Ethnicity, Violence and Attacks of Boko Haram

# Introduction

Boko Haram, a militant Islamist group, has been operating mainly in northern Nigeria since 2002. It was initially established as a group opposing Western education, which it believes corrupts the moral values of Muslims, and since 2009 it has launched operations to create Islamic state. In 2013 it was officially proclaimed a terrorist organisation by the US government. After the death of Boko Haram's founder in July 2009, Muhammad Yusuf, the members regrouped under a new leader, Abubakar Shekau, and have stepped up its insurgency. Amid growing concern about the escalating violence, former President Goodluck Jonathan declared a state of emergency in May 2013 in three northern states Borno, Yobe and Adamawa (see Map 1 in the Appendix).

Nigeria is an extremely multiethnic country, consisting of over 250 ethnic groups and is the most populous country in Africa (CIA, 2014). The country is also divided along religious lines into a mainly Muslim North and predominantly Christian South. However, both ethnic as well as religious divisions do not create an exclusively closed enclaves and the population is fairly intermingled.

Boko Haram draws its fighters mainly from the Kanuri ethnic group, which is the largest in the three previously mentioned states. However, Kanuri people create only 4 % of the overall Nigerian population and are thus considered as a national minority (Minority Rights Group International, 2005). Both leaders of Boko Haram were also ethnic Kanuris. “Most Kanuris have distinctive facial scars and when added to their heavy Hausa accents, they are easily identifiable to others Nigerians. As a result, the militants operate mainly in the north-east, where the terrain is also familiar to them“(BBC, 2015).

In general, demographic data are politically very sensitive in Nigeria. For instance, the 2006 national census did not ask respondents for information on their ethnicity or religion. However, it is widely known that four groups - Fulani, Hausa, Yoruba and Igbo - account for approximately 68 % of the total population. Hausa and Fulani peoples are concentrated in the north and practice Islam. Together they constitute around 29 % of the population and have dominated Nigerian politics (Minority Rights Group International, 2005).

The steady growth in violence of Boko Haram is currently one of the major issues in Nigeria. Their attacks vary in scale, from small explosions with no casualties to well-planned operations killing dozens of people. Given the broad ethnic variety of the Nigerian population and the fact that the majority of Boko Haram's members are recruited mainly from one ethnic group, this research attempts to address the political inequality between particular ethnic groups in Nigeria, meaning their political relevancy (such as participation in the states or federal government) and find out whether there is a connection between certain ethnic groups and the targets of Boko Haram's attacks. This research paper argues that it is political inequality between Nigerian ethnic groups in terms of the accessibility to politics, rather than systematic targeting of a certain ethnic group that drives the attacks of Boko Haram.

# Research Design

**Methods and Data Sources**

The method used for this research is a case study with the case being the intensification of attacks of Boko Haram. This is the most suitable method since the main purpose of a case study is to “provide the reader with a deep understanding or causal explanation of a specific case” (Kořan 2008, 33). Moreover, it must also provide an in-depth analysis, by taking into consideration the context (political, historical and social) within which a specific case occurs as well as examine as many variables as possible.

This study aims to answer its main research question: *Does ethnicity contribute to the intensification of violence and attacks of Boko Haram in Nigeria since its insurgency in 2009?* To be able to find the answer and draw final conclusions I also need to address the following secondary questions: Are the attacks concentrated in certain towns? If yes, what are the major ethnic groups there? And lastly, do all ethnic groups in Nigeria have equal opportunities to enter the state and federal political arena? Thus, the dependent variable in this research is the increase of violence and attacks of Boko Haram in Nigeria and the independent variable is the ethnic group affiliation.

I will use the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) as the main source of the primary data. The GTD provides a comprehensive list of all attacks of Boko Haram for the researched time period commencing 2009. It also contains basic information about each attack, including the place, the attacker, the number of causalities and usually also the general circumstances surrounding the incursion. The GTD will thus serve as the main building block for my research. The second main source of data is the official governmental websites which provide information about ethnic composition in that particular state. Unfortunately, not all states websites are accessible or they do not include the necessary data; therefore these will be supplemented by books dealing with ethnic identity in Nigeria. These include for instance *Ethnicity and child survival in Nigeria* by Olufunke and Adams (2011); *Working the Sahel: Environment and Society in Northern Nigeria* by Mortimor and Adams (1999); *Nigeira´s Diverse People: A Reference Sourcebook* by Gordon (2003) and *Ethnic Groups of Africa and the Middle East: an encyclopaedia* by Shoup (2011). Great source of information about ethnic groups in Nigeria is also an online database *Ethnologue: Languages of the World* prepared by Lewis, Simons and Fennig (2015) which provides self-content information about language ethnic groups in Nigeria. The third important source of data is the Nigerian Constitution which as a fundamental legal document will provide me with information about overall situation of ethnic groups in the country and their accessibility to politics.

