construing enr," "nonnatural" irean ancestry and mitmcnts are plain onic. Let me try to ments for intrinsic
value must be sclf-ic patron saint of 'to say that a kind .that the question .depends so I el v on I in question."" In in Principia Eihica, things have intrin-nsider what things I by themselves, in :t judge their exist-rvthing else is dc-ss, intrinsic values their worth within
iceivablc that any-rinsically. In prac-may not be such a ire came in the end but an experience
Beyond Intrinsic Value: Pragmatism in Environmental Ethics
can be intrinsically good; his argument turns on the claim that only experiences can be "worth having even if [they] exist quite alone." " Mere Moore invokes a fundamentally Cartesian outlook. Consciousness is aloof from, not implicated in, the failures and ambiguities of actual objects and states of affairs in the world. Descartes argued that while my beliefs may or may not correspond to something in the world, I am sure at least that I have them. Perhaps Moore is arguing that while my acts too, in the world, may be incomplete, damaging, or uncertain, at least my conscious enjoyment of them, taken by itself, is solid and unquestionable. Just as Descartes' way of setting up (he problem of knowledge made consciousness the natural and necessary standard-bearer against skepticism, so the demand that intrinsic values be self-sufficient may make consciousness the natural and necessary standard-bearer of the intrinsic. Only a commitment to a philosophical "paradigm" of this sort, I think, can explain the strikingly unargued insistence, even by such careful writers as VV. K. 1'rankena, that "|no]thing can have intrinsic value except the activities, experiences, and lives of conscious, sentient beings." Fran-kena just "cannot set" that "we ought morally to
consider   unconscious   animals,   plants, rocks,
. „12 etc.
(2) Philosophical tradition also demands, at least by implication, that intrinsic values be abstract. Intrinsic values arc, after all, special: not everything can be intrinsically valuable. But the distinction between special ends and ordinary means, perhaps innocent enough at first, sets in motion increasing!}, radical demands. Everyday values are integrated as means under fewer and somewhat more general ends. On the next tier these still proximate ends become means themselves, to be unified in turn under still fewer and more general ends. Already this is a kind of "slippery slope" -upward, as il were. The supercession of each proximate end seems to deprive it of any independent value at all: now they are only means to the ends on a still higher tier. Hut these ends too may be superseded. Nothing will stop this regress, we say, except the most general, not-to-be-super-seded ends in themselves: traditionally, values like "happiness" or respect for persons. I la\ tag reached this point, moreover, there is a familiar and strong impulse towards erecting a single end on the first and highest level. Traditional value theory tends towards a kind of monism. We are
not inclined to leave two or five values at the top of this pyramid when we might abstract down to one: on the most general level we want unity. Respect for persons might be reinterpreted as another source of happiness; happiness might be reinterpreted, as in Aristotle or Rawls, as valuable insofar as il represents the self-actualization of autonomous persons; but in any case, as Kenneth Ciood-pasler puts il, "one has the impression that it just goes milium! saying... that there must be some unified account of our considered moral judgments and principles,'7 some sort of "common denominator."
This monism too, moreover, may not be so neutral in practice. Conscious experience is supposed to be a single, unified sort of thing, abstract and self-sufficient enough, given Cartesian presuppositions, to be a bearer of intrinsic value. Adding a second sort of thing as another bearer of intrinsic value would destroy this tight unity. Thus, the implicit demand to reduce intrinsic values to a single common denominator may incline us once again towards the anthropoccntrie-sentient ist end of the range of possible environmental ethics. Goodpaster reminds us, for instance, that many philosophers have been tempted to underwrite environmental values by extension from familiar "interest" or "dignity" ethics, respectively 1 lumean or Kantian. Both are monistic models, tied at least historically lo human beings as exemplars, and therefore run the risk of "constraining our moral sensitivity to the si/e of our self-wrought paradigms," just as they gain plausibility from the very same appeal.14
On the speculative side, some metaphysical consciousness monisms have become attractive. Some environmental ethicists want to attribute conscious experience even to the seemingly inanimate world; l'o-Keutlg Ip, for example, uses a panpsychie Taoism lo vindicate the intrinsic value of nature; Jay McDaniel uses a Whileheadian reading of quantum mechanics. Christopher Stone suggests that we regard the whole planet as a conscious entity."' Nature itself is thus animated, and all of us can enter the Kingdom of Ends together. At this extreme, then, a monism of intrinsic values is perhaps compatible with a powerful environmental ethic after all. The cost, however, is a radical revision of our metaphysics - in itself not unattractive, perhaps, but in the process we must also reaffirm, rather than escape, the absolute ethical ccntralitv of sentience.
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Anthony Weston
(3) Intrinsic values demand sfiecial justification. Given their supposed self-sufficiency, they cannot be justified by reference to other values. Given their abstractness, they are loo special, too philosophically fragile, to exist unproblcmatically in the world. Hut merely to assert them is insufficient: I hat would make them arbitrary, or condemn us to speechlessness about them, and so would cast our whole system of values adrift. Just ilka t ion, we say instead, must take a special form: a "grounding" of intrinsic values is called for. Value as such must be derived, ontologieally, from something else. I'll us, intrinsic values have been construed as God's commands, as a priori truths about a special moral world revealed by intuition, as deliverances of Pure Reason, as aspirations fundamental [o "human nature," and so forth. It is not surprising, then, that when Regan tries to ground his "inherent values," he feels driven to an ontology of "nonnatural properties" - despite the irony of appealing to "nonnatural" properties precisely in order to vindicate the value of natttrcl Some such ontology seems necessary. David Ehrenfeld holds that only the religious tradition will do: only a transcendental perspective can transfigure nature into "the present expression of a continuing historical process of immense antiquity and majesty."
