DON KALB
Central European University and Utrecht University
Conversations with a Polish populist:
Tracing hidden histories of globalization, class, and
dispossession in postsocialism (and beyond)
A B S T R A C T
Building on the work of Jonathan Friedman and of
Andre Gingrich and Marcus Banks, I explain the rise
of populist, neonationalist sensibilities in Poland as
a set of defensive responses by working-class people
to the silences imposed by liberal rule. I trace in
detail a sequence of all-around dispossessions
experienced by Polish working-class sodalities since
1989, when activists with substantial legitimacy
among organized workers had claimed de facto and
de jure control over assets crucial for working-class
reproduction. “Democratization” and “markets” were
shrewd legal ways by which the new liberal capitalist
state reappropriated and recentralized those assets
from local constituencies. Meanwhile, the reputation
of workers, whose fights with the party-state had
been essential for regaining national sovereignty
and establishing parliamentary democracy, was
systematically annihilated in the public sphere by
discourses of “internal orientalism.” [postsocialism,
dispossession, class, neonationalism, populism,
neoliberalism, globalization, privatization, Europe]
Working people have proved most inspired when what was at stake was
not just a living wage, but the defence of a way of life. The political demand
our rulers find hardest to beat is one that is cultural and material.
—Terry Eagleton, commemorating Raymond Williams
M
any of the parameters of globalization that have been around
for some three decades are now shifting and turning dramatically.
This renders core concepts such as “neoliberalism”
and the “Washington Consensus” less stable and illuminating
than they were, for policy as well as analysis.1
Nevertheless,
few analysts would disagree that worker-citizens in contemporary transnationalizing
states will inevitably continue to feel the competitive heat of the
one billion new workers that have been added to the capitalist system since
1989, as well as the two billion that might be added in the next two decades.
This growth will remain one of the basic determinants of the current epoch,
n’importe the exact paradigms under which it gets signified. The consequences
of the tripling of the global proletariat, now more fragmented than
ever before and spread over a wider array of all-but-converging and differentially
inserted national states, will persist for a while, pace Immanuel
Wallerstein’s often repeated prognosis that the end of capitalism-as-weknow-it
is in sight.
States and state elites, as Jonathan Friedman (2003; see also EkholmFriedman
and Friedman 2008) has argued, will find their popular legitimacy
under sustained pressure as they remain locked in a global regime
that necessarily sets them up as “competition states” that compete for mobile
capital by offering their populations and territories up as readily exploitable
factors for global capital. Different locations, histories, and the
proximity or distance of state elites to the sources of capital will make a difference
for outcomes. But the general rule will be downward pressure on
the legitimacy of state elites and political classes and continued exhaustion
of the liberal and modernist narratives of nation-state building and social
engineering that have flanked the making of the modern state.2
As a consequence, as Paul Piccone (1993) was among the first to foresee,
Europe is undergoing the spread, generation, and regeneration of new
AMERICAN ETHNOLOGIST, Vol. 36, No. 2, pp. 207–223, ISSN 0094-0496, online
ISSN 1548-1425. C 2009 by the American Anthropological Association. All rights reserved.
DOI: 10.1111/j.1548-1425.2009.01131.x
American Ethnologist Volume 36 Number 2 May 2009
hybrid and volatile populisms that reject some of the foundations
of liberal rule and that are composed of ethnonational
or religious symbolic sources eclectically combined
with items of the classical Left. As Piccone wrote in 1993
on the example of France, “The French New Right seems
to be onto something when it counterposes a universalizing
New Class seeking to impose an abstract liberal agenda
on everyone, and populists wanting to live their lives in their
communities, with their particular cultures, institutions, religions
etc.” (1993:21). He failed to note that the abstract
liberalism of the new class had by his time of writing become
firmly wedded to the globalizing agenda of the capitalist
competition state, a shift that certainly contributed
to its accelerating loss of legitimacy and to the rapidly proliferating
“culture talk” that anthropologists described at
the time (Kalb 2005; Stolcke 1995). But his pointing at the
dialectics of local communal cultural particularity versus
abstract liberal cosmopolitanism that would increasingly
characterize the intrastate conditions in the new era of the
one world turned out to be very right: A new political divide
emerged as a little-noted close (“Northern”) kin to the
oft-noted spread of intrastate conflict in the global South
in the post-1989 period. Both were characteristically overlooked
by the lofty philosophers of “the end of history” and
the clash of civilizations, who monopolized prime time in
those days.
The spreading populisms are not just interruptions
of the daily business of politics but also, and ultimately
more importantly, the vehicles by which wider disenfranchised
populations try to make sense of their discontents
with globalizing modernisms. Those who do not speak out
loudly for the radical Right often blame incumbent political
classes sotto voce for their complicity with the perceived
conspiracies against “the people” and articulate their
bricolages of critique from combined bits of direct experience
and mediated right-wing protest frames. Unlocking
the dialectics between popular anger and resentment and
the organized radical Right seems an urgent project that
ethnographic methods might well help forward.3
I am advocating
the need to uncover the hidden histories of subalternity
that feed the particular alienations of the resenting
classes in their volatile dialectic with the histories of neoliberal
transnationalization by which they are shaped.
I first discuss recent general work in anthropology supporting
this argument and then consider the complexities
of the emergent populisms by looking in detail at a group
of Polish workers that I have followed from the late nineties
until today.
Anthropologies of fear, crisis, and the nation
In recent anthropology, Andre Gingrich and Marcus Banks
(2005) and Arjun Appadurai (2006) highlight the importance
of social insecurity, fear, and anger in generating
the popular receptiveness for ideologies of ethnic or religious
neonationalism. They also invoke the association
of such receptiveness with the general conditions generated
by neoliberal globalizations. Their work resonates
with Jonathan Friedman’s (2003) general notion of “double
polarizations” associated with globalization: polarizations
that pair widening social divides with spreading idioms of
deep cultural difference in an era in which ruling elites and
their allies are structurally invited to transform themselves
into cosmopolitan classes and forsake the project of the nation
as a community of fate. In the process, the erstwhile
“Fordist” working classes are unmade, in representation as
well as fact, into a new “ethnic folk,” and the lower tiers
are turned, in representation and fact, into racialized classes
dangereuses. These very different works collude, then, in
suggesting that any explanation of the surge of neonationalism
in Europe and beyond must be placed against the combined
background of what I would call the “dual crisis” of
popular sovereignty, on the one hand, and of labor, on the
other hand, a dual crisis that certainly characterizes the new
millennium. They also suggest, but do not always work out,
that spirals of nationalist paranoia, although structurally
derived from the dual crisis, receive their precise historical
dynamics, meanings, and symbolisms from demonstrable
configurations—confrontations, alliances, and divisions—
of class, within specific (but often “hidden”) local histories.
This general thesis seems to have substantial support
outside anthropology. Comparativist historical sociologists
such as Barrington Moore Jr. (1978), Michael Mann (1999),
Ira Katznelson (1998), and Charles Tilly (2004) have suggested
that the class cleavage under democratic capitalism
must be faced, articulated, and organized rather than
repressed if liberalism is to keep a hold on the center of
the democratic process. The dual crisis signals, if anything,
that over the last three decades it has become ever harder
for liberals to do precisely that. In Europe they have had,
of course, far more trouble doing so in the postsocialist
east than in the west. The dependent states of eastern Europe,
with their thoroughly comprador capitalisms, have at
best some 30 percent of the wealth of western Europe (see,
in general, Drahokoupil 2008), but Western state elites are
deeply affected too, as recent events in Italy, Switzerland,
Austria, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Denmark
show. Nor is the story limited to Europe. For the Middle
East and west Asia it has been argued that the repression
of the enlightened nationalist Left has ultimately become
the harbinger of religious fundamentalism (Ali 2002). Various
studies have made plausible that neoliberal globalization,
by fragmenting labor and exerting downward pressure
on social wages, by reducing popular sovereignty on
behalf of the sovereignty of capital, and by circumscribing
what Pierre Bourdieu (2000) has called “the left hand of
the state” (social inclusion) while strengthening “the right
hand” (finance, law and order), might well be systematically
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associated with a climate of deep popular uncertainty, feeding
into a politics of fear exploited by new political brokers
and resulting in defensive nonliberal popular responses in
areas as diverse as central and western Africa, the United
States, western Europe, eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and
east Asia (see, among others, Derluguian 2005; Frank 2004;
Friedman 2003; Gingrich and Banks 2005; Nonini 2003; Ost
2005; Turner 2003; Wieviorka 2003; for an overview, see Kalb
2005).
