THE NPT
Assessing the Past, Building the Future
Lewis A. Dunn
This article assesses the successes and failures of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons (NPT) since its creation in 1968 by developing and applying a set of ‘‘metrics’’ to each of
the NPT’s substantive articles as well as to its withdrawal provisions. In light of this analysis, the
article also puts forward some specific proposals for strengthening the NPT and its implementation,
with a view to the debate and decisions at the upcoming 2010 NPT Review Conference. A
concluding section turns explicitly to the 2010 NPT Review Conference and proposes pursuit of
agreement on three NPT Action Plans: one for nonproliferation, one for peaceful uses, and one for
nuclear disarmament. Combining vision and practicable steps, these Action Plans would set out a
roadmap for action between the 2010 and the 2015 NPT Review Conferences. They could provide
a foundation for substantive exchanges*in this case, on progress toward their implementation*
during the preparations for the 2015 conference.
KEYWORDS: Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; nuclear weapons;
International Atomic Energy Agency; safeguards; nuclear disarmament; United States
Since its entry into force in 1970, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
(NPT) has become the core of the global nuclear nonproliferation regime.1
Today, only
India, Israel, and Pakistan are not NPT parties; North Korea joined the treaty in 1985 but
withdrew in 2003. In 2010, the parties to the NPT will hold a conference to review and
strengthen treaty implementation. Against the backdrop of this upcoming conference, this
article assesses the pluses and minuses of the NPT and sets out some ideas on how to use
the 2010 NPT Review Conference (RevCon) to enhance the treaty’s contribution to global
nonproliferation efforts. Specifically, the discussion assesses in turn each of the NPT’s most
prominent ‘‘substantive’’ articles. Article by article, it puts forward and applies metrics for
evaluating the nonproliferation impact*positive and negative*of these articles, offering
a net assessment of each along with recommendations for strengthening it. Brief
consideration is also given to one of the ‘‘procedural’’ articles, Article X, which deals
with withdrawal from the NPT, a subject that has received considerable international
attention since North Korea’s exit. A concluding section provides a summary of the articleby-article
recommendations, as well as an overall treaty assessment.
One last introductory remark is warranted. Some metrics focus on the direct impact
of a given article’s obligations on national behavior, while others focus on more indirect
impacts in shaping nonproliferation decisions, institutions, and norms. Some metrics look
backward to an article’s origins in the negotiation of the NPT. Understanding why certain
articles became part of the treaty is valuable in light of some of today’s concerns, such as
Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 16, No. 2, July 2009
ISSN 1073-6700 print/ISSN 1746-1766 online/09/020143-30
– 2009 Monterey Institute of International Studies, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
DOI: 10.1080/10736700902969638
worries over the so-called peaceful uses loophole in Article IV. A few metrics highlight
broader questions relating to the long-term health of the NPT regime, for example,
whether greater progress on nuclear disarmament by the NPT nuclear weapon states
(NWS) would strengthen international support of nonproliferation issues. Given the
importance of such questions, they are included here.
Article I*No Transfers, No Assistance
Article I of the NPT obligates the NWS party to the treaty*defined as those states that had
detonated a nuclear explosive device by January 1, 1967*‘‘not to transfer to any recipient
whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such
weapons or explosive devices, directly, or indirectly.’’2
It also obligates the nuclear weapon
states ‘‘not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear weapon State to
manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or
control over such weapons or explosive devices.’’
Metric: Has the obligation ‘‘not to transfer’’ prevented the transfer of nuclear
weapons to other countries?
By the time the NPT was negotiated in the early to mid-1960s, the Sino-Soviet split had
ended Soviet nuclear weapon assistance to China. Earlier, Soviet leaders also had rejected
a Chinese request to transfer a nuclear weapon to China. Moreover, given Soviet distrust of
and control over its Eastern Bloc/Warsaw Pact allies, it is very difficult to envisage Soviet
transfers of nuclear weapons to any of them.
As for the United States, in the early 1960s Washington had already deployed
growing numbers of nuclear weapons to Europe, although under direct U.S. control. Some
U.S. allies pressed for greater access to nuclear operations and decision making as a means
to enhance the U.S. nuclear umbrella. One option that was being explored was the
creation of a NATO Multilateral Force (MLF), which would have deployed nuclear weapons
on ships manned by crews drawn from the United States and NATO countries, including
West Germany. The possible transfer of direct peacetime control over nuclear weapons
from the United States to its non-nuclear NATO allies was not inconceivable.
Soviet fears of U.S. transfers of nuclear weapons to NATO allies under the MLF
proved a major stumbling block to negotiation of the NPT.3
Ultimately, the U.S. decision to
drop support for the MLF as well as to accept the Article I obligation not to transfer (along
with U.S. success in gaining West German acceptance of this provision as part of a
nonproliferation treaty) brought about successful U.S.-Soviet cooperation in negotiating
the NPT. From a U.S. perspective, these decisions were a price worth paying because of the
expected NPT payoffs in preventing proliferation. Moreover, the interest of West Germany
and other NATO allies in greater involvement in U.S. nuclear planning and decision making
as part of the U.S. nuclear umbrella was successfully met otherwise: via a combination of
continued deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons on European soil but still under direct
144 LEWIS A. DUNN
U.S. control; programs of cooperation that provided for allies’ training to carry out nuclear
missions in wartime; and consultations on nuclear issues among NATO’s nuclear and nonnuclear
members within the NATO Nuclear Planning Group.
With regard to NATO nuclear arrangements, during the U.S. Senate hearings on
ratification of the NPT, U.S. officials repeatedly stated that existing nuclear obligations to
non-nuclear NATO allies would not be impacted by Article I’s obligation not to transfer. It
was emphasized that direct control over U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe would be retained
by the United States until wartime*at which point the NPT’s ‘‘no direct transfer’’ obligation
would cease to be binding.4
Also according to U.S. officials, the Soviet Union did not take
issue with U.S. assurances to its NATO allies that ‘‘the NPT would neither interfere with
existing NATO arrangements nor prevent allied consultations on nuclear matters.’’5
In part, the Article I obligation not to transfer legally codified U.S. and Soviet policies
based on their perceived self-interest and realpolitik. Both countries had good reasons not
to transfer nuclear weapons to non-nuclear weapon states. At the same time, without the
overall negotiation of the NPT, U.S. pursuit of the MLF might not have been shelved, and
conceivably more direct nuclear sharing could have gone forward. So viewed, negotiation
of the NPT generally and the Article I obligation not to transfer specifically was an
important catalyst in shifting U.S. policy. This shift closed the door on direct nuclear
weapons sharing and narrowed the measures available to implement the U.S. nuclear
guarantee to NATO allies.
Metric: Has the NPT ended deliberate weapons assistance to non-nuclear
countries?
Before and during the beginning of the atomic age, witting assistance to other countries’
efforts to acquire nuclear weapons was a continuing occurrence. Prior to the start of the
Manhattan Project, the United Kingdom helped the United States by providing theoretical
confirmation that an explosive chain reaction was possible; scientists of many nationalities,
including France, Britain, and Canada, worked on the Manhattan Project; the United States
assisted the British nuclear weapons program after the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 was
amended in 1958; the Soviet Union assisted China during the 1950s; and in the late 1950s
and early 1960s, the United Kingdom and France assisted Israel’s pursuit of nuclear weapons.
This last example may be the most striking: France sold Tel Aviv the Dimona research reactor
(which Israel later used to produce plutonium for nuclear weapons) and plutonium
reprocessing facility; French nuclear scientists reportedly transferred nuclear weapon design
information to their Israeli counterparts, with the purported knowledge of the French
government; both France and the United Kingdom supplied the heavy water needed to
operate the Dimona reactor; and the French and Israeli governments reportedly made a
secret agreement in 1957, later canceled, to cooperate in producing a nuclear weapon.6
By contrast, since 1968, no comparable cases have occurred of witting assistance by
the United States, the Soviet Union/Russia, or the United Kingdom, all of whom signed the
NPT when it opened for signature. This applies as well to France, which, though refusing to
THE NPT: ASSESSING THE PAST, BUILDING THE FUTURE 145
sign the NPT at the start, also stated that it would act as if it were a party. France and
Russia supplied enriched uranium fuel for India’s Tarapur nuclear power reactor, but the
reactor was under international safeguards and not linked to India’s nuclear weapons
program. Some critics also have alleged that the U.S.-India nuclear deal will indirectly aid
India’s production of nuclear weapons materials by freeing up Indian indigenous resources
that otherwise would have had to be used to support India’s nuclear energy program.
Whatever the merits of the agreement, this contention goes beyond the intention of
Article I’s obligation not to assist and indeed could apply virtually to any type of military or
commercial engagement.
China joined the NPT in 1992, and its record after joining has been subject to
considerable debate.7
Chinese companies’ assistance to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons
program in the mid-1990s resulted in periodic diplomatic Sino-U.S. confrontations.8
Perhaps
the most prominent instance was the apparent 1996 sale of ring magnets by a Chinese
company to Pakistan’s centrifuge enrichment program. According to public reports, Chinese
officials first denied that such a sale had taken place but then stated that the sale had been
unauthorized. Ultimately, faced with the prospect of U.S. sanctions, a Chinese spokesman
publicly stated that China would not ‘‘provide assistance to unsafeguarded nuclear
facilities.’’9
Since the late 1990s, there have been no public reports of comparable Chinese
assistance to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program. Chinese officials also have repeatedly
stressed their ongoing efforts to put in place effective national systems of export controls.
