DEMOCRATIZING A DEMOCRATIC
PROCEDURE: MYTH OR REALITY?
Candidate Selection in Western
European Parties, 1960–1990
Lars Bille
A B S T R A C T
The aim of the article is to analyse whether democratization of the
candidate selection process has occurred in Western European parties in
general and in Denmark in particular in the period from 1960 to 1990.
The analysis is based on the party rules in force around 1960 and 1990
of 57 and 71 Western European parties, respectively. The general
assumption is that the greater the role of the individual party member,
the more democratically the parties conduct their internal affairs and,
furthermore, the more decentralized the procedure, the greater the
possibilities for individual party members to play a role. The analysis
indicates that the candidate selection process was more decentralized
and the role of the individual party member in the process were greater
at the beginning of the 1990s than they were around 1960.
KEY WORDS Ⅲ Candidate selection Ⅲ democratization Ⅲ Denmark Ⅲ political parties
Ⅲ Western Europe
It is important, for at least two reasons, to study the parties’ selection of
candidates for election to the representative assemblies of a political system
and to trace whether the selection process has become more democratic.
First, if a political party is defined as ‘any group that presents at elections,
and is capable of placing through elections, candidates for public office’
(Sartori, 1976: 64), then it is obvious that the candidate selection process is
crucial to any party whatever the type: cadre (Duverger, 1954), mass
(Duverger, 1954), catch-all (Kirchheimer, 1966), electoral–professional
(Panebianco, 1988), cartel (Katz and Mair, 1995), or modern cadre party
(Koole, 1994). It follows from this definition that political parties have a
unique position in the political system in so far as:
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The political party is the one agency that can claim to have as its very
raison d’être the creation of an entire linkage chain, a chain of connections
that runs from the voters through the candidates and the electoral
process to the officials of government.
(Lawson, 1988: 16)
Given this unique position of the parties in the political system, it is reasonable
to assert that the way the parties carry out this linkage function will
have an important impact on the nature and functioning of a democratic
regime. Will the parties provide a participatory link, putting stress on the
active involvement of the citizenry in the party – for instance, as party
members with influence on candidate selection, party programme, party
policies, and so forth? Or will the parties act solely as agents for those in
government to maintain control over the behaviour of citizens?
In other words, the way parties are organized is a very important variable
when trying to characterize and understand the functioning of a democratic
regime. It is hard to imagine how a regime can be classified as democratic
if the political parties have an organizational structure that leaves no room
for citizens to participate and have influence. The decision-making process
within the parties, that is, the degree of internal party democracy, becomes
an interesting and even crucial issue for analysis. And of these processes the
candidate selection and nomination process stands out as one of the most
important:
The quality of candidates selected determines the quality of the deputies
elected, of the resultant parliament, often of the members of the government
and, to some extent, of a country’s politics. A change in parties’
selection procedures in any given country might thus have direct consequences
for the way politics operate here. Moreover, the way in which
political parties select their candidates may be used as an acid test of
how democratically they conduct their internal affairs.
(Gallagher and Marsh, 1988: 1)
Secondly, a variety of developments and trends during the past four decades
have been identified in the literature on political parties – party decline,
shrinking membership, the erosion of the once stable social basis of the
parties, an increasing number of floating voters, a rise in electoral volatility,
the commercialization and increased importance of the electronic media at
the expense of a party controlled or at least party loyal press, the medialization
of political communication, etc., all signalling a weakening of the
relationship between the parties and the voters. A democratization of the
candidate selection process might be a way by which to increase the sense
of involvement of either members or voters (Pennings and Hazan, this issue).
The aim of this article is to analyse whether democratization of the candidate
selection process has actually occurred in Western European parties in
general, and in Denmark in particular, during the period from 1960 to 1990.
Because Denmark experienced the most drastic decline in party membership
among the Western European parties during this period (Bille, 1994; Katz
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et al., 1992), the Danish case has been selected for closer analysis. So, to
what extent have the parties used this method in an effort to strengthen the
relationship between voters and parties? Is it possible to trace a general
trend? In other words, is democratization a myth or a reality?
The Western European Parties1
Given the importance of the candidate selection process and the obvious and
numerous possibilities of internal controversies and conflicts that are
embedded in the actual selection of candidates, it is reasonable to assume
that procedures for this process, and changes in the process, will be specified
explicitly and in detail in the party rules. An analysis of the party rules
in force of 57 Western European parties around 1960 and of 71 parties
around 1990 should then reveal if any major changes pointing in the direction
of democratization have taken place in this period.