This popular politics of fear should not be seen as being
immediately oriented on, or caused directly by, global
actors or accelerating flows of people, trade, and information
as such. This is the always slightly opaque level of aggregation
and abstraction moved by what Eric Wolf (1990)
called “structural power.” Rather, actual outcomes on local
grounds are intermediated by various path-dependent
“critical junctions” that link global process via particular national
arenas and local histories, often hidden, to emergent
and situated events and narratives (Kalb 1997, 2000, 2002,
2005; Kalb and Tak 2005). Critical junctions link the global
levels of structural power with the respective institutional
fields of “tactical power” on the scale of the national state
and with the spaces of agential power in situated everyday
circumstances (Wolf 1990). It is in these dynamic linkages
that the politics of fear and anger gets incubated. Examining
how this occurs is an agenda that requires an obsession
with local historical discovery and a critical reading of largescale
process from the vantage point of the particular and
situated livelihoods of subaltern classes.
Specifically, I would suggest, it is the contradictions and
disjunctures between everyday agential power fields, tactical
state-based political environments (including political
and media opportunity structures), and global structural
power relationships—including the significations that are
generated within and between these disjointed frames—
that move the popular anxiety and paranoia.4
Such anxieties,
in their turn, energize the nationalist populisms that
are taking the place of the liberal modernisms gone awry.
In a more narrowly political sense, populism, in the current
conjuncture, is the rejection of liberal elites and ideologies
that fail to use the resources of the democratic national
state to harness global process to local needs and
desires, that celebrate an elite cosmopolitanism, or that use
state power and cosmopolitan ideologies for outright local
dispossession. More broadly conceived, populism refers to
the moods and sensibilities of the disenfranchised as they
face the disjunctures between everyday lives that seem to
become increasingly chaotic and uncontrollable and the
wider public power projects that are out of their reach and
suspected of serving their ongoing disenfranchisement. In
Tilly’s (2004) definition of democracy, this implies dedemocratization
and a consequent return to particularized
trust networks crucial for working-class reproduction.
Although the headlines in the Western press tend to
paint an orientalizing picture of the postsocialist European
east as a cauldron of majority-ethnic nationalisms,5
there
has, in fact, been very little anthropological work on the
dynamics of neonationalisms in the east. This stands in
contrast to work by political scientists and political sociologists,
who have consistently discussed east European nationalisms,
often in alarmist mode, since the early nineties
(e.g., Tismaneanu 1998). The newest wave of such work
is less alarmist and much more analytical and has started
to experiment with, and advocate, ethnographic methods
(Derluguian 2005; Ost 2005).
Western media, of course, tend to treat majority nationalisms
in the West differently. They see the recent conflicts
within which nationalisms in the West are expressed
as conflicts about immigration, spurred on by local far-right
movements and sharpened by “the war on terror.” In so doing,
they mystify the sources of nationalism in the West by
shifting them onto actors deemed ultimately external to the
core of the West itself, that is, migrants and the fringe of the
extreme Right.6
Such events and movements are figured as
aberrations from a supposedly well-established norm of liberalism
in the West, which appears to stand in contrast to
the east, which is nationalist.
Against such self-gratifying occidentalizing imagery, it
is my contention that western and eastern European popular
nationalisms have broadly similar social roots and comparable
constituencies and are occasioned by related processes
of neoliberal globalization and class restructuring,
whereas their actual event-based dynamics, of course, derive
from differently ordered and sequentialized political
fields and get their symbolism from profoundly different
national histories, memories, and amnesias.7
Recent anthropological work on neonationalism in
western Europe (Gingrich and Banks 2005) has somewhat
echoed the media emphasis on migrants and farright
movements, thus doing little to expel the orientalizing
and occidentalizing mystifications. Alternatively, it has focused
(Holmes 2000) on conservative west European elites
and their revived Catholic organicist ideologies. This does
help to reestablish cultural essentialism in its rightful place
within the right flank of western European and continental
state making but fails to explain its populist dynamics and
contents outside the elite circles.
Current populisms, then, represent a systemic, structural,
locally contingent, and meaningful phenomenon,
and scholars should therefore try to grasp them in these interlocking
dimensions. Peter Worsley wrote long ago that
populism is “the eternal attempt of people to claim politics
as something of theirs” while they grope for “substantive
justice” and appeal “to the involvement of people in the
running of their own societies” (1969:248, 244, 245). An anthropological
agenda par excellence.
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In what follows, I plunge at once into the stories of a
group of workers in the Polish city of Wroclaw to try to dig
up the narrated realities that pushed skilled and semiskilled
industrial workers, arguably the largest population segment
in postsocialist Europe, to articulate an increasingly biting
populist rejection of liberalizing elites. This is meant to be
a microarchaeology of workers’ resentment in response to
misrecognized and misrecognizing processes of dispossession
initiated at state and global levels, liberal disenfranchisements
that are not merely related to their work but to
their whole habitat.8
Between 1997 and 2007, I followed a group of workers
organized around Solidarnosc unions in Polar, a whitegoods
factory (producing refrigerators and washing machines),
and other local factories in Wroclaw, southwest
Poland.9
These workers had built the local Solidarnosc units
against communist repression in the late seventies–early
eighties, sustained their underground self-organization
throughout the period of military rule and into the creeping
transition processes from 1985 onward, laid strong de
facto as well as de jure claims to “their” factories, and actively
tried to secure these claims as well as their factories
throughout the crises of shock therapy. I argue that these
crises served, paradoxically, to facilitate outright dispossession
of assets into state hands—legitimized and misrecognized
by regained sovereignty and parliamentary democratization.
My aim is to probe the lived inside of processes
largely understood and fetishized from the comfortable
outside as a “successful democratic transition.”10
“History repeats itself,” conversations with a
Polish populist
The best lead into working-class experience and its contentious
signification that I can give is to share conversations
my colleagues and I had with Krysztof Zadrozny, a
vocational teacher born in Wroclaw in 1953, a worker activist
who, in the end, never exchanged his job on the assembly
lines of the local Polar factory for a paid career in
unionism, politics, or a foreman position. He had been the
leader of the anti–martial law strike and factory occupation
in December 1981, was interned by General Jaruzelski in
1982, edited and published an underground factory journal
from 1983 to 1988 called “Our Home,” was interned again
and then dismissed from further industrial work in Wroclaw
for resurrecting Solidarnosc in 1988, temporarily became a
high-altitude chimney sweeper, and later became a youth
basketball coach and an organizer of “home-church” holiday
camps with other lay Catholics. He is the older brother
of a Solidarnosc forewoman of both local and national importance.
Above all, he is a persistent fighter for “living in
truth” and for demanding “normality” in Poland. He is the
father of three children, the oldest born while he was interned,
who are all studying pedagogy-related subjects. Like
many workers we interviewed, he now still lives in the small
apartment he got in the late seventies not far from the factory
complex. In the Polar factory environment, in which
more than 50 percent of employees had no more than a primary
education, he stood out for the trust he had gained
among hundreds, even thousands, of workers and inhabitants.
As a vocational teacher and production-line worker,
he was the intermediator between working-class sensibilities
and politics, on the one hand, and the more highly educated
actors in the institutional fields, including his sister,
on the other hand.
When we first met him in the small and sober union
office in the Polar administration building in 1998, some
of the Polar shares were just about to be sold to a French
industrial group. The European Union, which had insisted
on the full liberalization of imports into Poland while
still maintaining specific tariffs against Polish exports until
the early 2000s, loomed large in his internal conversations
and exchanges with friends. Fifteen hundred redundancies
(in a labor force of 4,500 in 1997) had recently
been announced. An investigation by McKinsey and Company
consultants, commissioned by the State Treasury,
had, predictably, shown that Polar employed more workers
than comparable white-goods firms in the West. “The
EU is a huge Soviet Union,” Zadrozny stated with selfconscious
cynicism. “There has been so much talk about
self-governments, locality, etc., and what they finally do is
create a huge monopoly.”
Monopoly, in the language of the anticommunist resistance,
stood for social and material waste, unaccountability,
misinformation, and corruption. Self-government,
in contrast, meant “normality” and “living in truth.” These
were the ultimate symbols for which Polish workers had
sustained their fight with the party-state, arguably more important
than the idea of “civil society” or even “pluralism,”
which remained rather tactical and intellectual concepts.
Normality and living in truth were the complex popular
symbols that had ultimately energized the people’s mobilization
(see, e.g., Kubik 1994; Ost 1990). They remained
magnets of signification and desire all through the 1990s
and into the 2000s and were increasingly targeted against
the liberal state and its transnational allies.
We met Zadrozny again in the same small office ten
years later, in April 2007. He was still working on the conveyor
belt of what is now Polar-Whirlpool. “History repeats
itself,” he exclaimed.
Our na¨ıvet´e and kind-heartedness have been exploited.