Many philosophers, however, no longer accept any of the traditional ontologies of values. Once again the result is to make some form of anthropo-ccntrism or sentietltism seem the only live option. Human concerns can always be counted upon to motivate, and the intrinsic value of conscious experience is often accepted without a fight, Thus, the temptation is to eschew the traditional ontology and to try to "build our" from these readily available anlhropocentric starting points. Bryan Norton, for instance, proposes what he calls "weak anthropocentrism," a view which countenances not only occurrcnt human desires but also "ideals," like living in harmony with nature, which represent patterns a£considered tlesire. Norton explicitly "avoids attributing intrinsic value to nature" because of the "questionable ontological commitment" that attribution would involve. "Strong" anthropocentrisls are often similarly motivated. Some utilitarians argue that cost benefit analysis can accommodate environmental values more effectively than they have so far.1'' 1 lere dubious ontological claims are avoided because only human interests are considered: utilitarianism  is  the epitome of an ontulogically
I
unadventurous theory of values. Mark Sagolf holds that we may value in nature expressions of things we value intrinsically in our own lives: freedom, nobility, etc.,2" and, in a similar way, Thomas Hill, Jr. argues that the best moral attitudes towards persons - humility, self-acceptance, gratitude are mirrored and promoted by more respectful environmental values.21 Both Sagolf and I fill, however, are still "building out" from human-centered value systems, from expressions or personal qualities which we value in our own and other human lives.
Regan has argued effectively that no strong anthropocentrism can vindicate environmental values to the extent that our convictions demand."' Sagolf, Hill and others may well disagree, but all the same they often convey a sense that they consider even their own approaches somewhat "second best." I fill writes at one point that "even if there is no convincing way to show that [environmentally! destructive acts are wrong... we may find that the willingness to indulge in them reflects an absence of human trails that we admire and regard as morally important.""4 Even if... we may find: the suggestion seems to be thai modified anthropocentrism is the best we can do, though definitely mil (he best we might wish. Regan, meanwhile, according lo I'luhar, draws the opposite conclusion from (he same premise: Regan, she says, "seems to find it preferable to make the commitment to dubious property instances and thus salvage the possibility of the kind of ethical justification he wants. The possibility is remote, but he may reason that it is better than nothing.""1 So "better than nothing" is the bottom line on both sides. We are in a sorry state indeed.
Only occasionally are there hints of anything truly different. Some of these are attempts lo formulate a new language for values in nature. Holmes Rolston's essay "Values Gone Wild," for instance, is striking in this regard for its plays on "source" and "resource," "neighbor," cie.2'1 Later 1 will suggest that Rolston's promising start too is partially undercut by his attempts to meet the demands of intrinsic value: whitl it promising, I hold, is precisely the part that has worked free of those shackles. So far I am only living to show how confining those shackles are. In short, not only has environmental ethics taken over from philosophical ethics an extremely specific and demanding notion of intrinsic value, moled in various ways in Cartesian metaphysics and in lime-honored philosoph-
ical tempti tion; thosi constraints c values in nati pocentric enviro possible within t values. In itself, objection to thl ethics finally is whether that tn
gainst
III Agair
Moore argues t own sake" or" to undent and tl something elst menial value « we speak of mi able to conceiv implicated in I Moore reads i equivalent to "good" in the
This ration reason. We c. instrumental \ non-intrinsic themselves wi which must b day's hike in either by the ii the woods or I themselves; in; woods may bi same may be i Appreciation t partly because others; but grc; make us bette: and so on. The expression of I refuge for wild turn be explai human-centerc
Someone ma these must stil If X is valuable we might seem is "passed on"
Beyond Intrinsic Value: Pragmatism in Environmental Ethics
values. Mark Sagoff nature expressions of ly in our own lives: ltd, in a similar way, it the best moral atti-nility, self-acceptance, id promoted by more alues.2' Both .Sagoff "building out" from :ms, from expressions we value in our own
ely that no strong an-licate environmental convictions demand."''
well disagree, but all a sense that they con-p proaehes somewhat t one point that "even y to show that [envir-
are wrong... we may ldulge in them reflects > that we admire and int.""4 liven if... we ms to be that modified si we can do, though
might wish. Regan, ihar, draws the oppos-e premise: Regan, she eferable to make the roperlv instances and
of the kind of ethical
possibility is remote, letter than nothing,** is the bottom line on y state indeed, ere hints of anything se are attempts to for-iues in nature. 1 lolmes te Wild," for instance,
its plays on "source" ," etc.21' Later 1 will lising start too is parts to meet the demands
promising, 1 hold, is
worked free ol those ■ trying to show how . In short, not only has iver from philosophical and demanding notion various ways in Carte-te-honored philosoph-
ical temptations to abstraction and Special justification; those very roots in turn put extraordinary constraints on any attempt to demonstrate intrinsic values in nature. At the deepest level, non-anthro-poccntric environmental ethics may simply be impossible within the inherited framework of intrinsic values. In itself, of course, this is not necessarily an objection to the iradilion: may be environmental ethics finally is impossible. But it is time to ask whether that tradition has any compelling defense.
Ill   Against Intrinsic Value
Moore argues that some notion of "valuable for its own sake" or "valuable in itself' is required simply to understand the notion of "valuable for the sake of something else," the everyday notion of instrumental value which we usually take for granted. If we speak of means, then logically we must also be able to conceive of ends, since an end seems to be implicated in the very concept of a means. Thus Moore reads the phrase "good as a means" as equivalent to "a means to good," where the "good" in the second case seems to be intrinsic."'
This rationale fails, however, for a simple reason. We can also understand the notion of instrumental value by reference to further, bul non-intrinsic values. Values may refer beyond themselves without ever necessitating a value which must be self-explanatory. The value of a day's hike in the woods need not be explained either by the intrinsic value of my appreciation of the woods or by the intrinsic value of the woods themselves; instead, both the appreciation and the woods may be valuable for further reasons, the same may be true of tliuse reasons, and so forth. Appreciation may be valued, as Hill points out, partly because it can lead to greater sensitivin lo others; but greater sensitivity to others may in turn make us better watchers of animals and storms, and so on. The woods may be valued not only as an expression of freedom and nobili I y, but also as a refuge for wildlife, and both of these values may in turn be explained by still other, not necessarily human-centered values.