The differences between the procedures adopted by the parties, and the
variations in regard to the degree of specificity in the written party rules, are
many indeed. Hence, the classic dilemma of the historical approach versus
the social scientific approach is at work here (Katz and Mair, 1990: 1). With
the historical approach, the danger is that all of the details are taken into
account, with confusion rather than clarity the result. If a basic trend has
actually developed during the three decades under consideration, it would
be lost in listing all particularities. On the other hand, the danger in the
social scientific approach, at worst, is that in the interests of ‘. . . “rigorous”
comparison across time and space, concepts are reduced to their lowest
common denominator, so that fundamentally different phenomena are given
the same name’ (Katz and Mair, 1990: 1).
At the risk of committing the ‘crime’ of the social scientific approach at
its worst, internal party democracy in this article is measured on the basis
of the role in the internal decision-making process as regards candidate
selection ascribed to the individual party members. The following analysis,
then, is based on the assumption that the greater the role of the individual
party member, the more democratically the parties conduct their internal
affairs.
The phenomenon of decentralization is related to democratization. The
less centralized the authority making the final decisions in a party, in the
case of the selection and nomination of candidates, the better are the possibilities
for a greater number of people to participate in the process, i.e. the
process will be more inclusive. Transferring power from one national oligarchy
deciding on one nationwide list of candidates to 10, 100, 1000 or
more local oligarchies each deciding on their own local list of candidates,
all of which together make up the list of the national party, may therefore
be seen as a step in the direction of democratization, although in addition
to decentralization, true democratization requires reforms that make both
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PARTYPOLITICS7(3)
366 Table 1. Level of final decision regarding candidate selection
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.
National organs Subnational Nat. organs provide Subnational organs decide Subnational organs control Membership ballot
control completely organs propose, list, subnational subject to national organs completely applied
national organs organs decide approval (b)
decide
Austria 1960 (a) SPÖ ÖVP, FPÖ
1989 SPÖ OVP, FPÖ GA
Belgium 1960 PCB/KPB PRL/PVV, VU, PSC/CVP
1989 PCB/KPB AGA CVP, VU PRL, PVV, ECO
Denmark 1960 SF, SD RV, V, KF
1989 SF, SD, KRF, FRP RV, CD, V, KF SF, SD, CD, V
Finland 1960 SKDL, SDP, KESK, SFP, KOK SDP
1989 SKDL, SDP, KESK, SFP, KOK SKDL, SDP, KESK, SFP
KOK
Germany 1960 SPD, CDU, CSU, FDP
1989 SPD, CDU, CSU, FDP, G
Ireland 1960 FF WP, LAP, FG
1989 FF, FG, PD WP, LAP, G G
Italy 1960 MSI, PR PCI, PSI, DC, PRI, PLI PSDI
1989 DP, MSI, PR PCI, PSI, DC
PRI, PSDI, PLI
The Netherlands 1960 CPN PPR PvdA, PSP, CHU ARP, KVP, CDA, VVD D66 PvdA, PSP, ARP, KVP,
CDA, D66
1989 CPN, PSP PPR, ARP CHU KVP, CDA, VVD PvdA, D66, GL CDA, D66, GL
Norway 1960 SF, DNA, SP, KRF, V, H
1989 SV, DNA, SP, KRF, V, H, FRP
Sweden 1960 VPK, S, C, FP, M VPK, S
1989 VPK, S, C, FP, M VPK, S
United Kingdom 1960 LAB, LIB, CON
1989 LAB, SDP, CON LIB SDP
Total 1960: 57 2 (4%) 5 (9%) 3 (5%) 22 (39%) 25 (44%) 9 (16%)
1989: 71 3 (4%) 10 (14%) 1 (1%) 23 (32%) 34 (48%) 16 (23%)
Note: (a) All rows 1960 or first year reported. (b): including the right to add or delete names according to a variety of different stipulations.
Source: All tables labelled D.5 in Richard Katz and Peter Mair (1992)
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the candidacy requirements and the selectorate more inclusive at the local
level (see Rahat and Hazan, this issue).
Democratizing Candidate Selection
Through Formal Rule Changes
Based on these assumptions, the stipulations in the formal rules of the parties
have been combined into the following six broad categories:
1 The national party organs completely control the selection of candidates.
2 The subnational party organs propose candidates, but the national party
organs make the final decision.
3 The national party organs provide a list of names from which the subnational
party organs can select the final list.
4 The subnational party organs decide, subject to the approval of the
national party organs, including the right to add or delete names according
to a variety of stipulated qualifications.
