VII*—THE AESTHETICS OF NATURE
by Malcolm Budd
ABSTRACT I begin by demonstrating the inadequacy of the idea that the aesthetic
appreciation of nature should be understood as the appreciation of nature
as if it were art. This leads to a consideration of three theses: (i) from the aesthetic
point of view natural items should be appreciated under concepts of the
natural things or phenomena they are, (ii) what aesthetic properties a natural
item really possesses is determined by the right categories of nature to experience
the item as falling under, and (iii) (the doctrine of positive aesthetics with respect
to nature) the natural world untouched by humanity is essentially aesthetically
good. I indicate an unclarity in (i) and identify difficulties facing (ii). I distinguish
various versions of (iii), reject certain of these, and fault a number of arguments
in support of (iii). I conclude that the idea of the aesthetic value of a natural
item is such that it endows the aesthetic appreciation of nature with a freedom
and relativity denied to the appreciation of art and renders (iii) problematic.
I
Introduction. What, if anything, is distinctive of the aesthetics
of nature? That nature is its subject does not in itself distinguish
it from the aesthetics of anything else, the aesthetics of
art, for example, at least with respect to aesthetic appreciation.
For a difference in the kinds of object amenable to aesthetic
appreciation might not introduce any corresponding difference
into the aesthetics of different domains. For example, the fact
that the aesthetics of nature is the aesthetics of nature is compatible
with the view that there is a unitary notion of aesthetic
appreciation according to which aesthetic appreciation abstracts
from what kind of thing the object of appreciation is, focusing
only on an item’s sensible properties and how they are structured
to compose the item’s perceptual form. It is also compatible with
the view that the aesthetics of art is basic and the aesthetics of
nature is to be elucidated in terms of it. According to the first
view, the aesthetic appreciation of nature and of art are distinguished
only by the different natures of their objects, neither
having priority over the other. According to the second view, the
aesthetic appreciation of nature consists in nature’s being
regarded as if it were art.
* Meeting of the Aristotelian Society, held in Senate House, University of London,
on Monday, 24th January, 2000, at 8.15 p.m.
MALCOLM BUDD138
But neither of these views is correct. The first can be quickly
dismissed: it operates with a conception of aesthetic appreciation
manifestly inadequate, not just to the appreciation of art, but
also to the appreciation of nature. For (leaving nature aside) the
aesthetic appreciation of works of art as works of art is appreciation
of them under concepts of the kinds of works of art they
are, and perceptually indistinguishable works nevertheless possess
different aesthetic properties (as with appropriation art that
replicates the original). The second view can also be dismissed
if, as I believe,1
just as the aesthetic appreciation of art is the
appreciation of art as art, so the aesthetic appreciation of nature
is the aesthetic appreciation of nature as nature. For, given that
the natural world is not anyone’s artefact, the aesthetic appreciation
of nature as nature, if it is to be true to what nature actually
is, must be the aesthetic appreciation of nature not as an intentionally
produced object (and so not as art).
But the rejection of the view that the aesthetic appreciation of
nature consists in appreciating nature as if it were art does not
need to rest on the acceptance of this conception of the aesthetic
appreciation of nature as nature. For two demands can be made
of this view, neither of which can be met. First, the undeniable
fact that it is possible to regard a natural object as if it were a
work of art does not entail that this is how we do or should
regard natural objects when we experience them aesthetically. So
an argument is needed to bridge the gap from possibility to actuality
or necessity. Second, an account of the aesthetic appreciation
of nature must be true to the characteristic phenomenology
of the experience of appreciating nature aesthetically.
The impossibility of meeting these two demands can be illustrated
by a consideration of the best articulated attempt to construe
the aesthetic appreciation of nature on the model of the
appreciation of art. Anthony Savile’s account (Savile, 1982, ch. 8)
is superior to other versions of the view precisely because it takes
seriously the implications of the idea of regarding a natural item
as if it were a work of art, which requires integrating natural
beauty into an account of artistic value. One admirable feature
of Savile’s account is that, although it assimilates the aesthetic
1. See Budd (1996). This conception of the aesthetic appreciation of nature has long
been recognised by Allen Carlson and Holmes Rolston III, among others.
THE AESTHETICS OF NATURE 139
appreciation of nature to the appreciation of art, it credits the
aesthetics of nature with a distinctive character. For the difference
between art and nature, which must figure in any adequate
aesthetics, is reflected in a feature — a kind of freedom and a
correlative form of relativity — attributed to aesthetic judgements
about the beauty of natural items but which is not possessed
by judgements about the beauty of art. I believe that
judgements of natural beauty are distinguished by a kind of freedom
and a form of relativity that does not pertain to judgements
of artistic value, but the versions of these ideas I favour are quite
different from Savile’s.
II
The Beauty of Art and the Beauty of Nature. The analysis that
Savile proposes of the beauty of a work of art is based on the
idea that, necessarily, every work of art answers to some problem,
which means that it is constructed to fit a description indicated
by its overall conception, the artist’s guiding overall
intention, a problem that the artist attempts to resolve within a
set of aesthetic constraints that can be called a style. In essence,
the idea is that a work of art is beautiful if and only if, when seen
as answering to its problem in its style, it evokes the appropriate
response, this appropriate response being the feeling of satisfaction
we experience when we recognise that the solution a work
of art proposes to its problem within its aesthetic constraints is
just right.
