Development and Conflict Lecture for Causes of Political Violence course Masaryk University 12.3.2015 H˚avard Hegre 10. mars 2015 1 / 45 Overview 1 Overview 2 The decline of war 3 coincides with a globally spreading process of socio-economic development What is development? 4 Development and peace: the correlation 5 Why is development associated with peace? Collier: The problems of justice-seeking rebel recruitment Greed or opportunity Government control Asset specificity The military-political and the trading worlds 6 How peace leads to development 7 How peace and development might have joint explanations Indirect effects through political institutions Mancur Olson: Dictatorship, democracy, and development 8 Conclusions 9 Bibliography 2 / 45 Overview Reading list: Fearon and Laitin (2003) Olson (1993) Gates et al. (2012) Collier (2000) Hegre (2015) 3 / 45 Overview The decline of war .. coincides with a globally spreading process of socio-economic development Development and peace: the correlation Why is development associated with peace? How peace leads to development How peace and development might have joint explanations 4 / 45 The decline of war Growing literature documenting a decline of war ... at least after WW II, but also over a longer period Steven Pinker, Azar Gat, Lawrence Keeley Three general sets of explanations State control (a ‘civilizing process’) Normative change (a ‘humanitarian revolution’) Emergence of a ‘liberal world’: Development Democracy Trade (international and domestic) International organizations Azar Gat: Increasing benefits of peace due to changes to economic structure What is the role of socio-economic development? Will concentrate on internal armed conflict 5 / 45 The decline of war: Conflicts per year 1400–2000 (Pinker) view of the history of war in Europe. FFIIGGUURREE 55 1177.. Figure 5–17. Conflicts per year in greater Europe, 1400–2000 Source: Conflict Catalog, Brecke, 1999; Long & Brecke, 2003. The conflicts are aggregated over 25 year periods and include interstate and civil wars, genocides, insurrections, and riots. “Western Europe” includes the territories of the present day U.K., Ireland, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, France, Belgium, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Germany, Switzerland, Austria, Spain, Portugal, and Italy. “Eastern Europe” 6 / 45 The decline of war: Battle deaths, 1946–2013 0 100,000 200,000 300,000 400,000 1945 1955 1965 1975 1985 1995 2005 2015 Year Internationalized Internal Interstate Extrasystemic Sources: UCDP, Lacina & Gleditsch 2005, Hegre & Kristiansen 2014 7 / 45 Poverty reduction and incidence of conflict 20406080100 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 202 IMR % without education Sources: UN World Population Prospects; IIASA Global averages in infant mortality rates, proportion of population without secondary education, and proportion of population aged 15–24 years. 8 / 45 What is development? Developed economies predominantly based on manufacturing and service production High importance of financial capital Economic diversification and division of labor Educated and skilled labor force Relatively little poverty Low fertility rates, large elderly population Property rights protection and often representative political systems Advanced bureaucracies; strong militaries Non-developed ones derive most of its income from agriculture and other forms of natural resource extraction High average income Oil-rich economies not necessarily ‘developed’ 9 / 45 Development and domestic conflict United StatesHaiti Dominican Republic Guatemala El Salvador Nicaragua Panama Colombia Peru Chile Argentina Uruguay United Kingdom Serbia Romania Russia Gambia Mali Senegal Mauritania Niger Cote d'Ivoire Guinea Liberia S. Leone Togo Cameroon Nigeria CAR Chad R Congo DR Congo Uganda Burundi Rwanda Somalia Ethiopia Zimbabwe South Africa Morocco Algeria Sudan Iran Turkey Iraq Syria Lebanon Israel Yemen Oman Afghanistan Pakistan Myanmar Sri Lanka Nepal Thailand Cambodia Lao PDR Vietnam Malaysia Philippines Indonesia 00.1%0.25%0.5%1%2%4% Proportionofpopulationkilledinbattle,1965-2009 200 100 50 25 12 Poverty in 1965: Infant mortality rate 10 / 45 Fearon & Laitin 2003: Statistical estimation 11 / 45 Development: Empirical results Hardly any high-income countries with internal armed conflict Fearon & Laitin find that increasing income with 1,000 dollars decrease log odds of internal conflict onset with 0.344 This corresponds to a reduction from 10 to 7%, or from 50 to 42% Other studies: Doubling GDP per capita has same effect Oil producers have twice as high risk of armed conflict, controlling for GDP per capita 12 / 45 Development: Empirical results Most quantitative studies agree that income per capita or other development indicators are among the most robust predictors of conflict Economic growth also has a strong conflict-reducing