Presumably reflecting an overall ‘‘clean record,’’ the United States also agreed to China’s
becoming a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) in 2004.
As with the ‘‘not to transfer’’ provision, Article I’s obligation not to assist is best seen
as legally codifying changes of policy that reflected realpolitik and self-interest. Each of the
first NPT NWS appears to have concluded that any such transfers to a non-nuclear weapon
state could backfire (as occurred with Soviet aid to China) or conflict with other foreign
policy goals (as was the case of France under President Charles de Gaulle and Israel).
Possibly the exception that proves the rule, lingering if circumscribed involvement by
Chinese firms with Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program in the 1990s reflected the special
political relationship between these two countries. As for U.S.-U.K. cooperation, the
language of Article I explicitly referred only to assistance to a non-nuclear weapon state,
thereby not banning assistance from one NWS to another NPT NWS.
Looking ahead, however, the obligation not to assist could paradoxically potentially
heighten nuclear insecurities. In particular, what assistance, if any, can be provided by an
NPT NWS to enhance nuclear weapon and materials security and control in a newly
nuclear state remains a matter of policy and legal debate. The case of Pakistan provides an
example. After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the United States reportedly
provided assistance to Pakistan to help ensure control over its nuclear weapons and
materials. This assistance is said to have included information on nuclear security best
practices as well as funding for improved physical security measures. However, assistance
in developing ‘‘permissive action link’’ systems for enhanced security of individual
weapons apparently was not provided because such technical assistance was reportedly
considered a violation of U.S. national and international legal obligations, including the
NPT.10
Nonetheless, a very strict legal interpretation on provision of assistance could result
146 LEWIS A. DUNN
in a heightened risk of loss of control over Pakistan’s nuclear warheads, should the internal
violence and instability there dramatically escalate; it also could heighten the danger of
unauthorized access to nuclear weapons during a Pakistan-India military conflict.
Article I Net Assessment. By the early-to-mid-1960s, a combination of realpolitik and
self-interest already was leading the first NWS to rethink the risks of helping other
countries acquire nuclear weapons. By codifying that self-interest in a legal obligation,
Article I’s ‘‘not to transfer’’ provision reinforced that change. Moreover, pursuit of the
NPT*and the need for Soviet support*catalyzed the U.S. decision to give up the MLF.
Similarly, U.S. acceptance of the obligation not to transfer set a legal limit on future nuclear
weapon cooperation with U.S. non-nuclear NATO allies, a limit that might or might not
have emerged otherwise.
Somewhat similarly, Article I’s obligation not to assist codified self-interest and
realpolitik on the part of the United States, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, and France.
That obligation in turn provided a legal basis for efforts to convince China, after it joined
the NPT in 1992, to shut down any lingering involvement with Pakistan’s nuclear weapons
program. Perhaps running counter to realpolitik and self-interest, U.S. judgments about
Article I NPT obligations appear to have significantly constrained U.S. support for
enhanced nuclear weapons control in Pakistan after the 9/11 attacks.
Steps to Strengthen Article I via the 2010 NPT RevCon. Looking ahead, the
conference should, at a minimum, reaffirm the Article I obligations. Doing so could
become more important in light of the possibility that one or more Middle Eastern states
could well seek direct access to nuclear weapons from one of the NPT NWS, should it
prove impossible to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.
Although the ‘‘not to assist’’ obligation is intended to constrain the five NPT NWS,
the principal that it reflects increasingly applies to all countries. In recent years, the fact
that virtually any country around the globe could become a safe haven, transshipment
point, or an actual production hub for nuclear weaponsÁrelated assistance, components,
and materials has been brought home by the so-called A.Q. Khan nuclear network. Under
the direction of Khan, former head of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program, this network
offered to provide aspiring proliferators with virtual turnkey nuclear weapons programs*
components, technical assistance, bomb design, and on-call support.11
With that in mind,
the Article I debate at the 2010 NPT RevCon should be used as a jumping-off point to seek
agreement that all countries*not only the NWS*have a legal obligation not to assist
other countries, or non-state actors, to acquire nuclear weapons. To that end, the
participants in the 2010 NPT RevCon could endorse UN Security Council Resolution 1540,
which obligates all states to put in place necessary controls and regulations to prevent
access to nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction by non-state actors. In so doing,
they also could explicitly acknowledge that Resolution 1540 applies not only in the case of
assistance to non-state actors, but also to assistance to states. Conference participants also
could call for strengthened international cooperation to meet the goals of Resolution
1540.
THE NPT: ASSESSING THE PAST, BUILDING THE FUTURE 147
Article II*No Receipt, No Manufacture, No Acquisition
Article II obligates the NPT non-nuclear weapon states ‘‘not to receive the transfer from
any transfer or whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of
control over [them].’’ It also obligates these states ‘‘not to manufacture or otherwise
acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices,’’ as well as ‘‘not to seek or
receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices.’’
Metric: Has Article II directly influenced the decisions of non-nuclear weapon
states about whether to pursue nuclear weapons?
In certain countries, the opening for signature and ratification of the NPT forced the issue
of whether or not to give up the right to acquire nuclear weapons. Often after a prolonged
political and bureaucratic debate, the decision was taken to sign and eventually ratify the
treaty. Both West Germany and Japan stand out in this regard. There are other examples,
including Switzerland, Sweden, and Australia. In all of these countries, the decision to give
up the nuclear option reflected a mix of security, political, economic, leadership, moral,
and other considerations as the underlying drivers. But the fact that the NPT was coming
into existence helped crystallize these states’ decisions not to acquire nuclear weapons by
making it necessary to choose.12
Metric: Has adherence to the NPT*and to Article II*significantly constrained
pursuit of nuclear weapons by NPT parties?
Past experience indicates that if a country’s leadership decides to pursue nuclear
weapons, the Article II ‘‘no manufacture and no acquisition’’ obligations will not be a
significant constraint. Article II was violated by Iraq under Saddam Hussein, as well as by
North Korea under both Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il. Indeed, in the internal Iraqi
deliberations about how to resume Iraq’s pursuit of nuclear weapons after the Israeli
1981 attack on the Osirak reactor, Saddam Hussein was reportedly advised by Jaffar Dhia
Jaffar, his top nuclear scientist, not to withdraw from the NPT but to remain an NPT
member to better hide Iraq’s intentions.13
For its part, Libya sought to purchase a virtual
turnkey nuclear weapons program from the A.Q. Khan network, even while remaining an
NPT party.14
If Iran’s clandestine enrichment activities from the mid-1980s to 2002 were
the initial step toward acquisition of nuclear weapons (as many experts believe), it would
be another example of maintaining NPT membership while pursuing nuclear weapons.15
Syria could well be an additional case; it was apparently building a clandestine plutonium
production reactor*closely resembling the one used by North Korea to produce nuclear
weapons materials*until a September 2007 Israeli air strike destroyed the structure.
Many experts believe Syria intended to acquire nuclear weapons.16
148 LEWIS A. DUNN
Metric: Does NPT adherence effectively limit nuclear hedging?
Nuclear hedging can range from a reluctance to give up capabilities that might later
provide the basis for a nuclear weapons program to purposive efforts to move steadily
closer to an option to produce nuclear weapons in a relatively short period of time.17
It is
often difficult to state conclusively that a country is engaged in nuclear hedging because
judgments must be made about intent. Both Sweden and Switzerland reportedly carried
out nuclear weaponsÁrelated activities after ratifying the NPT. In Sweden’s case, the
research was conducted as part of a so-called Protection Program*‘‘yet the distinction
between protection and weapons work remained as vague as ever.’’18
By contrast, the
adherence of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine to the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states
after the breakup of the Soviet Union reinforced and added momentum to their prior
decisions to give up the Soviet nuclear weapons left on their territories.
Looking ahead, in a more uncertain regional political-military environment, some
countries could intentionally hedge their non-nuclear bets. The effectiveness of ‘‘no
acquisition and no manufacture’’ as a constraint on hedging is weakened by the lack of
any agreed definition of what ‘‘manufacture’’ entails. Conceivably, a country could
advance considerably toward a nuclear weapons capability*acquiring facilities to
produce weapons materials; producing such materials; undertaking technical studies
and assessments; acquiring dual-use diagnostic, production, and other equipment; and
starting but then stopping nuclear weapons design work*all the while maintaining that
its actions had not violated its NPT obligation not to manufacture.
Metric: Does NPT adherence provide a leverage point for outside influence
and action to prevent proliferation?
NPT adherence clearly provides a point of leverage, although the nature of that leverage*
and its likely effectiveness*could vary depending on the country. In Iran’s case, its
adherence to the NPT has been most useful as a rallying point for outside efforts to
pressure Iranian leaders to think anew about their goals. UN Security Council Resolutions
1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), and 1835 (2008) all reaffirmed the council’s support
for the NPT, while Resolutions 1747 and 1803 both emphasized ‘‘the need for all States
Parties to that Treaty to comply fully with all their obligations.’’ Moreover, some key
European countries’ support for actions to stop Iran’s uranium enrichment activities has
been linked to a belief*accurate or not*that Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons
would put at risk the overall NPT structure.19
Amid continuing tensions between the
George W. Bush administration and other countries, Iran’s NPT obligations provided a
ready basis to argue that the issue was not simply one of the United States versus Iran.
