ALTERNATIVES  TO   CAPITALISM   PROPOSALS  FOR  A   DEMOCRATIC  ECONOMY           Robin  Hahnel   Erik  Olin  Wright           i CONTENTS     Acknowledgements   ii       Introduction   iii       Part  One     1. The  Case  for  Participatory  Economics   2   Robin  Hahnel     2. Participatory  Economics:  A  Sympathetic   Critique     11   Erik  Olin  Wright     3. In  Defence  of  Participatory  Economics   38   Robin  Hahnel         Part  Two     4. Socialism  and  Real  Utopias   61   Erik  Olin  Wright     5. Breaking  With  Capitalism   85   Robin  Hahnel     6. Final  Thoughts   107   Erik  Olin  Wright         About  the  authors   121   ii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS         Robin  would  like  to  thank  Mesa  Refuge,  a  writers  retreat  in  Point  Reyes  Station,  California,   where  he  was  a  resident  for  two  weeks  during  this  last  year.     iii INTRODUCTION     New  Left  Project       Poverty,   exploitation,   instability,   hierarchy,   subordination,   environmental   exhaustion,   radical   inequalities   of   wealth   and   power—it   is   not   difficult   to   list   capitalism’s  myriad  injustices.  But  is  there  a  preferable  and  workable  alternative?   What  would  a  viable  free  and  democratic  free  society  look  like?   Alternatives  to  Capitalism:  Proposals  for  a  Democratic  Economy  presents  a  debate   between  two  such  possibilities:  Robin  Hahnel’s  “participatory  economics”  and  Erik   Olin   Wright’s   “real   utopian”   socialism.   It   is   a   detailed   and   at   times   technical   discussion  that  rewards  careful  engagement.  Those  who  put  the  effort  in  will,  we   hope,  find  that  it  illuminates  a  range  of  issues  and  dilemmas  of  crucial  importance   to  any  serious  effort  to  build  a  better  world.   Is  it  worth  devoting  energy  to  thinking  about  alternatives  to  capitalism?  There  is  a   tradition   within   anti-­‐capitalist   politics   which   thinks   not.   It   is   argued   that   idle   speculation  distracts  from  what  really  matters:  the  struggles  emerging  in  the  here   and   now,   which   are   the   soil   from   which   any   emancipatory   future   will   spring.   Moreover,   if   participation   in   those   struggles   is   done   on   the   basis   of   a   preconceived  vision,  their  creativity  and  experimentation  may  be  inhibited.     However,   a   compelling   case   can   be   made   that   engaging   with   the   visionary   approach   could   invigorate   and   strengthen   radical   politics.   The   most   powerful   movements   of   the   left   in   the   twentieth   century   failed   to   produce   a   desirable   alternative   to   capitalism,   leading   instead   to   the   authoritarian,   statist   forms   of   “really  existing  socialism”  in  the  USSR  and  its  satellites,  on  the  one  hand,  and  the   “humanised   capitalism”   of   social   democracy,   on   the   other.   This   has   led   to   a   widespread   lack   of   conviction   in   the   possibility   of   transcending   capitalism   and,   indeed,  a  difficulty  in  even  imagining  such  a  task.  This  anxiety  is  pervasive  even   among  radical  movements  and  their  sympathisers.  By  contrast,  a  left  animated  by   a  shared  vision,  resting  on  the  kind  of  credible  intellectual  foundations  that  Robin   and  Erik  seek  to  supply,  could  act  with  a  confidence  and  strategic  direction  that  is   so  conspicuously  absent  today.  Not  only  would  this  strengthen  the  prospects  of     the  creation  of  a  desirable  post-­‐capitalist  future,  a  left  that  genuinely  threatened   the  ruling  order  would  also  be  able  to  win  important  reforms  to  ameliorate  the   harms  of  capitalism  in  the  immediate  term.     In  this  dialogue  New  Left  Project  brings  together  two  writers  who,  motivated  by   such   considerations,   have   devoted   substantial   efforts   to   thinking   systematically   about  alternative  models  of  social  order.  Both  Robin  and  Erik  began  this  process   in  a  focused  way  in  the  1990s,  when  the  collapse  of  the  USSR  heralded  a  new  era   of  capitalist  triumphalism.  Robin  and  his  collaborator  Michael  Albert  built  on  ideas   that   had   emerged   within   the   libertarian   socialist   tradition   in   the   twentieth   century—including  from  council  communists,  anarcho-­‐syndicalists  and  elements   of   the   New   Left—to   develop   a   plausible   and   robustly   anti-­‐capitalist   economic   model   known   as   “participatory   economics”.   This   system   dispenses   with   the   defining   features   of   a   capitalist   economy   -­‐   markets,   private   ownership   and   a   hierarchical   division   of   labour   -­‐   proposing   instead   a   system   of   participatory   planning,  worker  control  and  an  egalitarian  division  of  labour.  His  latest  book  on   the  subject  is  Of  the  People,  By  the  People:  The  Case  for  a  Participatory  Economy   (AK   Press,   2012),   where   he   sets   out   a   comprehensive,   accessible   and   refined   account  of  the  model.     In   the   1990s   Erik   initiated   the   Real   Utopias   Project,   editing   a   series   of   books   canvassing   and   assessing   a   range   of   proposals   for   emancipatory   institutional   arrangements.  This  eventually  led  to  the  publication  of  his  own  work,  Envisioning   Real   Utopias   (Verso,   2010).   By   far   the   most   ambitious   book   in   the   series,   developed   in   part   through   a   speaking   tour   of   18   countries   over   four   years,   it   outlines   a   novel   conception   of   socialism,   anchored   in   the   concept   of   “social   empowerment”,   a   variety   of   general   institutional   configurations   that   could   facilitate   its   realisation,   and   a   detailed   discussion   of   strategy   for   social   transformation.     In  Alternatives  to  Capitalism  Erik  and  Robin  bring  to  bear  the  ideas  developed  in   Of  the  People,  By  the  People  and  Envisioning  Real  Utopias.  Its  two  parts  focus  on   participatory   economics   and   real   utopian   socialism,   respectively,   each   opening   with  a  lead  essay  that  summarises  the  key  ideas  of  the  approach  in  question.  The   distinctive  nature  of  this  text  is  the  depth  of  the  dialogue  that  emerges.  Although   new  arguments  and  ideas  surface  in  each  of  the  six  contributions,  key  issues  are   also  revisited  throughout  and  subjected  to  sustained  critical  evaluation.  The  result   is  a  work  that,  even  as  it  covers  a  range  of  issues  in  economics,  social  theory  and   history,  achieves  a  rare  degree  of  depth  and  thoroughness  of  debate.       v Important  points  of  disagreement  emerge.  These  concern,  among  other  things,   the   level   of   detail   to   which   post-­‐capitalist   visions   should   aspire,   the   future   of   markets,  and  whether  a  revolutionary  strategy  has  a  credible  role  to  play  in  anti-­‐ capitalist   politics.   Readers   will   have   to   make   their   own   judgements   about   the   competing  arguments  on  these  issues  –  a  task  made  easier  by  the  constructive   spirit  with  which  Erik  and  Robin  pursue  their  disagreements,  with  no  time  wasted   on   straw-­‐manning   or   point   scoring.   This   reflects   the   genuine   political   desire,   shared   by   the   authors   and   New   Left   Project,   that   motivates   Alternatives   to   Capitalism:  to  strengthen  the  intellectual  resources  of  anti-­‐capitalist  politics.  We   hope  it  makes  a  worthwhile  contribution  to  this  most  vital  of  tasks.       Part  One THE  CASE  FOR  PARTICIPATORY  ECONOMICS     Robin  Hahnel       Curious  Jane:  “So,  if  you  don’t  like  capitalism,  what  do  you  want  instead?”   Modern  anti-­‐capitalist:  “Certainly  not  old-­‐style  bureaucratic  Communism!”     Curious  Jane:  “Fine.…  But  then  what  DO  you  want?”   Modern   anti-­‐capitalist:   “I   want   an   economic   system   that   promotes   economic   democracy,  economic  justice,  and  human  solidarity,  without  sacrificing  economic   efficiency.”   Curious   Jane:   “Who   wouldn’t!   …   But   people   sometimes   mean   different   things   when  they  use  these  words.  Can  you  be  more  specific?”   Supporter  of  participatory  economics:  “Yes  I  can  –  and  you  are  quite  correct  to   demand  clarification,  because  often  disagreements  over  how  best  to  organise  the   economic  system  stem  from  different  conceptions  of  what  these  words  mean.    By   economic  democracy,  I  mean  having  decision  making  power  in  proportion  to  the   degree  one  is  affected  by  a  decision.  By  economic  justice  I  mean  economic  reward   commensurate   with   sacrifice,   or   effort.   By   human   solidarity   I   mean   having   concern   for   the   wellbeing   of   others.   And   by   economic   efficiency   I   mean   using   scarce   productive   resources   where   they   are   most   socially   beneficial   and   not   wasting  people’s  hard  work.”   Curious  Jane:  “That  is  all  well  and  good….  I’m  not  sure  I  agree  entirely  with  your   definitions,  but  let’s  suppose  for  now  that  I  did.  Exactly  how  would  you  organise   the  economy  to  achieve  these  goals?”   The  model  of  a  participatory  economy  –  which  I  briefly  summarise  below  –  is  an   answer  to  Jane’s  last  question.  It  is  not  an  answer  to  other  important  questions,   such  as:  In  the  short-­‐run  what  can  we  do  in  the  here  and  now  to  best  promote  the   above  goals?  Or,  in  the  long-­‐run  what  strategy  might  maximise  our  chances  of   making  a  successful  transition  from  the  economics  of  competition  and  greed  to  an   economics   of   equitable   cooperation?   These   are   important,   but   quite   different   questions.  Participatory  economics  is  simply  a  coherent  description  of  how  a  fully   Robin  Hahnel     developed  system  of  equitable  cooperation  could  function.  It  is  not  a  transition   strategy  or  political  program.     A  PARTICIPATORY  ECONOMY1   The  major  institutions  “we”2  propose  to  achieve  economic  democracy,  economic   justice,   and   human   solidarity   while   protecting   the   environment   and   ensuring   efficiency  are:  (1)  self-­‐governing  democratic  councils  of  workers  and  consumers   where   each   member   has   one   vote,   (2)   jobs   balanced   for   empowerment   and   desirability   by   the   members   of   worker   councils   themselves,   (3)   compensation   according  to  effort  as  judged  by  one’s  workmates,  and  (4)  a  participatory  planning   procedure  in  which  councils  and  federations  of  workers  and  consumers  propose   and  revise  their  own  interrelated  activities  without  central    planners  or  markets,   under   rules   designed   to   generate   outcomes   that   are   efficient,   equitable,   and   environmentally  sustainable.   Over   the   past   twenty   years   some   critics   have   disagreed   with   our   goals   while   others   have   objected   to   one   or   another   of   our   recommendations   for   how   to   achieve  them.  Erik  has  offered  his  own  evaluation  of  participatory  economics  on   pages   252-­‐265   of   Envisioning   Real   Utopias.3  In   my   reading   Erik   seems   to   agree   with   our   goals   –   although,   as   one   would   expect   his   formulation   and   argument   differ   in   some   regards.   Most   importantly,   and   unlike   many   who   have   criticised   participatory   economics,   Erik   seems   to   share   our   views   about   what   economic   justice  and  economic  democracy  mean  and  require.   1  The   “model”   of   a   participatory   economy   briefly   presented   here   was   initially   developed   jointly   by   myself  and  Michael  Albert  in  the  1990s,  and  is  now  often  referred  to  as  ‘Parecon’.    I  do  not  use  this   acronym  because  I  believe  it  conveys  an  otherworldly  impression  and  fosters  a  cultish  mentality  I  find   detrimental   to   advancing   discussions   like   this   one   among   people   thinking   seriously   about   economic   system  change.   2  When  I  say  “we”  I  mean  not  only  myself  and  Michael  Albert,  but  also  a  growing  network  of  people   around   the   world   who,   without   necessarily   agreeing   on   every   detail,   nonetheless   refer   to   the   participatory   economic   “model”   as   the   kind   of   alternative   to   capitalism   they   favour.   In   short,   “we”   includes  all  of  us  who  answer  Jane’s  question  by  explaining  how  a  participatory  economy  could  work.  As   should   be   expected,   “we”   do   not   always   agree   about   short-­‐run   programs   or   long-­‐run   transition   strategies  for  getting  there!   3  Erik  Olin  Wright,  Envisioning  Real  Utopias.  Verso,  2010.  Hereafter  ERU.   The  Case  for  Participatory  Economics   3 Unless  I  am  mistaken,  Erik  is  also  supportive  of  compensation  based  on  effort  and   trying  to  balance  jobs  for  desirability  and  empowerment,  although  he  worries  it   may  prove  difficult  to  achieve  these  goals.  To  be  specific,  we  propose  that  each   worker  council  come  up  with  its  own  procedures  for  assigning  what  we  call  “effort   ratings”  to  one  another,  which  become  the  basis  for  their  members’  consumption   rights   in   neighbourhood   consumption   councils.   We   call   this   an   effort   rating   committee,  but  its  composition  and  procedures  are  left  up  to  each  council,  and   we  fully  expect  different  worker  councils  to  come  up  with  very  different  ways  to   go  about  this.  In  particular,  compensation  is  not  something  that  can  be  negotiated   when   new   members   are   hired   by   worker   councils   in   a   participatory   economy.   Everyone  is  free  to  apply  for  membership  in  any  worker  council  of  her  choice,  and   worker  councils  are  free  to  hire  whomever  they  wish  from  their  applicant  pools  –   subject   to   strict   rules   outlawing   discrimination   of   course.   However,   since   remuneration  is  determined  only  after  someone  has  worked,  and  is  to  be  based   only  on  differences  in  efforts,  or  sacrifices,  as  judged  by  co-­‐workers,  the  hiring   decision   is   completely   separate   from   decisions   about   compensation   levels   in   a   participatory  economy.   While   some   market   socialists   do   not   favour   self-­‐management   with   one   worker   one  vote,  Erik  agrees  with  most  advocates  for  market  socialism  who  see  worker   self-­‐management  as  one  of  its  major  virtues.4  However,  to  ensure  that  formally   equal   rights   to   participate   in   decision   making   in   one’s   workplace   translate   into   truly   equal   opportunities   to   participate,   supporters   of   participatory   economics   propose   that   in   addition   to   one   member   one   vote,   jobs   within   workplaces   be   balanced  for  empowerment.  We  argue  that  as  long  as  some  workers  sweep  floors   all  day,  every  day,  while  others  attend  meetings  of  various  kinds  all  day,  every   day,   formally   equal   rights   to   participate   at   worker   council   meetings   will   not   translate   into   truly   equal   opportunities   to   influence   firm   decisions.   Again,   we   refer  to  a  job  balancing  committee  and  discuss  how  it  might  function,  but  leave   4  The  first  model  of  market  socialism  developed  by  Oscar  Lange  and  Abba  Lerner  in  the  1930s  proposed   that   enterprise   managers   be   appointed   by   the   state,   not   chosen   by   a   self-­‐governing   worker   council   where   every   member   has   one   vote.   In   the   1990s   John   Roemer   proposed   a   different   variant   of   “managerial  market  socialism”  in  which  workers  also  were  not  “sovereign”  over  their  own  workplace.   However,   the   majority   of   market   socialists   have   historically   supported   worker   self-­‐management.   Jaroslav  Vanek  and  Branko  Horvat  proposed  models  of  “worker  self-­‐managed  market  socialism”  in  the   1960s.  David  Schweickart  and  Michael  Howard  have  proposed  slightly  different  versions  of  worker  self-­‐ managed   market   socialism   in   the   past   twenty   years.   Erik   strongly   supports   a   “worker   self-­‐managed”   rather  than  a  “managerial”  version  of  market  socialism.   Robin  Hahnel     particulars  up  to  individual  worker  councils,  and  expect  wide  variations  in  how   they   would   try   to   combine   tasks   in   job   descriptions   so   that   everyone’s   work   experience  contains  some  empowering  tasks,  and  pleasant  and  unpleasant  tasks   are  shared  by  all.  Unlike  many  other  market  socialists  who  object  to  job  balancing   as  inefficient  and  an  infringement  on  individual  economic  freedoms,  Erik  seems  to   agree   with   us   that   these   objections   are   not   compelling,   and   that   achieving   meaningful  economic  democracy  requires  job  balancing.   Which  means  that  while  many  other  market  socialists  object  to  our  proposals  for   how   to   reward   work   and   organise   the   production   process,   the   major   area   of   disagreement  between  Erik  and  supporters  of  participatory  economics  has  to  do   with   the   best   way   to   coordinate   the   interrelated   activities   of   different   worker   councils   and   consumers   –   or   what   economists   call   the   economy’s   “allocative   mechanism.”     WHAT  IS  PARTICIPATORY  PLANNING?     Erik’s   principal   objection   to   the   “model”   of   a   participatory   economy   is   the   proposal   to   replace   markets   with   a   procedure   we   call   “participatory   planning.”   Here  the  distinction  between  a  long-­‐run  goal  and  a  transition  strategy  is  crucial.  I   have  never  been  under  the  illusion  that  we  can  replace  markets  with  participatory   planning  immediately.  The  market  system  has  been  growing  and  deepening  for   hundreds   of   years,   and   regrettably   still   has   the   allegiance   of   an   overwhelming   majority   of   the   population.   Since   the   “system   change”   we   seek   is   highly   democratic  it  can  only  happen  when  we  have  convinced  a  significant  majority  to   support   replacing   the   market   system   with   participatory   planning.     Therefore,   I   personally  have  long  argued  that  while  the  market  system  persists  much  of  our   transition  strategy  necessarily  consists  of  various  ways  to  “socialise”  markets  –  as   Erik  and  other  proponents  of  market  socialism  put  it  –  in  order  to  ameliorate  their   detrimental  effects.  This  is  why  I  believe  supporters  of  participatory  economics   can  work  together  with  market  socialists  on  many  campaigns  to  “tame”  markets   in  the  here  and  now.  In  other  words,  in  my  view  the  difference  is  not  that  market   socialists  fight  to  tame  markets  while  proponents  of  participatory  economics  do   not.   The   difference   is   that   advocates   of   participatory   economics   fight   to   tame   markets  until  a  majority  supports  replacing  them  altogether  with  something  far   better,  while  market  socialists  fight  to  tame  markets  to  keep  them.   The  case  for  eventually  replacing  markets  altogether  logically  has  two  parts:  (1)   Demonstrating   how   and   why   markets   –   even   if   “tamed”   –   would   still   have   The  Case  for  Participatory  Economics   5 undesirable  consequences.  (2)  Demonstrating  that  there  is  an  alternative  way  to   coordinate   a   productive   division   of   labor   that   is   both   feasible   and   less   problematic.  I  can  postpone  the  first  part  of  this  “case  against  markets”  until  after   Erik   presents   his   reasons   for   believing   that   eliminating   markets   entirely   is   unnecessary  and  undesirable.  Here  I  confine  myself  to  the  second  part  –  the  “how   and  wherefores”  of  the  participatory  planning  alternative.  To  keep  things  simple  I   will  confine  myself  to  the  annual  participatory  planning  procedure,  taking  care  to   correct  some  common  misconceptions.     THE  PLANNING  PROCEDURE   The   annual   participatory   planning   procedure   takes   place   in   the   context   of   an   investment   plan   that   has   already   decided   what   investment   goods   will   be   produced   this   year   and   how   they   will   be   distributed   to   increase   capacities   of   different  industries  at  year’s  end.  It  also  takes  place  when  the  stocks  of  all  kinds  of   natural   capital   (e.g.   acres   of   fertile   land),   produced   capital   (e.g.   lathes),   and   human  capital  (e.g.  people-­‐hours  of  welding  labor)  available  for  use  during  the   year  are  known.5  What  the  annual  planning  procedure  “decides”  is  which  worker   councils  will  use  which  productive  resources,  what  those  worker  councils  will  use   their   primary   and   intermediate   inputs   to   produce,   how   intermediate   goods   produced  will  be  distributed  among  worker  councils,  and  how  consumption  goods   produced  will  be  distributed  among  consumer  councils  and  federations.  In  other   words,   the   procedure   yields   what   economists   call   a   comprehensive,   annual   production-­‐consumption  plan.   Only   worker   councils   and   consumer   councils   and   federations   participate   in   the   annual   planning   procedure.   Each   worker   and   consumer   council,   and   each   federation  of  consumer  councils  participates  by  submitting  a  proposal  for  what   that  council  or  federation  wants  to  do,  i.e.  councils  and  federations  make  what   we   call   “self-­‐activity   proposals.”   There   is   a   single   “iteration   facilitation   board”   (IFB)   that   performs   one,   very   simple   function.   The   IFB   announces   current   estimates   of   the   opportunity   costs   of   using   each   kind   of   “capital”   –   natural,   produced,  and  human  –  the  social  cost  of  producing  every  produced  good  and   service,  and  the  damage  caused  by  every  pollutant.  The  IFB  raises  its  estimate  of   5  In  other  words,  the  “demand”  for  each  investment  good  to  be  produced  this  year,  and  the  “supply”  of   every  input  that  cannot  be  produced  this  year  are  “givens”  when  annual  planning  begins.   Robin  Hahnel     the  “indicative  price”  for  anything  in  excess  demand  in  the  previous  round  of  the   planning  procedure,  and  lowers  its  price  for  anything  in  excess  supply,  after  which   councils  and  federations  revise  and  resubmit  new  “self-­‐activity”  proposals  until  a   feasible  plan  is  reached,  i.e.  until  there  is  no  longer  excess  demand  for  any  natural   resource,  any  kind  of  physical  capital,  any  category  of  labor,  any  intermediate  or   final  good  or  service,  or  any  pollutant.6   Individual   workers   participate   only   within   their   own   worker   council   helping   formulate   and   revise   their   own   worker   council   proposal.   Individual   consumers   participate  only  within  their  own  neighbourhood  consumer  council  (a)  voting  for   delegates  to  higher  level  consumer  federations  responsible  for  requesting  higher   level   public   goods,   (b)   making   their   own   and   approving   the   individual   consumption  requests  of  others,  and  (c)  deciding  on  requests  for  neighbourhood   public  goods.  The  process  whereby  individual  consumption  requests  are  approved   is   internal   to   each   neighbourhood   consumption   council,   and   not   part   of   the   participatory   planning   procedure   itself.   The   process   whereby   federations   of   consumer  councils  decide  what  higher  level  public  goods  to  ask  for  is  also  up  to   them,  and  not  part  of  the  planning  procedure.     Each   round   in   this   social,   iterative   procedure   begins   with   new,   more   accurate   estimates  of  opportunity  and  social  costs,  followed  by  revised  proposals  from  all   6  Note:   A   great   deal   of   what   has   been   written   about   the   need   for   supercomputers   and   modern   information   technologies   for   a   participatory   economy   to   work   is   simply   wrong.   For   example,   the   IFB   does  not  need  a  powerful  computer  at  all.  It  merely  adds  up  and  compares  the  demand  and  supply  for   each  natural  resource,  each  category  of  labor,  each  final,  intermediate,  and  capital  good  or  service,  and   each   pollutant.     In   terms   of   “technology”   the   IFB   might   want   an   abacus   but   has   no   need   for   a   supercomputer!   Nor   do   actors   in   the   planning   procedure   need   to   do   anything   other   than   multiply   quantities  by  “indicative  prices”  and  add  them  up  to  calculate  the  estimated  social  costs  of  consumption   requests  and  the  social  benefit  to  cost  ratios  of  production  proposals.  Again,  nothing  requiring  fancy   computer  capabilities.   Assuming   central   planners   could   obtain   accurate,   detailed   information   about   the   capabilities   of   all   production   units,   in   order   to   be   efficient   central   planning   does   require   supercomputers   capable   of   solving  very  large  mathematical  programming  problems  –  which,  incidentally,  have  been  available  for   decades   now.   However,   this   is   not   the   case   for   participatory   planning.   Nobody   in   a   participatory   economy  needs  to  acquire  detailed  information  about  the  production  capabilities  of  production  units,   and  nobody  requires  the  services  of  supercomputers.  Where  relatively  new  modern  technology  would   be  helpful  in  running  a  participatory  economy  is  in  adjusting  for  changes  during  the  year  from  what  was   planned  and  approved.  Computerised  inventory  management  systems  and  “real  time”  supply  chains  –   which  are  now  fixtures  in  the  global  economy  –  make  adjustments  during  the  year  much  smoother  than   they  would  have  been  a  few  decades  ago.   The  Case  for  Participatory  Economics   7 councils   and   federations   in   light   of   new   information   about   how   their   desires   affect   others.   Each   council   and   federation   must   revise   and   resubmit   its   own   proposal   until   it   meets   with   approval   from   the   other   councils.   Consumption   council   and   federation   proposals   are   evaluated   by   multiplying   the   quantity   of   every  good  or  service  requested  by  the  estimated  social  cost  of  producing  a  unit   of   the   good   or   service,   to   be   compared   to   the   average   effort   rating   of   the   members   of   the   consumption   council   or   federation   requesting   the   goods   and   services.   If,   for   example,   the   average   effort   rating   for   a   neighbourhood   consumption   council   is   equal   to   the   social   average,   this   should   entitle   them   to   consume  goods  and  services  whose  production  costs  society  an  amount  equal  to   the   average   cost   of   providing   a   neighbourhood   consumption   request.   A   neighbourhood   council   with   higher   than   average   effort   ratings   (indicating   that   they  had  made  greater  than  average  sacrifices  as  workers)  is  presumably  entitled   to   a   consumption   bundle   which   costs   society   more   than   the   average;   a   neighbourhood  council  with  lower  than  average  effort  ratings  should  presumably   only  be  entitled  to  a  consumption  bundle  which  costs  less  than  the  average.     The   estimates   of   opportunity   and   social   costs   generated   during   the   planning   procedure  make  it  easy  to  calculate  the  social  cost  of  consumption  requests.  This   is   important   information   for   councils   and   federations   making   consumption   requests  since  otherwise  they  have  no  way  of  knowing  the  extent  to  which  they   are  asking  others  to  bear  burdens  on  their  behalf.  It  is  also  important  for  councils   and  federations  which  must  vote  to  approve  or  disapprove  consumption  requests   of   others,   since   otherwise   they   have   no   way   of   knowing   if   a   request   is   fair   (consistent   with   sacrifices   those   making   the   request   have   made)   or   unfair   (in   excess  of  sacrifices  made).   Production  proposals  are  evaluated  by  comparing  the  estimated  social  benefits  of   outputs   to   the   estimated   social   cost   of   inputs.   In   any   round   of   the   planning   procedure  the  social  benefits  of  a  production  proposal  are  calculated  simply  by   multiplying  quantities  of  proposed  outputs  by  their  “indicative”  prices—including   negative  prices  for  proposed  emissions  of  pollutants  –  and  summing.  The  social   costs  of  a  production  proposal  are  calculated  by  multiplying  inputs  requested  by   their   “indicative”   prices   and   summing.   If   the   social   benefits   exceed   the   social   costs—that  is,  if  the  social  benefit  to  cost  ratio  of  a  production  proposal  exceeds   one—   everyone   else   is   presumably   made   better   off   by   allowing   the   worker   council  to  do  what  they  have  proposed.  On  the  other  hand,  if  the  social  benefit  to   cost  ratio  is  less  than  one,  the  rest  of  society  would  presumably  be  worse  off  if   the  workers  go  ahead  and  do  what  they  have  proposed,  unless  there  is  something   Robin  Hahnel     “the   numbers”   fail   to   capture.   Again,   the   “indicative”   prices   make   it   easy   to   calculate   the   social   benefit   to   cost   ratio   for   any   production   proposal,   allowing   worker  councils  making  proposals  to  determine  if  their  own  proposals  are  socially   responsible,   and   giving   all   councils   who   must   vote   to   approve   or   disapprove   production   proposals   of   others   an   easy   way   to   assess   whether   or   not   those   proposals  are  socially  responsible.   This   procedure   “whittles”   overly   ambitious   proposals   submitted   by   worker   and   consumer  councils  about  what  they  would  like  to  do  down  to  a  “feasible”  plan   where   everything   someone   is   expecting   to   be   able   to   use   will   actually   be   available.   Consumers   requesting   more   than   their   effort   ratings   and   allowances   warrant   are   forced   to   either   reduce   the   amounts   they   request,   or   shift   their   requests   to   less   socially   costly   items   if   they   expect   to   win   the   approval   of   other   councils  who  have  no  reason  to  approve  consumption  requests  whose  social  costs   are  not  justified  by  the  sacrifices  of  those  making  them.  Similarly,  worker  councils   are  forced  to  either  increase  their  efforts,  shift  toward  producing  a  more  desirable   mix   of   outputs,   or   shift   to   a   less   costly   mix   of   inputs   to   win   approval   for   their   proposals  from  other  councils  who  have  no  reason  to  approve  production  proposals   whose  social  costs  exceed  their  social  benefits.  Efficiency  is  promoted  as  consumers   and  workers  attempt  to  shift  their  proposals  in  response  to  updated  information   about  opportunity  and  social  costs  in  order  to  avoid  reductions  in  consumption  or   increases  in  work  effort.  Equity  is  promoted  when  further  shifting  is  insufficient  to   win   approval   from   fellow   consumers   and   workers   which   can   eventually   only   be   achieved   through   consumption   reduction   or   greater   work   effort.   As   iterations   proceed,   consumption   and   production   proposals   move   closer   to   mutual   feasibility,  and  estimates  more  closely  approximate  true  opportunity  and  social   costs  as  the  procedure  generates  equity  and  efficiency  simultaneously.   Because  estimates  of  opportunity  and  social  costs  are  available  to  all  it  is  easy  for   anyone   to   calculate   whether   or   not   a   consumption   or   production   proposal   is   socially  responsible.  This  means  there  is  no  need  for  a  central  planner  to  be  the   final   arbiter,   approving   or   disapproving   proposals.   Councils   can   vote   “yea”   or   “nay”   on   other   councils’   proposals   without   time   consuming   evaluations   or   contentious  meetings,  except  in  occasional  cases  requiring  special  review.   There  are  important  technical  issues  of  concern  to  economists.  In  this  regard  it   has   been   demonstrated   that   the   participatory   procedure   outlined   above   will   eventually  reach  a  feasible  plan  that  is  a  Pareto  optimum  under  less  restrictive   assumptions  about  technologies  and  preferences  than  those  necessary  to  prove   The  Case  for  Participatory  Economics   9 that  the  general  equilibrium  of  a  private  enterprise,  market  economy  will  do  so.  In   particular,   participatory   planning   accommodates   externalities   and   public   goods   efficiently,   and   generates   reasonably   accurate   estimates   of   damages   from   pollution  whereas  market  economies  do  not.7  But  this  is  what  it  boils  down  to:   When  worker  councils  make  proposals  they  are  asking  permission  to  use  particular   parts  of  the  productive  resources  that  belong  to  everyone.  In  effect  their  proposals   say:   “If   the   rest   of   you,   with   whom   we   are   engaged   in   a   cooperative   division   of   labor,  agree  to  allow  us  to  use  productive  resources  belonging  to  all  of  us  as  inputs,   then  we  promise  to  deliver  the  following  goods  and  services  as  outputs  for  others  to   use.”   When   consumer   councils   make   proposals   they   are   asking   permission   to   consume  goods  and  services  whose  production  entails  social  costs.  In  effect  their   proposals  say:  “We  believe  the  effort  ratings  we  received  from  co-­‐workers  indicate   that  we  deserve  the  right  to  consume  goods  and  services  whose  production  entails   an  equivalent  level  of  social  costs.”     The   planning   procedure   is   designed   to   make   it   clear   when   a   worker   council   production   proposal   is   inefficient   and   when   a   consumption   council   proposal   is   unfair,   and   allows   other   worker   and   consumer   councils   to   deny   approval   for   proposals   when   they   seem   to   be   inefficient   or   unfair.   But   initial   self-­‐activity   proposals,   and   all   revisions   of   proposals,   are   entirely   up   to   each   worker   and   consumer  council  itself.  In  other  words,  if  a  worker  council  production  proposal  or   neighbourhood   council   consumption   proposal   is   not   approved,   the   council   that   made  the  proposal  –  nobody  else  –  can  revise  its  proposal  for  resubmission  in  the   next   round   of   the   planning   procedure.   This   aspect   of   the   participatory   planning   procedure  distinguishes  it  from  all  other  planning  models,  which  advocates  believe   is  crucial  if  workers  and  consumers  are  to  enjoy  meaningful  self-­‐management.         7  Readers  interested  in  these  technical  issues  should  see  chapter  5  in  Albert  and  Hahnel,  The  Political   Economy   of   Participatory   Economics   (Princeton   University   Press,   1991),   “Socialism   As   It   Was   Always   Meant   to   Be,”   Review   of   Radical   Political   Economics   (24,   3&4),   Fall   and   Winter   1992:   46-­‐66,   “Participatory   Planning,”   Science   &   Society   (56,   1),   Spring   1992:   39-­‐59,   and   Hahnel,     “Wanted:   A   Pollution   Damage   Revealing   Mechanism,”   available   from   me   upon   request   and   under   review   at   the   Review  of  Radical  Political  Economics.   PARTICIPATORY  ECONOMICS:  A  SYMPATHETIC   CRITIQUE     Erik  Olin  Wright       Let   me   begin,   like   Robin   did   in   his   opening   contribution   to   this   dialogue,   by   affirming  a  very  broad  range  of  issues  on  which  we  are  in  deep  agreement:8   Strong   egalitarianism   is   a   core   value.   We   both   adopt   a   radical   egalitarian   understanding   of   social   justice,   although   we   use   slightly   different   language   to   express  our  views.  A  just  system  of  economic  distribution  is  one  which  combines   an   unconditional   guarantee   of   income   sufficient   to   provide   for   (generously   interpreted)   basic   needs   with   additional   income   that   is   proportionate   to   some   broadly  understood  notion  of  effort  or  sacrifice.  Robin  refers  to  the  first  of  these   conditions  as  a  condition  for  a  humane  economy,  not  a  just  economy,  and  treats   only  the  second  condition  as  a  matter  of  justice,  whereas  I  feel  it  is  unjust  to  deny   people  equal  access  to  the  material  means  necessary  to  live  a  flourishing  life.  But   this  makes  no  practical  difference  in  our  views  about  what  constitutes  a  desirable   system  of  distribution.9    We  both  reject  inequalities  in  material  conditions  of  life   that  are  the  result  of  talents  or  contributions  or  brute  luck  and  certainly  of  power.   The  quality  of  work,  not  just  the  material  rewards  from  work,  is  an  issue  in  justice.   Robin  expresses  this  concern  in  his  principle  of  “balancing  jobs”  –  the  idea  that  all   jobs,  to  the  extent  possible,  should  contain  the  same  mix  of  tedious  and  enjoyable   8  My   analysis   here   is   based   more   on   Robin’s   book,   Of   The   People,   By   The   People:   The   Case   for   a   Participatory  Economy,  rather  than  simply  his  initial  contribution  to  this  dialogue.   9  Using   the   term   “justice”   in   a   more   restrictive   way   only   really   matters   if   one   also   believes   that   considerations  of  justice  always  trump  other  values.  Some  liberal  political  theorists  seem  to  argue  this  –   that  whenever  there  is  a  conflict  of  values  between  justice  and  something  else,  justice  decides;  it  has,  to   use  the  philosophers’  term,  “lexical  priority.”  Neither  Robin  nor  I  give  justice  that  kind  of  over-­‐riding   weight.  In  Robin’s  terms  it  is  just  as  important  that  a  society  be  humane  as  just,  and  in  places  in  his   analysis  he  is  willing  to  accept  as  a  legitimate  trade-­‐off  some  departures  from  justice  in  the  name  of   efficiency  (see  my  discussion  below  of  the  problem  of  innovation).   Participatory  Economics:  A  Sympathetic  Critique   11 tasks,   pleasant   and   unpleasant   activities,   routine   and   “empowered”   responsibilities.  As  an  ideal,  all  jobs  should  be  equally  desirable  from  the  point  the   view  of  whatever  qualities  people  value  within  work.  This  is  a  complex  regulative   ideal,  and  while  in  practice  it  will  never  be  fully  realized,  deviations  are  a  matter   of  injustice.  People  in  jobs  which,  for  pragmatic  reasons,  have  more  burdens  in   this  sense  (i.e.  a  less  desirable  balance  of  tasks)  should  thus  be  compensated  with   greater  income  or  more  leisure  or  in  some  other  appropriate  way.     Radical,   substantively   meaningful   democracy.     Democracy,   if   taken   seriously,   means  that  people  should  be  able  to  meaningfully  participate  in  making  decisions   over  things  which  affect  their  lives.  Robin  correctly  argues  that  the  full  realization   of   that   principle   means   that   the   weight   of   individuals’   preferences   in   decisions   should  be  roughly  proportional  to  how  much  any  given  decision  affects  them.  This   is  obviously  a  very  complex  idea  to  put  into  practice  in  a  fine-­‐grained  way,  and   any  practical  implementation  will  at  best  be  a  rough  approximation  of  the  ideal   itself.    This  conception  of  democracy  provides  grounding  for  the  kind  of  nested   system   of   participatory   decision-­‐making   bodies   that   is   at   the   heart   of   the   institutional  design  of  Robin’s  model.     Capitalism  has  destructive  effects  on  all  of  these  values.  Finally,  we  both  argue   that  capitalism  systematically  contradicts  the  realization  of  all  of  these  values,  and   while  it  is  sometimes  possible  to  mitigate  some  of  the  deficits  with  various  kinds   of   public   policies   within   capitalism,   transcending   capitalism   is   a   necessary   condition  for  the  fullest  possible  realization  of  democratic  egalitarian  values.   That  is  a  lot  of  agreement.  Where  we  differ  is  in  our  views  of  certain  important   aspects  of  the  institutional  design  of  an  alternative  that  is  best  suited  to  realize   these  common  values.   Robin  feels  very  confident  that  a  complex,  large-­‐scale,  well-­‐functioning  economic   system  –  in  principle  even  a  global  economy  –  could  exist  in  which  markets  have   been  completely  replaced  by  participatory  planning.  While  he  acknowledges  that   the   actual   design   of   economic   institutions   in   a   post-­‐capitalist   participatory   economy   will   evolve   through   experimentation   and   democratic   deliberation,   he   nevertheless  argues  that  the  goal  should  be  the  complete  elimination  of  markets,   and  his  hypothesis  is  that  such  an  economy  would  function  in  ways  that  would  be   robustly   sustainable.     Sustainability,   in   the   context   of   a   democratic   egalitarian   economy,   means   that   the   institutional   configuration   in   question   would   be   continually  endorsed  by  the  broad  majority  of  participants  in  the  economy  since   they  have  the  power  to  change  the  rules  of  the  game  if  they  don’t  like  the  way   Erik  Olin  Wright   things  are  working.  There  will  inevitably  be  trade-­‐offs  across  the  different  values   that   a   participatory   economy   hopes   to   realize.   A   particular   set   of   institutional   rules  of  the  game  is  a  way  of  navigating  those  trade-­‐offs.  A  stable  system  is  one  in   which  the  continual  over-­‐time  results  of  the  operation  of  the  system  reinforce  the   actors’   commitment   to   those   rules.   Robin’s   hypothesis,   then,   is   that   a   participatory  economy  in  which  markets  play  no  role  would  be  sustainable  in  this   sense.     My   position   is   that   the   optimal   institutional   configuration   of   a   democratic-­‐ egalitarian   economy   is   much   more   likely   to   be   a   mix   of   diverse   forms   of   participatory  planning,  state  regulatory  mechanisms,  and  markets.  I,  like  Robin,   am  disposed  to  give  great  weight  to  the  participatory  mechanisms  because  of  the   ways  these  embody  values  of  equality  and  democracy,  but  I  am  very  skeptical  that   these  could  ever  completely  displace  markets,  or  even,  really,  that  this  should  be   some   bottom-­‐line   goal   to   which   we   aspire.   I   want   a   robustly   and   sustainably   democratic   egalitarian   economy,   but   my   expectation   is   that   the   institutional   designs   that   people   in   such   an   economy   would   actually   choose   (through   experimentation  and  learning)  will  include  a  significant  role  for  markets.  This  is  a   prediction   rather   than   a   prescription.   I   do   not   know   what   institutional   configuration  of  different  forms  of  economic  organization  would  work  best,  nor   what,  in  practice,  the  trade-­‐offs  will  be  between  different  configurations.  What  I   predict,  then,  is  that  a  configuration  in  which  markets  play  no  role  would  not  be   sustainable  in  the  sense  I  am  describing.10   I  also  believe  –  as  I  will  argue  in  more  detail  later–  that  this  expectation  may  not   be  so  different  from  what  Robin’s  model  would,  in  practice,  generate  iteratively   over   time.   Robin   acknowledges   that   the   actual   functioning   of   his   model   for   a   participatory   economy   combines   initial   rounds   of   planning   (through   his   nested   participatory  councils  of  various  sorts)  and  after-­‐the-­‐fact,  continual  “adjustments”   that  occur  for  a  variety  of  reasons.  Depending  on  the  scale  of  processes  through   which   these   adjustments   occur   and   exactly   how   they   are   executed,   they   could   function   a   lot   like   markets.   And   since   this   is   an   ongoing   process   in   which   the   10  Contrary   to   what   some   people   argue,   sustainability   of   a   post-­‐capitalist   democratic   egalitarian   economic   system   of   the   sort   proposed   by   Robin   would   not   require   that   it   generate   high   rates   of   economic  growth  (unless,  of  course,  it  were  also  the  case  that  the  participants  within  such  an  economy   would  be  sufficiently  dissatisfied  with  the  rates  of  growth  –  or  non-­‐growth  –  that  an  alternative  was   seen  as  preferable).  What  sustainability  requires  is  that  the  participants’  commitment  to  the  institutions   is  not  undermined  by  the  effects  of  its  operation.   Participatory  Economics:  A  Sympathetic  Critique   13 adjustments  in  one  period  constitute  inputs  for  subsequent  planning,  it  is  not  so   clear  that  the  marketish  processes  would  play  an  only  peripheral  role.     This  way  of  thinking  about  the  issues  implies  that  the  concept  of  “markets”  is  not   a  binary.  In  a  binary  conception  of  markets  you  either  have  markets  or  you  don’t;   any   given   transaction   is   either   a   market   transaction   or   it   is   not.   A   non-­‐binary   conception  recognizes  that    exchanges  can  be  heavily  regulated  and  affected  by   collective   priories,   but   still   involve   things   being   bought   and   sold   in   which   the   prices  are  affected  by  supply  and  demand  as  well  as  regulatory  constraints.  Such   exchanges   involve   significant   market   and   nonmarket   mechanisms.   Or   to   take   a   different  kind  of  example,  in  my  usage  of  the  term  “markets,”  garage  sales  (and   their  internet  equivalents  like  Craig’s  list)  are  a  form  of  market  relations:  items  are   put  up  for  sale;  the  prices  tend  to  be  higher  in  the  morning  than  at  the  end  of  the   day  in  response  to  the  demand  by  consumers  for  the  things  on  offer;  more  garage   sales  are  likely  to  occur  (i.e.  the  supply  of  goods  for  sale  through  this  mechanism   will  be  greater)  in  an  economic  environment  where  there  are  lots  of  people  who   like   to   buy   used   things.     A   participatory   economy,   I   would   predict,   is   likely   to   allow,  perhaps  even  encourage,  things  like  garage  sales.  Of  course  capitalism  is   not   like   a   garage   sale   writ   large   because   the   power   relations   implicated   in   capitalist  markets  are  vastly  different  from  those  in  a  neighborhood  garage  sale.   Garage   sales   are   a   very   minor   aspect   of   the   market   system   in   contemporary   capitalism.   But   nevertheless,   they   constitute   a   particular   form   of   market   processes.     In   what   follows   I   focus   on   five   elements   of   Robin’s   model: 11  household   consumption   planning;   the   mechanisms   for   dealing   with   externalities;   public   goods   planning;   risk-­‐taking   innovation;   the   organization   of   work   and   pay.   