But if ‘beauty’ is, as Savile maintains, the most general term
of aesthetic praise, univocal, whether predicated of art or nature,
the analysis must be extendable to cover cases of natural as well
as artistic beauty without importing an ambiguity into the concept
of beauty. Now although the notions of problem and style
have no place in nature, this does not preclude the possibility of
regarding a natural object as if it were a work of art constructed
as the solution to a certain problem within a set of stylistic constraints.
And if this is the way in which we do or must experience
natural beauty, the fact that there is no place in nature for style
and problem is no obstacle to a unitary account of beauty. But
for any natural object it will always be possible to think of some
style and problem which are such that the object can be seen
MALCOLM BUDD140
as a satisfactory solution to that problem within the aesthetic
constraints of that style, so that each natural object will be
beautiful under one description or another. Accordingly, Savile
amends his account of beauty so that a judgement of something’s
beauty is a judgement of it under a description (a problem) and
a style, so that the truth value of a judgement of a natural
object’s beauty is relative to the description and style chosen by
the beholder, who is free (unlike the beholder of a work of art)
to select whatever description and style he or she likes.
But this is not sufficient to overcome the problem that natural
beauty poses for the account. For possibility is not the same as
actuality or necessity: the fact that it is possible to regard a natural
object as if it were a work of art does not entail that this is
how we do or should regard natural objects when we experience
them as being beautiful. To bridge the gap between possibility
and actuality͞necessity, Savile first insists that judging something
as if it were a work of art (when it is not) is not a mere possibility,
but something that on occasion actually happens (with a detail
of a work of art). Then:
To make it plausible that this is what happens in the natural case
too we have only to find an explanation of the point of doing so
[i.e. of judging a natural object as if it were a work of art]. We
have, that is, to explain why we should care that nature exhibits
beauty (Savile, 1982: 181–2).
Savile suggests (along Kantian lines, although operating with a
different conception of beauty) that there is good reason to
experience natural things as being beautiful. For in doing so we
love them; in loving Nature our integration in the world is
encouraged; ‘such attachments to the world as are furthered
through the appreciation of its beauties encourage reverence for
it and a respect for the claims that it makes against ourselves’
(Savile, 1982: 182); and so, in loving something disinterestedly
that is distinct from ourselves, morality is furthered.
But this explanation of why we should care that nature exhibits
beauty, whatever its merits, fails to bridge the gap in the argument.
For what is needed is (i) an explanation of the point of
judging a natural object as if it were a work of art, and (ii) an
argument to the effect that this mode of judgement is mandatory
or the only possibility for the judgement of natural beauty. And
the suggestion fails to address (ii). Furthermore, the gap in the
THE AESTHETICS OF NATURE 141
argument is, I believe, unbridgeable. For, first, it is not impossible
to see the natural world aesthetically except by seeing it as
if it were art. Second, it is untrue that, unless nature is seen as if
it were art, there is little of aesthetic interest in nature. Third, the
Kantian considerations that postulate a link between the experience
of natural things as being beautiful and the furtherance of
morality are as readily available to the aesthetic appreciation of
nature as what nature actually is. Indeed, they are more naturally
available to this conception. For only so does nature actually
exhibit beauty and the question arise as to the importance of our
caring that it does. If we regard nature as if it were what we
know it not to be, and are free to select problem and style as we
choose, so that with enough imagination we can see anything as
beautiful (or, instead, as lacking beauty), we have no reason to
care what nature is actually like and so no reason to love it for
what it is. And, finally, the experience of nature as if it were art
offers no benefits substantial enough to outweigh the advantages
of the aesthetic experience of nature as what it actually is, so that
it would be better to experience it in the first rather than the
second manner. Accordingly, it is not mandatory to judge a natural
item aesthetically as if it were a work of art; and given that
nature is not art, to judge it as if it were art is to misjudge it.
Now any version of the claim that the aesthetic appreciation
of nature consists in nature’s being regarded as if it were art
must, whatever conception of artistic value it embraces, represent
the aesthetic appreciation of nature as being informed by concepts
integral to artistic appreciation but which are known not
to be applicable to nature. It therefore faces the same insuperable
obstacle presented to Savile’s account of aesthetic judgements of
natural beauty. Furthermore, it will be vulnerable to a crucial
objection—one that I have not yet brought against Savile’s version—namely,
that it is untrue to the phenomenology of the aesthetic
experience of nature. For the aesthetic experience of nature
is not impregnated with those notions essential to the appreciation
of art: the satisfaction we experience when we find a tree,
a bird, a landscape or skyscape beautiful is not that of seeing an
object as an excellent solution to a problem within a set of aesthetic
constraints constitutive of a style, nor does it answer to
any viable alternative conception of artistic value. On the contrary,
the (nontheistic) aesthetic appreciation of nature is saturated
with an unbracketed consciousness, clear or dim, of
nature’s not being art.