Someone may respond that explanations such as these must still have slopping points somewhere. If X is valuable because it leads to or enhances V, we might seem to be required to say that X's value is "passed on" from Y. Y's value in turn may be
passed on from Z. Hut - the argument goes - there must be some origin to the value which is thus "passed on." Like a bucket of water in a fire chain, it must have started in some reservoir which is not merely another bucket. Monroe Beardsley likens this argument to the first cause argument for the existence of God: "... the existence of any instrumental value [is supposed lo| prove the existence of some intrinsic value just as ihe occurrence of anv event is said to prove the existence of a h'irst Cause,
Bcardsiey's analogy, however, suggests an initial objection. The "first value" argument may beg the very question it is trying to answer. Just as the first cause argument must assume that the chain of causes it invokes cannot be infinite, so the "first value" argument assumes that the long process of tracing means back lo ends must have a final stopping point. Km; actually this is just what it was supposed to jt//«H\
Most importantly, however, (here are many ways of not having a stopping point. We need not think of an endless series of means each necessitating the next like a long line of falling dominoes. Il is more appropriate lo think in quite different terms. Outsider a more holistic picture conception according to which values are connected in a weblike way, so that any value can be justified by referring to those "adjacent" to it. On this model there is no ultimate reference or stopping point simply because the series of justifications is ultimately, in a sense, circular: to justify or to explain a value is to reveal its organic place among our others. These justifications feed not wind their way only in a single direction or even towards a single type of value. If sometimes 1 value the mountain air because in it I feel (and am) healthy, other times I value health because it enables me to reach the mountains. If sometimes I value the melancholy glory of the autumn because it mirrors the closure of my own year, other times 1 value the rhythms of my yearly schedule because they mirror the glories of the seasons. The web image also emphasizes the multiple "adjacencies" of most values. To explain why I climb mountains may take hours; Henry IJeston took a whole book lo chart the riches of a year spent living alone on Cape Cod. By extension we may think of multiple circularities and feedback loops, multiple arcs returning to completion, so that lhe summation of those arcs is a rough map of one's whole system of values. To explain why 1 climb mountains may take hours, bui il is not an
Anthony Weston
endless task: although the story has no filial stopping point or ultimate appeal, it is complete when 1 have articulated the manifold connections between mountain climbing and the other values, beliefs, etc. which make up my sell'.
Conceiving values in this holistic way undercuts the very center of the traditional notion of intrinsic value. Self-sufficiency, in the first place, is just what we should Hal want in our values. Beardsley argues that the notion of "intrinsic value" is almost a amlrudirtiim precisely because it insists on culling values oil'from their relations with others in order to consider them "just in themselves." following Richard Brandt's suggestion that the statement "X is desirable" means something like "desiring X is justified," Beardsley argues:
What "desirable" adds to "desired" is this claim to justifiability. Hut the only way this claim can be made good is by considering X in the wider context of other things, in relation to a segment of life or of many lives. Thus the term "intrinsic desirability" pulls in two directions: the noun tells us to look farther afield, the adjective tells us to pay no attention to anything bin X itself."'
What would il actually be like, after all, lo value a conscious experience for itself, "in absolute isolation"? Clearly it could qualify only in so far as it approximates the Cartesian self-sufficiency ol" dreams or visions: it could not mailer whether the experience is connected to anything else in the world. Hut it is not obvious that this self-sufficiency makes an experience good at all, let alone good intrinsically and the reasons are precisely the considerations that the self-sufficiency criterion requires us to rule out. What can exist anil attract in isolation from everything else may be, for just that reason, bad: like the dream world of the drug user, it seduces us away from the complexity of our lives, substitutes solipsism for sociality, divides certain parts of our lives from the rest. We should prefer a conception of values which tics them lo their contexts and insists not on their separability but on their relaledness and interdependence.
Beardsley himself has a somewhat different line of response to the "first value" argument. It is not so much a challenge to the alleged self-sufficiency of intrinsic values as a challenge lo their ahslract-ness. 1 le begins by recalling Hume's response to
the lirst cause argument. In ordinary life, Hume points out, we are not only familiar with specific causal relations, but are entirely capable of dealing with them concretely. The ultimate nature of causality, by contrast, is neither know able nor important: it is "merely speculative," as Hume put it, both in the sense that it is endlessly debatable and in the sense that it is irrelevant to practical purposes. Beardsley makes just this argument with respect to intrinsic values. "We have a good deal of sound knowledge about instrumental values," he writes, "hut we are in considerable doubt ahoul intrinsic values." 1 In ordinary life we are not only familiar with specific values, but are eminently capable of dealing with them concretely. We know that il is better to be healthy than to be sick, better to live amidst beauty than monotony or ugliness, better to walk in a virgin forest than along the median strip of Interstate .S4, and so on. But we do not know whether these things are good because they maximize our net hedonic quality, or good because they cultivate a good will, or what. So far from being the absolutely central project of any philosophy of values, the search for an ultimate end seems "merely speculative." It is better to think of values more concretely, in all their richness and plurality.
Besides, why should there be something which all values have in common? It is more plausible to deny that there is any final end from which all the olhers flow and which plays end to all the others' means. We have instead an irreducibly pluralistic system of desires. Some are straightforwardly biological, others culturally rooted, others more personal, and many are mixtures of all three. If anything we are doomed lo hopelessly conflicting desires. Neither our biological predispositions nor our cultural heritage are even self-consistent, let alone fully compatible with the other.