My   skepticism   is   greatest   about   the   first   of   these,   so   I   will   spend   the   most   time   exploring  its  mechanisms  and  ramifications.  For  the  others  I  have  specific  issues   to   discuss,   but   I   broadly   endorse   what   I   see   as   the   core   principles   they   each   attempt  to  achieve.         11  Throughout   this   paper   I   will   address   my   comments   strictly   to   Robin’s   writing   on   participatory   economics.  I  recognize,  of  course,  that  many  of  the  ideas  were  developed  jointly  with  Michael  Albert.   Erik  Olin  Wright   PARTICIPATORY  PLANNING  OF  HOUSEHOLD  CONSUMPTION   In   his   book   (p.115),   Robin   describes   four   basic   principles   that   his   model   of   participatory   planning   is   meant   to   embody,   all   of   which   are   touched   on   in   his   opening  contribution  to  this  dialogue  as  well:     1. We   want   people   to   have   input   over   decisions   to   the   degree   they   are   affected.     2. We  want  outcomes  to  be  fair  and  efficient.     3. We  want  procedures  to  promote  rather  than  undermine  solidarity.     4. We  want  all  our  plans  to  be  environmentally  sustainable.     These   are   all   desirable   principles.   What   I   wish   to   interrogate   is   the   second   element   in   the   second   criterion:   efficiency.12  Specifically,   I   am   skeptical   that   an   institutional  design  in  which  markets  have  been  completely  eliminated  –  where   they  play  no  role  whatsoever  in  economic  coordination  –  is  likely  to  be  as  efficient   as   an   institutional   configuration   that   combines   a   variety   of   forms   of   economic   coordination:   participatory   planning,   centralized   regulations,   and   market   interactions.   I   will   not   argue   for   the   superiority   of   markets   over   participatory   planning;   I   am   arguing   for   the   desirability   of   an   institutional   ecosystem   of   the   economy  that  combines  a  variety  of  institutional  forms  and  mechanisms.   I  will  focus  first  on  the  aspect  of  the  planning  process  which  I  feel  is  the  most   problematic,   the   planning   of   household   consumption.   The   planning   of   consumption   is   in   many   ways   the   pivotal   process   within   the   participatory   economy  model  for  this  is  what  most  fundamentally  dictates  what  is  produced  in   the  economy.  As  Robin  writes:     There  is  complete  freedom  of  choice  in  a  participatory  economy  regarding  what  one   wishes  to  consume.  Moreover,  consumer  preferences  determine  what  will  be  produced   in   a   participatory   economy   whereas   they   only   do   so   very   imperfectly   in   market   economies.   Since   markets   bias   consumer   choice   by   overcharging   for   goods   whose   production   or   consumption   entail   positive   external   effects,   undercharging   for   goods   with  negative  external  effects,  and  over  supplying  private  goods  relative  to  public  goods,   markets   influence   what   will   be   produced   in   systematic   ways   that   deviate   from   12  Like   Robin,   I   reject   the   narrow   meaning   of   efficiency   adopted   by   many   economists   as   the   profit-­‐ maximizing   use   of   resources   on   a   market.   Rather,   efficiency   refers   to   the   allocation   all   resources   (including  the  time  of  all  participants)  that  best  reflects  the  optimal  trade-­‐offs  for  alternative  uses  of   those  resources.  Efficiency  must  include  a  full  account  of  positive  and  negative  externalities.     Participatory  Economics:  A  Sympathetic  Critique   15 consumers’  true  preferences.  Participatory  planning  is  carefully  designed  to  eliminate   these  biases  which  both  infringe  on  ‘consumer  sovereignty’  and  generate  inefficiencies.   (p.80)   Robin’s   model   of   the   participatory   planning   of   public   goods   –   collective   consumption  in  its  various  forms  –  does  not  pose  the  same  problems.  By  their   very  nature,  public  goods  are  always  planned  in  one  way  or  another,  and  Robin’s   proposed  model  of  participatory  planning  of  public  goods  in  which  councils  at  the   appropriate  scale  for  a  given  public  good  are  the  primary  site  for  deliberation  over   public   goods   seems   absolutely   right.   I   also   have   much   less   to   say   about   the   various  forms  of  production  planning  –  annual  plans,  long  term  investments  and   development  planning.  These  are  certainly  important,  and  some  of  what  I  have  to   say  would  be  relevant  to  those  arenas  of  planning  as  well,  but  I  also  think  that  the   weight  of  the  participatory  planning  elements  for  those  kinds  of  decisions  would,   in   an   optimal   social   design,   be   much   greater   than   for   household   consumption   planning.     One  final  provisional  comment:  I  am  not  sure  that  in  all  details  I  fully  understand   the  operation  of  the  participatory  planning  mechanisms  that  are  at  the  core  of   Robin’s   model.   I   have   read   Robin’s   opening   contribution   and   the   relevant   chapters  in  the  book  numerous  times,  as  well  as  Michael  Albert’s  book  Parecon   and  a  few  other  discussions  of  these  issues,  but  nevertheless  there  are  parts  of   the   exposition   which,   for   me   anyway,   remain   unclear.   I   have   not   been   able   to   develop  an  intuitive  understanding  of  how  all  of  this  actually  works,  how  all  of  the   pieces   fit   together,   and   especially   why   the   proposed   institutional   design   eliminates  all  perverse  incentives  so  that  everyone  provides  perfect  information   to   everyone   else,   thus   making   the   system   invulnerable   to   opportunism   by   individuals  or  groups.13     Let  me  begin  by  reviewing  the  basic  elements,  as  I  understand  them,  of  the  way   consumption  planning  for  individual  households  takes  place  in  Robin’s  model.  This   process  is  covered  to  some  extent  in  Robin's  opening  contribution  but  there  it  is   13  I  don’t  think  my  lack  of  intuition  here  is  because  I  have  not  read  the  technical  economic  papers  that   Robin   refers   to   in   his   essay,   papers   which   he   describes   as   proving   that   his   planning   mechanism   generates  optimal  outcomes.    I  am  not  skeptical  that  the  mathematical  models  that  are  elaborated  in   those   papers   show   these   things.   What   I   am   skeptical   about   is   that   the   mathematical   models   can   adequately  represent  the  way  these  institutions  would  actually  function  over  time.  I  suppose  this  is  in   part  the  skepticism  of  a  sociologist  about  the  empirical  robustness  of  conclusions  that  can  be  drawn   from  formal  mathematical  models  of  complex  social  processes.     Erik  Olin  Wright   interwoven  with  an  account  of  production  planning  as  well.  For  my  purposes  it  is   useful  to  distill  the  consumption  planning  process,  which  I  take  to  be  as  follows:   1. At  the  beginning  of  the  process  the  Iteration  Facilitation  Board  announces   current   estimates   of   indicative   prices   for   everything   (consumption   items,   inputs  to  production,  labor,  etc.)  based  on  estimates  of  opportunity  costs   and  positive  and  negative  externalities  in  the  production  of  all  goods  and   services.     2. Each  household  begins  the  process  with  a  budget  constraint  determined  by:   a)   an   effort   rating   based   on   the   contributions   of   labor   effort   by   all   household   members   during   the   previous   year,   b)   a   level   of   consumption   allowances   for   people   excused   from   participation   in   production   (children,   elderly,  severely  disabled,  etc.),  and  c)  a  consumption  allowance  for  people   who   simply   don’t   want   to   work   (this   is,   in   effect,   an   unconditional   basic   income,  presumably  set  at  a  level  to  fully  meet  basic  needs).   3. Every   year   individual   households   submit   to   their   neighborhood   consumer   councils  their  requests  for  all  the  things  they  anticipate  consuming  in  the   following  year  given  the  household  budget  constraints.  In  effect,  they  pre-­‐ order  their  annual  household  consumption.   4. The   powers   of   neighborhood   consumption   councils   with   respect   to   household   consumption   include:   authorizing   borrowing   and   saving   of   households;   approving   their   consumption   requests;   discussing   and   proposing   neighborhood   public   goods.   The   household   proposals   are   reviewed   by   neighborhood   consumption   councils.   If   they   fall   within   the   budget  constraint  of  the  household,  then  they  would  normally  be  approved   automatically.   If   there   is   a   request   for   consumption   above   this   level   –   in   effect  a  request  for  a  loan  –  this  would  normally  be  reviewed  more  closely.   If  the  proposals  are  rejected,  households  revise  them.   5. Neighborhood   consumption   councils   aggregate   the   approved   individual   consumption   requests   of   all   households   in   the   neighborhood,   append   requests   for   whatever   neighborhood   public   goods   they   want,   and   submit   the   total   list   as   the   neighborhood   consumption   council’s   request   in   the   planning  process.   6. Higher   level   federations   of   consumption   councils   make   requests   for   whatever  public  goods  are  consumed  by  their  membership.   Participatory  Economics:  A  Sympathetic  Critique   17 7. On  the  basis  of  all  of  the  consumption  proposals  along  with  the  production   proposals  from  workers  councils,  the  IFB  recalculates  the  indicative  prices   and,   where   necessary,   sends   proposals   back   to   the   relevant   councils   for   revision.   8. This  iterative  process  continues  until  no  revisions  are  needed.   There   are   two   issues   that   I   would   like   to   raise   with   this   account   about   how   household  consumption  planning  would  actually  work  in  practice:  1.  How  useful  is   household  consumption  planning?  2.  How  marketish  are  “adjustments”?     How  useful  is  household  consumption  planning?   Robin  argues  that  this  planning  process  would  not  be  especially  demanding  on   people.  In  his  words:   We  are  well  aware  that  consumers  will  misestimate  what  they  ask  for  and  need  to  make   changes  during  the  year,  and  that  some  consumers  will  prove  more  reliable  and  others   more  fickle.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  being  quite  lazy  about  such  matters,  I  would  not  bother   to   update   my   consumption   proposal   at   all!   And   being   very   irresponsible   about   communication  I  would  also,  in  all  likelihood,  fail  to  respond  to  the  prompt  from  my   neighborhood   consumption   council   reminding   me   to   send   in   a   new   proposal   for   the   coming   year.   I   would   simply   allow   my   neighborhood   council   to   re-­‐enter   what   their   records  show  I  actually  ended  up  consuming  last  year  as  my  pre-­‐order  again  for  this   year.  Sound  difficult?   The  easiest  way  to  think  about  this  is  to  imagine  each  consumer  with  a  swipe  card  that   records  what  they  consume  during  the  year  as  they  pick  it  up,  and  compares  their  rate   of   consumption   for   items   against   the   amount   they   had   asked   for.   If   one’s   rate   of   consumption   for   an   item   deviates   by   say   20%   from   the   rate   implied   by   the   annual   request,  consumers  could  be  “prompted”  and  asked  if  they  want  to  make  a  change.  If  at   the  end  of  the  year  the  total  social  cost  of  someone’s  actual  consumption  differs  from   the  social  cost  of  what  they  had  asked,  and  been  approved  for,  they  would  simply  be   credited  or  debited  appropriately  in  their  savings  account.  (pp.  86-­‐87)   Here  is  one  of  the  things  I  don’t  understand  about  this  process  as  described:  A  key   issue  for  any  meaningful  planning  process  is  the  classification  of  the  items  in  the   consumption   bundle.   When   a   consumer   submits   a   plan,   how   fine-­‐grained   are   these  categories?  For  example,  is  “clothing”  a  category,  or  is  the  relevant  category   “shirts,”  or  “dress  shirts,”  or  “highly  tailored  dress  shirts”  or  “highly  tailored  silk   dress   shirts”?   Among   food   items,   is   “jam”   a   category,   or   is   “imported   French   blueberry  jam”  a  category?  For  something  like  “books”,  is  it  enough  to  estimate   how  much  I  plan  to  spend  on  books  in  a  year,  or  do  I  have  to  know  which  titles  I   am   likely   to   buy?     Also:   if   I   travel,   then   my   consumption   of   certain   things   will   Erik  Olin  Wright   extend  far  beyond  the  boundaries  of  my  immediate  location.  If  I  estimate  how   much  of  the  value  of  my  consumption  will  be  in  restaurants,  does  it  matter  that   some  of  these  might  be  in  Paris  or  New  York  rather  than  in  the  city  where  my   neighborhood   consumption   council   is   located?   I   can   certainly   imagine   making   gross  estimates  of  very  large  categories  of  consumption  –  like  clothing  or  travel  or   food  –  but  not  of  fine-­‐grained  items.     The  problem  is  that  the  gross  categories  provide  virtually  no  useful  information   for  the  actual  producers  of  the  things  I  will  consume.  It  does  not  help  shirt-­‐makers   very   much   to   know,   based   on   the   aggregation   of   individual   household   consumption  proposals,  that  consumers  plan  to  spend  a  certain  per  cent  of  their   budget  on  clothing;  they  need  to  have  some  idea  of  how  many  shirts  of  what  style   and  quality  to  produce  since  these  have  very  different  indicative  prices  (and  thus   reflect   different   opportunity   costs   and   positive   and   negative   externalities).   But   consumers   can   hardly   be   expected   to   have   a   reasonable   idea   of   their   consumption   for   the   future   at   that   level   of   detail   –   how   many   cheap   versus   expensive  meals  I  will  consume  in  what  cities,  etc.  Robin  does  not  explain  how   detailed  the  consumption  list  is  expected  to  be,  whether  it  is  built  on  categories   like  “food”  or  the  list  needs  to  be  broken  down  into  “wild-­‐caught  smoked  salmon”   and  “gourmet  organic  chunky  peanut  butter.”  In  some  places  he  seems  to  suggest   that  the  categories  will  be  quite  coarse-­‐grained,  as  in  the  above  quotation  when   he  writes:    “If  one’s  rate  of  consumption  for  an  item  deviates  by  say  20%  from  the   rate  implied  by  the  annual  request,  consumers  could  be  ‘prompted’  and  asked  if   they  want  to  make  a  change.”    That  prompting  would  make  sense  for  a  broad   category  like  clothing,  but  not  a  detailed  specification  like  “silk  neckties”.     Since   the   coarse   categories   would   not   be   useful   for   planning   by   federations   of   workers   councils,   and   this   is   the   fundamental   purpose   for   pre-­‐ordering   consumption,  I  will  assume  that  the  finest  level  of  detail  is  required.  This  would   involve  for  any  complex  economy  hundreds  of  millions  of  items  –  basically,  all  of   the   differentiated   final   consumption   items   around   which   producers   make   decisions  about  how  much  to  produce.    Since  it  is  beyond  the  ability  of  people  to   meaningfully  specify  such  an  inventory  a  year  in  advance,  the  solution,  of  course,   is  for  households  simply  to  use  the  list  of  specific  items  they  actually  consumed   from   the   previous   year.   This   seems   to   be   what   Robin   suggests   that   he,   and   probably  most  people,  would  do:  “I  would  simply  allow  my  neighborhood  council   to  re-­‐enter  what  their  records  show  I  actually  ended  up  consuming  last  year  as  my   pre-­‐order  again  for  this  year.”  (p.86)  If  overwhelmingly  this  is  what  people  would   do,   then   there   is   actually   no   real   need   for   them   to   submit   pre-­‐ordered   Participatory  Economics:  A  Sympathetic  Critique   19 consumption  “proposals”  at  all  since  the  total  consumption  of  specific  items  from   the  previous  year  is  already  known  to  producers  –  this  equals  the  total  of  all  the   goods   and   services   produced   that   were   acquired   by   consumers.   The   plans   for   production  for  the  future,  then,  in  effect  would  be  done  pretty  much  as  they  are   done  now:  producers  would  examine  the  sales14  and  trends  of  sales  in  the  recent   past,  and  make  their  best  estimate  of  what  to  produce  for  the  next  year  on  that   basis.   Indeed,   since   producers   and   their   sector   federations   can   continually   and   efficiently  monitor  these  trends,  they  are  in  a  position  to  make  updates  to  plans  in   an  on-­‐going  way  on  the  basis  of  the  actual  behavior  of  consumers,  rather  than   mainly   organize   their   planning   activities   around   annual   plans   animated   by   uninformative  household  pre-­‐orders.   There  is  a  certain  irony  here.  Robin  argues  in  favor  of  pre-­‐ordering  by  saying:     A  participatory  economy  is  a  planned  economy.  This  means  we  must  have  some  idea   what  people  want  to  consume  in  order  to  formulate  a  plan  for  how  to  produce  it.  In   market   economies   consumers   do   not   “pre-­‐order,”   and   instead   producers   are   left   to   guess   what   consumers   will   eventually   demand.   ….   the   convenience   for   consumers   of   never  having  to  pre-­‐order  in  market  economies  is  actually  bought  at  the  expense  of  a   significant  amount  of  economic  inefficiency  as  resources  are  wasted  producing  more  of   some  goods  and  less  of  others  than  it  turns  out  people  want.”  (p.84)   But   if   pre-­‐ordering   is   really   a   fiction   since   most   people   will   behave   as   Robin   predicts  that  he  will  behave,  then  it  will  still  be  the  case  that  “producers  are  left  to   guess   what   consumers   will   eventually   demand.”   Of   course,   in   a   participatory   economy   where   there   is   little   competition   among   producers   and   they   are   organized  into  federations  of  workers  councils,  it  will  be  easier  for  them  to  get  full   and  detailed  on-­‐going  data  on  consumer  choices  relevant  to  their  on-­‐going  plans,   so   their   guesses   are   likely   to   be   more   accurate   than   in   capitalism.   But   what   is   gained   by   having   households   submit   a   formal   pre-­‐order   of   a   year’s   worth   of   consumption,   given   how   they   are   likely   to   behave,   instead   of   having   the   producers  simply  use  all  of  the  relevant  data  from  actual  patterns  of  consumption   in   their   sectors   as   the   basis   for   estimating   what   will   be   consumed   in   the   next   year?     14  I  use  the  term  “sales”  here  for  convenience,  since  strictly  speaking  in  Robin’s  model  of  participatory   economics  the  nature  of  the  exchange  between  consumer  and  worker  is  not  exactly  buying  and  selling   in  the  usual  market  sense.     Erik  Olin  Wright   There  is  one  other  secondary  issue  I’d  like  to  raise  about  household  consumption   planning  and  neighborhood  consumer  councils.  I  understand  –  and  support  –  the   role   of   neighborhood   councils   in   planning   neighborhood   public   goods.   I   don’t   understand   why   my   personal   consumption   should   be   the   business   of   a   neighborhood   council,   even   apart   from   the   problem   already   discussed   of   the   usefulness   of   the   procedures   involved.   The   general   principle   underlying   participatory  planning  is  that  people  should  be  involved  in  decisions  to  the  extent   it   affects   them.   But   why   does   my   personal   consumption   have   any   effects   whatsoever  on  my  immediate  neighbors  any  more  than  it  does  on  anyone  else?   They   are   affected   by   the   division   of   consumption   between   public   goods   and   private  consumption,  but  not  by  the  content  of  what  I  consume,  so  why  should   they   have   any   role   in   that   at   all?   The   same   goes   for   my   requests   for   loans   or   credit:  why  is  this  the  business  of  my  neighbors?     How  marketish  are  “adjustments”?     In   his   opening   piece   in   this   dialogue,   Robin   only   sketches   part   of   the   planning   process   –   the   annual   plan   as   generated   by   worker   and   consumer   councils.   However,  in  his  book  he  acknowledges  that  the  initial  annual  plans  will  only  be   approximations  and  that  throughout  the  year  adjustments  will  have  to  be  made.   With  respect  to  household  consumption,  Robin  affirms  the  value  of  consumers   being   able   to   consume   what   they   want   in   a   participatory   economy:     “There   is   complete   freedom   of   choice   in   a   participatory   economy   regarding   what   one   wishes   to   consume”   (p.80).     This   means   that   the   pre-­‐ordered   household   consumption   plans   will   result   in   lots   of   deviations,   and   accordingly,   lots   of   adjustments.  Here  is  how  Robin  foresees  these  adjustments  taking  place:   One  of  the  functions  of  consumer  councils  and  federations  is  to  coordinate  changes  in   consumption   among   themselves.   If   another   consumer   wants   more   of   an   item   I   pre-­‐ ordered  but  no  longer  want,  there  is  no  need  to  change  the  amount  the  agreed  upon   production   plan   called   for.   Whenever   consumer   councils   and   federations   (which   will   function  like  clearing  houses  for  adjustments)  discover  that  changes  do  not  cancel  out,   the   national   consumer   federation   will   have   to   discuss   adjustments   with   industry   federations  of  worker  councils.  Computerized  inventory  management  systems  and  “real   time”   supply   chains   are   already   fixtures   in   the   global   economy,   which   makes   adjustments  much  smoother  than  they  would  have  been  only  a  few  decades  ago.  (p.85)   The  actual  process  by  which  these  adjustments  will  occur  is  not  very  clear  to  me,   but  even  with  the  best  inventory  management  systems  one  can  imagine,  there   will  still  be  excess  inventory  of  some  goods  in  the  system  and  shortfalls  in  others.   The   most   obvious   way   that   excess   inventory   will   be   dealt   with   is   by   allowing   Participatory  Economics:  A  Sympathetic  Critique   21 people   to   acquire   these   things   less   expensively.   To   use   conventional   language,   where  there  is  excess  supply,  prices  will  be  reduced,  whether  on  an  erratic  basis   or  as  “end  of  season  sales.”    To  be  sure,  this  means  that  the  prices  of  these  goods   will  be  not  reflect  the  opportunity  costs  of  their  initial  production  or  the  positive   and  negative  externalities  that  were  taken  into  consideration  in  determining  their   initial  “price”.  But  it  will  reflect  the  opportunity  costs  consumers  face  in  deciding   to  acquire  one  good  or  another.   There  will  also  be  shortages  in  goods.  In  some  specific  situations,  this  is  inherent   in   the   nature   of   the   goods.   For   a   theater   performance   there   is   a   difference   between  the  best  seats  and  the  worst  seats  in  the  house,  although  the  production   costs   of   the   “seat”   in   terms   of   material   inputs,   and   positive   and   negative   externalities,   don’t   differ   across   seats.   For   other   goods,   especially   some   novel   good,  there  will  be  shortages  just  because  of  the  time  it  takes  to  produce  as  much   as  people  want.  One  way  of  dealing  with  shortages  in  the  supply  of  something  is   rationing,  for  example  through  a  lottery.  People  could  buy  a  theater  ticket  and  be   randomly  assigned  a  seat.  Or  they  could  order  a  new  product  and  the  length  of   time   they   had   to   wait   until   they   received   it   could   be   randomized.   That   is   one   perfectly  good  solution  and  satisfies  a  certain  interpretation  of  equality.  Or  access   could   be   based   on   a   first-­‐come-­‐first-­‐served   basis,   with   the   accompanying   night   long   vigils   to   get   tickets   when   a   box   office   opens.   But   one   could   also   charge   people   more   for   the   items   that   are   in   short   supply.   If   this   occurs   in   a   social   context  of  effort-­‐rating  based  income  –  that  is,  a  system  in  which  everyone  has   the  same  choice  of  how  much  income  they  want  to  earn  by  simply  deciding  how   much  effort  they  want  to  expend  –  then  charging  more  for  goods  in  short  supply   simply  means  that  those  people  who  really  want  the  good  more  will  be  able  to   choose  to  consume  it  sooner.    In  Robin’s  model,  the  extra  income  generated  by   these  higher-­‐than-­‐cost-­‐of-­‐production  prices  would  not  go  into  the  pockets  of  the   producers.   Their   incomes   would   continue   to   be   based   on   their   own   effort   expenditure.   All   that   would   change   is   that   consumers   would   be   able   to   decide   whether   it   was   sufficiently   important   for   them   to   have   the   good   in   question   sooner   that   they   would   be   willing   to   consume   less   of   something   else   or   work   harder  for  some  period  of  time.   This   description   of   how   adjustments   to   annual   consumption   plans   would   work   looks  a  lot  like  certain  critical  aspects  of  markets:  prices  adjust  to  disequilibria  of   supply  and  demand.  This,  of  course,  does  not  render  the  economy  overall  a  “free   market  economy”.  The  fact  that  the  costs  of  externalities,  positive  and  negative,   are  built  into  the  base  price  of  goods,  is  not  something  that  happens  in  market   Erik  Olin  Wright   systems,   and   certainly   the   fact   that   purchasing   power   is   based   on   effort-­‐ expenditures  is  not  based  on  a  market  mechanism.  Yet,  allowing  the  actual  prices   consumers  face  to  be  systematically  affected  by  supply  and  demand  is  a  market   process.  And  depending  upon  the  actual,  practical,  degree  of  adjustment  needed   in  the  system,  this  could  generate  significant  variation  in  prices.  My  prediction  is   that  in  a  participatory  economy,  the  participants  would  decide  that  this  was  often   a  reasonable  way  of  dealing  with  the  problem  of  discrepancies  between  supply   and  demand.       PUBLIC  GOODS  PLANNING   My   concerns   about   participatory   planning   of   publics   goods   are   much   less   than   about  household  consumption.  Public  goods  do  need  to  be  discussed  and  decided   on  by  public  bodies,  and  it  is  certainly  desirable  as  much  as  possible  to  have  the   deliberation  over  public  goods  be  by  the  circles  of  people  who  will  actually  benefit   from  them.  For  many,  perhaps  most  public  goods,  the  appropriate  level  for  such   decision-­‐making  will  be  at  a  fairly  macro-­‐level  –  cities  and  regions  and  even  higher   levels.  But  there  certainly  are  some  important  public  goods  where  the  key  domain   of   collective   consumption   is   the   neighborhood,   and   it   is   appropriate   that   the   people  directly  affected  have  the  major  role  in  deciding  the  details  on  these.  This   is   what,   in   a   limited   way,   participatory   budgeting   of   municipal   infrastructure   investments  tries  to  do.  Robin’s  model  of  participatory  planning  of  public  goods   can  be  thought  of  as  a  radical  extension  of  some  of  the  elements  of  participatory   budgeting.   I   strongly   endorse   the   general   spirit   of   the   idea   that   public   goods   planning  should  be  maximally  participatory  at  whatever  geographical  level  is  most   relevant  for  a  particular  kind  of  public  good.   The   participatory   decision-­‐making   over   collective   public   goods   consumption,   however,   does   not   require   consumer   councils   that   also   approve   or   disapprove   individual   household   consumption   plans.   What   a   neighborhood   public   goods   council  needs  to  decide  is  the  division  between  public  and  private  consumption   within  the  neighborhood  (i.e.  how  much  of  income  that  would  otherwise  go  to   households  should  be  allocated  to  those  public  goods)  and  what  specific  public   goods  to  produce.    There  is  no  inherent  reason  why  this  needs  to  be  connected  to   Participatory  Economics:  A  Sympathetic  Critique   23 approval  of  plans  for  what  households  consume  privately.  For  this  reason,  I  think   it  would  be  better  to  call  these  public  goods  councils  than  consumption  councils.15   Unlike   the   planning   for   household   consumption,   public   goods   planning   at   whatever   level   it   occurs   requires   real   public   deliberation:   meetings,   debates,   bargaining,  formulation  of  plans  for  specific  projects,  etc.  Participatory  planning   of  public  goods  –  at  the  neighborhood  level  and  beyond  –  will  be  a  critical  feature   of  a  post-­‐capitalist,  democratic  egalitarian  economy,  especially  because  it  is  likely   that  the  balance  between  private  and  public  consumption  will  shift  considerably   in  the  public  direction.  Planning  such  public  goods  in  a  deeply  democratic  way,   however,  will  be  arduous,  not  simple,  because  it  is  unlikely  there  will  be  a  smooth   consensus  over  the  balance  between  household  consumption  and  public  goods  or   over  the  specific  mix  of  public  goods.  This  will  raise  the  Oscar  Wilde  problem  of   socialism  taking  up  too  many  evenings,  but  it  is  worth  it.   There  is  one  set  of  issues  around  public  goods  planning  in  Robin’s  model  that  was   not  clear  to  me:  the  role  of  Government  institutions  rather  than  just  consumer   federations.   On   one   interpretation   of   Robin’s   participatory   economics   model,   virtually   all   government   functions   are   replaced   by   consumer   councils   and   federations  and  by  workers  councils  and  federations.  There  might  still  be  a  role   for   government   around   certain   kinds   of   rule-­‐making   and   rule   enforcing   –   for   example,  things  like  speed  limits  or  enforcing  the  accurate  reporting  of  pollution   discharges   so   the   planning   process   (however   it   is   organized)   has   accurate   information  on  which  to  deal  with  externalities.  But  the  government  would  have   no  responsibility  for  planning  and  producing  any  kind  of  public  goods.     There  may  be  reasons,  however,  to  make  a  distinction  between  the  way  public   goods  are  connected  to  people  as  consumers  and  public  goods  that  are  linked  to   their  status  as  citizens.  For  one  thing,  some  public  goods  do  not  fall  neatly  into  the   distinction   between   consumers   and   producers.   Educational   public   goods,   for   example,  serve  people’s  needs  both  as  producers  and  consumers,  and  the  same   can   be   said   for   health   care.   Public   transportation   systems   are   public   goods   for   people   both   as   consumers   and   producers.   Democratically   accountable   government  institutions  might  be  more  appropriate  than  consumer  or  producer   15  If  these  councils  are  also  meant  to  deal  with  the  problem  of  negotiating  pollution  prices,  then  this   could  be  treated  as  the  planning  of  “public  bads”  consumption.  The  mandate  for  these  councils  would   thus  revolve  around  the  dual  task  of  planning  both  public  goods  and  public  bads.       Erik  Olin  Wright   federations   for   providing   these   kinds   of   multidimensional   public   goods   and   monitoring  their  performance.  But  it  is  also  the  case  that  there  is  a  range  of  public   goods   (or   aspects   of   public   goods)   which,   in   certain   important   ways,   serve   the   needs   of   people   neither   as   consumers   or   producers   but   as   members   of   a   community.   Public   gathering   places   are   public   goods,   and   in   a   sense   they   are   “consumed”  by  people  when  they  gather  for  public  purposes,  but  this  is  only  one   aspect   of   their   social   meaning.   They   also   contribute   to   constructing   a   public   sphere  and  public  identities.  Public  spaces  for  performing  music  and  theater  are  a   public  good  in  which  these  activities  are  consumed  by  audiences  and  produced  by   performers;  but  they  are  also  sites  for  the  collective  project  of  affirming  cultural   identities  and  purposes.  Aspects  of  the  mass  media  are  like  this  as  well  insofar  as   the  media  contribute  to  civic  mindedness  and  solidarities.     Perhaps   these   kinds   of   civic   public   goods   would   be   adequately   attended   to   by   nested  councils  and  federations  organized  around  consumption.  But  perhaps  not.     It  may  be  that  they  would  be  better  fostered  by  citizens  assemblies  organized  as   political  bodies  within  a  federated  state  structure.  As  a  sociologist  I  am  somewhat   skeptical  that  a  system  of  councils  organized  around  the  social  role  of  people-­‐as-­‐ consumers   and   institutionally   embedded   in   a   planning   process   concerned   with   negotiations  with  workers  federations  through  the  intermediation  of  the  iteration   facilitation   board’s   management   of   indicative   prices   is   the   optimal   setting   for   deliberations  over  civic  public  goods.       THE  PROBLEM  OF  EXTERNALITIES   One   of   the   most   important   elements   in   Robin’s   critique   of   markets   is   their   inability   on   their   own   to   adequately   take   account   of   negative   and   positive   externalities  of  production.  If  there  were  no  negative  and  positive  externalities,   and  if  there  were  no  concentrations  of  power  in  markets  (and  thus  no  monopoly   rents),  then  the  equilibrium  prices  of  goods  in  markets  would  be  unlikely  to  differ   dramatically  from  those  generated  by  participatory  planning.  Both  systems  would   produce   prices   closely   in   line   with   the   total   real   costs   of   production.16  But   of   course,  there  are  substantial  positive  and  negative  externalities.  Among  the  most   16  The  mix  of  public  goods  and  private  goods  would,  of  course,  be  likely  to  be  very  different  under  any   system  of  democratic  planning.   Participatory  Economics:  A  Sympathetic  Critique   25 interesting  and  original  parts  of  the  model  of  participatory  economics  is  the  way   Robin  proposes  to  deal  with  these  issues.   The  key  problem  for  any  planning  process  with  respect  to  externalities  is  figuring   out   a   way   to   assign   quantitative   values   to   externalities   so   that   these   can   be   adequately  reflected  in  the  prices  of  the  things  that  people  consume.    Assigning  a   value   to   such   costs   and   benefits   involves   two   steps.   First,   there   is   a   technical   problem  of  identifying  the  inventory  of  actual  negative  and  positive  side-­‐effects  of   a  given  production  process.  This  is  the  work  of  scientists  and  technical  experts.   For   example,   in   the   case   of   environmental   negative   externalities,   this   involves   identifying  the  amounts  of  different  pollutants  generated  in  a  given  production   process,   and   scientifically   showing   what   are   the   ill-­‐effects   of   given   levels.   Producers,  of  course,  have  to  be  required  to  report  these  levels,  and  this  generally   requires  some  kind  of  monitoring  and  enforcement  mechanism,  but  these  levels   only  have  meaning  in  a  planning  process  when  there  is  a  way  of  assessing  the   harms  they  cause.  This  is  where  science  plays  a  pivotal  role:  providing  information   about  such  things  as  the  increase  in  risk  of  cancer  caused  by  a  given  level  of  a   particular  pollutant.     This  brings  us  to  the  second  step:  figuring  out  the  value  to  be  placed  on  the  harm.   It  would  always  be  possible,  of  course,  to  declare  that  zero  pollution  is  the  only   acceptable  level.  This  could,  however,  turn  out  to  be  enormously  costly  in  many   situations,  and  thus  some  device  needs  to  be  concocted  to  put  a  value  on  the   harms  caused  by  a  given  level  of  pollution  compared  to  the  costs  of  reducing  the   pollution.   This   is   where   Robin’s   model   has   a   particularly   original   suggestion.   Basically   he   proposes   that   federations   of   consumer   councils   at   the   appropriate   geographical  level  in  which  an  environmental  negative  externality  of  production  is   present  be  allowed  to  decide  on  the  level  of  compensation  they  need  in  order  to   be  willing  to  accept  a  given  amount  of  pollution.  This  is  like  saying:  I’ll  be  happy  to   have  a  cancer  risk  increase  by  10%  if  you  increase  my  consumption  by  20%.  Here   is  how  the  process  works:       In   each   iteration   in   the   annual   planning   procedure   there   is   an   “indicative   price”   for   every   pollutant   in   every   region   impacted   representing   the   current   estimate   of   the   damage,  or  social  cost  of  releasing  a  unit  of  that  pollutant  into  the  region.  What  is  a   pollutant   and   what   is   not   is   decided   by   federations   representing   those   who   live   in   a   region,   who   are   advised   by   scientists   employed   in   R&D   operations   run   by   their   Erik  Olin  Wright   federation 17 ….  If  a  worker  council  proposes  to  emit  x  units  of  a  particular  pollutant  into   an  affected  region  they  are  ‘charged’  the  indicative  price  for  releasing  that  pollutant  in   the   region   times   x….The   consumer   federation   for   the   region   affected   looks   at   the   indicative   price   for   a   unit   of   any   pollutant   that   impacts   the   region   and   decides   how   many  units  it  wishes  to  allow  to  be  emitted.  The  federation  can  decide  they  do  not  wish   to   permit   any   units   of   a   pollutant   to   be   emitted,   in   which   case   no   worker   council   operating   in   the   region   will   be   allowed   to   emit   any   of   that   pollutant.   But,   if   the   federation  decides  to  allow  X  units  of  a  pollutant  to  be  emitted  in  the  region,  then  the   regional  federation  is  ‘credited’  with  X  times  the  indicative  price  for  that  pollutant.   What  does  it  mean  for  a  consumer  federation  to  be  “credited?”  It  means  the  federation   will  be  permitted  to  buy  more  public  goods  for  its  members  to  consume  than  would   otherwise  be  possible  given  the  effort  ratings  of  its  members.  Or,  it  means  the  members   of   the   federation   will   be   able   to   consume   more   individually   than   their   effort   ratings   from  work  would  otherwise  warrant.  (pp.124-­‐5)   If   the   consumers   harmed   by   pollution   are   unwilling   to   permit,   at   the   level   of   compensation   offered   by   the   price   of   pollution,   as   much   pollution   as   the   producers  would  like,  then  the  price  for  units  of  pollution  will  go  up  in  the  next   round   of   the   iterative   planning   process.   And   if   the   price   is   too   high,   then   the   federation  of  consumers  affected  by  pollution  will  want  to  purchase  more  units  of   pollution  than  the  producers  will  want  to  emit,  and  so  the  price  will  decline  in  the   next  round.  This  continues  iteratively  until  an  equilibrium  is  reached.   This   is   indeed   a   clever   device.   The   principal   alternative   discussed   by   Robin   is   pollution  taxes  (called  “Pigouvian  taxes”)  set  equal  to  the  value  of  the  negative   externalities   and   imposed   on   polluters.   The   problem   with   such   taxes,   as   Robin   points  out,  is  the  difficulty  in  knowing  how  high  to  set  the  taxes  to  fully  cover  the   amount   of   damage   caused   by   the   pollution.   What   Robin   proposes   is   a   specific   method  for  determining  the  level  of  those  taxes  by  organizing  what  is  very  much   like  a  series  of  collective  auctions  for  the  right  the  pollute.  The  auctions  continue   until  there  is  an  equilibrium  between  the  demand  for  pollution  payments  and  the   supply   of   pollutants   offered   by   producers.   Robin   sees   the   process   as   iterative   adjustments   in   the   indicative   price   for   pollution,   but   it   could   equally   well   be   17  This  particular  detail  –  that  the  federations  corresponding  to  a  region  affected  by  pollution  have  its   own  R&D  department  employing  scientists  –  does  not  seem  like  a  workable  institutional  design  for  the   technical  issues  involved  in  assessing  environmental  externalities.  The  boundaries  of  regions  impacted   by  given  pollutants  will  vary  enormously.  Some  will  be  smaller  than  cities,  some  much  larger  regions.  It   does  not  seem  necessary  that  consumer  federations  in  each  region  have  its  own  R&D  department  and   hire  its  own  scientists.  It  is  not  clear  to  me  why,  for  these  kinds  of  technical  regulatory  matters,  state   institutions  with  field  offices  and  extension  services  wouldn’t  do  this  job  more  effectively.   Participatory  Economics:  A  Sympathetic  Critique   27 described   as   a   method   for   determining   the   Pigouvian   taxes   on   pollutants.   This   looks   a   lot   like   a   quasi-­‐market   in   which   the   buyers   and   sellers   are   councils   of   various  sorts  acting  as  agents  for  individuals  as  consumers  and  workers.   This   device   for   calculating   the   value   of   externalities   could   work   well   in   some   situations.  But  it  could  easily  become  extremely  complex  and  cumbersome.  There   are  a  number  of  issues  in  play:  The  geographical  boundaries  of  a  particular  source   of  pollution  may  or  may  not  correspond  to  the  boundaries  of  existing  consumer   federations.    If  the  smallest  scale  federation  that  includes  all  of  the  affected  areas   is  the  relevant  decision-­‐making  body,  then  this  would  often  include  large  numbers   of  consumers  unaffected  by  the  pollution.  This  undermines  the  sense  in  which  the   valuation  of  damage  by  the  federation  as  a  whole  would  reflect  the  subjective   valuation  of  those  most  affected  by  the  pollution  in  question.  Would  coalitions  of   most   affected   consumers   be   able   to   constitute   themselves   as   an   ad   hoc   federation  and  insist  on  higher  prices  for  the  rights  to  pollute?  Furthermore,  even   apart  from  the  fact  that  different  parts  of  a  region  will  have  differential  damage,   there  may  be  considerable  heterogeneity  among  the  population  of  an  area  how   much  they  care  about  the  damage  in  question.  This  is  obviously  a  problem  in  any   system   for   constructing   a   metric   of   damage   from   pollution,   but   it   adds   special   complexity  when  the  process  is  meant  to  be  participatory  and  deliberative.  Would   consumers   with   stronger   anti-­‐pollution   preferences   be   able   to   form   an   ad   hoc   federation  to  demand  higher  pollution  prices?  Could  they  constitute  a  blocking   coalition?     Finally,  unless  I  am  misunderstanding  the  process  involved,  the  procedures  Robin   advocates  would  likely  generate  considerable  heterogeneity  in  the  pollution  taxes   (i.e.   the   negative   externality   charges   built   into   “indicative   prices”)   faced   by   producers   of   similar   goods   in   different   places.   This   means   producers   in   areas   where  consumers  don’t  care  so  much  about  pollution  would  be  able  to  produce  at   lower  cost.  However,  there  is  no  restriction  (as  far  as  I  can  tell)  that  they  only   distribute  their  products  to  the  pollution-­‐indifferent  consumers.  This  means  that   the   same   goods   will   be   available   to   consumers   elsewhere   at   lower   and   higher   indicative   prices   depending   on   the   pollution   preferences   of   consumers   in   the   places   where   production   takes   place.   This   begins   to   look   like   a   situation   that   generates  market  pressures  on  the  high  cost  producers.     Given   that   there   are   many   thousands   of   potential   pollutants,   and   the   geographical   damage-­‐boundaries   of   different   pollutants   from   the   same   production  process  will  often  be  different,  the  actual  process  by  which  negative   Erik  Olin  Wright   externalities   are   dealt   with   through   iterated   annual   planning   by   consumer   federations   could   become   extremely   cumbersome   and   inconsistent.   In   such   a   situation,   consumers   might   decide   that   they   prefer   a   simpler   system   which   combines   government   regulations   that   impose   various   kinds   of   limits   on   allowable   pollution   with   a   system   of   uniform   taxes   on   different   types   of   environmental   externalities.     Given   that,   in   a   participatory   economy,   the   democratic  accountability  of  government  policy-­‐making  will  not  be  distorted  by   concentrations   of   private   power   as   in   capitalism,   consumers-­‐as-­‐citizens   might   prefer  the  uniformity  and  predictability  of  such  a  regulatory  system  even  though   it  would  be  less  immediately  responsive  to  the  particular  preferences  for  levels  of   pollution  of  citizens-­‐as-­‐consumers.         RISK  TAKING  INNOVATION   I  have  no  problem  with  the  broad  principle  that  a  great  deal  of  investment  in  new   projects   –   perhaps   even   a   large   majority   of   investments   –   could   be   effectively   organized   through   some   kind   of   participatory,   democratic   planning   process   involving   various   kinds   of   councils   and   federations.   Whether   this   would   be   precisely  organized  along  the  lines  of  workers  councils  and  sectoral  federations  as   proposed   by   Robin   or   through   some   other   institutional   arrangement   is   a   secondary  matter;  the  important  point  is  that  it  is  plausible  that  much  investment   can  be  productively  allocated  through  directly  democratic  processes.   What   is   less   clear   to   me   is   whether   the   optimal   system   would   eliminate   all   features  of  more  market-­‐like  allocations  for  at  least  some  investments.  Is  there   good   reason   to   believe   that   the   optimal   system   would   allow   no   investments   outside  of  the  decision-­‐making  processes  of  councils  and  federations?  