To use a hypothetical example, let us imagine that due to some combination of the
most recent North Korean volte-face on giving up its nuclear weapons, tensions with
China, and uncertainty about the U.S. security link, pressures grow in Japan to pursue
nuclear weapons. In this case, outside powers could use Japan’s NPT adherence as a
THE NPT: ASSESSING THE PAST, BUILDING THE FUTURE 149
leverage point to urge the Japanese leadership to think carefully about whether to take
that step. Japan’s NPT adherence*and the need for it to go through procedures to
withdraw from the NPT*would also help buy time for new initiatives to deal with future
Japanese security concerns.
Still another example of the leverage provided by NPT membership concerns
possible action to be taken after a country has violated its obligations and broken out of
the NPT. Iran may yet be a future case in point. Should Iran acquire nuclear weapons, the
international community will need to take many actions to contain the regional and global
spillovers.20
Those actions could well include measures to make Iran pay a price for
violating the NPT*to signal resolve to Iran, to its threatened neighbors, and to the wider
NPT community. The fact that Iran would have violated its legal obligations under the NPT
would provide a stronger foundation for any such international punitive actions.
Metric: Did widespread NPT adherence help reverse the perception that
runaway proliferation was unavoidable?
In the early 1960s, there was a growing fear that widespread proliferation of nuclear
weapons was possibly unavoidable. President John F. Kennedy warned in 1963 that a world
with many dozens of nuclear weapon states might emerge. This fear of runaway proliferation
gave urgency to the negotiation of a nonproliferation treaty, not least because of the belief
that growing worldwide use of nuclear power would place access to nuclear weapons
material in the hands of many countries.21
Such warnings of runaway proliferation, however,
could well have become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Fearful of a world of nuclear powers, many
countries might have sought nuclear weapons lest they be left behind.
Responding to such fears, the United States took actions to enhance the nuclear
security of its European non-nuclear allies. In parallel, the United States, the Soviet Union,
and many other countries joined together to create what became the nonproliferation
regime. The NPT was and remains a key part of that regime. Steadily growing membership in
the NPT after its opening for signature in 1968*including critical countries in Europe and
Asia*provided a valuable symbol that demonstrated to many countries that runaway
proliferation was not the wave of the future. So did the prospect of an international system of
nuclear safeguards*run by a then-new International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)*to
prevent diversion of nuclear weapon materials from peaceful nuclear uses. In effect, partly
because of more traditional security mechanisms and partly due to the growing NPT
membership, early fears of a world of runaway global proliferation became a self-denying
prophecy.
Today, fears have again emerged that runaway proliferation could develop. It is
often argued that the spread of nuclear weapons is at a ‘‘tipping point,’’ that there is a
danger of ‘‘cascading’’ proliferation, and that we could be entering a ‘‘new nuclear age.’’22
In this context, however, widespread adherence to the NPT alone will not suffice to
counter fears of nuclear weapon proliferation. Rather, the NPT’s contribution to countering
150 LEWIS A. DUNN
fears of runaway proliferation will depend heavily on whether there is a widespread
perception that countries are complying fully with their NPT obligations.
Article II Net Assessment. The direct impact of Article II in preventing proliferation is
mixed. Negotiation of the NPT with its ‘‘no manufacture, no acquisition’’ obligation forced
a number of countries to decide whether or not to pursue nuclear weapons. Faced with
that decision, important countries chose to renounce nuclear weapons. In deciding, states
were motivated by a mix of considerations, and the NPT helped crystallize their decisions.
By contrast, some prominent NPT parties have stayed in the NPT while pursuing nuclear
weapons: North Korea, Iraq, and Libya*and quite possibly Iran.
The indirect impact of Article II may be more compelling. The ‘‘no acquisition, no
manufacture’’ obligation provides a nonproliferation leverage point for rallying outsiders,
for engaging in dialogue with countries rethinking their nonproliferation commitment,
and for taking action after NPT breakout. Successful negotiation of the NPT and Article II
contributed significantly to reversing earlier fears of runaway worldwide proliferation.
Today, adherence to Article II still provides a potentially valuable means to counter
renewed fears of such a world*assuming there is compliance with NPT obligations.
Steps to Strengthen Article II via the 2010 NPT RevCon. The lack of an agreed
understanding of no ‘‘manufacture’’*of what actions would violate Article II obligations*
remains an oft-noted weakness of the NPT. First among the five NPT NWS, and then perhaps
more widely, it may be time to seek an agreed understanding. Continued efforts to use the
review process to create a consensus on what broad actions violate the ‘‘no manufacture’’
obligation could be pursued in parallel. Both sets of actions would make it harder for an NPT
party to pursue nuclear weapons while claiming to meet its NPT obligations.
Close consultations among the great powers on how to make Iran pay a high price
for NPT breakout would be another step. As argued above, how the international
community responds to an Iranian bomb*should one emerge*would have a significant
impact on the prospects for containing proliferation in the Middle East, negating the gains
to Iran of acquiring nuclear weapons, and limiting the wider erosion of the NPT regime.
Article III*Acceptance of IAEA Safeguards, No Exports without Safeguards
Article III of the NPT obligates non-nuclear weapon members ‘‘to accept safeguards, as set
forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic
Energy Agency . . . with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful
uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.’’ It also obligates all NPT
parties ‘‘not to provide source or special fissionable material or equipment or material
especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable
material to any non-nuclear weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or
special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this Article.’’
THE NPT: ASSESSING THE PAST, BUILDING THE FUTURE 151
Metric: Did the Article III obligation to require safeguards on nuclear exports
result in strengthened export control and nuclear supply practices?
Absent the NPT’s Article III obligation not to provide without safeguards, the export
control and nuclear supply practices of the major nuclear suppliers could well have been
considerably weaker and less effective as a means to constrain proliferation. At worst,
without the NPT framework, exports without safeguards*if not of complete facilities then
of important components and materials*might have become more widespread in the
1970s and early 1980s.
Exports to India prior to the NPT provide the starting point. In the mid-1950s,
Canada supplied a nuclear research reactor to India, subject to a commitment from India
that the reactor would be used for peaceful purposes only. Canada and the United States
supplied the heavy water, also without any safeguards commitment. India later used this
CIRUS reactor to produce the plutonium for its so-called peaceful nuclear test on May 18,
1974, maintaining that it had not violated any obligation.23
By the early 1960s, U.S. officials
recognized the need for tightened controls, including safeguards. Talks had begun on
strengthened controls among the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Canada, and
South Africa. These talks were ultimately superseded by the negotiation of the Article III
‘‘not to provide’’ obligation. Thus, at one level, Article III and the NPT again codified a
policy change that already was taking shape on the part of critical supplier countries. On a
different level, however, the Article III obligation made such tightened nuclear export
practices mandatory for all NPT parties, thereby considerably expanding the countries
covered.24
Moreover, after the treaty entered into force in 1970, a group of NPT suppliers met
to determine how to implement their NPT obligation to require safeguards and to decide
which specific exports would be covered. The Zangger Committee, named for its first
chairman, Professor Claude Zangger, addressed this question, seeking to develop so-called
trigger lists. Four years later, agreement was finally reached in the aftermath of India’s
1974 nuclear test. The NPT nuclear suppliers took steps to put in place or upgrade national
controls and regulations governing their nuclear exports on the Zangger Committee
trigger lists; in the 1980s the trigger lists expanded to cover additional items for heavy
water, reprocessing, and enrichment. All of this activity was grounded in the basic NPT
Article III obligation to require safeguards on exports. The creation of the NSG in 1978 also
indirectly owes its origins to the NPT Article III obligation; part of its purpose was to find a
vehicle whereby France’s export control practices could be harmonized with those of the
NPT nuclear exporters*though the NSG guidelines also went beyond the NPT ‘‘not to
provide’’ without safeguards obligation.25
After India’s 1974 nuclear test, national legislation provided an independent
impetus toward tightened nuclear export controls and practices, particularly in the
United States. India’s use of plutonium from the CIRUS reactor*and knowing that the
United States had supplied its heavy water*was an important factor in congressional
passage of the 1978 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act (NNPA).26
The NNPA tightened
considerably procedures and oversight of U.S. nuclear exports, mandated the renegotiation
of most existing U.S. agreements for nuclear cooperation to tighten their provisions,
152 LEWIS A. DUNN
required that U.S. supply be accompanied by the recipient’s agreement to a U.S. right to
consent to the reprocessing of U.S.-origin nuclear fuel, and required potential recipients
to accept IAEA full-scope safeguards on all of their nuclear activities as a condition
of supply.27
However, the NNPA was widely condemned by other industrial countries
that saw it as unilaterally changing the rules of peaceful nuclear cooperation. For them,
the NPT Article III obligations remained determinative*and were the basis of U.S.
efforts throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s to buttress global nuclear export
controls.
Furthermore, within the context of discussion of Article III at the NPT Review
Conferences, a consensus gradually emerged between 1980 and 1990 on the concept of
requiring recipients to accept safeguards not only on the specific exports listed, but also
on all peaceful nuclear activities, as a condition of supply. So-called full-scope (or
comprehensive) safeguards further strengthened the overall system. (As argued below,
their impact was to impede proliferation.)
Metric: Has the Article III obligation not to provide without safeguards*and the
resulting systems of export controls*impeded pursuit of nuclear weapons?
Leveraging the Article III obligation and the associated trigger lists, diplomatic de´marches
urging other countries not to export certain items to countries of proliferation concern
have long been a U.S. nonproliferation measure. Other NPT parties have frequently
cooperated in these efforts or undertaken their own actions, and there have been both
successes and failures.