5 The subnational party organs completely control the process and make
the final decision.
6 Finally, it is of interest to see whether a membership ballot is introduced,
thus making the process more inclusive.
The assertion is that democratization has taken place if the rules have been
changed so that the party has to be moved from one category to another
with a higher number. In other words, the lower down in the party hierarchy
the final decision regarding candidate selection is made, the more
decentralized the procedure and the greater the possibilities, other things
being equal, for the individual party members to play a role. The result of
the analysis based on this categorization is presented in Table 1.
The first thing to note is the relatively high degree of stability in the formal
rules regulating the candidate selection process. Around 50 of the parties
have not issued any major changes to their official statutes introducing new
principles of selection or transforming in any significant way the internal
distribution of power. In four countries (Finland, Germany, Norway, and
Sweden), none of the parties has made any significant change. In Finland
and Germany this is because the basic organizational structure and the
central features of the candidate selection process are regulated by national
legislation adopted in 1969 and 1967, respectively.
Secondly, Table 1 shows that the predominant candidate selection procedure
in force around 1960, as well as at the beginning of the 1990s, is the
one in which the subnational party organizations control the process
completely. Around 1960, and also around 1990, nearly half of all the
parties applied this approach. In 1960 only Austria, Belgium, Ireland and
the United Kingdom did not have any parties granting subnational organs
this influence. Around 1990 only Ireland and pre-1992 Italy were in this
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situation. Furthermore, the absolute number in this category increased by
nine during the period.
The second most widely used candidate selection method is the one that
gives the right to decide on the subnational party organs, subject to the
approval of the national party organization. Around one-third of the parties
belonged to this category in both 1960 and 1989.
In sum, then, more than three-quarters of the parties have rules that give
the subnational party organizations the power either to control the process
completely or, at least, to have a major and substantial influence. The parties
in question cover the whole ideological spectrum and they are present in all
countries. There is thus no pattern regarding either party families or countries.
The subnational organs exercised a very important role around 1960,
a role they have maintained at the beginning of the 1990s.
Looking at all the parties, this comes out as the dominant picture. But
what about the new parties founded during the period? What selection procedure
have they adopted? Do they represent a trend different from the old
parties? Are their candidate selection procedures more democratic, or less,
from the outset than the established parties? And, further, in what direction
have the eight parties that have actually made substantial changes in their
rules moved?
In the countries covered by this study, thirteen of the parties founded since
1960 were still in existence around 1990. Six of these have adopted rules
conferring on the subnational organs complete control of candidate selection,
and four have adopted provisions giving the national party organs prerogatives
by which to endorse the decisions made by the lower party
echelons. In only three of the parties do the national party organs make the
decision on the basis of proposals from subnational organs. Parties as different
in ideological orientation as the green parties (which account for five of
the new parties), and the Progress Party in Denmark and in Norway, have
adopted almost identical procedures. From the outset, therefore, the new
parties were very similar to the old ones regarding this organizational
feature, and remained so around 1990. Consequently, as far as candidate
selection is concerned, they do not represent a new trend or a new type of
party.
Only eight parties have made sufficiently substantial changes in their rules
that they have to be moved from one category to another (see Table 1), but
no dominant trend emerges from these changes. Four parties (FG in Ireland,
PSDI in Italy, and ARP and PSD in The Netherlands) have increased the
power of the national party organization, while four parties (PRL, PW in
Belgium, PvdA in The Netherlands and LIB in the UK) have increased the
power of the subnational party organizations.
Finally, and most importantly from the perspective of democratization,
membership postal ballots have been applied in an increasing number of
parties. Around 1960, members possessed this decisive influence on candidate
selection in less than one-fifth of parties. The number had increased by
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the beginning of 1990 to around one-fourth of parties, indicating that a
democratization has indeed taken place with expansion of the selectorate,
thus making the candidate selection process more inclusive.
Assuming that the possibilities of individual party members to play an
active and influential role in the candidate selection process are greater the
lower in the party hierarchy and the more decentralized the decisions are
made, the above analysis, based exclusively on the formal rules of the
parties, indicates that a decisive and influential role was formally ascribed
to the individual members around 1960 and also at the beginning of the
1990s. The changes adopted have been relatively few, but those actually
issued point more in the direction of a democratization of the candidate
selection process through an increased importance of the individual party
member than they point in the opposite direction.