Consider   the  following  example:   Suppose  a  group  of  people  have  an  idea  for  some  new  product  but  they  cannot   convince  the  relevant  council  or  federation  to  provide  them  the  needed  capital   equipment   and   raw   materials   to   produce   it.   There   is   just   too   much   skepticism   about  the  viability  of  the  project.  An  alternative  way  of  funding  the  project  could   be  through  a  form  of  crowd-­‐sourcing  finance  along  the  lines  of  kickstarter.  The   workers  involved  would  post  a  description  of  the  project  online  and  explain  their   specific   needs   for   material   inputs.   They   appeal   to   people   (in   their   role   of   consumers)   to   allocate   part   of   their   annual   consumption   allowances   to   the   project.  Consumers  might  decide,  for  example,  to  put  in  extra  hours  at  work  in   order  to  acquire  the  extra  funds  needed  for  their  contribution,  or  they  might  just   Participatory  Economics:  A  Sympathetic  Critique   29 decide  to  consume  less  of  some  discretionary  part  of  their  consumption  bundle.   Once  sufficient  funds  are  raised  in  this  manner,  the  project  can  proceed.  Such  a   device  could  be  used  for  an  experimental  theater  project  that  the  relevant  sector   federation  (which  would  in  effect  function  like  an  arts  council)  thinks  is  a  waste  of   resources.  Or  it  could  be  used  for  some  new  manufactured  product.     There  are  a  variety  of  motivations  that  might  lead  people  to  voluntarily  make  this   allocation.  They  might  believe  in  the  social  value  of  the  project  and  therefore  be   willing   to   give   the   funds   as   an   outright   grant.   This   is   currently   the   motivation   behind  a  range  of  kickstarter  projects  in  the  arts.  Or  they  might  be  really  keen  on   the  product,  and  give  the  funds  in  exchange  for  a  promise  of  being  the  first  to  get   the  product  itself  at  an  equal  value  to  what  they  gave.  This  would,  in  effect,  be   simply  a  long-­‐term  pre-­‐order  of  the  product,  although  operating  outside  of  the   mechanism  of  the  Iteration  Facilitation  Board.  But  potential  contributors  to  the   project  might  also  only  be  interested  in  contributing  if  they  got  a  positive  return   on  their  “investment”.  This  would  look  much  closer  to  market-­‐investment.   The   question,   then,   is   should   such   practices   be   prohibited   in   a   participatory   economy?  Especially  if  a  positive  return  on  crowd-­‐sourced  investments  is  allowed,   these  projects  would  constitute  a  kind  of  quasi-­‐market  niche  in  the  participatory   economy.   Robin   argues   that   new   worker   councils   should   be   prohibited   from   raising  capital  outside  of  the  planning  process.  Here  is  what  he  says  about  new   start-­‐up  worker  councils:   In  a  participatory  economy  new  worker  councils  bid  for  the  resources  they  need  to  get   started  in  the  participatory  planning  process.  If  they  submit  a  proposal  that  is  accepted,   they’re   good   to   go.   Otherwise   not….But   just   as   banks   judge   the   ‘credibility’   of   new   entrepreneur’s  business  plans  in  capitalism,  industry  federations  judge  whether  or  not  a   group  who  has  proposed  to  form  a  new  worker  council  are  ‘credible.’  (p.  111-­‐2)   Mostly,  I  suppose,  industry  federations  will  make  sound  judgments.  After  all,  they   have  no  incentives  to  block  creative,  well-­‐thought  out  proposals.  But  they  may  be   excessively   risk   averse   and   be   subject   to   other   kinds   of   biases.   And,   of   course,   there   could   be   factions,   in-­‐groups   and   out-­‐groups,   and   other   forms   of   social   exclusion   which   marginalize   some   kinds   of   projects.   Certainly   around   artistic   endeavors   this   is   likely   to   happen   periodically.   In   Robin’s   model   if   a   group   of   Erik  Olin  Wright   workers  fail  to  get  permission  from  a  federation,  they  are  out  of  luck  (this  is  how  I   interpret  the  expression  “otherwise  not”  in  the  above  quotation).18   I  think  more  flexibility  than  this  is  likely  to  be  desirable.  One  thing,  I  think,  would   be  pretty  certain:  if  such  processes  are  allowed,  a  fair  number  of  projects  outside   of  the  ordinary  planning  process  are  likely  to  emerge,  and  this  potentially  could   generate  undesirable  inegalitarian  dynamics.  Clearly  a  set  of  rules  would  have  to   be  in  place  to  counteract  such  forces.  They  could  take  the  form  of  strict  caps  on   the  amount  of  extra  income  that  could  be  generated  as  returns  on  such  “private”   investments  as  well  as  on  the  income  generated  by  the  projects  for  the  workers.   There   could   be   rules   by   which   once   the   viability   of   an   investment   project   is   demonstrated,  it  had  to  gradually  fold  into  the  ordinary  annual  planning  model   for  future  inputs.  The  firms  created  through  these  outside-­‐of-­‐planning  processes   could   still   be   required   to   be   internally   governed   democratically.   And   of   course   they   would   be   subjected   to   the   same   externalities   taxes   (or   their   functional   equivalent)  like  any  other  productive  activity.     My   prediction   is   that   in   a   vigorously   democratic   participatory   economy,   the   participants   themselves   would   be   likely   to   endorse   a   space   for   something   like   unplanned  risk-­‐taking  of  this  sort.  People  would  come  to  recognize  certain  kinds   of   rigidities   and   blind   spots   that   occur   whenever   all   projects   need   to   seek   permission  from  formally  constituted  collective  bodies,  and  that  a  looser,  more   free-­‐wheeling   alternative   could   make   the   system   as   a   whole   more   dynamic.     While  this  means  that  there  will  be  modest  deviations  from  the  purest  model  of   participatory  planning  and  effort-­‐based  remuneration,  my  prediction  is  that  most   people   will   see   this   as   worthwhile.   Under   the   background   conditions   of   strong   equality  of  material  conditions  and  democratic  control  over  the  rules  of  the  game,   a   certain   amount   of   capitalism   between   consenting   adults   might   be   seen   as   a   good  thing.   18  It   is   worth   noting   that   in   capitalism   there   is   a   very   wide   range   of   ways   that   small   businesses   can   acquire  the  necessary  capital  for  projects:  There  are  ordinary  banks,  of  course,  but  in  many  countries   there  are  a  wide  variety  of  specialized  banks  with  different  criteria  for  making  loans,  including  some  with   social  and  environmental  mandates.  Community  banks  are  different  from  national  banks,  and  German   state   banks   are   different   from   multinational   banks.   There   are   also   government   agencies   in   many   countries  that  give  far  below  market-­‐rate  loans  for  targeted  purposes  and  even  outright  grants.  And   there  are  things  like  Kickstarter  and  other  unconventional  ways  of  raising  capital.  I  am  not  at  all  saying   that  this  generates  a  fair  and  open  access  to  capital.  It  does  not  in  capitalism.  The  point  is  that  this   constitutes  a  heterogeneous  institutional  environment.  I  think  a  participatory  economy  is  also  likely  to   function  best    with  qualitatively  distinct  devices  for  funding  projects.   Participatory  Economics:  A  Sympathetic  Critique   31 This   prediction,   of   course   could   be   wrong.   It   could   turn   out   that   the   corrosive   effects   on   egalitarian   norms   of   allowing   even   modest   forms   of   market-­‐like   investments  would  be  seen  as  so  unpalatable  that  an  absolute  prohibition  of  such   practices  might  be  the  democratic  decision  after  a  period  of  experimentation.  But   I   think   this   is   unlikely.   The   optimal   economic   “ecosystem”   for   a   democratic   egalitarian  economy,  I  predict,  would  probably  have  something  like  participatory   democratic   planning   processes   as   the   dominant   mechanism   for   allocating   investments,   but   this   would   be   combined   with   a   variety   of   other   economic   allocation  processes,  including  some  with  a  strong  market  character.   Even  though  my  specific  views  on  this  matter  differ  from  Robin’s,  in  other  places   in  his  analysis  Robin  acknowledges  that  in  a  real  participatory  economy  people   might   well   decide,   democratically,   to   deviate   from   the   core   principles   of   the   system  in  order  to  solve  certain  incentive  problems.  In  discussing  the  problem  of   dynamic   efficiency,   for   example,   Robin   carefully   explores   the   problem   of   the   incentives  for  innovation.  He  asks,  about  innovation:   …   since   innovations   are   shared   with   all   immediately   [because   there   are   no   patent   protections],   where   is   the   incentive   for   individual   worker   councils   to   innovate   rather   than  wait  for  special  R&D  units  or  other  worker  councils  to  do  so?  In  particular,  will  it   prove   desirable   to   provide   material   rewards   to   innovating   workplaces,   above   and   beyond  what  their  members’  sacrifices  entitle  them  to?  (p.108)     He  answers  as  follows:   There  is  good  reason  to  believe  in  an  economy  where  it  is  unlikely  that  status  will  be   achieved   through   conspicuous   consumption,   and   where   social   serviceability   will   be   more   highly   esteemed,   that   rewarding   workers   in   highly   innovative   enterprises   with   consumption  rights  in  excess  of  sacrifices  may  not  be  necessary.  However,  if  people  in  a   participatory   economy   come   to   the   conclusion   that   extra   rewards   for   workers   in   innovating  enterprises  are  needed,  any  such  rewards  will  be  determined  democratically   by  all  citizens.  (p.109,  italics  added)   I   agree   completely   with   this   formulation.   It   affirms   the   idea   democratic   choice   over   the   rules-­‐of-­‐the-­‐game   is   the   decisive   principle   at   work   in   a   participatory   economy.   In   this   case,   if   there   is   a   trade-­‐off   between   strict   adherence   to   the   remuneration   according   to   effort   principle   and   dynamic   efficiency,   then   it   is   reasonable  for  citizens  to  decide  to  allow  some  inequality  in  income  to  emerge.  In   effect,  this  means,  they  would  be  willing  to  allow  some  injustice  in  the  income   mechanisms  in  exchange  for  improvements  in  the  rate  of  innovation.  I  am  making   the  same  point  with  respect  to  planning  and  an  investment  market.       Erik  Olin  Wright   THE  ORGANIZATION  OF  WORK  AND  PAY   In  terms  of  the  underlying  normative  principles,  I  fully  support  the  central  ideas  of   Robin’s  framework  for  both  the  organization  of  work  and  for  pay:  balanced  job   complexes  and  pay  determined  by  effort  rather  than  contribution.  Where  I  would   like  to  raise  some  issues  is  with  the  practical  implementation  of  the  ideals.   Balanced  Jobs   In  my  book,  Envisioning  Real  Utopias,  I  define  the  equality  principle  of  justice  this   way:   “In   a   just   society,   all   people   have   equal   access   to   the   social   and   material   conditions   necessary   to   live   a   flourishing   life.”   This   is   entirely   in   keeping   with   Robin’s  proposal  for  the  organization  of  work  in  terms  of  “balanced  jobs”.  One  of   the  social  conditions  for  a  flourishing  life  is  meaningful  and  interesting  work,  and   the  idea  of  equal  access  to  those  conditions  of  work  means  that  the  work  of  all   members  of  a  workplace  should  have  relatively  equal  mixes  of  tasks  with  positive   and  negative  attributes  (e.g.  tedious  and  enjoyable  tasks,  stressful  and  relaxing   tasks,  etc.).    Significant  deviations  from  this  ideal  constitute  violations  of  justice.     The  fact  that  in  practice  it  will  often  be  very  difficult  to  fully  implement  this  ideal   does  not  in  any  way  invalidate  the  principle  itself.  It  simply  suggests  that  where   this   occurs,   some   kind   of   compensation   might   be   required.   For   example,   a   job   with  an  above  average  density  of  unpleasant  or  tedious  work  might  get  a  higher   effort  rating  per  hour,  so  that  a  person  could  work  fewer  hours  to  receive  the   standard  full  time  pay.   But   there   is   another   issue   around   balanced   jobs   that   is   not   mainly   about   the   practical  difficulty  of  creating  balanced  jobs.  There  are  situations  in  which  people   in  a  community  may  value  the  specific  skills  and  contributions  of  certain  people   that  they  consider  it  a  waste  of  the  time  and  talents  of  these  people  for  them  to   do  as  much  tedious  work  as  others.  This  does  not  imply  that  they  should  be  paid   more   for   their   time   or   effort:   the   principle   that   pay   differentials   should   reflect   differences  in  effort,  not  contributions,  is  an  entirely  different  matter.  But  it  could   well   mean   that   the   community   could   decide,   democratically,   not   to   strive   for   “balance”  in  the  mix  of  tasks  for  some  people  or  some  kinds  of  jobs.  This  is  similar   to   the   issue   of   deciding   to   give   workers   extra   pay   for   innovations,   or   to   allow   privately   recruited   investments   for   projects   rejected   by   sector   federations.   Balanced  jobs  may  best  reflect  the  specific  ideal  of  justice  in  the  organization  of   work,  but  justice  is  not  the  only  value  people  in  a  participatory  economy  will  care   about,  and  so  it  is  reasonable  for  people  to  be  willing  to  trade-­‐off  some  deviations   from  justice  in  order  to  better  realize  some  other  value.   Participatory  Economics:  A  Sympathetic  Critique   33 How  frequent  is  this  situation  likely  to  be?  I  really  have  no  idea.  If  the  income   consequences  of  such  deviations  are  modest  (because  pay  continues  to  be  tied  to   effort),  and  if  the  amount  of  paid  work  people  do  declines  significantly  because  of   a   broader   reordering   of   work   and   leisure   for   both   environmental   and   life-­‐style   reasons,  then  balanced  jobs  may  simply  not  be  an  issue  that  people  worry  about   so  much.  There  is  a  very  big  difference  between  how  salient  this  problem  is  in  a   world  where  the  average  work  week  was  15  hours  compared  to  40  hours.19     Effort-­‐rating  as  the  basis  for  pay  differentials   A  fairly  broadly  held  position  among  people  holding  liberal  egalitarian  views  of   justice   is   that   inequalities   due   to   “brute   luck”   –   things   over   which   one   has   no   control  –  are  unjust.  This  is  fairly  close  to  Robin’s  position,  because  it  means  that   inequalities   connected   to   natural   talents   are   unjust.   This   also   implies   that   inequalities   in   income   due   to   education   would   be   largely   unjustified   except   insofar   as   acquiring   education   involves   real   sacrifices   on   the   part   of   students,   which  –  as  Robin  points  out  –  would  generally  not  be  the  case  in  a  participatory   economy  in  which  education  is  free  and  students  receive  an  appropriate  stipend   for   the   effort   involved   in   their   studies.   Robin   goes   one   step   further   by   categorically   rejecting   any   inequality   connected   to   “contribution,”   even   if   everyone   has   the   full   opportunity   to   acquire   the   skills   that   enhance   their   productivity   and   thus   their   contribution.   I   broadly   agree   with   this   very   general   idea.20     There  are  a  number  of  issues  in  the  implementation  of  this  ideal,  however,  which   I  do  think  are  very  difficult  and  which  may,  in  the  end,  mean  that  simply  paying   everyone   the   same   hourly   remuneration   may   be   better   than   trying   to   really   evaluate  their  “effort.”   Robin  argues  that  within  workplaces  people  generally  have  a  pretty  good  idea  of   how   much   effort   different   workmates   expend   since   they   will   all   be   engaged   in   19  It  is  worth  noting  that  the  massive  reduction  of  the  work  week  was  basically  Marx’s  conception  of   how  this  problem  would  be  dealt  with  in  a  communist  society:  the  “realm  of  necessity”  –  the  amount  of   work   that   needed   to   be   done   to   satisfy   needs   –   would   be   dramatically   reduced   and   the   “realm   of   freedom”  would  expand.     20  As  in  the  earlier  discussion  of  Robin’s  potential  willingness,  on  the  grounds  of  incentives,  to  accept   pay   differentials   for   innovative   behavior   even   though   this   violates   effort-­‐based   pay,   I   assume   more   generally  that  he  would  regard  some  contribution-­‐based  pay  differentials  as  legitimate  if  this  was  the   result  of  a  robust  democratic  decision.   Erik  Olin  Wright   roughly  similar  jobs  and  they  closely  observe  each  other.  Workers  should  thus  be   able   to   make   meaningful   effort-­‐ratings   of   fellow   workers.   Undoubtedly   this   is   sometimes  the  case,  but  there  are  many  kinds  of  work  in  which  it  is  very  difficult   to  really  know  how  much  effort  someone  is  expending.  The  problem  is  that  the   relevant  meaning  of  “effort”  for  purposes  of  assigning  remuneration  is  “sacrifice”   or   “burden”.   The   basic   idea   is   that   in   a   cooperative   endeavor   people   should   equally  share  rewards  and  burdens,  so  if  some  people  don’t  “pull  their  weight”   then  it  is  legitimate  to  reward  them  less.  But  different  people  can  experience  the   exact  same  intensity  of  work  as  very  different  levels  of  burden.    Some  professors   find  sitting  at  a  desk  and  writing  intensively  for  eight  hours  exhilarating;  others   find  it  torture.  This  is  not  just  that  some  people  find  writing  easy  and  other  hard;   some  just  find  it  more  enjoyable  and  exciting,  and  thus  less  of  a  burden.  The  same   issue  can  apply  to  physical  exertion  as  well:  depending  on  one’s  level  of  fitness   and  one’s  endorphins,  intense  physical  labor  can  be  a  greater  or  lesser  burden.    Of   course,  sometimes  it  is  possible  to  make  roughly  reliable  judgments  that  someone   is  goofing  off,  not  putting  their  mind  to  the  task,  not  trying  very  hard.  But  this   probably  has  more  to  do  with  a  sense  of  their  lack  of  diligence  or  responsibility,   then  actually  effort  or  burden  or  sacrifice.  If  the  morally  salient  issue  is  paying   people  according  to  real  burden,  then  even  within  workplaces  this  will  often  not   at  all  be  easy  to  do  to.   This   problem   of   meaningfully   comparing   people’s   efforts   becomes   even   more   intractable   across   workplaces,   at   least   if   different   workplaces   involve   very   different   kinds   of   tasks.21  I   honestly   don’t   know   if   a   diligent   musician   who   practices  five  hours  a  day  expends  more  effort  or  less  effort  than  a  diligent  waiter   in  a  restaurant  or  a  diligent  taxi-­‐driver  who  works  the  same  number  of  hours.  But   simply   saying   that   the   average   work   effort   is   the   same   across   workplaces   also   doesn’t  seem  plausible.  I  would  find  it  an  excruciating  burden  to  collect  tolls  at  a   bridge  four  hours  a  day,  but  I  find  it  a  pleasure  to  write  and  lecture  60  hours  a   week.  Which  involves  more  “effort”?  I  would  rather  work  60  hours  a  week  at  my   job  than  20  hours  a  week  as  a  toll  collector  even  for  the  same  overall  pay,  but   21  This   problem   of   non-­‐comparability   of   effort   measures   across   workplaces   is   especially   important   because  of  the  way  aggregate  effort  ratings  figure  in  all  sorts  of  planning  processes,  not  just  individual   remuneration.   The   resources   available   to   a   community   for   neighborhood   public   goods,   for   example,   depend  significantly  on  the  aggregate  effort  rating  of  people  in  the  neighborhood.     Participatory  Economics:  A  Sympathetic  Critique   35 many  toll  collectors  would  find  it  an  enormous  burden  to  spend  as  many  hours  a   week  as  I  do  doing  the  “work”  I  do.22       I’m  not  sure  what  is  the  best  way  of  dealing  with  these  kinds  of  measurement   problems.   Robin’s   proposed   solution   to   the   possibility   that   average   workplace   effort  levels  vary  significantly  across  workplaces  is  to  calibrate  the  average  effort   in  a  workplace  in  terms  of  what  he  calls  “the  social  benefit  to  cost  ratio  of  each   enterprise”.    We  don’t  need  to  go  into  the  technical  details  here,  but  basically  he   assumes  that  the  only  reason  this  ratio  could  be  greater  than  1.0  is  if  workers  are   expending   more   effort.23  But   as   I   have   argued,   workers   may   be   working   more   intensively  without  this  meaning  that  they  are  experiencing  any  greater  burden  or   sacrifice.  Paying  them  extra  in  this  situation  is  directly  paying  them  extra  for  the   greater  contribution  they  are  making  per  hour  of  work  (i.e.  their  more  intense   work  does  produce  more  output  per  hour),  but  not  necessarily  paying  them  more   for  extra  burden  or  sacrifice.  This  may  be  desirable  for  motivational  purposes,  but   it  may  end  up  being  closer  to  a  contribution-­‐based  remuneration  scheme  than  a   burden-­‐based  scheme.     Another  way  of  assessing  the  burden  of  work  in  different  kinds  of  workplace,  of   course,  would  simply  to  see  how  difficult  it  is  to  recruit  people  to  different  work   settings.  To  the  extent  that  balanced  jobs  make  work  as  interesting  and  enjoyable   as   possible   within   a   workplace,   the   main   reason   why   it   would   be   difficult   to   recruit  people  to  some  kinds  of  workplaces  was  that  the  work  itself  was,  over  all,   less  attractive  –  i.e.  more  of  a  burden.  Extra  remuneration  could  be  used  then  to   recruit   workers.   This   is   not   exactly   the   same   sense   of   effort-­‐burden   Robin   is   talking   about   –   this   is   more   like   experience-­‐burden   –   but   it   still   might   better   capture  the  ideal  in  question.  It  does,  however,  introduce  something  that  looks   more   like   a   market   mechanism   for   regulating   the   labor   market:   using   higher   wages  to  attract  workers.   Given  this  array  of  problems,  the  best  approximation  of  a  remuneration  system   that  tries  to  equalize  the  connection  of  rewards  to  burdens  across  workers  may   be  simply  to  pay  everyone  the  same  hourly  pay,  perhaps  with  caps  on  the  number   22  I  put  the  word  “work”  in  quotes  here  because  if  I  were  independently  wealthy  and  my  income  had   nothing  to  do  with  my  job,  I  would  still  pretty  much  do  exactly  what  I  currently  do  connected  to  my  job.   23  The  idea  is  basically  that  if  the  qualities  and  costs  of  all  inputs  (especially  labor)  and  outputs  have   been  properly  measured,  then  the  only  thing  that  could  generate  more  total  social  benefit  per  unit  of   input  cost  would  be  that  workers  are  working  harder.   Erik  Olin  Wright   of  hours  that  can  be  counted  as  “work”,  and  then  allow  modest  deviations  for   pragmatic  reasons.24  This  does  not  mean  abandoning  the  moral  premises  of  the   burden/reward  equation.  This  principle  could  still  play  a  role  of  a  regulative  ideal   in  the  democratic  deliberations  over  appropriate  pay  schemes,  but  it  would  not   be  the  direct  basis  for  differentiating  pay  across  workers.       CONCLUDING  COMMENTS   Robin’s   exploration   of   the   normative   principles   and   institutional   designs   of   a   participatory  economy,  along  with  his  earlier  joint  work  with  Michael  Albert  and   Albert’s   own   treatise,   Parecon,   constitute   one   of   the   very   few   systematic   contemporary   attempts   at   elaborating   a   comprehensive   model   of   an   emancipatory   alternative   to   capitalism.   Even   if   it   is   the   case   that   the   specific   institutional   proposals   would   be   unlikely   to   ever   be   adopted,   even   if   ordinary   people   were   fully   empowered   to   do   so,   nevertheless   elements   of   the   models   should  certainly  be  part  of  any  sustained  discussion  of  transcending  capitalism  in   a  democratic,  egalitarian  direction.  Perhaps  even  more  crucially,  since  we  are  so   distant   from   such   a   world,   many   of   the   ideas   connected   to   participatory   economics   can   be   embodied   in   concrete   projects   of   building   alternative   institutions   inside   of   our   existing   socio-­‐economic   system.                               .                       24  The   large,   successful   worker-­‐owned   construction   cooperative   in   Copenhagen,   Logik   &   Co,   pays   everyone  exactly  the  same  hourly  wage  –  from  the  most  senior  to  the  most  junior  member,  regardless   of  skills  –  but  does  not  allow  anyone  to  be  paid  for  more  than  40  hours  a  week.  People  often  work  more   than  that,  but  this  is  treated  as  reflecting  how  much  they  enjoy  the  process.  Real  slackers  –  which  are   rare  –  are  dealt  with  through  social  sanctions  and,  potentially,  expulsion.  (This  information  was  given  me   by  a  senior  member  of  the  cooperative  during  a  visit  there  in  2012.  I  have  not  verified  this  account  with   more  detailed  research).   IN  DEFENCE  OF  PARTICIPATORY  ECONOMICS     Robin  Hahnel       THE  MAJOR  POINT  OF  CONTENTION   Let   me   begin   by   accepting   Erik’s   characterisation   of   our   disagreement   about   markets.  In  Erik’s  words:     Robin   feels   very   confident   that   a   complex,   large-­‐scale,   well-­‐functioning   economic   system…  could  exist  in  which  markets  have  been  completely  replaced  by  participatory   planning.   Yes,  I  do.   Erik’s  writes:     My   position   is   that   the   optimal   institutional   configuration   of   a   democratic-­‐egalitarian   economy   is   much   more   likely   to   be   a   mix   of   diverse   forms   of   participatory   planning,   state  regulatory  mechanisms,  and  markets.   That  is  the  proposal  I  assume  Erik  will  defend  in  greater  detail  in  round  two  of  this   dialogue.  It  is  what  I  regard  as  a  pragmatic,  nuanced  version  of  market  socialism  –   even  if  Erik  objects  to  being  categorised  as  a  market  socialist  –  which  hopefully  I   will  criticise  in  the  same  thoughtful  and  comradely  spirit  that  Erik  has  criticised   participatory  economics.   Erik  goes  on  to  clarify:     Specifically,   I   am   skeptical   that   an   institutional   design   in   which   markets   have   been   completely  eliminated  –  where  they  play  no  role  whatsoever  in  economic  coordination  –   is  likely  to  be  as  efficient  as  an  institutional  configuration  that  combines  a  variety  of   forms   of   economic   coordination:   participatory   planning,   centralized   regulations,   and   market  interactions….  This  way  of  thinking  about  the  issues  implies  that  the  concept  of   ‘markets’  is  not  a  binary  –  you  either  have  markets  or  you  don’t.   I  understand  that  Erik  does  not  recommend  a  system  where  economic  activity  is   organised  by  markets  alone.  Nonetheless,  there  either  will  be  or  there  will  not  be   markets  in  the  system  Erik  recommends.  That  is  a  “binary”  choice,  to  use  Erik’s   words,  about  which  we  disagree.       Robin  Hahnel   At   the   beginning   of   the   twentieth   century   virtually   all   who   opposed   capitalism   saw   the   market   system   as   a   destructive   force   that   required   replacement   by   democratic   planning.   Not   only   did   they   believe   we   needed   to   replace   private   ownership   with   social   ownership   of   the   “means   of   production,”   they   also   envisioned  replacing  the  impersonal  rule  of  market  forces  with  a  self-­‐conscious   system  of  democratic  planning.  During  the  middle  third  of  the  twentieth  century   social  democratic  political  parties  changed  their  position  on  this  issue,  and  came   out  in  support  of  the  view  that  Erik  expresses  above  –  a  system  that  combines   markets  with  state  regulation  and  planning  through  the  political  system.25  During   the  last  fifth  of  the  twentieth  century  many  radicals  from  the  generation  to  which   Erik  and  I  both  belong  reacted  to  the  demise  of  the  planned  economies  and  free   market   triumphalism   by   joining   social   democrats   in   support   of   a   vision   of   “socialised   markets”   while   endorsing   the   “tacit   knowledge”   critique   of   comprehensive   planning   voiced   by   conservative   champions   of   free   market   capitalism  like  Von  Mises  and  Hayek  fifty  years  earlier.  I  believe  the  participatory   planning   procedure   that   is   a   key   part   of   the   participatory   economic   model     demonstrates  that  these  concessions  to  the  practical  necessity  of  markets  were   unwarranted,  which  is  fortunate,  since  the  pernicious  effects  of  markets  become   ever  more  apparent  as  the  global  market  system  continues  to  spread  its  influence   destroying  community  and  natural  environment  alike.   As  I  said  in  my  opening  piece,  the  case  against  markets  logically  consists  of  two   parts:  (1)  How  bad  are  markets?  And,  (2)  is  there  a  more  desirable  alternative  that   is  feasible?  Here  I  respond  to  Erik’s  specific  criticisms  of  the  alternative  to  markets   we  have  proposed  –  participatory  planning.  I  postpone  until  a  second  round  in   this  dialogue  my  full  argument  against  the  use  of  markets  until  after  Erik  presents   in   more   detail   his   case   for   how   and   why   he   believes   markets   are   part   of   a   desirable   economy.   But   let   me   foreshadow   my   objection   to   markets   in   the   broadest  terms:  When  a  division  of  labour  is  coordinated  by  markets  those  who   take  advantage  of  others  are  often  rewarded  while  those  who  behave  in  socially   responsible  ways  are  often  punished  for  having  done  so.  For  this  reason  markets   act   like   a   cancer   that   undermines   efforts   to   build   and   deepen   participatory,   equitable   cooperation.   In   my   view   those   who   admire   the   convenience   markets   afford   individuals   fail   to   appreciate   the   magnitude   of   the   socially   destructive   effects  markets  unleash.  I  claim  we  can  provide  for  the  desirable  conveniences   25  Later   social   democrats   also   dropped   their   opposition   to   private   enterprise   and   instead   favored   a   “mixed  economy,”  i.e.  a  mixture  of  private  and  public  enterprises.   In  Defence  of  Participatory  Economics   39 markets  afford  through  participatory  planning,  and  thereby  avoid  the  cancerous   effects  market  interactions  have  on  social  relations.  Erik  has  challenged  this  claim   in  specific  regards,  which  I  will  now  address.     HOUSEHOLD  CONSUMPTION  PLANNING   Erik  raises  two  issues  about  household  consumption  planning:  (1)  How  useful  is  it   anyway?   And   (2)   aren’t   mid-­‐year   adjustments   really   just   forms   of   market   behaviour?  In  the  process  he  raises  questions  about  how  detailed  consumption   pre-­‐ordering   can   or   should   be   that   other   critics   have   raised   before   him.   David   Schweickart   ridiculed   household   consumption   planning   in   his   book   review   of   Parecon:  Life  After  Capitalism  titled  “Nonsense  on  Stilts”  in  2006.  Seth  Ackerman   rejected  participatory  economics  for  this  reason  alone  in  “The  Red  and  the  Black”   published   in   Jacobin   (9)   in   2013.   Aware   of   the   prevalence   of   this   objection,   Stephen  Shalom  made  this  his  first  question  in  a  Q&A  session  with  me  about  Of   the  People,  By  the  People:  The  Case  for  a  Participatory  Economy  posted  on  the   New   Politics   website   on   January   14,   2013.   I   can   also   testify   that   it   is   the   most   frequent  issue  raised  by  students  in  my  classes  over  the  past  twenty  years  when   they  are  mulling  over  whether  they  would  personally  like  to  live  in  a  participatory   economy.   David  Schweickart  put  it  this  way:     Unless  requests  are  made  in  excruciating  detail  producers  won’t  know  what  to  produce.   In  any  event,  they  have  little  motivation  to  find  out  what  people  really  want.   Seth   Ackerman   thought   it   sufficient   to   dismiss   comprehensive   planning   of   any   kind  as  a  practical  impossibility  by  simply  pointing  out:     There   are   more   than   two   million   products   in   Amazon.com's   “kitchen   and   dining”   category  alone!   And  most  recently  Erik  put  it  this  way:     The  problem  is  that  the  gross  categories  provide  virtually  no  useful  information  for  the   actual  producers  of  the  things  I  will  consume.  It  does  not  help  shirt-­‐makers  very  much  to   know,  based  on  the  aggregation  of  individual  household  consumption  proposals,  that   consumers  plan  to  spend  a  certain  per  cent  of  their  budget  on  clothing;  they  need  to   have  some  idea  of  how  many  shirts  of  what  style  and  quality  to  produce  since  these   have  very…  different  opportunity  costs.   Robin  Hahnel   Since  this  concern  features  so  prominently  in  critics  minds  let’s  give  it  a  name.  I’m   going  to  call  it  the  “size  6½  purple  women’s  high-­‐heeled  leatherless  shoe  with  a   yellow  toe  problem.”   Quite  simply  the  problem  is  this:  A  shoe  producer  must  know  to  produce  a  size  6½   purple  women’s  high-­‐heeled  leatherless  shoe  with  a  yellow  toe.  It  must  know  that   size   6   will   not   do,   a   red   toe   will   not   do,   a   low   heel   will   not   do.   However,   it   is   unreasonable   to   expect   the   consumer   who   will   eventually   discover   she   or   he   wants  a  size  6½  purple  women’s  high-­‐heeled  leatherless  shoe  with  a  yellow  toe  to   specify   this   at   the   beginning   of   the   year   as   part   of   her   annual   consumption   request.   How   does   a   shoe   producer   in   any   economy   know   to   produce   a   size   6½   purple   women’s   high-­‐heeled   leatherless   shoe   with   a   yellow   toe,   rather   than   a   slightly   different  shoe?  In  a  market  economy  shoe  producers  guess  what  shoe  consumers   will   want   when   they   decide   to   go   shoe   shopping.   They   guess   based   on   their   experience.  They  guess  based  on  any  consumer  research  they  engage  in,  perhaps   including  information  culled  from  focus  groups.  They  guess  based  on  government   projections  of  changes  in  relevant  economic  variables  such  as  the  distribution  of   income  among  households.  And  recently,  many  large  companies  have  started  to   use   newly   available   data   gathering   and   processing   capabilities   to   predict   what   products  particular  customers  will  want  in  the  future.  When  I  go  to  the  Amazon   website  to  inquire  about  some  book,  Amazon  now  tells  me  what  other  books  I   might   be   interested   in   buying.   Only   when   I   go   on   the   internet   from   my   wife’s   email  address  does  Amazon  provide  me  with  book  suggestions  that  do  not  match   my  preferences.  In  our  brave  new  market  economy  producers  often  know  what   we  will  want  before  we  do!  In  market  economies  producers  also  try  to  influence   what  I  will  want  to  buy  through  advertising.  In  other  words,  a  shoe  company  will   decide  to  produce  a  certain  style  shoe  and  use  advertising  to  make  people  want   to  buy  the  style  they  have  decided  to  produce.   In  sum:  In  market  economies  producers  guess  what  to  produce  –  because  many   sales  are  not  arranged  through  pre-­‐orders  –  and  producers  use  advertising  to  try   to   influence   consumers   to   buy   what   they   have   produced.   New   technologies   of   automated   inventory   supply   line   management   and   consumer   data   base   mining   have   made   their   guess   work   more   accurate,   but   in   the   end   producers   are   still   guessing.     There  is  often  a  great  deal  of  inefficiency  that  results  from  this  guessing  game  that   is  an  intrinsic  feature  of  market  economies.  Unlike  planned  economies,  in  market   In  Defence  of  Participatory  Economics   41 economies  there  is  no  attempt  to  coordinate  all  the  production  and  consumption   decisions   actors   make   before   those   decisions   are   translated   into   actions.   As   a   result  a  great  deal  of  what  economists  call  “false  trading”  occurs.  False  trades  are   trades  individual  parties  make  at  prices  that  fail  to  equate  supply  and  demand  –   which  actually  occurs  more  often  than  not!  While  seldom  emphasised,  competent   economic   theorists   know   that   all   false   trading   generates   inefficiency   to   some   extent,   and   disequilibrating   forces   operate   in   market   systems   alongside   equilibrating  forces  when  quantities  adjust  as  well  as  prices.  The  notion  that  in   market   economies   the   convenience   consumers   enjoy   of   not   having   to   pre-­‐plan   their   consumption   with   producers   comes   at   no   price   is   based   on   the   grossly   inaccurate  assumption  that  market  economies  are  always  in  general  equilibrium.   For   all   their   faults,   twentieth   century   planned   economies   did   not   experience   major  depressions,  or  even  significant  recessions  caused  by  mutually  reinforcing   disequilibrating   forces   in   markets   that   all   too   often   go   unchecked   by   sufficient   countervailing  fiscal  and  monetary  policies  in  market  economies.     But   how   will   all   this   work   in   a   participatory   economy   where   there   is   a   self-­‐ conscious   attempt   to   coordinate   production   and   consumption   decisions   before   production  begins?   Let’s   begin   with   information   consumers   will   have   about   what   is   available.   Ironically,   the   two   million   products   in   the   Amazon.com   “kitchen   and   dining”   section   is   not   an   insurmountable   problem   rendering   comprehensive   economic   planning  of  any  kind  impossible  at  all.  Instead  it  is  a  wonderful  example  of  how   consumers  today  can  easily  be  made  aware  of  the  tremendous  variety  of  products   that   will   be   available   in   a   participatory   economy.   Just   as   Amazon.com   can   list   millions  of  products  –  providing  pictures  and  details  about  their  characteristics  –   consumer   federations   can   provide   this   service   to   consumers   in   a   participatory   economy  for  any  who  wish  to  shop  online.  And  for  those  who  prefer  what  some   of   my   students   once   told   me   were   “the   pleasures   of   malling   it,”   consumer   federations  can  host  shopping  malls  where  anyone  who  wishes  can  go  to  see  and   be   seen,   and   walk   away   with   whatever   strikes   their   fancy.   Information   about   product  improvements  can  be  provided  by  consumer  federations  as  well.  The  fact   that  it  will  be  consumer  federations  providing  information  about  products,  rather   than   producers   singing   their   own   praises   as   is   the   case   in   market   economies,   Robin  Hahnel   seems  to  me  to  be  a  significant  change  for  the  better.26  But,  how,  critics  ask,  will   consumers  pre-­‐order?     It  is  important  to  distinguish  between  what  we  need  to  accomplish  and  what  we   do  not  need  to  accomplish  in  the  annual  participatory  planning  process.  When  the   year  starts  any  shoemaking  worker  council  with  an  approved  proposal  knows  it   should  start  making  shoes.  It  also  knows  how  much  cloth,  leather,  rubber,  etc.  it   has  been  pre-­‐authorised  for  during  the  year,  and  how  many  shoes  it  has  said  it   can  make.  It  also  knows  that  X%  of  the  shoes  it  made  last  year  were  women’s   shoes,  and  Y%  of  the  women’s  shoes  it  made  last  year  were  size  6½.  How  does  it   know   whether   to   make   size   6½   purple   women’s   high-­‐heeled   leatherless   shoes   with  a  yellow  toe,  or  size  6½  purple  women’s  high-­‐heeled  leatherless  shoe  with  a   red  toe?  It  does  just  what  a  shoemaking  company  in  a  market  economy  does:  It   makes   an   educated   guess.   Then,   as   soon   as   actual   consumption   begins   new   information   becomes   available.   Suppose   purchases   of   size   6½   purple   women’s   high-­‐heeled   leatherless   shoes   with   a   yellow   toe   are   lower   than   producers   expected  while  the  red  toed  shoes  are  disappearing  like  hot  cakes.  This  kind  of   new  information  is  what  helps  worker  councils  answer  the  question:  Exactly  what   kind  of  shoe  should  I  be  producing,  just  as  it  does  in  market  economies.  So  much   for   the   claim   that   a   planned   economy   has   no   answer   to   the   size   6½   purple   women’s  high-­‐heeled  leatherless  shoe  with  a  yellow  toe  problem.  It  has  the  same   answer   a   market   system   does   with   regard   to   moving   from   a   “coarse”   decision   about   shoe   production   to   a   “detailed”   decision   about   size   6½   purple   women’s   high-­‐heeled  leatherless  shoe  with  a  yellow  toe  production.   This  first  kind  of  new  information  fills  in  the  details  producers  need  to  know  about   exactly  what  kinds  of  shoes  people  want,  which  is  why  consumers  do  not  need  to   specify  these  details  when  submitting  their  personal  consumption  requests  during   the   planning   procedure.   Submitting   personal   consumption   requests   during   planning   is   not   impossibly   burdensome   because   the   form   would   only   need   to   have  an  entry  called  “shoes”  for  one  to  put  a  number  after,  not  an  entry  called   “size  6½  purple  women’s  high-­‐heeled  leatherless  shoes  with  a  yellow  toe!”  Those   kinds  of  details  are  revealed  by  actual  purchases  as  the  year  proceeds.  In  other   words,  Erik  misreads  our  proposal  when  he  writes:  “Since  the  coarse  categories   would  not  be  useful  for  planning  by  federations  of  workers  councils,  and  this  is   26  We   have   also   suggested   that   consumer   federations   be   primarily   responsible   for   research   and   development   of   new   and   better   products   in   a   participatory   economy,   rather   than   leave   product   innovation  to  producers  as  is  it  is  in  market  economies.   In  Defence  of  Participatory  Economics   43 the   fundamental   purpose   for   pre-­‐ordering   consumption,   I   will   assume   that   the   finest   level   of   detail   is   required.”   Consumption   proposals   during   planning   are   made   using   what   Erik   calls   “coarse   categories”   because   the   fine   level   of   detail   producers  require  is  revealed  as  the  plan  is  actually  implemented.  Whether  filling   out  even  this  reduced  list  of  items  is  beyond  people’s  capabilities  or  desires  I  will   return  to  shortly.27   What  about  David  Schweickart’s  claim  that  worker  councils  “have  little  motivation   to  find  out  what  people  really  want,”  disenfranchising  consumers  as  the  centrally   planned   Soviet   economy   certainly   did   for   decades?   Here   it   is   important   to   distinguish   between   the   worker   council   production   plan   that   was   approved   as   “socially   responsible”   before   the   year   began,   and   what   the   worker   council   is   credited   for   at   the   end   of   the   year.   Plan   approval   is   based   on   projected   social   benefit  to  cost  ratios.  However,  worker  councils  are  credited  for  the  social  benefit   to   cost   ratio   of   actual   outputs   delivered   and   accepted,   and   actual   inputs   used   during  the  year.28   It  is  last  year’s  actual  social  benefit  to  cost  ratio  that  serves  as  a  cap  on  average   effort   ratings   worker   councils   can   award   members.   So   if   their   approved   production  plan  had  a  SB/SC  ratio  of  1.09  but  their  actual  ratio  at  year’s  end  turns   out  to  be  1.03  the  cap  on  average  effort  ratings  for  workers  in  the  council  next   year   is   1.03   not   1.09.   Therefore,   a   worker   council   that   failed   to   reduce   yellow   toed   shoe   production   and   increase   red   toed   shoe   production   in   response   to   signals   that   become   available   during   the   year   about   what   consumers   truly   like   would  end  up  with  a  lower  actual  social  benefit  to  cost  ratio,  and  consequently  a   lower  average  effort  rating  for  the  following  year.29     27  If  a  consumer  knows  she  wants  women’s  shoes,  or  size  6½  shoes,  there  is  no  reason  for  her  not  to  add   this  information  when  filing  out  her  consumption  order  –  since  it  is  useful  for  producers.  The  point  is   simply  that  she  does  not  have  to  if  this  is  too  burdensome,  and  she  can  change  her  mind  later  if  she   wants.   28  Similarly,   consumers,   and   consumer   councils   and   federations   are   charged   for   what   they   actually   consume  during  the  year,  not  what  was  approved  for  them  in  the  plan.  Any  differences  are  recorded  as   increases   or   decreases   in   the   debt   or   savings   of   individual   consumers,   neighbourhood   councils,   and   consumer  federations.   29  There   are   endless   details   one   could   pursue   in   this,   as   in   other   areas,   regarding   exactly   how   a   participatory  economy  would  actually  function.  Suppose  a  worker  council  delivers  yellow  toed  shoes  to   the  consumer  federation.  Suppose  the  consumer  federation  accepts  them  anticipating  that  they  will  sell,   only  to  discover  later  that  nobody  bought  them  because  they  bought  red  toed  shoes  instead.  Who  takes   responsibility?   Does   the   worker   council   get   credit   for   them   because   they   were   accepted   by   the   Robin  Hahnel   Actual  purchase  patterns  during  the  year  reveal  more  than  needed  details  about   consumer  desires.  They  also  signal  when  consumers  have  changed  their  minds.  At   the  individual  level  people  reveal  by  their  purchases  that  they  want  more  of  some   things  and  less  of  others  than  they  indicated  during  planning.  At  the  aggregate   level   individual   increases   and   decreases   sometimes   cancel   out   and   therefore   require  no  changes  in  production.  