Sometimes, the result of such de´marches*even with other countries’ support*has
been to force a proliferator to find new and creative ways to circumvent international
nuclear export controls; Pakistan’s pursuit of nuclear weapons from the 1970s onward is a
striking example.28
At other times, however, the NPT-linked de´marche process has been
able to impede a program and to buy time with the hope that diplomatic and political
actions could prevent acquisition of nuclear weapons; Iran is such an example. Over the
past decade, the United States and other countries have repeatedly joined together to
seek to slow Iran’s uranium enrichment program, thereby impeding its access to nuclear
weapons-usable materials. Most recently, UN Security Council resolutions added further
international legal authority to these efforts. It remains to be seen, however, whether this
bought time can be used to strike a political deal with Iran that would lead it to stop short
of acquiring nuclear weapons.
Argentina and Brazil in the 1980s provide a different example, although neither
country had decided to seek nuclear weapons. At that time, both countries were intent on
acquiring sensitive nuclear facilities that would have given them access to unsafeguarded
nuclear weapons materials. U.S. officials and outside experts worried that a dynamic of
mutual suspicion could create pressure in each country to advance toward a nuclear
weapons program. Export controls impeded that advance. Around the same time,
governmental changes in Argentina and Brazil replaced military rule with civilian leaders,
who began a process of wide-ranging political, military, and economic accommodation.
THE NPT: ASSESSING THE PAST, BUILDING THE FUTURE 153
They also began expanding a set of nuclear confidence-building steps that led to a system
of mutual inspections; to their adherence to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which created a
nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America; and ultimately to decisions to join the NPT.
Had the sensitive nuclear programs in Argentina and Brazil been more advanced, it may
have been more difficult for leaders to re-craft the nuclear relationship between the two
countries.
Metric: Has the Article III obligation to accept IAEA safeguards indirectly shaped
NPT proliferators’ pursuit of nuclear weapons?
The obligation to accept IAEA safeguards (as well as the more fundamental Article II
obligation) has reinforced other motivations in leading NPT proliferators to pursue nuclear
weapons clandestinely. Iraq, Libya, and North Korea (before testing a nuclear device in
2006) all have pursued nuclear weapons covertly. Iran is widely believed to be doing so
now, despite its protestations to the contrary. Syria appears to have been doing so as well,
though Syrian officials reject all such charges.29
One result of having to pursue nuclear
weapons clandestinely may be to constrain the size, pace, and effectiveness of these
programs. Here, too, buying time sometimes allowed other things to happen, whether
Saddam Hussein’s self-defeating decision to invade Kuwait in 1991 or Colonel Muammar
Qaddafi’s fundamental reassessment of Libya’s national goals in 2003.
Metric: In implementing Article III, have IAEA safeguards provided early
warning*or more usable public warning*of nuclear weapons activities?30
The record of IAEA safeguards in providing early warning of clandestine activities has been
poor. Noteworthy safeguards violations that were not detected include: undeclared
separation in 1985 of very limited quantities of plutonium by Romania, declared to the
IAEA in 1992; failure to detect Iraq’s undeclared enrichment activities prior to the 1991 Gulf
War; a series of enrichment and reprocessing experiments in South Korea dating back to
the 1980s and revealed by officials in 2004; failure to detect Iran’s undeclared enrichment
activities prior to 2003; and Syria’s construction of what is widely believed to have been an
undeclared plutonium production reactor.31
In part, this record reflects the tools made available to the IAEA by its member
states, including restrictions on its safeguards rights and their safeguards obligations. But
the record also resulted from a safeguards culture that focused almost exclusively on
monitoring declared activities in cooperation with member states and which only started
to change after the revelations in the early 1990s of Iraq’s clandestine nuclear weapons
program.32
Moreover, the cases of Iran and Syria occurred despite initial upgrades of the
IAEA’s safeguards rights in the wake of its failure to detect Saddam Hussein’s enrichment
program. These included a reaffirmed right to conduct special inspections within and
outside declared facilities; collection of environmental samples at certain facilities; a
requirement that states provide design information as soon as a decision is made on a
facility; and expanded use of unannounced inspections, within the routine inspection
154 LEWIS A. DUNN
regime. (These steps stopped short of the more comprehensive changes provided in the
IAEA’s Additional Protocol for safeguards, which neither Iran nor Syria has accepted.)33
Metric: Have the Article III obligations to accept safeguards and not to provide
without safeguards slowed proliferation?
Since the United States first acquired nuclear weapons in 1945, the time a country needs
to produce a nuclear weapon has steadily increased*even taking into account the
uncertainties in determining exactly when some programs started and when they came to
fruition. (See Table 1, ‘‘Estimated Time Needed to Acquire the Bomb.’’) The first five nuclear
powers took between three and eight years to test a nuclear weapon, with China the
outlier at eight years. By contrast, the next nuclear powers took on the order of between
nine and fifteen years to acquire a nuclear weapon, if not longer, depending on whether
North Korea had weaponized plutonium as of 1994. Aspiring proliferator Libya had been
seeking nuclear weapons for nearly thirty years when Qaddafi decided to end the
program; Iraq under Saddam Hussein had been pursuing nuclear weapons for almost
twenty years when its program was ended by outside intervention; Iran, today’s most
threatening case, may well be nearly twenty years into its pursuit of nuclear weapons*or
even longer, given speculation about interest in nuclear weapons on the part of the shah
of Iran.
Many factors probably explain the relative lengthening of the time it takes to get the
bomb, including limited technological and industrial capabilities, financial limitations, poor
management, and uncertain political and bureaucratic commitment. Suffice it to propose,
however, that by forcing countries to pursue nuclear weapons clandestinely, NPT Article II
and III obligations (for its parties) and the NPT-based norm of nonproliferation (for nonparties)
contributed as well. In both cases, the need to pursue a program clandestinely
turned out to be an important impediment that caused problems with mobilizing
resources, paying extra expenditures for middlemen, acquiring needed inputs, and
carrying out the daily activities of clandestinely pursuing nuclear weapons. Perhaps
equally important, by making it harder, more expensive, and time-consuming to assemble
the necessary wherewithal for the bomb, international export controls linked directly to
NPT Article III also played a part in slowing these proliferation programs. Over time,
moreover, the impact of Article III in slowing proliferation probably grew thanks to the
steady strengthening of nuclear suppliers’ controls in the 1980s and 1990s.34
In addition, this Article IIIÁrelated contribution in slowing proliferation had three
major benefits. First, as already suggested, it allowed time for ‘‘other things to happen.’’
Second, even in the cases in which it proved impossible to block eventual acquisition of
nuclear weapons, slowing the pace of proliferation may have significantly contributed to
avoiding a growing perception of runaway proliferation as unavoidable. (The fact that
even those proliferators that openly tested a nuclear weapon did so only after a
considerable further delay may also have helped lessen the resulting proliferation
momentum.) Third, in many cases, having to covertly seek nuclear weapons constrained
the scope of the country’s nuclear weapons program, thereby posing a lesser threat.
THE NPT: ASSESSING THE PAST, BUILDING THE FUTURE 155
TABLE 1
Estimated time needed to acquire bomb.a
a
There is unavoidable uncertainty in estimating the ‘‘time to the bomb.’’ The starting point is subject to
differing interpretations, partly due to the original sensitivity of the information and partly to the ambiguity
of many initial activities. For several countries, the decisions started under the guise of pursuing peaceful
nuclear explosions. Similarly, with the exception of countries that clearly tested a nuclear weapon, the
acquisition date is often debatable. The table presents estimates based on publicly available information.
See generally, David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1996); Margaret Gowing, Britain and Atomic Energy, 1939Á1945 (London:
Macmillan, 1964); Carey Sublette, ‘‘France’s Nuclear Weapons: Origin of the Force de Frappe,’’
BNuclearWeaponsArchive.org; ‘‘China Profile*Nuclear,’’ Nuclear Threat Initiative, Bwww.nit.org/
e_research/profiles/China/Nuclear/index.html; Avner Cohen, Israel and the Bomb (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1999); Federation of American Scientists, ‘‘Pakistan Nuclear Weapons,’’ Bwww.fas.org/
nuke/guide/pakistan/nuke/; Carey Sublette, ‘‘India’s Nuclear Weapons Development Program,’’
BNuclearWeaponArchive.org; Jean du Preez and Thomas Maettig, ‘‘South Africa: From Pariah to
Nuclear Poster Boy How Plausible is a Reversal?,’’ unpublished manuscript; ‘‘Libya Profile*Nuclear,’’
Nuclear Threat Initiative, Bwww.nti.org/e_research/profiles/China/Nuclear/index.html; Larry A.
Niksch, ‘‘North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Program,’’ CRS Issue Brief, August 27, 2003; ‘‘Iraq Nuclear
Profile*Nuclear Chronology,’’ Nuclear Threat Initiative, Bwww.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Iraq/Nuclear/
2121_2122.html; Federation of American Scientists, ‘‘Back-ground Briefing with Senior U.S. Officials
on Syria’s Covert Nuclear Reactor and North Korea’s Involvement,’’ April 24, 2008, Bwww.fas.org/irp/
news/2008/04/0dni0408.pdf; ‘‘Nuclear Profile*Iran, Nuclear Chronology,’’ Nuclear Threat Initiative,
Bwww.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Iran/Nuclear/1825_1857.html.
b
The start date of the Soviet program could have been a year or so earlier.
c
Information from South African officials after the collapse of the apartheid regime dates acquisition at
1982.
d
Sufficient plutonium for one to two weapons is estimated to have been available by 1994.
e
First contacts between Iran and A.Q. Khan took place in 1987, predated by a decision to build a centrifuge
enrichment capability.