These last points, however, may lead us to a I bird and final argument for intrinsic values. Il may be urged that, in fact, intrinsic values can be concrete, plural, and possibly even inconsistent. This is I lolmes Rolston's view, and a version of it has been held even by some pragmatists, such as C. I- Lewis. There are times, Rolston or Lewis would say, when we apprehend value concretely and directly, without having to look farther afield or into the future in order to recognize it. Lewis echoes Moore by comparing I his recognition to the way we see redness or hear shrillness.11 Rolston speaks of the intrinsic value of "point experiences,"
like the l fleeting s Rolston's tli en, and they r "special" jtistifia worthwhile evenil mind ur anin ance: the oo considered ev simply good "foj
Undeniably,] real kind of cxp kind ofexperic encc of what we i Dewey argued, howev diacy of enjoyment t( value' is a leap for vi When we do endorse and non-inferential in do not usually make a so a fortiori do not r value. Instead, that ei the effect that no ju there is no conflict of cration and choice." activities-doiog the i are sometioics appre non-referential way. 1 a virus or a tornado, beautiful. Arresting v. sponse to them prec reference in which va
When values do choice is required, and defense. But to i ston's sense, now off disconnect objects ar in order to value the themselves," what tl thing else is pushed c the beauty of the tor in lime. Rolston insis be put in context, lik< sometimes ambiguoi when contcxtualizcd that the attribution sense, carries no spec thousand other "poin in upon us from ever have always pressed will and should be de been determined, by
<5l2)
it. In ordinary life, Hume only Familiar with specific entirely capable of dealing he ultimate nature of caus-her knowahlc nor import-.tlative," as 1 lume put it, is endlessly debatable and relevant to practical pur-just this argument with es. "We have a good deal out instrumental values," considerable doubl about dinary life we are not only alues, but are eminently h them concretely. We o be healthy than to be st beauty than monotony Ik in a virgin forest than F Interstate 84, and so on. ther these things are good ur net hedonic quality, or ate a good will, or what, iohltely central project of , the search for an ullim-icculative." It is better to icretcly, in all their rich-
icre be something which n? It is more plausible to )l end from which all the ays end to all the others' an irreducibly pluralistic ire straightforwardly bio-rooted, others more per-lixtures of all three. If
to hopelessly conflicting igical predispositions nor
even self-consistent, let th the other.
ver, may lead us to a third ltrinsic values. It may bene \ allies can be concrete, :n inconsistent. This is and a version of it has ne pragmatists, such as times, Rolston or Lewis prebend value concrete!v ving to look farther afield der to recognize it. I .ewis ring this recognition to the hear shrillness.'1 Rolston eof "point experiences,"
Beyond Intrinsic Value: Pragmatism in Environmental Ethics
like the warmth of the spring sun, calling il "as fleeting and plural as any other kind of value."'2 Rolston's intrinsic values need not be abstract, then, and they need no justification at all, let alone "special" justification. A day's hike in the woods is worthwhile even if it does not contribute to peace of mind or animal-watching ability or job performance: the experience, as well as the woods itself considered even apart from my experience, is simply good "for what it is in itself.'"'1
Undeniably, Lewis and Rolston are pointing to a real kind of experience; the question is what this kind of experience shows. It is, at least, an experience of what we might call immediate value. John Dewey argued, however, thai "to pass from immediacy of enjoyment to something called 'intrinsic value' is a leap for which there is no ground."" When we do endorse something in an immediate and non-inferential way, according to Dewey, we do not usually make a judgment of value at all, and so tt fortiori do not make a judgment of intrinsic value. Instead, that endorsement is a "statement to the effect that no judgment is required, because there is no conflict of values, no occasion for deliberation and choice."'1'1 Even obviously instrumental activities - doing the dishes, driving the highways -are sometimes appreciated in this immediate and non-referential way. liven something that destroys, a virus or a tornado, can sometimes he arrestinglv beautiful. Arresting is the right word, loo: our response to them precisely disconnects the frame of reference in which value questions even arise.
When values do become problematic, when choice is required, then they need articulation and defense. But to call them "intrinsic," in Rolston's sense, now offers no help. -Since we have to disconnect objects and actions from their contexts in order to value them just "for what they are in themselves," what they are in relation to everything else is pushed out of focus. If I lose myself in lite beauty of the lornado, 1 may not reach shelter in lime. Rolston insists that immediate values must be put in context, like any others, and that they are sometimes ambiguous or even downright bad when contextualized. The upshot, however, is that the attribution of intrinsic value, in his sense, carries no special force in the real world. A thousand other "point experiences" of values press in upon us from every side, just as ordinary values have always pressed in upon us, and what we tin will and should be determined, just as it has always been determined, by the balances and synergies
and trade-oils between them. By all means let us remember that ibis is a world lavish with its moments of beauty and preciousness - hill let us honor those moments without cutting them off from the practical living of our lives.
Earlier I called into question the traditional demands for self-sufficiency and abstractness in intrinsic values. Here, finally, the task of justification too is rcconceivcd. It is not the task of "grounding" values: what Rolston's defense of the notion of intrinsic values may finally illustrate, in fact, is the way in which the project of "grounding" natural values (or, perhaps, any values) finally cuts itself off from the real-life task of assessment and choice. Lor assessment anil choice we must learn, again, to relate values. Any adequate theory of valuation must recognize that valuation involves desires with a complex internal structure, desires interlinked, and mutually dependent with a large number of other desires, beliefs, exemplars and choices."' Love, for example, interlinks with a wide range of desires and beliefs, from the tenderness of "being with" to sexual desires, from one's complex understanding of the other person to the culture's images and exemplars of love, and so on. Justification draws on these intcrdependencies. We justify a value by articulating the supporting role it plays with respect to Other values, which in turn play a supporting role with respect to it, and by referring to the beliefs which make it natural, which it in I urn makes natural by reaffirming those choices and models which link it to the living of our lives. Precisely this is Beard-sky's "wider context of things."
Interdependent values are not closed to criticism: it may actually be this sort of interdependence, indeed, which makes the most effective criticism pnssible. Criticism becomes an attempt to alter certain desires by altering something in the constellation of other desires, beliefs, choices, etc. to which they are linked,' Some of the beliefs in question may be false, desires artificial or shallow, and so forth. Norton is right to point out that "fell preferences" exploitative of nature can often be criticized on the basis of "considered preferences." Too often we are simply thoughtless, or nol thoughtful enough. But the power of this sort of criticism goes far beyond the dialectic of '"ideals": only Norton's wish to set up shop on the edge of the concept of intrinsic value, 1 think, leads him to conceive considered preferences on the model of ideals, thus making them seem far more marginal than they are. s As Pluhar writes:
Anthony Weston
It is amazing how much prejudice and ignorance fuel ethical disputes, not to mention bad
reasoning----i low much lack of impartiality
and empathy underlie common altitudes towards animals...? How much greed (a prime source of partiality), ignorance, and muddled thinking fuel common attitudes about ecosystems and natural objects?