In all these years after 1989 we were told that we are
nothing; that the West has come to take it all over; that
the Poles happen to have their national vices. And in
this way the ground was prepared for people to accept
the status quo. But in my opinion, what was missing in
1989 was a spirit of resistance against abnormality. Also
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in Solidarity and the church. See, for example, this recent
issue of women working in supermarkets not being
allowed to go to the toilet and therefore wearing
Pampers! Where was Solidarity? Where was the church?
They should have reacted sharply. Then other things
could not have taken place either. And here, I think,
quite intentionally, the enterprises and Polar too, were
broken into pieces. They were left to fight for themselves.
And in that way solidarity was broken.
We were told that this is how it has to be, that there
is this transition going on, and that we should just be
happy that we have work at all. Well, labor is a great
value but our dignity and our incomes are important
too. I think we should at least revisit the process of privatization,
even in Polar, whether it was real privatization
or, as people say, mere theft.
My sister, when the privatization was pending in 1998,
had to travel to a dinner with Prime Minister Buzek,
talk at night, lots of alcohol, to convince him to get the
social package done. Absurd! He was meant to be our
own Solidarnosc prime minister! But in the ministry he
let an undersecretary deal with our case, and this guy
was of the Proszkow mafia [secret services]. Such things
must be investigated, show the truth! It would be odd
that those who bought the enterprises for almost nothing
would be doing it for the people?
We cannot undo what was done. Still it would be psychologically
important to find out whether this company
was sold for less than its real value. Then it could
become easier to enforce something now, like better
wages. It is a question of honor. I myself never believed
that this was how it had to be, that Poles are such that
they cannot do this or that . . . it was a big mistake to say
that Poles were worthless.
Some words are immediately in order to help contextualize
and disentangle these superficially straightforward but, in
fact, thickly layered narratives. Privatization, counterintuitively,
was something that workers in Poland had fiercely
believed in, from the moment that the term was first circulated
in public in 1989 to about 1992 (see also Kalb in
press; Ost 2005). In their view, though, it had a totally different
connotation than it did in the West or when used by the
Polish liberal elite. It was not about selling a public asset to
a private investor but, rather, the other way around. For Polish
workers in the late eighties, it initially signified a transfer
of firms—which, under communism, were the anchor of total
community life, including health care, holidays, housing,
kindergartens, loans, and so on—out off the hands of the
communist state, seen as a private and external force encroaching
on the nation, scheming to appropriate its properties,
and into those of the workers, seen as the factual national
public.11
The period of the late eighties and early nineties in
Poland, indeed, probably everywhere in central and eastern
Europe, was one in which the early 20th-century
idea of workers’ self-management, indeed, workers’ selfgovernment,
was very much in the air; more precisely, it was
materially real and very close to being a daily lived experience,
in Raymond Williams’s sense of a structure of feeling,
in many sites and locations, including Wroclaw. Few
analysts of postsocialism have focused on this reality sufficiently,
so it requires a further excursion. It is the starting
point for understanding local popular experience.12
Remarkably enough, under martial law, one of the first
civil acts of the military regime was to implement a crucial
demand of the program that had been accepted by the Solidarnosc
General Assembly in September 1981—workers’
self-management (Poznanski 1996). It is often assumed that
this demand had figured as one of the radicalizations of
the Polish rebellion that convinced Moscow and the Polish
generals of the increasing inevitability of armed intervention
to defend the position of the nomenklatura. But with
Solidarnosc outlawed and dismantled, the military regime
felt that new institutions for self-management at the factory
level would help to pacify the population, sever the
links between local workers and national intelligentsia, and
create some legitimacy for the regime. On top of that, selfmanagement
could help to solve, at one stroke, some systemic
problems of socialist accumulation.
First, by making them responsible for their own finances,
the regime hoped that firms would be forced to
become more financially responsible and entrepreneurial.
Second, lawmakers hoped to prevent, or at least deflect to
plant and local level, eventual new waves of collective wage
claims by workers. In this way, they hoped to take away one
of the structural impediments to socialist accumulation: the
inability of the state to control wages, profits, and investment
and, indeed, the inability to forestall state-focused
working-class collective action. Workers would now preside
over their own wage funds as part of limited budgets
with “hard constraints,” in Janos Kornai’s (1980) sense. And
because workers had considerable control over the overall
budget, they would have to weigh their own wages in
relation to productive investments and the extensive social
funds. They were expected to become responsible caretakers
of and investors in their own social reproduction.
This was meant to be the end of the socialist patriarchal
state and its uncontainable contradictions (see Ekiert and
Kubik 1999; Poznanski 1996). And, in retrospect, this is
indeed what happened, although not in the form anticipated
by Jaruzelski or Moscow. It became the end not of
patriarchy but of the socialist state tout court: The state
would ultimately lose its control over “people’s property”
and crumble—after which, the new neoliberal state would
emerge to take it all back under the paradoxical sign of
democratic market reform.
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Communist technocrats in Poland had launched new
regime-friendly unions (confederated in the Ogolnopolskie
Porozumienie Zwiazkow Zawodowych [All-Poland Alliance
of Trade Unions], or OPZZ) in 1982, which were expected
to take control of the self-management institutions
now that Solidarnosc had been outlawed. But at those sites
where Solidarnosc had been strong and had gone underground,
as, for example, at Polar and several other factories
in Wroclaw, OPZZ proved only capable of organizing
some sections of the white-collar workers. The new worker
councils got very rapidly colonized by cohesive and democratic
worker collectives that now used formally legal ways
to wrestle de facto control over productive property from
the state. Zadrozny and his colleagues had been deeply involved
in this fight for working-class and national repossession
vis-`a-vis the Moscow-backed military communists; in
fact, Zadrozny had been the key actor and, in the process,
had gained the trust of hundreds, even thousands, of workers
at Polar.13
In the course of the late eighties, workers had
succeeded in pushing back the power of the nomenklatura
over the Polar factory and its social assets; they had subsequently
prevented nomenklatura privatization and asset
stripping; and, by 1989, they were starting to actually
choose and nominate their own directors. In other core factories
in Wroclaw, such as the computer maker Elwro and
the train-maker Pafawag, the same thing was happening.
Tens of thousands of workers in this city alone felt substantially
in control of factory and community assets. The personnel
director of Polar in 1998, in explaining the moral and
factual difficulty of firing hundreds of workers, stressed repeatedly
to us that there was still an overwhelming sense of
factory ownership among workers at Polar.
The notion of “privatization,” of course, came from a
totally different corner. It was introduced in public speech
by liberal economists from Gdansk, in particular, Leszek
Balcerowicz, in 1988–89. They had been invited into the
core team of political liberals organized around Bronislaw
Geremek and Adam Michnik to help educate them in economic
matters to which they had given less than serious
thought, even though they had begun to reject ideas of
workers’ self-management after 1985 (Ost 1990). But in the
context of an economy that was de facto managed, legally
co-owned, and morally claimed by victorious worker collectives
while the other formal co-owner, the illegitimate and
Soviet-backed communist state, was believed to be finally
collapsing, the idea of privatization was perceived by workers
to signify something like the endgame of their struggles
over people’s property. Privatization was, first and foremost,
popularly understood as the final realization of the original
1981 Solidarnosc demands that had triggered military rule.
It was something like the crowning ritual of the workers’
rebellion.
Let me emphasize that worker self-management was
not only a blue-collar affair and not exclusively a blue-collar
connotation of the idea of privatization. Self-management
was embraced by many university-educated people as
well, particularly in more high-end factories such as the
computer-maker Elwro in Wroclaw. In the first two parliaments
after 1989, a faction sprang from self-management
institutions that defended the idea of the worker cooperative
as one of the desirable paths of privatizing the economy.
From the self-managed factories, a nationwide movement
of well-trained cadres had already emerged in 1988
that pushed for reforms from the Round Table talks between
the communist government and the opposition, and for
subsequent financial and economic regulations, that were
conducive to worker-managed democratic cooperatives.14
But these “organic” actors quickly discovered that the liberal
intellectuals at the Round Table, who by now had very
weak ties with constituencies on the ground, as correctly
anticipated by the generals, had very little patience with
the idea of letting workers consolidate power (Ost 1990).
The only broadly respected initial sympathizer among the
liberal opposition was the former Trotskyist Jacek Kuron
(Kuron was also the initiator, in 1976, of KOR, the committee
that gave legal support to interned workers and that was
the vehicle by which the Polish intelligentsia finally linked
up with workers after several unsynchronized and failed
waves of action in 1956, 1968, 1971, and 1976; see Ekiert
and Kubik 1999 and Kubik 1994), but he rapidly became isolated.
Meanwhile, the crucial economic and fiscal chunks
of liberal state making were delegated to Balcerowicz and
his Washington Consensus interlocutors in the West, who
were working in silence on their shock-therapy program
(see also Wedel 2001). One of our informants from Wroclaw,
Andrzej Piszel, a computer scientist, was a member of the
self-management group in parliament after 1989. He is now
a successful entrepreneur with few political illusions and
recalls vividly how the core group around Geremek, whom
he admired, would regularly silence him with whistling and
other less-than-polite methods when he made the case for
policies that would help consolidate the worker-managed
sector of the economy. He is still convinced that a great and
feasible socioeconomic option was thus intentionally killed
off for political reasons that he does not like to think about.