The research consists of two parts. In the first one I use the data available at the GTD to find out the location and scale of the attacks. This paper uses the definition by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), which defines an armed conflict as “a contested incompatibility which concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths“ (UCDP, 2014). Based on this definition I will divide the attacks into small-scale attacks (which caused less than 25 fatalities) and large-scale attacks (which caused more than 25 fatalities). I will specifically focus on whether Boko Haram carries out the large-scale attacks in specific areas that are different from the small-scale attacks. Secondly, I will find out which are the majority ethnic groups in those areas. I will obtain the data in the second phase of the research from the previously mentioned books, official governmental portals. Combining these sources and the two-phased approach will enable me to draw conclusions and address the primary and secondary research questions.

Although Boko Haram was established in 2002, it did not begin conducting military operations until 2009 (The Telescope News, 2014). Because this paper examines the increase of violence and attacks, the research time frame is set from July 2009 when the previous leader Muhammad Yusuf died until the end of 2013 which is the most recent available data in the GTD.

**Conceptualization**

To clarify the concepts this research operates with, I shall now define them. Due to the existence of so many ethnic groups in Nigeria, ethnicity refers in this study to the affiliation to these ethnic groups. Based on the definitions of two prominent authors, Thomas Hylland Eriksen and Anthony D. Smith, ethnicity can be defined as “an aspect of relationships between groups [ethnic groups/ communities] which consider themselves, and are regarded by others as being culturally distinctive” (Eriksen 2002, p. 4). At the same time, these ethnic groups must share six key traits: a) a group name b) a believed common ancestry c) common historical memories d) element of shared culture (such as language, religion etcetera) e) attachment to a specific territory f) a sense of solidarity (Hutchinson and Smith 1996, p. 6-7).

The term ethnic group refers in this paper to the groups created along kinship and ancestral lines (such as Kanuri people, Hausa-Fulani people etc.) and can be defined as “a collectivity within a larger society [who] have real or putative common ancestry, memories of a shared historical past, and a cultural focus on one or more symbolic elements defined as the epitome of their peoplehood“(Schermerhorn, 1970: 12).

For the purpose of this research paper it is essential to differentiate between ethnicity and ideology. Ideology can be defined as “a system of collectively held normative and reputedly factual ideas and beliefs and attitudes advocating a particular pattern of social relationships and arrangements, and/ or aimed at justifying a particular pattern of conduct, which its proponents seek to promote, realise, pursue or maintain” (Hamilton 1987, p. 39). In case of Boko Haram religion is a driving force of their Islamist ideology rather than an expression of ethnicity since Boko Haram targets Christians, Animists and Muslims as well as churches and mosques. Therefore, attacks on religious figures and institutions are seen in this study to be a part of their ideology, not ethnicity.

This study also operates with the concept of political inequality. In order to examine it, the group needs to be politically relevant. Using the definition of Wimmer, a group is politically relevant “if at least one significant political actor claims to represent the interests of that group in the national political arena, or if members of an ethnic category are systematically and intentionally discriminated against in the domain of public politics. By “significant” political actor is meant a political organization (not necessarily a party) that is active in the national political arena“(Wimmer et al., 2009). Boko Haram certainly plays an active part in Nigerian political arena. Moreover, the group has been suspected to have connections with governments of some north Nigerian states (The Telescope News, 2014).

**Theory**

The connection between ethnicity and violence can be examined from various perspectives. For instance micro-studies focus mainly on individuals and attempt to explain the mechanisms of ethnicity and how does ethnicity matter. It is mainly due to the lack of data about the ethnic affiliation of the members of Boko Haram as well as the casualties that this approach would be nigh on impossible to implement for the purpose of this paper. Because obtaining such data would require conducting an extensive and investigative field research.