When  they  do  not  cancel  out,  how  to  increase   or  decrease  production  of  shoes  because  consumers  have  changed  their  minds   must   be   negotiated   between   the   shoe   industry   federation   and   the   national   consumer  federation.  Again,  there  are  different  ways  these  adjustments  could  be   handled,  each  with  its  pros  and  cons.  But  the  relevant  point  is  that  adjustments   can  be  made.30  The  difference  between  a  planned  economy  and  an  unplanned,   market   economy,   is   that   to   the   extent   that   consumers   submit   proposals   that   reflect   their   changed   circumstances   and   tastes,   and   to   the   extent   that   worker   councils   submit   proposals   that   reflect   their   new   technologies   and   work   preferences,  the  plan  creates  an  initial  situation  that  reduces  the  number  and  size   of  adjustments  that  are  necessary.  All  mechanisms  for  making  adjustments  in  a   market  economy  are  available  if  wanted  in  a  planned  economy  as  well,  although   presumably   a   participatory   economy   would   put   a   higher   priority   on   using   mechanisms  that  distribute  the  costs  of  adjustments  more  fairly.     Finally,   how   burdensome   is   it   for   consumers   to   put   numbers   next   to   a   list   of   “coarse  categories?”  Perhaps  I  was  too  flip  when  I  explained  in  my  most  recent   book  how  a  lazy  person  such  as  myself  might  spend  no  time  on  submitting  a  new   consumption   request   without   impinging   on   the   ability   of   my   neighbourhood   consumer  federation?  Or  does  the  consumer  federation  notify  the  worker  council  at  the  end  of  the  year   that  it  does  not  get  credit  for  some  of  the  yellow  toed  shoes  it  produced?  Selling  is  different  from  selling   on   consignment.   The   important   question   is   not   which   option   will   be   chosen   –   because   that   will   be   decided  by  the  people  who  live  in  a  participatory  economy.  The  issue  before  us  now  is  simply  if  there   are   perfectly   straightforward   solutions   to   these   problems,   and   therefore   a   participatory   economy   is,   indeed,  a  practical  possibility.   30  The  crucial  questions  are:  (1)  To  what  extent  will  the  shoe  industry  or  consumers  bear  the  burden  of   adjustments?  (2)  Will  shoe  customers  who  change  their  demand  for  shoes  be  treated  any  differently   from  shoe  customers  who  do  not?  In  the  case  of  excess  supply  the  issue  reduces  to  whether  or  not   producers  will  be  credited  for  shoes  that  are  added  to  inventories,  and  if  so  how  much.  The  case  of   excess  demand  is  more  complicated.  To  raise  shoe  production  more  resources  will  have  to  be  drawn  out   of  inventories  or  away  from  industries  experiencing  excess  supply.  Beyond  crediting  shoe  workers  for   working  longer  hours,  will  the  indicative  prices  of  shoes  and  those  resources  be  increased  above  their   levels  in  the  plan,  or  not?  If  shoe  production  is  not  raised  sufficiently  to  satisfy  all  who  now  want  shoes,   will  those  who  did  not  increase  their  demand  above  what  they  ordered  be  given  preference?   In  Defence  of  Participatory  Economics   45 council   to   participate   in   the   planning   procedure,   and   without   serious   personal   repercussions.   If   a   person   does   not   fill   out   and   submit   a   consumption   request   form  their  neighbourhood  council  can  simply  use  their  actual  consumption  last   year  as  their  new  consumption  request  for  this  year.  If  their  effort  rating  for  this   year   warrants   this   level   of   consumption,   their   request   will   be   approved   and   included  in  the  neighbourhood  proposal.  If  not,  and  if  a  person  continues  to  fail  to   respond  to  requests  for  a  new  proposal,  the  neighbourhood  council  can  reduce   every  item  in  their  last  year  consumption  by  the  same  percent  until  the  reduced   request   is   covered   by   their   lower   effort   rating   this   year.   In   this   way   neighbourhood   consumption   councils,   who   must   submit   neighbourhood   proposals  during  the  planning  procedure,  can  do  what  they  have  to  do  even  if   some  of  their  members  fail  to  provide  personal  consumption  proposals.   In   the   end   Erik   seems   to   understand   how   signalling   necessary   details   to   producers,  and  making  adjustments  because  consumers  changed  their  minds  can   work  in  a  participatory  economy.  He  writes:     Production…in  effect  would  be  done  pretty  much  as…  now:  producers  would  examine   the  sales  and  trends  of  sales  in  the  recent  past,  and  make  their  best  estimate  of  what  to   produce…on   that   basis.   Indeed,   since   producers   and   their   sector   federations   can   continually  and  efficiently  monitor  these  trends,  they  are  in  a  position  to  make  updates   to  plans  in  an  on-­‐going  way  on  the  basis  of  the  actual  behavior  of  consumers,  rather   than   mainly   organize   their   planning   activities   around   annual   plans   animated   by   uninformative  household  pre-­‐orders.    This  is  accurate  enough,  although  I  don’t  see  why  Erik  dismisses  household  pre-­‐ orders   as   “uninformative.”   They   certainly   provide   industry   federations   more   useful   information   at   the   start   of   the   year   than   the   zero   information   market   systems  provide  producers  about  changes  in  consumer  intentions.     From  year  to  year  consumers’  incomes  change,  and  consumers’  desires  change.   Signalling  producers  about  these  changes  is  what  pre-­‐ordering  is  for  and  why  it  is   quite   useful   for   producers.   Necessary   details   can   be   filled   in   from   consumer   profiles  and  actual  purchases  during  the  year,  and  adjustments  can  be  negotiated   with   the   aid   of   instantaneous   inventory   supply   line   prompts   at   the   disposal   of   worker  councils  and  federations.  But  just  because  pre-­‐ordering  lacks  detail  and   people  change  their  minds  does  not  mean  the  planning  process  is  pointless.  If  we   want   consumers   to   influence   what   is   produced   in   the   economy,   and   if   we   are   going  to  decide  what  is  produced  in  large  part  through  a  planning  procedure,  then   we  need  consumers  to  provide  their  best  guesses  about  what  they  will  want.  We   Robin  Hahnel   don’t   need   them   to   agonise   over   their   proposals,   and   we   certainly   can   accommodate  them  when  they  change  their  minds.   Erik  also  asks:     I   don’t   understand   why   my   personal   consumption   should   be   the   business   of   a   neighbourhood   council,   even   apart   from   the   problem   already   discussed   of   the   usefulness  of  the  procedures  involved.   This  question  has  been  raised  before,  and  fortunately,  therefore,  I  have  a  name   for   it.   I   call   it   the   “kinky   underwear   problem.”   One   may   not   want   one’s   neighbours  gossiping  about  what  kind  of  underwear  one  has  ordered.31  In  recent   expositions   I   have   tried   to   explain   that   it   was   never   our   intent   that   one’s   neighbours  should  sit  in  judgment  over  one’s  consumption  requests,  and  offered   several   suggestions   for   how   consumer   privacy   could   be   protected.   The   bottom   line  is  that  personal  consumption  requests  must  be  approved  or  disapproved,  and   this   must   occur   before   neighbourhood   consumption   councils   can   submit   their   aggregated  neighbourhood  consumption  requests  during  the  planning  procedure.   Since  neighbourhood  councils  must  aggregate  their  members’  approved  requests   we   talked   about   them   as   also   approving   them.   But   even   in   our   earliest   presentation  we  specified  that  as  long  as  one’s  effort  rating  plus  any  allowance   was  sufficient  to  cover  the  social  cost  of  one’s  request  it  could  not  be  denied.  In   1991  we  also  wrote  of  neighbours’  having  the  opportunity  to  provide  constructive   feedback   and   suggestions   about   particulars,   which   in   retrospect   was   probably   overly  enthusiastic  on  our  part.  Over  the  years  it  has  become  apparent,  at  least  to   me,  that  for  most  people  today  concern  for  privacy  is  far  greater  than  any  desire   for  constructive  feedback  from  one’s  neighbours.   In  any  case,  there  are  a  number  of  ways  to  protect  privacy.  (1)  Eliminate  review   and  make  approval  or  disapproval  of  individual  consumption  requests  automatic   based  on  effort  rating  and  allowances  –  which  seems  to  be  Erik’s  preference.  (2)   There  is  no  reason  to  attach  names  to  personal  consumption  proposals.  Review   only  requires  an  effort  rating,  any  allowance,  and  a  personal  consumption  request   form   that   is   filled   out.   Submissions   can   be   by   number,   not   name.   (3)   Personal   requests  –  with  or  without  names  attached  –  could  be  reviewed  by  consumption   councils   that   are   not   geographically   based.   So   any   information   about   one’s   31  Since   one   simply   puts   a   number   after   the   category   “underwear”   when   submitting   personal   consumption  requests  kinky  underwear  is  really  not  an  issue  –  although  the  point  remains:  Why  should   one’s  neighbours  pass  judgment  on  one’s  consumption  request.   In  Defence  of  Participatory  Economics   47 consumption   request   would   be   available   only   to   strangers.   In   this   case   the   decision   to   approve   or   disapprove   would   have   to   be   passed   on   from   the   non-­‐ geographical  council  to  one’s  neighbourhood  consumption  council  so  it  could  be   added  to  other  individual  requests  and  requests  for  neighborhood  public  goods.   Similar  issues  arise  regarding  who  approves  special  need  requests  and  requests   for   loans.   To   enhance   building   strong,   local,   neighbourhood   communities   we   suggested  that  special  need  requests,  and  loan  applications  be  handled  by  one’s   neighbourhood   consumption   councils.   But   that   is   not   the   only   option.   These   functions  could  be  de-­‐localised  if  people  felt  that  was  more  advantageous.   Finally,  is  the  adjustment  process  really  just  a  market  after  all,  as  Erik  suggests?   Approved   consumption   plans   are   not   treated   as   binding   contracts   since   individuals   are   free   to   change   their   minds   as   the   year   proceeds.   One   possible   option  for  making  adjustments  would  allow  indicative  prices  to  rise  when  excess   demand  for  something  appears  during  the  year,  and  indicative  prices  to  fall  in  the   case  of  excess  supply.  If  it  looks  like  a  market,  and  smells  like  a  market,  doesn’t   that  mean  it  is  a  market?   In  this  case  the  answer  is  “no.”  Here  are  the  crucial  differences:   (1)  In  market  economies  there  is  no  plan  that  has  been  agreed  to  at  the  beginning   of   the   year.   There   is   no   plan   where   people   had   an   opportunity   to   affect   production   and   consumption   decisions   at   least   roughly   in   proportion   to   the   degree  they  are  affected.  There  is  no  plan  that  incorporates  effects  on  “external   parties”   which   are   ignored   by   buyers   and   sellers   who   make   the   decisions   in   market   economies.   There   is   no   plan   that   would   be   efficient,   fair,   and   environmentally   sustainable   if   carried   out.   Instead,   in   a   market   economy   all   decisions  about  how  to  organise  a  division  of  labour  and  distribute  the  benefits   from   having   done   so   are   settled   by   agreements   between   buyer-­‐seller   pairs   –   which   predictably   leads   to   outcomes   that   are   inequitable,   inefficient,   and   environmentally  unsustainable.   (2)  Even  when  adjustments  are  made  during  the  year  in  a  participatory  economy   individual   buyers   and   sellers   do   not   negotiate   those   adjustments   between   themselves   however   they   see   fit,   including   any   adjustment   in   prices.   Instead,   adjustments  are  negotiated  socially.  Industry  and  consumer  federations  negotiate   adjustments  in  production.  And  whether  or  not  to  adjust  indicative  prices  is  also  a   social  decision,  so  that  fairness  as  well  as  efficiency  can  be  taken  into  account.   Robin  Hahnel   Markets  are  the  aggregate  sum  of  haggling  between  many  self-­‐selected  pairs  of   buyer-­‐sellers.   Neither   participatory   planning   nor   the   adjustment   procedures   I   have   discussed   above   permit   self-­‐selected   buyer-­‐seller   pairs   to   make   whatever   deals  they  want  –  because  we  have  learned  that  the  consequences  of  allowing   this  are  unacceptable.     PUBLIC  GOODS  PLANNING   As  Erik  says,  we  are  in  substantial  agreement  about  how  to  plan  for  public  good   consumption.   He   is   correct   that   once   it   is   decided   how   much   of   consumers’   income   will   go   toward   private   versus   public   consumption,   approval   of   private   consumption   requests   could   be   handled   outside   neighbourhood   consumption   councils.   I   have   already   explained   why   designating   neighbourhood   councils   to   handle  private  consumption  requests,  as  well  as  requests  based  on  special  needs   and  requests  for  loans,  seems  to  be  a  good  way  to  build  strong  local  communities,   but  all  these  decisions  could  be  de-­‐localised  if  people  wanted  to.   Erik  is  also  correct  when  he  observes  that  many  functions  performed  by  what  we   call   political   institutions   today   are   performed   by   consumer   federations   in   a   participatory  economy.  That  is  because  markets  cannot  be  relied  on  to  provide   adequate  amounts  of  public  goods,  so  different  levels  of  “government”  must  step   in  and  do  this  through  public  expenditures  on  public  goods  paid  for  by  taxes.  In   effect,   market   economies   fail   utterly   to   provide   public   goods,   so   in   the   most   egregious  cases  people  have  come  to  insist  that  government  institutions  fill  this   void,  even  if  very  imperfectly.  Since  we  consider  public  goods  to  be  just  as  much  a   part  of  “the  economy”  as  private  goods,  we  have  proposed  economic  institutions   and  procedures  to  handle  them,  which  we  believe  also  eliminates  the  unfortunate   bias   in   market   economies   against   public   goods   and   in   favour   of   private   good   consumption.   I  don’t  see  the  distinction  Erik  tries  to  draw  between  consumer  public  goods  and   citizen  public  goods.  Not  all  goods  that  are  public  are  public  for  the  same  reason   and  the  same  way.  And  “yes,”  each  of  us  is  consumer,  producer,  and  citizen.  And   “yes,”  there  will  still  be  a  need  for  an  appropriate  set  of  political  institutions  to   handle   political   issues   besides   the   institutions   we   have   proposed   to   handle   In  Defence  of  Participatory  Economics   49 economic   decisions.32  But   I   don’t   see   any   purpose   in   setting   up   a   separate   network   of   citizen   councils   to   demand   citizen   public   goods.   Even   if   this   were   done,  presumably  these  councils  would  function  just  as  our  consumer  federations   do,   and   they   would   have   to   participate   in   the   participatory   planning   process,   making  and  revising  proposals  in  every  round.     EXTERNALITIES   In   free   market   economies   externalities   go   completely   unaccounted   for   –   effectively  disenfranchising  external  parties  who  have  no  say  in  deals  struck  by   buyers   and   sellers.   This   not   only   generates   a   great   deal   of   inefficiency,   it   is   increasingly  obvious  that  it  is  putting  the  natural  environment  seriously  at  risk.   While   it   is   possible   to   ameliorate   damage   due   to   external   effects   through   regulation,  emission  taxes,  or  cap  and  trade  policies,  the  problem  remains  that   the  market  system  provides  no  signals  as  to  how  much  correction  is  warranted.  It   is  well  known  that  in  theory  if  we  set  an  emission  tax  equal  to  the  sum  of  the   negative  effects  on  all  external  parties  we  will  get  the  efficient  level  of  emissions.   However,  the  market  provides  no  information  about  the  magnitude  of  damages   caused   and   therefore   how   high   such   a   tax   should   be.   Moreover,   ad   hoc   corrections  in  every  market  that  are  inherently  contestable  soon  become  highly   impractical.   As   Erik   acknowledges,   one   of   the   more   interesting   features   of   participatory  planning  is  how  it  handles  externalities.  As  I  explained  in  my  initial   presentation,   by   having   communities   of   affected   parties   participate   in   the   planning   procedure   as   described   we   are   able   to   generate   reasonably   accurate   quantitative   estimates   of   damages   from   emissions,   which   worker   councils   can   then   be   charged   for,   just   as   they   are   charged   for   using   scarce   productive   resources.   Erik  points  out:  “The  geographical  boundaries  of  a  particular  source  of  pollution   may  or  may  not  correspond  to  the  boundaries  of  existing  consumer  federations.”       Erik  is  absolutely  correct.  Additional  “communities  of  affected  parties,”  or  CAPs,   would  have  to  be  created  whenever  the  effects  of  pollution  did  not  conform  to   areas  already  defined  as  neighbourhood  consumer  councils  or  federations,  which   adds   a   whole   new   institutional   layer   to   the   economy.   Moreover,   I   have   32  Stephen  Shalom  has  proposed  a  set  of  political  institutions  that  he  argues  are  compatible  with  the   values  and  goals  of  a  participatory  economy,  which  is  sometimes  referred  to  as  “parpolity.”   Robin  Hahnel   acknowledged   that   the   most   difficult   problem   with   our   proposal   for   how   to   handle   externalities   will   be   settling   on   membership   in   CAPs.33  For   the   record,   I   have  stated:     Since  membership  in  a  CAP  entitles  one  to  extra  consumption  rights  a  serious  problem   will  be  that  people  may  claim  to  be  adversely  affected  and  deserve  membership  in  a   CAP  even  though  they  are  not.  This  means  the  process  of  defining  CAPs  –  deciding  who   should,  and  who  should  not  be  included  –  must  be  carefully  monitored.  It  might  even  be   necessary  to  create  a  formal  “judicial”  system  for  settling  disputes  over  membership  in   CAPs.   Presumably   expert   testimony   of   scientists   and   medical   personnel   would   be   relevant,  along  with  testimony  on  the  part  of  individuals  petitioning  for  membership,  as   well  as  testimony  from  current  members  contesting  their  claims.   Unfortunately,  there  appears  to  be  no  way  around  this.     Erik  asks:     Would  coalitions  of  most  affected  consumers  be  able  to  constitute  themselves  as  an  ad   hoc   federation   and   insist   on   higher   prices   for   the   rights   to   pollute?...   Could   they   constitute  a  blocking  coalition?   No.  This  is  a  misunderstanding  of  how  the  procedure  works.  Once  membership  in   a  CAP  has  been  settled  –  through  what  may  sometimes  be  a  contested  judicial   process  as  explained  above  –  the  CAP  must  come  up  with  a  single  answer  to  how   many   units   of   the   pollutant   they   are   willing   to   permit   given   the   level   of   compensation  quoted.  Disagreements  among  members  of  CAPs  about  how  much   to  allow  must  be  hashed  out  among  themselves  –  presumably  through  discussion   where   people   try   to   persuade   others   to   agree   with   them,   but   ultimately   determined  by  democratic  vote.  There  will  be  disagreements  among  members  of   CAPs   over   how   the   CAP   should   respond,   just   as   there   will   be   disagreements   among   members   of   consumer   councils   and   federations   over   how   much   of   any   public  good  to  request.  But  just  as  members  of  consumer  councils  and  federations   who  have  different  preferences  and  opinions  must  come  up  with  a  single  answer   for  which  public  goods  to  request,  and  how  much,  so  must  members  of  a  CAP   with   different   attitudes   about   pollution   come   up   with   a   single   answer   to   how   much  pollution  they  are  willing  to  permit.   A  different  issue  is  whether  the  compensation  paid  the  CAP  will  be  distributed   equally  among  all  its  members.  I  have  addressed  this  issue  at  greater  length  in  a   33  This   and   other   issues   Erik   raises   are   treated   at   length   in   “Wanted:   A   Pollution   Damage   Revealing   Mechanism,”   available   from   me   upon   request   and   under   review   at   the   Review   of   Radical   Political   Economics.   In  Defence  of  Participatory  Economics   51 an  article  under  review.34  The  simple  solution  is  to  distribute  equal  shares  to  all   members  of  a  CAP,  in  which  case  everyone  has  an  incentive  to  report  truthfully   how   much   they   believe   they   will   be   damaged.   However,   if   members   of   a   CAP   wished   to   pay   greater   compensation   to   members   who   are   more   adversely   affected  they  could  do  so  without  distorting  incentives  to  report  damage  by  using   any  of  several  “incentive  compatible  mechanisms”  that  are  now  part  of  the  public   good   literature.   The   key   to   incentive   compatibility   is   that   the   formula   for   determining   an   individual’s   compensation   must   not   use   the   individual’s   own   reported  damage.  As  ingenious  as  they  are,  I  suspect  people  would  usually  find   these   incentive   compatible   procedures   for   distributing   compensation   unequally   among  members  of  CAPs  to  be  more  trouble  than  they  are  worth.   Erik  says:     Unless   I   am   misunderstanding   the   process   involved,   the   procedures   Robin   advocates   would  likely  generate  considerable  heterogeneity  in  the  pollution  taxes  (i.e.  the  negative   externality  charges  built  into  “indicative  prices”)  faced  by  producers  of  similar  goods  in   different  places.  This  means  producers  in  areas  where  consumers  don’t  care  so  much   about  pollution  would  be  able  to  produce  at  lower  cost.  However,  there  is  no  restriction   (as  far  as  I  can  tell)  that  they  only  distribute  their  products  to  the  pollution-­‐indifferent   consumers.  This  means  that  the  same  goods  will  be  available  to  consumers  elsewhere  at   lower  and  higher  indicative  prices  depending  on  the  pollution  preferences  of  consumers   in   the   places   where   production   takes   place.   This   begins   to   look   like   a   situation   that   generates  market  pressures  on  the  high  cost  producers.   While  true  that  in  Portland  Oregon  firms  may  be  charged  a  higher  amount  for  a   ton   of   particulate   matter   released   than   firms   in   Dallas   Texas,   this   does   not   produce  the  problem  Erik  worries  about.  What  it  does  is  induce  firms  releasing   particulate  matter  to  locate  in  Dallas  rather  than  in  Portland.  The  charge  is  higher   in   Portland   either   because   Portland   is   hemmed   in   between   the   Coastal   and   Cascade  Mountains  so  the  particulate  matter  stays  in  the  air  longer  than  in  Dallas   where  the  prairie  wind  sweeps  it  away  faster,  or  because  Portlanders  value  clean   air   more   than   the   residents   of   Dallas.   In   either   case,   our   best   estimate   of   the   social  cost  of  particulate  emissions  in  Portland  is  higher  than  in  Dallas,  and  that  is   a  signal  we  want  to  send  particulate  emitters  when  they  are  deciding  where  to   locate.   What  happens  when  a  worker  council  building  houses  in  Portland  needs  cement?   There   will   be   a   single   indicative   price   for   cement   nationwide   which   it   will   be   34  Ibid.   Robin  Hahnel   charged   for   each   ton   it   uses   no   matter   the   source.   But   where   will   the   cement   come  from?  A  Portland  cement  factory,  or  a  cement  factory  in  Dallas?  If  the  social   cost  of  transporting  the  cement  from  Dallas  to  Portland  is  less  than  the  higher   social   cost   of   producing   cement   in   Portland   because   the   charge   for   releasing   particulate   matter   in   Portland   is   higher,   the   cement   will   come   from   Dallas.   Otherwise  it  will  come  from  Portland.   Finally,  Erik  suggests:     Consumers  might  decide  that  they  prefer  a  simpler  system  which  combines  government   regulations  that  impose  various  kinds  of  limits  on  allowable  pollution  with  a  system  of   uniform  taxes  on  different  types  of  environmental  externalities.   Simpler  is  always  better,  all  other  things  being  equal.  But  in  this  case  other  things   are  not  equal.  Government  regulations  mean  limiting  emissions.  But  how  much   should   the   government   require   polluters   to   reduce   emissions?   5%,   10%,   30%,   70%?  A  market  system  provides  no  help  when  we  try  to  answer  the  “how  much”   question.   A   uniform   tax   on   each   type   of   pollution?   The   example   above   demonstrates  why  the  same  tax  on  particulate  emissions  in  Portland  and  Dallas  is   actually   wrong.   But   even   if   a   uniform   tax   on   particulate   emissions   nationwide   were  efficient,  how  high  should  the  tax  be?  $5  a  ton,  $10  a  ton,  $30  a  ton,  $70  a   ton?  Again,  the  market  system  provides  no  help  when  we  try  to  answer  the  “how   high”   question.   The   beauty   of   the   procedure   we   have   proposed,   as   Erik   acknowledged,  is  that  it  generates  a  credible  quantitative  estimate  of  how  high   emissions   charges   should   be,   and   induces   players   to   emit   socially   efficient   quantities  as  a  result.  It  is  true  that  you  don’t  get  this  major  advantage  at  no  cost.   But   the   cost   reduces   to   spending   some   extra   time   and   resources   to   set   up   a   judicial   procedure   to   settle   foreseeable   disputes   over   membership   in   communities  of  affected  parties.   There  is  actually  one  other  “cost”  –  although  I  think  Erik  will  agree  with  me  that  it   is   actually   not   a   “cost”   but   a   “benefit.”   Our   mechanism   doesn’t   work   if   communities  have  significantly  different  incomes  because  it  would  lead  to  a  race   to  the  bottom  effect  where  pollution  was  unfairly  and  inefficiently  located  nearer   poor  communities.  Only  in  a  highly  egalitarian  economy  such  as  the  participatory   economy  we  propose  does  it  appear  possible  to  design  a  mechanism  that  reveals   accurate  quantitative  estimates  of  the  damage  from  pollution.       In  Defence  of  Participatory  Economics   53 RISK  AND  INNOVATION   Any  group  of  workers  who  can  submit  a  proposal  during  the  planning  procedure   that  is  approved  as  socially  responsible,  i.e.  whose  social  benefit  to  cost  ratio  is  at   least   one,   will   receive   the   inputs   it   requests   to   start   producing   when   the   year   begins.   That   could   be   a   group   composed   mostly   of   students   exiting   the   educational   system.   It   could   be   a   group   of   disgruntled   members   of   an   existing   worker  council  who  have  been  consistently  outvoted  about  how  to  do  things,  and   who  want  to  start  up  a  new  operation  to  try  and  do  things  their  own  way.  The   problem   is   how   to   protect   others   from   negative   consequences   if   a   group   of   crackpots   submit   a   proposal   that   looks   good   and   is   approved,   but   in   fact   is   a   fantasy   because   they   will   not   be   able   to   comply   with   their   promise.   If   this   happens,   at   a   minimum   resources   will   be   wasted,   and   in   all   likelihood   other   worker  councils  who  rely  on  deliveries  from  the  crackpots  which  do  not  arrive  will   be  unable  to  fulfil  their  plans  through  no  fault  of  their  own.  That  is  what  I  meant   when  I  wrote  that  it  seems  wise  to  empower  industry  federations  to  verify  the   credibility   of   new   groups   asking   to   participate   in   the   planning   process.   By   “credible”  I  simply  meant  “not  obvious  crackpots.”   I   sympathise   with   Erik’s   concern   that   industry   federations   might   be   too   conservative   in   these   judgments,   and   act   like   old   fuddy   duddies   who   stifle   creative  new  ideas.  And  I  would  look  kindly  on  any  suggestions  to  prevent  this   from   happening.   What   I   do   not   agree   with   is   Erik’s   tendency   to   interpret   democracy  with  regard  to  economic  system  design  as  “anything  any  group  in  the   economy  wants  to  do  should  be  permitted  rather  than  disallowed.”  There  will  be   people  in  a  participatory  economy  who  want  to  start  up  a  privately  owned  firm,   hire  employees,  and  keep  the  profits.  When  a  solid  majority  disapprove  of  this   kind  of  economic  relationship  I  think  they  have  every  right  to  outlaw  it.  It  has  no   place  in  a  participatory,  equitable  economy.  It  is  inconsistent  with  economic  self-­‐ management  for  the  employees,  and  when  wages  commensurate  with  sacrifices   are  not  forthcoming,  it  will  be  inconsistent  with  economic  justice  as  well.  Crowd   sourcing  where  investors  earn  a  return  on  their  investments,  which  Erik  regards   positively,   might   melt   the   glue   of   economic   justice   that   holds   a   participatory   economy   together.   It   could   create   the   same   problem   the   Cuban   government   creates   every   time   it   succumbs   to   pressure   to   appease   frustrated   Cuban   entrepreneurial  desires  by  allowing  people  to  start  up  small  businesses  for  profit.   When  a  trained  doctor  stops  doctoring  in  Cuba  to  drive  a  private  taxi,  and  earns   ten  times  more  a  week  from  doing  so  than  his  fellow  doctors  who  continue  to   work  in  public  clinics  it  makes  those  colleagues  feel  like  suckers.  What  Cuba  has   Robin  Hahnel   long  needed  to  do  instead  is  to  allow  frustrated  Cuban  workers  to  self-­‐manage   their   own   workplaces,   and   allow   Cubans   with   frustrated   entrepreneurial   ideas   opportunities  to  start  up  new  worker  self-­‐managed  enterprises  that  balance  jobs   and  reward  effort.   But   there   is   also   a   practical   problem   with   Erik’s   suggestions   about   risk   and   innovation  when  applied  to  the  context  of  a  participatory  economy.  Even  if  those   who   received   start-­‐up   funds   from   crowd   sourcing   agreed   that   the   enterprise   would  be  run  according  to  participatory  economic  principles,  and  even  if  investors   received  no  return  on  their  investment,  the  new  enterprise  would  have  to  obtain   the  inputs  it  needs  to  operate  through  the  participatory  planning  procedure.  And   it  can’t  do  this  without  being  certified  as  “credible.”  A  worker  council  can’t  buy  its   inputs  with  funds  raised  through  crowd  sourcing  in  a  participatory  economy.     I  think  instead  what  is  needed  are  multiple  ways  for  groups  who  want  to  start  up   new   enterprises   to   demonstrate   their   credibility   so   they   can   participate   in   the   planning   procedure.   If   a   group   comes   with   an   impressive   display   of   crowd   sourcing  support,  this  can  demonstrate  credibility.  If  members  of  the  group  have   relevant  educational  credentials,  this  can  demonstrate  credibility.  If  members  of   the  group  have  worked  in  the  industry  elsewhere  this  demonstrates  credibility.   Another  option  would  be  to  create  a  review  board  separate  from  all  the  industry   federations   where   groups   who   were   turned   down   for   accreditation   by   their   industry  federation  could  appeal  for  approval.  We  could  even  order  this  board  to   overturn  rulings  until  the  number  of  new  firms  they  approved  who  turned  out  to   be  crackpots  reached  some  specified  percentage  –  demonstrating  that  we  were   no  longer  being  too  conservative  in  accrediting  start-­‐ups.   It  seems  to  me  better  to  think  along  these  lines  than  to  think  about  adding  a  dose   of  capitalist  investment  to  a  participatory  economy.  Not  only  is  this  a  practical   impossibility   because   of   the   way   all   enterprises   must   obtain   their   inputs,   it   is   unnecessary  and  destructive  of  equitable  cooperation.     THE  ORGANISATION  OF  WORK  AND  PAY   Erik   and   I   are   clearly   in   broad   agreement   on   these   issues:   He   writes:   “I   fully   support  the  central  ideas  of  Robin’s  framework  for  both  the  organisation  of  work   and   for   pay:   balanced   jobs   and   pay   determined   by   effort   rather   than   contribution.”   As   I   noted   earlier,   many   prominent   market   socialists   do   not   support  either  balancing  jobs  or  pay  according  to  effort  rather  than  contribution,   In  Defence  of  Participatory  Economics   55 so  it  is  gratifying  to  have  an  ally  on  these  issues  which  are  highly  contested  at  this   point  even  among  those  who  see  themselves  as  staunch  “leftists.”   Moreover,  since  I  was  never  under  any  illusions  that  balancing  jobs  and  rewarding   effort  would  always  be  easy  to  achieve,  I  welcome  discussion  about  difficulties   that  will  arise  in  what  Erik  calls  “the  practical  implementation  of  the  ideals.”   As   I   see   it   there   are   two   practical   problems:   (1)   There   will   be   people   in   a   participatory  economy  who  disagree  with  the  principles.  What  does  one  do  when   workers  in  an  enterprise  want  to  reward  contribution  rather  than  effort?  What   does  one  do  when  workers  in  an  enterprise  don’t  want  to  balance  jobs?  (2)  Even   if  everyone  did  agree  on  balancing  jobs  and  rewarding  effort,  sometimes  it  will  be   difficult  to  accomplish  because  effort,  empowerment,  and/or  desirability  can  be   difficult  to  measure.   Regarding  the  first  problem:  Supporters  of  participatory  economics  recommend   that  worker  councils  try  to  balance  jobs  and  reward  effort  as  best  they  can,  taking   practical   obstacles   into   account.   However,   we   propose   to   leave   this   up   to   individual  worker  councils  to  work  out  as  they  see  fit,  and  we  would  oppose  any   proposals  authorising  anyone  outside  a  workplace  to  impose  these  policies  on  a   workplace  where  a  majority  of  members  did  not  wish  to  implement  them.  This  is   why   we   expect   that   different   worker   councils   will   go   about   things   quite   differently.  For  example,  some  may  decide  to  do  just  what  Erik  suggests  might   prove  reasonable  in  some  cases  –  pay  everyone  the  same  rate  of  pay  per  hour   they  work.   What  does  one  do  then  when  a  majority  of  members  of  a  worker  council  want  to   reward  contribution  rather  than  effort?  What  does  one  do  when  a  majority  don’t   want   to   balance   jobs?   And,   “yes,”   it   seems   likely   that   in   the   early   years   of   a   participatory   economy   there   will   be   worker   councils   where   those   favouring   balancing   jobs   and   rewarding   effort   will   be   in   the   minority.   To   effect   a   full   transition  to  an  economy  that  is  truly  based  on  economic  justice  and  democracy,   at   least   two   things   will   be   necessary:   First   and   foremost,   other   workers   in   the   same  enterprise  must  argue  with  these  workmates,  explaining  to  them  why  failing   to   balance   jobs   will   erode   effectively   equal   rights   to   participate   in   workplace   decisions,   and   why   rewarding   contribution   rather   than   effort   will   be   unfair   to   some  members.  Secondly,  political  groups  who  champion  economic  democracy   and  justice  must  wage  fierce  ideological  campaigns  on  these  subjects.  There  must   be  an  on-­‐going  national  dialogue  on  these  issues  driven  by  political  parties  and   interest  groups,  facilitated  by  the  formal  political  and  educational  systems,  until   Robin  Hahnel   what  may  start  as  a  slim  majority  who  support  these  principles  nationwide  has   become   an   overwhelming   majority.   It   will   be   of   great   importance   that   such   a   national  debate  form  the  backdrop  for  discussions  that  will  rage  inside  individual   worker   councils.35  But   we   believe,   and   I   suspect   Erik   agrees,   any   attempt   to   impose  these  principles  on  unwilling  workers  will  only  prove  counterproductive.36   Regarding  measuring  effort:  I  admit  it  is  sometimes  difficult  to  measure  effort,  or   sacrifice,  and  confine  myself  only  to  clarifying  one  issue  that  is  understandably   confusing.  For  interested  readers,  this  problem  is  addressed  a  greater  length  in  Of   the  People,  By  the  People:  The  Case  for  a  Participatory  Economy.     Erik  writes:     Different  people  can  experience  the  exact  same  intensity  of  work  as  very  different  levels   of  burden.    Some  professors  find  sitting  at  a  desk  and  writing  intensively  for  eight  hours   exhilarating;  others  find  it  torture.   And:   I  would  find  it  an  excruciating  burden  to  collect  tolls  at  a  bridge  four  hours  a  day,  but  I   find  it  a  pleasure  to  write  and  lecture  60  hours  a  week.  Which  involves  more  “effort”?  I   would  rather  work  60  hours  a  week  at  my  job  than  20  hours  a  week  as  a  toll  collector   even   for   the   same   overall   pay,   but   many   toll   collectors   would   find   it   an   enormous   burden  to  spend  as  many  hours  a  week  as  I  do  doing  the  “work”  I  do. 37   Consider   this:   Just   as   some   people   like   apples   more   than   oranges   while   other   people  like  oranges  more  than  apples,  some  people  like  mowing  lawns  more  than   washing   windows   (me)   while   other   people   like   washing   windows   more   than   mowing   lawns   (my   eldest   son).   It   would   have   been   crazy   –   economists   call   it   “inefficient”  –  for  me  to  have  washed  the  windows  and  my  son  to  have  mowed   35  Popular  opinion  in  Cuba  about  what  constituted  fair  pay  was  changed  dramatically  in  less  than  ten   years  after  the  revolution  by  just  the  kind  of  ideological  and  educational  campaigns  I  am  talking  about.   By  the  late  1960s  most  Cubans  believed  that  those  who  had  the  good  fortune  to  receive  more  education   owed  society  more,  rather  than  being  owed  more  by  society.  Unfortunately,  attitudes  about  economic   justice  may  have  retrogressed  somewhat  in  Cuba  since  then.   36  As  indicated  previously,  I  do  not  believe  this  principle  should  be  applied  to  minorities  who  want  to  set   up  private  businesses  for  profit.  A  participatory  economy  is  an  economy  where  the  role  of  employer  is   outlawed,  just  as  the  role  of  slave  owner  has  been  outlawed  everywhere  in  the  United  States  since  June   19,  1965.  But  as  long  as  every  worker  in  a  worker  council  has  one  vote,  I  believe  each  worker  council   should  be  permitted  to  decide  how  to  organize  work  and  how  to  reward  one  another  as  they  see  fit.   37  David   Kotz   raised   similar   concerns   in   his   contribution   to   a   Symposium   on   the   future   of   socialism   published  in  Science  &  Society  66(1),  Spring  2002.       In  Defence  of  Participatory  Economics   57 the  lawn  at  our  house.  It  would  have  been  less  crazy,  but  nonetheless  still  crazy   for   each   of   us   to   mow   and   wash   half   the   time.   So   of   course   we   agreed   that   I   would  mow  four  hours  a  week  and  he  would  wash  four  hours  a  week  –  and  our   jobs  were  balanced  for  both  desirability  and  empowerment!   What’s  the  trick?  Mowing  lawns  and  washing  windows  are  more  or  less  equally   unempowering.   Mowing   lawns   and   washing   windows   are   more   or   less   equally   undesirable  for  the  average  person.  Clearly  they  are  not  equally  undesirable  for   either   me   or   my   son;   and   an   hour   spent   mowing   would   have   been   a   bigger   sacrifice  for  my  son  than  for  me,  just  as  an  hour  of  washing  windows  would  have   been  a  bigger  sacrifice  for  me  than  for  him.  But  if  you  advertise  window  washing   and  lawn  mowing  jobs  for  the  same  rate  of  pay  the  line  of  applicants  for  each  job   would  be  roughly  the  same  length,  and  that  is  the  sense  in  which  we  call  them   equally  undesirable  forms  of  human  activity  (as  compared  to  leisure).     Erik  should  clearly  not  apply  for  a  job  collecting  tolls  in  a  participatory  economy,   any  more  than  I  should  have  washed  windows  at  my  house.  However,  because  on   average   people   would   rather   write   and   lecture   than   collect   tolls   Erik   should   be   compensated  somewhat  less  for  an  hour  of  professor  work  than  a  toll  worker  is   compensated   for   an   hour   of   toll   collection   –   whether   or   not   practical   complications  make  this  easy  to  measure  and  achieve  in  a  participatory  economy.   Nor  should  we  be  overly  pessimistic  about  our  ability  to  measure  differences  in   desirability.   When   applicants   are   few,   a   job   is   probably   less   desirable   than   average,   and   some   less   desirable   tasks   need   to   be   replaced   by   more   desirable   ones;   and   when   applicants   are   many   a   job   is   probably   more   desirable   than   average,  and  some  desirable  tasks  need  to  be  replaced  by  less  desirable  ones.     CONCLUSION   The  initial  purpose  of  elaborating  the  model  of  a  participatory  economy  was  to   demonstrate  concretely  that  at  least  in  theory,  the  presumption  that  had  become   increasingly   widespread   even   among   leftists,   that   we   must   choose   between   authoritarian  planning  or  a  market  economy,  is  wrong.  There  is  a  third  alternative   –  which  turns  out  to  look  very  much  like  the  kind  of  economy  socialists  envisioned   long  ago,  but  were  only  able  to  describe  in  a  general  way  that  many  no  longer   found   convincing.   But   the   model   of   a   participatory   economy   -­‐-­‐   which   I   believe   demonstrates  that  the  original  socialist  vision  was  not  a  pipe  dream,  but  perfectly   possible  -­‐-­‐  should  not  be  confused  with  a  transition  strategy,  much  less  a  political   programme.  A  participatory  economy  is  only  a  coherent  answer  to  how  might  a   Robin  Hahnel   full-­‐fledged   system   of   equitable   cooperation   function   –   without   recourse   to   authoritarian   planning   or   markets.   How   to   go   about   replacing   the   increasingly   destructive  economics  of  competition  and  greed  with  an  economics  of  equitable   cooperation  is  a  different,  more  difficult  question.   Part  Two SOCIALISM  AND  REAL  UTOPIAS     Erik  Olin  Wright38       In   what   follows   I   will   outline   a   general   way   of   thinking   about   alternatives   to   capitalism  that  is  anchored  in  two  ideas:  real  utopias  and  socialism.  Real  Utopia   identifies   institutional   designs   that   simultaneously   attempt   to   embody   emancipatory  ideals  in  a  serious  way  while  still  being  attentive  to  the  practical   problems  of  viability  and  sustainability.  Socialism,  of  course,  is  a  venerable  term   associated  with  anti-­‐capitalist  struggles,  but  to  many  critics  of  capitalism  it  has   lost  its  appeal,  both  because  of  its  association  with  the  authoritarian  state  run   economic   systems   of   the   20th   century   and   its   association   with   many   political   parties   in   developed   capitalist   countries   that   have   abandoned   any   ambition   of   transcending  capitalism.  In  spite  of  this,  because  of  its  clear  historical  association   with  anti-­‐capitalism,  I  will  propose  a  reconstruction  of  the  idea  of  socialism  that,   when  combined  with  the  idea  of  real  utopias,  can  offer  a  framework  for  both  a   vision  beyond  capitalism  and  the  practical  work  of  moving  in  that  direction.   To  set  the  stage  for  this  discussion,  it  will  be  helpful  to  begin  by  briefly  examining   the  very  idea  of  an  “alternative”  to  the  existing  social  world.    This  will  be  followed   by   a   discussion   of   a   particular   way   of   thinking   about   socialism   in   which   the   “social”   in   socialism   is   taken   seriously.   We   will   then   turn   to   the   idea   of   “real   utopias”   as   a   way   framing   the   problem   of   transforming   –   and   transcending   –   capitalism.     THINKING  ABOUT  SYSTEMIC  ALTERNATIVES   One  of  the  striking  things  about  human  imagination  is  our  capacity  to  think  that   things   could   be   otherwise,   whether   the   objects   of   such   imagination   are   our   38  Parts   of   this   essay   are   taken   from   “Transforming   Capitalism   through   Real   Utopias,”   American   Sociological  Review,  February,  2012.    Socialism  and  Real  Utopias   61 immediate   life   circumstances   or   the   broader   society   in   which   we   live.  39  Such   imagination,  fuelled  by  deep  longing,  easily  drifts  into  wishful  thinking,  fantasies   of   what   a   better   world   would   be   like   unconstrained   by   difficult   questions   of   whether   such   imagined   alternatives   would   actually   work.   Wishful   thinking   can   help   provide   motivation   for   action,   but   it   can   also   lead   to   dead   ends   and   disillusion.   What   we   need,   then,   is   utopian   longing   melded   to   realist   thinking   about  the  dilemmas  and  constraints  of  building  viable  alternatives  to  the  world  as   it  is.   My   strategy   for   exploring   these   questions   is   rooted   in   three   very   general   considerations   about   the   nature   of   social   systems   and   the   problem   of   transforming  them.   First,  what  precisely  does  the  word  “system”  mean  when  we  talk  about  “social   systems”?   This   is   a   big   theme   in   social   theory,   one   filled   with   opaque   formulations.   For   present   purposes,   a   contrast   between   two   metaphors   for   thinking  about  systems  can  be  helpful.  One  metaphor  conceives  of  a  society  as   analogous   to   an   organism   in   which   all   of   its   parts   are   tightly   integrated   into   a   functioning  whole.  There  is  some  degree  of  freedom  and  variability  in  the  way  the   parts   function,   but   basically   the   component   parts   of   an   organism   constitute   a   totality  of  functional  interdependency.  