156 LEWIS A. DUNN
Article III Net Assessment. Article III’s ‘‘not to provide’’ without safeguards obligation
had a significant, direct impact in shaping the export control laws, regulatory systems, and
practices of the industrialized countries that were parties to the NPT from its early years. In
so doing, it provided an important legal foundation for a continuing series of efforts by the
United States and other countries to strengthen nuclear supply constraints on would-be
proliferators. As a result, it likely contributed to an overall slowing of the pace of
proliferation. The ‘‘not to provide’’ obligation and the related systems of export controls
also came to provide a standard for late NPT entrants, including China, Argentina, and
Brazil. (By contrast, with no comparable obligations, Pakistan provided a congenial
environment for A.Q. Khan to sell nuclear weapons technology, equipment, and design
information on the black market.)
In addition, both the requirements not to provide and, at least for the NPT parties, to
accept safeguards, along with the more basic Article II obligation not to manufacture,
helped to force problem country programs underground, thereby again contributing to a
slowing of proliferation and a constraining of eventual programs. (For the non-NPT parties
such as India, Pakistan, and Israel, the NPT’s nonproliferation norm also created pressures
to go underground.) This bought useful time.
In contrast, the safeguards system required by Article II has done less well in
providing early warning or more usable public warning of clandestine nuclear weapons
activities. In part, as IAEA officials are wont to contend, this record reflects the limited tools
made available to the IAEA by its member states and the restrictions placed on it by the
safeguards agreements that it negotiated with those states. But in part, IAEA failings
reflect an internal culture that did not begin to change until after the 1991 revelations of
Saddam Hussein’s clandestine program. That culture placed its emphasis not on detecting
undeclared activities but on evaluating state-supplied information about declared sites in
order to confirm that there had been no diversion of nuclear materials from peaceful
purposes to nuclear weapons. That internal culture also was unwilling to exercise the
rights of access provided for in the IAEA Statute. (It remains to be seen whether the
enhanced safeguards of the Additional Protocol, with their emphasis on detecting
clandestine activities, will better provide early warning.)
Steps to Strengthen Article III via the 2010 NPT RevCon. Perhaps the most important
near-term step to strengthen implementation of Article III would be to universalize
adherence to the IAEA Additional Protocol. Even with its limitations, the Additional
Protocol would provide the IAEA with significant new rights to use in detecting or
deterring clandestine nuclear weapons activities.35
The 2010 NPT Review Conference
should endorse universal adherence.
Beyond the Additional Protocol, steps should be taken to create a new consensus to
support exercise of the IAEA’s right to conduct special inspections. As noted above, that
right ultimately resides in Article XII of the IAEA’s Statute, with its provision for ‘‘access at
all times to all places and data and to any person who by reason of his occupation deals
with materials, equipment, or facilities which are required by this Statute to be
safeguarded.’’36
It also is provided for in the basic NPT safeguards agreement, IAEA
INFCIRC/153, ‘‘The Structure and Content of Agreements Between the Agency and States
THE NPT: ASSESSING THE PAST, BUILDING THE FUTURE 157
Required in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.’’
Moreover, when the INFCIRC/153 formulation was negotiated in the early 1970s, the
intention was that special inspections would be a cooperative measure used to resolve
anomalies and uncertainties. This never took place.37
Today, empowering the IAEA
director general to make greater use of special inspections, however, would require a
significant change by the member states, who have taken a far more exceptionalist
attitude toward special inspections. (Under INFCIRC/153 special inspections have been
carried out only twice.)38
Here too, the 2010 NPT RevCon would offer a forum to seek
support for the IAEA to use all of its access rights, including Article XII.
Creating a consensus for new non-national approaches to enrichment (and
reprocessing) would make the IAEA’s task considerably more manageable and technically
feasible. Many proposals now are on the table for internationalizing or multilateralizing
future enrichment and reprocessing activities.39
Article IV*Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy
Article IV affirms the ‘‘inalienable right’’ of all countries to use nuclear energy for peaceful
purposes ‘‘in conformity with Articles I and II.’’ It also calls for ‘‘the fullest possible
exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the
peaceful uses of nuclear energy.’’ Parties are called on to cooperate in fostering the
peaceful uses of nuclear energy ‘‘with due consideration for the needs of the developing
countries of the world.’’
Metric: Was the recognition in Article IV of an ‘‘inalienable right’’ to use nuclear
energy for peaceful purposes a condition for the NPT, and has it contributed
to NPT adherence?
In light of the current controversies over Article IV*and concern about an ‘‘Article IV
loophole’’ under which countries can pursue nuclear weapons while claiming only to be
exercising their Article IV right to peaceful uses*it is important to look back at the origins
of the ‘‘inalienable right’’ obligation. The negotiating record shows that Article IV was one
of the essential underlying bargains of the NPT, and, as stated by one U.S. negotiator, ‘‘In
the course of the negotiations, a number of countries expressed the strong view that
neither their renunciation of nuclear weapons nor the concomitant safeguards should
prejudice their opportunity to share in the peaceful atom.’’40
Two sets of countries pressed
hard on the peaceful uses issue: on the one hand, developed countries that needed to be
reassured that the NPT would in no way prejudice their future access or use of nuclear
energy (including countries in Europe as well as Japan, all of whose adherence was critical
to the success of the NPT); and on the other hand, developing countries (thereby resulting
in the specific reference in Article IV to ‘‘due consideration for the needs of the developing
countries’’). With today’s growing interest in nuclear energy, the importance of Article IV,
in sustaining support for and legitimizing the NPT, is likely to increase.
158 LEWIS A. DUNN
Metric: Has the Article IV ‘‘inalienable right’’ to use nuclear energy for peaceful
uses been used as a cover for pursuit of nuclear weapons?
The use of the Article IV right as a cover behind which a country can pursue nuclear
weapons is the most glaring weakness of the NPT. Iran has used the language of Article IV
to answer criticism of its uranium enrichment activities, to gain supporters among
developing countries, and to generally make it harder to create an international consensus
to block what is feared to be its pursuit of nuclear weapons. Looking ahead, it should be
expected that other countries will use their asserted Article IV right to peaceful uses to
divert international attempts to block their pursuit of nuclear weapons. This could well
include those countries in the Middle East that could follow Iran in a regional proliferation
cascade.
In part, successful use of Article IV to divert attention from activities of proliferation
concern reflects a broader problem within the NPT community: the difficulty of generating
widespread international support for the position that the Article IV inalienable right has
to be viewed in the context of good-faith adherence to the other NPT provisions, including
particularly Articles I and II. This difficulty exists even though Article IV explicitly links the
‘‘inalienable right’’ to its exercise ‘‘in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty.’’
Moreover, from the start, the nuclear supplier states have enunciated their right to deny
supply if there is a question about the good-faith compliance of a non-nuclear weapon
state party with its obligations. Lack of support for the position that Article IV needs to be
read in the context of Article I and II partly reflects the wider North-South gap on
economic and energy issues. Here, continued actions to support the peaceful nuclear
activities of good-faith NPT adherents could help to lessen that opposition. But the
difficulty selling the view that Article IV has to be seen in the overall NPT context is also
tied to the unwillingness of many developing countries to adopt a stricter construction of
Article IV when they believe that the NWS have not been prepared to do so for the nuclear
disarmament obligations of Article VI.
Article IV Net Assessment. The ‘‘inalienable right,’’ ‘‘fullest possible exchange,’’ and
‘‘cooperate in contributing’’ provisions of Article IV all were necessary conditions for
successful negotiation of the NPT. There has been, however, a continuing nonproliferation
price for Article IV. The Article IV inalienable right has been, is being, and is likely to be
used again as a cover for pursuing nuclear weapons.
Steps to Strengthen Article IV via the 2010 NPT RevCon. Perhaps the most important
step to strengthen Article IV would be to create a consensus that the article’s rights are
conditional on good-faith NPT adherence. That consensus might be pursued via the next
UN Security Council resolution on Iran; it also could be pursued at the 2010 NPT Review
Conference. Put simply: Article IV’s inalienable right can be alienated by bad-faith actions.
The readiness of the non-nuclear weapon states to support that interpretation of Article IV,
as suggested above, will be tied to the readiness of the NWS to make greater progress on
the Article VI nuclear disarmament goals.
THE NPT: ASSESSING THE PAST, BUILDING THE FUTURE 159
Article VI*Nuclear Disarmament
Article VI obligates all parties ‘‘to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures
relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament,
and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective
international control.’’
Metric: Was Article VI a necessary condition for successful negotiation
of the NPT?
The negotiating record shows that without Article VI on nuclear disarmament, there would
not have been an NPT.41
Neither the advanced industrial countries nor the developing
countries were prepared to sign on to the proposition that forevermore there would be a
small group of NWS.42
In practice, many countries recognized that movement toward
nuclear disarmament would be slow; in principle, they wanted the goal of nuclear
abolition to be set out in the NPT and steps taken to pursue it.