Therefore, the research examines ethnicity at the group level. Probably the most suitable approach is the theory of horizontal inequality (HI) developed by a prominent scholar Frances Steward, director of the Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity (CRISE) at the Oxford University. The theory is based on the premise that cultural differences coinciding with economic and political differences between groups may cause deep resentment that may lead to violent struggles (Steward and Brown 2007, p. 222). According to the hypothesis a combination of cultural differences, political and economic inequalities running along cultural lines can partially explain violent conflict. HIs emerge between groups of individuals sharing a common identity. In this case the common identity is the affiliation to the same ethnic group. Unlike the “vertical” inequality, the HI focuses on whole ethnic groups rather than on individuals (for instance Cederman et al., 2013, Østby, 2008, Richardson 2011).

As stated above, HI consists of four main components: the economic, social, political and cultural status HIs. The economic HI includes imbalances in income levels, employment opportunities, access to and ownership of assets (financial, human, social, resource-based etc.). The social HI contains access to services, such as education, health care or housing. The cultural status HI means a disparity in the recognition of language, religion, customs, traditions and norms. Lastly, the political HI includes inequalities in the distribution of political opportunities and power, such as control of the army, the parliament, both state and regional governments, the police and the presidency. They also include disparities in political participation of the public. According to Stewart (Stewart 2010, p. 7) the first three are more likely to motivate the public masses, whereas the latter represents political exclusion of a particular group and as such is more prone to motivate group leaders.

Relevance of the four components is different across societies, depending on how important source of welfare each component is in that particular society. For instance access to land would be more essential in societies where the majority of people work in the agricultural sector than for developed societies where the majority of population is employed in services (Ibid.).

For the case of Boko Haram, the most relevant component is certainly the political HI since its well-known objective is to establish an Islamic state. Also, Boko Haram as a terrorist organization operates under the commands of a closed group of decision makers. This body is known as the “Shura Council “consisting of around 30 leaders and is characterized by a high degree of operational security (The Telescope News, 2014). These decision makers plan the attacks mainly on politically related entities. According to the GTD the most common targets of Boko Haram attacks are “Private Citizens and Property” (including attacks on individuals, attacks in public areas such as markets, commercial streets, busy intersections and pedestrian malls), the “Police” (including attacks on members of police force, police boxes, headquarters, cars, checkpoints etc.), the “Religious Figures/ Institutions” and the “General Government” (including attacks on government buildings and government sponsored institutions, members and employees of government, politicians, election-related attacks etc.) respectively. More detailed information about the targets and overall data collection methodology can be found in the GTD Codebook (GTDa, 2014, p. 30-39). Together they stand for approximately two thirds of all attacks.

Due to the closed decision-making group, their primary objective and the most common targets of their attacks, this study focuses on the political HIs, even though the author is aware that this might create a certain limitations. However, as stated above, it is mainly the political HI that motivates the leaders.

# Analysis

I will first introduce four graphs displayed in chapter five and then move to the analysis. Graph 1 shows the number of large-scale attacks by Boko Haram in Nigeria. Over the researched period Boko Haram carried out 30 of them. The most attacked city is Maiduguri, capital of Borno state and Boko Haram's headquarters. Kano city, the capital of Kano state, Damatura, the capital of Yobe state and Bama in Borno state experienced each 3 large-scale attacks. Other cities displayed in Graph 1 (Jos, Abuja etc.) were attacked only once. Graph 2 shows frequency of large-scale attacks according to states. Borno state was targeted the most and experienced 5 large-scale attacks. Yobe state experienced 4 large-scale attacks, Kaduna and Adamawa 2 and Kano, Abuja and Niger 1 large-scale attack each.

Small-scale attacks are displayed in Graphs 3 and 4. Graph 3 shows small-scale attacks for 20 most attacked states. By far the most attacked city is again Maiduguri with 165 small-scale attacks. Kano city experienced 51 attacks, followed by Potiskum (23 small-scale attacks) and Damatura (16 small-scale attacks) in Yobe state. Kaduna city experienced 12 small-scale attacks, same as the city of Gamboru in Borno state. Gombe 11, Biu, Bama and Gwoza all in Borno state were attacked eight times each. The Federal capital Abuja was attacked seven times and the same number of attacks were carried out in Dambou (Borno state). Jos, the capital of Plateau, experienced 6 small-scale attacks. 5 attacks were carried out Bauchi city, Geidum (Yobe state) and Mubi (Adamawa). Cities of Konduga, Mafa and Banki experienced 4 small-scale attacks each.

Graph 4 shows small-scale attacks by states. The most attacked states are Borno (262 small-scale attacks), followed by Yobe (60) and Kano (57), then Kaduna (24), Adamawa (18), Gombe (16) and Bauchi (14). Less than 10 small-scale attacks were carried out in Plateau state (8), the Federal capital Abuja (7), Niger (5) and Taraba (4). Other states such as Jigawa, Katsina, Ondo, Delta or Edo experienced only one small-scale attack. Due to a large number of towns with only one attack, these are not included within the graphs.