MALCOLM BUDD142
III
Appreciating Nature as what Nature actually is. Given the unacceptability
of the view that the aesthetic appreciation of natural
items should be thought of as the appreciation of them under
concepts of art, the obvious alternative is that they should be
appreciated under concepts of the natural things or phenomena
that they are. And this alternative conception of the aesthetic
appreciation of natural items will have a special aesthetic significance
insofar as two theses of Kendall Walton (Walton, 1970)
about the connection between the aesthetic properties of works
of art and the categories of art to which they belong hold equally
for the connection between the aesthetic properties of natural
items and categories of nature. Applied to nature these theses
become: (i) (the psychological thesis) what aesthetic properties a
natural item appears to possess—what aesthetic properties the
item is perceived or experienced as possessing—is a function of
the category or categories of nature under which it is experienced
(i.e. what sort of natural thing it is perceived as being), and (ii)
(the philosophical thesis) what aesthetic properties the item really
possesses is determined by the right categories of nature to
experience the item as falling under—it really possesses those
aesthetic properties it appears to possess when perceived in its
correct categories of nature (by an aesthetically sensitive and
properly informed observer who employs the relevant knowledge
of what items in that category are standardly like to so perceive
it).
But it is compatible with the requirement that the aesthetic
appreciation of nature is the aesthetic appreciation of nature as
nature (as what nature actually is) that natural items should be
appreciated aesthetically under no concepts at all (except that of
nature itself), that is, not as instances of the kinds they exemplify,
but only with respect to their sensible qualities, the way in which
they compose their items’ perceptual forms, and the aesthetic
properties they possess in virtue of these qualities and forms.2
2. As Allen Carlson has argued (Carlson, 1979b), it is only a framed view of the
natural environment, not the environment itself, that possesses formal qualities,
although I am unpersuaded by the stronger claim he favours, that, when appreciated
aesthetically in the appropriate mode, it is not possible to see a section of it as having
any formal qualities. But in any case, what is true of the aesthetic appreciation of
the natural environment is not thereby true of the aesthetic appreciation of nature.
THE AESTHETICS OF NATURE 143
Now although we rarely, if ever, aesthetically appreciate a natural
item merely as being natural, and to do so would be to engage
in a diminished form of aesthetic appreciation of nature, we often
delight aesthetically in natural items that we perceive only under
highly general concepts ( flower), not as instances of the specific
kinds they exemplify (orchid), or under one concept ( flower), but
not another coextensive concept that expresses a deeper understanding
of the nature or function of the kind (sexual organ of
plant). This brings out an unclarity in the idea of appreciating a
natural thing as the natural thing it is, for any natural thing falls
under more or less specific concepts of nature, and can be
appreciated under concepts that express a greater or lesser understanding
of it. And it also brings out a problem for Walton’s
philosophical thesis transferred to nature.3
The problem is: What
determines which concept or concepts of nature are the correct
concept or concepts under which a natural item is to be perceived?
For what is at issue is not just whether a natural item falls
under a certain concept of nature, but which of those concepts it
falls under it should be perceived under from the aesthetic point
of ûiew, where this means that perception under these concepts
discloses the aesthetic properties it really possesses and thereby
makes possible a proper assessment of its aesthetic value. A noncategory-relative
interpretation of judgements of the aesthetic
properties of natural items requires that a natural thing should
not fall under different concepts of nature which are such that,
when perceived under these concepts—the correct concepts to
perceive it under—it is properly experienced as possessing incompatible
aesthetic properties. Since the same natural item falls
under a variety of concepts of nature, the successful transference
of the non-psychological thesis to nature stands in need of a criterion
of correctness that will deliver the required result. And
there is an additional difficulty about the aesthetic properties and
3. There is no difficulty in transferring the psychological thesis from art to nature
(although I believe that, in virtue of natural items not being the products of artists,
it holds only in an impoverished form): just as the perceived aesthetic character of a
work is a function of which of its nonaesthetic perceptual features are ‘standard’,
‘variable’ or ‘contra-standard’ for one who perceives the work under a certain category
of art, so the perceived aesthetic character of a natural thing is a function of
which of its nonaesthetic perceptual features are standard, variable or contra-standard
for one who perceives it under a certain category of nature. Carlson (1981) tries
to show that both the psychological and the philosophical thesis can be transferred
to nature.
MALCOLM BUDD144
aesthetic value of natural things, considered as the kinds of natural
things they are, which concerns how they should be appreciated
aesthetically and what is relevant to their aesthetic
appreciation. For there is an important disanalogy between the
constraints imposed on aesthetic appreciation by, on the one
hand, the fact that an item is to be appreciated as the work of
art it is, and, on the other, by the fact that it is to be appreciated
as the natural item it is. This difference assumes crucial significance
in an assessment of the doctrine of positive aesthetics with
respect to nature.
IV
Positiûe Aesthetics with respect to Nature. Positive aesthetics with
respect to nature maintains that there is the following vital difference
between the aesthetic appreciation of virgin nature and the
appreciation of art (or nature affected by humanity): whereas
the aesthetics of untouched nature is positive, involving only the
acceptance and aesthetic appreciation of whatever exists in nature,
the aesthetics of art is critical in the sense that it allows for
negative aesthetic judgement. And, so positive aesthetics claims,
the reason for this difference, the reason that negative aesthetic
criticism is out of place in the aesthetic appreciation of nature,
is that the natural world untouched by humanity is essentially aesthetically
good.4
But this doctrine needs to be made more precise.
First, there is the question of its scope. It could be taken to apply
to (i) nature taken as a whole, (ii) the earth’s (or any other
planet’s) biosphere, (iii) each ecosystem, (iv) each kind of natural
(or perhaps organic) item, (v) each particular natural (organic)
thing, (vi) each natural event (or connected sequence of events).