Equally important, the intent of the non-nuclear parties was not simply good-faith
negotiations on measures to end the nuclear arms race, as has sometimes been argued by
U.S. officials.43
Results were expected. In that regard, as argued by two participants in the
original negotiations, one American and one Russian, ‘‘The three such measures most often
mentioned in the negotiating history and in the parties’ 1968 agreement on an agenda to
implement Article VI were a ban on nuclear testing; a cut-off in the production of fissionable
materials for nuclear weapons; and a prohibition on the use of nuclear weapons.’’44
Metric: Was a renewed commitment to Article VI a necessary condition
for indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995?
Like the original Article VI bargain, the nature of the renewed bargain at the 1995 NPT
Review and Extension Conference is also a subject of sporadic contention in debates about
the treaty. Among some American disarmament skeptics, there often is a reluctance to
acknowledge the linkage between the reaffirmation of Article VI (including a Comprehensive
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty) and the indefinite extension of the NPT. By contrast, the
record shows how critical this linkage was for creating the 1995 consensus.
At the 1995 conference, the U.S. goal was the indefinite extension of the NPT by
consensus of the parties.45
To achieve that goal, one of the key negotiations revolved
around the readiness of the five NWS to reaffirm their commitment to the goal of nuclear
disarmament in what came to be a resolution on ‘‘Principles and Objectives for Nuclear
Nonproliferation and Disarmament.’’ This document also emphasized the importance of
‘‘the completion . . . of a Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty [CTBT] no later than
1996.’’ Though definitely less than what many non-nuclear states likely wanted, these
commitments were essential to achieve the result sought by the United States and many
160 LEWIS A. DUNN
others. Absent a reaffirmed commitment to Article VI (including a CTBT), it probably still
would have been possible to round up a majority of votes for the indefinite extension
decision. However, an extension by a contentious majority vote could have eroded the
legitimacy of the NPT; it also could have been by a surprisingly slim majority. In the words
of one the U.S. ambassadors to the 1995 conference, Thomas Graham Jr., ‘‘Indefinite
extension of the NPT depended on these political conditions [in the ‘Principles and
Objectives’ document]. It might not have happened otherwise, or if it did, it would have
been in a most divisive manner.’’46
Metric: Have Article VI obligations directly shaped the policies of the five
NPT NWS?
For the most part, the NPT NWS have made decisions about their nuclear forces policy,
posture, and doctrine with very little, if any, reference to Article VI. The Article VI obligation
has been occasionally cited in the preambles of arms control treaties, but as an afterthought.
Since the end of the Cold War, there have been dramatic reductions in the numbers of U.S.
and Russian nuclear weapons. These facts show progress in meeting Article VI obligations*
and are often cited by U.S. and Russian negotiators. However, the impetus lies elsewhere
than in a desire to meet Article VI obligations.47
Yet there are several possible*and important*exceptions to the overall judgment
that Article VI has had at best a limited impact on nuclear force decisions. Strenuous efforts
by the United States and the other NWS to negotiate a CTBT in 1995 and 1996 originate in
good part in the 1995 commitment to achieve a CTBT by the end of 1996. Indeed, one of the
arguments used by U.S. officials in seeking Senate support for CTBT ratification (unsuccessfully)
was that the CTBT ‘‘fulfills a commitment of the declared nuclear powers [at the 1995
NPT Review and Extension Conference] to conclude a CTBT.’’48
Russian, French, and British
ratification of the CTBT can also be partly linked to Article VI and the indefinite extension
bargain. Some of the reductions in French and British nuclear forces also have been taken
with an eye on Article VI obligations. Beginning in the late 1990s, France also began a
program first to shut down and then to dismantle irreversibly its nuclear weapons plutonium
production reactors at Marcoule, its associated military reprocessing plant, and its nuclear
weapons enrichment plant at Pierrelatte. This project was completed by 2008. French
officials state that irreversibly dismantling these facilities*rather than simply shutting them
down*was undertaken to implement France’s NPT Article VI obligations.49
Further, the direct impact of Article VI in actually shaping nuclear force postures in the
United States and other NPT NWS could be considerably greater in the years ahead. The
argument that more vigorous pursuit of the nuclear abolition goal of Article VI would
reinforce nonproliferation is increasingly heard from former officials, and not just nuclear
disarmament advocates. In particular, it is argued that greater progress in meeting Article VI
would engender more widespread support for new nonproliferation initiatives and for
efforts to deal with today’s proliferation problem countries.
THE NPT: ASSESSING THE PAST, BUILDING THE FUTURE 161
Metric: Will perceived insufficient progress in meeting the Article VI nuclear
disarmament obligation decisively impact decisions by other countries to pursue
nuclear weapons?
This metric is included because the issue it addresses has been a continuing source of
contention*and will be again at the upcoming 2010 NPT Review Conference. However,
there is virtually no evidence to believe that a perception (or for that matter, a reality) of
insufficient progress on nuclear disarmament has in the past or would in the future
decisively impact national decisions to pursue nuclear weapons.
Looking backward, Table 2 lists the most important drivers of past nuclear
proliferation; insufficient progress on Article VI does not figure in them. In different
ways, security and status are the most prominent considerations. Unique leadership
psychology also plays a part, especially in those regimes dominated by a single person,
whether Josef Stalin’s Soviet Union, Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, or Kim Jong Il’s North Korea.
Other factors may have played a supporting part, for example, bureaucratic and technical
momentum, as well as whether a country was inward- or outward-looking economically
and politically. The role of key personalities inside a program also often stands out, from
General Leslie Groves and J. Robert Oppenheimer in the U.S. Manhattan Project, to A.Q.
Khan in Pakistan.
TABLE 2
Key drivers of past proliferation.
162 LEWIS A. DUNN
Looking forward, Table 3 focuses on potential future proliferators to 2025. Once
again, what stands out is the role of security and status motivations, again reinforced by
other domestic, leadership, social, and economic factors. Progress in implementing Article
VI has little direct nonproliferation impact.
There is one possible caveat to the preceding line of argument. Past experience
strongly suggests that decisions to pursue and acquire nuclear weapons are not made
simply on the basis of a cold, hard balancing of security and status costs and benefits.
From this perspective, a perception of lack of progress on nuclear disarmament could
become part of the overall political-psychological context for proliferation decision
making. In some countries, the impact would likely be minimal at best, for example,
the Gulf countries facing a nuclear-armed Iran. Yet in other countries, a perception that the
world was not moving away from nuclear weapons, but that rather one or more of the five
NPT NWS was increasing rather than decreasing reliance on nuclear weapons, could
indirectly impact proliferation decisions, for example, in a Japan confronting heightened
insecurity linked to decreased credibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella.
Metric: Would greater progress on Article VI issues*and the perception
of a more robust commitment to the goal of nuclear disarmament by the
United States and other NPT NWS*result in strengthened international support
on nonproliferation issues?
International support for U.S. nonproliferation initiatives is shaped by many factors, from
the diplomatic style of U.S. officials to other countries’ political, military, and economic
interests. Nonetheless, there is significant evidence (though based mostly on one-on-one
TABLE 3
Potential drivers of proliferation, to 2025.
THE NPT: ASSESSING THE PAST, BUILDING THE FUTURE 163
interviews) that the answer to this question is probably yes. For instance, a linkage
between perceptions of progress on nuclear disarmament by NWS and support for
nonproliferation by non-nuclear weapon states was a recurrent theme from friends and
allies of the United States in a recent assessment of ‘‘Foreign Perceptions of U.S. Nuclear
Policy and Posture.’’ As one former senior official from a close U.S. ally put it, the attitude
of European countries is: ‘‘If you want us to work your problem [nonproliferation], you
need to work our problem [nuclear disarmament].’’50
Article VI Net Assessment. Article VI was a necessary condition for negotiation of
the NPT initially, while its reaffirmation (including negotiation of a CTBT) was part of the
bargain that led to the indefinite extension of the treaty. At one level, there has been
considerable progress in meeting the broad goal of Article VI. The Cold War nuclear
arms race has ended, while great progress has been made in rolling back the Cold War
nuclear arsenals in the United States and Russia, as well as in France and the United
Kingdom. (China alone continues to deploy growing numbers of nuclear weapons on
increasingly sophisticated delivery systems*though with little if any condemnation from
within the NPT community.)51
At another level, however, the most important specific
actions long associated with successful implementation of Article VI remain unfinished,
not least a treaty to end nuclear testing. Moreover, all of these actions were taken with
relatively little reference to the Article VI obligations, which have actually had at best
very limited impact on the nuclear weapon policies, postures, and doctrines of the five
NPT NWS.
From a different perspective, no country has based its decision on whether or
not to pursue nuclear weapons on the extent of progress made by the NPT NWS in
fulfilling Article VI. Instead, security and status*as well as domestic economic, political,
bureaucratic, and psychological factors*have driven the proliferation process. Looking
at the ‘‘next wave’’ of potential nuclear weapon states, this lack of direct impact on
proliferation decisions almost certainly will remain a constant. By contrast, there are
good reasons to judge that depending on the extent of progress in meeting the nuclear
disarmament goals of Article VI, it may be easier or harder for the United States to win
international support, from developed as well as developing countries, for today’s
nonproliferation agendas.
Steps to Strengthen Article VI via the 2010 NPT RevCon. In the context of the Obama
administration’s readiness not only to reaffirm the goal of eliminating nuclear weapons,
but also its pledge to take steps toward that goal, the 2010 NPT Review Conference
provides an opportunity to significantly bridge the gap between nuclear and non-nuclear
weapon states in the NPT. The payoffs from bridging that gap could range from greater
legitimacy and effectiveness for the NPT to an enhanced cooperation among the NPT
parties in confronting today’s nonproliferation challenges. Toward that end, four steps
warrant consideration in the run-up to, or at, the 2010 NPT RevCon.