Democratizing Candidate Selection
Through Informal Procedural Changes
An analysis of the rule changes covers only a part of the story, albeit an
important part. The conclusion, however, might be different if we look at
the real story. One possible explanation behind the relatively high stability
concerning stipulations regulating the candidate selection method might be
that the rules are phrased so flexibly that they allow the leading echelons of
the party, and the central party officials, to increase their control over the
process without needing to change the text of the rules. After all, it is
common in politics for the written rules to be one thing, while the practice
actually adopted when decisions are made and implemented is quite another.
Pretending in public that the party members have a major say in internal
decision-making might just be ideological window-dressing, a public image
that the party wishes to nourish in order to be perceived as truly democratic.
What, then, is the real story concerning candidate selection?
In Finland, Norway, Sweden and Germany, the high degree of autonomy
of subnational organizations has been fact and not just formal prescription
during the entire period (Sundberg, 1994; Svåsand, 1994; Pierre and
Widfeldt, 1994; Poguntke, 1994). The subnational branches have always
defended their prerogative from direct interference or orders from the
central party, with candidate selection being considered one of the most
important indications of their autonomy. Indirectly, however, the central
and local levels have always collaborated in the nomination of leading or
promising politicians in safe constituencies, not least because of an obvious
mutual interest in ensuring that a candidate be elected, and that a ‘local’
person wins through to Parliament.
It is therefore difficult to distinguish between situations in which the
local organization has more or less been forced by the central party to
select a specific candidate and situations in which it sees its own interests in
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accepting a candidate proposed by the central office. Moreover, controversies
of this kind rarely emerge before the public gaze. From time to
time, however, the public learn that an MP has taken a firm stand in opposition
to the party leadership with the confidence that the MP has the full
support of his or her constituency and that the leadership does not have the
power to replace him or her with another candidate against the will of the
constituency. The national party executives are careful to avoid conflicts
with the subnational party, and attempts to centralize the nomination
process have proved unsuccessful and have been effectively blocked. The
real story of the importance and role of the individual members in Scandinavian
and German parties is similar to the official story.
Although all the Belgian parties in 1960, as well as in 1989, with the
exception of the AGA, are placed in the same two categories in Table 1 as
the Scandinavian and German parties, the practice employed by the Belgian
parties has developed in a different direction. Because of the increasing need
for the national party leadership to be in control of the party, a need rooted
in the ongoing complicated and delicate coalition negotiations needed to
keep the consociational system going, there has been a downgrading of the
role of the individual member.
At the same time, however, the central leadership is not in control of the
whole procedure. The constituency level has considerable autonomy . . .
but it is the executive at that level which decides how to proceed . . .
[and] it must be recalled that almost all national elections in Belgium
are premature, which reduces the time available to draft the lists, and
which promotes a more centralized and less democratic procedure.
(Deschouwer, 1994: 98)
Contrary to the development in Belgium, the Dutch consociational system
has undergone a de-pillarization with the effect that
. . . the parties have become more independent – or, perhaps, more
isolated – from the societal organizations and hence the influence of the
latter on the candidate selection has declined considerably since 1960.
(Koole, 1994: 294)
Furthermore, the wave of democratization in the late 1960s and early 1970s
increased the power of the subnational party organizations, and the process
of decentralization culminated with the introduction in D66 of the right of
all members to participate, via a postal ballot, in determining the ordering
of the lists of candidates. Since the end of the 1980s, however, the decentralization
has reversed in the sense that in practice the power of the central
party organs has been increased. In D66, for instance, since 1986 a special
commission appointed by the national committee has sent to members,
along with an alphabetical list, an advisory list with an ordering of the
candidates decided by that commission. This list has great steering power
(Koole, 1994: 295).
A trend towards centralization has also occurred in Austria in regard to
candidates who are nominated for the first round of seat distribution (Bille,
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1992). It is worth noting that although SPÖ is placed in one column in Table
1 and ÖVP and FPÖ in another, in practice there is not much difference
between the two. In the case of SPÖ, the decision of the national organization
de facto tends to be a ratification of subnational decisions. The
development in SPÖ has gone in the direction of increasing importance of
the national executive organs of the party and a decreasing role of the individual
members. The development in ÖVP, both de jure and de facto, is one
in which the role of the executive organs of the Land party organization and
that of the national executive organs have increased during the period under
consideration, while the role of the individual members has been reduced
from a right to nominate via delegation to a right to send proposals to higher
ranking organs. The development in Austria has therefore moved in the
direction of centralization by a reducing of the role of individual party
members and an increasing of the role of the executive organs of the national
and regional party organizations. This is even more the case when it comes
to drawing up the list for the second round of seat distribution. Since 1989,
however, a general trend towards granting individual party members a
greater say has been initiated (Müller, 1994).