Second, there is the question of its strength. The claim that nature
unmodified by humanity is essentially aesthetically good
might be understood to allow that pristine nature possesses some
negative aesthetic qualities (but qualities that are always ‘outweighed’
by positive aesthetic qualities), or might be intended to
4. In his (1984) Allen Carlson decisively criticises three possible justifications of positive
aesthetics before presenting what he takes to be a more plausible justification of
the doctrine. This is the first of the arguments I examine below. Stan Godlovitch
distinguishes and examines various interpretations of positive aesthetics in his (1998).
THE AESTHETICS OF NATURE 145
rule out this possibility.5
Since it would not be enough to claim
that every natural item has some aesthetically valuable quality
or qualities—a claim that would appear to be almost as plausible
for artefacts as for nature—then, leaving nature taken as a whole
aside, positive aesthetics must claim that each biosphere, ecosystem,
kind of natural item, particular natural thing, or natural
occurrence (a) lacks negative and possesses positive aesthetic
qualities, (b) has positive aesthetic value oûerall or on balance, or
(c) has equal overall positive aesthetic value.6
Third, there is the
question of the doctrine’s modal status. Is it supposed to be some
kind of necessary truth about nature or might nature have been
otherwise?
Two arguments put forward by Allen Carlson in support of
positive aesthetics, neither of which uses as a premise that any
individual natural items have a positive aesthetic value, deserve
examination. The first (Carlson, 1984) runs as follows. In order
to appreciate what aesthetic qualities and aesthetic value an item
has it is necessary to know how it is to be perceived, which
requires knowledge of what kind of thing it is. What aesthetic
qualities something possesses are those it appears to possess
when perceived in its correct category. The correct categories for
the aesthetic appreciation of nature—natural objects and landscapes,
for example—are those provided and informed by natural
science. So positive aesthetics will be established if, and only
if, it can be shown that the natural world (unaffected by
humanity) must seem aesthetically good when perceived in categories
of nature (under which it falls): the aesthetic qualities of
nature are those it appears to have when appropriately aesthetically
appreciated, i.e. when perceived under its correct categories,
categories of nature; and so nature is essentially aesthetically
5. The second alternative is embraced by Eugene Hargrove: ‘nature is beautiful and
has no negative aesthetic qualities’ (Hargrove (1989, p. 177), quoted in Godlovitch
(1998a)). Whether or not nature lacks negative aesthetic qualities, it is immune to all
the many defects to which art is liable in virtue of being the product of intelligent
design.
6. Note that the view that each natural thing (ecosystem, or whatever) has equal
positive overall aesthetic value (i) is noncommital about the degree of that value,
which, for all it claims, might be rather low, and (ii) denies that issues of the comparative
aesthetic values of natural items are ever indeterminate—that it is neither true
that one of the items has a greater aesthetic value than the other nor that they are
precisely equal in value. But it would be charitable to interpret ‘equal’ as meaning
‘roughly equal’, in which case indeterminacy is allowed, perhaps inevitable (unless
the items are of the same kind and indiscernible).
MALCOLM BUDD146
good if, and only if, this is how it appears when perceived in
those categories of nature it belongs to. This will be so if the
categories created by science for landscapes and natural objects
are such that the correctness of these categories is determined by
the criterion of aesthetic goodness, that is, if the correct categories
are those that are such that nature seems aesthetically good
when perceived in them. But ‘aesthetic goodness is certainly not
the criterion by which scientists determine correctness of descriptions,
categories, and theories’ (Carlson, 1984: 30). However, the
creation of categories of nature and their correctness are in an
important sense dependent on aesthetic considerations. For:
a more correct categorization in science is one that over time
makes the natural world seem more intelligible, more comprehensible
to those whose science it is. Our science appeals to certain
kinds of qualities to accomplish this. These qualities are ones such
as order, regularity, harmony, balance, tension, conflict, resolution,
and so forth. If our science did not discover, uncover, or
create such qualities in the natural world and explain that world
in terms of them, it would not accomplish its task of making it
seem more intelligible to us; rather, it would leave the world
incomprehensible, as any of the various world views which we
regard as superstition seem to us to leave it. Moreover, these qualities
which make the world seem comprehensible to us are also
those which we find aesthetically good. Thus, when we experience
them in the natural world or experience the natural world in terms
of them, we find it aesthetically good. (Carlson, 1984: 30–1)
In short: Since the categories of nature created by science are
the correct categories in which to appreciate it, and since these
categories are created partly in light of aesthetic goodness and
so make the natural world appear aesthetically good when perceived
in these categories, the natural world is aesthetically good.
The second argument (Carlson, 1993) maintains that the
appreciation of nature should be understood as a form of ‘order
appreciation’. Order appreciation consists in a selection of
objects to be appreciated and a focusing on a certain kind of
order that the objects display. The focus is on the order imposed
on the selected objects by the various forces, random or otherwise,
which produce these objects. ‘Order’ means ‘ordered pattern—a
pattern ordered by and revelatory of the forces of
THE AESTHETICS OF NATURE 147
creation or selection responsible for it’. The selection is by reference
to a general nonaesthetic and nonartistic account which, by
making this order manifest and intelligible, makes the objects
appreciable. In the case of nature, (i) the relevant order is the
natural order, (ii) the relevant forces are the geological, biological
and meteorological forces which produce the natural order, and
(iii) the relevant account is that given by natural science—astronomy,
physics, chemistry, biology, meteorology and geology. And
because all of nature necessarily reveals the natural order, all
natural objects are (more or less) ‘equally appreciable’, ‘equally
aesthetically appealing’, ‘equal in beauty and importance’, so
that ‘selection among all that the natural world offers is not of
much ultimate importance’.