A first minimalist step would be for the NWS to reaffirm the ‘‘unequivocal
undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their
nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament to which all the States parties are
164 LEWIS A. DUNN
committed under Article VI.’’ Made at the 2000 NPT Review Conference, this commitment
was not reaffirmed at the 2005 conference because of opposition from the George W.
Bush administration.
Second, all parties should join again to define a practical ‘‘Action Plan’’ to guide
implementation of Article VI over the ensuing five-year period. This, too, would be a
return to the so-called Thirteen Practical Steps on implementing Article VI that were
agreed at the 2000 NPT Review Conference. However, the goal should not be to readopt
those steps, in toto or as revised, but to agree on the most important practical actions to
be pursued in light of today’s strategic and political realities. In effect, doing so would
create a precedent that one purpose of each review conference would be to identify a
limited set of priority actions on Article VI for the five-year intervals between conferences.
The most important such action would be to bring the CTBT into force, catalyzed by
U.S. Senate ratification.
A third way to bridge the gap between the NWS and the non-nuclear weapons
states would be for the parties to undertake some joint analytic work. Outside experts and
governments, moreover, have already begun to explore this idea. Potentially promising
areas abound, from the technical requirements for the internationally monitored
elimination of nuclear warheads to assessing the technical and political conditions of
nuclear abolition. Some projects could involve all concerned NPT parties; others would of
necessity be limited to the nuclear powers because of their NPT obligation under Article I
‘‘not to assist.’’ The results could be discussed by the parties, both in the preparatory
process for and at the 2015 NPT Review Conference.
Finally, taking the lead, the permanent five (P-5) members of the UN Security
Council, who are also the five legally recognized NPT NWS, should seek agreement among
themselves on a common template for providing information about their implementation
of Article VI as well as their overall nuclear postures*and then use that template at the
2010 review. Agreement to such a shared set of transparency actions would meet
persistent calls from non-nuclear countries for more systematized NPT ‘‘reporting.’’ In
differing degrees and for different reasons, some of the P-5 countries may be reluctant to
take this step. To overcome that reluctance, such a template could be viewed as an
evolving document, beginning with the least-sensitive areas for transparency and then
growing in scope over time.
Article X*Right to Withdraw
Article X recognizes that each party has the ‘‘right to withdraw’’ from the NPT based on a
decision that ‘‘extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have
jeopardized [its] supreme interests.’’ Any such party also must ‘‘give notice of such
withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council
three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary
events.’’52
THE NPT: ASSESSING THE PAST, BUILDING THE FUTURE 165
Metric: Does the existing ‘‘right to withdraw’’ on three months’ notice to other
parties and the Security Council provide sufficient opportunity and legitimacy for
the international community to try to influence any such national decision?
The negotiating record shows that without a withdrawal right it would not have been
possible to negotiate the NPT. In particular, some of the most important industrial
countries that were intended parties to the NPT all wanted a right to withdraw. Parties’
statements in the years since North Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT also show the
continued importance of this right.
However, North Korea’s 2003 decision to withdraw from the NPT triggered a new look
at Article X. Various proposals have been put forward, focused frequently on how to take
advantage of the language of Article X to ensure a greater role for the Security Council in
reviewing and influencing*if not seeking to roll back*decisions to withdraw. In turn, there
are proposals to deal with what happens after a withdrawal. For example, how can
international monitoring be maintained of facilities and materials transferred by other
countries and previously subject to IAEA safeguards under the NPT Article III obligations?
Can materials and equipment so transferred be removed from the state in question?53
Here,
too, actions by the Security Council would provide one mechanism to address these issues.
Article X Net Assessment. The language of Article X provides a basis for greater
international involvement via the Security Council in decisions to withdraw from the NPT. What
remains is to strengthen the consensus for such council actions and to identify specific
responses that the council might consider. Skeptical views from some parties will also need to
be addressed. Strengthening the council’s role takes on even greater importance given the
possibility that Iran could withdraw from the NPT in the course of its pursuit of nuclear weapons,
claiming that none of its pre-withdrawal activities violated its NPT obligations and that postwithdrawal
it is free to use previously acquired nuclear expertise for weapons purposes.
Steps to Strengthen Article X via the 2010 NPT RevCon. Drawing on the proposals
already on the table, the 2010 conference could support Security Council review of any
decision to withdraw from the NPT. Such a review would be fully consistent with Article X,
as well as the council’s broader nonproliferation responsibilities, most recently reflected in
UN Security Council Resolution 1540. The parties could also call on member states to
require, as a condition of exports, backup safeguards agreement in parallel with those of
the NPT. This would ensure continuity of safeguards on previous supply even after
withdrawal. In turn, the NPT parties could call on the Zangger Committee to seek
agreement on procedures to govern how previously transferred materials and equipment
would be treated after a country withdraws from the NPT.
Concluding Thoughts: Looking Ahead to 2010 and Beyond
There is less than one year to go before the 2010 NPT Review Conference. Following its
mandate, the conference will both look backward at implementation of the NPT over the
166 LEWIS A. DUNN
preceding five years and look forward to identify actions to strengthen the NPT’s
implementation over the succeeding five years.
Looking backward, the participants in the 2010 RevCon will address in their own
ways the specific issues explored in this analysis. As is to be expected, opinions will vary on
how well the NPT has served its goals of preventing proliferation, fostering the peaceful
uses of nuclear energy, and advancing toward a world without nuclear weapons. Suffice it
to suggest: writ large, the NPT remains an essential part of global nonproliferation efforts
but has come under increasing proliferation pressures in recent years and has specific
nonproliferation mechanisms that need strengthening; the NPT provides an irreplaceable
political-legal-cooperative underpinning for increased use of nuclear energy for peaceful
purposes but also lends itself to misuse by countries seeking nuclear weapons under the
guise of peaceful nuclear programs; and the NPT commits all of the world’s nations to
nuclear disarmament, but the progress that has been achieved so far in pursuing that goal
falls far short of what the non-nuclear weapon states expected at the NPT’s creation four
decades ago.
Looking ahead, the upcoming NPT Review Conference offers an opportunity for the
parties to join together to bolster the NPT’s contributions to a safer, more secure, and
more prosperous world. Doing so successfully is essential, as well, to ensure the credibility
and legitimacy of the treaty in the eyes of all of its parties. With that in mind, the preceding
discussion has put forward a variety of specific proposals for using the 2010 NPT Review
Conference to strengthen different articles of the NPT and their implementation. Use of
the RevCon in this manner would reflect a long tradition; the quinquennial conferences
have helped to create an international consensus for action on issues ranging from
physical protection of nuclear materials to full-scope safeguards. Table 4 summarizes the
proposals set out above. Suggestions range from creating a consensus that all NPT parties
have an obligation ‘‘not to assist,’’ to identifying specific steps to move toward a fuller
implementation of Article VI, to reaching a consensus on how best to strengthen Security
Council oversight of withdrawal under Article X.
How best to proceed in reaching agreement at the 2010 conference on such actions
to enhance implementation of the NPT? One possible way forward would be for the
participants to agree on three separate but linked NPT Action Plans: one for
nonproliferation, one for peaceful uses, and one for nuclear disarmament. Each Action
Plan would on the one hand briefly set out and reaffirm the parties’ vision in that area and
on the other hand commit the parties to the pursuit of a limited set of practicable actions
in the 2010Á2015 period. These Action Plans would be developed in light of earlier NPT
decisions, such as the 1995 ‘‘Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and
Disarmament,’’ as well as the consensus Final Documents from the 1975, 1985, and 2000
NPT Review Conferences. In effect, the purpose of each Action Plan, to use a metaphor
derived from American football, would be to ‘‘look long but throw short.’’54
Taken
together, these Action Plans would provide a roadmap to guide the parties in the years
that followed. They also could provide the basis for discussion on problems and progress
in their implementation at each of the preparatory sessions for the 2015 NPT Review
Conference. As such, they would help to realize the goal of the 1995 Review and Extension
Conference of a more substantive overall NPT review process. Not least, agreement on
THE NPT: ASSESSING THE PAST, BUILDING THE FUTURE 167
these NPT Action Plans would help meet today’s challenge of recreating a common vision
for the NPT among all of its parties.
There are other tasks ahead for the 2010 NPT Review Conference. The conference
needs to address challenges of noncompliance and, at least in this author’s view, help to
send a strong signal to Iran’s leadership that it needs to choose between valuable political,
economic, and social integration into the world of nations, or international containment
and isolation, should it go all the way to acquire nuclear weapons. The conference also
should explore how to begin a process of engaging the non-NPT NWS*especially India,
Pakistan, and Israel*and bringing them into the nuclear disarmament process. There is
one final consideration in both looking back at the NPT’s history and looking forward at its
future. When negotiations began in earnest on the NPT in the mid-1960s, there was a
widespread fear that runaway proliferation could become unavoidable. The negotiation,
TABLE 4
Possible steps to strengthen the treaty at the 2010 NPT Review Conference.