effect Average income tends to ‘trump’ democracy statistically for internal conflicts Relation much less clear for interstate conflict: possibly for neighboring countries, but development increases capacity for long-distance wars (Gartzke, 2007) 13 / 45 Empirical regularities: Development reduces the risk of armed conflict Internally: more strongly for upper-middle income countries Also indications that the relationship is stronger for democracies than for non-democracies High income that is due to natural resource extraction is less effective per dollar, but not necessarily negative Indications that development reinforces the effects of trade and democracy 14 / 45 Development = domestic peace – why? Poverty may be an incentive for conflict in itself: Marx and Engels‘(1848) claim that the ends of poor workers ‘can be attained only by the forcible overthrow of all existing social conditions ... The proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains’ Low income implies opportunities for violence entrepreneurs Poor-country governments have trouble controlling their territory Development is economic diversification – development is ‘domestic globalization’ Indirect effect through political institutions Education and the cognitive ability to maintain peaceful relations Boix: Asset mobility/lootability 15 / 45 Poverty: Deprivation Poverty leads to frustration and aggression ⇒ conflict Most rebel groups state revolution, democratization, or poverty reduction as their goal – Nepalese Maoists; Sierra Leone’s ‘Revolutionary United Front’ But rebel group leaders are often from elites: Che Guevara (Medical student), Dr. John Garang (PhD in Agricultural economics), Prachandra (Brahmin caste) Poverty is inversely related to political activity in several surveys 16 / 45 Collier: The collective action problem for rebel recruitment Potential rational rebel group recruits: Whether the government gets overthrown is not dependent only on my participation, but on many others’ In fact, the best would be that someone else carries out the revolution, since I benefit as much from that The collective action problem is a N-player generalization of the PD game Free-rider problems may be reduced by institutions that enforce repeated interactions (e.g. political parties or ethnic groups) 17 / 45 Collier: The time-inconsistency problem Revolutions must be fought before justice is achieved Effective revolutions must be hierarchically organized Upon victory, the rebel leadership will be in a position to replace the former dictator, and the rebel soldiers may be no better off than before This is a time-consistency or a commitment problem 18 / 45 Collier: Empirical implications If Collier’s argument is wrong, we would expect to see civil wars to be more common in ethnically fragmented, unequal and non-democratic countries where there is lots of unjustice But civil wars happen in poor, slow-growing countries Collier attributes this to the low ‘opportunity costs’ in poor countries rather than to the ‘deprivation’ 19 / 45 Alternative organization of rebellion To solve these problems, a rebel leader must rely on private incentives (greed) rather than on justice Private incentives: salary, loot, forced recruitment, opportunities for violent behavior We cannot observe true motivations of rebel group leaders, but some at least are motivated by private rather than public incentives Even those that started out as revolutionary movements may be forced into greed-based ones 20 / 45 Government control: Infrastructure Fearon & Laitin: Investment in infrastructure increases governments’ counter-insurgency capabilities – roads, telecommunications Wealth increases quality and organization of counter-insurgency operations 21 / 45 Asset specificity Asset specificity or asset immobility: Wealth is concentrated in immobile assets E.g. agricultural land, mines, oil Mobile assets: Financial capital, human capital It is easier to use physical force to control immobile assets than mobile ones 22 / 45 Detour 1: Inequality Bussmann & Schneider indicate asymmetric effects of globalization on income Hegre, Gissinger, Gleditsch show that trade may increase inequality ... although studies strongly suggest that economic growth reduces poverty Ambiguous evidence for a link inequality – internal armed conflict But Boix (2008) and studies of horizontal inequality are exceptions 23 / 45 Boix: When does political violence take place? Setup of model: Two types of individuals: a poor majority and a wealthy minority The wealthy initially control the government but may choose to accept democracy If they choose democracy, the median voter sets a tax rate that redistributes from the wealthy to the poor If they do not choose democracy, the poor may acquiesce and right-wing authoritarianism follows Revolt and violence takes place, eventually leading either to a left-wing regime where the