Now it is unclear exactly which version of positive aesthetics
these arguments are intended to establish. If the scope is not just
kinds but also instances of them,7
and the doctrine is that all
natural things have equal positive aesthetic value,8
the arguments
are unconvincing. Consider (the selection of) a single living natural
object—a plant or animal, for example. There is nothing in
the second argument to prevent the conclusion that each natural
object is equally aesthetically appealing from meaning that each
organic natural object, at each moment of its life, is equally aesthetically
appealing. But the fact that a living object’s condition,
which might be diseased or malformed or indicative of approaching
death, is explicable in terms of natural forces and processes
does not entail that, when seen as the product of such forces, the
object, in that condition, must or should be seen as just as equally
aesthetically appealing as any other natural object, or as itself in
any of its former or later conditions. On the contrary, living
objects decline, are subject to illness or lack of nutrients that
affect their appearance, lose their attractive colours and (if they
7. Carlson is inclined to believe that the justification of positive aesthetics offered in
the first argument makes the thesis applicable not just to kinds but also to instances
of them: ‘given the role of aesthetic goodness in scientific description, categorisation,
and theorising, I suspect that scientific knowledge as a whole is aesthetically imbued
such that our appreciation of particulars is as enhanced as is that of kinds’ (Carlson,
1984: 32, fn. 67).
8. That this is Carlson’s position in Carlson (1984) is confirmed by endnote 61 of
Carlson (1993), which refers the reader to Carlson (1984) for a fuller development of
the line of thought leading to the conclusion that ‘natural objects all seem equally
aesthetically appealing’ (Carlson, 1993: 222).
MALCOLM BUDD148
possess the power of locomotion) whatever ease and gracefulness
of movement they formerly possessed, and in so doing diminish
in aesthetic appeal. Any argument that yields the conclusion that
each living natural object is equally aesthetically appealing at
each stage of its life and is as aesthetically appealing as any other
natural object must be defective. And the two arguments, understood
as aimed at the conclusion that each particular natural
thing has a roughly equal positive overall aesthetic value, are
unsound.
The first argument concludes from the fact that (positive) aesthetic
considerations partly determine the categories created by
science to render the natural world intelligible, which are the correct
categories in which to perceive nature, that the natural world
is aesthetically good. But this summary statement blurs an essential
feature of the argument, which is that science accomplishes
its task of rendering the natural world intelligible by discovering
positive aesthetic qualities in nature. Accordingly, ‘when we
experience them in the natural world or experience the natural
world in terms of them, we find it aesthetically good’. These qualities
are ones ‘such as order, regularity, harmony, balance, tension,
conflict, and resolution’, which are the kinds of qualities we
find good in art. Now it is unclear how the final three qualities
contribute to the argument. Neither tension nor conflict are in
themselves positive aesthetic qualities and the resolution of tension
or conflict, whether in art or nature, might come about in a
manner that is not, from the aesthetic point of view, attractive.
Furthermore, the aesthetic appreciation of a natural item need
not be impregnated with the concepts of tension, conflict and
resolution on pain of being shallow or in some other way defective,
for it is often the case that a natural thing is not in a state
of tension or conflict (in any ordinary sense). Accordingly, appeal
to such qualities as these could not bear the weight of the argument.
As for the first three qualities, they seem to be little more
than reflections of the law-governed character of nature, and it
does not follow from the fact that each natural thing, and each
part of it, is subject to natural law that all natural objects are
equally aesthetically appealing.9
Even if some aesthetic appeal
9. Note that simplicity and elegance, for example, which are desired qualities of
theories, the second being also an aesthetic quality, are not, at least explicitly, being
appealed to in the argument, although they perhaps fall under the ‘such as’.
THE AESTHETICS OF NATURE 149
accrues to an item in virtue of being law-governed, natural
objects will nevertheless vary in their aesthetic appeal, manifesting
different positive aesthetic qualities. Moreover, law-governedness
does not preclude possession of negative aesthetic
qualities, nor guarantee possession, by any natural object that
possesses negative aesthetic qualities, of compensating positive
aesthetic qualities such that each natural object has the same
overall aesthetic value. And grossly malformed living things will
remain grotesque no matter how comprehensible science renders
their malformation.
Putting aside the issue whether the correct model for the
appreciation of nature is order appreciation, the second argument,
which as it stands contains no reference to aesthetic qualities
figuring in the determination of categories of nature, fares no
better—perhaps worse. It may be true that, from the point of
view of the appreciation of nature, there is an enormous, perhaps
an infinite, amount to be understood about what composes any
natural thing and how it was generated by the forces and materials
of nature, but this implies nothing about the aesthetic qualities
of the item—in particular, that these are essentially positive
and equal in value to those of anything else in nature. The fact
that the order imposed on any selected natural objects by the
various forces that produced them is the natural order, so that
‘all of nature necessarily reveals the natural order’, does not
imply that the order manifest in any selection from nature is,
from the aesthetic point of view, equally attractive, interesting or
valuable. Not all appreciation is aesthetic appreciation, and the
argument, as it stands, slides from ‘equally appreciable’, meaning
‘equally displaying the natural order’, to ‘equally appreciable’,
meaning ‘equally aesthetically valuable’.