If  you  remove  critical  parts  of  the  whole  or   try  to  dramatically  transform  them,  the  whole  disintegrates.   An  alternative  metaphor  is  that  a  social  system  is  more  like  an  ecosystem.  Think   of  society  like  a  pond.  A  pond  contains  many  species  of  fish,  insects,  and  plants   within  a  specific  watershed,  terrain  and  climate.  Sometimes  an  alien  species  gets   introduced   into   the   ecosystem   and   it   thrives;   sometimes   it   does   not.   Some   ecosystems   are   quite   fragile   and   easily   disrupted;   others   can   tolerate   quite   significant  intrusions  of  invasive  species  without  being  seriously  affected.  If  you   think   of   society   as   an   ecosystem,   it   still   is   the   case   that   everything   is   interdependent,   everything   affects   everything   in   one   way   or   another,   but   the   system   does   not   constitute   a   tightly   functionalised   totality.   This   opens   up   a   different  way  of  imagining  alternatives.  One  way  to  transform  an  ecosystem  is  to   introduce  an  alien  species  that  initially  finds  a  niche  and  then  gradually  increases,   39  For   a   superb   discussion   of   the   utopian   imagination,   see   Ruth   Levitas,   Utopia   as   Method   (Palgrave   MacMillan,  2013),  particularly  her  discussion  of  Ernst  Bloch.  Bloch,  Levitas  writes,  “posited  the  existence   of  a  utopian  impulse,  an  anthropological  given  that  underpins  the  human  propensity  to  long  for  and   imagine  a  life  otherwise.”   Erik  Olin  Wright   potentially  even  displacing  certain  other  species.  The  idea  of  real  utopias  as  a  way   of  transforming  a  society  is  more  in  line  with  the  ecosystem  view  of  society  than   the  organismic  view.   The  second  general  comment  about  alternatives  concerns  two  contrasting  ways   of  thinking  about  how  to  make  the  world  a  better  place  –  ameliorative  reforms   and  real  utopian  transformations.  Ameliorative  reforms  involve  looking  at  existing   institutions,   identifying   their   flaws   and   proposing   improvements   that   can   be   enacted.   These   improvements   matter   –   they   reduce   harms   and   enhance   flourishing   –   but   they   are   limited   to   those   improvements   that   directly   act   on   existing  structures  and  move  one  step  beyond.  Real  utopias,  in  contrast,  envision   the   contours   of   an   alternative   social   world   that   embodies   emancipatory   ideals   and  then  look  for  social  innovations  we  can  create  in  the  world  as  it  is  that  move   us  towards  that  destination.  Now  sometimes  this  turns  out  to  be  the  same  as  an   ameliorative   reform,   but   often   ameliorative   reforms   do   not   constitute   building   blocks  of  an  emancipatory  alternative.  Consider,  for  example,  affirmative  action   policies  around  race.  Affirmative  action  is  one  of  the  critical  policies  for  combating   the  pernicious  effects  of  on-­‐going  racism,  not  merely  the  legacies  of  racism  in  the   past.  But  affirmative  action  is  not  itself  a  building  block  of  a  world  of  racial  justice   and  emancipation.  It  is  a  necessary  means  to  neutralise  severe  harms  of  racism  in   the  world  as  it  exists,  but  it  is  not  itself  a  constitutive  element  of  the  alternative   that   we   seek.   The   same   could   be   said   of   food   stamps:   it   is   a   critical   policy   for   alleviating  hunger  generated  by  brutal  forms  of  inequality  generated  in  American   capitalism,  but  the  imagined  world  of  social  emancipation  beyond  capitalism  is   not  one  characterised  by  a  massive  expansion  of  food  stamps  for  all.  Real  Utopian   transformations,  in  contrast,  consist  of  building  elements  of  the  alternative  world   we  seek  in  the  world  as  it  is.   Finally,  there  is  the  difficult  problem  of  deciding  how  much  concrete  detail  to  try   to  specify  in  exploring  the  alternative  social  system  of  our  utopian  longing.  One   impulse   is   try   to   create   a   detailed   account   of   the   critical   institutions   of   an   alternative  system  and  making  arguments  about  how  these  would  actually  work.   This  can  be  in  the  spirit  of  trying  to  paint  a  vivid,  compelling  picture  of  what  it   would   be   like   to   live   in   such   an   alternative   world   rather   than   providing   a   rigid   recipe  of  how  to  build  a  new  society,  but  often  such  efforts  look  something  like  a   contrived   blueprint   for   emancipatory   institutions   and   practices.   An   alternative   impulse  is  to  enunciate  the  basic  values  that  animate  the  search  for  alternatives   and  the  core  principles  of  institutional  design  that  would  facilitate  a  realisation  of    Socialism  and  Real  Utopias   63 those  values,  but  not  attempt  a  comprehensive,  integrated  design  model  of  the   alternative  system  as  a  whole.   Both  of  these  strategies  have  value.  The  detailed  model  building  strategy  is  useful   and   sometimes   inspiring,   so   long   as   one   treats   these   as   speculative   ideas   to   inform   the   messy   trial-­‐and-­‐error   experimentation   of   emancipatory   social   transformation   rather   than   blueprints.   The   more   open-­‐ended   discussion   of   general  principles  and  values  can  help  give  us  a  sense  of  the  direction  we  want  to   move  and  provide  a  basis  for  critical  evaluation  of  our  experiments,  but  provides   less   clarity   of   what   it   might   be   like   to   live   in   the   destination   itself.   This   is   the   strategy  I  will  pursue  here.     A  SOCIAL  SOCIALISM   Both  social  democracy  and  socialism  contain  the  word  “social”,  but  generally  this   term   is   invoked   in   a   loose   and   ill-­‐defined   way.     The   suggestion   is   of   a   political   programme  committed  to  the  broad  welfare  of  society  rather  than  the  narrow   interests   of   particular   elites.   Sometimes,   especially   in   more   radical   versions   of   socialist  discourse,  “social  ownership”  of  the  means  of  production  is  invoked  as  a   contrast  to  “private  ownership,”  but  in  practice  this  has  generally  been  collapsed   into   state   ownership,   and   the   term   social   itself   ends   up   doing   relatively   little   analytical  work  in  the  elaboration  of  the  political  programme.  What  I  will  argue  is   that  the  social  in  social  democracy  and  socialism  can  be  used  to  identify  a  cluster   of   principles   and   visions   of   change   that   differentiate   socialism   and   social   democracy  from  both  the  capitalist  project  of  economic  organisation  and  what   could  be  called  a  purely  statist  response  to  capitalism.   At   the   centre   of   the   analysis   is   a   power-­‐centred   framework   for   understanding   capitalism   and   its   alternatives.   Power   is   an   especially   elusive   and   contested   concept  in  social  theory,  often  formulated  in  ways  that  make  it  very  difficult  to   use  in  concrete  discussions  of  institutions  and  their  transformation.  In  the  present   context,  I  will  adopt  a  deliberately  stripped-­‐down  concept  of  power:  power  is  the   capacity  to  do  things  in  the  world,  to  produce  effects.  This  is  what  might  be  called   an   “agent-­‐centred”   notion   of   power:   people,   both   acting   individually   and   collectively,  use  power  to  accomplish  things.   With  this  broad  definition  of  power,  we  can  then  distinguish  three  kinds  of  power   that  are  deployed  within  economic  systems:  economic  power,  rooted  in  control   over   the   use   of   economic   resources;   state   power,   rooted   in   control   over   rule   Erik  Olin  Wright   making   and   rule   enforcing   over   territory;   and   what   I   will   term   social   power,   rooted   in   the   capacity   to   mobilise   people   for   cooperative,   voluntary   collective   actions.   Expressed   as   a   mnemonic   slogan,   you   can   get   people   to   do   things   by   bribing  them,  forcing  them,  or  persuading  them.    Every  complex  economic  system   involves  all  three  forms  of  power,  connected  in  different  ways.   Three  ideal  types  of  economic  structures  —  capitalism,  statism  and  socialism  —   can   be   differentiated   in   terms   of   the   dominant   form   of   power   controlling   economic  activity40 :   • Capitalism  is  an  economic  structure  within  which  the  means  of  production   are  privately  owned  and  the  allocation  and  use  of  resources  for  different   social  purposes  is  accomplished  through  the  exercise  of  economic  power.   Investments  and  the  control  of  production  are  the  result  of  the  exercise  of   economic  power  by  owners  of  capital.   • Statism  is  an  economic  structure  within  which  the  means  of  production  are   owned   by   the   state   and   the   allocation   and   use   of   resources   for   different   social  purposes  is  accomplished  through  the  exercise  of  state  power.  State   officials  control  the  investment  process  and  production  through  some  sort   of  state-­‐administrative  mechanism.   • Socialism  is  an  economic  structure  within  which  the  means  of  production   are  socially  owned41  and  the  allocation  and  use  of  resources  for  different   social  purposes  is  accomplished  through  the  exercise  of  “social  power.”    In   effect   this   is   equivalent   to   defining   socialism   as   pervasive   economic   democracy.   These  are  definitions  of  ideal  types.  In  the  world,  actual  economies  are  complex   forms  of  combination  of  these  three  types.  They  are  hybrids  that  vary  according   to  how  these  different  forms  of  power  interact  and  intermix.  To  call  an  economy   40  This  is  not  meant  to  be  a  complete  theoretical  specification  of  the  differences  between  these  three   types   of   economic   structures,   but   only   their   differentiation   in   terms   of   power   relations.   For   a   fuller   discussion,  see  Erik  Olin  Wright  Envisioning  Real  Utopias.  (London  and  New  York:  Verso,  2010),  pp.  11-­‐ 123.   41  Social   ownership   should   be   distinguished   from   state   ownership.   Social   ownership   of   economic   resources  means  that  these  are  owned  in  common  by  everyone  in  a  society,  and  thus  everyone  has  the   collective  right  to  decide  on  the  distribution  of  the  net  income  generated  by  the  use  of  those  resources   and   the   collective   right   to   dispose   of   those   resources.   Under   conditions   of   deep   and   pervasive   democracy,  state  ownership  becomes  one  way  of  organizing  social  ownership.    Socialism  and  Real  Utopias   65 ‘capitalist’  is  thus  a  short-­‐hand  for  a  more  cumbersome  expression  such  as  “an   economic  hybrid  combining  capitalist,  statist  and  socialist  power  relations  within   which  capitalist  relations  are  dominant”.    The  idea  of  a  structural  hybrid  can  be   used  to  analyse  any  unit  of  analysis  –  firms,  sectors,  regional  economies,  national   economies,  even  the  global  economy.  The  possibility  of  socialism  thus  depends  on   our   ability   to   enlarge   and   deepen   the   socialist   component   of   the   hybrid   and   weaken  the  capitalist  and  statist  components.   This  way  of  thinking  about  economic  systems  means  abandoning  a  simple  binary   notion  of  capitalism  versus  socialism.  An  economic  structure  can  be  more  or  less   capitalist,   more   or   less   socialist,   more   or   less   statist.     It   is   an   important,   but   unresolved,   question   how   stable   different   kinds   of   hybrids   might   be.   One   traditional   Marxian   view   is   that   any   capitalist   hybrid   with   significant   socialist   elements   would   be   deeply   unstable.   The   only   reasonably   stable   equilibria,   the   thinking  goes,  are  ones  in  which  socialism  is  unequivocally  dominant  or  ones  in   which  capitalism  is  unequivocally  dominant  and  whatever  socialist  elements  exist   fill  small  niches  in  the  economic  system  in  ways  that  are  functional  for  capitalism.   This  is  consistent  with  the  organism  view  of  capitalism  as  a  system:  a  system  can   be  either  capitalist  or  socialist,  but  not  a  stable  hybrid.    An  alternative  view  is  that   there   may   be   multiple   relatively   stable   equilibria   involving   all   three   economic   forms  in  quite  variable  combinations,  and  that  it  is  even  possible  for  there  to  be   an  equilibrium  involving  no  clear  dominance  among  them.  The  extent  to  which   any   given   configuration   could   be   stable   depends   upon   a   complex   array   of   contingent   historical   and   political   factors   and   this   makes   it   impossible   to   make   any  general,  abstract  propositions  about  what  is  really  possible.  My  approach  is   based  on  the  second  of  these  views.   Our  task,  then,  is  to  clarify  the  alternative  ways  in  which  we  can  conceptualise  the   deepening  of  the  socialist  component  of  hybrids.  I  will  refer  to  this  as  the  problem   of  the  structural  configurations  of  social  empowerment.   A  Visual  Vocabulary   In   order   to   explore   the   problem   of   deepening   the   socialist   component   within   hybrid  economic  systems,  it  will  be  useful  to  represent  visually  different  patterns   of   interconnection   among   the   three   forms   of   power   within   economic   systems.   The  visual  vocabulary  I  use  for  this  purpose  is  illustrated  in  Figure  1.   The  arrows  in  Figure  1  indicate  the  direction  of  influence  of  one  form  of  power   over  the  use  of  another;  the  width  of  the  arrows  indicates  the  strength  of  this   relationship.  Thus,  in  the  first  illustration  in  Figure  1,  state  power  is  subordinated     Erik  Olin  Wright      Socialism  and  Real  Utopias   67 to  social  power.  This  is  what  is  meant  conventionally  by  political  democracy  as   “rule  by  the  people”.  The  expression  “rule  by  the  people”  does  not  really  mean,   rule  by  the  atomised  aggregation  of  the  separate  individuals  of  the  society  taken   as   isolated   persons,   but   rather,   rule   by   the   people   collectively   organised   into   voluntary  associations  in  various  ways  for  the  purpose  of  controlling  the  use  of   state   power,   especially   through   the   institutional   mechanism   of   elections.   In   a   democracy  state  power  is  still  important  –  why  have  a  democracy  if  the  state  has   no  capacity  to  do  anything?  –  but  this  power  is  not  autonomously  exercised  by   state  officials;  it  is  subordinated  to  social  power.     In   the   second   illustration,   economic   power   subordinates   social   power.   The   unrestrained  use  of  donations  by  corporations  and  the  wealthy  to  fund  political   parties  in  the  United  States  would  be  an  example.  Political  parties  still  matter  –   they  are  the  vehicles  for  selecting  state  officials  who  directly  exercise  state  power   –  but  the  social  power  mobilised  by  political  parties  is  itself  subordinated  by  the   exercise  of  economic  power.   These   configurations   can   be   connected   in   chains   of   power   relations,   as   in   the   third  and  fourth  illustrations.  In  the  first  of  these,  corporate  influence  over  state   power  occurs  through  the  subordination  of  political  parties  to  economic  power.   Finally,   in   the   fourth   illustration,   social   power   subordinates   economic   power   through  the  mediation  of  state  power.  This  is  the  ideal  of  social  democracy:  the   state   effectively   regulates   the   behaviour   of   capitalist   firms   but   is   itself   democratically  subordinated  to  social  power.     Figure   2   illustrates   the   different   aggregate   configurations   of   forms   of   power   within   a   dominant   capitalist   hybrid   economy   and   within   a   dominant   socialist   hybrid   economy.     In   these   diagrams,   the   arrows   are   all   directed   towards   explaining   the   control   over   economic   activity:   investments,   production   and   distribution  of  goods  and  services.  In  the  picture  of  capitalist  empowerment,  both   social  power  and  state  power  are  subordinated  to  economic  power  in  the  control   over   economic   activity;   in   the   case   of   socialist   empowerment,   both   economic   power  and  state  power  are  subordinated  to  social  power.         Erik  Olin  Wright      Socialism  and  Real  Utopias   69     Configurations   of   Socialist   Empowerment:   pathways   for   building   a   socialist   hybrid   The   basic   purpose   for   which   I   use   these   schematic   representations   is   to   differentiate   salient   configurations   of   social   empowerment.   Different   kinds   of   progressive   policies,   institutional   innovations   and   proposals,   strategies   and   reforms   can   be   located   within   these   various   configurations.   Seven   such   configurations  are  particularly  important:  1.  Statist  socialism;  2.  Social  democratic   statist   regulation;   3.   Associational   democracy;   4.   Social   capitalism;   5.   The   solidarity   economy;   6.   The   cooperative   market   economy;   7.   Participatory   socialism.  I  will  discuss  each  of  these  briefly.   1.  Statist  Socialism   The  configuration  in  Figure  3  corresponds  to  the  classical  definition  of  socialism  in   which   social   power   controls   economic   activity   via   the   state.     Investment,   production  and  distribution  are  directly  controlled  by  the  exercise  of  state  power   –   through,   for   example,   state   ownership   and   control   over   the   commanding   heights   of   the   economy   –   while,   at   the   same   time,   state   power   is   itself   subordinated  to  social  power  by  being  democratically  accountable  to  the  people.     This   is   the   configuration   that   was   at   the   core   of   traditional   Marxist   ideas   of   revolutionary  socialism.  This  is  not,  of  course,  how  the  revolutions  that  occurred   in  the  name  of  socialism  turned  out  in  the  Twentieth  Century.    Once  the  power  of   revolutionary   parties   was   consolidated   in   the   form   of   the   one-­‐party   state,   “actually  existing  socialism”  became  a  form  of  authoritarian  statism  in  which,  as   illustrated  in  Figure  4,  both  social  power  within  civil  society  and  economic  power   were  subordinated  to  state  power.   Erik  Olin  Wright      Socialism  and  Real  Utopias   71 The   experience   of   authoritarian   statism   has   justifiably   lead   to   great   scepticism   about   the   desirability   of   the   centralised   state   planning   model   of   socialism.   Nevertheless,  the  power  configuration  of  statist  socialism  remains  an  important   component   of   any   prospect   for   transcending   capitalism,   particularly   for   large   infrastructure  projects,  systems  of  public  transportation,  various  kinds  of  natural   monopolies,  and  for  at  least  the  core  components  of  the  financial  system.   2.  Social  democratic  statist  regulation   In   the   second   configuration   (Figure   5)   social   power   regulates   the   economy   through  the  mediation  of  both  state  power  and  economic  power.  This  is  a  key   aspect  of  social  democracy.  Capitalist  economic  power  directly  controls  economic   activity  –  capitalists  continue  to  make  investments,  hire  managers  and  workers,   organise   the   labour   process,   etc.   –   but   this   power   is   itself   regulated   by   state   power,   which   is   in   turn   subordinated   to   social   power.   Through   a   transitivity   of   power  relations,  this  means  that  social  power  exerts  regulative  control  over  the   exercise  of  economic  power.  Those  forms  of  regulation  of  capital  that  improve   working  conditions  and  job  security  and  protect  the  environment  generally  reflect   this  kind  of  democratic  imposition  of  constraints.     Erik  Olin  Wright   In   and   of   itself,   statist   regulation   of   capitalist   economic   power   need   not   imply   significant  social  empowerment.  As  in  the  case  of  statist  socialism,  the  issue  here   is  the  extent  and  depth  to  which  the  power  of  the  state  is  a  genuine  expression  of   democratic   empowerment   of   civil   society.   In   actual   capitalist   societies,   much   statist  economic  regulation  is  in  fact  itself  subordinated  to  economic  power,  as   illustrated  in  Figure  6.  In  capitalist  statist  regulation,  state  power  regulates  capital   but  in  ways  that  are  systematically  responsive  to  the  power  of  capital  itself.    In  the   United  States,  the  heavy  involvement  of  industry  associations  in  shaping  the  rules   of  Federal  regulation  of  airlines,  energy,  agriculture  and  other  sectors  would  be   examples.  Perhaps  even  more  pervasively,  the  structural  dependency  of  the  state   on  the  capitalist  economy  underwrites  this  configuration  of  power  relations.42   42  Much  of  the  theory  of  the  capitalist  character  of  the  capitalist  state  developed  in  the  late  1960s  and   1970s  can  be  interpreted  as  an  attempt  to  explain  how,  in  spite  of  the  democratic  form  of  the  state,   much  –  perhaps  most  –  intervention  by  the  state  in  the  capitalist  economy  is  subordinated  to  the  needs   of  capital  rather  than  the  collective  will  of  the  people,  and  thus,  in  the  present  terms,  is  an  expression  of   economic  power  rather  than  social  power.    Socialism  and  Real  Utopias   73   3.  Associational  Democracy.   Associational   democracy   is   a   term   that   covers   a   wide   range   of   institutional   devices  through  which  collective  associations  in  civil  society  directly  participate  in   various  kinds  of  governance  activities,  usually  along  with  state  agencies.  The  most   familiar   form   of   this   is   probably   the   tripartite   neo-­‐corporatist   arrangements   in   some   social   democratic   societies   in   which   organizsed   labour,   employers’   associations,   and   the   state   bargain   over   various   kinds   of   economic   regulations,   especially  concerning  the  labour  market  and  employment  relations.    Associational   democracy   can   be   extended   to   many   other   domains,   for   example   watershed   councils   which   bring   together   civic   associations,   environmental   groups,   developers  and  state  agencies  to  regulate  ecosystems,  or  health  councils  involving   medical  associations,  community  organisations  and  public  health  officials  to  plan   various  aspects  of  health  care.  To  the  extent  that  the  associations  involved  are   Erik  Olin  Wright   internally   democratic   and   representative   of   interests   in   civil   society,   and   the   decision-­‐making   process   in   which   they   are   engaged   is   open   and   deliberative,   rather   than   heavily   manipulated   by   elites   and   the   state,   then   associational   democracy  can  contribute  to  social  empowerment.     4.  Social  Capitalism       “Social   capitalism”   is   not   a   standard   expression.   I   use   it   to   describe   a   power   configuration  in  which  secondary  associations  of  civil  society,  through  a  variety  of   mechanisms,   directly   affect   the   way   economic   power   is   used   (Figure   8).   The   “solidarity   funds”   in   Quebec   would   be   a   good   example.     Unions   and   other   organisations  in  civil  society  often  manage  pension  funds  for  their  members.  In   effect   this   is   collectively   controlled   capital   that   can   be   allocated   on   various   principles.   In   the   Quebec   “Solidarity   Fund,”   developed   by   the   labor   movement   initially  in  the  1980s,  investment  is  used  deliberately  to  protect  and  create  jobs    Socialism  and  Real  Utopias   75 rather   than   simply   to   maximize   returns   for   retirement.   One   way   the   Solidarity   Fund  accomplishes  this  is  by  directly  investing  in  small  and  medium  enterprises,   either   through   private   equity   investment   or   loans.   These   investments   are   generally   directed   at   firms   that   are   strongly   rooted   in   the   region   and   satisfy   various   criteria   in   a   social   audit.   The   Solidarity   Fund   is   also   involved   in   the   governance  of  the  firms  in  which  it  invests,  often  by  having  representation  on  the   board   of   directors.   Solidarity   finance   thus   goes   considerably   beyond   ordinary   “socially  screened  investments”  in  being  much  more  actively  and  directly  engaged   the   project   of   allocating   capital   on   the   basis   of   social   priorities.     The   idea   for   stakeholder  boards  of  directors  of  corporations  in  which  all  stakeholders  in  the   activities   of   a   corporation   are   represented   also   constitutes   a   form   of   social   capitalism.   The  simple  fact  that  social  power  has  an  impact  on  economic  power,  however,   does   not   mean   that   it   constitutes   a   form   of   social   empowerment.   In   Figure   9,   Erik  Olin  Wright   social  power  affects  the  exercise  of  economic  power  but  it  does  so  in  a  way  that  is   itself  subordinated  to  economic  power.    An  example  would  be  trade  associations   formed  by  voluntary  cooperation  among  capitalist  firms  for  the  purpose  of  setting   industry  standards  and  in  other  ways  regulating  various  practices  of  firms  in  the   sector.  This  kind  of  collectively  organised  self-­‐regulation  of  sectors  constitutes  a   configuration  of  capitalist  empowerment,  not  socialist  empowerment.     5.  Cooperative  market  economy   In  a  fully  worker-­‐owned  cooperative  firm  in  a  capitalist  economy  the  egalitarian   principle  of  one-­‐person  one-­‐vote  of  all  members  of  the  business  means  that  the   power   relations   within   the   firm   are   based   on   voluntary   cooperation   and   persuasion,   not   the   relative   economic   power   of   different   people.   Jointly   they   control   through   democratic   means   the   economic   power   represented   by   the   capital   in   the   firm.   And   if   individual   cooperative   firms   join   together   in   larger   associations   of   cooperatives   —   perhaps   even   a   cooperative-­‐of-­‐cooperatives,    Socialism  and  Real  Utopias   77 collectively  providing  finance,  training,  and  other  kinds  of  support  —  they  begin  to   transcend  the  capitalist  character  of  their  economic  environment  by  constituting   a  cooperative  market  economy  (Figure  10).  The  overarching-­‐cooperative  in  such  a   market  stretches  the  social  character  of  ownership  within  individual  cooperative   enterprises  and  moves  governance  more  towards  a  stakeholder  model,  in  which   cooperative   enterprises   are   governed   by   democratic   bodies   representing   all   categories   of   people   whose   lives   are   affected   by   the   enterprises’   economic   activity.   The   Mondragon   Cooperative   Corporation   would   be   a   partial   example.   Such   firms   remain   a   hybrid   economic   form,   combining   capitalist   and   socialist   elements,  but  a  hybrid  in  which  the  socialist  component  has  considerable  weight.     6.  The  solidarity  economy       The   “solidarity   economy”   goes   beyond   other   forms   of   social   empowerment   by   constituting   an   alternative   way   of   directly   organising   economic   activity   that   is   distinct   from   capitalist   market   production,   state   organised   production,   and   household   production   (Figure   11).43  Its   hallmark   is   production   organized   by   collectivities  directly  to  satisfy  human  needs  not  subject  to  the  discipline  of  profit-­‐ maximisation   or   state-­‐technocratic   rationality.   The   state   may   be   involved   in   funding   these   collectivities,   but   it   does   not   directly   organise   them   or   their   services.44  The  system  of child  daycare  provision  in  Quebec  is  a  good  example.  In   43  There  is  no  firmly  established  use  of  terminology  to  identify  the  form  of  economic  organization  that  I   am  describing  here.  Sometimes  the  terms  “social  economy”  and  “solidarity  economy”  are  used  more  or   less  interchangeably.  Sometimes  they  are  coupled  in  the  expression  “the  social  and  solidarity  economy.”   Generally  it  seems  that  the  term  social  economy  is  used  as  a  broader,  more  heterogeneous  umbrella   term  than  solidarity  economy,  although  both  are  meant  to  identify  more  egalitarian,  socially-­‐oriented   forms  of  economic  life  than  capitalism.    Here  I  will  use  the  term  “solidarity  economy”  to  define  the  form   of  social  economy  in  which  social  power  –  i.e.  voluntary  cooperation  for  collective  purposes  –  plays  the   most  direct  and  unmediated  role  in  organizing  economic  activity,  and  use  the  term  social  economy  as   broader  rubric  for  ways  in  which  social  power  shapes  economic  activity  without  the  direct  mediation  of   the  state.   44  Of  course,  in  a  sense  the  state  is  always  involved  in  all  economic  activities  insofar  as  it  enforces  rules   of  the  game,  imposes  taxes,  etc.  The  issue  here  is  that  in  the  solidarity  economy  the  state  operates  in  a   relatively  passive  way  in  the  background  rather  than  directly  organising  economic  activity  or  regulating   economic  power.  Because  the  state  is  on  the  side  lines,  political  conservatives  and  libertarians  are  often   relatively  enthusiastic  about  certain  kinds  of  solidarity  economy  initiatives  (although  they  don’t  use  the   term),   particularly   when   these   activities   are   anchored   in   religious   communities   or   other   socially   conservative  organisations.  When  the  solidarity  economy  embodies  ideals  of  economic  democracy  and   egalitarian  participation,  the  initiatives  pose  a  bigger  challenge  to  free  market  ideologies.   Erik  Olin  Wright   2008  parents  only  paid  seven  Canadian  dollars  per  day  for  full  time  daycare  for   preschool  children  provided  by  community-­‐based  nonprofit  daycare  caneter,  but   provincial  government  subsidies  ensured  that  providers  were  paid  a  living  wage.   These   daycare   centers   were   often   organised   as   “solidarity   cooperatives”,   an   organisational   form   governed   by   elected   representatives   of   staff,   consumers   (parents   in   this   case)   and   community   members.   Another   kind   of   example   is   Wikipedia  and  other  instances  of  peer-­‐to-­‐peer  collaborative  network  production.   Wikipedia  produces  knowledge  and  disseminates  information  outside  of  markets   and  without  state  involvement;  the  funding  comes  largely  from  donations  from   participants   and   supporters.   In   most   respects,   the   system-­‐level   proposal   for   participatory  economics  as  outlined  by  Robin  Hahnel  and  Michael  Albert  can  be   thought  of  a  universalisation  of  the  solidarity  economy  configuration  to  an  entire   economy.      Socialism  and  Real  Utopias   79 7.  Participatory  socialism   The  final  configuration  of  social  empowerment  combines  the  solidarity  economy   and   statist   socialism:   the   state   and   civil   society   jointly   organise   and   control   various   kinds   of   production   of   goods   and   services   (Figure   12).   In   participatory   socialism  the  role  of  the  state  is  more  pervasive  than  in  the  pure  social  economy.   The  state  does  not  simply  provide  funding  and  set  the  parameters;  it  is  also,  in   various   ways,   directly   involved   in   the   organisation   and   production   of   the   economic   activity.   On   the   other   hand,   participatory   socialism   is   also   different   from  statist  socialism,  for  here  social  power  plays  a  role  not  simply  through  the   ordinary  channels  of  democratic  control  of  state  policies,  but  directly  inside  the   productive  activities  themselves.  An  example  is  the  participatory  budget  in  urban   government.  Since  these  budgets  constitute  allocations  of  resources  to  produce   infrastructure   to   meet   human   needs,   they   should   be   treated   as   an   aspect   of   economic   activity,   and   thus   participatory   budgets   are   not   simply   a   form   of   Erik  Olin  Wright   democratic  participation  in  the  state,  but  of  a  participatory  socialist  economy.      Socialism  and  Real  Utopias   81 The  seven  configurations  together     As  summarised  in  Figure  13,  the  different  configurations  of  social  empowerment   we   have   been   examining   can   be   clustered   into   three   broad   groups,   each   corresponding  to  different  political  traditions  of  socio-­‐economic  transformation:  a   socialist  cluster,  a  social  economy  cluster,  and  a  social  democratic  cluster.    These   different  clusters  vary  in  the  role  they  accord  to  the  state  and  the  extent  to  which   they  attempt  to  subordinate  rather  than  bypass  capitalist  economic  power.  What   all  of  the  configurations  have  in  common  is  the  idea  of  democratisation  of  power   over   economic   life   by   subordinating   both   economic   power   and   state   power   to   social   power,   power   rooted   in   voluntary   cooperation   for   collective   action.   Of   course,  the  ideal  of  socialism  involves  much  more  than  this.  Equality  and  social   justice   are   also   core   traditional   socialist   values,   to   which   environmental   sustainability   should   be   added   today.   What   this   model   of   socialism   stresses,   however,   is   that   the   realisation   of   all   these   values   depends   upon   the   transformation  of  the  power  relations  over  economic  activity,  both  in  terms  of  the   ways  social  power  is  directly  involved  in  shaping  economic  activity  and  indirectly   through  the  democratisation  of  the  state.       WHAT  ABOUT  MARKETS?   The  framework  elaborated  above  says  almost  nothing  explicitly  about  markets.  To   be  sure,  the  dominance  of  economic  power  in  capitalism  rests  in  significant  ways   on  the  centrality  of  markets  as  the  organising  principle  for  the  exchange  of  private   property  rights.  And  it  is  certainly  the  case  that  the  subordination  of  economic   power  to  social  power  –  either  directly  or  indirectly  via  the  state  –  would  entail   pervasive  democratic  regulation  of  markets  far  beyond  the  kinds  of  constraints  on   markets  within  capitalism.45    But  the  framework  itself  does  not  imply  either  the   possibility   or   desirability   of   abolishing   markets.     The   precise   scope   of   market   transactions   and   market-­‐like   processes   relative   to   democratically   planned   45  Markets,   of   course,   are   always   regulated   in   one   way   or   another,   both   by   the   state   and   by   other   mechanisms   (including   norms,   associational   regulation   by   capitalists,   and   what   sociologists   call   social   embeddedness).    The  “free”  market  in  the  sense  fantasised  by  many  defenders  of  capitalism  is  a  myth.   But   the   character   and   depth   of   regulation   in   a   socialist   economy,   and   especially   the   purposes   and   interests  served  by  regulation,  would  go  far  beyond  anything  that  occurs  within  capitalism.   Erik  Olin  Wright   allocations   of   resources   depends   on   the   practical   trade-­‐offs   people   face   under   conditions  of  broad  democratic  power  over  the  economy  and  the  results  of  the   continual   process   of   experimentation   with   alternative   solutions   to   these   trade-­‐ offs.   Stating   the   problem   of   markets   in   this   ways   implies   that   I   do   not   see   market   transactions   as   such   as   intrinsically   undesirable.   What   is   undesirable   are   two   things   that   are   generally   strongly   linked   to   markets:   first,   the   ways   in   which   markets  can  enable  people  and  organisations  with  specific  kinds  of  power  to  gain   advantages  over  others,  and  second,  the  way  markets,  if  inadequately  regulated,   generate  all  sorts  of  destructive  externalities  and  harms  on  people.  But  if  those   problems   are   minimised   through   various   mechanisms,   then   the   sheer   fact   of   buyers  and  sellers  of  goods  and  services  agreeing  to  exchange  things  at  a  mutually   agreed-­‐upon  price  is  not,  in  and  of  itself,  objectionable.   This  is  the  issue  that  is  most  in  contention  in  this  dialogue  with  Robin  Hahnel.   Both  Robin  and  I  share  a  commitment  to  the  values  of  democracy  and  equality,   and   both   of   us   understand   these   values   in   similarly   radical   ways.   We   both   understand  democracy  as  an  ideal  in  which  people  should  be  able  to  participate  in   decisions  to  the  extent  that  they  are  affected  by  those  decisions.  And  we  both  see   equality  as  demanding  an  economic  system  that  both  meets  people’s  basic  needs   to  live  a  flourishing  life  and  allocates  rewards  above  this  level  on  the  basis  of  the   burdens  people  take  on  in  their  work  (or  “effort”  in  Robin’s  usual  formulation).46   Both  of  these  values  are  generally  violated  by  the  unfettered  operation  of  market   processes:   markets   systematically   generate   unjust   inequalities   and   also,   inherently  violate  democratic  principles  by  enabling  people  to  engage  in  exchange   without   regard   to   social   costs.   For   these   reasons   Robin   argues   that   in   an   ideal   economy   –   an   economy   that   fully   realises   democratic   and   egalitarian   values   –   markets   would   disappear   and   be   replaced   by   something   like   participatory   planning.  In  terms  of  my  categories  of  configurations  of  social  empowerment,  his   model  for  an  alternative  economy  beyond  capitalism  would  fall  under  the  single   46  The   central   moral   idea   is   that   rewards   should   be   proportional   to   burden   or   sacrifice.   Sometimes   people  use  the  term  effort  in  precisely  this  way,  as  something  unpleasant,  a  “disutility”  of  labour  to  use   the  economist’s  expression.  But  sometimes  effort  simply  reflects  the  level  of  energy  and  enthusiasm  a   person  expends  in  a  task,  which  may  not  at  all  imply  sacrifice.  For  certain  kinds  of  tasks  expending  a   great  deal  of  effort  is  more  intrinsically  rewarding  than  doing  the  task  in  a  less  intense  way.  It  is  for  this   reason  that  I  prefer  the  expressions  burden  or  sacrifice  in  talking  about  fair  rewards.    Socialism  and  Real  Utopias   83 structural   configuration   of   social   empowerment   that   I   identify   as   the   solidarity   economy  (Figure  11).47   Since   I   share   these   basic   values   and   also   acknowledge   that   markets   tend   to   generate  these  moral  deficits,  why  then  do  I  take  the  position  that  in  a  democratic   egalitarian  economy  beyond  capitalism  there  is  likely  to  be  a  significant  role  for   markets?    There  are  two  main  issues  in  play  here.   The  first  issue  concerns  the  complex  trade-­‐offs  involved  in  the  actual  process  of   designing  and  implementing  institutional  solutions  to  socio-­‐economic  problems.   In  transcending  a  system  as  complex  as  capitalism,  there  will  necessarily  be  many   trade-­‐offs  among  competing  values,  and  in  some  settings  and  contexts  markets   may  play  a  positive  role  in  resolving  these  difficulties.  This  is  not  simply  the  case   for   the   “transition   problem”   –   how   to   move   from   capitalism   to   a   democratic-­‐ egalitarian   alternative   –   but   also   in   the   institutional   configuration   of   the   destination  itself.  Markets,  in  one  form  or  another,  are  likely  to  be  a  desirable   part  of  solutions  to  some  of  the  design  problems.  To  take  a  fairly  simple  example,   consider   the   problem   of   second-­‐hand   goods,   things   people   have   already   purchased   and   no   longer   want.   One   institutional   solution   is   simply   allowing   people  to  sell  these  to  whomever  wants  them  at  whatever  price  the  parties  agree   to;  another  would  be  to  submit  proposals  for  what  to  do  with  such  goods  to  the   consumption   planning   process.   In   a   world   in   which   people   are   ecologically   conscious   about   waste,   a   market   in   second   hand   goods   might   be   quite   a   significant  market  and  account  for  a  sizable  part  of  total  consumption.  What  is  the   optimal   way   of   organising   the   distribution   of   second   hand   goods?   A   market   solution  might  simply  be  better  than  participatory  planning  for  the  allocation  of   second  hand  goods  consumption  –  less  hassle,  quicker,  fewer  transaction  costs,   etc.    Or  consider  a  quite  different  kind  of  example:  the  allocation  of  tickets  and   seats  in  the  performing  arts.  Getting  tickets  to  a  particular  performance  matters   much  more  to  some  people  than  to  others,  as  does  getting  the  best  seats.  As  long   as  the  underlying  income  structure  is  just  by  egalitarian  standards,  I  don’t  see  any   reason  why  the  price  of  theatre  tickets  shouldn’t  be  a  simple  reflection  of  what   people  are  willing  to  pay  for  better  and  worse  seats  for  a  given  production.  This   does  not  mean,  of  course,  that  the  performers  and  staff  in  a  theatre  collective   would  receive  as  income  the  full  price  of  what  people  are  willing  to  pay  for  tickets   47  In  Figure  11  the  solidarity  economy  is  identified  as  the  direct,  unmediated  subordination  of  economic   activities  to  social  power.  The  processes  of  participatory  planning  outlined  by  Robin  can  be  viewed  as   the  mechanisms  embodied  in  the  arrow  between  social  power  and  economic  activities.   Erik  Olin  Wright   in  the  market,  for  this  would  violate  the  fair  rewards  principle.  Taxation  of  ticket-­‐ generated  income  could  prevent  that  from  happening.  But  having  ticket  and  seat   prices  adjust  to  “market  demand”  could  still  be  the  optimal  way  of  distributing   them.48  These  are  just  two  examples  of  situations  in  which  market  solutions  to   institutional  design  problems  may  be  optimal;  many  other  examples  can  easily  be   given.   The  second  issue  for  why  markets  may  be  a  significant  design  element  in  the  best   possible  real  utopian  alternative  to  capitalism  (and  not  simply  in  the  transition)   concerns   the   weight   of   market-­‐like   mechanisms   within   any   effective   planning   process.  I  don’t  want  to  get  into  an  arcane  definitional  discussion  here  about  what   counts  as  a  market  or  not,  but  the  basic  point  is  fairly  straightforward.  In  Robin’s   model  of  a  democratic-­‐egalitarian  economic  system  without  markets,  allocations   of  resources  to  alternative  production  processes  and  the  prices  for  the  outputs   are  initially  determined  through  an  iterated  participatory  planning  process  that   links   consumption   planning   and   production   planning.     There   are   two   critical   features   of   this   process   that   could,   in   practice,   assume   a   very   market-­‐like   character.  First,  in  the  actual  execution  of  these  plans,  there  are  what  Robin  terms   “adjustments”.  What  is  unspecified  –  because  it  is  really  unspecifiable  in  advance   –   is   the   magnitude   of   these   adjustments   relative   to   the   initial   allocations,   and   what  role  market-­‐like  processes  of  demand  and  supply  shape  the  prices  in  these   adjustments.   If   these   adjustments   are   fairly   large   and   include   things   like   “clearance   sales”   in   which   prices   drop   significantly   to   clear   inventory,   then   the   adjustment  part  of  the  overall  allocation  and  pricing  process  could  look  very  much   like  a  market  process.  Second,  in  the  initial  iterated  planning  process,  consumers   submit   proposed   consumption   plans   for   the   year   ahead.   If,   in   practice,   nearly   everyone  simply  submits  the  “default”  plan  of  consuming  the  same  pattern  they   actually   did   in   the   previous   year   (i.e.   what   they   consumed   after   the   previous   year’s   adjustments),   then   in   effect   the   initial   input   from   consumers   into   the   48  The  performing  arts  are,  of  course,  a  fairly  special  case,  but  it  can  be  considered  an  instance  of  a  more   general  kind  of  problem:  the  pricing  of  services  that  vary  in  their  desirability  (or  quality)  and  in  which  it  is   not  possible  to  simply  produce  more  in  response  to  demand.  Seats  in  athletic  events  of  a  popular  team   have  this  character,  but  the  extent  of  the  demand  for  seats  will  depend  on  the  success  of  the  team.   Should   tickets   be   available   by   lottery?   Should   a   secondary   market   be   allowed?   Restaurants   have   somewhat  this  character  also.  Again,  if  the  background  conditions  of  income  distribution  are  fair,  then   the  best  solution  to  these  problems  might  well  be  to  allow  a  regulated  market  to  function  where  access   is   rationed   by   the   willingness   of   people   to   pay   premium   prices   for   the   best   seats   and   most   popular   events.    Socialism  and  Real  Utopias   85 planning   process   also   looks   very   much   like   the   information   a   market   provides   producers:  producers  already  know,  without  the  additional  input  of  “plans”  from   consumers,  what  the  total  pattern  of  consumption  was  the  previous  year.   My   basic   point   here   is   that   markets   and   market-­‐like   arrangements   within   the   planning   process   are   likely   to   be   elements   of   any   complex   democratically   organised  economic  system  because  the  people  living  in  those  systems  will  see   these   arrangements   as   the   simplest   and   most   effective   way   of   dealing   with   certain   specific   problems.   Of   course,   none   of   these   issues   in   the   design   of   a   democratic-­‐egalitarian  economy  implies  that  the  market  elements  in  the  system   function   in   the   same   way   as   in   a   system   without   participatory   planning.   The   planning  process  itself  changes  the  ramifications  of  these  market-­‐like  elements.   In   the   end,   therefore,   the   issue   is   not   really   planning   versus   markets,   but   the   specific  articulation  of  planning  mechanisms  and  market-­‐mechanisms  in  shaping   the  way  allocations  for  the  production  and  distribution  of  different  kinds  of  goods   and   services   occurs.   