wealthy’s assets are expropriated or to right-wing authoritarianism 24 / 45 Boix: When does political violence take place? Parameters: Inequality: the wealth of the rich relative to the poor Country-specificity of assets – how productive capital is at home relative to abroad (how mobile it is) Repression costs – how likely it is that the elites will be able to put down a rebellion Uncertainty about the true repression costs/probability that a revolution will succeed 25 / 45 Intuitions of the model Violence does not occur under low to medium levels of inequality and asset specificity Demands for democratization will succeed, since the median voter will vote for lower redistributive tax rates: When inequality is moderate When the assets of the rich can be moved abroad Violence more probable if inequality is larger or assets more country-specific Demands for democratization will not succeed since the wealthy have more to lose At least when repression costs are low Intra-elite fighting happens where the poor can easily be repressed and asset specificity is high – when there is lots of immobile wealth to grab and little mobile capital to be lost as collateral damage 26 / 45 Boix’ empirical demonstration Measure of inequality: Percentage of family farms (owned by families; no more than four workers) Land-based inequality measure most relevant to the theoretical argument Measure of asset mobility: ‘Index of occupational diversity’: Percentage of labor force outside agriculture and proportion of population living in cities 27 / 45 Boix’ empirical demonstration TABLE 2 PREDICTED PROBABILITY OF CIVIL WAR ONSET OVER 5 YEARS BY SIZE OF AGRARIAN SECTOR AND LANDHOLDING INEQUALITY Share of Family Farms over Total Cultivated Land (Percentiles) 10 30 50 70 90 10 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 Index of 30 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.02 Occupational 50 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01 Diversification 70 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 90 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 Lagged value of civil war set to 0; all other variables set at their median values. SOURCE: Simulation based on Table 1, column 1. 28 / 45 Rosecrance: The military-political and the trading world The military-political world Territorial expansion is main route to maximize wealth, power, access to markets and resources, and security All units compete for primacy – cooperate only to achieve balance of power Self-sufficiency an important goal – homogenous countries Interaction is zero-sum Anarchy: War is always a realistic option to achieve gains Examples: 17th century Europe Iraq under Saddam Hussein Russia today? 29 / 45 Rosecrance: The military-political and the trading world The trading world Trade is main route to maximize wealth, power, and access to markets and resources States are differentiated in function Security is maximized by means of alliances Units compete, but within a context of accepted interdependence Interaction is positive-sum rather than zero-sum Examples: 14th century Hansa League late 20th century Europe China today? 30 / 45 Rosecrance: Necessary to choose one of the two worlds The two worlds or strategies are incompatible War undermines the trust required for trade (protection of property rights) Access to resources and markets through trade reduces incentives for territorial expansion Reliance on rule of law versus military power to settle international conflicts Specialization and differentiation unattractive without pre-existing security Mercantilist policies hinder trade The liberal peace literature’s finding of a negative correlation between trade and conflict is an outcome of states’ choice of strategy 31 / 45 Growth decreases conflict, conflict decreases growth Growth decreases risk of internal conflict – also shown when reciprocal causation is taken into account Internal and external conflict decreases growth 32 / 45 Internal conflict decreases growth 050100150200250300 GDPperCapita 050010001500 BattleRelatedDeaths 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 Year BRD in Burundi BRD in Burkina Faso GDP of Burundi GDP of Burkina Faso 33 / 45 Internal conflict decreases growth 10001200140016001800 1970 1980 1990 2000 Country With War 1974−1978 Country With No War 10th/90th percentile confidence interval 34 / 45 Internal conflict decreases growth 10001200140016001800 1970 1980 1990 2000 Country With War 1974−1986 Country With No War 10th/90th percentile confidence interval 35 / 45 Ghobarah et al: Four sources of differences in health outcomes The extent to which populations are exposed to conditions that increase the risk of death, disease, and disability The financial and human resources available for addressing the public health needs of populations The level of resources actually allocated to public health needs by the private