As she points out, visiting a meat factory makes many vegetarians! Although I'luhar, oddly, regards this pragmatic sort of criticism as an alternative way of defending Regan's "inherent values," she offers no argument that the values which might emerge from this procedure are in any sense "inherent" or intrinsic.4" 1 suspect that no such arguments can be found. It is time to abandon the old preoccupation with intrinsic values entirely: let practical criticism be practical.
Not even radical criticism is excluded. The culture to which we owe so many of our explicit desires and their interlinkings also includes an attic full of latent ideals, inconsistent perhaps with its main tendencies, hut still there waiting to be drawn out. God may have given us dominion over land and sea, but I le also gave us Si Francis, against the swashbuckling exploitation of the Industrial Revolution we have the romantic poets, landscape painting, Rousseau, Emerson, Thorcau; against factory farms we have the still compelling image of" the solitary farmer close to the soil. The wide-ranging recent debates about Christian and Judaic attitudes towards nature underscore this fundamental dissonance." It is a mistake to try to find the Christian (or the American, etc.) altitude towards nature: there are many. Our traditions, I want to suggest (I have tried to argue this general point elsewhere42), contain their dialectical opposites within themselves. Even our biologically rooted desires are far from monolithic and static. Sometimes criticism simply needs the time and the patience to draw these latent elements out.
IV   Pragmatism in Environmental Ethics
The real power of the pragmatic approach lies in what it does not say, in what it has removed the need to say. Thus my concern here is emphatically
not to devise new arguments for environmental values, hut instead to show thai the familiar ones are laboring under needless constraints. Still, this may be a modest, if unexotic, bit of progress, and I expect that it will be controversial all the same. I think that if values are conceived along the lines just sketched, then the case we can already make for environmental values - and in quite simple terms - is far stronger than most environmental ethicists themselves seem to believe.
We know that the experience of nature can awaken respect and concern for it. We know indeed that these feelings can become deep and synergistic desires in some lives, and we have before us exemplars of such lives in Muir, Tbor-cau, Leopold and others. Most of us are not so single-minded, but we too know bow essential a return to nature can be, how Thorcau fell returning to Walden Pond from town, and why Yeats yearned fur the bee-loud glade. While there are varied motives behind the recent boom in backpacking, cross-country skiing, canoeing, camping, and the like, at least part of the cause is surely a growing appreciation of nature, not just as another frame for our exercise and relaxation, but for its own unique voices, from the silence of the winter woods to the roar of waterfalls in spring.
These feelings are essential starling points for a pragmatic defense of environmental values. They arc not "second best," "weak" anthropocentrie substitutes for the intrinsic values philosophers wani but cannot find. They do not need a philosophical "grounding." The questions lhal arise for us are of quite a different sort. Again, we need to know how to articulate, to ourselves and to others, the relation of these values to other parts of our system of desires, to other things that are important, and to the solution of concrere problems, For ourselves we want to understand and strengthen these values; in others we want to nourish and extend them. Nor, finally, need we start by trying to assimilate environmental values to our other values. Even our respect and concern for each other may be of quite a different type, and have entirely different sources, from our respect and concern lor the environment.
The articulation of these values is not the province of philosophy alone. Poetry and biography are just as vital. Think of Wordsworth:
And 1 have felt A presence that disturbs me with the joy
Or elevated t Of something f Whose dwell And the round b
Therefore 1 Shine on thci
And lei the i To blow again
We must not read tl of pantheism, in tion. Maybe Words ician, but the possible what makes us ache tt worth offers a way to experience which for o stricter formulation. It kind of portrait. Likcwi in (Yaltfcn is not Thot phizing, but the way i own person, how a 1 evening, between the or how to look at a lal
A lake is the lan feature. It is eartl the hch older mca! nature. The fluvi; are the slender ey the wooded hills a: hanging brows.44
Nietzsche suggests iti phers arc too clumsy t exaggerate, but all t philosophy has too 1 what it cannot itself the demand to "grout matism also begins t( we articulate them in stemically oriented w;
Still, on the wholt mcnts fare well in tern I am advancing, hide when measured again than against the set actually trying to an: Rolston's "Values G with a critique of "resource." The ide; source," he argues, li is selfish," becomes si
Beyond Intrinsic Value: Pragmatism in Environmental Ethics
ncnls for environmental iw thai the familiar ones :ss constraints. Still, this itic, bit of progress, and I troversial all the same. I oneeived along the lines asc we can already make ; - and in quite simple han most environmental to believe.
tperience of nature can icern for it. We know B can become deep and >me lives, and we have jch lives; in Muir, Thor-. Most of us are not so m know bow essential a be, how Thureau felt nd hum town, and why :-loud glade. While there nd [he recent boom in atry skiing, canoeing, least part of the cause is tion of nature, not jusl as ereisc and relaxation, but !, from the silence of the of waterfalls in spring. :ntial starting points for a 'ironmental values. They "weak" antbropoeentrie nsic values philosophers hey do not need a philo-llequestions that arise lor t sort. Again, we need to d ourselves and to others, les to other parts of our :r things that are import->f concrete problems. For iderstand and strengthen we want lo nourish and f, need we start by trying ntal values to our other rt and concern for each different type, and have s, from our respect and ncnt.
iese values is not the profit Poetry and biography I Wordsworth:
urbs me with the joy
Of elevated thoughts; a sense sublime Ol something lar more deeply interfused, Whose dwelling is the light of setting suns, And the round ocean and the living air...
Therefore let the moon Shine on thee in thy solitary walk;
And let the misty mountain winds be free To blow against ihee____
We must not read this as an incomplete statement of pantheism, in need of philosophical clarification. Maybe Wordsworth was a closet metaphysician, bin ihe possible linkage lo Spino/a is mil what makes us ache to feel those winds. Wordsworth offers a way to begin lo describe a kind of experience which for our purposes may not need a stricter formulation. It is not a "grounding": it is a kind at portrait. Likewise, what is finally important in Waitlen is nol Thorcau's misanthropic philosophizing, bill the way in which he shows us, ill his own person, how a human being can meet the evening, between the squirrels and the shadows, or how lo look at a lake:
A lake is the landscape's mosl... expressive feature. It is earth's eye, looking into which the beholder measures the depth of his own nature. The fhiviatc trees next to the shore are the slender eyelashes which fringe it, and the wooded hills and cliffs around are iis overhanging brows.44
Nietzsche suggests more than once that philosophers are too clumsy to handle real values. 1 ie may exaggerate, but all the same we do know that philosophy has too long failed to lake seriously whal it cannot ilself fully arliculate. By rejecting the demand to "ground" these values, then, pragmatism also begins to undercut the demand that we ariiculale ihem in philosophy's peculiar, epi-stemically oriented way.