At the same time, shock therapy, with its full liberalization
of the market at one stroke and its mythic focus on consolidating
the state budget amidst economic collapse, was
punishing all productive enterprises so heavily that sheer
survival of factories, and of their community functions, became
a more crucial concern for activists than the skewed
discussion about the legal form. While the new regime gently
silenced the public debate about the particular legal
paths of privatization by leaving it to groups of sheltered
experts and by slowing down the public decision-making
processes (even by the late nineties, a majority of Polish
enterprises were not yet formally privatized, in contrast to
the country’s postsocialist neighbors), it engineered a rough
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beating of the national economy that, by 1991, had left most
firms begging for loans and help from the state and the
state-run banking sector. In this way, the new liberal state
gradually wrestled de facto ownership claims away from
worker collectives. It channeled the property titles into the
state-led banks and the State Treasury, while popularly advertising
this move as the definitive blow against the communists.
In the same process, it destroyed worker solidarity
and fragmented the movements for self-management
and cooperatives. By 1993, with Poland again witnessing
massive worker protests against shock therapy and poverty
(Ekiert and Kubik 1999), the cooperative option had all but
vanished from the political debates, and privatization came
more and more to connote bringing a firm under the wing
of the State Treasury and onto the Warsaw stock exchange
to find desperately needed new sources of capital abroad.
If 1985–89 had thus seen the repossession of productive
assets by worker-citizens from the militarized partystate,
1989–95 saw the dispossession of worker collectives
by a liberal state that was shrewdly recentralizing the nation’s
assets under a now-independent treasury in globalizing
mode. One of the crucial legal details was that a firm
whose ownership had been transferred to the treasury was
immediately lifted out of the self-management legal regime
and lost the right to a workers’ council and its nomination
of the director. State appropriation had thus become legally
secured against still-prevailing popular structures of feeling
that workers were actual owner-occupiers of their factories.
By the time we started our interviews, in 1997, workers in
Polar and elsewhere had begun to see their legal defeat, as
their property claims had been annulled while they were
shocked into sheer survival mode, as Klein (2007) analyzed
so well and more generally.15
“Real privatization,” in Zadrozny’s words, signifies, in
its purest form, a worker cooperative and, in a diluted and
compromised form, at least a privatization that is beneficial
for the plant and its workers, in which a measure of
control from below is exchanged for growth, investment,
and better wages.16
The opposite he calls “theft.” Theft, of
course, is a motive in populist narratives par excellence.
But it does rather realistically connote the dispossession
of assets from worker constituencies and their subsequent
transfer into the hands of the state and the global market
by purely legal and financial procedures beyond the control
of the assets’ moral proprietors. It also describes the consequent
deprivation of communities of workers—not just
communities but actual sodalities with known fighting histories
in a national rebellion—as the proceeds of privatization
disappeared into the hands of state bureaucrats and international
bidders.
Recall that in the interview excerpt above, Zadrozny
moves from the issue of “theft” into a little tirade about
Poles being told that they had their vices and, hence, should
not want to trust their own sources of agency. Here he
immediately connects material dispossession to the wider
public culture of neoliberalism in Poland after 1989. He is
referring to the nasty public rhetorics spawned by the liberal
elite and its following of media and academic pundits
after the discovery of the yawning state debt. None of the
liberals had the guts to even discuss canceling the debt as
that of an illegitimate regime (as Klein 2007 importantly
points out).17
But with shock therapy shaking the nation
and the specter of economic failure becoming a realistic
possibility, intellectuals and media people began desperately
picturing themselves as “middle class” while increasingly
depicting workers and peasants as gross liabilities for
a Poland now openly exposed to world capitalist competition.
Workers and peasants were systematically associated
in the media with alcoholism and laziness, and labor
unions were openly decried as dysfunctional for the new
civil Poland.18
In fact, the whole concept of “civil society”
was regularly turned against them. Even such an honorable
person as Michnik, at a 1999 commemoration of the events
of 1989, which was held in the Kaiserliche Hofburg in Vienna
and which I attended,19
openly devalued Polish industry
by talking about “ex-socialist workers who were merely
producing busts of Lenin.” In the same elite ceremonial
event, Balcerowicz showed himself still almost religiously
satisfied at having finally unleashed “healthy” market forces
and creative destruction and at punishing Polish workers
for “the crowding out of conscience” that he thought had
been their willing fate under the state-led economy (Kalb
2002; for further examples, see Buchowski 2006). Inevitability
was mentioned regularly, but speakers were keen to turn
such perceived necessity into (their own) virtue. While they
celebrated their peaceful victory over communism and the
Evil Empire in lusty Vienna, there was no audible dissent to
the silencing of the workers’ fight and plight among the exdissident
new Polish elite at this particular banquet, as there
surely would have been at other banquets.20
This was the context that Michal Buchowski has recently
described with the notion of “internal orientalization”
(also Kideckel 2002, 2007), which “blames workers and
peasants for their own degraded circumstances and for society’s
difficulties” (2006:467). It refers to a public climate in
which workers “have proven to be ‘civilizationally incompetent’
(Sztompka 1993), show a ‘general lack of discipline
and diligence’ (Sztompka 1996:119) and obstruct the efforts
of those who are accomplished and the progress of whole
societies in the region” (Buchowsky 1996:469). By regularly
invoking the Homo sovieticus syndrome, liberal intellectuals
displaced workers out of the bounds of Europe and
into a timeless Asia. At the same moment, they passionately
claimed a place for themselves in the new European
pantheon, invoking their conscientious and peaceful advocacy
of liberal civil society against the communist Goliath
and their successful liberalization and privatization of “the
economy.” More than that, they prided themselves on their
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successful imposition of Western-type civil society and individualism
on backward, populist eastern nations.
Zadrozny is basically speechless in response to this inflicted
symbolic violence. As a tenacious fighter for justice,
he keeps uttering that he has always refused to believe that
“Poles were worthless.” But he clearly recognizes how important
this public attack, the withdrawal of recognition,
has been in breaking resistance and disqualifying collective
action in working-class communities. Internal orientalization
served as one of the style figures of a process of cultural
dispossession that accompanied, deepened, and smoothed
the material process of dispossession simultaneously taking
place. It was one of the cultural mechanisms that helped
produce a Polish ethnic folk figure against a cosmopolitanizing
elite, as Friedman would have anticipated.
Zadrozny makes another important observation that
merits further decoding: “Enterprises were broken into
pieces and left to fight for themselves,” and he blames,
among others, Solidarnosc and the church for this. He also
mentions, in the same breath, “Poles having their vices” and
the related “absence of a spirit of resistance.” In fact, he addresses
the whole liberal complex of dispossession at once.
Again, when he talks of “enterprises,” he, in fact, is talking
about whole living communities with all the necessary supportive
social services. In a more narrow sense, he refers to
the self-management movement and its failure to protect
the firms against the attacks by the neoliberal state. He correctly
registers the fragmentation of working-class power
around 1990 and its failures in the face of the emerging liberal
state-making project.
But for all his experientially based insights into the
liberal complex of dispossession in Poland, he all but ignores
the way in which this outcome was to some extent
intentionally inscribed by the communist generals when
they introduced worker self-management and cut the links
between local worker sodalities and national dissidents.
The growing control by worker constituencies over factories
was clearly not anticipated by the regime, which
underestimated the cohesiveness of working-class communities
and overestimated its own legitimacy. But the displacement
of the point of struggle from the national center
down to the single local firm, and the erasure of the dangerous
liaisons between them, was shrewdly intended and
subsequently guaranteed by military rule and repression.
Thus, the conditions that allowed worker groups to repossess
assets from the communist state were the same conditions
that subsequently prevented them from fighting in
concerted ways against dispossession by the liberal state.
Remember that it had been precisely the worker–dissident
alliance that had made the 1980 national rebellion possible
in the first place (see Kubik 1994; Ost 1990; among others).
Cut off from its civil base in working-class communities,
the intelligentsia, now nurtured by the generals and
their technocrats and selectively put in control of the state
by a dying regime in 1988–89, did exactly what the communist
generals had scripted for it: It turned against the local
working-class owner-occupiers, destroyed their cohesion,
power, and emergent alliances, and secured their assets for
the state, becoming the main beneficiary or owner-occupier
of those assets. Zadrozny will understandably not picture
this. It would be a devastating insight for him. That is why he
must sense conspiracy or at least perverse complicity. Before
picking up Zadrozny’s narrative, I discuss one last aspect
of how resistance had been undermined by the institutionalization
of self-management itself, an aspect that helps
embed his disappointments.