and public sectors The degree to which resources actually allocated to public health are efficiently utilized Conflicts tend to affect all these 36 / 45 Gates et al: A conflict of median severity (2,500 direct battle-related deaths: Increases undernourished proportion of population by 3.3% – 300,000 people in a country of 10,000,000 Removes a year from the expected life of every citizen Leads to a 10% increase in infant mortality rates Over a five-year period, the 2,500 direct deaths are accompanied by the deaths of 5,000 newborn Cuts 1.8% of population off from access to safe water 37 / 45 Indirect effect through political institutions Democratic institutions are more frequent, stable, effective, and less corrupt in high-income countries Stability of institutional setup is critical to domestic peace (Hegre et al 2001) 38 / 45 The relationship between development and democratic stability United States Canada Dominican Republic Jamaica Trinidad Mexico Guatemala Honduras El Salvador Nicaragua Costa Rica Panama Colombia Venezuela Ecuador Peru Brazil Bolivia Paraguay Chile Argentina Uruguay United KingdomIrelandNetherlandsBelgium France SwitzerlandSpain Portugal German Fed. Rep. Poland Austria Hungary Czech Republic Slovakia Italy/Sardinia Albania Macedonia Croatia Slovenia GreeceBulgaria Moldova Rumania Russia (USSR) Estonia Latvia Lithuania Ukraine Georgia FinlandSwedenNorwayDenmark Mali Senegal Benin/Dahomey Niger Sierra Leone Ghana Kenya Burundi Mozambique Zambia South Africa Lesotho Botswana Turkey/Ottoman Empire Lebanon Israel Mongolia TaiwanKorea, Rep. of JapanIndia Sri Lanka Nepal Malaysia Philippines Indonesia Australia .96.97.98.991 Probabilityofstabledemocracy 500 1000 2000 5000 10000 20000 GDP per capita 39 / 45 Determinant of democracy: MDP society Robert Dahl: Democratic institutions are clearly more stable in ‘modern dynamic pluralist’ societies, characterized by: Urbanization Occupational diversity High education levels High levels of citizens’ well-being Production mainly carried out by relatively autonomous and market-oriented firms 40 / 45 Mancur Olson: Dictatorship, democracy, and development ‘Roving bandits’ that become dominant in a territory has an incentive to monopolize theft (taxation) and become stationary Producers and productivity benefit from stationary banditry Stationary bandits have longer time horizons and benefit from higher productivity Public good provision (e.g. order) increases productivity and tax income A sub-maximum tax rate enhances productivity and investment, reduces capital flight, and increases tax returns to the king in absolute terms 41 / 45 Mancur Olson: Dictatorship, democracy, and development This leads to decreased tax returns to the autocrat in relative terms – the relative value of being the autocrat decreases The marginal utility of taking over power for rivaling elites diminishes relative to alternative investment opportunities Environments conducive to development and democracy are similar: Governments need to respect individual property rights Political institutions must guarantee against leaders with short time horizons in the future Autocracies may have long time horizons for a while, but mature democracies are better at keeping myopic leaders out of power in the long run Democracy more likely if the formation of multiple miniautocracies is infeasible – this is the case if communities are tightly interwoven economically? 42 / 45 Mancur Olson: Implications for the liberal peace Democracy, trade, and peace emerge as a result of strong incentives for leaders to promote prosperity Democracy, trade, and peace reinforce each other Democracy and trade does not cause peace, but are complimentary aspects of a rational equilibrium Aspects of teleology also here? 43 / 45 Conclusions .. .. Development and shift to trading-state strategies Autocrats’ incentives to promote order and prosperity 44 / 45 Bibliography Collier, Paul. 2000. Doing Well Out of War: An Economic Perspective. In Greed & Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars, ed. Mats Berdal and David M. Malone. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner (91–111). Fearon, James D. and David D. Laitin. 2003. “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War.” American Political Science Review 97(1):75–90. Gartzke, Erik. 2007. “The Capitalist Peace.” American Journal of Political Science 51(1):166–191. Gates, Scott, H˚avard Hegre, H˚avard Mokleiv Nyg˚ard and H˚avard Strand. 2012. “Development Consequences of Armed Conflict.” World Development 40(9):1713–1722. Hegre, H˚avard. 2015. Civil Conflict and Development. In Oxford University Press Handbook on the Politics of Development, ed. Nicholas van de Walle & Carol Lancaster. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Olson, Mancur. 1993. “Democracy, Dictatorship and Development.” American Political Science Review 87(3):567–576. 45 / 45