At   this   point   in   history,   when   we   are   so   far   from   the   realisation   of   a   world   in   which   economic   democracy   has   been   realized   in   any   form,  we  cannot  reasonably  predict  what  people  would  choose  (or  even  prescribe   what  they  should  choose)  if  they  had  the  power  to  do  so.  How  much  markets  and   market-­‐like   processes   will   be   part   the   institutional   configuration   for   stably   realising   democratic   egalitarian   principles   will   depend   on   a   range   of   practical   issues,  many  of  which  cannot  be  anticipated  in  advance.     REAL  UTOPIAS  AND  TRANSFORMATION   Transforming  capitalism  in  a  socialist  direction  means  democratising  the  economy   through   the   seven   configurations   summarised   in   Figure   13.   In   this   process   the   economic   structure   remains   a   hybrid   combining   capitalist,   statist   and   socialist   practices  and  relations,  but  the  socialist  dimension  gains  weight  and  centrality.   Extending  and  deepening  social  power  in  any  one  of  these  configurations  may  be   quite   compatible   with   maintaining   the   dominance   of   capitalism,   but   if   it   is   possible   to   increase   social   power   within   all   of   these   configurations,   the   cumulative   effect   could   be   a   qualitative   transformation   in   which   socialism   becomes   the   dominant   form   of   relations   within   a   complex   economic   hybrid,   subordinating  both  capitalism  and  statism  within  democratised  power  relations.   This,  of  course,  is  a  very  big  “if.”  Scepticism  towards  socialism  at  the  beginning  of   the   21st   century   is   at   least   as   much   about   the   prospects   of   challenging   the   Erik  Olin  Wright   dominance  of  capitalist  relations  as  it  is  in  the  viability  of  alternative  institutions  if   they  could  be  created.  The  power  of  capital  seems  so  massive  that  if  ever  social   power  seemed  to  threaten  the  dominance  of  capitalism,  it  would  be  relentlessly   attacked   and   undermined.   Real   progress   in   advancing   the   project   of   democratising   the   economy   through   these   configurations   seems   impossible   so   long  as  capitalism  is  dominant.  For  this  reason  radical  anti-­‐capitalists  have  often   felt  that  decisively  breaking  the  power  of  capital  was  a  precondition  for  significant   movement   towards   socialism   rather   than   mainly   a   consequence   of   such   movement.   Marx  had  an  elegant  solution  to  this  problem.  He  believed  that  in  the  long  run   capitalism   destroyed   its   own   conditions   of   existence:   the   laws   of   motion   and   contradictions  of  capitalism  ultimately  make  capitalism  an  increasingly  fragile  and   vulnerable  system  in  which  the  ability  of  the  ruling  class  and  its  political  allies  to   block   transformation   becomes   progressively   weaker   over   time.   Eventually   capitalism   has   so   weakened   its   own   conditions   of   existence   that   it   becomes   overthrowable.  This  was  a  strong  prediction,  not  simply  a  weak  claim  about  future   possibilities. 49  This   doesn’t   solve   the   problem   of   exactly   how   to   build   the   emancipatory   alternative   to   capitalism,   but   at   least   it   makes   the   problem   of   overcoming  the  obstacles  of  existing  power  relations  much  less  daunting  in  the   long  run.   Relatively   few   people   today   –   even   those   who   still   work   within   the   Marxist   tradition   –   feel   confident   that   capitalism   will   destroy   itself.   Capitalism   may   be   crisis-­‐ridden   and   cause   great   suffering   in   the   world,   but   it   also   has   enormous   resilience   and   capacity   to   effectively   block   alternatives.   The   problem   of   its   transformation,  at  least  in  the  developed  world,  therefore  cannot  be  treated  as   mainly   the   problem   of   “seizing   the   time”   when   capitalism   through   its   own   contradictions   becomes   so   weak   and   chaotic   that   it   is   vulnerable   to   being   overthrown.  Rather,  the  problem  of  transformation  requires  understanding  the   49  While  there  is  considerable  debate  on  this  matter,  I  think  Marx  was  largely  a  determinist  about  the   ultimate   demise   of   capitalism,   even   if   he   was   not   a   determinist   about   the   process   of   actually   constructing  socialism.  Capitalism  could  not,  he  believed,  survive  indefinitely  in  the  face  of  the  inevitable   intensification   of   the   contradictions   generated   by   its   laws   of   motion.   This   does   not   mean   that   the   overthrow   of   capitalism   must   wait   until   the   literal   collapse   of   capitalism,   but   it   does   mean   that   it   progressively  becomes  more  vulnerable  to  overthrow  as  its  sustainability  becomes  ever  more  fragile.  For   my  assessment  of  this  argument,  see  Envisioning  Real  Utopias,  chapter  4.    Socialism  and  Real  Utopias   87 ways  in  which  strategies  of  transformation  have  some  prospect  in  the  long  term   of  eroding  capitalist  power  relations  and  building  up  socialist  alternatives.   Three   strategic   logics   of   transformation   have   characterised   the   history   of   anti-­‐ capitalist   struggle.   I   refer   to   these   as   ruptural,   interstitial,   and   symbiotic   strategies:   • Ruptural   transformations   envision   creating   new   emancipatory   institutions   through  a  sharp  break  with  existing  institutions  and  social  structures.  The   central  image  is  very  much  that  of  a  war  in  which  ultimately  victory  depends   on  the  decisive  defeat  of  the  enemy  in  a  direct  confrontation.  The  result  of   victory  is  a  radical  disjuncture  in  which  existing  institutions  are  destroyed   and  new  ones  built  in  a  fairly  rapid  way.  In  most  versions,  this  revolutionary   scenario  involves  seizing  state  power,  rapidly  transforming  state  structures   and  then  using  these  new  apparatuses  of  state  power  to  destroy  the  power   of  the  dominant  class  within  the  economy.   • Interstitial  transformations  seek  to  build  new  forms  of  social  empowerment   in  the  niches  and  margins  of  capitalist  society  where  this  is  possible,  often   where  they  do  not  seem  to  pose  any  immediate  threat  to  dominant  classes   and   elites.   Prodhoun’s   vision   of   building   a   cooperative   alternative   to   capitalism   within   capitalism   itself   is   a   19th   century   version   of   this   perspective.   The   many   experiments   in   the   social   economy   today   are   also   examples.  The  central  theoretical  idea  is  that  building  alternatives  on  the   ground   in   whatever   spaces   are   possible   both   serves   a   critical   ideological   function  of  showing  that  alternative  ways  of  working  and  living  are  possible,   and  potentially  erodes  the  constraints  on  the  spaces  themselves.50   • Symbiotic  transformations  involve  strategies  which  use  the  state  to  extend   and  deepen  the  institutional  forms  of  social  empowerment  in  ways  which   also  solve  certain  practical  problems  faced  by  dominant  classes  and  elites.   The  basic  idea  here  is  that  there  are  multiple  institutional  equilibria  within   capitalism,  all  of  which  are  functionally  compatible  with  capitalism  (i.e.  they   contribute   to   solving   problems   of   capitalist   reproduction),   but   some   of   50  The  idea  of  interstitial  transformation  resonates  with  various  strands  of  nonviolent  activism  in  which   people  are  exhorted  (in  words  apocryphally  attributed  to  Gandhi)  to  “be  the  change  you  want  to  see  in   the   world”.   The   difference   is   that   interstitial   transformation   involves   collectively   building   new   institutions  embodying  the  kind  of  changed  world  you  want,  not  just  individually  behaving  in  a  dignified,   value-­‐affirming  way.   Erik  Olin  Wright   which  are  better  for  capitalists  than  others  and  some  of  which  involve  more   social   empowerment   than   others.   A   symbiotic   transformation   is   one   that   seeks  to  expand  social  empowerment  while  still  achieving  an  institutional   configuration  that  contributes  to  an  adequately  well-­‐functioning  capitalism.   This  is  what  in  the  1970s  was  called  “non-­‐reformist  reforms”  –  reforms  that   simultaneously   make   life   better   within   the   existing   economic   system   and   expand   the   potential   for   future   advances   of   democratic   power.   It   is   also   reflected  in  a  variety  of  forms  of  civic  activism  in  which  social  movements,   local  leaders  and  city  governments  collaborate  in  ways  that  both  enhance   democracy  and  solve  practical  problems.   All  three  of  these  strategic  logics  have  historically  had  a  place  within  anti-­‐capitalist   social   movements   and   politics.   Ruptural   strategies   are   most   closely   associated   with   revolutionary   socialism   and   communism,   interstitial   strategies   with   some   strands  of  anarchism,  and  symbiotic  strategies  with  social  democracy.    It  is  easy  to   raise  objections  to  each  of  them.  Ruptural  strategies  have  a  grandiose,  romantic   appeal  to  critics  of  capitalism,  but  the  historical  record  is  pretty  dismal.  There  are   no  cases  in  which  socialism  as  defined  here  –  a  deeply  democratic  and  egalitarian   organisation  of  power  relations  within  an  economy  –  has  been  a  robust  result  of  a   ruptural   strategy   of   transformation   of   capitalism.   Ruptural   strategies   seem   in   practice  more  prone  to  result  in  authoritarian  statism  than  democratic  socialism.   Interstitial   strategies   may   produce   improvements   in   the   lives   of   people   and   pockets   of   more   democratic   egalitarian   practices,   but   they   also   have   nowhere   succeeded   in   significantly   eroding   capitalist   power   relations.   As   for   symbiotic   strategies,   in   the   most   successful   instances   of   social   democracy   they   have   certainly  resulted  in  a  more  humane  capitalism,  with  less  poverty,  less  inequality,   and  less  insecurity,  but  they  have  done  so  in  ways  which  stabilise  capitalism  and   leave   intact   the   core   powers   of   capital.   Any   advance   of   symbiotic   strategies   historically   that   appeared   to   potentially   threaten   those   core   powers   was   massively  resisted  by  capital.  The  reaction  of  Swedish  capitalists  to  proposals  for   serious  union  involvement  in  control  over  investment  in  the  late  1970s  is  one  of   the  best  known  examples.    These  are  all  reasonable  objections.  Taken  together   they  suggest  to  many  people  that  transcending  capitalism  through  some  kind  of   long  term  coherent  strategy  is  simply  not  possible.   Pessimism  is  intellectually  easy,  perhaps  even  intellectually  lazy.  It  often  reflects  a   simple   extrapolation   of   past   experience   into   the   future.   Our   theories   of   the   future,  however,  are  far  too  weak  to  really  make  confident  claims  that  we  know   what   can’t   happen.   The   appropriate   orientation   towards   strategies   of   social    Socialism  and  Real  Utopias   89 transformation,  therefore,  is  to  do  things  now  which  put  us  in  the  best  position  to   do   more   later   by   working   to   create   those   institutions   and   structures   which   increase,   rather   than   decrease,   the   prospects   of   taking   advantage   of   whatever   historical   opportunities   emerge.   Building   real   utopias   can   both   prefigure   more   comprehensive  alternatives  and  move  us  in  the  direction  of  those  alternatives.   In   these   terms   I   think   the   best   prospect   for   the   future   in   developed   capitalist   countries   is   a   strategic   orientation   mainly   organised   around   the   interplay   of   interstitial   and   symbiotic   strategies,   with   perhaps   periodic   episodes   involving   elements   of   ruptural   strategy.   Through   interstitial   strategies   activists   and   communities   can   build   and   strengthen   real   utopian   economic   institutions   embodying   democratic   egalitarian   principles   where   this   is   possible.   Symbiotic   strategies  through  the  state  can  help  open  up  greater  space  and  support  for  these   interstitial  innovations.  The  interplay  between  interstitial  and  symbiotic  strategies   could  then  create  a  trajectory  of  deepening  socialist  elements  within  the  hybrid   capitalist  economic  ecosystem.   Worker   cooperatives   are   a   good   example.   Under   existing   conditions,   worker   cooperatives   face   serious   obstacles   to   becoming   a   significant   component   of   market   economies:   credit   markets   are   sceptical   of   worker-­‐owned   firms;   risk-­‐ averse   workers   are   reluctant   to   sink   their   savings   in   a   venture   that   has   low   probability  of  success;  cooperatives  face  supply  chains  in  which,  because  of  scale,   they   face   higher   costs   than   capitalist   corporate   rivals;   and   so   on.   Symbiotic   strategies  directed  at  public  policy  could  address  all  of  these  issues.    Given  the   potential   for   worker-­‐owned   cooperatives   to   help   solve   problems   of   unemployment,  deteriorating  tax  bases,  and  unstable  communities,  new  rules  of   the  game  to  support  cooperatives  could  gain  political  traction.  Even  within  the   logic   of   market   economies,   the   positive   externalities   of   worker   cooperatives   provide  a  justification  for  public  subsidies  and  insurance  schemes  to  increase  their   viability.   Such   policies   could,   over   time,   expand   the   weight   of   a   cooperative   market  economy  within  the  broader  capitalist  economic  hybrid.       Many   other   real   utopian   institutions   and   innovations   could   contribute   to   deepening  the  forms  of  social  empowerment  over  economic  life.  Some  of  these   can   take   place   with   little   or   no   state   involvement;   others   would   be   greatly   Erik  Olin  Wright   enhanced   by   various   kinds   of   state   support.     Here   are   a   few   additional   examples:51   • Peer-­‐to-­‐peer  collaborative  production:  Wikipedia,  open-­‐source  software.   • Urban  agriculture  with  community  land  trusts.   • Community   owned   fab   labs   for   advanced   customised   small-­‐batch   cooperative  manufacturing   • Open-­‐access   intellectual   property:   creative   commons,   copy-­‐left,   open   source  pharmaceuticals,  free  downloadable  blueprints  for  3-­‐D  printing   • Free  Publicly  provided  goods/services:  libraries,  free  public  transport   • Unconditional  basic  income   • Policy  juries  and  “randomocracy”   • Eco-­‐villages  and  Transition  towns   Such  a  combination  of  symbiotic  and  interstitial  strategies  does  not  imply  that  the   process   of   transformation   could   ever   follow   a   smooth   path   of   enlightened   cooperation  between  conflicting  class  forces.  What  is  ultimately  at  stake  here  is  a   transformation  of  the  core  power  relations  of  capitalism,  and  this  does  ultimately   threaten   the   interests   of   capitalists.   While   elites   may   become   resigned   to   a   diminution  of  power,  they  are  unlikely  to  gracefully  embrace  the  prospects.  While   symbiotic  transformations  help  solve  problems  within  capitalism,  they  often  are   not   optimal   for   elites   and   are   thus   resisted.   This   means   that   a   key   element   of   ruptural  strategies  –  confrontations  between  opposing  organised  social  forces  in   which  there  are  winners  and  losers  –  will  be  a  part  of  any  plausible  trajectory  of   sustainable  social  empowerment.  The  purpose  of  such  confrontations,  however,   is   not   a   systemic   rupture   with   capitalist   dominance,   but   rather   creating   more   space  for  the  interplay  of  interstitial  and  symbiotic  strategies.       CONCLUSION   51  Most  of  these  are  discussed  at  length  in  Envisioning  Real  Utopias,  chapters  6  and  7.    Socialism  and  Real  Utopias   91 The   framework   proposed   here   for   a   socialism   rooted   in   social   empowerment   involves  a  commitment  to  institutional  pluralism  and  heterogeneity.  Instead  of  a   unitary   institutional   design   for   transcending   capitalism,   the   configurations   of   social   empowerment   open   up   space   for   a   wide   diversity   of   institutional   forms.     Worker-­‐cooperatives   and   local   social   economy   projects,   state-­‐run   banks   and   enterprises,   social   democratic   regulation   of   private   corporations,   solidarity   finance,  and  participatory  budgeting  all  potentially  undermine  the  dominance  of   capitalism  and  increase  the  weight  of  social  power  within  the  hybrid  economic   ecosystem.  These  diverse  forms  all  increase  social  power,  but  they  do  not  point  to   an   integrated,   comprehensive   system   driven   by   a   single   institutional   design   principle  of  the  sort  proposed  by  Robin  in  his  analysis  of  participatory  economics.   The  institutional  pluralism  of  the  destination  also  suggests  strategic  pluralism  in   the   practices   of   transformation.   Within   some   of   these   configurations,   to   strengthen  social  power  requires  access  to  state  power.  But  other  configurations   can  be  advanced  even  without  state  power.  This  is  especially  true  for  the  social   economy  initiatives  –  workers  cooperatives,  community-­‐based  urban  agriculture,   solidarity   finance,   community   land   trusts,   etc.   Activists   on   the   left,   especially   those   on   the   radical   left,   have   often   regarded   these   kinds   of   locally-­‐oriented,   community-­‐based  initiatives  as  not  being  very  “political”,  since  they  do  not  always   involve  direct  confrontation  with  political  power.  This  is  a  narrow  view  of  politics.   Interstitial  strategies  to  create  real  utopias  involve  showing  that  another  world  is   possible  by  building  it  in  the  spaces  available,  and  then  pushing  against  the  state   and   public   policy   to   expand   those   spaces.   For   many   people   these   kinds   of   interstitial  initiatives  also  have  the  advantage  of  generating  immediate,  tangible   results   in   which   each   person’s   contribution   clearly   matters.     A   vision   of   emancipatory   alternatives   that   is   anchored   in   the   multidimensional   and   multiscalar  problem  of  deepening  democracy  can  encompass  this  wide  range  of   strategies  and  projects  of  transformation.                 Erik  Olin  Wright       BREAKING  WITH  CAPITALISM     Robin  Hahnel         In  “Socialism  and  Real  Utopias”  Erik  comments  on  how  to  think  about  systemic   alternatives,   argues   that   markets   can   play   a   positive   role   in   a   fully   desirable   economy,  and  discusses  transition  strategy.  Below  I  comment  briefly  on  questions   of  methodology  and  social  theory  before  going  on  to  discuss  markets  at  greater   length.  After  identifying  large  areas  of  agreement  with  only  minor  disagreements   with  regard  to  transition  strategy,  I  close  with  some  personal  observations  about   the  response  to  our  model  of  a  participatory  economy  over  the  past  twenty  years.       THINKING  ABOUT  SYSTEMIC  ALTERNATIVES   Both  Erik  and  I  have  contributed  to  a  vast  literature  on  “social  theory.”52  All  either   of  us  can  hope  to  do  in  this  dialogue  is  briefly  discuss  a  few  insights  we  believe  are   particularly  relevant.   (1)   Erik   distinguishes   between   an   “organism”   vs.   “ecological”   view   of   human   societies,  and  observes  that  “the  idea  of  real  utopias  as  a  way  of  transforming  a   society  is  more  in  line  with  the  ecosystems  view”  where  transformation  results   from   introducing   “an   alien   species   which   finds   a   niche   and   then   gradually   increases,  potentially  even  displacing  certain  other  species.”   52  As   an   alternative   to   Marxist   historical   materialism   I   helped   develop   a   social   theory   known   as   “complimentary  holism”  which  purports  to  provide  a  more  realistic  and  useful  framework  for  thinking   about   relations   between   the   “human   center”   and   “institutional   boundary”   of   societies,   the   political,   kinship,  community,  and  economic  “spheres  of  social  life,”  and  the  conscious  and  unconscious  forces   that  operate  to  stabilise  and  destabilise  societies.  This  is  not  the  place  for  Erik  or  me  to  explain  our  full   thoughts  on  social  theory.  Readers  interested  in  mine  should  see  Marxism  and  Socialist  Theory  (Boston:   South  End  Press,  1981)  with  Michael  Albert,  Liberating  Theory  (Boston:  South  End  Press,  1986),  written   with  Michael  Albert,  Leslie  Cagan,  Noam  Chomsky,  Mel  King,  Lydia  Sargent,  and  Holly  Sklar,  and  chapter   one  in  The  ABCs  of  Political  Economy:  A  Modern  Approach,  2nd  edition  (London:  Pluto  Press,  2014).   Robin  Hahnel   The  problem  with  the  “society  as  ecological  system”  metaphor  is  that  there  are   cases  where  the  “society  as  organic  system”  metaphor  is  more  apt.  For  example,   what  if  an  "alien  species"  of  socially  empowering  institutions  we  seek  to  introduce   into   a   capitalist   economy   cannot   survive,   or   if   survival   requires   becoming   co-­‐ opted?  A  “pure  cooperativist”  strategy  for  social  change  is  to  introduce  more  and   more   “alien”   cooperative   “species”   into   capitalism   until   “native”   private   enterprise  “species”  are  all  replaced.  But  there  are  many  who  have  argued  that   simply   introducing   more   cooperatives   into   capitalism   cannot   achieve   “system   change”  precisely  because  they  will  either  fail  or  become  co-­‐opted.   I   do   not   bring   this   up   because   I   believe   Erik   and   I   actually   disagree   about   cooperatives.   We   both   believe   they   can   play   a   positive   role   as  one   part  of   a   successful   transition   strategy,   while   neither   of   us   thinks   “one,   two,   many   cooperatives”  can  be  a  successful  strategy  all  by  itself.  My  point  is  simply  that  the   analogy  Erik  offers  does  not  settle  any  of  the  issues  that  –  to  use  Erik’s  words  –   “rupturalists,”   “interstitialists,”   and   “symbiotics”   argue   over.   It   is   merely   an   analogy   that   inclines   one   to   think   more   along   interstitial   and   symbiotic   lines,   which  is  Erik’s  inclination.   (2)  Erik  distinguishes  between  “ameliorative  reforms”  –  which,  to  his  credit,  he   argues  deserve  our  full  support  because  they  are  beneficial  even  though  they  are   not  “transformative”  –  and  “real  utopian  transformations”  –  which  he  claims  are   both  beneficial  in  the  here  and  now  and  transformative.  Elsewhere  I  have  angered   most  of  my  closest  radical  friends  by  disputing  that  “non-­‐reformist  reforms”  can   be  meaningfully  distinguished  from  “reformist  reforms.”53  In  brief,  I  argue  that  it   is  a  mistake  to  think  that  the  key  to  fighting  for  reforms  in  ways  that  undermines   the  system  lies  in  picking  a  particular  kind  of  reform,  i.e.  choosing  reforms  that   are  somehow  particularly  deadly  silver  bullets.  I  argue  instead  that  the  key  is  how   53     See  “The  Myth  of  Non-­‐reformist  Reforms,”  in  Economic  Justice  and  Democracy:  From  Competition  to   Cooperation  (NY:  Routledge,  2005):  154-­‐156.  To  be  blunt,  I  think  the  idea  of  “non-­‐reformist  reforms”  is   intellectually  vacuous,  but  often  a  socially  useful  psychological  crutch  for  radicals.  All  too  often  those   who   want   system   change   find   it   difficult   to   motivate   themselves   to   participate   whole   heartedly   in   reform   campaigns   even   though   they   should.   However,   if   radicals   convince   themselves   it   is   a   “non-­‐ reformist   reform”   they   have   less   trouble   motivating   themselves   to   pitch   in.   Apparently   radicals,   like   most  humans,  must  sometimes  resort  to  “necessary  illusions”  to  motivate  themselves  to  do  what  they   should.  In  which  case,  what  I  probably  should  say  to  my  radical  comrades  is:  If  labelling  a  reform  “non-­‐ reformist”  helps  motivate  you  to  get  off  the  side  line  and  participate  whole  heartedly,  be  my  guest!   Breaking  With  Capitlaism   95 we  go  about  waging  the  fight  for  whatever  reform  we  are  working  for,  rather  than   what  the  particular  reform  happens  to  be.   Any   successful   reform   campaign   will   make   capitalism   less   harmful   to   some   extent.  There  is  no  way  around  this,  and  even  if  there  were  such  a  thing  as  a  non-­‐ reformist   reform,   it   would   not   change   this   fact.  However,   just   because   every   reform   success   makes   capitalism   less   harmful   need   not   prolong   the   life   of   capitalism  –  although  it  might,  and  this  is  something  I  argue  anti-­‐capitalists  must   learn  to  accept  without  regret.54  But  if  winning  a  reform  further  empowers  those   who   challenged   the   status   quo,   if   it   fortifies   emancipating   institutions   and   weakens   oppressive   institutions,   if   it   whets   reformers’   appetite   for   more   economic   democracy,   more   economic   justice,   and   more   environmental   protection   than   capitalism   can   provide,   then   a   successful   reform   campaign   can   also  help  lead  to  system  change.  In  sum,  any  reform  can  be  fought  for  in  ways   that  diminish  the  chances  of  further  gains,  and  any  reform  can  be  fought  for  in   ways  that  make  further  progress  more  likely.   (3)  Erik  compares  trying  to  “create  a  detailed  account  of  the  critical  institutions  of   an  alternative  system,”  to  limiting  ourselves  to  “enunciate  the  basic  values  that   animate   the   search   for   alternatives   and   the   core   principles   of   institutional   design,”  and  argues  that  while  “both  of  these  strategies  have  value”  he  is  more   inclined   to   the   second   approach.   I   would   add   one   consideration   he   fails   to   mention  when  evaluating  the  pros  and  cons  of  the  two  approaches.   The   second   approach   runs   a   greater   risk   of   permitting   people   to   dream   about   things  that  are  actually  not  possible.  Because  it  keeps  discussion  at  the  level  of   “values,”  and  tolerates  imprecision  about  how  something  would  actually  be  done,   it  can  permit  people  to  continue  to  hold  onto  views  that  are  self-­‐contradictory.   For  example,  limiting  discussion  to  basic  values  can  delude  people  into  thinking   that  markets  are  compatible  with  economic  justice  and  democracy,  or  that  central   planning   is   compatible   with   worker   self-­‐management.   Requiring   visionaries   to   spell  out  exactly  how  they  propose  decisions  be  made  can  serve  as  an  important   bulwark   against   this   kind   of   self-­‐deception,   which   I   believe   has   been   all   too   common  on  the  left.  It  is  also  the  only  way  I  know  to  convince  people  that  this   54  Those  who  foolishly  root  for  worsening  conditions  because  they  believe  it  will  drive  people  to  rebel   more  quickly  are  prime  examples  of  radicals  who  have  failed  to  learn  this  important  lesson.  Those  who   capitalism  victimises  learn  quickly  to  despise  any  who  display  this  attitude,  as  they  should.   Robin  Hahnel   time  anti-­‐capitalists  really  do  have  a  better  idea  how  to  make  dreams  come  true,   because  everyone  knows  that  last  time  we  did  not.     A  SOCIAL  SYSTEM   Since  he  does  not  discuss  political,  cultural,  or  kinship  systems,  Erik  is  only  talking   about   economic   systems,   not   entire   social   systems,   when   he   talks   of   three   traditional   “ideal   types”   and   seven   non-­‐traditional   ideal   types.   As   a   long-­‐time   comparative  economic  systems  professor  I  classify  economic  systems  differently,   based  on  who  owns  productive  assets,  who  manages  production  processes,  and   how  any  division  of  labour  is  coordinated.55  But  in  the  interest  of  brevity,  let  me   comment  briefly  on  how  Erik  puts  his  frameworks  to  use.   Erik  points  out  that  most  real  world  economies  are  hybrids  in  the  sense  that  they   contain   elements   from   more   than   one   ideal   type.   Using   his   three   system   framework  he  suggests:  “The  possibility  of  socialism  thus  depends  on  our  ability   to   enlarge   and   deepen   the   socialist   component   of   the   hybrid   and   weaken   the   capitalist  and  statist  components.  This  way  of  thinking  about  economic  systems   means   abandoning   a   simple   binary   notion   of   capitalism   versus   socialism.”   Sometimes  this  is  useful,  but  it  ignores  thorny  problems  about  compatibility,  and   contains  an  implicit  bias  toward  an  incremental  approach  to  social  change.   For  example,  the  Chavez  government  chose  to  leave  the  private  and  state  sectors   of  the  Venezuelan  economy  largely  in  place,  and  concentrate  instead  on  building   a   new   sector   they   call   “the   social   economy”   comprised   of   worker-­‐owned   cooperatives,   neighbourhood   clinics,   food   stores,     educational   “misiones,”   municipal  assemblies,  and  most  recently  communal  councils.  In  that  context  Erik’s   approach  makes  all  the  sense  in  the  world.  In  Venezuela  socialism  depended  on   their   “ability   to   enlarge   and   deepen”   the   new   social   economy   and   reduce   the   capitalist  and  state  sectors  of  the  old  economy.  But  Erik’s  framework  does  not   help  us  understand  how  and  why  it  may  be  unrealistic  to  expect  people  to  behave   55  It   is   rather   straightforward   to   classify   all   the   economic   “models”   in   the   literature   as   different   combinations   of   a   few   possible   institutional   choices   in   each   of   the   three   areas   –   ownership,   management,   and   coordination   of   any   division   of   labour.   For   example,   the   model   of   a   participatory   economy   can   be   classified   as:   social   ownership   (not   private   ownership),   worker   self-­‐managed   (not   “other”  directed),  with  a  particular  democratic  planning  procedure  to  coordinate  a  significant  division  of   labour  (rather  than  leaving  coordination  of  a  significant  division  of  labour  to  markets,  or  an  authoritarian   planning  procedure,  or  minimizing  the  division  of  labour  by  making  communities  largely  self-­‐sufficient.)   Breaking  With  Capitlaism   97 in  socially  responsible  ways  in  the  social  economy  while  others  are  permitted  to   profit   from   socially   irresponsible   behaviour   in   the   capitalist   sector,   or   when   society’s  most  valuable  resources,  in  the  case  of  Venezuela  oil,  are  reserved  for   the   state   sector.   Incrementalism   also   has   no   answers   for   situations   where   one   must  either  make  a  qualitative  change  or  accept  eventual  re-­‐stabilisation  back  to   the   old   status   quo.   An   entirely   incremental   strategy   implicitly   assumes   that   no   such  bridges  will  ever  present  themselves.   However,  let  me  be  clear:  Right  now  in  the  United  States,  where  we  are  nowhere   near   having   sufficient   popular   support   for   change   to   a   highly   democratic   economic   system,   and   where   radicals   and   reformers   must   both   become   much   stronger  in  a  number  of  areas,  like  Erik,  I  am  an  unapologetic  incrementalist  and   think   rupturalist   talk   is   premature.   However,   let   me   flag   two   situations   where   incremental  strategies  become  problematic  and  I  would  not  support  them.   (1)   Different   economic   systems   rely   on   different   ways   to   motivate   people.   At   some  point  I  believe  Venezuela  will  have  to  choose  between  motivating  people   through   greed   and   fear   –   as   they   do   in   their   private   sector   –   ordering   people   around  –  as  they  do  in  their  state  sector  –  and  motivating  people  by  letting  them   decide  what  they  want  to  do  as  long  as  it  is  socially  responsible,  and  rewarding   people  according  to  their  work  efforts  –  as  they  are  trying  to  do  in  their  “social   economy.”  In  other  words,  once  the  social  economy  has  proved  its  superiority  to   a  majority  of  Venezuelans,  because  their  incentive  systems  are  not  only  different   but  contradictory,  I  think  it  would  be  a  mistake  not  to  extend  the  social  economy   system  to  the  entire  economy  in  a  non-­‐incremental  way.   (2)  Those  who  benefit  from  the  status  quo  can  become  very  aggressive  when  they   feel  their  privileges  slipping  away.  Failure  to  take  decisive  action  to  defend  our   right   to   continue   making   progress   which   a   majority   supports   is   a   recipe   for   disaster.  In  cases  where  privileged  economic  elites  refuse  to  accept  the  will  of  the   majority  the  best  decisive  action  is  often  to  strip  them  of  their  power  by  making  a   dramatic  and  qualitative  change  in  how  the  economic  system  functions.  Failure  to   disarm  defeated  enemies  is  poor  military  strategy.   I   am   also   concerned   that   Erik   may   render   the   useful   notions   of   “stability”   and   “instability”  vacuous.  He  writes:     One…view   is   that   any   capitalist   hybrid   with   significant   socialist   elements   would   be   deeply  unstable.  The  only  reasonably  stable  equilibria,  the  thinking  goes,  are  ones  in   which  socialism  is  unequivocally  dominant  or  ones  in  which  capitalism  is  unequivocally   dominant….  An  alternative  view  is  that  there  may  be  multiple  relatively  stable  equilibria   Robin  Hahnel   involving  all  three  economic  forms  in  quite  variable  combinations….  The  arguments  of   this  paper  are  based  on  the  second  of  these  views.   If  this  is  my  choice,  then  I  am  more  inclined  to  the  first  view  which  Erik  rejects.  For   example,  to  expect  a  mixture  of  one  third  capitalism,  one  third  statism,  and  one   third  socialism  to  be  as  stable  as  a  mix  of  nine  tenths  capitalism,  one  twentieth   statism,  and  one  twentieth  socialism  seems  to  me  farfetched.  As  a  general  rule  I   think   the   more   hybrid   a   system   is   the   less   stable   it   is   likely   to   be.   Of   course   a   strongly  hybrid  system  could  be  poised  on  a  knife  edge  for  quite  some  time,  just   as   a   largely   pure   system   might   be   transformed.   But   there   is   a   reason   that   hybridisation   breeds   instability,   and   it   is   the   same   reason   that   incrementalism   does  not  always  work.   Any   economic   system   relies   on   people   to   think   and   behave   in   particular   ways.   Different  economic  systems  require  people  to  think  and  behave  in  different  ways.   The   kind   of   humans   capitalism   requires,   and   the   kind   of   humans   we   tend   to   become   when   we   play   our   appointed   roles   under   capitalist   institutions,   are   different  from  the  kind  of  humans  socialism  requires,  and  participation  in  socialist   institutions   tends   to   create.   In   other   words,   when   we   choose   to   use   particular   institutions  to  organise  and  govern  our  economic  activities  we  are  also  choosing   to  some  extent  what  kind  of  people  we  want  to  become.  And  this  is  why  hybrids   are  generally  less  stable.  In  a  capitalist-­‐socialist  hybrid  when  capitalist  institutions   mould  people  to  better  conform  with  the  roles  they  must  play  for  the  capitalist   part  to  function  effectively  and  smoothly  they  rob  the  socialist  part  of  the  kind  of   personnel   needed   to   play   the   roles   required   for   the   socialist   part   to   function   effectively  and  smoothly.  Or,  to  put  it  differently,  we  humans  find  it  difficult  to   serve  two  different  masters.   But  let  me  conclude  this  part  on  a  note  of  agreement.  Erik  writes:     Relatively  few  people  today  –  even  those  who  still  work  within  the  Marxist  tradition  –   feel   confident   that   capitalism   will   destroy   itself.   Capitalism   may   be   crisis-­‐ridden   and   cause  great  suffering  in  the  world,  but  it  also  has  an  enormous  capacity  to  effectively   block  alternatives.  The  problem  of  its  transformation,  at  least  in  the  developed  world,   therefore  cannot  be  treated  as  mainly  the  problem  of  ‘seizing  the  time’  when  capitalism   through   its   own   contradictions   becomes   so   weak   and   chaotic   that   it   is   vulnerable   to   being  overthrown.  Rather,  the  problem  of  transformation  requires  understanding  the   ways   in   which  strategies  of   transformation   have   some   prospect   in   the   long   term   of   eroding  capitalist  power  relations  and  building  up  socialist  alternatives.   I   could   not   agree   more.   Disavowing   theories   that   capitalism   is   programmed   to   self-­‐destruct   due   to   internal   contradictions   as   ill-­‐conceived   and   untrue   is   Breaking  With  Capitlaism   99 extremely  important  if  we  are  to  have  a  realistic  view  of  the  nature  of  the  task   before  us.56       WHAT  ABOUT  MARKETS?   Points  of  Agreement   I   agree   with   Erik   that   markets   are   “the   issue   that   is   most   in   contention   in   this   dialogue.”   I   also   think   he   is   correct   that   we   do   not   disagree   about   markets   because   we   disagree   about   what   economic   democracy   and   economic   justice   mean.  As  Erik  points  out:  “Both  Robin  and  I…  understand  democracy  as  an  ideal  in   which  people  should  be  able  to  participate  in  decisions  to  the  extent  that  they  are   affected  by  those  decisions.  And  we  both  see  equality  as  demanding  an  economic   system  that  both  meets  people’s  basic  needs  to  live  a  flourishing  life  and  allocates   rewards   above   this   level   on   the   basis   of   the   burdens   people   take   on   in   their   work.”  This  is  important  because  most  often  people  who  disagree  about  markets   do  so  because  they  disagree  about  what  economic  justice  and  democracy  require.   I  also  endorse  Erik’s  summary  of  my  position:     Both   of   these   values   are   generally   violated   by   the   unfettered   operation   of   market   processes:   markets   systematically   generate   unjust   inequalities   and   also,   inherently   violate  democratic  principles  by  enabling  people  to  engage  in  exchange  without  regard   to  social  costs.  For  these  reasons  Robin  argues  that  in  an  ideal  economy  –  an  economy   that  fully  realises  democratic  and  egalitarian  values  –  markets  would  disappear  and  be   replaced  by  something  like  participatory  planning.     This  is  what  I  mean  when  I  call  myself  a  market  “abolitionist.”  In  contrast,  Erik  is   “agnostic”   with   regard   to   markets,   whose   use   he   argues   should   depend   on   56     As   an   aside,   I   think   there   is   a   link   between   the   view   of   capitalism   as   doomed   by   internal   contradictions  –  which  Erik  and  I  both  reject  –  and  the  notion  of  “non-­‐reformist  reforms”  that  has  gone   unnoticed.   Aside   from   the   crucial   question   of   how   reforms   are   fought   for,   if   all   reforms   improve   outcomes  there  are  only  two  ways  a  reform,  itself,  could  be  “non-­‐reformist.”  Either  it  “heightens”  some   internal  contradiction  and  thereby  undermines  the  system,  or  it  “prefigures”  a  solution  that  is  part  of  a   post-­‐capitalist  system.  I  think  any  who  believes  in  non-­‐reformist  reforms  for  the  first  reason  is  chasing  a   myth.   On   the   other   hand,   I   think   the   second   strategic   idea   makes   all   the   sense   in   the   world.   My   argument  for  the  importance  of  creating  real  world  examples  of  “imperfect  experiments  in  equitable   cooperation”   which   others   frequently   call   “prefigurative”   organizing,   in   combination   with   reform   organizing  is  discussed  further  below.  I  think  Erik  and  I  agree  on  this  and  that  when  he  distinguishes   between   “ameliorative   reforms”   and   “real   utopian   transformations”   he   is   talking   about   what   I   call   “reform  organizing”  as  distinct  from  building  real  world  “experiments  in  equitable  cooperation.”   Robin  Hahnel   “practical   trade-­‐offs,”   not   just   during   transition   but   also   “in   the   institutional   configuration  of  the  destination  itself.”   To  be  clear,  I  have  never  questioned  whether  or  not  markets  will  continue  to  play   a  role  during  a  transition  to  a  desirable  economic  future  –  which  seems  obvious  to   me  –  nor  whether  during  transition  we  should  often  participate  in  campaigns  to   “tame”   markets   to   reduce   their   negative   consequences   –   which   also   seems   obvious  to  me.  So  if  we  do  not  disagree  about  goals,  and  we  are  not  talking  about   markets  and  the  need  to  tame  them  during  transition,  why  do  we  disagree  about   whether  there  is  a  place  for  markets  in  a  truly  desirable  economy?  As  I  said  in  the   first   round   of   this   dialogue,   the   case   against   markets   logically   consists   of   two   parts:  How  bad  are  markets?  And,  is  there  a  more  desirable  alternative  that  is   feasible?  I  have  presented  my  case  for  what  I  believe  is  a  feasible  and  desirable   alternative.  I  will  now  outline  the  case  for  why  we  should  embrace  the  desirable   alternative  that  is  feasible  and  eventually  eliminate  markets  altogether.   The  Dispassionate  Case  Against  Markets   Efficiency:  It  is  well  known  among  professional  economists  that  markets  allocate   resources   inefficiently   when   they   are   out   of   equilibrium,   when   they   are   non-­‐ competitive,   and   when   there   are   external   effects.   When   the   fundamental   theorem  of  welfare  economics  is  read  critically  it  says  as  much:  Only  if  there  are   no  external  effects,  only  if  all  markets  are  competitive,  and  only  when  all  markets   are   in   equilibrium   is   it   true   that   a   market   economy   will   yield   a   Pareto   optimal   outcome.  But  despite  these  clear  warnings,  market  enthusiasts  insist  that  if  left   alone  markets  generally  allocate  resources  very  efficiently.  This  can  only  be  true   if:  (1)  disequilibrating  forces  are  weak,  (2)  non-­‐competitive  market  structures  are   uncommon,  and  (3)  externalities  are  the  exception,  rather  than  the  rule.  There   are  good  theoretical  and  empirical  reasons  to  believe  exactly  the  opposite  in  all   three   cases.   A   second   line   of   defence   holds   that   while   free   markets   may   be   plagued  by  inefficiencies,  it  is  possible  to  correct  market  failures  through  a  variety   of  policies  and  thereby  render  them  “reasonably”  efficient.  However,  there  are   good  practical  reasons  to  believe  it  is  unrealistic  to  expect  such  policies  could  ever   render  market  systems  even  “reasonably”  efficient.57     57  For  my  full  argument  regarding  efficiency  interested  readers  should  see  “The  Case  Against  there  is  a   spacing  problem  here(Markets,”  Journal  of  Economic  Issues  (41,  4),  December  2007:  1139-­‐1159.     Breaking  With  Capitlaism   101 Equity:  Not  only  do  markets  for  natural,  produced,  and  financial  capital  distribute   income   unfairly   to   their   owners   who   expend   no   effort   whatsoever,   labour   markets   distribute   income   unfairly   to   people   with   different   amounts   of   human   capital  as  well.  If  the  last  hour  of  welding  labour  hired  raises  output  and  therefore   revenue   by   more   than   the   last   hour   of   floor   sweeping   does,   when   employers   compete  with  one  another  in  labour  markets  for  welders  and  sweepers  they  will   bid   the   wage   rate   for   welders   up   higher   than   the   wage   rate   for   sweepers   –   whether   or   not   they   are   capitalist   employers   trying   to   maximise   enterprise   profits,   or   worker-­‐owned   enterprises   trying   to   maximise   profits   per   member.58  This   means   that   when   labour   is   hired   in   labour   markets   those   who   have   more   human   capital,   and   therefore   contribute   more   to   enterprise   output   and  revenues,  will  receive  higher  wages  than  those  with  less  human  capital.  This   is   problematic   because   it   means   that   a   welder   and   sweeper   who   work   equally   hard   in   equally   unpleasant   circumstances   will   not   be   rewarded   equally   even   though   they   make   what   we   might   call   equal   “sacrifices.”   In   a   market   economy   those  with  more  human  capital  will  receive  more,  even  if  they  make  no  greater   sacrifices,  and  those  with  less  human  capital  will  receive  less,  even  if  they  sacrifice   just  as  much  or  more.59     Moreover,  there  is  no  way  to  fix  this  problem  in  a  market  system  without  creating   a   great   deal   of   inefficiency.   If   we   intervene   in   the   labour   market   and   legislate   wage  rates  we  consider  to  be  fair,  but  allow  markets  to  determine  how  resources   are  allocated,  not  only  will  different  kinds  of  labour  be  allocated  inefficiently,  the   entire  price  structure  of  the  economy  will  fail  to  reflect  the  opportunity  costs  of   producing  different  goods  and  services  leading  to  further  inefficiencies.  There  is   no  getting  around  the  dilemma:  In  a  market  economy  we  must  either  allow  the   58  Worker-­‐owned  cooperatives  may  well  have  goals  other  than  maximizing  profits  per  member,  but  as   long  as  this  is  one  of  their  concerns  the  argument  holds.   59  Most   fail   to   understand   how   arbitrary   differences   in   what   economists   call   the   “marginal   revenue   product”  of  different  categories  of  labour  truly  are,  and  how  little  of  those  differences  are  due  to  how   hard  people  work.  Not  only  do  differences  in  talent,  education,  and  training  come  into  play,  differences   in   the   quantity   and   quality   of   complimentary   inputs,   and   differences   in   the   scarcity   of   different   categories  of  labour  are  all  important  in  determining  differences  in  marginal  revenue  products  of  labour.   The  important  point  is  that  unlike  the  amount  of  effort  someone  puts  into  his  or  her  work,  all  these   other  influences  on  the  value  of  output  are  largely  beyond  an  individual’s  control.   