As self-management got consolidated, a predictable
shift occurred in leading personalities. And this shift contributed
significantly to the lack of mobilization and popular
energy after 1989. Zadrozny, the vocational teacher,
was recognized as an honorable fighter for living in truth
and had the trust of his coworkers, but the technicalities
of self-managing a midtech firm with around ten thousand
workers (in the mid-eighties) inevitably brought people to
the fore with a different habitus. In that shift, Zadrozny
rightly felt that some other people were better qualified to
lead than he was. His sister, Malgorzata Calinska, a strong
woman and a bookkeeper in the accounting department,
was brought in and successfully used the symbol of kinship
to ask for a transfer of trust from her brother to her,
which she received and retained until at least 2008. She is
still a democratically chosen paid union representative in
Polar (and a national political backbench figure in the rightwing
coalition). Zbigniew Kostecki, working at the department
of quality control and with an M.A. in economics in
hand, was asked to lead the workers’ council; later he became
the chairman of Polar’s supervisory board and a director
of a large local firm. The Wroclaw-wide club of leaders
in self-management, which had emerged in the later
eighties to answer the need for more coordination among
self-management activists, was chaired by Andrzej Piszel.
He had a managerial position in the computer firm Elwro
and a university degree in computer science and later became
a member of the national parliament and a successful
entrepreneur. In short, leadership was transferred from a
deeply political vocational teacher aspiring to live in truth,
someone with great credit among his fellow workers on the
assembly line, to more technically and highly schooled personnel,
who then turned their experiences into significant,
sometimes nonlocal, careers on the basis of their expertise.
But these were not the people who could or would
mobilize working-class communities to fight with a regime
still ostensibly seen as their own democratic achievement
and hailed by the wider world as an example of successful
peaceful political transition. Certainly Kostecki and Piszel
tended to retrospectively view worker self-management as
an intermediate technical solution to the problems of a centrally
led economy on its way to full marketization rather
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than as a popular claim for justice, as it was for Zadrozny
and his coworkers.
I continue with Zadrozny’s narrative at the precise
point at which it broke off above:
Now it is all coming out, that it was prepared by the Secret
Services [see also Los and Zybertowicz 2000]. But
this knowledge should have been there before. I was
saying this but nobody listened. When people raised
critical voices they were set apart as lunatics. I still work
in production and I was always chided, first for [Lech]
Walesa’s betrayal, then for the corruption of AWS [the
political party coalition Akcja Wyborcza Solidarnosc
(Solidarity Electoral Action)]. And it was me who had to
excuse their failures while those high up did not have
to excuse themselves at all. They were uninterested. I
am surprised that all these smart people find lustration
unimportant.
He explains that, because crucial things were never investigated,
including the choice of who would be at the Round
Table and all that came after, accusations can always come
up and the press will immediately turn them into a spectacle,
which destroys reputations and politics but never leads
to more insight. In this vision, widely shared among my informants,
the secret services become the actual agencies
behind the scene that control all sorts of private knowledge.
When groups organize politically and become an
obstacle for inside networks, Zadrozny argues, the secret
services can always break them apart by releasing bits of information
about their members or concocting falsehoods.
“And then finally all the scandals are supposed to discredit
lustration itself because, as you can see, everyone has
done it.”
Many people were compromised under communism
because they were concerned about their career, Zadrozny
explains. “But you do not necessarily need to have a career.
Just live in truth!” And he continues with a story
about his own illegal company journal, “Our Home,” in the
eighties:
We actually cleared things up. We investigated. But now
there is a lot of lies. And the press has been given away
while we are passive onlookers. This is just outrageous,
giving away the press and the banks [90 percent of
which are foreign owned]. There is a good chance that
the banks started steering privatization for their own
ends when they at once shortened the payback periods
of loans in the early nineties. For us at Polar it became
at once impossible to pay. I was not against Solidarnosc
entering politics. But Solidarnosc entered politics without
doing politics. I have always thought that politics
should be everywhere. Different people, not just liberals,
should have been at the Round Table, people less
eager to strike a deal.
Since 1998, Zadrozny has identified with the far-right
party of the League of Polish Families, which he sees as not
yet morally compromised, and he has become a big supporter
of President Lech Kaczynski and his brother Jaroslaw,
the former prime minister. He was utterly disappointed by
the weakness of Solidarnosc and its right-wing parliamentary
branch, the AWS party, in 1997–98. He was, first of
all, disappointed about the actual paths and outcomes of
privatization. Neither Solidarnosc nor AWS was willing to
do politics and take privatization out of its neoliberal orbit.
Polar was first “X-rayed” against Western standards by
MacKinsey. Then, after 30 percent of its jobs were axed, it
was pushed into the hands of a French investor that was reluctant
to commit investments or even sign a “social package.”
It was the refusal to do the latter, in particular, that
hurt the old unionists at Polar. It at once made clear to them
that they had lost all institutional clout and were at the full
mercy of market forces. The French owner went bankrupt in
the early 2000s, and Polar could be cherry-picked, without
much negotiation, by Whirlpool.
But, ultimately, Zadrozny’s disappointment was about
far more than Polar’s acquisition by foreign corporations,
just as factories and self-management used to be about
far more than mere production for the market. It was
about community, “Our Home,” and about value at large.
Zadrozny narrates a long story of decline of neighborhoods,
of safety, of sports, of youth, and of the rise of criminality.
He strongly believes that the ex-communist security forces
benefited from street crime, hooliganism, and fear and happily
let them thrive. In his neighborhood, homeowners’ associations
are asked to pay extra contributions to the police
if they want to have better security. And they all pay. Fear
makes people weak and makes them long for the beautiful
past of communism, he claims, a nostalgia that he is contemptuous
of. He sometimes serves as a court juror and remarks
that the courts are heavily underfunded, not able to
deal with the pressures on society at all. Zadrozny, the vocational
teacher and basketball trainer, deplores the demoralization
of working-class youth, and he slips finally into a
glorification of Jozef Pilsudski, the interwar Polish populist
dictator with socialist leanings, and compares him favorably
with the current regime. He then jumps to excess: “If
we were to put the middle-ranking communists in prison
(as supposedly Pilsudski would have done), then the margin
of error would have been negligible. The vast majority
was corrupted. They are simply unfit for patriots.”
Fighting amnesia with the Kaczynskis
Zadrozny therefore cheered up during the creation of the
Kaczynskis’ right-wing populist government in 2005. The
Kaczynski brothers, dubbed by the Economist magazine
Europe’s “Terrible Twins,” brought a resurgent Right to
power with precisely the election themes that were close to
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Zadrozny’s heart. In fact, the Kaczynskis finally lifted the
anger and concerns of Zadrozny’s class and generation
out of the local communities and onto the level of the
nation-state. They combined nationalist and protective
economic policies, conservative family and gender policies,
and zero-tolerance and anticrime positions with vitriolic
anti–European Union reflexes and authoritarian lustration
fantasies. Their policy visions culminated in an assertive
anti-German stance within the European Union, mobilizations
against the emergent European Constitutional Treaty,
which supposedly would corrupt Polish sovereignty, and
antiliberal diatribes focused on the planned Equality Parade
in Warsaw, which was supported by European multiculturalists.
Most spectacularly, their law-and-order vision
was not conveniently restricted to the petty street crime of
neighborhood youth but extended to exposing the middleand
top-level corruption that people like Zadrozny had
been singling out for years.
Populists are fighting official and imposed amnesia, by
definition. That is because the historical and cultural narratives
of the new liberal regimes inevitably obscure the actual
cultural and material dispossession that has been going
on. The Kaczynski government adopted this stance, and
it therefore invited the contempt of liberals in Poland and
elsewhere. The Kaczynskis engineered two excellent occasions
for fighting amnesia. The first was based in the attack
on the secret services and their collaborators and was
aimed at the imposed historical amnesia of the “thick line”;
the second concerned the amnesia about poverty and social
rights and was instantiated in struggles around the Equality
Parade in Warsaw. Both had strong working-class connotations
and resonance.
