DEMOCRATIZING CANDIDATE
SELECTION
Causes and Consequences
Paul Pennings and Reuven Y. Hazan
A B S T R A C T
This special issue offers an up-to-date overview of the democratization
of candidate selection, while giving attention to causes and cases from
both past and present. The focus is on the consequences of internal
democratization for the overall functioning of political parties. The
contributions show that there are many forms of democratizing
candidate selection. These differences mainly concern the inclusiveness
of the selectorate that controls the candidate selection process and the
degree of centralization of the selection methods, of which the role and
composition of the selectorate are the most vital and defining criteria.
The types of consequences and their impact on the functioning of parties
are not univocal because there are different degrees of democratization.
The empirical evidence presented by the contributions shows that
moderate forms of democratization can have beneficial effects on party
organizations – such as higher levels of membership participation – but
that this effect is not certain. Radical forms, on the other hand, are more
likely to distort party cohesiveness, and consequently weaken the
quality of representative democracy.
KEY WORDS Ⅲ candidate selection Ⅲ intra-party democracy Ⅲ party organization Ⅲ
primaries
In most modern representative democracies, the relationship between the
party and the voter is weakening. The reasons are mostly related to increasing
levels of education and material well-being, which make citizens more
and more independent from parties, unions and other collective bodies of
representation (Flanagan and Dalton, 1984; Mair, 1989; Schmitt and
Holmberg, 1995; Poguntke, 1996).
The consequences of these trends for political parties are well known.
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Most parties are confronted with dropping membership rates, which causes
financial problems and also hampers the recruitment of candidates and the
party organization as a whole (Daalder, 1992; Scarrow, 1996). Another consequence
is that the number of floating voters is growing. The increase in
electoral volatility causes (potentially) heavy fluctuations in the vote shares
of parties. This strengthens the vulnerability of the party elites because their
position increasingly depends on factors they cannot control, such as the
media’s coverage of electoral campaigns, the effects of political scandals, etc.
(Kleinnijenhuis and De Ridder, 1998).
These tendencies indicate that parties no longer possess a stable electoral
base. Parties therefore need to seek new methods of increasing their popularity
and of gaining votes in elections. Shifts in party strategy are becoming
more and more important for parties if they are to secure and enlarge
their vote shares (Kaase, 1994; Scarrow, 1999; Wattenberg, 1991).
Examples of this include the intensification of campaigning prior to elections,
rather than ongoing partisan activities, and the focus on individual
candidates rather than on the party.
However, there is another method that parties are adopting in order to
increase their popularity, a process which is novel and has not received much
scholarly attention – the democratization of candidate selection. By enlarging
the number of those who have a say in the nomination and selection
of candidates, parties can try to strengthen the sense of involvement of either
members or voters. This can be done through varying degrees of membership
participation, ranging from a mediated indirect party vote to unrestricted
participation. Primaries belong to the unrestricted forms of
membership participation, in which candidates are chosen by the party
members (‘closed primaries’) or by the voters (‘open primaries’) (Carty and
Blake, 1999; Hazan, 1997; Rahat and Hazan, in this issue).
As parties constitute the only apparatus that is in a position to select
candidates, new forms of democratization have significant effects on the
functioning of parties and of democracies as a whole. Parties play a double
role here. On the one hand, they serve an intermediate function by giving
voters a chance to select a representative. On the other hand, they also want
to monitor who is selected. The representation of voters is clearly affected
by the selection of candidates.
The democratization of candidate selection means that the controlling
role of an exclusive selectorate diminishes so that more people – i.e. a more
inclusive selectorate – have a direct say in who is selected and, hence, how
they are represented. However, the evidence presented in this special issue
also points in another direction: democratization may also strengthen the
role of the party elites in the selection of candidates. To what extent and
under which circumstances these contrasting effects occur varies, and the
contributions that follow seek to describe and explain these differences.
The democratization of candidate selection is not a global trend, as there
are significant differences in the degree to which parties open up their
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selection procedures (Gallagher and Marsh, 1988; Norris, 1996). West
European parties regulate their own candidate selection processes, and
therefore have a greater chance of keeping the process under control. This
is in contrast to US primaries, which are open by law, or to Israeli primaries,
where the two main parties lost control of the process.