In the following section presents data about the most attacked cities and states. In order to compare them I will also include information about states that has been attacked only once or not at all, despite they are located in frequently attacked parts of the country. I will conclude this section by analysing whether there is any connection between the attacks and ethnic groups.

In the research period by far the most frequent attacks were in Maiduguri, the capital city of the Borno state, where Boko Haram has its headquarters. The city experienced 165 small-scale attacks and 5 large-scale attacks, according to the definition in chapter 2 Research Design. In Maiduguri the most common ethnic groups are Hausa, Fulani and Kanuri (Toyin 2015, p. 179). Other towns in the Borno state are far behind Maiduguri regarding number of attacks. The second most affected is Bama with 8 small-scale and 3 large-scale attacks. Bama is inhabited mainly by the Kanuris with minority of the Shuwa people. Another attacked areas including Gwoza (8 small-scale and 1 large-scale attacks) with the majority of Marghis people, Gamboru (12 small-scale attacks), Biu (8 small-scale attacks) inhabited predominantly by the Babur Bura ethnic group, Damboa (7 small-scale attacks) with the majority of Kanuri people and Monguno town (2 large-scale attacks) inhabited mainly by the Shuwa and Kanuri people. Altogether, the major ethnic groups in the Borno state are Baburd Bura, Shuwa, Marghi, Fulani, Hausa, Gamergu (also known as Kanakuru), Chibok, Ngoshe, Guduf, Mandara and Tera (Borno State Government 2013).

The second most attacked state is the Kano state where the majority of attacks aimed again at the capital. Kano city experienced 51 small-scale and 3 large-scale attacks during the researched time-frame. Other attacks took place in attached areas to the capital (e.g. Kumbotso area, 2 small-scale attacks), Kano city as well as the Kano state is predominantly inhabited by Hausa-Fulani people with other ethnic groups including Kanuri, Nupe, Ibo, Yoruba, Tiv, Idoma, Igala (Paden 1973, p. 22; Gambari n.d., p. and Umar and Bassey 2010, p. 76). Kano city is one of the greatest of the Hausa city-states they have established over centuries. It is essential to note that many of Hausa institutions and skills come from the Kanuri people in Borno state. The contact between these two groups was intensive and eventually resulted in the Kanuris adopting Hausa language and much of their culture (Gordon 2003, p. 14).

The third most affected state is Yobe state which directly borders with Borno state in the East. The worst affected cities are the capital Damaturu (16 small-scale and 3 large-scale attacks) inhabited by the Kanuri and Ngizim ethnic groups (Lewis, M. P., Simons G. F. and Fennig C. D. 2015), also the city of Potiskum (23 small-scale attacks), which is an ancient city geographically situated at a cross road which connects Maiduguri in Borno State with Bauchi, Jos and Kano (Daily Trust 2013) and is recognized as a traditional headquaters of the Ngizim ethnic group (Joshua Project 2015a).

On the other hand, Zamfara is the only state in northern Nigeria where according to the GTD Boko Haram did not strike any attack in the researched period. It lies between Sokoto, Kebbi, Niger, Kaduna and Katsina, each of which experienced at least one attack. The ethnic composition in Zamfara is not any different from its neighbouring states. It is mostly inhabited by the Hausa and Fulani people and is an overwhelmingly Muslim state (Mwakikagile 2014, p. 441), other ethnic groups in the state include Igbo, Yoruba, Kanuri, Nupe and Tivs (Cometonigeria.com 2011). In 1999 the governor of Zamfara, Ahmed Sani, introduced Sharia law as the very first state in Nigeria (Ibid). Borno state adopted the Shari law in August 2000 (BBC 2000), which is even before Boko Haram was established and therefore it is not a sufficient explanation for Boko Haram's targeting. However, neither is the ethnic composition which includes the same ethnic groups that can be found in other attacked states.