Although the rejection of the view that each natural thing, at
each moment of its existence, has overall positive aesthetic value
does not imply the rejection of the view that each natural thing,
taken as a whole, i.e. considered throughout its duration, has
overall positive aesthetic value (roughly equal to that of each
natural thing), this weaker position does not recommend itself.
Apart from the question how the aesthetic value of a natural
item, taken as a whole, should be determined, natural items come
in such various guises, biotic and nonbiotic, of short or long
duration, and answering to different criteria of identity, as to
MALCOLM BUDD150
preclude the truth of any universal claim about their aesthetic
values.
If, as seems clear, there is no hope for the most ambitious
version of positive aesthetics, in what form might the doctrine be
preserved?
First, its scope must be changed. It would perhaps be more
plausible if it were to be a claim, not about particulars, but about
kinds. For each kind of living thing is endowed with some aesthetic
value in virtue of possessing parts with natural functions
they are well suited to perform,10
their exercise sometimes displaying
such attractive aesthetic qualities as gracefulness of
movement; and many biotic kinds (all flowers, perhaps) undoubtedly
possess a positive overall aesthetic value. There are even
kinds of natural object (galaxy, star, ocean) or occurrence
(exploding volcano) which are such that, on one understanding
of the notion, each instance of them is sublime.11
Nevertheless,
on the one hand, there are many kinds of natural item that are
not forms of life and whose character appears ill-suited to
guarantee a positive overall aesthetic value, and, on the other,
perhaps there are forms of life that do not possess a positive
overall aesthetic value. In any case, categories of nature exhibit
such diversity—a few (hill) are basically morphological, some
(rainbow) collect mere appearances, others (nest) are defined by
the use made of them, and so on—as to render hazardous a
doctrine of positive aesthetics about kinds of natural item.
What about ecosystems? The claim that any ecosystem, taken
as a whole, inevitably has a positive overall aesthetic value
(roughly comparable to that of any other) raises three issues, one
concerning the basis of the claim, one concerning the appreciation
of the postulated aesthetic value, and one concerning the
relation between the aesthetic appreciation of an ecosystem and
10. Compare Aristotle, De partibus animalium, 645a23–25. Burke’s well-known counter-examples
(Burke, 1958, Part Three, Section VI) to the view that the beauty of
natural objects derives from the fitness of their parts to their various purposes—‘the
wedge-like snout of a swine’, ‘the great bag hanging to the bill of a pelican’, the
prickly hide of a hedgehog and ‘missile quills’ of a porcupine, for instance—were
perhaps well-chosen to appeal to the common prejudices of the time, but in fact are
not inconsistent even with his own conception of beauty (as that quality or qualities
in objects by which they cause love or some similar passion).
11. Compare Holmes Rolston III: ‘Like clouds, seashores, and mountains, forests
are never ugly, they are only more or less beautiful; the scale runs from zero upward
with no negative domain.’ (Rolston III, 1998: 164)
THE AESTHETICS OF NATURE 151
the aesthetic appreciation of items in it. If it is indeed true that
each ecosystem must have a positive overall aesthetic value, this
necessity must stem from the character of such a system. Now
an ecosystem, in the sense at issue, is a relatively self-contained
segment of nature, an integrated, self-maintaining biological
community and its environment, that contains a rich variety of
interdependent life-forms, each with its own niche, that is a product
of selection pressures, and that involves a multiplicity of circular
movements of energy within the system by means of
biological processes whereby parts of one life-form are assimilated
by others, the parts of which are in turn assimilated by
others, with at some point or points a decomposition of organic
structure into elements that nourish new life taking place. It is
unclear exactly how this essence is supposed to guarantee a positive
overall aesthetic value, especially in the light of there being
a great deal of killing and suffering in most ecosystems.
Perhaps the most plausible line of thought runs as follows.
Although an ecosystem will contain objects and events that, in
themselves, possess a negative aesthetic value, when these are
seen in the context of the recycling of resources intrinsic to the
system, which issues in the perpetual re-creation of life (much of
which is beautiful):
the ugly parts do not subtract from but rather enrich the whole.
The ugliness is contained, overcome, and integrates into positive,
complex beauty. (Rolston III, 1988: 241)
Here there appear to be four ideas: first, that many, perhaps a
great majority, of the living forms in an ecosystem are in themselves
beautiful, second, that any local ugliness is just a stage in
a process that issues in beauty, third, that this local ugliness,
when seen as a prelude to the creation of new life, is diminished,
and, fourth, that in virtue of the continual creation of life by
means of the biological processes at work in the system, the system,
considered as the temporal unfolding of those processess, is
itself beautiful (or sublime12
). If the first of these ideas, even when
combined with the vital consideration that nature is immune to
all defects to which art is liable in virtue of being the product of
intelligent design, is not sufficient to guarantee each ecosystem a
12. See Rolston III (1988), pp. 243–5.
MALCOLM BUDD152
positive aesthetic value—as it might not be, given that each living
thing sooner or later becomes aesthetically unattractive in itself
as it deteriorates, dies and decomposes—the weight must be
borne by the last.