The Kaczynski regime was, above all, meant to be
the end of the “thick line” that liberals like Michnik
and Geremek had defended all through the nineties. The
thick line, in Polish parlance, refers to the no-blame, nopunishment
policy in relation to past behavior, agreed to in
the Round Table pact between the “chosen” democrats and
the communist generals. None of my working-class informants
in Wroclaw ever said a good word about the policy
of the thick line.21
Without exception, they favored lustration
and punishment. The Kaczynski government channeled
these popular and populist feelings into the creation
of a very well endowed anticorruption watchdog that,
among other tasks, compiled a register of some 700,000 Polish
individuals suspected of collaboration with the communist
secret services. Very tellingly, the most prominent
potential traitor in the eyes of the Kaczynski government
was Geremek, by now a widely respected former minister
of foreign affairs, a professor of history, a member of the
European Parliament, and an active participant in liberal–
conservative European think tanks. Geremek was among
hundreds of thousands of academics, judges, administrators,
engineers, and businesspeople who were summoned
to submit declarations that they were not guilty of collaboration,
an intentional inversion of the liberal procedures for
establishing innocence and guilt: Suspicion was sufficient
for an accusation, and proof had to be shown to refute a
suspicion. The full Western press joined Gazeta Wyborcza,
Michnik’s liberal daily, in a sustained public outcry against
the demeaning picture of Geremek, for some, the icon of
dissident incorruptibility, pushed into submission by a populist
government in Warsaw and desperately pleading his
innocence before a hardly friendly committee of populists,
judging him under the eyes of a less than civil public media.
But, of course, as Buchowski (2006) would appreciate, it
was both the material history as well as the public culture of
working-class dispossession that worked to place Geremek
in the top position on the corruption list. In fact, the post-
1989 Polish elite finally faced the return of the repressed: It
would be punished for its own willing and nationally imposed
amnesia of the workers’ fight as well as their plight,
and for that to happen, its “pacted” and therefore quasiconstitutionally
imposed amnesia had to be inverted by a
lustration that was not just about communists but about the
new liberal elite as well. And this was all posed as the Polish
ethnic nation taking revenge on those of its members who
had sold it out. There was an ominous underlying, if not explicit,
message to the Polish liberal elite in this: that it might
not have been you who were “the people” in 1989, but we.
Zadrozny agreed wholeheartedly.
Consider in this context the symbolism of the Equality
Parade, which used to be called the “Gay Parade.”22
This
international parade was intentionally scheduled to take
place in postsocialist Warsaw to challenge then mayor Lech
Kaczynski’s “antimulticulturalism.” Mayor Kaczynski had
forbidden the parade in 2004 and 2005, his refusal spiced
up with politically incorrect antiliberal and antigay rhetoric.
A youth organization associated with the League of Polish
Families and founded by Jaroslaw Kaczynski’s ideologuecum-education
minister Roman Giertych had beaten up local
parade participants in the years before. West European
political classes from the multiculti Left had intervened
and had officially warned Warsaw about spreading “intolerance.”
That pressure helped to secure the event for 2006 and
2007, which now included the participation of high-level
Western politicians, mostly from the German Greens, under
the banner of promoting human rights in Poland. The
League of Polish Families, however, was allowed to schedule
a countermanifestation at the same time. Zadrozny participated
in it. He was annoyed by the multicultural and human
rights imagery sponsored by the European Union. “Why is
the EU making so much fuss about that parade,” he asked?
“Nobody in Brussels says a word if Polish workers starve on
low wages, have to work like dogs, and get exploited.”
For him, apparently, the Equality Parade was a travesty
that served another important amnesia. He recalled that the
equality in the title of this parade once meant a concern
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with social rights, and not just multicultural gay rights. And
he therefore hinted at western Europe’s forgetfulness of its
own history. Many of my informants in Wroclaw would have
concurred. Of course, a clash of class surrounds multiculti
events such as gay parades. From the point of view of postsocialist
industrial workers, who had lost control over their
factories and communities, had barely saved their skins in
the collapse of their industries, and had been confined to a
life of hard work and material stagnation in a hostile public
environment that openly fetishized consumption, they
appeared as rituals extolling the pleasure of licentious, freechoice
consumerism. They were part of a festival of neverending
free circulation, as it were. Not just a circulation
of objects, however, but of objectified intimate relations.
The workers’ own lives taught other lessons. One of those
lessons was the importance of solidarity within families and
among trusted friends rather than of free circulation.23
Free
circulation had turned out to be precisely a threat to solidarity,
trust, and intimacy. Another lesson was that the liberal
promise of mass consumption had simply been false and
that the opportunities of a world of endless circulation and
unlimited pleasure had been very unfairly distributed. The
Equality Parade, for the workers, was not just an indecent
public act, as it was for the Polish Catholic church. It was,
rather, an indecent public myth that served to silence the
Polish popular reality of scarcity, of toil, and of confinement
for many; a reality that received much less attention and respect
from the European Union and others, they felt, than
that frivolous parade. Hence, it was again a case of public
amnesia. A festival used as a signifier to obscure an uncomfortable
reality. And the Polish ethnic nation was again
positioned against the promiscuous cosmopolitans who
were pictured as literally willing to sell themselves out to
everybody.
History is still repeating itself
Throughout our conversations, Zadrozny pointed out several
times that “history repeats itself.” Polish people have
lost their sovereignty and dignity repeatedly throughout
history, and he firmly doubts whether an end to national
victimization will be found in this era of liberal capitalist
globalization. “The power is still the same,” he argues.
“There is big disillusionment. Also I am disillusioned. We
thought that if some Western companies come in, there will
be good order and justice and that all these things so typical
of socialism would be over; like petty fighting for pay rises,
all that petty bargaining. We thought it would be wisely and
humanely ordered.”
In 2005, Polar was taken over by Whirlpool. Wroclaw
will become the main European production and development
location of this U.S. oligopolist in the white-goods
sector. Substantial investments are finally being made in
new production lines, machinery, and buildings. Nevertheless,
Zadrozny is often addressed by fellow workers about
the stepped-up productivity norms and the petty despotism
on the shop floor. “It is just abnormal,” he says, invoking the
symbolic heritage of the workers’ fight for “normality.”
Certain things from communism, such as the singular
focus on productivity, on work, and not on the human
being, are persisting. This is an American firm but it
is a beggars’ firm. The West should imply quality. They
all complain about socialism, but these masters nowadays
seem just hell-bent to churn out these 500 items—
everything has become so tense and tight. Compared
with socialism, our current piecework norms are much
tougher. And the style of being a master derives directly
from socialism. The worst aspects of communism are
retained and are combined with the worst things from
the West.
Real wages on the shop floor have hardly risen since 1997,
when we started research. They are still just over 300 euros
(roughly $400) per month. Average wages in Poland (and
eastern Europe, in general), of course, do rise, but median
wages rise much more slowly, and all the personal information
that we got from interviews with workers, including
union representatives, from personnel directors, and from
local researchers indicate that production-line wages had
completely stagnated at least until early 2007 (see below).
In fact Zadrozny’s generation has experienced generalized
and lifelong stagnation in earnings. Against that, there has
been a 700 percent rise [sic!] in productivity per worker in
the Polar-Whirlpool factory as a whole since Whirlpool took
over. New investments in machines, supplies, and logistics
have certainly played a role in this. But, very tellingly, a notable
hierarchization of relations has occurred on the shop
floor. The number of masters and overseers, who impose
capitalist work discipline on the shop floor, has roughly
doubled. These individuals now earn wages that are 50–100
percent higher than those of line workers, something unheard
of in the past. Workers with long experience cannot
remember that work has ever been so stressful. They note
that young people find the work very hard to bear and often
leave the factory after a few weeks. Zadrozny, the teacher
and sports trainer, often helps them to control their bodies,
energy, and concentration, but even the best of them need
three full weeks to learn to cope with the pressure, and they
need months to get used to it.
He is genuinely concerned:
Young people have been cheated. They studied hard
but still can’t get decent jobs here. It is a rat race. Young
people and their potentials have been exploited. I think
there is gross disappointment. On the one hand there
were great promises, but in fact very little has been delivered.
There is this shallowness of life and the old role
models are falling apart. There is less patriotism. It is
easy for people just to leave, to migrate. They are not
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held back by anything. They even make kids abroad,
but not here. And they do not appreciate the unions
that we’ve built. But we could have gone so much further!
If only we didn’t have to bother about certain
things [I suspect this is a superior understatement referring
to the still threatening presence of the Soviet
Union in 1988–89], we could have turned it all upside
down, formed a government of our own, a parliament
earlier. All these anti-labor regulations would not have
been so advanced and the employers that were coming
in would have been coming on different terms. And
that, ultimately, is the great loss. People were willing.
There was zest. We could have been building a new society.
And I think that this is what the Poles expected to
happen. It was just like after the war. There was this rebuilding
atmosphere and people had the will to switch
to another system and to other habits too. But I guess
it didn’t work out too well. Wild capitalism emerged. It
was all great on the surface but on the inside it was not
the human relations that we craved.
Conclusion
In a stimulating recent study, the political scientist David
Ost (2005) has argued that right-wing ideologues such as
the Kaczynskis cunningly imposed a willful “illiberal” hegemony
over postsocialist workers in Poland (and, he implies,
elsewhere). They did so to catch the worker vote while trying
to avoid confrontations with capital about wage issues.