In Italy, before the breakdown of the old party system, only four of the
Italian political parties were organized as mass parties – PCI, PSI, DC and
MSI. All others, such as the PLI and the PRI, were élite parties with some
organizational structure only in very limited areas and with connections to
powerful groups such as the association of entrepreneurs (Bardi and
Morlino, 1992: 459 ff.). The role and importance of the members in these
parties were very limited indeed.
The real story in pre-1992 Italy was always that national organs had more
control over the candidate selection process than stipulated in the rules. In
general, and for all parties, national organs approved or ratified local level
decisions made on the basis of very detailed instructions coming from the
national organs themselves, which often refused to approve if they did not
like the choices. Furthermore, for the PCI, PSI and DC, it is essential not to
underestimate the importance of the quota of candidates whose choice was
exclusively attributed to the national organs. Although these candidates
were only a fraction of the total number of candidates nominated by the
party, they were often a high percentage of those actually elected. In the PLI,
for instance, the quota was 63 candidates, which was more than the total
number of seats the party had ever obtained (Bardi and Morlino, 1994). The
already minor role of the individual party members described in the party
rules was further diminished when looking at the real decision-making
process. This was the case around 1960 as well as around 1990.
The Irish parties represent a case in which centralization has taken place
not primarily by reformation of the rules, but through a growing tendency
to make use of existing rules to strengthen the position of the leadership
regarding candidate selection (Farrell, 1994: 226 ff.). The central office of
the parties has made growing use of its right to add candidates to the list of
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those selected at the local level. In the mid-1980s, FF created a Constituencies
Committee chaired by the party leader, ‘whose role was that of
head-hunting prospective candidates, identifying and focussing resources
on marginal constituencies, and liaising with the relevant constituency
organizations’ (Farrell, 1994: 228). A similar involvement in the candidate
selection process has increasingly been put into practice by the rest of the
Irish parties. Although the rule changes adopted by the parties do not
qualify them (except FG) for placement in a different column in the broad
categories used in Table 1, the changes initiated in practice nevertheless
represent important steps towards increasing the power of the central party
office.
A trend in the opposite direction can be observed in Britain represented
by the smaller parties (the Liberals, the Liberal Democrats and the SDP),
but mainly by Labour’s shift towards the ‘one-member-one-vote’ principle.
This shift, however, can be seen as both a strengthening of the role and
importance of the individual party members and as a means by which the
party leadership can increase its influence by reducing the power of the small
and presumably unrepresentative elites of the local party activists. In 1993,
the Labour conference adopted the system of direct balloting among individual
members and ‘registered’ members from the trade unions (Webb,
1994: 120).
No clear pattern regarding democratization emerges from this brief
account of the practice of candidate selection. The potential of the national
leadership to influence the outcome of actual selection through informal and
untraceable channels has always existed and has presumably always been
used. The analysis has shown some examples of centralization, but mainly
it has indicated that the real story is not that different from the official story.
In general, party members still exercise an important influence on the selection
of candidates for national elections, Italy being the only dubious case.
In Belgium, Ireland and, recently, in The Netherlands a slight trend towards
centralization has been perceptible. In almost all of the countries, the subnational
party organs have preserved the influence they possessed around
1960. In those cases in which the executive bodies of the subnational
organizations have lost some of their influence, the power has mostly been
transferred to individual party members via the introduction of a membership
ballot, which has meant an empowering of the rank and file of party
members. This by-passing of the activists of the party might in fact increase
the manoeuvrability of the national leadership (Katz in this issue) but the
ultimate power to decide rests nevertheless with the ordinary members, and
that is after all what counts in the end. The selectorate has been expanded
thus making the process more inclusive.
Subject to the fact that grouping of the party rules into only a few broad
categories may conceal minor but nevertheless very important nuances
enacted by the parties (such as a centralization at the subnational level),
analysis of the party rules, as well as the practice of the parties, indicates
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that the candidate selection process is more decentralized at the beginning
of the 1990s than it was around 1960. Individual party members have a
greater say in the process than was once the case, and in this respect the
process has become more inclusive. This provides evidence supporting the
assertion that a democratization of candidate selection for national elections
actually has taken place among Western European parties during the last
third of the century.
Whether this democratization trend has to be characterized as minor,
modest or comprehensive depends of course on one’s initial expectations. In
my judgement, the tale of Table 1 and the account of the real story point to
a characterization of the trend as modest. Stability and modest adaptations,
rather than major changes, have characterized the majority of parties in
relation to their candidate selection and nomination process.