But even if it could be shown that each ecosystem must have
a (roughly equal) positive overall aesthetic value, there would be
problems about the appreciation of that value (leaving aside the
issue of the temporal and spatial limits of an ecosystem). If an
ecosystem’s having a positive overall aesthetic value is a matter
of how the various events in it are related to one another, either
all the events that take place within it are relevant to the determination
of that value or only a subset of them is, in which case
the distinguishing feature of the subset, if it is to be viable, must
square with the concept of an item’s aesthetic value. (Perhaps the
only requirement imposed by the idea of the aesthetic is that
events integral to a system’s aesthetic value should be perceptible.)
In either case, the fact that an observer will perceive only
a small time-slice of an ecosystem, and even then only a small
part of what is contained within that time-slice, presents a problem
for the appreciation of the aesthetic value of that ecosystem,
a problem that cannot be avoided by emphasis on the transformation
of perception by knowledge, the ecologically informed
observer perceiving events and states within an ecosystem as
stages in circular movements of energy through different forms
of life. For in addition to the difficulty presented to an observer
of encompassing the totality of an ecosystem in its spatial extent,
the temporal duration of an ecosystem is likely to exceed, often
greatly so, the time one might give to observing it, precluding the
realistic possibility of one’s appreciating that value, no matter
how much one’s perception of things or events in it might be
informed by relevant ecological knowledge or how vividly one
might imaginatively realise the biological processes that underlie
and are responsible for the visual or other appearance of the
system. In the appreciation of a temporal work of art (or a literary
work) it is necessary to experience the work from beginning
to end, following the way in which part succeeds part as the work
unfolds: only in this way is it possible to form a judgement of its
artistic success. But myriad events integral to the stability of an
ecosystem take place within the system in such a manner—
underground, in the dark, within a living thing—as to be normally
unobservable, or beyond the limits of observation (as with
THE AESTHETICS OF NATURE 153
the release of nutrients from humus back into the soil). Furthermore,
the colours of natural things, as we human beings see
them, are not integral to the maintenance and functioning of an
ecosystem, yet figure prominently in our aesthetic appreciation
of nature; innumerable sounds, some of which do and some of
which do not play a functional role in an ecosystem, are too deep
or high pitched for us to hear; many of the smells of nature, the
scents of animals, for example, escape our detection and yet are
of crucial significance in the working of an ecosystem; and in
general the smells, tastes, colours, sounds and feels of an ecosystem,
as perceived by humans, are different from their appearance
to those creatures that inhabit the system and are capable of
perceiving them, and mean nothing to those living things that
cannot perceive them but form an integral part of the system.
The idea that each ecosystem (or other natural system) has a
positive overall aesthetic value implies nothing about the aesthetic
values of the natural items it contains considered in themselves—in
particular, that these are always positive. But the
aesthetic significance of such values not always being positive
would be undermined if, from the aesthetic point of view, any
natural item in an ecosystem should properly be considered not
in itself, but in relation to the ecosystem of which it forms a
part13
(or the natural environment of its creation).14
However,
there is nothing in the notion of aesthetic appreciation that
licenses this requirement: the idea of the aesthetic appreciation
of nature as nature—as what nature actually is—does not imply
that every natural fact about a natural item, and in particular its
role in an ecosystem, is relevant to the aesthetic appreciation of
that item (as being natural) and so must be taken into account
if the aesthetic appreciation of that natural item is not to be
defective or shallow. It is true that, just as the appreciation of a
work of art requires that its parts be considered aesthetically in
the context of the entire work, so the aesthetic appreciation of
13. ‘Every item must be seen not in framed isolation but framed by its environment,
and this frame in turn becomes part of the bigger picture we have to appreciate—
not a ‘‘frame’’ but a dramatic play.’ (Rolston III, 1988: 239). As Yuriko Saito points
out (Saito, 1998), the natural consequence of this line of thought is that the proper
object of aesthetic appreciation is the entire global ecosphere (if not some larger
portion of nature).
14. A highly unplausible requirement imposed on organic and inorganic items alike
by Allen Carlson’s natural environment model. (Carlson, 1979a)
MALCOLM BUDD154
an ecosystem requires that any natural item in it be considered
aesthetically in the light of its role in that system. But this does
not yield the desired conclusion, which is an unconditional, not
a conditional, requirement.
V
Freedom and Relatiûity in the Aesthetic Appreciation of Nature.
What, then, is the aesthetic value of nature? I shall restrict myself
to natural items, rather than sequences of events, and focus primarily
on vision, while recognising that the other senses play a
significant role in the aesthetic experience of nature. If the aesthetic
appreciation of nature is appreciation of the aesthetic
properties and aesthetic value of a natural item qua the natural
thing it is, the question is what aesthetic properties and value
natural items possess. Here I need to make good a claim about
the aesthetic properties and values of natural items that I made
earlier but did not elaborate.
First it is necessary to clarify Walton’s thesis about the relation
between the aesthetic properties of a work of art and the categories
of art to which it belongs. For it is not accurately represented
by the formulation that a work really possesses those aesthetic
properties it appears to possess when perceived in its correct categories
of art by a duly sensitive observer. This would not be
sufficient because, first, the work might not be in its optimal condition,
and, second, the conditions of observation might not be
appropriate. Accordingly, the thesis is that a work’s real aesthetic
properties are those manifest to a duly sensitive and wellinformed
observer who perceives the work in its correct artistic
categories under the right conditions at the right time.