A similar situation can be observed in Jigawa state which only experienced two small-scale attacks although it lies between two most attacked states, Kano and Yobe. According to the State Government (2015a) 80 % of the population is found in the rural areas and is made up of mostly Hausa, Fulani and Manga (a Kanuri dialect). Boko Haram aimed at the Ringim town which was settled around 1800 by migrants from Kano. The present Emir of Ringim comes from a Fulani family which dominated Ringim politics since 1924 (Jigawa State Governemnt 2015b). The second target was a police station in Birmiwa. The city has two main ethnic groups: Manga (related to Kanuri) and FulBe (Mortimore and Adams 1999, p. 41-42). Likewise this can also be noted in Katsina state. The main ethnic groups are Hausa and Fulani with pockets of other ethnic groups such as the Ibos and Yorubas (Katsina State Government 2002). More importantly, the city of Daura where the attack was held, is perceived by most Hausa people as „their founding city and the home of their civilization and ruling lineages“(Gordon 2003, p. 13).

Boko Haram often claims to be anti-governmental. This is support by the fact that around 12 % of all their attacks is targeted towards governmental institutions and bodies (GTD 2014b). However, the capital city Abuja, which is the seat of all major political institutions, experienced only 1 large-scale and 7 small-scale attacks attack. The former did not even target the government, but the United Nation headquarters. This is probably less than one would expect for a “political capital of the West Africa“, accommodating the regional bodies such as ECOWAS, the Economic Community of West Africa States or OPEC and the regional home of the diplomatic and international (including Western) community. The territory of today´s Abuja was historically a land of Gbagyi, which was conceived of by a military government in 1976. The idea was to find a 'no-man's land' in the geographic centre of the country, which no one group could lay claim to, and an area in which Nigerians could unite under (Ndege 2012). The name Gbagyi means „slave“ in Hausa language, perhaps because they underwent a long time of persecution from both the Hausa and Fulani people. The slavery contributed to produce the Gwaris' identity which coupled with the forcible removal from their original land, is seen as a part of a larger conspiracy against them (Shoup 2011, p. 110 - 111). Today, Abuja is viewed as neutral both ethnically and religiously and no part is dominated by any particular ethnic group (Williams 2008, p. 231).

During the researched period Boko Haram also targeted southern part of Nigeria. For instance Akure city in Ondo state which is a traditional Yoruba city (Olufunke and Obafemi 2011, p. 93; Ondo State Government 2015). The Benin City in Edo state is a diverse city with mixture of ethnic groups such as Benins, Akoko-Edo, Etsako, Ishan and Owan (Edo State Tourism 2014). Thirdly, the city of Sapele in Delta state is mainly inhabited by Urhobos, also known as Isoko (Encyclopaedia Britannica 2015). All of these cities experienced one small-scale attack. It is worth pointing out that Boko Haram does not usually operate in the southern part of Nigeria. As shown above, the ethnic groups inhabiting these areas in the south are different from those in the north. One possible explanation can be their importance due to the oil reserves that can be found in the Nigerian Delta. All three cities are also important political and economic regional centres; Akure and Benin are also the capitals. Therefore, neither here will ethnic groups serve as a sufficient explanation for Boko Haram's targeting.

Another essentials aspect is examining the access of Nigerian ethnic groups into politics. Article 2. of the 1999 Constitution states that „The composition of the Government of the Federation or any of its agencies and the conduct of its affairs shall be carried out in such a manner as to reflect the federal character of Nigeria and the need to promote national unity, and also to command national loyalty, thereby ensuring that there shall be no predominance of persons from a few State or from a few ethnic or other sectional groups in that Government or in any of its agencies (Constitution 1999)“. Also according to the article 15. „discrimination on the grounds of place of origin, sex, religion, status, ethnic or linguistic association or ties shall be prohibited“(Ibid). Article 222. prohibits any political party to use symbols or logos with any ethnic or religious connotations or give the appearance that the activities of the association are confined to a part only of the geographical area of Nigeria (Ibid). This provides an example of how should “things” work in theory. In reality, many sources suggest that it is the Hausa Fulani ethnic group that has been dominant in Nigerian politics (e.g. PBS Newshour 2007; Minority Rights Group International, 2005). The Human Rights Watch 2013 and 2012 Reports also state that “the state and local government policies that discriminate against “non-indigenes” people who cannot trace their ancestry to what are said to be the original inhabitants of an area—also continue to exacerbate inter-communal tensions and perpetuate ethnic-based divisions“ (Human Rights Watch Reports 2012 and 2013). The fact that the ethnic affiliation of most of Nigerian politicians is publicly taboo further supports the argument.

