

Always positive?

The consequences of candidate selection

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Candidate selection

- A process taking place inside political parties
- May include broader masses than just party members
- Possible consequences may affect:
 - The political party itself
 - Events following the candidate selection
 - Politics in general



Consequences

- Participation
- Representation
- Competitiveness
- Cohesion of parties
- Quality of candidates

A test for citizens

- If you want to vote, please select the correct answers:
- 1. Who is the head of state in our country?
 - a) Prime Minister
 - b) President
 - c) Head of Constitutional court
- 2. How many MPs there are in our parliament?
 - a) 350
 - b) 500
 - c) 180

1. Participation

- Active approach of those who may select
- In general the idea of democracy:
 - Maximum inclusiveness – the universal suffrage
 - Question of quantity, not quality
- Decreasing membership as a challenge for parties partly solved by raising inclusiveness in candidate selection

Participation

- Inclusiveness vs. turnout
- Inclusiveness:
 - The amount of people who **may take part** in selection
 - All members of party elite
- Turnout:
 - The share of people allowed to select who **actually took part** and selected
 - Members of party elite who met and selected

Participation

- Raising inclusiveness of the selectorate allows more people to decide, but does not automatically guarantee higher turnout
- Application of Olsonian logic:
 - Higher incentives to participate in smaller groups
 - And vice versa
- The more included people, the lesser weight of each person's vote

Participation

- A general trend – raising inclusiveness of selectorate **increases absolute number** of people allowed to participate, but **lowers turnout**
- Typically a shift from party delegates to primaries
- The main logic – when all are included, also the non-active are

Participation

- Empirical findings:
 - Turnout of members – around 50 %
 - Turnout of delegates – 70 – 90 %
- Influencing factors:
 - The relation between selection and election
 - The predictability of results of the selection
 - Technical issues

Participation - cases

- Likud (ISR) - turnout:
 - Primaries – around 50 %
 - Central committee – around 90 %
- British parties:
 - Conservatives – delegates – 70 – 90 %
 - Liberals – primaries - 34 %
- Czech Republic

Quantity vs. quality

- Increase of participation as a democratization tool
- Is there a point where negatives outweigh the positives?
- Risks of opening the gates to membership:
 - Mass registration of members
 - Uninformed members
 - Penalizing previous activity of members

Mass registration


- Typical impact of including members to participate
- Strong increase of membership before candidate selection and quick fall after the process
 - Canada – 60 – 300 %
 - Israel – similar findings
 - Iceland – more participants on primaries than voters

Mass registration

- Important note – mass registration is **not connected** only to primaries
- Similar effects may be present even when more exclusive selectorates have the real power
- Organized hiring of instant members
- Many cases also in Czech Republic (ODS, CSSD, etc.)

Mass registration

- Example:
 - Candidates are selected by regional delegate conventions
 - Each region consists of several counties
 - Main rule – each county can nominate one delegate for each 500 members
- Is there an incentive to hire instant members?
- What can be done to prevent it or at least weaken incentives to do so?



Mass registration

- Preventing the risks:
 - Freezing the membership
 - Higher requirements for members to participate (which ones?)
 - Change of rules of candidate selection
 - Modification of creation of the selectorates

2. Representation

- Who / what will the candidates represent?
- Representation of ideas:
 - Candidates share the party's ideology
- Representation of presence:
 - Composition of candidates reflects the demographic structure of society (women, employers, young etc.)

Representation of presence

- Easier to analyze than representation of ideas
 - Data from candidate lists vs. data for individual candidates
- A mutual influence?
 - Women (young people) may have lesser interest in being candidates
 - This may be due to lower chances they have in candidate selection

Impact of candidacy

- Higher requirements decrease representation:
 - Age → older aspirants
 - Monetary deposit → lower social groups, women
 - Previous experience → younger aspirants
- Lower requirements may improve representation, but the party has weaker control on the process
- Who may benefit from **no requirements** on candidates?

Impact of selectorate



Impact of selectorate

- More **exclusive selectorate** improves representation:
 - Smaller group with ability to find and agreement through discussion
 - Composition of candidates is made via coordination and cooperation
 - Balancing the final selection in ideological and social aspects

Impact of selectorate

- **Inclusive selectorate:**
 - Undermines representation
 - Mostly without ability to coordinate and cooperate
 - Numerous masses support uniformity
- Western Europe – increasing inclusiveness of selectorate in parallel with adding quotas
 - D66 – primaries are preceded by screening process
 - A coincidence?



Impact of decentralization

- Ensuring both territorial and social representation may be mutually exclusive (FPTP as prime example)
- Selection on non-national level:
 - Ensures territorial representation, but harms social representation
 - Social representation (f.e. women) is better achieved in more centralized selection
- Quotas:
 - Help the social representation
 - Small quotas – may help a specific person instead of the whole group

Impact of appointment/voting

- Strongly connected to impact of selectorate
 - More exclusive selectorate appoint
 - More inclusive selectorate vote
- Various effects of applied voting systems:
 - FPTP, Two round, STV, List PR
 - Different chances for coordination and balancing

Measuring representation

- Many ways how to operationalize representation
- Index of representation (IR):

$$\text{IR} = \frac{\sum W_{rp}}{\sum R_p} \times 100$$

- Percentage share of candidates of the respective group (women) among all candidates