Reactionary culture and the politics of symbols, he implies,
was substituted for anticapital mobilization and organized
bargaining. I propose an alternative explanation of Polish
outcomes (and those elsewhere). My explanation is less focused
on wage issues and is less “ideas based” (Ost’s words)
in the mode of Laclau and Mouffe 1985, less focused on the
discursive machinations of political elites. It is more relational
in the Gramscian sense (Smith 2004), in that it looks
at a particular hidden history of worker sodalities and their
dramatically declining power, prestige, and opportunities in
postsocialist Poland, including the volatile articulations of
their emergent “common sense” and sense of injustice with
public political process and its discursive signifiers.
Ost is correct in putting his finger on the politics of
the Polish liberal intelligentsia after 1989 as a major factor
behind the production of right-wing populism, but he
has been less than persuasive in suggesting that, in their
rise, the Kaczynskis and their circles manipulated industrial
workers into a paranoid illiberal politics that distracted
from their “real” class interests, which is apparently equated
with wage bargaining. Against such reductive and prescriptive
notions of class and interest from the liberal cookbook, I
make an anthropological case for analyzing the much more
complex and comprehensive critical junctions that describe
both the global and local historical configurations of power
that structure workers’ worlds, as well as their personal becoming
“in class ways” in Poland (and elsewhere). I point,
first, to the displacement over time of material struggles
onto public symbolic confrontations that are supposed to
make up, a bit, for terrain lost after the fights over communal
property had ended in irreversible defeat; second, to the
flanking cultural dispossession and vibrant internal orientalism
that was being unleashed; and, third, to dissipation
of the resources and cohesion needed to take up new fights
in a now liberal and globalized context of a subordinate and
dependent east European capitalism.
The Kaczynskis are an organic product of popular Polish
resentment and not its originator, nor do they dominate
it. Currently, Poland is, indeed, far from unique in pitting
figures of ethnic folk against liberal cosmopolitans and
in substituting conflict in those terms for old-style modernist
languages of class conflict. Ost might have noted the
structural decline of the legitimacy of liberal state elites under
globalization in Poland, as elsewhere, including western
Europe. In fact, by emphasizing the intentionally political
framing work of right-wing ideologues as the prime
driver of right-wing resurgence, this sort of analysis overestimates
the resources for popular legitimacy on the part
of the political classes of contemporary competition states
and the capitalist globalizations of which they are a part. Ultimately,
such left-liberal analyses misrecognize the structural
processes of popular disenfranchisement by ignoring
them as structural and painting them as contingent because
erasable by unionism. As Zadrozny’s history shows, the class
tristesse is about much more than the lack of wage bargaining,
nor is such wage bargaining a mere matter of voluntarism
and finding the right political representation. The
weakness of bargaining is just an expression of the overall
loss of power and prestige.
The Kaczynski interlude, however, has also suggested
something else. Post-1989 politics in east-central Europe
has always been more a politics of resentment than a politics
of endorsement. Electoral participation has consistently
hovered around a dismaying 50 percent, and few
governments anywhere in central and eastern Europe have
won two elections in a row except under special conditions.
Postcommunist transition under conditions of neoliberal
globalization and the dual crisis of labor and sovereignty
was never truly electorally approved. The extrication from
the iron Soviet embrace and the farewell to the local communist
party machines were unanimously celebrated but
not the substance of what came after. The Kaczynskis got
into power because their voters, at best some 15 percent of
the electorate, were the only ones motivated to go to the
polls in 2005. And even though many of my informants in
the Wroclaw electrical industries felt a certain discursive
proximity to the Kaczynskis, only a minority were actually
willing to give them their votes. My informants whispered,
and sometimes screamed, political cynicism of all sorts,
rather than a positive belief in the virtues of any Warsaw
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Conversations American Ethnologist
government, including that of the Kaczynskis. Only a few,
such as Zadrozny, really embraced the Kaczynski campaign
of virtue, fear, and suspicion. In October 2007, the rightwing
government was voted out again, and the remnants of
the liberal Freedom Union—now with a more social face—
were voted in. Participation at the polls was higher than it
had been since 1989, an enormous 51 percent. Although
the Kaczynskis gained a higher numerical following than
in 2005, mobilization among educated youth in the bigger
cities changed the fragile electoral equation.
Something else had changed too in the conditions of
working-class reproduction in bigger Polish cities, including
Wroclaw. EU accession in 2004 had finally delivered
three things that Poles had been intensely longing for since
1989: (1) the possibility of large-scale labor emigration to
the West; (2) a massively accelerating flow of industrial investments
by transnational enterprises to the east; and (3)
big transfers from the EU regional and agricultural funds.
Poland was the biggest regional recipient as well as originator
of these flows, and central and eastern Europe as a
whole was turned into the premier mass production base
for Western and Asian corporations operating in the European
Union. After 2004, these three processes together finally
began to make a dent in Polish unemployment, the
highest in Europe (official unemployment in 2003 was still
close to 20 percent; in 2008 it was about 11 percent, although
participation rates in the formal labor market remained
low compared to west European standards).
The declining labor reserve and the accelerated incorporation
into global capitalism were leading to tighter labor
markets and increasingly despotic regimes of labor in manufacturing.
Although my interviewees in the late nineties
would complain about scheming communists and a public
life corrupted by liberals, in this new European and global
context they began to tell stories of increasing old-style exploitation
by (Western) capital. Significantly, a wider shift in
political identifications seemed underway that might help
to reframe Polish resentment in the years to come. “We are
workers, after all,” said an only slightly embarrassed informant
in April 2007; he had, in the late nineties, insisted
that he had always been a sort of entrepreneur. It was the
first time since I started research in Poland in 1997 that we
had heard the word worker, with old-style socialist connotations,
used as self-ascription in an interview. While uttering
this sentence, the man, in his fifties, kept a searching eye on
my interviewer, deeply unsure of, but somehow also eager
for, his approval.
The politics of resentment in postsocialist central and
eastern Europe will probably remain blurred between nationalist
rejections of liberal cosmopolitan elites that keep
selling out the nation and bouts of workerist emphasis on
the class struggle, as Polish manufacturing locations will
feel the heat of Asian labor reserves with even fewer social,
economic, and political rights.
In this article, I have studied the particular Polish path
to populist paranoia. I have argued that, to analyze the current,
often screaming, headlines of nation and nationalism,
scholars should not just study nationalist parties and
elites but, rather, bring a relational approach to trajectories
and configurations of class to penetrate the lived subtexts
of social and existential insecurity and its attendant
fears and angers. I have shown how analyzing critical junctions
among Wolf’s levels of structural, tactical, and agential
power through time and space can help unlock the hidden
and entangled histories of subalternity that feed the anger
and resentment articulated in current European right-wing
populisms. Such a procedure forces one to recognize in
the Polish case that celebratory discourses of successful
democratization, economic growth, transition, and EU accession
obscure deep local histories of dispossession, disenfranchisement,
and dedemocratization that force themselves
onstage via volatile and biting populisms that rock
the political process in unexpected ways. Similar, though
different (and contextually specific), critical junctions of
class and disenfranchisement create similar, though different
(again, context-specific), bouts of havoc in western
Europe and elsewhere.
Notes
Acknowledgments. This article is based on intermittent
periods of local research and interviewing over a period of ten
years, sponsored by the Netherlands Science Organization (1997–
2001) and Central European University’s Research Board (2007).
I am deeply grateful for the research support offered by Herman
Tak, Ewa Tak-Ignaczak, and Kacper Poblocki. I have enormously
benefited from comments from, and discussions with, Istvan
Adorjan, Eszter Bartha, Johanna Bockman, Glenn Bowman, Jan
Drahokoupil, Doug Holmes, Marc Edelman, Tamas Kraus, David
Ost, Mathijs Pelkmans, Kacper Poblocki, Tony Robben, Oscar
Salemink, Gavin Smith, Luisa Steur, Sid Tarrow, Katherine Verdery,
Nico Wilterdink, and participants at discussions in the framework
of the Max Weber Programme at the European University Institute,
Florence, and at the Department of Sociology and Social
Anthropology, Central European University, Budapest.
1. I am not saying that discussions about these concepts have
lost all meaning. On the contrary, scholars are still in the phase
of tracking where we actually are analytically and historically and
where we have been heading. We need continued debate on neoliberalism,
its nature, limits, and permutations. See, for example,
the enlightening debate between John Clarke (2008a, 2008b), Peter
Little (2008), Don Nonini (2008), and Neil Smith (2008).
2. Although the recent reappearance of welfare states and national
protective economies in the wake of the current financial crisis
suggests otherwise, I would argue that what is occurring now is
not much more than the capitalist state doing its fire-extinguishing
tasks on behalf of capital; indeed, it is actually doing these tasks in
ways that might turn out to be, in the absence of concerted civic
mobilization, even more inequitable than under the conditions
of neoliberalism-as-we-have-known-it. For an analytically similar
perspective, see Panitch and Gindin 2008.