Robin  Hahnel   market  system  to  reward  people  unfairly,  or,  if  we  try  to  correct  for  inequities  we   must  tolerate  even  greater  inefficiencies.60     Democracy:  When  all  else  fails  –  when  they  can  no  longer  claim  that  markets  lead   to  efficient  or  equitable  outcomes  –  enthusiasts  fall  back  on  the  claim  that  free   markets  promote  economic  and  political  democracy.  But  this  defence  of  markets   does  not  stand  up  under  analysis  any  better  than  the  others.  Once  we  realise  that   economic   freedom   –   the   freedom   to   do   as   you   wish   with   your   person   and   property  –  is  quite  different  from  economic  democracy  –  decision  making  power   in   proportion   to   the   degree   one   is   affected   -­‐-­‐   the   case   that   markets   promote   economic   democracy   quickly   unravels.   Markets   disenfranchise   “third   parties”   affected  by  decisions  a  buyer  and  seller  agree  on.  In  a  market  “election”  to  decide   what  goods  to  produce  a  wealthy  person  gets  to  vote  thousands  of  times  more   than  a  poor  person.  Pretending  that  when  market  exchanges  are  voluntary  there   can  be  no  coercion  ignores  the  fact  that  a  buyer  or  seller  is  often  in  a  position  to   impose  his  will  on  the  other  who  may  have  severely  limited  “outside”  options.   Finally,  as  every  child  knows,  unequal  economic  power  breeds  unequal  political   power,  so  Milton  Friedman’s  defence  of  markets  on  grounds  that  the  economic   inequality  markets  generate  is  a  virtue  because  any  political  cause  can  appeal  for   support  from  a  wealthy  benefactor  is  patently  absurd.61     Markets  Never?     In  a  song  in  a  famous  Gilbert  &  Sullivan  opera  the  captain  of  the  H.M.S.  Pinafore   insists  that  he  never  swears  when  talking  to  his  crew.  His  crew  responds,  “What   never?”  to  which  the  captain  replies,  “Not  ever!”  to  which  his  crew  asks  again,   “Not  ever?”   to   which   the   captain   finally   replies   “…   Well,  hardly  ever.”  Erik's   position  is  that  to  deny  that  markets  should  feature  in  an  economic  system  even   hardly  ever   is   misguided   and   inflexible.   In   his   words,  because   “there   will   necessarily  be  many  trade-­‐offs  among  competing  values…  markets,  in  one  form  or   another,   are   likely   to   be   a   desirable   part   of   solutions   to   some   of   the   design   problems.”   He  argues   that   markets   may   be  “a   desirable   part   of   solutions”  to   problems   that   a   participatory   economy   would   encounter.   Given   that   a   participatory  economy  is  designed  to  eliminate  the  need  for  markets,  if  it  can  be   60  For  my  full  argument  regarding  equity  see  “Against  the  Market  Economy,”  Monthly  Review  (59,  8),   January  2008.   61     For   my   full   argument   regarding   democracy   see   “Why   the   Market   Subverts   Democracy,”  American   Behavioral  Scientist  (52,  7),  March  2009:  1006  –  1022.   Breaking  With  Capitlaism   103 shown   that   they   are   needed   even   here,   it   appears   to   follow   that   they   are   unavoidable  in  any  system.  The  two  situations  he  identifies  as  requiring  markets   are  (1)   during   the   implementation   of   the   plan   where   coarse   categories   are   refined,  and  adjustments  to  unanticipated  circumstances  are  made,  and  (2)  for   the  exchange  of  second  hand  goods  and  tickets  for  entertainment  events.   In  round  one  I  explained  how  refining  coarse  categories  and  making  adjustments   to  a  comprehensive  plan  could  be  done  as  the  plan  was  being  implemented.  My   purpose   at   the   time   was   to   refute   the   claim   that   practical   problems   of   implementation  were  overwhelming  and  without  solution,  thereby  rendering  any   kind   of   comprehensive   planning   impossible,   or   at   least   highly   undesirable,   by   outlining   several   solutions,   any   of   which   would   be   adequate.   In   doing   so   I   identified   the   important   questions   to   consider   when   choosing   among   different   possibilities:  (a)  to  what  extent  producers  or  consumers  will  bear  the  burden  of   adjustments,  and  (b)  whether  customers  who  change  their  demand  for  a  good  are   treated  any  differently  from  customers  who  did  not.  I  went  on  to  point  out  that   adjustments  in  supply  and  demand  could  be  made  with  or  without  adjusting  the   planned   “indicative”   price   used   to   credit   producers   and   charge   buyers,   with   different  implications  for  who  was  bearing  the  burden  of  making  adjustments.  So,   is  it  true  that  in  a  participatory  economy  we  never  have  any  markets?   The  easy  answer  would  be  to  take  my  queue  from  the  captain  of  the  Pinafore  and   sing  “…  well,  hardly  ever.”  And  if  anyone  wants  to  claim  this  means  there  may  be   a  desirable  role  for  markets  in  a  participatory  economy,  so  be  it.  However,  as  I   pointed   out   when   discussing   the   pros   and   cons   of   adjusting   prices,   in   a   participatory   economy   the   purpose   of   making   or   not   making   adjustments   in   prices,  and  how  much  to  adjust  them,  is  to  share  the  burdens  of  adjustments  to   the  plan  more  equitably.  I  also  explained  three  reasons  why  I  do  not  believe  in   this  case  just  because  it  may  “look  like  a  market  and  smell  like  a  market,”  it  truly  is   a  market  in  any  meaningful  sense,  which  I  need  not  repeat  here  because  readers   can  revisit  those  arguments  in  my  second  contribution  to  the  first  round  of  our   dialogue  if  need  be.   As   for   the   second   situation,   exchanging   second   hand   goods   and   tickets   for   entertainment   events   have   nothing   to   do   with   what   goods   to   produce,   what   events  to  schedule,  or  how  many  seats  of  different  qualities  there  should  be  at   events.  So  these  exchanges  have  nothing  to  do  with  any  decisions  that  planning   addresses.   However,   Erik   is   correct   that   absent   alternative   solutions   that   are   equally  convenient  people  will  want  to  trade  used  goods  and  tickets,  as  many  do   Robin  Hahnel   today   over   ebay.   Again,   the   easy  response  would   be  “…   well  hardly  ever,”   and  concede  that  markets  may  have  a  role  to  play  here  as  well.  And  when  the   time   comes   if   people   want   an   ebay   in   a   participatory   economy,   I   am   not   so   “inflexible”  as  to  object.   However,  even  in  this  very  limited  context  that  has  nothing  to  do  with  deciding   what   to   produce,   how   to   produce   it,   or   how   to   distribute   what   has   just   been   produced,  I  think  it  is  worth  considering  non-­‐market  alternatives,  or,  at  the  very   least,   monitoring   an   ebay   “solution”   to   prevent   inequities   and   discourage   antisocial  behaviour.  A  leading  figure  in  Parecon  Sweden  is  currently  working  on  a   proposal  for  how  to  credit  people  for  returning  used  goods  to  distribution  centres   where  redistribution  can  then  be  handled  through  normal  participatory  economic   procedures.   And   a   leading   figure   in   the   International   Organization   for   a   Participatory  Society,  IOPS,  in  the  UK  is  setting  up  an  ebay  for  cooperatives  to  use   that   helps   them   express   cooperative   values   concretely   in   exchanges   among   themselves   and   minimise   inequities   and   dangers   of   anti-­‐social   behaviour.   I   am   happy   there   are   others   sufficiently   concerned   over   whether   or   not   convenient   trading   can   foster   antisocial   behaviour   to   be   looking   for   alternatives   even   in   situations  like  those  Erik  has  raised.   The  Socialist  Case  Against  Markets   The   dispassionate   case   against   markets   is   clearly   not   enough.   Erik   was   already   aware  of  the  dispassionate  arguments  that  markets  are  inefficient,  inequitable,   and  anti-­‐democratic  which  I  and  others  have  voiced,  when  he  wrote:  “I  do  not  see   market  transactions  as  such  as  intrinsically  undesirable.  What  is  undesirable  are   two  things  that  are  generally  strongly  linked  to  markets:  first,  the  ways  in  which   markets  can  enable  people  and  organisations  with  specific  kinds  of  power  to  gain   advantages  over  others,  and  second,  the  way  markets,  if  inadequately  regulated,   generate  all  sorts  of  destructive  externalities  and  harms  on  people.  But  if  those   problems   are   minimised   through   various   mechanisms,   then   the   sheer   fact   of   buyers  and  sellers  of  goods  and  services  agreeing  to  exchange  things  at  a  mutually   agreed-­‐upon  price  is  not,  in  and  of  itself,  objectionable.”  The  problem  with  this   attitude  –  which  the  dispassionate  case  against  markets  is  powerless  to  affect  –  is   that  it  is  insufficiently  fearful.   This  attitude  mistakenly  assumes  that  only  the  bad  outcomes  are  problematic  –   the   inefficiencies,   inequities,   and   violations   of   democracy   –   which   therefore   should   be   addressed   through   appropriate   means.   However,   beyond   the   bad   outcomes  there  is  a  more  fundamental  problem.  I  tried  to  flag  this  problem  in  the   Breaking  With  Capitlaism   105 first  round  of  our  dialogue  by  expressing  my  concern  in  a  very  simple  way:  “When   a  division  of  labour  is  coordinated  by  markets  those  who  take  advantage  of  others   are  often  rewarded  while  those  who  behave  in  socially  responsible  ways  are  often   punished   for   having   done   so.   For   this   reason   markets   act   like   a   cancer   that   undermines   efforts   to   build   and   deepen   participatory,   equitable   cooperation.”   Why?   In  every  market  transaction  the  seller  is  trying  to  take  advantage  of  the  buyer,  and   the  buyer  is  trying  to  take  advantage  of  the  seller.  If  we  play  “word  association”   and   say   “market”   economists   are   likely   to   respond   with   “mutual   benefit,”   whereas   normal   people   would   be   more   likely   to   respond   with   “haggle.”   The   problem   is   not   that   one   response   is   right   and   one   is   wrong.   The   problem   is   that  both  responses  are  correct!  Moreover,  in  every  market  transaction  both  the   buyer  and  seller  have  every  incentive  to  ignore  the  interests  of  anyone  else  who   might  be  affected  by  their  decision.  This  is  not  only  undemocratic  and  inefficient,   it  is  a  second  way  in  which  market  relations  not  only  fail  to  provide  means  for   people  to  take  the  interests  of  others  into  account,  they  systematically  punish  any   who  attempt  to  practice  solidarity.  In  other  words,  markets  “work”  by  stimulating   greed   and   fear   while   undermining   trust   and   solidarity   needed   to   build   the   economics  of  equitable  cooperation.  In  short,  markets  are  cancer  to  the  socialist   project.   I  use  the  word  “cancer”  not  to  evoke  powerful  negative  emotions,  but  because   cancer  begins  as  a  small  malignancy,  a  cellular  dysfunction,  which  spreads  until  it   destroys  an  entire  organism.  And  that  is  the  image  I  wished  to  convey  for  why  we   should   fear   permitting   markets   to   continue   to   play   a   role   in   a   truly   desirable   economy.  That  is  why  we  should  search  for  other  ways  to  respond  to  situations   that   make   markets   tempting.   As   Erik   pointed   out,   people  will  spontaneously   engage  in  market  behaviour,  and  using  markets  for  particular  purposes  even  in  an   economy  where  what  to  produce  and  how  to  produce  it  is  first  determined  by  a   comprehensive   production   plan,  will  often   appear   convenient.   So   it   is   easy   to   understand  why  people  may  feel  that  objecting  to  even  “a  dash”  of  markets  is   overly  zealous  and  inflexible.  Which  would  indeed  be  true  if  a  dash  of  markets   were  like  a  dash  of  salt.  But  if  instead  a  dash  of  markets  is  like  a  dash  of  cancer   that  can  spread  to  undermine  the  socialist  project,  that  is  quite  another  matter   altogether.   In  a  sense  this  is  a  debate  over  what  is  a  realistic  attitude  regarding  markets.  Is   there  good  reason  to  fear  them?  The  dispassionate  case  against  markets  refutes   Robin  Hahnel   every  positive  claim  made  on  markets  behalf  except  that  people  often  find  them   convenient,  which  I  do  not  deny.  But  when  presented  in  this  way  the  case  against   markets  fails  to  convey  what  I  believe  is  a  fully  warranted  sense  of  danger.  And   acknowledging  that  there  are  policies  available  to  mitigate  damages,  which  I  also   do   not   deny,   leaves   the   impression   that   in   a   world   that   is   inevitably   imperfect   some   markets   can   hardly   be   problematic.  This   is   the   attitude   of   someone   who   argues  that  markets  are  not  intrinsically  bad,  it  is  only  the  negative  consequences   of  markets,  not  markets  themselves  that  are  problematic.  Nobody  would  say  that   about  cancer.  This  is  the  attitude  of  someone  who  points  out  that  we  can  correct   for   inequities,   externalities,   and   market   disequilibria,   even   if   only   imperfectly.   Nobody   would   agree   to   introduce   a   little   cancer   if   it   were   convenient   because   chemotherapy   treatments   are   available.   This   is   the   attitude   of   someone   who   reasons   there   must   surely   be   a   role   for   markets   as   well   as   planning   in   the   “optimal”  economy  because  planning  has  its  weaknesses  as  well  as  strengths,  just   as   markets   do.   Nobody   would   say   that   an   optimal   life   includes   exposure   to   cancer.     While  this  is  not  the  place  to  go  into  particulars,  I  believe  there  is  overwhelming   historical  evidence  to  back  my  fears.  Despite  strong  measures  favouring  worker   self-­‐management   and   retention   of   public   ownership,   because   the   Basic   Law   of   Worker  Self-­‐Management  also  replaced  planning  with  markets  in  1951  it  gave  rise   to   increasingly   anti-­‐social   behaviour   and   rising   inequality   in   Yugoslavia.   Market   reforms   which   retained   public   ownership   but   did   not   grant   workers   self-­‐ management  in  the  Soviet  Union,  Eastern  Europe,  China,  and  Vietnam  invariably   generated   similar   anti-­‐social   behaviour   and   rising   inequality.   And   the   dilemma   worker-­‐owned   cooperatives   face   as   they   try   to   reconcile   commercial   and   cooperative  goals  when  subjected  to  market  competition  are  well  documented.     REAL  UTOPIAS  AND  TRANSFORMATION   While  Erik  and  I  use  different  language  our  thinking  about  what  he  calls  “social   transformation”   and   I   call   “transition   strategy”   is   very   similar.   Erik   talks   of   “ruptural”  vs.  “symbiotic”  strategies.  I  talk  of  “system  change”  vs.  “reform,”  and   how   radicals   and   reformers   better   learn   to   work   more   productively   with   each   other.   Erik   talks   of   “interstitial”   strategies.   I   talk   of   creating   “imperfect   experiments  in  equitable  cooperation,”  or  “prefigurative”  organising.  But  we  are   talking   about   the   same   things,   making   the   same   distinctions,   and   for   the   most   part   we   come   to   the   same   conclusions.   Since   I   concur   with   Erik’s   summary   Breaking  With  Capitlaism   107 evaluation  of  the  historical  record  regarding  weaknesses  in  each  strategy,  I  will   concentrate  on  digging  deeper  into  why  each  has  failed  historically.   Regarding  ruptural  strategies,  Erik  writes:     Ruptural  strategies  have  a  grandiose,  romantic  appeal  to  critics  of  capitalism,  but  the   historical  record  is  pretty  dismal.  There  are  no  cases  in  which  socialism  as  defined  here  –   a  deeply  democratic  and  egalitarian  organisation  of  power  relations  within  an  economy   –   has   been   a   robust   result   of   a   ruptural   strategy   of   transformation   of   capitalism.   Ruptural  strategies  seem  in  practice  more  prone  to  result  in  authoritarian  statism  than   democratic  socialism.   True,   but   the   important   question   is   why?   Many   conclude   that   “ruptural,”   or   wholesale   system   change   is   incompatible   with   changes   that   are   “deeply   democratic  and  egalitarian.”  I  think  the  problem  lies  elsewhere  if  a  build  up  to   “ruptural”   system   change   does   not   involve   enough   people   fighting   for   reforms   and   lacks   enough   experiments   creating   institutions   that   “prefigure”   deeply   democratic   and   egalitarian   behaviour.  Overall,   therefore,   I   am   more   positive   about   the   prospects   of   ruptural   strategies   when   movements   committed   to   democratic   societies   prepare   for   them   properly   –   which   is   fortunate   because   I   also  believe  they  are  more  likely  to  play  a  necessary  role  in  achieving  desirable   “system  change”  as  explained  below.     As  for  interstitial  strategies,  Erik  writes  that  they  “may  produce  improvements  in   the  lives  of  people  and  pockets  of  more  democratic  egalitarian  practices,  but  they   also  have  nowhere  succeeded  in  significantly  eroding  capitalist  power  relations.”   True,  but  again  the  important  question  is  why?  I  think  it  is  because  concentrating   exclusively  on  building  prefigurative  institutions  has  two  predictable  pitfalls:  First   and   foremost,   exclusive   focus   on   building   alternatives   to   capitalism   is   too   isolating.  Until  the  non-­‐capitalist  sector  is  large,  the  livelihoods  of  most  people   will   depend   on   winning   reforms   in   the   capitalist   sector,   and   therefore   that   is   where   most   people   will   become   engaged.   But   concentrating   exclusively   on   experiments   in   equitable   cooperation   will   also   not   work   because   the   rules   of   capitalism   put   alternative   institutions   at   a   disadvantage   compared   to   capitalist   firms  they  must  compete  against,  and  because  market  forces  drive  non-­‐capitalist   institutions   to   abandon   cooperative   principles.   Unlike   liberated   territories   in   third-­‐world   countries   fighting   to   overthrow   imperialism   last   century,   in   the   advanced   economies   we   will   have   to   build   our   experiments   in   equitable   cooperation  inside  our  capitalist  economies.  So  our  experiments  will  always  be   fully  exposed  to  competitive  pressures  and  the  culture  of  capitalism.  Maintaining   cooperative  principles  in  alternative  experiments  under  these  conditions  requires   Robin  Hahnel   high  levels  of  political  commitment,  which  it  is  reasonable  to  expect  from  activists   committed  to  building  “a  new  world,”  but  unreasonable  to  expect  from  everyone.   Erik  writes  about  the  failures  of  reform  organising  at  greater  length:   As  for  symbiotic  strategies,  in  the  most  successful  instances  of  social  democracy  they   have  certainly  resulted  in  a  more  humane  capitalism,  with  less  poverty,  less  inequality,   and  less  insecurity,  but  they  have  done  so  in  ways  which  stabilise  capitalism  and  leave   intact  the  core  powers  of  capital.  Any  advance  of  symbiotic  strategies  historically  that   appeared  to  potentially  threaten  those  core  powers  was  massively  resisted  by  capital.   The  reaction  of  Swedish  capitalists  to  proposals  for  serious  union  involvement  in  control   over   investment   in   the   late   1970s   is   one   of   the   best   known   examples.   These   are   all   reasonable  objections.   In  my  own  critique  of  Swedish  social  democracy62  I  also  finger  the  failure  to  push   through   with   the   Meidner   plan   and   wage   earner   fund   in   the   mid-­‐1970s,   when   progressive   forces   arguably   had   Swedish   capitalists   “on   the   run,”   as   a   critical   mistake.   Progressives   should   have   disarmed   Swedish   capitalists   by   taking   away   their  power  over  jobs  and  investment.  Whether  Swedish  social  democrats  could   have  won  a  political  “stare  down”  with  Swedish  capitalists  in  1975  we  will  never   know  because  they  never  tried.  But  with  hindsight  we  do  know  that  the  rollback   of   social   democratic   reforms   that   took   decades   to   win   began   soon   afterwards,   and  neoliberalism  in  Sweden  has  become  ever  more  ascendant.  More  generally  I   point   to   what   Michael   Harrington   called   the   “grand   social   democratic   compromise,”   which   he   defined   as   “settling   for   a   situation   in   which   social   democrats   would   regulate   and   tax   capitalism   but   not   challenge   it   in   any   fundamental  way.”  However,  I  believe  not  even  Harrington  appreciated  the  full   consequences  of  the  compromise.  It  is  one  thing  to  say:  We  are  committed  to   democracy  above  all  else.  Therefore  we  promise  that  as  long  as  a  majority  of  the   population  does  not  want  to  replace  capitalism  we  have  no  intentions  of  trying  to   do  so.  It  is  quite  another  thing  to  say:  Despite  our  best  efforts  we  have  failed  to   convince   a   majority   of   the   population   that   capitalism   is   fundamentally   incompatible   with   economic   justice   and   democracy   and   environmental   sustainability.  Therefore  we  will  cease  to  challenge  the  legitimacy  of  the  capitalist   system  and  confine  our  efforts  to  reforming  it.  The  first  position  is  one  I  believe   the  movement  for  equitable  cooperation  must  abide  by  in  the  future,  while  the   second  is  one  we  must  learn  from  history  to  reject.   62  See   chapter   five,   “Social   Democracy:   Losing   the   Faith,”   in  Economic   Justice   and   Democracy:   From   Competition  to  Cooperation  (Routledge,  2005).   Breaking  With  Capitlaism   109 In  any  case,  reforms  alone  cannot  achieve  equitable  cooperation  because  as  long   as  the  institutions  of  private  enterprise  and  markets  are  left  in  place  to  reinforce   anti-­‐social   behaviour   based   on   greed   and   fear,   progress   toward   equitable   cooperation  will  be  limited,  and  the  danger  of  retrogression  will  be  ever  present.   Moreover,   reform   campaigns   undermine   their   leaders’   commitment   to   full   economic   justice   and   democracy   in   a   number   of   ways,   and   do   little   to   demonstrate  that  equitable  cooperation  is  possible,  or  establish  new  norms  and   expectations.   However,   most   importantly   I   agree   with   Erik’s   conclusion   about   what   the   best   strategy  seems  to  be  for  the  moment,  at  least  in  the  United  States:  “I  think  the   best   prospect   for   the   future   in   developed   capitalist   countries   is   a   strategic   orientation   mainly   organised   around   the   interplay   of   interstitial   and   symbiotic   strategies,   with   perhaps   periodic   episodes   involving   elements   of   ruptural   strategy.”   I   have   argued   at   length   elsewhere   that   in   the   United   States:   (1)   Desirable  system  change  –  a  “ruptural  transformation”  –  will  not  come  until  we   have   strengthened   our   forces   through   much   more   successful   reform   and   prefigurative   organising.   (2)   Reform   and   prefigurative   organising   each   play   a   critical   role   the   other   cannot.   And   (3)   each   of   these   kinds   of   organising   help   counter  the  predictable  pitfalls  of  the  other  when  pursued  alone.63     Erik   also   sees   symbiotic   and   interstitial   organising   complementing   each   other:   “Through   interstitial   strategies   activists   and   communities   can   build   and   strengthen  real  utopian  economic  institutions  embodying  democratic  egalitarian   principles  where  this  is  possible.  Symbiotic  strategies  through  the  state  can  help   open  up  greater  space  and  support  for  these  interstitial  innovations.  The  interplay   between   interstitial   and   symbiotic   strategies   could   then   create   a   trajectory   of   deepening  socialist  elements  within  the  hybrid  capitalist  economic  ecosystem.”  I   agree  -­‐  reform  campaigns  counteract  the  tendency  for  prefigurative  projects  to  be   self-­‐isolating,   while   expanding   experiments   in   equitable   cooperation   helps   activists  fighting  for  system  change  “keep  the  faith,”  demonstrates  concretely  to   sceptics  that  equitable  cooperation  works,  and  allows  us  to  discover  how  we  can   cooperate  with  one  another  more  effectively  through  experimentation.   Erik  and  I  both  understand  that  elites  can  force  confrontation.  He  writes:  “While   elites   may   become   resigned   to   a   diminution   of   power,   they   are   unlikely   to   63  For  a  more  extensive  presentation  of  my  suggestions  regarding  transition  strategy  see  the  last  four   chapters  of  Economic  Justice  and  Democracy:  From  Competition  to  Cooperation  (Routledge,  2005).   Robin  Hahnel   gracefully   embrace   the   prospects.   While   symbiotic   transformations   help   solve   problems   within   capitalism,   they   often   are   not   optimal   for   elites   and   are   thus   resisted.  This  means  that  a  key  element  of  ruptural  strategies  –  confrontations   between  opposing  organised  social  forces  in  which  there  are  winners  and  losers  –   will  be  a  part  of  any  plausible  trajectory  of  sustainable  social  empowerment.”  As  I   have  already  said,  we  should  not  be  surprised  if  elites  refuse  to  abide  by  majority   opinion  when  reform  and  prefigurative  organising  threatens  their  privileges  and   power,  and  we  should  not  hesitate  to  disarm  them  precisely  in  order  to  be  able  to   continue  with  programs  that  have  majority  support.  However,  I  am  disappointed   with  Erik’s  formulation  of  how  we  should  behave  when  such  situations  arise:  “The   purpose  of  such  confrontations,  however,  is  not  a  systemic  rupture  with  capitalist   dominance,   but   rather   creating   more   space   for   the   interplay   of   interstitial   and   symbiotic   strategies.”   At   some   point   “creating   more   space   for   interplay”   must   give   way   to   “a   systemic   rupture   with   capitalist   dominance,”   which   means   abolishing   the   institutional   basis   for   their   dominance,   the   private   enterprise   market  system.  When  decisive  moments  come  one  either  defeats  an  enemy  and   disarms  him  to  prevent  war  from  erupting  anew,  or  one  fails  to  do  so.  In  moments   of   confrontation   unfortunately   in   my   opinion   those   with   a   personal   inclination   toward   symbiotic   and   interstitial   strategies   are   all   too   likely   to   make   the   same   mistake  Swedish  social  democrats  made  in  1975.  At  moments  when  those  who   hesitate   are   lost   leadership   with   more   “ruptural   inclinations”   becomes   more   socially  useful.  Why,  when  we  get  the  chance,  should  we  hesitate  to  drive  our   stake  through  the  vampire’s  heart?     CONCLUSION   Erik  writes  in  his  conclusion:     Instead   of   a   unitary   institutional   design…the   configurations   of   social   empowerment   open   up   space   for   a   wide   diversity   of   institutional   forms….   These   diverse   forms   all   increase  social  power,  but  they  do  not  point  to  an  integrated,  comprehensive  system   driven   by   a   single   institutional   design   principle   of   the   sort   proposed   by   Robin   in   his   analysis  of  participatory  economics.   I   hope   it   is   clear   by   now   that   I   not   only   regard   “institutional   pluralism  in   transition,”   including   markets,   as   a   practical   necessity,   but   also   appreciate   that   pluralism  in  transition  provides  a  valuable  way  to  test  different  ideas  about  how   best   to   organise   economic   activities.   However,   in   my   opinion   “institutional   Breaking  With  Capitlaism   111 pluralism  of  the  destination”  can  be  an  excuse  for  imprecise  reasoning  which  fails   to  follow  assumptions  through  to  their  logical  conclusions.   In   today’s   world   an   alternative   economic   “vision”   needs   to   accomplish   three   goals:  (1)  It  must  open  people’s  eyes  to  the  possibility  of  a  much  more  desirable   way  of  organising  our  economic  activities.  In  other  words,  it  must  be  inspiring.  (2)   It   must   answer   reasonable   doubts   about   whether   or   not   the   “vision”   is   a   real   possibility  rather  than  merely  a  fantasy  arising  from  bitter  disappointment  –  much   like   the   concept   of   heaven.   To   do   this   it   must   demonstrate   concretely   how   questions  that  must  be  answered  in  any  economy  could  be  answered,  and  how   problems   that   will   inevitably   arise   could   be   addressed.   In   other   words,   it   must   convince   people   the   vision   is   feasible   for   humans   who   are   both   self   and   other   regarding.   And   (3)   it   must   challenge   popular   misconceptions   about   what   is   consistent  or  inconsistent  with  our  goals.  In  other  words,  it  must  help  clarify  what   the   pursuit   of   economic   justice   and   democracy   as   well   as   environmental   sustainability  require.   While   Erik   no   longer   misinterprets   the   model   of   a   participatory   economy   as   a   strategic   transitional   program,   I   think   he   still   underestimates   the   usefulness   of   elaborating   rigorous   models   of   future   economic   systems.  I   conclude   my   contribution   to   our   dialogue   by   reminiscing   about   reactions   the   model   of   a   participatory  economy  has  provoked  over  the  past  two  decades,  which  indirectly   testifies  to  the  value  and  limits  of  this  kind  of  intellectual  exercise.   Over   the   past   twenty   years   I   have   sometimes   had   to   respond   to   criticisms   I   anticipated.  I  expected  people  to  challenge  our  proposal  to  base  any  differences   in   income   on   differences   in   workers’   efforts   as   judged   by   co-­‐workers.   And   I   expected  people  to  question  the  desirability  of  balancing  jobs  for  empowerment.   And   over   the   past   two   decades   many   have   questioned   the   wisdom   of   asking   worker  councils  to  reward  effort  and  balance  jobs  for  empowerment  –  although   Erik  does  not.  However,  since  it  was  widely  believed  that  in  a  modern  economy   with   an   elaborate   division   of   labour   there   simply   is   no   alternative   to   a   market   system  or  authoritarian  comprehensive  planning,  I  expected  people  to  challenge   our   claim   to   have   found   a   highly   democratic   way   to   arrive   at   an   efficient   comprehensive  economic  plan.  However,  few  have  challenged  our  claim  that  the   participatory  planning  procedure  belies  the  claim  that  there  is  no  alternative  to   markets  and  authoritarian  planning.  And  frankly,  this  has  surprised  me.   I   initially   thought   the   major   stumbling   block   was   that   many   who   were   disenchanted  with  the  market  system  no  longer  believed  there  was  any  feasible   Robin  Hahnel   way  to  engage  in  comprehensive  economic  planning  that  was  not  authoritarian   and/or  inefficient.  So  I  expected  critics  to  challenge  our  claim  to  have  solved  that   problem.  However,  for  the  most  part  critics  have  not  argued  that  our  procedure   will  fail  to  produce  a  feasible  plan.  They  have  not  argued  that  the  plan  arrived  at   would  be  inefficient,  or  that  it  would  fail  to  adequately  protect  the  environment.   Except  for  a  few  anarchists  who  insist  that  the  iteration  facilitation  board  –  which   in  fact  has  no  discretionary  power  whatsoever  –  is  nonetheless  an  authoritarian   central  planning  bureau  in  disguise,  critics  have  not  disputed  that  our  procedure  is   thorough   democratic,   nor   that   it   affords   worker   and   consumer   councils   more   autonomy  than  most  dreamed  democratic  planning  ever  could.   It   is   true   that   some   have   criticised   participatory   planning   as   a   nightmare   of   endless  meetings  where  a  “dictatorship  of  the  sociable”  would  inevitably  end  up   settling  on  an  inefficient  plan.  But  those  who  make  these  arguments  have  either   failed  to  read  our  actual  proposal,  or  utterly  failed  to  comprehend  it.  Those  who   voice   this   criticism   confuse   our   procedure   with   a   common   conception   of   democratic   planning   that   is   completely   different.   We   most   emphatically   do  not  propose   that   worker   and   consumer   councils   send   delegates   lacking   estimates  of  opportunity  and  social  costs  of  making  things  to  meetings  that  would   be  endless,  to  come  up  with  a  comprehensive  plan  which  would  be  inefficient.  In   fact,  we  agree  with  critics  that  any  attempt  to  go  about  comprehensive  economic   planning  in  this  way  would  prove  disastrous,  and  what  we  have  proposed  is  an   alternative  to  this  naïve  and  misguided  notion  of  how  to  organise  comprehensive   planning  democratically.  In  sum,  these  critics  do  not  engage  our  actual  proposal   for   how   to   arrive   at   a   comprehensive   plan,   but   instead   criticise   a   completely   different  idea  we  explicitly  reject.   But   most   criticisms   of   our   planning   proposal   have   nothing   to   do   with   how   we   propose   to   arrive   at   a   comprehensive   plan.   Whether   consciously   or   not,   most   critics   have   challenged   the   desirability   of  any  comprehensive   economic   plan,   independent  of  how  it  is  generated,  or  whatever  desirable  properties  it  may  have.   Most  criticisms  are  about  problems  that  arise  when  we  move  onto  implementing   a   plan.   Critics   ask   how   broad   categories   in   a   comprehensive   plan,   like   shoes,   would   be   turned   into   detailed   items,   like   size   6½   purple   women’s   high-­‐heeled   leatherless  shoes  with  a  yellow  toe.  Some,  like  Seth  Ackerman  writing  in  Jacobin   Magazine,   assume   there   is   no   answer   to   this   question   and   dismiss   all   comprehensive   planning   as   impossible.   Others,   like   Erik,   recognise   that   this   problem  is  not  insurmountable,  but  argue  that  we  will  find  markets  helpful  when   solving  it.  Critics  ask  what  will  happen  when  unforeseen  circumstances  arise  and   Breaking  With  Capitlaism   113 the  plan  needs  to  be  adjusted.  Again,  some  argue  that  market  systems  adjust  far   better  than  planned  economies  to  unforeseen  events,  and  therefore  should  be   preferred  for  this  reason  alone.  Others,  like  Erik,  argue  that  markets  can  help  us   make   necessary   adjustments   in   the   plan,   and   also   handle   exchanges   of   second   hand   goods.   But   none   of   this   has   anything   to   do   with   how   to   come   up   with   a   comprehensive   economic   plan   in   the   first   place   –   which   was   the   problem   we   tackled  initially.   A  part  of  me  feels  like  I  have  won  the  war  I  volunteered  to  fight,  and  would  now   like  to  retire  –  with  full  honours  of  course.  Surely  there  must  be  other  volunteers   willing   to   answer   questions   about   how   best   to   address   practical   problems   that   arise  when  we  start  to  implement  any  comprehensive  economic  plan.  If  we  have   demonstrated  there  is  a  way  to  arrive  at  a  comprehensive  plan  for  the  economy   that  is  not  authoritarian  but  instead  fully  democratic;  if  we  have  demonstrated   the   plan   arrived   at   will   use   resources   efficiently;   if   we   have   shown   that   the   procedure   generates   credible   estimates   of   the   damage   from   pollution   and   charges   polluters   accordingly;   if   we   have   shown   that   the   procedure   generates   credible   estimates   of   social   benefits   and   costs,   allowing   worker   and   consumer   councils   to   self-­‐police   with   little   fanfare;   if   we   have   shown   how   all   this   can   be   done  without  sending  delegates  to  the  kind  of  planning  meetings  that  would  be   unproductive  nightmares…  isn’t  this  enough?  If  not,  who  moved  the  finish  line?   Looking  back  on  questions  critics  have  raised    about  our  planning  proposal  over   the   past   twenty   years   it   is   now   apparent   to   me   that   there   were   always   two   questions,   not   one.   (1)   Is   it   possible   to   arrive   at   a   desirable   comprehensive   national  plan  in  a  desirable  way?  (2)  Is  it  desirable  to  use  comprehensive  plans  to   run  our  economies?  The  first  is  the  question  we  set  out  to  answer  many  years   ago.  But  if  the  answer  to  the  second  question  is  “no”  it  makes  no  difference  what   the  answer  to  the  first  question  is.  There  is  no  reason  to  search  for  a  desirable   process   to   generate   a   desirable   comprehensive   plan   if   we   don’t   want   to   use   a   comprehensive   plan   in   any   case.   On   the   other   hand,   if   the   answer   to   the   first   question   is   “no,”   there   is   no   need   to   consider   the   second   question   if   we   have   already  rejected  authoritarian  planning.   I  believe  the  participatory  planning  procedure  has  now  stood  the  test  of  time  as  a   satisfactory   answer   to   the   first   question.   Yes,   we   can   generate   an   attractive   comprehensive   plan   through   a   process   that   is   quite   appealing.   Which   is   why   I   think  criticisms  of  participatory  planning  are  now  either  criticisms  of  a  planning   procedure  that  is  not  ours,  or  criticisms  of  comprehensive  planning  in  any  form.   Robin  Hahnel   That  is,  criticisms  that  would  apply  equally  to  any  and  all  comprehensive  plans,   irrespective   of   how   they   were   generated   or   how   desirable   their   properties.   As   long  as  people  believed  the  answer  to  the  first  question  was  “no”  they  did  not   have  to  think  about  the  second  question.  On  the  other  hand,  people  would  not  be   raising  questions  about  implementing  comprehensive  plans  if  they  did  not  now   accept   the   possibility   of   generating   a   desirable   comprehensive   plan   through   a   process  that  is  also  desirable.   So  while  I  anticipated  having  to  defend  the  virtues  of  the  participatory  planning   procedure   over   alternative   ways   of   arriving   at   a   comprehensive   plan,   instead   I   have   more   often   had   to   defend   comprehensive   planning   in   general   as   an   alternative   to   a   market   system.   In   this   dialogue   and   elsewhere   I   have   tried   to   respond   to   questions   people   raise   about   how   comprehensive   plans   can   be   implemented  and  adjusted.  In  truth  I  find  this  an  odd  exercise  since  a  number  of   large   national   economies   implemented   comprehensive   economic   plans   successfully  for  many  decades  during  the  twentieth  century.  But  memories  are   short,  confusion  over  what  went  wrong  and  what  did  not  in  the  centrally  planned   economies   runs   rampant,   and   most   who   ask   such   questions   never   lived   in   anything  other  than  a  market  economy  themselves  and  therefore  understandably   have  little  sense  of  how  a  non-­‐market  system  works.  But  I  should  be  clear:  I  treat   these   problems   as   practical   problems   for   which   we   must   only   find   adequate   answers.   Because   provided   there   are   adequate   answers   we   need   not   abandon   comprehensive  planning  –  which  we  have  good  reasons  to  prefer  provided  it  can   be  done  democratically  and  efficiently  –  in  favour  of  a  market  system  –  which  we   have  good  reasons  for  rejecting.  In  other  words,  for  me  solutions  to  problems  of   implementation   and   adjustment   need   not   be   perfect,   but   only   adequate.   And   when  there  are  multiple  ways  to  implement  and  adjust  plans  I  believe  not  only   convenience,   but   the   possibility   of   generating   antisocial   behaviour   should   be   carefully  considered.   FINAL  THOUGHTS     Erik  Olin  Wright       In  my  final  contribution  to  this  dialogue  on  alternatives  to  capitalism  I  will  focus   on  a  number  of  specific  ways  in  which  Robin’s  approach  to  these  matters  differs   from  my  own.  It  should  certainly  be  clear  to  everyone  that  our  dialogue  is  not   antagonistic.    There  are,  to  be  sure,  some  real  differences  in  our  judgments,  but   these  are  disagreements  within  a  common  project  of  trying  to  grapple  with  the   problem  of  thinking  beyond  capitalism.    The  convergence  of  our  views  is  much   more  fundamental  than  these  points  of  disagreement.  In  particular  we  share  a   common  critique  of  capitalism,  a  common  understanding  of  the  central  values  we   would  like  to  see  realised  in  a  post-­‐capitalist  society,  and  a  common  commitment   to   progressive   reform   within   capitalism   as   a   necessary   part   of   the   (possible)   transformation   beyond   capitalism.   Within   this   context   of   such   shared   understandings,  what  I  hope  to  do  here  is  not  mainly  defend  my  positions  against   Robin’s  last  piece,  but  rather  revisit  a  variety  of  themes  we  have  been  discussing   throughout  this  dialogue  to  give  as  much  precision  as  I  can  to  the  nature  of  our   remaining  disagreements.     1.  What  is  wrong  with  markets?   In  Robin’s  comment  on  my  approach  to  socialism  and  real  utopias  he  correctly   identifies  our  disagreement  over  the  moral  implications  of  markets.  Both  of  us   agree  that  unfettered  markets  systematically  generate  negative  consequences  –   especially   negative   externalities,   intensifications   of   inequalities,   and   concentrations   of   power.   And   we   both   argue   that   these   consequences   can   be   mitigated   by   appropriate   countermeasures   (although   perhaps   I   am   more   optimistic  than  Robin  about  the  extent  to  which  the  pontential  harms  of  markets   can   be   prevented   with   appropriate   public   policies).     We   also   both   believe   that   whatever  problems  there  are  with  markets  as  such  are  intensified  in  capitalism.   Where  we  differ  is  in  our  assessment  of  whether  in  addition  to  these  side-­‐effects   of   markets,   markets   are   intrinsically   harmful   to   central   values   of   a   democratic   egalitarian  society,  especially  the  value  of  solidarity.  Here  is  how  Robin  formulates   this  issue:   Erik  Olin  Wright   In  every  market  transaction  the  seller  is  trying  to  take  advantage  of  the  buyer,  and  the   buyer   is   trying   to   take   advantage   of   the   seller….   In   other   words,   markets   “work”   by   stimulating  greed  and  fear  while  undermining  trust  and  solidarity  needed  to  build  the   economics   of   equitable   cooperation.   In   short,   markets   are   cancer   to   the   socialist   project.     …..As  Erik  pointed  out,  people  will  spontaneously  engage  in  market  behaviour,  and  using   markets  for  particular  purposes  even  in  an  economy  where  what  to  produce  and  how  to   produce   it   is   first   determined   by   a   comprehensive   production   plan,  will  often   appear   convenient.  So  it  is  easy  to  understand  why  people  may  feel  that  objecting  to  even  “a   dash”  of  markets  is  overly  zealous  and  inflexible.  Which  would  indeed  be  true  if  a  dash   of  markets  were  like  a  dash  of  salt.  But  if  instead  a  dash  of  markets  is  like  a  dash  of   cancer  that  can  spread  to  undermine  the  socialist  project,  that  is  quite  another  matter   altogether.   ….The   dispassionate   case   against   markets   refutes   every   positive   claim   made   for   markets,  except  that  people  often  find  them  convenient,  which  I  do  not  deny….Nobody   would  say  that  an  optimal  life  includes  a  proper  dose  of  cancer.   The  metaphor  of  cancer,  of  course,  is  a  powerfully  evocative  way  of  characterising   markets  as  having  intrinsic  harms,  but  is  this  really  apt?64  Is  it  true  that  fear  and   greed   are   inherently   the   motivational   states   of   actors   engaged   in   voluntary,   uncoordinated,   decentralised   agreements   to   produce   and   sell   things   to   each   other?   Is   it   true   that   engaging   in   market   practices   between   consenting   adults   necessarily  embodies  and  fosters  antisocial  values?   Before  directly  engaging  this  question,  I  would  like  to  make  a  side  point  on  the   metaphor  of  markets-­‐as-­‐cancer.  An  alternative  metaphor  would  be  markets-­‐as-­‐ carcinogenic-­‐agents  rather  than  as  cancer  itself.  In  this  alternative  metaphor,  the   presence  of  markets  poses  some  risks,  one  of  which  is  the  fostering  of  antisocial   norms  and  behaviour.  But  it  is  no  longer  the  case  that  one  can  unequivocally  say   that  no  one  would  choose  a  “dash  of  risk”,  even  in  the  case  of  a  risk  for  cancer.     Indeed,   in   Robin’s   own   analysis   of   participatory   planning   he   argues   that   under   conditions   of   strong   equality   and   democratic   empowerment,   people   in   a   community  ought  to  be  able  to  opt  for  whatever  level  of  pollution  they  want  so   64  Robin’s  co-­‐author  in  the  development  of  the  participatory  economics  model,  Michael  Albert,  uses  an   even   more   provocative   metaphor   to   describe   the   presence   of   markets   in   an   otherwise   participatory   economy.  He  sees  markets  like  slavery:  “Having  a  little  markets  in  a  parecon  is  a  bit  like  having  a  little   slavery   in   a   democracy,   though   even   less   tenable.   The   logic   of   markets   invalidates   the   logic   of   participatory  planning  and  of  the  whole  parecon,  and  it  is  also  imperial,  once  it  exists  trying  to  spread  as   far  as  wide  as  it  can.”  (Michael  Albert,  Parecon,  Verso,  2003,  p.79).      Final  Thoughts   117 long  as  they  are  properly  compensated  for  this  by  the  polluters.  This  is  a  critical  –   and   I   would   add   valuable   –   aspect   of   the   iterative   planning   process   between   producers  and  people  in  the  broader  society  affected  by  the  externalities  of  the   production  process  since  it  forces  producers  to  take  into  account  the  full  social   costs  of  their  production.65  I  endorse  that  aspect  of  Robin’s  model  as  part  of  his   deep   effort   to   realise   the   democratic   value   that   people   ought   to   participate   in   decisions   to   the   extent   that   they   are   affected   by   the   consequences   of   those   decisions.  