The consequences of the democratization of candidate selection are varied
because different selectorates (i.e. bodies that select candidates) are likely to
produce not only different kinds of parliamentary candidates but also different
types of candidates for the party leadership. The major British, American
and Canadian parties tend to have more open selection procedures than
those common in Western Europe (although some major European parties
are opening up their procedures, too). The US Democratic Party, the British
Labour Party and the Canadian Progressive-Conservative Party are
examples of parties in government that suffered a crushing electoral defeat.
Those defeats led to considerable tensions within the respective parties and,
in turn, to a request for party renewal that could lay the foundation for their
return to power. In each instance, an important component of the argument
was the need for greater democratization – to open up the party to new
ideas, new groups and broader participation. But in doing so, the parties
themselves changed in a number of significant ways and encountered many
unintended consequences concerning their selection of leaders (LeDuc, in
this issue).
Primaries have traditionally been more important in English-speaking
countries than in Western Europe as a whole. But during the 1990s, forms
of candidate selection involving internal party elections of various kinds
have become an increasingly visible feature of Western European party politics.
Examples are found in Denmark (Bille, 1994), Finland (Sundberg,
1994), Belgium (Deschouwer, 1994), Ireland (Farrell, 1994) and the UK
(Punnett, 1992). There are, however, also examples of parties that continue
to centralize the selection of candidates and leaders, such as the Dutch
parties (Koole, 1994; Krouwel, 1999). In other countries, like Norway,
attempts to centralize the selection processes have proven unsuccessful
(Svåsand, 1994: 318). Hence, there is a wide variety in candidate selection
procedures in European countries. This diversity can be explained by referring
to the complex interactions between national laws, intra-party decisionmaking
and the electoral fortunes of parties. However, the more parties are
weakened by the loss of members and/or votes, the stronger the incentives
will be to open up the process of candidate selection.
The logic of primary elections as observed in the United States suggests
general patterns not directly applicable to the Western European cases
because no party has opened up the process to its whole electorate – or is
likely to do so. The US primaries were introduced in order to give voters a
choice and to eliminate the manipulation of the presidency by party elites.
US primary elections are run by state governments, so that parties have no
direct control over the nomination procedure (Ware, 1996). According to
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its critics, these primaries suffer from at least three problems: low voter
turnout; insufficient information on choices; and the weakening of political
parties (Epstein, 1980; Ranney, 1975). These problems were reinforced by
the change from caucus/convention to direct primaries.
Western European primaries have, up until now, been founded on the
membership principle, and are therefore different from US-style primaries.
The European model is more restricted and mediated than the US primary.
Within Europe there is more experience with the democratization of candidate
selection than is often assumed. Scandinavia is an obvious example of
this. In Sweden and Norway, the candidates are ranked as a result of an
internal process; in Denmark, voters have the alternative of voting for a
single candidate; and in Finland, the voters – not the party – decide who will
be elected. As a result, in Sweden and Norway party members have more
influence than the voters, while in Finland it is the voters who have more
influence. Denmark seems to be an in-between case (Bille, in this issue). In
Denmark, the selection of candidates for national elections has always been
a matter for party members at the constituency/local level. The increasing
role of the individual member in this process can be seen as an attempt to
counteract the decline in membership levels, which was especially marked
from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s (Bille, 1994: 144). Within the European
context, the Scandinavian tradition of candidate selection appears
relatively open and decentralized. Its consequences are, however, not comparable
to those of US primaries. The traditional openness of Scandinavian
parties is more restricted and its consequences are, therefore, moderate. For
those parties that seek democratization, but also want to avoid unforeseen
consequences, the Scandinavian routes are instructive.