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American Ethnologist Volume 36 Number 2 May 2009
3. Is a partial shift toward a dynamized ethnography going on in
such a rational choice–based field as political science? See the important
examples of Ost 2005 and Derluguian 2005 on the present
subject of neonationalism and class and the stimulating arguments
for contextualized approaches in political analysis in Goodin and
Tilly 2005 and Tilly 2006, among others.
4. Note the close affinity of this Wolfian analytic agenda with
Tilly’s approach to political analysis (Goodin and Tilly 2005; Tilly
2006): echoes of an earlier phase of anthropological interdisciplinarity
that remains utterly relevant these days.
5. Michal Buchowski (2006) has demonstrated that east European
elites have similar, and perhaps even more unrestrained, orientalizing
ideas about their “lesser” compatriots.
6. Peter Van der Veer (2006) should be mentioned as an exception.
He sees Dutch populist mobilization against Islam as a
consequence of the incapacity of the Dutch to deal with religion.
Note, however, that the wider political-economic background to
the Dutch mobilizations disappears in his analysis and that he does
not treat the Dutch anti-Muslim response as a form of reactive nationalism,
as I am suggesting.
7. I am explicitly siding here with Michael Burawoy (2001) in his
world-system and class-based critique of Eyal et al. 1998 and Stark
and Bruszt 1998, but I remain slightly more methodologically sympathetic
to the path-dependency approaches advocated in those
works than Burawoy seems to be. I emphasize the critical junctions
of global–spatial process and local histories (see Kalb 2005). They
are part of the same parcel of world-systemic processes. See also
Drahokoupil 2008 in relation to the emergence of the competition
state in central and eastern Europe, which uses a related criticaljunctions
approach.
8. I am well aware that my study could be presented as a case
study in what David Harvey (2003) has called “accumulation by
dispossession” or as another case of Naomi Klein’s (2007) “disaster
capitalism” and “shock complex” (Klein 2007 has a good chapter
on Poland). Although recognizing the importance of these theorizations,
in general as well as for my Polish material, I decided
in this instance to protect my case against theoretical overstretch.
Nevertheless, I would not refrain from claiming a very close general
elective affinity between accumulation by dispossession and
populism.
9. From 1997 to 2000, I worked with small teams of interviewers,
following a snowball method set in train by two local key informants
involved in Solidarnosc labor unions. We interviewed some
sixty local workers at length, often two or more times, sometimes at
their homes, sometimes at the factory premises or in Solidarnosc
offices. We also interviewed labor union leaders at the Polar factory,
personnel managers, specialists on the local economy, and locally
acknowledged self-management leaders. In 2007, Kacper Poblocki
and I did extensive follow-up interviews with 25 of our informants
and with some of their children. Other sources we consulted were
private archives of activists and (unsystematically) the local and national
press.
10. There are, of course, also excellent general studies “from a
distance,” such as Shields 2007.
11. I am grateful to Johanna Bockman and Dora Vetta for pointing
out to me that similar meanings of the symbol of privatization
were current among Yugoslav workers at the time; see also
Uvalic 1997. Professor Tamas Krausz (personal communication)
confirms that, in Hungary, workers’ management was, for a short
while around 1988–89, popularly felt to be an option. Bill Lomax
(1980), Paul Lendvai (2008), and others, of course, have shown that
the Hungarian revolution in 1956 was not just about sovereignty
and democracy but also very much about worker councils opposing
the Stalinist command economy and the new Soviet-imposed
Kadar regime.
12. Surprisingly little research has been done on workers’ selfmanagement–self-government,
either in Poland (although I cannot
claim to know all sources) or in international publications. The best
international reference is probably Poznanski 1996. I have never
seen thick local research into the actual dynamics of it. In general,
local historical research on the last decades of socialism and early
postsocialism is just reaching the publishing phase; see, for example,
Eszter Bartha’s (2007) insightful dissertation. I claim that in the
Polish case these local dynamics often ultimately led to a form of
legitimate control and effective claims over property by worker col-
lectivities.
13. In fact, one other person had similar influence at Polar–
Wroclaw. His name is Andrzej Kowalski. He is mentioned by Padraic
Kenney (2003) and was also one of our informants. The differences
between Zadrozny and Kowalski are interesting. Zadrozny’s parents
came from villages in the east and remained religious throughout
their lives. Zadrozny had a teacher’s diploma. He represented revolutionary
Polish nationalist Catholicism. Kowalski’s parents came
from Gdansk and were largely secular. He only had a primaryschool
education and represented more left-wing views. Workers’
Catholicism as an ethical source of rebellion has probably been underestimated
in the “labor conflicts” in socialist Poland.
14. This history is based on interviews with Andrzej Piszel and
Zbigniew Kostecki, two key actors, as well as on Kostecki’s private
archive of newspaper clippings and other writings on worker selfmanagement
from the early eighties to early nineties. I am very
grateful to Kostecki for allowing us to see these materials.
15. How seriously worker collectives identified with their role of
owners can be sensed from the fact that workers in Polar made significant
savings on their wage fund to modernize its production
lines and launch a new dishwasher plant, the kind of behavior well
known from studies of worker cooperatives such as Mondragon in
Spain.
16. My oral research generated extensive insight into the politics
of privatization of Polar workers, who basically tried to keep a
branch investor from taking over the firm after transnational corporations
such as Siemens had killed off the large local Pafawag
firm and after Elwro, the computer maker, had been destroyed too.
They also tried to secure as many shares in Polar as possible for
themselves as a group (not individualized shares), which ultimately
left them with 15 percent. The state got the rest after it floated Polar
on the Warsaw stock exchange and sold 35 percent to Brandt, the
French investor that went bankrupt in the early 2000s. I have no
space here to go into this. But the intensity of workers’ sustained
mobilization and consultation about the particular choices in the
privatization of “their” plant must be emphasized.
17. The debt, in the end, got substantially reduced in two waves
in the early and mid-nineties. Western creditors, mostly sovereign
creditors coming together in the Paris Club of Creditor Nations, had
kept up the pressure on the debt from 1989 to 1992 and had waited
to alter its terms until the new regime had fully implemented the
emerging Washington Consensus agenda of liberalization, political
stabilization had been achieved, and crucial choices in the direction
of wholesale privatization had been made. When the communists
were voted back into power in 1993, the West panicked
and decided it had to cut the debt to keep Poland, and, with it,
perhaps the whole of eastern Europe, in the Western camp and
to prevent it from slipping out off control. Poland was the first
nation to be so kindly served by the “international community.”
Significantly, Yugoslavia was denied similar treatment, which contributed
in multiple ways to its violent implosion (see Woodward
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1994). After 2000, as a consequence of the successful Jubilee Debt
Campaign, some African nations received “debt forgiveness,” followed
up under strict guidance by the World Bank.
18. This was the view expressed, for example, by Jerzy Scacki,
a respected “grandfather” of Polish sociology, in a talk at the Institute
for Human Sciences in Vienna in 1997, which I attended.
Several discussants, including myself, tried to convince him that
labor unions are a crucial part of civil society, but he refused to accept
that position because unions demonstrated “communist style
claiming behavior” and were not “self-responsible.”
19. I served as director of the Soco program at the Institute for
Human Sciences in Vienna and, as such, was part of the “Ten Years
After” celebration. Soco was a support program for social policy research
mainly in the Visegrad countries and was funded by the Ford
Foundation and the Austrian Federal Chancellery. Soco was one of
the Western responses to the surprise election of the postcommunists
in 1993 in Poland.
20. The exception was the Catholic ex–prime minister of Poland,
Tadeusz Mazowiecki, whose duty it was to announce the shocktherapy
program in the parliament in September 1989 and who still
suffered visibly from the recollection. See also Klein 2007:180–181.
21. John Borneman (1997) argued correctly that postsocialist
regimes would suffer from legitimacy problems generated by the
impunity conferred by the “thick line.” He also partly foresaw that
such problems would be deflected onto “cultural others,” including
other nations and minorities. However, he did not foresee
that “liberals” would be turned into “cultural aliens” and “traitors”
by populist nationalists. See also Narotsky and Smith 2006 on
working-class dissatisfaction with impunity and how, combined
with neoliberal restructuring, it creates problems for regime legitimacy
in postfascist Spain.
22. See Renkin in press for a longer discussion of homophobia
and gay parades in postsocialist Europe as well as an excellent analysis
of events around gay activism in Budapest.
23. Malgorzata Calinska, Zadrozny’s sister and leader of the Solidarnosc
local at Polar, regularly referred to the factory, the workers,
and Solidarnosc as “my family.”
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accepted December 19, 2008
final version submitted January 4, 2009.
Don Kalb
Central European University and Utrecht University
kalbd@ceu.hu
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