Denmark: Evidence of Modest Democratization
Denmark is an interesting case because it represents an almost ideal-typical
case of modest democratization. It serves as an example from which we
can extract detailed knowledge on how a process of democratization has
developed.
In 1960 the Danish parties organized 21 percent of the electorate as party
members, but by 1990 the ratio was only 6 percent (Bille, 1994: 137 ff.).
Since democratization of the candidate selection process might be a way to
increase the sense of involvement of members or voters it is of interest to
find out whether this method actually was used by the Danish parties in an
effort to counteract declining membership figures.
The Danish electoral system is basically a list system of proportional representation
with provisions for effective preferential voting. The functions
of the 103 nomination districts are mainly related to those parts of the electoral
system that bear on candidate selection. Each of the 17 multi-member
districts contains between two and ten nomination districts.
A party can decide on the organization of its list. With the traditional form,
the party has one candidate in each nomination district and that candidate is
placed at top of the party’s list on the ballot paper in the nomination district
in question. The candidate receives all votes cast for the party in the nomination
district plus his or her own preferential votes through the multimember
district. If a party chooses this form in a multi-member district, it can
further decide to present the candidates in a fixed-order party list, which
reduces the voters’ possibilities of influencing the candidate selection within
the party while it increases the influence of the party organization. Another
form is parallel lists, with which votes cast for the party are distributed among
the party’s candidates in relation to their number of preferential votes. This
form greatly increases the influence of preferential voting, i.e. it reduces the
influence of the party organization vis-à-vis the voters. Finally, a joint list is
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a list with which all nomination districts in a multi-members’ district agree
on one common list and form (Elklit and Pade, 1992).
The Danish political parties are made up of local branches, constituency
organizations, multi-member district organizations, a national conference
and national executives. That is, all have a mainly pyramidal structure
which stipulates a relatively high degree of subnational autonomy. This is
reflected particularly in the candidate selection process. Party membership
is direct and individual, and individual members have always played an
important and decisive role in the selection and nomination of candidates.
Prior to 1960 their influence was exercised mainly at general local and multimember
district meetings, which were open to all members with the right
to vote. The point of departure in measuring the role of individual party
members and the degree of decentralization is that the members have always
played a major role in the process and that decentralization has been fairly
high. The question is whether the parties have become even more decentralized
since 1960 and whether the power of individual members has been
enhanced as a result of the process becoming more inclusive with expansion
of the selectorate. In other words, has democratization of an already democratic
procedure taken place?
The Socialist People’s Party (Socialistisk Folkeparti (SF)) was founded in
1959 as a consequence of a split in the Communist Party. SF deliberately
sought to form an organization that was far less centralized than the Communist
Party. This was reflected in the 1959 rules of candidate selection. The
candidates were nominated and selected at a constituency organization
meeting open to all party members in the constituency. The party members,
then, both proposed and elected. The multi-member district organizations
had no role to play at all. However, an important element of central control
was laid down in a provision stipulating that the National Committee
(Hovedbestyrelsen) subsequently had to approve all candidates.
In 1965, two changes were made in the rules affecting the degree of decentralization.
If joint candidates in the multi-member district were preferred by
a majority of boards of the local branches in the multi-member district, the
boards made the nomination, but the selection was still determined at a joint
meeting open to all party members in the multi-member district. Furthermore,
the influence of the National Committee was weakened in that it no
longer sanctioned the selected candidates. The changes indicated a centralization
at the subnational level but a decentralization at the national level.
In 1970, a joint list in the multi-member district was made obligatory. A
nomination committee formed by representatives from the boards of the
local branches proposed a list of candidates. The selection then took place
at a meeting open to all members in the multi-member district or at a closed
primary in the multi-member district. The National Committee regained its
prerogative to approve all selected candidates. The process of centralization
thus continued while the role of individual members increased with the
introduction of an optional postal membership ballot.
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The trend toward centralization was abandoned in 1974, and the obligatory
joint list in the multi-member district was made optional, depending on
the preferences of the local branches. If a candidate list in the constituency
was the choice of only one local branch, nomination and selection took place
at a meeting open to all members in the constituency. If a joint list in the
multi-member district was preferred by all the local branches in the multimember
district, nomination and selection took place either at one or more
meetings open to all members in the multi-member district or a ballot was
held among the members in the multi-member district. Finally, in 1976, the
principle of a ballot to be held among members was made obligatory both at
the constituency level and at the multi-member district level. In addition, it
was made optional to have either a party list or a parallel list. With only a few
minor changes, these stipulations have been in effect ever since.