The consequences of democratization for intra-party relationships are
illustrated by the debate on the cartel party (Katz and Mair, 1995; Mair,
1994). Since the eighteenth century there has been a professionalization of
party leadership. As the elite party was replaced by the mass party, and then
transformed into a catch-all party, the central party elites became more
important, and also more independent. In the meantime, society has become
more complex and demanding. As a consequence, politicians have become
more constrained in what they can deliver, but they also have increasingly
become professionals, for whom the personal stakes of failure are high. The
result, according to the Katz and Mair (1995) hypothesis, is the tacit formation
of a cartel among the ruling elites. The consequences of this development
are that real issues are kept off the political agenda, there is a limited
class of inside participants and rules are used to shut out challengers to this
new ruling class. These challengers are found mainly among the party
activists. These activists become less powerful when party decisions are
made, for example, by direct postal vote of the full membership, rather than
by the party congress. Hence, when cartel parties open up and allow more
influence of ordinary members on candidate selection, it would imply a
strengthening of the party elites and of the cartel party model, which is, in
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essence, not as democratic as the mass party once was. Democratization of
the candidate selection process can, therefore, have the unforeseen effect of
a further cartelization of parties (Katz, in this issue). This is the paradox of
the democratization of candidate selection: democratization can go hand in
hand with professionalization and cartelization. But this democratization
concerns mainly the ‘ordinary’ members, who are more docile and prepared
to follow the party leadership than the middle-level elite and the activists
(Mair, 1994: 16). While this hypothesis has yet to be tested on the basis of
empirical research in a broad variety of countries, one of the goals of this
special issue is to examine varieties in the interrelationships between democratization
and cartelization.
We also seek to take one step ahead and assess the consequences of the
democratization of candidate selection (Pennings, 2000). In general, politicians
show the greatest loyalty to the locus that has greatest influence on
their re-election. For this reason, the cohesion of the party is closely related
to the locus of selection. Party cohesiveness is important because it directly
affects the quality of the democratic political process. When the decline of
parties in terms of membership, finances and, incidentally, electoral support
is countered by an opening up of candidate selection, the reaction seems to
strengthen the problem instead of solving it, especially when democratization
takes the form of primaries. The reason is that primaries invoke a direct
relationship between voters and candidates that can weaken the cohesiveness
and the intermediary role of the party organs. If candidates are chosen
directly by voters or members, then the candidates, their views and preferences,
could become more important than the programmatic profile of the
party as a whole. Hence, the most important consequences are the loosening
of party control over the behavior of its representatives, the changing of
legislative working patterns and the introduction of both public and extraparty
mediators – rather than the party – as the focal points of interaction.
But, as stated before, these consequences have not been studied yet for a
larger range of countries simultaneously – and that is exactly what this
special issue intends to do.
The contributions in this special issue demonstrate that radical forms of
democratizing candidate selection fundamentally alter the relationships
between the parties and the candidates, between the parties and the voters,
and between the party representatives and the party leaders. By putting
candidates in a more independent position vis-à-vis the party and its leadership,
primaries have, in several instances, undermined the loyalty of candidates
to party policies and led to both a decrease in party cohesiveness and
instability in legislative behavior. All in all, it is quite clear that the combination
of ‘cartelization’ and primaries does not automatically lead to more
democratization. When we look in general terms at the democratization of
candidate selection for the cohesiveness and impact of parties we often see
two consequences: First, the more unrestricted voter control becomes, the
more dramatic and significant the consequences are; second, the negative
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and unexpected consequences often outweigh the positive ones. These findings
are clearly supported by the case study of Israel, for example (Rahat
and Hazan, in this issue).
This special issue offers an up-to-date overview of the democratization of
candidate selection, while giving attention to causes and cases from both
past and present. The focus is on the consequences of internal democratization
for the overall functioning of political parties. The articles in this
special issue also address such questions as: Can parties and candidates find
a new balance of responsibilities? Is the democratization of candidate selection
truly democratic? Can the opening of candidate selection be a strategy
of the party leadership to circumvent the party activists by empowering the
rank and file – and now growing – party membership? Can this process be
reversed? What are the consequences of intra-party democratization for the
systemic functioning of democratic regimes?
In order to present a clearer picture of the causes and consequences of
democratizing candidate selection, the articles pose the following questions
and offer a detailed overview and analysis of theoretical, methodological,
analytical and comparative aspects.
• What are the implications of the democratization of candidate selection
for party theory? How is the functioning of parties affected and what are
the possible implications for the role of parties within modern democracies?
Richard Katz deals with these questions by comparing candidate
selection within different models of party democracy.
• How do nomination procedures vary across parties and countries, and
what is the impact of this variation on the nature of the candidates chosen
and on legislative behavior? This question is addressed by Gideon Rahat
and Reuven Hazan, who present an analytical framework of selectorates
and selectoral systems, and assess their influences on competitiveness, representativeness,
the level of intra-party conflict and legislative behavior.