Now one issue that a defence of positive aesthetics should
engage with is that of the proper level of observation at which a
natural item’s aesthetic qualities are supposed to appear to the
informed observer. A grain of sand, observed with the naked eye,
lacks as great an aesthetic appeal as many other natural things;
but a microscope enables us, if not ‘To see a world in a grain of
sand’ (William Blake, ‘Auguries of Innocence’), at least to see its
microstructure (at a certain level), and this is likely to have a
greater aesthetic appeal than its appearance to the naked eye.
Similarly, a drop of water from a lake contains a multitude of
THE AESTHETICS OF NATURE 155
organisms visible under a microscope, which possess aesthetic
properties of various kinds and constitute a possible source of
aesthetic value. Positive aesthetics with respect to nature would
be more plausible if it were to maintain that each natural thing,
at some level of observation, has a positive aesthetic value. But
level of observation is just one of many factors that affect a natural
thing’s aesthetic appeal and manifest aesthetic qualities: other
relevant factors include the observer’s distance from the object,
the observer’s point of view and the nature of the light that
illuminates the object. Furthermore, not only do the appearances
of natural things vary under different conditions of observation,
but natural things themselves undergo changes that cause them
to display different aesthetic qualities at different times and make
them more or less aesthetically appealing.15
So the manifest aesthetic
qualities of a natural item are relative both to conditions
of observation and time.
The transference to nature of Walton’s thesis about the aesthetic
properties that works of art really possess must accommodate
a crucial difference between the appreciation of art and the
aesthetic appreciation of nature, which is linked with a disanalogy
between the way in which categories of art and categories of
nature function in the determination of the aesthetic properties
and value of those items that belong to them. Whereas works of
art are either immutable (if they are types), or, if subject to
change, standardly have an optimal condition—at least, according
to the intention of their creator—in which their aesthetic
properties are manifest, not only is nature always changing but
it has no optimal condition in which its aesthetic properties are
manifest; and whereas certain observational manners and conditions
are in general either privileged or ruled out for works of
art, this is not so for natural things. Categories of nature do not
function to partially determine the real aesthetic properties of
natural items as categories of art do those of works of art. That
natural items are not designed for the purpose of aesthetic
appreciation releases them from the constraints governing the
artistic appreciation of works of art: categories of art prescribe
the appropriate manner of artistic appreciation as categories of
15. In fact, the transient character of a natural phenomenon or a natural object’s
power of endurance or its longevity can itself be an aspect of its aesthetic appeal.
MALCOLM BUDD156
nature do not prescribe the appropriate manner of aesthetic
appreciation of nature. The aesthetic appreciation of nature is
thereby endowed with a freedom denied to artistic appreciation:
in a section of the natural world we are free to frame elements
as we please, to adopt any position or move in any way, at any
time of the day or night, in any atmospheric conditions, and to
use any sense modality, without thereby incurring the charge of
misunderstanding. No visible aspect, quality or structure of a
natural item, of its exterior or interior, perceived from any direction
or distance, with or without optical instruments, is deemed
irrelevant to the aesthetic appreciation of that item by the
requirement that it must be appreciated as the kind of natural
item it is. And the same is true, mutatis mutandis, for the other
sense modalities, insofar as the perception of taste, smell, felt
texture, movement, pressure and heat falls within the bounds of
the aesthetic. The fact that an object is to be appreciated as a
painting means that its weight is irrelevant, as is its smell, taste
and felt warmth or coldness; but the fact that an object is to be
appreciated aesthetically as a river or as a tree in itself rules out
no mode of perception nor any perceptual aspect of the object.
In short, whereas categories of art disqualify certain sense
modalities, internal structure, appearance under various conditions
and from various distances, and so on, categories of
nature do not.
If appropriate aesthetic appreciation is ‘that appreciation of
an object which reveals what aesthetic qualities and value it
has’,16
then in general there is no such thing as the appropriate
aesthetic appreciation of nature. In the sense in which there is
such a thing as the aesthetic qualities and value of a work of art,
there is no such thing as the aesthetic qualities and value of nature.
Of course, the truth-value of an aesthetic judgement about
a natural item can be understood (as it usually is) as relative to
a particular temporal slice of or stage in the item’s natural history,
a sensory mode, a level and manner of observation and a
perceptual aspect. But if not, the idea of the aesthetic value of a
natural item is ill-defined. What are the aesthetic qualities and
aesthetic value of a particular galaxy qua galaxy, a planet qua
planet, a mountain qua mountain, a cloud qua cloud, a river qua
16. Carlson (1984), p. 25).
THE AESTHETICS OF NATURE 157
river, a mango qua mango?17
Perhaps the only viable conception
of the aesthetic value of a natural item qua the natural item it is
represents this value as being a function of the totality of positive
and negative aesthetic qualities possessed by the item as an
instance of its kind. If so, the multifaceted indefiniteness of this
function underscores the problematic character of a positive
aesthetics of nature.
Malcolm Budd
Department of Philosophy
Uniûersity College London
Gower Street
London WC1E 6BT
m.budd@ucl.ac.uk
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17. Is the appearance of a planet’s star at sunrise and sunset an aspect of the aesthetic
value of the planet qua planet—or perhaps of the star qua star? Are the reflections
of trees on the bank an aspect of a river’s aesthetic value qua river?