Measuring representation

- Weighted index of representation (WIR):

$$\text{WIR} = \frac{\sum \left[\left(\frac{W_p}{V_{pi}} \right) \times R_p \right]}{\sum R_p} \times 100$$

- Share of candidates of the respective group (women) on realistic positions taking account to value of these positions

Weighted index of representation

- Example:
 - 7 realistic positions
 - Women got positions 3, 6 and 7
 - Values – position seven (1 point), position six (2 points), ... position one (7 points)

Weighted index of representation

- Sum of all values:
 - $7 + 6 + 5 + 4 + 3 + 2 + 1 = 28$
- Sum of women's positions:
 - $5 + 2 + 1 = 8$
- WIR:
 - $8 / 28 * 100 = 28,6 \%$

Position	Value
1	7
2	6
3	5
4	4
5	3
6	2
7	1

Weighted index of representation

- Sum of all values:
 - $7 + 6 + 5 + 4 + 3 + 2 + 1 = 28$
- Sum of women's positions:
 - $7 + 6 + 5 = 18$
- WIR:
 - $18 / 28 * 100 = 64,3 \%$

Position	Value
1	7
2	6
3	5
4	4
5	3
6	2
7	1

Weighted index of representation

- **What if there are more selection events?**
 - 14 in Czech Republic (each district individually)
 - Each selection is calculated separately
 - Each selection has a weight equal to its realistic positions
- **Example:**
 - Selection one – 7 seats, WIR = 28,6
 - Selection two – 3 seats, WIR = 60
 - WIR for both = $(28,6 * 7 + 60 * 3) / 10 = 38$
 - Pure average of 28,6 and 60 would be 44,3

Region	Weight (ODS)	WIR (ODS)	
Prague	8	0,19	1,52
Central Bohemia	8	0	0
South Bohemia	6	0	0
Plzen	6	0,1	0,6
Karlovy Vary	4	0	0
Usti nad Labem	6	0,24	1,44
Liberec	4	0	0
Hradec Kralove	6	0,05	0,3
Pardubice	4	0	0
Vysocina	4	0,05	2
South Moravia	8	0,11	0,88
Olomouc	6	0	0
Zlin	6	0	0
Moravia-Silesia	8	0,28	2,24
	84	0,11	8,98

3. Competition



- Is the process a real competition?
- Is it a challenge for the incumbents?
- **No competition:**
 - Number of aspirants equals number of candidates (on realistic positions)
 - Typically – FPTP with just one aspirant
 - In multi member districts even equality of aspirants and realistic positions may include **some** competition

Impacts on competition

- Candidacy:
 - Higher / lower requirements put on incumbents may affect their chances
 - Automatic or easier reselection
 - Age restrictions, maximum amount of served terms

Impacts on competition

- **Selectorate:**
- **Party elite** - lowest competition
 - High support for incumbents
 - Preventing intraparty conflicts by making only little changes
- **Primaries** - middle competition
 - Support of incumbents – better known to members
 - Obstacles for newcomers - needed support of numerous groups
→ campaign
- **Delegates** – highest competition

Impacts on competition

- Decentralization:
- High territorial decentralization lowers competition:
 - USA – only 2 % of incumbents lost in primaries
 - Similar findings in Ireland or Israel
 - Germany – lower turnovers in SMD than in regions
- Quotas:
 - Effect strongly depends on the „previous“ situation
 - Typically adopted after women already gained seats

Measuring competition

- Aspirant index 1:

$$AI1 = \frac{\sum Crp}{\sum RP}$$

- Crp – candidates competing for realistic positions
- RP – number of realistic position

- 26 candidates competing for 4 seats = $26 / 4 = 6,5$
- 13 candidates competing for 11 seats = $13 / 11 = 1,2$

Measuring competition

- Aspirant index 2:

$$AI2 = \frac{\sum C_{ni}}{\sum C_i}$$

- C_{ni} – non-incumbents competing for realistic positions
- C_i – incumbents competing for realistic positions
- 26 candidates are competing out of which 17 are non-incumbents = $17 / 26 = 0,654$

Measuring competition

- Non-incumbents winning index (NIWI):

$$NIWI = \frac{\sum Wni}{\sum Ci}$$

- Wni – non-incumbents who won a position that is equal or higher than number of incumbents
- Ci – number of competing incumbents
- 7 incumbents are competing and won positions 1, 2, 4, 6 and 7 $\rightarrow 2 / 7 = 0,29$

- 6 incumbents on the list
- Positions of incumbents :
 - 1, 2, 4, 6, 7, 9
- Positions of newcomers:
 - 3, 5, 8, 10
 - 2 newcomers in positions 1-6
- $NIWI = 2 / 6 = 0,33$

Position	Incumbent
1	
2	
3	
4	
5	
6	
7	
8	
9	
10	

Other consequences

- Cohesion of parties:
 - Candidates respond to those who can select them
 - Applying more inclusive selectorates reduces cohesion:
 - Higher importance of candidates and their profiles
 - Lesser importance of party's profile as a whole
 - Allowing non-members to participate even supports these trends

Democracy at its best?

Selectorate	Inclusiveness	Representation	Competition	Cohesion
Elite / Committee	Low	High	Low	High
Party delegates	Medium	Medium	High	Medium
Party members	High	Low	Medium	Lower