

Non-Violent Conflict

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Outline


What is nonviolence

Main findings from the literature

Preference Falsification

Tactics & Outcome


Correlation or Causation?



Demonstrations Iran, 1979



Sit-in Karachi, 2013



Hunger strike

'For me, nonviolence was not a moral principle but a strategy; there is no moral goodness in using an ineffective weapon'.

Nelson Mandela





Anti-regime protesters



Independence protesters



Anti-occupation protesters

Chenoweth and Stephan identified:

- 323 campaigns from 1900 to 2010
 - 106 mainly non-violent
 - 214 mainly violent



'A single spark can start a prairie fire'

- Often revolutions appear as out of the blue, but in retrospect seem inevitable (Kuran 1991)
- Kuran distinguishes between private and public preferences in authoritarian regimes
- Preference falsification can make unpopular regimes appear as robust
- This makes it much harder to overcome collective action problems
- External shock can provide information – in combination with a mismatch between private and public preferences this is likely to generate a cascade of protests





Violent vs. Non-Violent Tactics & Outcome

- Stephan & Chenoweth (2008; 2011) are the first studies to compare non-violent and violent strategies across the entire world (1900-2006)
- They find that non-violent movements are almost twice as likely to succeed as their violent counterparts
- Gamson (1990) study American challenge groups and find the opposite: Groups employing force are more likely to succeed than those refraining from violent tactics
- Quite a few small N studies examine the relationship between tactics and **outcome** (Ackerman & DuVall 2000; Ackerman & Kruegler 1994; Schock 2005; Skarp 1973, 2005; Wehr et al. 1994, Zunes 1994, Kurtz & Asher 1999)

Main Finding

- Non-Violent movements are almost twice as likely to succeed as their violent counterparts.



Why Civil Resistance Works

- A campaign (both non-violent and violent) will succeed if:
 - ① The regime (as a whole) is defeated
 - ② The regime is, due to the costs inflicted by the campaign, better off if they accommodate the group
 - ③ Loyalty shifts take place within one or several of the regime's pillars of support
(These are not mutually exclusive)
- Non-Violent movements are more likely to lead to accommodation and loyalty shifts: directly and indirectly
- **Directly:** Through the nature of non-violent tactics, reducing accommodation risks and increasing the likelihood of loyalty shifts
- **Indirectly:** Being better at mobilizing large number of people which increases the costs inflicted on government and members who make up the most important pillars of support

Tactics & Mobilization

- Large campaigns are better at inflicting costs directly on the government or at their main pillars of support
 - Non-Violent campaigns are on average four times larger than violent campaigns
 - 20 of 25 largest campaigns were non-violent
- According to Chenoweth & Stephan (2011) this is the main reason why non-violent campaigns tend to be more successful than violent campaigns
- But violent movements might achieve a bigger bang for the buck




The Mobilization Advantage: Physical Costs

- Many non-violent tactics demand no skills other than sitting on the ground.



The Mobilization Advantage: Physical Costs

- Many non-violent tactics demand no skills other than sitting on the ground.
- In contrast, participants in violent campaigns, must be in good shape and know how to use weapons. This take time to learn, and for many is not possible



The Mobilization Advantage: Informational Difficulties

- Individuals are more likely to engage in protests when they expect large number of people to participate
- Information regarding group size is easier to access in non-violent than violent campaigns
- Violent campaigns – particularly guerilla and terrorist groups, have to hide to survive



Figure: Naxalite guerillas trek back to their jungle redoubt, south Bastar region

The Mobilization Advantage: Moral Barriers

- Taking up weapons and killing adds a new dimension.
- While some people might *not* have any moral difficulties taking up weapons, most people have
- People joining a non-violent movement often face no moral barriers

The Mobilization Advantage: Commitment Barrier & Risk tolerance

- People with varying degrees of risk and commitment tolerance can participate in non-violent movements
- It is possible to join a non-violent movement just for a day – this is seldom an option in violent campaigns (training needs, access to classified information)
- It is easier to combine non-violent activities with a job and a family: Do not have to make major life sacrifices (lower opportunity costs)

Why are Large Movements more likely to Succeed?

- Large movements inflict higher costs on the government (This is true both for non-violent and violent campaigns)
- This makes it more costly to preserve status quo, and more attractive to grant concessions
- It also makes it more likely that some sort of loyalty shift take place within the government's most important pillars of support

Loyalty Shifts

- Every political leader depends on some kind of coalition (This is true for Kim Jong-un as well as Erna Solberg)
 - The most important pillar of support is the security apparatus (military and police)
 - Without the support of the security apparatus the days of the regime will be counted
 - The economic elite as well often play an important role:
 - Wood (2000) argues that the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa succeeded partly by inflicting cost on the economic elite which responded by pressing the regime to negotiate



Loyalty Shifts within the Security Apparatus

- When demanded to use force to quell the protests the security force (military and police) might not always do so. Instead they might:
 - **Shirk:** Do nothing and let the protesters do what they want (Extremely unlikely to happen if the campaign is violent)
 - **Defect:** Join forces with the campaign



Loyalty Shifts within the Security Apparatus

- Repression is more likely to backfire if the campaign is non-violent
- The military might be less willing to repress large number of people ●
- With a large number of participants, the chances for kinship ties or other social networks linking members of the military to members of the movement increases. This is likely to make soldiers more reluctant to shoot at protesters, particularly if they non-violent
- More convincing that the military will be treated well by the new regime if the campaign is non-violent



Summary

- Non-Violent campaigns are more than twice as likely to succeed
- Non-Violent campaigns better at mobilizing large number of people
- The regime is more likely to negotiate with a non-violent than a violent campaign
- Non-violent campaigns are more likely to cause loyalty shifts within the regime as well as amongst the regime's erstwhile supporters

Does Correlation imply Causation?

- Would violent campaigns be more successful if they made use of non-violent strategies?



Figure: Anti-regime Protest against President Marcos in Philippines

Puzzling Tactical Choices?

- Research by Cunningham, Bakke & Seymour (2012), Pearlman (2011) & Bloom (2005) suggest that organizations engage in two contests simultaneously:
 - ① Against the state, and
 - ② Against other organizations fighting for the same group
- Violence is an efficient way to ensure that an organization remains relevant
- As competition between groups increases organizations are more likely to shift to violent tactics. This might happen despite the group as a whole (including all organizations) would be more likely to succeed against the state if they stuck to non-violent tactics
- This can explain why organizations make use of tactics that do not increase the likelihood that the group as a whole will succeed

Is there a selection bias?

- Would violent groups with a small mobilization potential and/or are located in the periphery be better off using non-violent means?
- Far away from any centre non-violent tactics tend not to be very efficient
- Over time non-violent tactics tend not to be very mobile
- In these situations violent tactics might be more efficient than non-violent: This might explain the lack of non-violent secessionist movement

Available Data

- Non-Violent and Violent Data
 - [NAVCO 1.1](#): Campaign oriented (1900–2006)
 - [NAVCO 2.0](#): Campaign-year oriented (1945–2006)
 - [NAVCO 3.0](#): (To be released) Event data (1987–2011)
 - [MAROB](#): Ethnopolitical organizations in North Africa and the Middle East (1980–2004)
- Violent Data
 - [UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Database](#): Conflict-year oriented (1946–2012)
 - [Correlates of War](#): Conflict-year oriented (1816–1997)

'Erich, we can't beat up hundreds of thousands of people'.

Erich Mielke, Head of Stasi (1957 – 1989)

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