Still, on the whole, many philosophical arguments fare well in terms of the new set of questions I am advancing. Indeed many of them fare better when measured againsl ibis new set of questions than against the set of questions that they are actually hying to answer. Let us first return to Rolston's "Values Gone Wild." Rolston begins with a critique of the idea of nature as a "resource." The idea that "everything is a resource," he argues, like the idea that "everybody is selfish," becomes simply trivial at the extremes,
"eating up everything, as if humans had no other operating mode vis-a-vis wilderness." In fact, we must enier wilderness "on iis own terms" - not, or not primarily, as a means to "high quality experience," In this way, he argues, "one is not so much looking to resources as to sources, seeking relationships in an elemental slream of being with transcending integrities."41 At this point, however, Rolston goes on to suggest that nature is intrinsically valuable because it is a source, in (his sense, of whatever (else) we intrinsically value. This seems to me to add nothing: it only vee&keris the evocative force of the notion of "so nice hood." Although "elemental... transcending integrities" make a certain ecosyslcmie sense, trying to make their value transcendental either introduces an extremely problematic ontology, as I argued in pan 11, or represents only one way of talking, as 1 argued in part III, with no special force in actual moral thinking. "Sourcehood" is a perfectly understandable and powerful model of value in its own righl: why force it inlo the mold of intrinsic values?
Consider one other example. Rolston writes of "syinpaihetiealh turning to value what does nor stand directly in our lineage or underpinning" -our "kin" and "neighbors" in the animal world. This too is genuinely perceptive: we do have a latent sense of community wilh animals which close acquaintance may bring out. Hut here too Rolston tries to wring intrinsic values out of facts which are belter left alone. He argues, for instance, lhal ibe similarity heiwcen our reactions and those of animals suggests that we should take their reactions to express imperatives - values - as well, presumably including intrinsic values. Why these imperatives also bear on its, however, is not clear, and the claim lhal thev do bear on us involves analogic arguments problematic in both philosophy of mind and moral theory. Once again Rolsion's concrete notions, here of "kinship" and of being "neighbors," capture the values at stake much more freshly and directly than the philosophically problematic analogies necessary to make them over into intrinsic values. Moreover, as Rolston also points out, even within the animate world the notion of kinship eventually stretches beyond (he breaking poini: certainly we have liltlc kinship with spiders. 1 f another kind of value must be invoked for such "aliens," then ir is not clear why this should not be so even for "neighbors." There is no need to fit all values into a single model.
Anthony Weston
liven more standard philosophical arguments or at least their basic intentions fit naturally into this framework. Recall Sagoffs argument that we may value in nature expressions of things that we value intrinsically in our lives: freedom, nobility, etc. Critics have pointed out that this cannot demonstrate the intrinsic value of nature itself. ' Pragmatisls, however, want to know simply how this value relates to others and can form an organic part of our lives. 'This is exactly what Sagoff helps to show us, locating it partly in the orbit of the desire for freedom. Or again, the persistent inclination to attribute "rights" directly to nature might now be reapproached and understood. In part, certainly, that attribution is a straightforward political attempt to state environmental values with enough force that others will take them seriously. But it is also an attempt to articulate a specific and familiar attitude towards nature. Alone in the woods We find ourselves feeling a sense of gratefulness, of "awe," finally almost of intrusion, a feeling which probably has its closest parallel in those responses to other people which make us want to attribute them rights. But how closely these feelings are actually parallel remains an open question. Here we first need a careful phenomenology. This may be true even of human rights: real respect for others comes only through the concrete experience and finally "awe" of the other. It is the conditions and nature of this feeling which we really need to understand. Reversing the usual deduction entirely, we might even take rights talk itself as a first and rather crude attempt at just such a phenomenology -but surely we can do better.
Let me conclude by returning to the level of practical problems in environmental ethics. Why, for instance, should we value wilderness? What sort of justification can w:e give for keeping exploitable land and resources in their natural state? Not surprisingly, it is necessary to begin with a reorientation. Notice that this question is already posed in abstraction from any specific situation. This may itself give rise to absurdities. If we answer that wilderness indeed has intrinsic value, then presumably we are required to go to any lengths to support as much of it as possible, and wherever possible, at least consistent with other intrinsic values. But too many other things of equal or greater importance in the situation will not he captured by a hierarchical scheme of intrinsic values. Of course, there are other ways out,
perhaps invoking intrinsic principles of such generality that they can be used to justify anything. The response 1 am urging, however, is the abandonment of these very ways of posing the question. The important questions for pragmatism are the ones posed by specific situations, and while the answers across different situations will probably bear a strong family resemblance, they will not always be the same.
Why should we protect the new Alaskan national parks, for example? Now the answers are much easier: because the new parks are both exceptionally wild and exceptionally fragile; because the non-preservationist pressures in at least this case are exceptionally unworthy, lied largely to the exploitation of energy resources to which there are any number of more intelligent alternatives; perhaps also because their protection is still possible. These arguments do indeed seem to dodge the original question, They do not say why wilderness as such should be protected. On the other hand, one certainly does not have to be an anthropocentrist to doubt whether it should he protected "as such." 'This is why the exceptional nature of ihe Alaskan wilderness makes that particular case so powerful. These "practical" arguments are precisely the kinds offered by the Sierra Club, the Nature Conservancy, and most of the other environmentally oriented organizations. Are these arguments offered merely for lack of better (philosophical?) ones? Or might those organizations actually have a more reasonable position after all?