From a point of departure where party members, congregated at nomination
and selection meetings, were almost sovereign, depending, however,
on the subsequent approval of the selected candidates by the National Committee,
the changes in the second half of the 1960s indicated a trend toward
a centralization of the process. This was followed in the 1970s by a trend
in the opposite direction, once again with empowerment of the local constituencies
and with the introduction of a ballot to be held among members.
It became possible for the individual member to influence the process
without even attending a meeting. In conclusion, we can say that development
in the SF has gone in the direction of democratization with increasing
decentralization and the role of individual members.
In 1961 the rules of the Social Democratic Party (Socialdemokratiet (SD))
stipulated that individual party members could propose nominees via the
local branch. The party members then selected among the nominees at a
general meeting at which all members of the local branches in the constituency
could participate and vote. The National Committee (Hovedbestyrelsen)
had to approve all selected candidates and under special
conditions might add names to the list of candidates.
In 1969, a closed primary was introduced and the parallel list system was
made obligatory. In constituencies with only one local branch, the nomination
took place at a general meeting if there was only one candidate. With
two or more candidates, a postal ballot among the members was obligatory.
In constituencies with more than one local branch, the nomination of candidates
took place at a meeting of delegates from the local branches. With
more than one candidate, a ballot was held among the party members. The
multi-member district organization had the option to add names to the list
selected at the meeting of delegates from the local branches and constituency
organizations. In 1977 it was stipulated that these additional candidates
must have an absolute majority at this meeting. The rules regarding the
power of the national committee in the selection process remained the same.
No significant changes have been adopted since 1969.
Rule changes in the SD point in the same direction as in the SF, although
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the element of multi-member district and central control over the process is
slightly more explicit in the SD than in the SF. Introduction of the obligatory
postal ballot system in 1969 significantly increased the inclusiveness
and role of individual party members in the candidate selection process. This
marks the most important step toward democratization of the process.
There was no mention of candidate selection in the central party statutes
of the Social Liberal Party (Det radikale Venstre (RV)) until 1970. Until then
it was considered a matter for the local branches and the constituency
organizations to adopt their own rules and procedures without any interference
from the central party. In 1970, a provision that the selection of
candidates was to take place at a general meeting in the constituency
organization where all members could participate and vote was incorporated
into the rules of the central party. If the same candidate was nominated
in more than one constituency, the multi-member district organization was
to give its approval. Neither the national committee (Hovedbestyrelsen) nor
the national executive (Forretningsudvalget) had any say in the selection
process. These rules have been in effect ever since; hence it makes no sense
to talk about a process of democratization.
The 1965, the rules of the Liberal Party (Venstre (V)) stipulated that if
two-thirds of the constituency organizations in a multi-member district preferred
a joint multi-member district list of candidates, the selection as well
as the form of the list was to be decided at a special multi-member district
meeting composed of the boards of the constituency organizations plus one
delegate per 25 members of the constituency organizations. Otherwise the
selection took place at a special constituency meeting where the constituency
board and one delegate per 25 members of the local branches in the constituency
had the right to vote. The central party organizations had no role
to play in the process.
In the 1973 rule change, it was stipulated that at both constituency and
multi-member district levels a majority could decide to hold a membership
ballot. In 1980, the stipulation of a two-thirds majority among the constituency
organizations to make a joint multi-member district list was
altered to a simple majority, thereby weakening the position of the constituency
organizations in relation to the multi-member district organization.
In sum, the development in V has been contradictory. Individual members
do not exercise their influence directly at a meeting, but via delegation primarily
at constituency level. The autonomy of this level was slightly reduced
in 1980, pointing in the direction of a minor increase of centralization at
the subnational level. But the introduction of the option to hold a postal
ballot among the members meant an increase in inclusiveness and in the role
of the individual members. Together, however, these point in the direction
of democratization of the process.
The central organs in the candidate selection process of the Conservative
People’s Party (Det konservative Folkeparti (KF)) were and still are the constituency
organizations. Candidates are selected at a special nomination
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meeting at which all members are allowed to attend and vote. Stipulations
give the multi-member district and national organizations rights to influence
the process, but they do not have the power directly to oppose a nomination
or to add names to the list. The constituency organizations are sovereign.
These rules have been in effect since the beginning of the 1960s.