• Do different selectorates produce different types of leaders? Lawrence
LeDuc answers this question by pointing to three parties in different
majoritarian systems. He reveals major, unforeseen consequences, such as
the loss of control over the parties’ selectorates and the issue of permeability,
referring to the possibility that leaders are recruited entirely from
outside the party.
• How do primaries function in Western Europe compared to the USA?
Jonathan Hopkin makes this comparison and gives a detailed analysis of
the effects of primaries in Spain and the UK. One conclusion is that the
logic of primary elections is not directly applicable to Western European
countries. The European model could be described as a mixed, or
restricted, model of primaries.
• To what extent have parties used the democratization of candidate selection
as a method of strengthening the relationship between voters and
parties? Lars Bille examines whether the democratization of candidate
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selection methods has actually occurred in the West European parties in
general, and in Denmark in particular, during the period from 1960 to
1990. In Denmark, for example, the introduction of postal ballots
increased the role of the individual member and made an already democratic
procedure even more democratic. But, both in Western Europe and
in Denmark, stability and modest changes are the dominant picture.
What these contributions do make clear is that there are many forms of
democratizing candidate selection. These differences mainly concern the
inclusiveness of the selectorate and the degree of centralization of the selection
methods. Democratization often means adopting more inclusive candidate
requirements and territorial or functional decentralization. However,
neither territorial nor functional decentralization is crucial for democratization.
Instead, the role and composition of the selectorate that controls the
candidate selection process are the most vital criteria. As long as the more
important and powerful selectorate continues to be a restricted and small
party elite, decentralization will not lead to substantial democratization.
The types of consequences produced by democratizing candidate selection,
and their impact on the functioning of parties, are not univocal because
there are different degrees of democratization. The empirical evidence presented
in this special issue shows that moderate forms of democratization
can have beneficial effects on party organizations – such as higher levels of
membership – but that this effect is far from certain. Radical forms, on the
other hand, are more likely to distort party cohesiveness, and consequently
weaken the quality of representative democracy.
Notes
This special issue is the outcome of a 1999 ECPR workshop at the University of
Mannheim on ‘The Consequences of Candidate Selection’. We are indebted to all
participants in the workshop who do not appear in this special issue and whose
contributions to the lively discussions helped us develop and sharpen our arguments:
Magnus Blomgren, John Ishiyama, André Krouwel, Richard Matland, Raymond
Miller, Hanne Marthe Narud, Carmen Ortega, Geoffrey Roberts, Marco Schikhof
and Henry Valen. We thank the numerous referees whose comments and suggestions
helped improve the articles in this special issue: Joan Botella, Yitzhak Brody,
Abraham Diskin, Michael Gallagher, José Ramón Montero, Hanne Marthe Narud,
Pippa Norris, Mogens Pedersen, Susan Scarrow, Lars Svåsand, Henry Valen and Paul
Webb. Our special gratitude goes to David Farrell and Ian Holliday, whose enthusiasm
and support made this special issue possible.
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PAUL PENNINGS is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Political Science at the
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam. His recent publications include Comparing Party
System Change (1998, co-edited with Jan-Erik Lane) and Doing Research in Political
Science: An Introduction to Comparative Methods and Statistics (1999, with Hans
Keman and Jan Kleinnijenhuis).
ADDRESS: Department of Political Science, Vrije Universiteit, De Boelelaan 1081-c,
room U-401, 1081 HV Amsterdam, The Netherlands [email: PJM.Pennings@
scw.vu.nl]
REUVEN Y. HAZAN is a Lecturer in the Department of Political Science at the
Hebrew University of Jerusalem. His research interests include parties and party
systems, electoral systems, and legislative studies. His publications include articles
in Comparative Political Studies, Electoral Studies, Journal of Legislative Studies,
Journal of Theoretical Politics, Legislative Studies Quarterly, Party Politics, Political
Geography and various other journals. He is the author of Centre Parties: Polarization
and Competition in European Parliamentary Democracies (2000), and coeditor
of Parties, Elections and Cleavages: Israel in Comparative and Theoretical
Perspective (2000).
ADDRESS: Department of Political Science, Hebrew University, 91905 Jerusalem,
Israel [email: mshazan@mscc.huji.ac.il]
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