"What about those people, though, who simply could not care less about wilderness? What about the many cases in which such values simply cannot be assumed? Tame rivers are much nicer than wild ones if one owns a motorboat; exploitation in Alaska might lower our fuel bills and make America more self-sufficient in some vital resources; and so tin." Let mc respond in several ways. First, even these cases may not be real cases of "could not care less." Nearly everyone recognizes some value in nature; think of how often natural scenes turn up on wall calendars and church bulletins. Kven motorboaters like to see woods. Wilderness values may just seem to them less significant than other values at stake in the particular situation. Common ground remains. If we begin by healing others as absolutists, we run the risk of turning them into just what we fear. But ibis is only a caricature, and we can instead approach them from a standpoint of complex mutuality. 'Then,
though, if upon, the real i natives, and t both sides, and have tu go eve
The prag swears the < will convince values are imp sional extremist \ But if this is; to pragmatism* arguments to t tal ethics would ence is that knockdown str; ourselves witl in other ways, search for a pn is almost ah were finally to j would not be are in search of ! nature, since tmr values differ so of nature through i mistakes and mishap ing, and, if we were 1 What guarantees that to accept the fact thai even our most thoti deeply different, pri of the ideal world,4 brates a wide-open the prerequisite of a] intelligence, frccdot we have yet to at and open-endedne struggle for our ow to the values and search for intrinsic shadowboxing for fight.
Acknowledgments
"Beyond Intrinsic Va Ethics" first appeared 4 (Winter 1985). I an and to an anommou for extensive comma
principles of such gen-scd to justify anything.
however, is the aban-ays of posing the qucs-ions for pragma I ism are situations, and while the situations will probably :mb!ance, they will not
the new Alaskan national ■ the answers are much 'ksare both e\ccplionally ■agile; because the non-in at least this case are ied largely to the exploit-; to which there are any :nt alternatives; perhaps ection is still possible. Iced seem to dodge the o not say why wilderness d. On the other hand, one bean anthropocentrist to be protected "as such." sal nature of the Alaskan rticular case so powerful, ments are precisely the ra Club, the Nature Con-he other environment a IK re these arguments offered (philosophical?) ones? Or ins actually have a more all?
:oplc, though, who simply it wilderness? What about , such values simply cannol rs arc much nicer than wild motorboar; exploitation in r fuel bilk and make Amcr-tn some vital resources; and and in several ways. First, not be real cases of "could ly everyone recognizes some Icofhow often natural scenes Itndars and church bulletins, like to see woods. Wilderness Ito them less significant than fin die particular situalion. a. If we begin by treating imn the risk of turning £(wr. But this is only a ?instead approach (hem fcx mutuality. Then,
Beyond Intrinsic Value: Pragmatism in Environmental Ethics
though, if some shared values can indeed be agreed upon, the real issue shifts to the question of alternatives, and this is a recognizably factual issue on both sides, and also negotiable. Motorboats don't have to go everywhere.
The pragmatic approach defended here forswears the search for knockdown arguments that will convince absolutely everyone that natural values are important. We cannot defeat the occasional extremist who sees no value at all in nature. Bui d this is a defect, it is certainly not unique to pragmatism. No other approach has knockdown arguments to offer either; otherwise, environmental ethics would not be a problem. The real difference is thai pragmalists are not looking for knockdown arguments; we propose to concern oorseives with defending environmental values in other ways. Il is striking, actually, that the search for a proof of the intrinsic value of nature is almost always post lint:. Even if someone were finally to discover a knockdown proof, il would mil be (he reason that most of us who are in search of such a proof do in facl value nalure, since our present accounts of natural values differ so markedly. We learned the values of nature through experience and effort, through mistakes and mishaps, through poetry and stargazing, and, if we were lucky, a few inspired friends. What guarantees that there is a shortcut? It is wiser to accept the (act that many of our contemporaries, even our most thoughtful contemporaries, hold deeply different, probably irreconcilable, visions of the ideal world.11' Pragmatism, indeed, celebrates a wide-open and diverse culture; il is the prerequisite of all the central Dcwovan virtues: intelligence, freedom, autonomy, growth. What we have yet lo accept is its i neon elusive n ess-arid open-endedness, its demand that we struggle for our own values without being closed to the values and the hopes of others. The search for intrinsic values substitutes a kind of shadowhoxing for what must always be a good fight.
Acknowledgments
"Rewind Intrinsic Value: Pragmatism in Environ me lira I Ethics*' first appeared in liircirnniuental Ethics Vol. 7, No. 4 (Winter 19K5). I am indebted to Holmes Rolston, 111, and lo an anonymous reviewer for Environmental Ethics for extensive eommeills on earlier versions of this essav.
Il has also benefited greatly from a colloquium discussion at the Vassar College Department of Philosophy and from several careful readings hy Jennifer Church.
Notes
1 The confusion of subjectivism with "subject-centrism" is dissected, though nol in these terms, by Richard ami Val Routlcy in "Against The Inevitability of 1 Ionian Chauvinism,'1 in K. E Goodpa-ster ami K, M. Sayre, eds, Ethics and the Problems of the 21st Century (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1970), pp. 42 7.
2 for an extensive list, see David Ehrcnfeld, The. trro-gauce of Humanism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978). Chap. 5; or Holmes Rolston, III, "Valuing Wildlaiids," Environmental Ethics 7 (198S): 24 30.
.1 I am equating intrinsic values with ends in themselves, instrumental values with means to ends, for present proposes f think thai subtle distinctions between these concepts can be ignored,
4 See W. K, Erankcna, "Ethics and the Environ-menl,'1 in Goodpasler and .Sayre, Ethics, pp. 5 h and pp. IS 10; and J. Baud Callioott, "Non-anthro-noccntnc Value Theory and Environmental Ethics," American    Philosophical   Quarterly    21 (19S4),
pp. 299-309.
5 Routley and Routlcy, "Againsl the Inevitability." pp. 36 62.
6 Tom Regan, "Che Nature and Possibility of an Environmental hit hie," Lneirimmental Ethics 3 (1981): .>() 4. Frankcna, C. 1. Lewis, and others use inherent value to refer to objects or actions the contemplation of which leads to intrinsically valuable experience. Regan, however, clearlv means by inherent whal Erankcna and Lewis mean b> intrinsic. "If an object is inherently good," he tells us, "its value must inhere in the object itself1 (p. aO). Its value does not depend upon experience ar all.