The  implication  of  this  commitment  to  democratic  values,  however,  is   that  there  is  nothing  strange  about  voluntarily  choosing  a  certain  level  of  risk  for   cancer  (since  pollution  often  brings  such  risks)  given  the  trade-­‐offs  people  face   between  such  risks  and  other  things  they  care  about.  If  allowing  markets  is  like   this  –  they  pose  risks  –  then  it  would  be  reasonable  for  people  to  make  choices   about  this  as  well.   But  is  this  the  right  way  to  think  about  the  impact  of  markets  on  motivations  and   values?  Or  are  markets,  as  Robin  argues,  actually  like  cancer  itself,  which  suggests   that  inevitably  the  presence  of  markets  will  foster  corrosive  anti-­‐social  values?    I   disagree   with   this   diagnosis   of   the   intrinsic   effects   of   uncoordinated   voluntary   exchange.    Rather,  I  see  the  extent  to  which  market  relations  embody  motivations   of  fear  and  greed  is  highly  variable  and  depends  on  the  specific  cultural  forms  and   social   relations   within   which   those   market   processes   are   embedded.   This   is   a   standard  argument  in  the  sociological  analysis  of  markets.  Emile  Durkheim  refers   to  this  as  the  “noncontractual  elements  of  contract”  and  Karl  Polanyi  as  the  social   embeddedness  of  markets.  The  basic  idea  is  that  markets  are  always  existing  in  an   environment  of  internalised  norms  and  informal  social  regulation  (as  well  as,  of   course,  formal  legal  regulation),  and  this  deeply  shapes  the  experience  of  people   within   market   exchanges   and   the   kinds   of   dispositions   they   bring   into   those   relations.   In   some   market   environments   there   are   high   levels   of   trust   and   reciprocity,   without   the   pervasive   fear   and   anxiety   associated   with   brutally   65  This  aspect  of  Robin’s  model  goes  against  the  views  of  many  radical  environmentalists  who  broadly   argue  for  minimizing  pollution  rather  than  leaving  this  up  to  the  preferences  of  people  who  will  have  to   live  with  the  pollution.  Robin  correctly  recognises  that  there  are  real  trade-­‐offs  people  face  in  opting  for   no   risk,   and   while   it   may   be   difficult   to   finely   calibrate   how   to   navigate   those   trade-­‐offs,   so   long   as   people  have  good  information  and  are  on  equal  footing  in  balancing  their  priorities,  then  people  should   be  able  to  choose  the  balance  between  income  and  the  level  of  pollution.  This  is  what  is  accomplished   through  the  iterated  planning  process  on  negative  externalities.     Erik  Olin  Wright   competitive   markets.   In   other   markets   the   aphorism   “buyer   beware”   properly   describes  the  exchange  relation.   This   Durkheimian   sociological   understanding   of   the   normative   dimension   of   markets  is  quite  alien  to  the  way  markets  are  typically  understood  by  economists.   For  most  economists,  market  agents  are  purely  selfish,  rational  calculative  actors.   This  is  what  sociologists  traditionally  characterise  as  an  “under-­‐socialised”  view  of   people.66  In  a  world  of  people  who  are  disconnected  from  reciprocity-­‐based  social   relations   and   normative   commitments,   then   it   is   reasonable   to   see   markets   as   intrinsically  reinforcing  and  spreading  antisocial  motivations  and  practices.  But  I   see   no   reason   to   imagine   that   in   an   economy   dominated   by   participatory,   democratic,  egalitarian  relations  and  values,  the  co-­‐presence  of  market  relations   within  certain  aspects  of  economic  practices  would  have  these  properties.  These   motivational  states  are  not  intrinsic  to  market  processes  as  such;  they  are  only   intrinsic   to   the   atomistic,   normatively   unconstrained   markets   of   economics   models.  In  a  capitalist  economy  –  especially  a  neo-­‐liberal  capitalist  economy  in   which  markets  are  indeed  relatively  disconnected  from  community  reciprocities,   competition   is   destructive,   and   the   cultural   formation   of   people   encourages   manipulative  selfish  strategies  –  market  do  indeed  embody  and  foster  greed  and   fear,  but  this  is  not  because  of  something  intrinsic  to  the  sheer  fact  of  market   processes  but  to  the  social  form  of  those  markets  in  capitalism.67   66  Mark  Granovetter,  in  “Economic  Action  and  Social  Structure:  The  Problem  of  Embeddedness,”    (The   American  Journal  of  Sociology  (  91,  3),  November,  1985:  481-­‐510)  famously  contrasts  the  characteristic   “undersocialized  view  of  man”  in  economics  with  an  “oversocialized  view  of  man”  in  much  sociology.   While   the   former   sees   people   as   atomistic   self-­‐directed   rational   actors,   the   latter   sees   people   as   following   scripts   imposed   on   them   by   culture.   Granovetter   offers   an   intermediary   view   of   socially-­‐ embedded  economic  action.   67  To  fully  sort  out  the  contrast  between  my  views  and  Robin’s  on  this  issue  would  require  a  discussion   of  some  quite  difficult  methodological  issues  about  the  relation  between  abstract  concepts  and  their   concrete   realization.   When   Robin   claims   that   fear   and   greed   are   intrinsic   to   markets   rather   than   a   variable  effect  of  markets  in  specific  contexts  (as  is  the  case  for  negative  externalities),  he  is  relying  on  a   particular  way  of  thinking  about  the  abstract  “pure”  concept  of  “markets”  in  which  the  fundamental   nature   of   markets   can   be   analyzed   independently   of   the   concrete   institutional   and   cultural   forms   in   which  they  may  occur,  and  at  that  level  of  abstraction  fear  and  greed  are  inherent  features.  He  then   assumes  that  because  these  are  inherent  features  at  the  most  abstract  level  of  analysis  they  remain   inherent   features   at   the   concrete   institutional,   cultural   and   social   forms   which   markets   take   in   the   world.    My  position,  in  contrast,  is  that  these  concrete  cultural  and  social  forms  are  internalised  within   markets  and  can  alter  the  consequences  of  what  might  otherwise  be  seen  as  their  inherent  properties.    Final  Thoughts   119 Let  me  give  an  imperfect  parallel  example  to  illustrate  my  point  here:  competition   within   sports.   Some   radical   egalitarians   have   argued   that   competition   within   sports  and  games  intrinsically  fosters  status  hierarchies  and  various  types  of  anti-­‐ solidaristic  sentiments.  Players  in  a  sport  want  to  win  and  this  means  “defeating”   an  “opponent”.  Winners  are  better  than  losers.  Aggressiveness  is  valued.  And  so   forth.  Other  people  contend  that  competition  in  sports  can  be  governed  by  norms   of  good  sportsmanship,  of  fair  play  and  camaraderie,  and  that  whatever  status   inequalities  are  generated  by  sports  could  be  contained  in  ways  that  would  make   them   relatively   benign.   In   particular,   if   other   kinds   of   rewards   –   in   particular   wealth   and   power   –   are   not   connected   to   being   successful   in   sports,   then   normatively   regulated   competitive   sports   need   not   be   corrosive   of   egalitarian   social  solidarity.     I  do  not  think  the  question  of  the  moral  status  and  cultural  effects  of  competition   in  sports  is  a  settled  issue.  It  is  possible  that,  in  the  end,  competitive  sports  are   always   pernicious,   that   they   intrinsically   foster   socially   harmful   forms   of   status   inequality  regardless  of  the  broader  social  context.  Anti-­‐competition  activists  in   the  1970s  created  a  range  of  “new  games”  rooted  in  cooperative  values  and  some   of  these  in  fact  were  reasonably  enjoyable,  at  least  to  some  people.68  Perhaps  in  a   post-­‐capitalist   world   with   a   participatory   economy,   people   will   abandon   competitive   sports   just   as   Robin   hopes   that   they   will   completely   abandon   markets.  But  it  is  also  possible  that  in  the  context  of  the  cultural  forms  that  are   consolidated   within   such   a   world,   whatever   negative   effects   of   competition   in   sports  will  be  minimal,  and  competitive  sports  will  flourish  as  a  human  activity   because  many  people  will  find  them  interesting  and  fun  to  play.     2.  But  is  there  anything  actually  desirable  about  markets?   Even   if   one   accepts   my   argument   that   markets,   understood   as   uncoordinated   decentralised   voluntary   exchanges,   do   not   intrinsically   generate   anti-­‐social   behaviour,  nevertheless  I  acknowledge  that  they  may  have  a  tendency  to  do  so.   Why  not  try  to  completely  eliminate  all  social  practices  that  have  the  potential  of   generating  such  harms?    The  only  reason  to  allow  a  space  for  market  processes  is   that  they  promote  some  other  positive  value  that  we  care  about  and  a  complete   elimination   of   all   market   processes   would   harm   those   values.   There   are   two   positive  values  a  constrained  use  of  markets  might  advance:  “convenience”  and   risk-­‐taking  initiatives.     68  For  a  description  of  new  games,  see  http://inewgames.com/   Erik  Olin  Wright   Convenience   Robin   acknowledges   that   even   in   a   broadly   democratic-­‐participatory   economy   people   might   opt   to   use   markets   in   some   contexts,   but   if   they   do   so   it   will   because  of  “convenience”,  with  the  implication  that  this  is  to  be  contrasted  with  a   deeper   dedication   to   democratic-­‐participatory   principles.     As   quoted   above:   “people  will  spontaneously   engage   in   market   behaviour,   and   using   markets   for   particular   purposes   even   in   an   economy   where   what   to   produce   and   how   to   produce   it   is   first   determined   by   a   comprehensive   production   plan,  will  often   appear   convenient.”   The   use   of   the   word   “convenient”   here   suggests   that   this   reflects  a  kind  of  weakness  of  will  or  moral  laziness.  Certainly  if  markets  really  are   like   cancer,   people   would   be   making   a   mistake   in   deciding   that   a   “dash   of   markets”   is   convenient.   But   if   the   greed-­‐and-­‐fear-­‐inducing   property   of   markets   depends  upon  how  they  are  embedded  in  other  social  institutions  and  the  ways  in   which   they   embody   specific   pro-­‐social   norms,   then   in   a   broadly   democratic-­‐ egalitarian  economic  system  “convenience”  could  actually  reflect  positive  values   for  which  it  is  reasonable  that  people  would  think  about  balance  and  trade-­‐offs.   “Convenience”  is  a  way  of  talking  about  the  time  and  effort  for  doing  one  thing   rather  than  another.  Time  and  effort  are  valuable,  and  thus  it  may  be  reasonable   to  trade  convenience  off  against  other  values,  depending  on  the  situation.  It  is   even  reasonable  to  give  up  some  degree  of  taking  into  account  total  social  costs   of  production  (the  negative  externality  problem)  or  other  aspects  of  resource-­‐use   efficiency  for  a  significant  increase  in  convenience.  Robin  is  quite  confident  that  a   pure   participatory   economy   in   which   all   aspects   of   economic   activity   were   processed  through  the  participatory  planning  mechanisms  would  not  take  up  a  lot   of   time   and   effort.   He   therefore   believes   that   there   would   not   be   much   convenience   gained   from   allowing   any   market-­‐like   processes   into   the   system.   (And,  as  already  noted,  he  also  believes  there  would  always  be  significant  costs,   since   markets   are   like   cancer   and   this   would   be   corrosive   of   the   participatory   process  itself).    I  lack  Robin’s  confidence  that  participatory  mechanisms  will  work   as  smoothly  as  he  believes  and  that  the  time  and  effort  involved  will  be  minimal.   My  expectation,  therefore,  is  that  “convenience”  will  matter  to  people  for  good   reasons  and  this  will  provide  legitimate  grounds  for  people  to  choose  a  dose  of   markets  (probably  more  than  just  a  dash).     The   trade-­‐off   between   convenience   and   fully   banishing   market   processes   is,   I   believe,  a  significant  issue  in  the  iterative  planning  process  for  consumers.  Robin   admits  that  many  –  perhaps  most  people  –  will  not  spend  much  time  on  planning    Final  Thoughts   121 their  consumption  for  the  next  year.  They  will  only  provide  very  rough  indicators   of  what  they  plan  to  consume,  largely  based  on  what  they  did  the  previous  year,   and   certainly   nothing   like   a   fine-­‐grained   account   of   specific,   detailed   products.   Why?  Because  they  don’t  want  to  spend  the  time  and  energy  to  do  so.  They  opt   for  convenience.  I  agree  with  Robin  that  this  is  perfectly  fine.  But  the  result  is  that   the  post-­‐planning  adjustments  to  initial  allocations  are  likely  to  be  quite  large  and   –  more  importantly  –  may  function  very  much  like  market  adjustments  that  shape   both   prices   and   quantities   of   things   produced.   To   avoid   such   market-­‐like   adjustments  would  require  people  to  spend  a  great  deal  more  time  in  carefully   planning  their  future  consumption,  which  would  be    an  unacceptable  sacrifice  of   “convenience”.  I  will  discuss  this  trade-­‐off  in  more  detail  in  the  section  on  hybrids   below.     Risk-­‐taking  initiative     As   I   explained   in   my   initial   comment   on   Robin’s   model,   another   aspect   of   economic  life  in  which  I  can  imagine  people  democratically  embracing  a  space  for   market  processes  would  be  to  allow  certain  forms  of  entrepreneurial  risk  taking.   In   any   participatory   process   of   investment   planning   there   will   inevitably   be   a   range   of   investment   projects   that   get   rejected,   which   is   fine.   But   it   is   easy   to   imagine  that  under  these  conditions  there  will  be  people  with  rejected  proposals   who  are  nevertheless  able  to  mobilise  capital  from  personal  networks  or  personal   savings  –  after  all,  an  effort-­‐based  income  system  can  allow  very  hard-­‐working   people,   especially   if   they   are   part   of   a   group,   to   amass   over   a   period   of   time   considerable   savings.   The   question   then   is   whether   there   will   be   a   strict   prohibition  on  people  launching  a  project  using  these  “private”  resources  without   getting  prior  permission  from  the  relevant  planning  council.  My  prediction  is  that   in  a  broadly  participatory  economy  some  space  will  be  allowed  for  more  chaotic   investment  processes  because  this  will  be  seen  as  an  all-­‐things-­‐considered  better   mix   of   planning   and   un-­‐coordinated   spontaneity   than   a   system   requiring   that   every  economic  project  get  permission  go  through  the  standard  planning  process.       The  importance  of  trade-­‐offs   The   presence   of   some   space   for   democratically   constrained   markets   within   a   participatory  economy  may  thus  be  the  optimal  mix  given  trade-­‐offs  of  various   values.   Acknowledging   such   trade-­‐offs   in   the   ideal   social   “destination”   of   a   process   of   social   transformation,   however,   does   not   imply   watering   down   the   ideal;  it  just  says  that  the  ideal  economic  system  must  try  to  realise  a  plurality  of   values  and  that  the  different  values  themselves  are  sometimes  in  tension.  This  is   Erik  Olin  Wright   not   about   the   practical   necessity   tolerating   imperfections   in   the   ideal   during   a   transition;  it  is  about  the  optimal  institutional  configuration  in  the  destination  to   realise  a  complex  set  of  partially  conflicting  values.   To  help  clarify  my  fundamental  point  here,  let  me  discuss  another  case  that  also   bears  on  core  values  involved  in  a  participatory  economy:  the  difficult  problem  of   implementing  in  an  optimal  way  the  democratic  value.  Both  Robin  and  I  endorse   the   radical   democratic   value   that   people   should   participate   in   decisions   to   the   extent  that  they  are  affected  by  them.  If  a  decision  only  affects  oneself,  then  that   decision  can  be  autonomously  made  without  anyone  else’s  involvement;  but  if  a   decision  affects  other  people,  then  they  should  be  co-­‐participants  in  the  decision   to   the   extent   that   they   are   affected.   Now,   this   is   the   correct   principle.   The   question  then  is  how  precisely  we  should  understand  the  practical  trade-­‐offs  in  its   implementation.  In  reality,  nearly  everything  we  do  has  effects  on  other  people,   so   it   is   impossible   to   actually   involve   everyone   affected   by   a   decision   in   a   proportionate   role   in   the   decision.   The   result   is   that   some   kind   of   line   of   demarcation   has   to   be   drawn   between   the   public   and   the   private   domains   of   decision-­‐making:   inside   the   private   domain,   however   that   is   defined,   one   need   not  get  permission  from  anyone  else  to  make  choices.  This  boundary  is,  of  course,   not  pre-­‐social,  not  some  “natural”  line  of  demarcation.  It  is  socially  constructed,   and   in   a   democratic   society,   constructed   through   democratic   deliberation.   But   once  created  it  defines  the  limits  of  collaborative,  democratic  decision-­‐making.   One  way  of  looking  at  this  is  demarcation  of  the  public/private  boundary  is  that  it   is  simply  a  practical  concession  to  the  complexity  of  life.    Another  way  of  looking   at  the  issue  is  that  even  if  magically  one  could  involve  everyone  in  every  decision   that  had  any  effect  on  them  we  would  not  want  to  do  this.  Individual  self-­‐directed   autonomy   is   also   a   value,   and   a   full   implementation   of   the   democratic   proportionality  principle  would  involve  too  severe  a  restriction  on  autonomy.  This   is  a  tricky  issue,  of  course,  and  it  opens  a  space  for  a  lot  of  contestation  about   how   much   autonomous   self-­‐direction   is   desirable.   Billboards   impinge   on   other   people.   Some   messages   may   be   offensive.   Some   may   be   offensive   to   a   small   group  of  people  and  not  others.  Should  everyone  who  is  negatively  affected  by  a   billboard  have  a  proportionate  say  in  allowing  it?  Or  do  we  value  autonomy  of   individual  expression  and  want  to  allow  a  fairly  broad  scope  for  people  erecting   billboards   to   express   their   views?   These   are   difficult   issues   that   cannot   be   resolved  by  simply  invoking  a  no-­‐trade-­‐off  rule  for  democratic  values.      Final  Thoughts   123 As  long  as  we  are  trying  to  realise  multiple  values  and  ideals,  then  worrying  about   these  kinds  of  trade-­‐offs  is  inherent  in  the  design  of  any  social  institution.  In  the   case   of   economic   institutions,   democracy,   solidarity   and   equality   are   critical   values,  but  so  are  convenience  and  autonomous  individual  initiative.  The  optimal   trade-­‐off   across   these   values   is   likely   to   require   a   space   for   some   market-­‐ processes  within  a  participatory  economy.   3.  The  hidden  infusion  of  marketish  processes  within  a  participatory  economy:   the  problem  of  hybrids   I  make  the  argument  that  even  if  we  had  a  participatory  economy  fully  in  place,   we  cannot  know  now  what  the  real  weight  of  the  adjustment  processes  within   the  implementation  of  plans  will  look  like.  Robin  acknowledges  that  there  will  be   lots  of  adjustments  to  plans.  But  he  also  assumes  that  these  adjustments  will  be   relatively   small   relative   to   planned   allocations,   and   thus   that   the   system   as   a   whole   is   really   a   planned   system   of   allocations   with   minor   adjustments,   rather   than  a  planned  system  which  imposes  constraints  on  lively  market-­‐like  processes.   I  do  not  think  we  can  confidently  know  now  whether,  in  such  a  possible  world,   post-­‐planning  adjustments  will  be  small  relative  to  initial  expectations  or  large,   and   whether   or   not   the   adjustment   process   will   look   a   lot   like   markets   or   something  else.  Robin  writes:     I   also   explained   three   reasons   why   I   do   not   believe   in   this   case   [i.e.   post-­‐planning   adjustments]  just  because  it  may  “look  like  a  market  and  smell  like  a  market,”  it  truly  is  a   market  in  any  meaningful  sense…   This  is  a  key  issue  –  looking  and  smelling  like  a  market  but  not  “truly”  being  a   market.  This  is  part  of  what  I  mean  by  saying  that  all  real  economic  systems  are   hybrids   of   different   principles.   Of   course,   market-­‐like   adjustments   within   a   participatory  planning  world  it  is  not  the  same  as  a  “market  system”  or  a  “free   market”,  but  these  market  processes  could  still  play  a  critical  role  in  coordinating   actual   production   through   feedback   processes   based   on   supply   and   demand,   lowering   prices,   and   increasing   and   shifting   production   in   response   to   what   people  actually  do  rather  than  what  they  anticipate  doing.     The  key  to  my  diagnosis  of  the  actual  infusion  of  market  processes  within  even   Robin’s   model   of   a   participatory   economy   is   the   claim   that   the   adjustments,   especially  if  large,  are  really  a  variety  of  a  hybrid  market  process.  Robin  clearly   does  not  think  this  is  the  right  way  to  think  about  this.  In  the  conclusion  of  his   commentary   on   my   essay   he   discusses   the   mistakes   people   have   made   in   criticising  the  processes  of  comprehensive  participatory  planning:   Erik  Olin  Wright   Critics  ask  how  broad  categories  in  a  comprehensive  plan,  like  shoes,  would  be  turned   into  detailed  items,  like  size  6½  purple  women’s  high-­‐heeled  leatherless  shoes  with  a   yellow  toe.  Some,  like  Seth  Ackerman  writing  in  Jacobin  Magazine,  assume  there  is  no   answer  to  this  question  and  dismiss  all  comprehensive  planning  as  impossible.  Others,   like  Erik,  recognise  that  this  problem  is  not  insurmountable,  but  argue  that  we  will  find   markets  helpful  when  solving  it.   He   rejects   my   argument   and   instead   describes   the   process   by   which   actual   production  hones  in  on  the  right  number  of  “size  6½  purple  women’s  high-­‐heeled   leatherless  shoes  with  a  yellow  toe”  as  nonmarket  adjustments.    My  position  is   certainly   not   that   the   solution   requires   introducing   a   full-­‐blown,   autonomous   “market  system”  into  the  economy,  but  rather  that  the  introduction  of  effective   adjustment  processes  is  likely  to  have  strong  market-­‐like  features  –  they  would   look  like  a  market  and  smell  like  a  market  –  in  that  they  would  involve  “buyers   and  sellers  of  goods  and  services  agreeing  to  exchange  things  at  mutually  agreed   upon  prices.”  The  actual  exchanges  that  result  from  this  process  (in  contrast  to   the  anticipated  plans),  in  turn,  would  be  data  that  would  feedback  into  on-­‐going   decisions  about  how  much  of  different  things  to  produce.    This  is  a  real  feedback   process,  which  is  embedded  in  the  post-­‐planning  uncoordinated  interactions  of   buyers   and   sellers   and   the   adjustments   that   emerge   out   of   those   interactions.   These  significant  market-­‐like  adjustments  would  in  turn  systematically  inform  the   next  year’s  cycle  of  the  iterated  planning  process.     Robin   concludes   the   discussion   of   incorrect   criticisms   of   his   planning   model   by   saying   that   this   really   has   nothing   to   do   with   an   articulation   of   planning   and   market  processes:  “But  none  of  this  has  anything  to  do  with  how  to  come  up  with   a  comprehensive  economic  plan  in  the  first  place  –  which  was  the  problem  we   tackled  initially.”  He  could  be  right  about  this  if  the  adjustments  are  small  to  the   comprehensive   plan   that   comes   out   of   the   iterated   participatory   planning   process.   The   initial   plan,   after   all,   will   include   some   number   of   size   6½   purple   women’s   high-­‐heeled   leatherless   shoes   with   a   yellow   toe,   and   perhaps   this   is   pretty  close  to  what  people  will  actually  want  when  they  actually  buy  shoes.  But  if   the  adjustments  are  large,  and  if  they  require  significant  shifting  around  of  actual   allocations  of  resources,  then  these  supply  and  demand  feedback  processes  and   adjustments  which  “look  like  a  market  and  smell  like  a  market”  will  have  much   more   the   character   of   actual   market   processes.   In   effect   this   means   that   the   planning   process   itself   is   not   in   fact   comprehensive,   but   rather   loosely   constructed.  It  is  a  hybrid  of  planning  and  market  processes,  not  a  pure  form  of   either.   I   see   no   problem   with   this   because   I   do   not   see   this   as   inherently   generating  pernicious  antisocial  effects.        Final  Thoughts   125 4.  Mathematical  models  of  complex  systems   One  of  the  interesting  issues  that  has  run  through  our  dialogue  is  the  contrast   between   the   methods   by   which   Robin   and   I   envision   alternatives.   Robin   has   developed  an  elaborate  model  of  a  future  possible  economic  system.  At  its  core   this   involves   formal   mathematical   models   in   which   various   kinds   of   consistent   outcomes  can  be  demonstrated,  given  the  assumptions  of  the  model,  including   behavioural   assumptions   about   agents.     While   these   formal   models   have   not   directly   figured   in   our   exchanges   in   this   dialogue,   they   have   been   periodically   referred   to   in   footnotes,   and   in   any   case   constitute   the   foundation   for   Robin’s   belief   that   his   proposed   procedures   of   iterated   participatory   planning   will   produce  consistent  prices  that  fully  embody  the  social  costs  of  production  and  an   allocation  of  resources  needed  to  produce  the  planned  output.  My  approach  has   been  to  elaborate  the  normative  principles  we  would  want  to  see  embodied  in   ideal   economic   institutions   and   then   explore   a   wide   variety   of   quite   different   institutional  forms  that  could  help  realise  those  values  without  positing  a  model   of   an   overarching   unified   system   within   which   these   diverse   institutional   arrangements  would  fit  together  and  function  seamlessly.     While  Robin  supports  many  of  the  specific  proposals  I  endorse  in  my  account  of   socialism  and  real  utopias,  nevertheless  he  argues  that  my  pluralist  approach  has   significant  limitations:     I   hope   it   is   clear   by   now   that   I   not   only   regard   ‘institutional   pluralism  in   transition,’   including   markets,   as   a   practical   necessity,   but   also   appreciate   that   pluralism   in   transition  provides  a  valuable  way  to  test  different  ideas  about  how  best  to  organise   economic  activities.  However,  in  my  opinion  “institutional  pluralism  of  the  destination”   can  be  an  excuse  for  imprecise  reasoning  which  fails  to  follow  assumptions  through  to   their   logical   conclusions…..While   Erik   no   longer   misinterprets   the   model   of   a   participatory   economy   as   a   strategic   transitional   program,   I   think   he   still   under   estimates  the  usefulness  of  elaborating  rigorous  models  of  future  economic  systems.   Let  me  try  to  clarify  my  view  of  “rigorous  models  of  future  economic  systems,”   especially  the  kind  of  comprehensive  models  elaborated  by  Robin.     I  absolutely  agree  that  it  is  useful  to  develop  formal  mathematical  models  and   deploy  them  within  discussions  of  social  transformation.  They  clarify  the  logic  of   ideas  and  the  implications  of  different  design  features.  They  alert  us  to  potential   problems.   They   are   a   critical   part   of   the   intellectual   map   of   envisioning   alternatives.   Just   as   I   advocate   viewing   economic   systems   as   ecosystems   combining  qualitatively  different  forms  of  economic  organisation,  so  I  think  the   Erik  Olin  Wright   optimal   intellectual   ecosystem   for   emancipatory   theory   should   contain   a   wide   variety  of  different  forms  of  theoretical  and  empirical  work.   But   I   also   believe   that   too   much   reliance   on   formal   models   can   create   overconfidence   that   the   complexities   and   dynamics   of   the   actual   world   do   not   seriously  undermine  the  predicted  smoothness  of  the  model.  There  is  a  tendency   for  people  who  are  really  good  at  constructing  formal  mathematical  models  of   social  processes  to  treat  real  world  complexity  as  disturbances  and  noise,  rather   than   as   problems   that   could   potentially   severely   undermine   the   expected   outcomes.   If   it   should   come   to   pass   that   someday   people   are   in   a   position   to   institute   an   emancipatory   economic   system   along   the   lines   of   participatory   planning,  I  don’t  know  what  the  problems  will  be  and  whether  they  will  be  just   minor   wrinkles   that   require   practical   implementation   adjustments,   or   whether   they  will  involve  more  fundamental  issues.  I  suspect  that  it  is  not  even  possible  to   know  how  system  complexity  will  shape  the  optimal  way  of  navigating  whatever   problems  occur.     Robin  acknowledges  that  there  will  be  lots  of  experimentation  and  modification   of  the  ideas  he  proposes  in  his  model.  He  does  not  claim  that  the  specific  details   of   his   iterated   planning   process   with   a   facilitation   board   and   various   kinds   of   councils  constitute  a  full-­‐blown  blueprint  for  an  alternative  economy.  The  specific   design  of  these  institutions  will  emerge  out  of  an  extended  process  of  democratic   experimentalism.  But  he  is  quite  confident  –  and  I  feel  over-­‐confident  –  that  there   will  be  no  necessity  for  markets  in  the  institutional  configuration  of  a  democratic,   egalitarian,  cooperative  economy.  I  think  he  believes  this  because  his  equations   show   that   markets   are   not   needed.   It   is   on   this   strong   confidence   in   the   conclusions  derived  from  formal  models  that  we  disagree.   The   upshot   of   these   arguments   is   that   in   the   intellectual   ecosystem   of   emancipatory  thinking  it  is  certainly  desirable  to  have  some  people  pushing  ideas   anchored   in   models   of   a   unitary   system-­‐building   totality.   But   we   also   need   institutional   pluralists   who   attempt   to   give   precision   to   the   idea   of   a   heterogeneous  loosely  coupled  system  embodying  emancipatory  values.     5.  The  ultimate  need  for  system-­‐rupture   As  in  many  of  the  themes  in  our  dialogue,  Robin  and  I  have  similar  views  about   many  aspects  of  the  process  of  transformation.  In  particular,  we  share  a  strong   commitment  to  struggles  for  progressive  reforms,  both  because  these  can  make   life  better  for  people  and  because  they  can  help  pave  the  road  for  more  radical   transformation   in   the   future.     He   also   endorses   the   importance   of   what   I   call    Final  Thoughts   127 interstitial   and   symbiotic   strategies   and   transformations   as   a   way   of   thinking   about  such  reform  processes.   Where  we  may  differ  is  in  the  question  of  whether  or  not  at  some  point  in  the   future  a  system-­‐level  rupture  might  be  needed,  and  if  needed,  would  be  actually   possible.  Commenting  on  my  account  of  situations  in  which  sharp  confrontations   with  capitalist  elites  may  be  necessary,  Robin  poses  the  problem  this  way:   I   am   disappointed   with   Erik’s   formulation   of   how   we   should   behave   when   such   situations   arise:   “The   purpose   of   such   confrontations,   however,   is   not   a   systemic   rupture  with  capitalist  dominance,  but  rather  creating  more  space  for  the  interplay  of   interstitial  and  symbiotic  strategies.”  At  some  point  “creating  more  space  for  interplay”   must   give   way   to   “a   systemic   rupture   with   capitalist   dominance,”   which   means   abolishing   the   institutional   basis   for   their   dominance,   the   private   enterprise   market   system.  When  decisive  moments  come  one  either  defeats  an  enemy  and  disarms  him  to   prevent  war  from  erupting  anew,  or  one  fails  to  do  so.  In  moments  of  confrontation   unfortunately   in   my   opinion   those   with   a   personal   inclination   toward   symbiotic   and   interstitial   strategies   are   all   too   likely   to   make   the   same   mistake   Swedish   social   democrats  made  in  1975.  At  moments  when  those  who  hesitate  are  lost  leadership  with   more   “ruptural   inclinations”   becomes   more   socially   useful.   Why,   when   we   get   the   chance,  should  we  hesitate  to  drive  our  stake  through  the  vampire’s  heart?   This   is   a   potent   argument,   for   unquestionably   there   are   situations   in   which   progressive   reform   is   completely   blocked.   Robin   is   correct   when   he   writes,   “Incrementalism  also  has  no  answers  for  situations  where  one  must  either  make  a   qualitative  change  or  accept  eventual  re-­‐stabilisation  back  to  the  old  status  quo.”   But,   of   course,   it   does   not   follow   that   simply   because   incrementalism   has   no   answer  for  this  problem,  system-­‐ruptures  are  actually  possible,  that  they  could   succeed   in   their   stated   objective   of   “abolishing   the   institutional   basis   for   [capitalist]   dominance”.     System-­‐ruptural   strategies   may   be   wishful   thinking   rather   than   genuine   answers   to   the   question   “what   is   to   be   done?”   in   these   situations.   It   is   one   thing   to   argue   that   in   the   case   of   political   dictatorships   a   seizure  of  power  could  be  capable  of  transforming  the  institutions  of  the  state  in  a   democratic  way,  and  quite  another  to  say  that  a  seizure  of  power  can  successfully   both   abolish   something   as   complex   as   capitalism   and   replace   it   with   a   participatory  democratic  alternative.  I  do  not  have  an  answer  to  the  problem  of   what   should   be   done   in   the   face   of   the   impossibility   of   further   incremental   advance,   but   I   remain   sceptical   that   a   systemic   rupture   in   which   capitalism   is   effectively  abolished  could  result  in  an  emancipatory  alternative.   When   thinking   about   the   foundational   transformation   of   core   power   relations   within   an   economic   system,   the   metaphor   of   “driving   the   stake   through   the   Erik  Olin  Wright   vampire’s   heart”   is   gravely   misleading.   The   metaphor   suggests   that   there   is   a   single  centre  of  agency  and  power  that  can  be  decisively  destroyed  and  whose   destruction  effectively  removes  the  main  obstacle  to  transformation.    This  is,  of   course,  the  way  revolutionaries  have  often  thought  about  social  revolution:  seize   state  power,  destroy  the  enemy  and  clear  the  way  for  building  a  new  society  “on   the  ashes  of  the  old.”  Robin  and  I  both  regard  this  as  an  unrealistic  strategy  for   the   United   States   today,   but   is   it   likely   ever   to   be   a   plausible   strategy   for   the   purposes   creating   a   radically   egalitarian   democratic   economy   and   society?   The   historical   evidence   weighs   against   this   possibility:   revolutionary   ruptures   have   been  capable  of  transforming  state  power,  and  they  have  also,  in  a  few  notable   instances,  been  capable  of  abolishing  the  core  class  relations  of  existing  economic   systems,  but  so  far  they  have  not  shown  any  capacity  to  build  even  the  rudiments   of  democratic  egalitarian  emancipatory  alternatives.   Robin   invokes   the   case   of   Sweden   in   1975   when   the   Social   Democrats   initially   proposed,  and  then  in  the  face  of  strong  opposition  from  Swedish  capital,  backed   away   from   a   proposal   to   gradually   democratise   ownership   of   large   Swedish   corporations  through  the  use  of  a  novel  kind  of  wage-­‐earners  fund.  Robin  uses  a   military  image  to  set  up  his  reference  to  the  Swedish  situation:  “When  decisive   moments   come   one   either   defeats   an   enemy   and   disarms   him   to   prevent   war   from  erupting  anew,  or  one  fails  to  do  so.”    This  just  does  not  seem  an  apt  way  of   thinking  about  the  foundational  transformation  of  capitalism  in  Sweden.  While  I   agree  with  him  that  it  is  conceivable  that  Swedish  Social  Democracy  might  have   been   able   to   enact   their   wage-­‐earner   funds   plan   if   they   had   been   willing   to   confront  capital  head  on,  it  seems  implausible  that  they  would  have  been  able  to   abolish  “the  institutional  basis  for  [capitalist]  dominance,  the  private  enterprise   market  system.”  The  most  that  could  have  been  hoped  for  would  have  been  a   shift  in  the  power  relations  within  the  “economic  ecosystem”  in  which  capitalism   would  have  been  rendered  less  dominant  and  perhaps  even  subordinate  to  more   democratically  organised  economic  relations.     There  are,  then,  two  fundamental  issues  a  ruptural  argument  must  confront:  first,   under   what   condition   would   it   be   possible   to   really   “abolish”   something   as   complex   as   “the   institutional   basis   of   capitalism”,   and   second,   under   what   conditions   would   that   abolition   actually   result   in   a   democratic   egalitarian   alternative.    We  know  from  historical  experience  that  it  is  possible  to  destroy  the   private   enterprise   market   system   without   creating   a   democratic   egalitarian   alternative.  What  is  unclear  is  whether  under  other  conditions  not  yet  historically    Final  Thoughts   129 encountered   a   ruptural,   abolitionist   attack   on   capitalism   could   have   genuinely   emancipatory  results.   The  only  condition  in  which  I  think  a  successful  systemic  rupture  might  actually   lead  to  an  emancipatory  alternative  is  one  in  which  it  was  the  case  that  the  hybrid   economic   ecosystem   had   already   shifted   to   one   in   which   participatory,   democratic   egalitarian   economic   relations   had   become   the   core   of   the   economy.69  If  over  an  extended  period  of  time  interstitial  and  symbiotic  strategies   had   transformed   the   economy   in   this   way,   then   the   institution-­‐building   tasks   following  a  rupture  would  be  fairly  modest  and  the  chaotic  processes  unleashed   by  rupture  perhaps  manageable.    This  scenario,  however,  seems  to  be  ruled  out   by   Robin’s   scepticism   that   anti-­‐capitalist,   egalitarian   and   cooperative   economic   processes   could   ever   reach   such   a   threshold   so   long   as   capitalism   remains   a   powerful   component   of   the   economic   system.   We   are   therefore   left   with   the   conclusion   that   (a)   a   successful   rupture   with   capitalism   in   which   the   private   enterprise  market  system  is  abolished  and  a  participatory  economy  is  established   is  only  possible  if  a  participatory  economy  has  already  reached  near  dominance   within   the   economic   ecosystem,   but   (b)   a   participatory   economy   cannot   reach   that  level  of  development  so  long  as  capitalism  is  dominant.    It  therefore  may  well   be   true   that   incrementalism   does   not   have   an   answer   to   the   problem   of   overcoming  absolute  barriers  to  transformation.    Unfortunately,  the  same  is  true   for  ruptural  strategies:  they  have  no  answer  to  the  problem  of  actually  advancing   a  democratic  egalitarian  economy  and  society  in  the  aftermath  of  a  rupture.     CONCLUSION   Where,  then,  does  this  leave  us?       A  critical  issue  for  a  political  project  of  emancipatory  transformation  is  having  an   array   of   practical,   achievable   objectives   that   make   life   better   for   people   in   the   world  as  it  is  that  are  connected  to  the  vision  for  a  fundamentally  different  kind  of   economy   and   society.   Having   a   strategic   scenario   that   can   take   us   all   the   way   from  here  to  there  matters  much  less.  On  the  core  strategic  issues,  Robin  and  I   are  largely  in  agreement.    Both  of  us  argue  that  another  world  is  possible  in  which   69  This  is  –  roughly  –  the  way  capitalism  replaced  feudalism:  proto-­‐capitalist  economic  processes  had   already   become   the   dynamic   core   of   the   economy   at   the   time   that   feudal   centres   of   power   were   effectively  abolished.       Erik  Olin  Wright   people  have  vastly  more  equal  access  to  the  conditions  to  live  flourishing  lives   than   they   do   in   capitalism   and   vastly   greater   capacity   to   directly   shape   the   conditions   of   their   own   lives   through   an   array   of   empowered   participatory   processes.   We   also   both   believe   that   much   can   be   done   now   to   mitigate   the   damage  to  people’s  lives  created  by  the  dominance  of  capitalism,  and  that  some   of  the  things  we  can  do  also  prefigure  this  alternative  world.   Still,   there   are   some   real   differences   in   our   views   –   on   the   potential   role   for   markets   within   the   structural   configurations   of   the   desired   destination,   on   the   level  of  our  confidence  that  we  can  actually  anticipate  the  kinds  of  dilemmas  and   trade-­‐offs  that  will  exist  even  in  the  ideal  world  we  want,  and,  perhaps,  on  the   necessity  at  some  point  for  a  systemic  rupture.  These  differences,  however,  may   in  the  end  have  almost  no  practical  implications.    I  suspect  that  the  time  horizon   before  the  issue  of  attempting  a  systemic  rupture  with  capitalism  in  developed   capitalist  countries  is  very  far  in  the  future,  and  that  it  is  even  further  in  the  future   before  the  issue  of  whether  or  not  markets  should  be  abolished  will  be  on  the   political  agenda  of  any  democratic  society.  But  I  also  doubt  that  one’s  beliefs  now   about  what  should  be  decided  under  those  future  conditions  would  greatly  affect   any  choices  about  strategies  and  initiatives  today.  It  is  in  this  sense  that  I  think  the   main   thing   is   to   be   very   clear   about   fundamental   values   and   the   critique   of   capitalism,  about  the  possibility  of  realizing  those  values  to  a  much  greater  extent   in   alternative   economic   institutions,   and   about   the   practical   initiatives   we   can   undertake   today   that   move   us   in   that   direction.                                         .  Final  Thoughts   131 ABOUT  THE  AUTHORS     Robin  Hahnel  is  Professor  Emeritus  from  American  University  in  Washington  DC   where  he  taught  in  the  department  of  economics  for  thirty-­‐three  years.  He  has   also   taught   as   a   visiting   professor   at   the   Catholic   University   in   Lima,   Peru,   the   University  of  Manchester  in  Manchester  England,  and  most  recently  at  Lewis  and   Clark   College   and   Portland   State   University   in   Portland   Oregon.   He   has   been   active   in   left   politics   for   over   forty-­‐five   years,   beginning   with   New   Left   SDS   chapters   at   Harvard   and   MIT   in   the   1960s,   and   most   recently   with   Jobs   with   Justice  and  Rising  Tide  in  Portland  Oregon.       He  is  best  known  as  co-­‐creator,  together  with  Michael  Albert,  of  the  alternative  to   capitalism   known   as   “participatory   economics,”   (The   Political   Economy   of   Participatory  Economics,  Princeton  University  Press,  1991.)  His  most  recent  books   are   Economic   Justice   and   Democracy:   From   Competition   to   Cooperation   (Routledge,   2005),   Green   Economics:   Confronting   the   Ecological   Crisis   (M.E.   Sharpe,  2011),  Of  the  People,  By  the  People:  The  Case  for  a  Participatory  Economy   (AK   Press,   2012),   and   The   ABCs   of   Political   Economy:   A   Modern   Approach,   2nd   edition  (Pluto  Books,  2014).       Erik  Olin  Wright  has  taught  sociology  at  the  University  of  Wisconsin  since  1976   where   he   is   currently   Vilas   Distinguished   Professor   of   Sociology.   His   academic   work  has  been  centrally  concerned  with  reconstructing  the  Marxist  tradition  of   social   theory   and   research   in   ways   that   attempt   to   make   it   more   relevant   to   contemporary  concerns  and  more  cogent  as  a  scientific  framework  of  analysis.  His   empirical   research   has   focused   especially   on   the   changing   character   of   class   relations   in   developed   capitalist   societies.   Since   1992   he   has   directed   The   Real   Utopias   Project   which   explores   a   wide   range   of   proposals   for   new   institutional   designs   that   embody   emancipatory   ideals   and   yet   are   attentive   to   issues   of   pragmatic  feasibility.  He  was  president  of  the  American  Sociological  Association  in   2011-­‐12.     His   principal   publications   include:   The   Politics   of   Punishment   (Harper   Collins,   1973);   Classes   (London:   Verso,   1985);   The   Debate   on   Classes   (London:   Verso,   1990);  Interrogating  Inequality  (London:  Verso,  1994);  Class  Counts:  Comparative   Erik  Olin  Wright   Studies   in   Class   Analysis   (Cambridge   University   Press,   1997);   Deepening   Democracy:   institutional   innovations   in   empowered   participatory   governance   (with  Archon  Fung.  London,  Verso,  2003);  Envisioning  Real  Utopias  (Verso,  2010);   and  jointly  with  Joel  Rogers,  American  Society:  how  it  really  works  (W.W.  Norton,   2011).  He  is  also  the  editor  of  the  Real  Utopias  Project  series,  published  by  Verso   Books.   His   forthcoming   book,   Understanding   Class   (Verso,   2015),   proposes   a   framework  for  integrating  the  insights  of  different  traditions  of  class  analysis.  He   is   currently   working   on   a   new   manuscript,   Sociological   Marxism   (Verso:   tentatively,  2017).     Website:  www.ssc.wisc.edu/~wright                                          Final  Thoughts   133