Boko Haram's attacks might affect the Hausa and Fulani people the most. However, it is not a case of a systematic targeting. Firstly, Hausa and Fulani ethnic groups are the majority ethnic groups in Maiduguri, by far the most attacked city of all. On the other hand, there are states where these groups create majority but which were only attacked once or not at all, such as Zamfara, Jigawa or Katsina states. Especially the city of Ringim in Jigwa state, where Fulani members have been dominating the politics since 1924 would probably undergo marginally more attacks than just one. This contradiction is even more obvious when it comes to Hausa ethnic group. Kano city, the second most attacked area, is one of the greatest Hausa cities. On the contrary, the city of Daura which is known as the “homeland” of Hausa people was only attacked once. If Boko Haram systemically targeted Hausa and Fulani people, Daura city would probably experience significantly more attacks. Also, attacks in the southern part of Nigeria, inhabited by completely different ethnic groups, contradicts the idea of targeting a certain ethnic group.

The Kanuri ethnic group forms the major in Maiduguri, Bama or Damaturu, which belong to one of the most targeted areas. However, if this was the case and Boko Haram targeted the Kanuris, their “own” ethnic group, it would not make any sense for Boko Haram to carry out attacks in the South, where the attacks are for them more logistically difficult due to the distance from their “home-base”. A similar situation can be observed with regards to the Ngizim ethnic group which forms the majority in Damaturu and Potiskum is known as their “centre”. Both of these cities underwent substantial amount of attacks. Nevertheless, in Maiduguri or any other attacked city, the Ngizim ethnic group does not stand for a significant portion of population or does not inhabit it at all. Neither in this case, a systemic targeting of a certain ethnic group, does not seem to be a sufficient explanation.

To conclude, for all aforementioned contradictions, ethnic group affiliation does not seem to be the reason for Boko Haram's targeting. Therefore, ethnicity does not prove to contribute to the intensification of violence and attacks of Boko Haram. It also does not seem to be more likely that Boko Haram targets those areas which they are most familiar with, that is Borno state and its direct neighbours with the exception of Yobe state. Kano and Kaduna states are separated from Borno state by at least two other states that experienced significantly less attacks.

Possible explanation could be the political horizontal inequality as described in the theoretical part. According to the Nigerian Constitution all ethnic groups should have equal opportunities to enter the political arena. However, in reality this is not the case and the politically dominant groups are the Hausa and Fulani. These two groups are settled in the North of Nigeria and created the majority where Boko Haram attacked the most. Nevertheless, as explained above it is not a case of any systemic targeting of these two groups, but those who enjoy some sort of political privilege, in this case the Hausa and Fulani groups.

# Conclusion

This research paper addresses the contribution of ethnicity towards Boko Haram's terrorist attacks. It concludes that due to the contradictions between ethnic composition in the most and the least attacked areas, ethnicity did not prove to be the reason behind Boko Haram's targeting. It suggests that the political horizontal inequality, which includes the access to Nigerian politics, is more likely to be the driving force of their targeting.

The research opened up a broad window of possibilities for further examining this topic. Firstly, to further support the conclusions, one way for a future research would be to look at the most common ethnic groups involved in Nigerian politics and compare them to attacks of Boko Haram. Such a way would be basically a reversed to my own, which first look at the attacks of Boko Haram and after then at the ethnic groups “profile”. Needles to say that such a research could struggle with data availability because as stated above, information about ethnic affiliation is extremely difficult to find. Future research could also examine closely particular attacks targeting private property and governmental institutions. This qualitative research would require two things: firstly, an extensive field research or reliable local or regional news which would provide the researcher with detailed information about where and who exactly have been attacked. Secondly, a great deal of patience because such information will not be easy to find; also taking into consideration the frequency of the attacks which was nearly “every other day” in the research period.

Activities of Boko Haram have not been substantially examined by scholars of ethnicity in International Relations and variety of questions is yet to be explored. This research paper may serve as a valuable starting point which summarizes the basic issues and points out the logic behind ethnicity and Boko Haram.

# Graphs

Graph 1.: Boko Haram's large-scale attacks by cities/ towns.

*Source: Graph created by the author using the GTD data (GTD 2014)*

Graph 2.: Boko Haram's Large-scale attacks by states.

*Source: Graph created by the author using the GTD data (GTD 2014)*

Graph 3.: Boko Haram's small-scale attacks by cities/ towns.

*Source: Graph created by the author using the GTD data (GTD 2014)*

Graph 4.: Boko Haram's small-scale attacks by states.

*Source: Graph created by the author using the GTD data (GTD 2014)*

Map 1: Political map of Nigeria exhibiting its 36 states and the federal capital territory.



*Source: Wikipedia. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Template:Nigeria\_states\_map)*

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