7 Evelyn Pluhar, "'Phe Justification of an Environmental Ethic," Environmental Ethics 5 (J983): 55-8.
S G. E. Moore, Philosophical Studies (London: Paul, Trench, 'Prubner, 1922), p. 26U,
9 G. E. Moore, Princifna Ethica (Cambridge: Clam-bridge Universily Press, 1903), p. 187.
10 G, K. Moore, "Is Goodness a (Quality?1' in Philosophical Papers (London: lllen ami Unwin, ] 959), p. 95.
11 Erankcna, "Ethics and the Hnvironmcm," p. 17. Pluhar makes some sharp comments on litis claim in l'Thc Justification o! an Environ me ma] Ethic," p. 54.
12 Ibid,, p. 15, Mv emphasis.
Li K. E. Cioodpaster, "Prom Egoism to Environmen-talisin," in C ioodpastcr and Sayre, Ethics, p. 25 and
Anthony Weston
Ii.
In
19
2(1
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
p. .54, his emphasis. Strictly speaking the claim here 32 is only about ethics in the 1 himean tradition, hut he soon allows thai the Kantian I radii inn has still stronger monistic tendencies. Ibid., p. 32.
Po-kcung Ip, "Taoism and the Foundations of Environmental Ethics," Environmental Ethics 5 (1983): 335 44, and Jay McUaniel, "Physical Mailer as Creative and Sentient," Environmental Ethics 5 (1983): 201-318.
Christopher Stone, Should Trees Have Standing? (Los Altos: William Laufmann, 1974), pp. 52-3. 33 Ehrenfeld, Arrogance oj'Humanism, p. 208. Hrvan Norton, "Environmental Ethics and Weak Anthropocentrism," Environmental Ethics 6 (1984): 34 131, 136, 138.
J. V. Kruiilla and A. C. Fisher, The Economics of Natural Environments (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 35 1975). 36 Mark Sagolf, "On Preserving the Natural Environment," Yah /.am Journal 84 (1974): 205-67; reprinted in Richard Wasserstrom, Today's Mora! 57 Problems (New York: Macmillan, 1979). Thomas E. I lill, Jr., "Ideals of I himan Excellence 38 and Preserving Natural Environments,'' Environmental Ethics 5 (1983): 211-24. See Hill, "Ideals," p. 233, or p. 220: "It may be thai, given the sort of beings we are, we would never 39 learn humility before persons without developing 40 the general capacity to cherish... many [mher] things for their own sakes" (my emphasis). Sagol'f speaks of our obligation lo nature as finally an 41 obligation "to our national values, to our history, and, therefore; to ourselves" (Wasserstrom, Today's Moml Problems, p. 620). 42 Regan, "Nature and Possibility," pp. 24 31). Hill, "Ideals." p. 215.
Huh.ir, "Justification," p. 58. 45 Holmes Rolslon, 111, "Values Gone Wild," Inquiry 26(1983): 181-207. 14 Moore, Principal Ethica, p. 24.
Monroe llcardslcy, "Intrinsic Value," Philosophy 45 ami Phenotttenohgical Research 26 (1965): 6. The 46 critique offered here is indebted to IScardslcy's line 47 article. Ibid., p. 15.
Ibid., p. 7. 48
C. I. Lewis, An Analysis of Knowledge ami Valuation (LaSalle, 111.: Open Qiurt, 1946), pp. 374-5.
Kolston was generous enough lo comment extensively on an earlier draft of this paper, and I am quoting from his comments. Obviously he should not he held to these exaci words, though I think his position hen: is a natural completion of what he has said in prim. See Rolslon, "Values Gone Wild" and Holmes Rolslon, III, "Are Values in Nature Objective or Subjective?" Environmental Ethics 4 (1982); 125 52; reprinted in Robert Elliot and Arran Gare, cds. Environmental Philosophy (University Park: Pennsylvania State Press, 1985), pp. 135-65. Rolslon, "Are Values in Nature Objective or Subjective?" in ElltOI and Ciare, Environmental Philosophy, p. 158.
John Dewey, Theory of Valuation (Chicago: International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, 1939), 2:41.
Beardsley, "Intrinsic Value," p. 16. See Anthony Weston, "Toward the Reconstruction of Subjectivism: Love as a Paradigm of Values," Journal of Value linitiirr 18 (1984): 181 94. Ibid, and R. 1). Brandt, Theory of the Good anil the Right (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), pan I. Norton ends up arguing that having ideals need not presuppose the intrinsic value of the things or slates of affairs idealized: see Norton, "Weak Anthropocentrism," p. 137. Pluhar, "Justification," p. 60. Ibid., p. 58. This curious inference also mars J. liaird Callicott's otherwise line survey: see Callieott, "Noii-anihropoccnlric Value Theory,*' p. 305. See Robin Allfield, "Western Traditions and Environmental Ethics," in Elliot and Gare, Environmental Philosophy, pp. 201-50.
See Anthony Weston, "Subjectivism and the Question of Social Criticism," Mela philosophy 16 (1985): 57-65.
William Wordsworth, "Lines Composed a Few Miles above Tinlern Abbey," lines 93 8 and 134-7. II. O. Thoreau, Wahlen (New York: Signet, 1960), p. 128.
Rolslon, "Values Gone Wild," pp. 181-3. Ibid., pp. 188, 191.
For instance, Louis Lombard!, "Inherent Worth, Respect, and Rights." Environmental Ethics 5 (1983): 260.
A particularly striking example is Steven S. Schwar/.ehild, "The Unnatural Jew", Environmental Ethics 6 (1984): 347 62.
Pragr Ethi< and
Ben A.
I Introduction
In a recent pap Ethics, Bryan Norton environmental philos avoids sterile abstra case-study approach growing number of ( become dissatisfied i philosophy as the p; in the field. Accort begun to outline a pr menla! ethics by pro tempt to shift the fi more practical convc values at play in speci policy. Norton's work Weston and Andrew sents the leading edge but ions to this pragn ethics.'
One of the clearest i work is the notion th environmental ethics t environmental problc changes must occur -metaphysical - change: appraisal of the role policy deliberation an new environmental f such reconstructions p to the traditional preo>