Three new parties were founded in Denmark at the beginning of the
1970s, but none of them adopted a candidate selection procedure that differed
in any significant way from that of the old parties. The Christian
People’s Party (Kristeligt Folkeparti (KRF)) was founded in 1970 and in
1973 the first rules were formally adopted. According to these rules, candidates
are to be approved first by the board of the multi-member district
organization, and second by the national committee. Besides the right of
approval, these organs can add names to the list. The approved list of candidates
is then sent to the party members. At a special meeting open to all
members in the multi-member district, members choose among the names
on the list. The parallel list form is obligatory. Although it is the members
of the multi-member district/constituency organizations who make the
final decision, centralization of the selection process is stronger in KRF
than in most other Danish parties because of the prerogative of the board
of the multi-member district organization and the national committee to
veto a nominee as well as to add names to the list. Since these rules from
1973 have been in effect ever since, it is irrelevant to talk about a process
of democratization.
The Centre Democrats (Centrum-Demokraterne (CD)) was founded in
1973. According to the rules adopted in 1974, the members chose candidates
via a postal ballot held in the region. The national committee was to
comment on the list before the ballot was held and the multi-member district
organization decided what to do with the comments of the national
committee, but the rules were ambiguous in that respect. The multi-member
district organization could add names to the list.
In 1980 it was decided that the national committee with a two-thirds
majority could recommend to the multi-member district organization that
a candidate be dropped from the list. If the national committee disapproved
the nomination of a candidate, a meeting of delegates in the multi-member
district could drop the name from the list with a two-thirds majority before
the membership ballot was held. From a position of total control by
members over the nomination and selection of candidates, the rule changes
point in the direction of a minor increase in the role played by the central
party organ and the multi-member district meeting of delegates, i.e. a minor
centralization at the national and local level and an even more modest
decrease of the individual party member’s role.
There are no specific stipulations as regards candidate selection for national
elections in the central party rules of the Progress Party (Fremskridtspartiet
(FRP)), founded in 1972. In practice, the constituency organizations have had
total sovereignty, but an amendment adopted in 1991 gave the national
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committee the power to veto a selected candidate, which meant an increase
in centralization of the process without changing the inclusiveness.
In conclusion, individual members of Danish political parties have always
played and still play an important and decisive role in the selection and
nomination process. At the beginning of the 1960s, their influence was exercised
mainly at general meetings at the subnational level. Since then, three
parties (SF, SD, CD) have introduced obligatory postal balloting among
members and one party (V) has adopted an option to use this method –
indeed an increase in inclusiveness and in the role to be played by individual
members. No party has significantly increased the role of the central party
organs except the FRP. The role exercised by these organs has remained virtually
unchanged during the period, which means that in four parties (SF,
SD, KRF, FRP) the national committee has to approve the list of the candidates
actually selected. In the remaining parties, the national bodies have no
major direct role to play other than the right to comment on the list, propose
changes or be represented at a meeting in the subnational organization. The
increase in the centralization variable has only been marginal.
Based on this analysis it is reasonable to conclude, due mainly to the
introduction of postal ballots among members, that the answer to the question
of whether a process of democratization of the candidate selection
process has taken place in Denmark is ‘yes’. Despite the fact that the
membership decline was higher in Denmark than in the other Western European
countries, the democratization trend must be characterized as modest
in Denmark as well.
Concluding Remarks
In the introduction, the question was raised whether democratization of the
candidate selection process has actually occurred in Western European
parties in general and in Denmark in particular. Myth or reality?
The analysis has demonstrated that the role of the individual party
member in the candidate selection process was greater and the process was
more decentralized at the beginning of the 1990s than it was around 1960.
This is evidence supporting the assertion that democratization of candidate
selection for national elections actually has taken place among Western
European parties, although stability and modest adaptation, rather than
major change, have characterized the majority of parties. In Denmark, an
already democratic procedure was made even more democratic with expansion
of the selectorate and of the role of individual members, markedly by
the introduction of postal ballots in four of the parties, while the level of
decentralization remained practically unchanged. Stability and modest
change characterized the picture in Denmark. Democratization of the
candidate selection process is a reality.
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Note
1 The Western European parties analysed in this article are those covered in the
project on party organizations directed by Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair. The
analysis is based on all tables labelled D.5 in Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair (eds)
(1992) plus Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair (1995) and correspondence with the
individual country experts in the project.
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LARS BILLE is senior lecturer in comparative politics at the Department of Political
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ADDRESS: Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen, Rosenborggade
15, DK-1130 Copenhagen K, Denmark [email: LB@ifs.ku.dk]
Paper submitted 14 January 2000; accepted for publication 3 October 2000.
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