168 LEWIS A. DUNN
implementation, and near-universal adherence of the NPT significantly contributed to
making that fear a self-denying prophecy. Today, there are again growing fears of runaway
proliferation. Renewed support, commitment, and practical actions toward all of the NPT’s
goals*and a readiness to stand up for the treaty in the face of noncompliance*will be
essential parts of a broader set of nonproliferation efforts to make those fears once again a
self-denying prophecy. In the final tally of the NPT’s pluses and minuses, this potential
future contribution to shaping perceptions of the proliferation future may well be the
treaty’s most important element. It also provides a compelling motivation to strengthen
the treaty and buttress its legitimacy first by reaching agreement on an integrated set of
NPT Action Plans at the 2010 NPT Review Conference and then working cooperatively to
ensure those plans’ effective implementation in the years that follow.
DISCLAIMER
The views contained in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily
reflect those of Science Applications International Corporation or any of its
sponsoring organizations.
NOTES
1. This paper draws partly on an earlier paper prepared for a workshop, ‘‘Challenges to the NPT Regime
Instruments,’’ organized by the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, October 6Á7, 2008. The
author gratefully acknowledges the support of the Naval Postgraduate School and its sponsors for
preparation of the initial paper.
2. For this and other references to the NPT, see Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,
March 5, 1970.
3. See George Bunn and John B. Rhinelander, ‘‘Looking Back: The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, Then
and Now,’’ Arms Control Today 38 (July/August 2008),Bwww.armscontrol.org/act/2008_07-08/looking
back.
4. See Dean Rusk, ‘‘Hearings on the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons before the
Committee on Foreign Relations,’’ U.S. Senate, 90th Cong., 2nd. sess., July 1968, pp. 21, 27; Paul Nitze,
Ibid., pp. 55Á56.
5. See Melvin Laird, ‘‘Hearings on the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons before the
Committee on Foreign Relations,’’ U.S. Senate, 90th Cong., 2nd sess., February 18 and 20, 1969, p. 384.
6. On nuclear weapons assistance in the early years, see Richard Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb
(New York: Simon and Shuster, 1986); Jenifer Mackby and Paul Cornish, eds., U.S.-UK Nuclear
Cooperation after 50 Years (Washington, DC: CSIS Press, 2008); ‘‘China’s Nuclear Weapon Development,
Modernization and Testing,’’ Nuclear Threat Initiative/James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies,
Bwww.nti.org/db/china/wnwmdat.htm; Warner D. Farr, ‘‘The Third Temple’s Holy of Holies: Israel’s
Nuclear Weapons,’’ Counterproliferation Papers, U.S. Air Force Counterproliferation Center, Air War
College, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, September 1999; Reuters, ‘‘Peres Biography: Israel,
France Had Secret Pact to Produce Nuclear Weapons,’’ Ha’aretz, September 5, 2007; Wisconsin Project
on Nuclear Arms Control, ‘‘Israel’s Nuclear Weapon Capability: An Overview,’’ JulyÁAugust, 1996; Avner
Cohen, Israel and the Bomb (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999); BBC News, ‘‘UK Helped Israel
Get Nuclear Bomb,’’ August 4, 2005.
7. It is widely believed publicly that in the mid-1980s, China transferred a nuclear weapon design to
Pakistan. For a summary of earlier China-Pakistan ties, see ‘‘China’s Nuclear Exports and Assistance to
Pakistan,’’ James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, August 1999, Bcns.miis.edu/research/
india/china/npakpos.htm.
THE NPT: ASSESSING THE PAST, BUILDING THE FUTURE 169
8. See Shirley A. Kan, ‘‘China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Policy Issues,’’
Congressional Research Service, Updated November 15, 2006, pp. 3Á5.
9. ‘‘China’s Nuclear Exports and Assistance to Pakistan,’’ James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies,
Archived Material: Resources on India and Pakistan.
10. See Paul Kerr and Mary Beth Nikitin, ‘‘Pakistan Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues,’’
Congressional Research Service, June 20, 2008, p. 9; David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, ‘‘U.S. Secretly
Aids Pakistan in Guarding Nuclear Arms,’’ New York Times, November 18, 2007.
11. See David Albright and Corey Hinderstein, ‘‘The A.Q. Khan Illicit Nuclear Trade Network and
Implications for Nonproliferation Efforts,’’ Strategic Insights 5 (July 2006), Bwww.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/
2006/Jul/albrightJul06.asp.
12. See Bunn and Rhinelander, ‘‘Looking Back: The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Then and Now’’; Wayne
Reynolds and John Simpson, ‘‘Australia: A Potential Future Proliferator?’’ pp. 11Á13; and Etel Solingen,
‘‘The Perils of Projection: Japan’s Once and Future Nuclear Status,’’ pp. 2Á20, papers for ‘‘Forecasting
Nuclear Proliferation Project,’’ James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, August 2008; Paul M.
Cole, Sweden Without the Bomb: The Conduct of a Nuclear-Capable Nation Without Nuclear Weapons
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1994), pp. 96Á112; Jurg Stussi, ‘‘Historical Outline on the Question of Swiss
Nuclear Armament,’’ English translation of Swiss Government report, April 1996, Bnuclearweapon
archive.org/Library/Swissdoc.html.
13. David Kay, ‘‘Iraqi Inspections: Lessons Learned,’’ presentation at the Center for Nonproliferation
Studies, Monterey, California, February 10, 1993.
14. See Joby Warrick and Peter Slevin, ‘‘Probe of Libya Finds Nuclear Black Market,’’ Washington Post,
January 24, 2004, p. A1; James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, ‘‘Weapons of Mass
Destruction in the Middle East: Libya,’’ November 14, 2006, Bcns.miis.edu/wmdme/index.htm.
15. For a comprehensive analysis of the reasons for concern about Iran’s nuclear weapon ambitions, see
Mark Fitzpatrick, The Iranian Nuclear Crisis: Avoiding Worst-Case Outcomes (London: International
Institute for Strategic Studies, 2008), Adelphi Paper 398.
16. See Richard Weitz, ‘‘Israeli Airstrike in Syria: International Reactions,’’ James Martin Center for
Nonproliferation Studies, November 1, 2007,Bcns.miis.edu/stories/071101.htm; Greg Miller and Paul
Richter, ‘‘U.S. Offers Evidence of North Korea-Syria Nuclear Plant,’’ Los Angeles Times, April 25, 2008.
17. For a discussion of the overall issue that concludes, inter alia, that the NPT has ‘‘more to do with
encouraging [states] . . . to trade nuclear development for nuclear hedging,’’ see Ariel E. Levite, ‘‘Never
Say Never Again: Nuclear Reversal Revisited,’’ International Security 27 (Winter 2002/03), pp. 59Á88.
18. See Cole, Sweden Without the Bomb: The Conduct of a Nuclear-Capable Nation Without Nuclear
Weapons, pp. 106Á9; Stussi, ‘‘Historical Outline on the Question of Swiss Nuclear Armament.’’
19. This judgment reflects the author’s discussions with various European officials and experts over the
past several years.
20. For a discussion of responses to Iran’s emergence as a nuclear weapon state in violation of its NPT
obligations, see, Lewis A. Dunn, ‘‘After Iranian Acquisition, What?,’’ paper prepared for the William S.
Cohen Center, University of Maine and the National Defense University, July 9, 2007.
21. This fear of runaway proliferation*and the belief that the NPT would help to prevent such
proliferation*recurs throughout U.S. officials’ testimony in support of U.S. Senate consent to the
ratification of the NPT. See ‘‘Hearings on the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons before
the Committee on Foreign Relations.’’
22. See, for example, Kurt M. Campbell, Mitchell Reiss, and Robert Einhorn, eds., The Nuclear Tipping Point:
Why States Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices, (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2004).
23. Paul Leventhal, ‘‘CIRUS Reactor’s Role in a U.S.-India Nuclear Agreement,’’ prepared remarks delivered
at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Washington, DC, December 19, 2005.
24. The early discussions were pointed out to the author in a personal communication from a former
senior official of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission.
25. For an excellent discussion of the origins of the nuclear supply regime, written by one of the
participants in its creation, see Frederick McGoldrick, ‘‘International Nuclear Export Control Regimes:
The Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group,’’ unpublished report, September 2008.
26. See Leventhal, ‘‘CIRUS Reactor’s Role in a U.S.-India Nuclear Agreement.’’
27. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, Bwww.nti.org/db/china/engdocs/nnpa1978.htm.
28. See, for example, William Langewiesche, ‘‘The Wrath of Khan,’’ Atlantic Monthly, November 2005.
170 LEWIS A. DUNN
29. Leonard Spector and Deborah Berman, ‘‘The Syrian Nuclear Puzzle,’’ unpublished manuscript, James
Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, August 2008.
30. Some readers may question the inclusion of a metric dealing with the effectiveness of IAEA safeguards
in a paper assessing the pluses and minuses of the NPT; this metric has been included given the role of
the IAEA in monitoring compliance with NPT safeguards obligations.
31. See, respectively, Malcolm Rifkind, ‘‘The Work of the United Nations Special Commission in Iraq,’’
Guardian, June 28, 1996,Bwww.fas.org/news/iraq/1997/01/9701-fco-unscom.htm; Online NewsHour,
‘‘Tracking Nuclear Proliferation*Romania,’’ PBS, May 2, 2005, Bwww.pbs.org/newshour/indepth_
coverage/military/proliferation/countries/romania.html; Paul Kerr, ‘‘IAEA: Seoul’s Nuclear Sins in
Past,’’ Arms Control Today 34 (December 2004); Fitzpatrick, The Iranian Nuclear Crisis, p. 15; Spector and
Berman, ‘‘The Syrian Nuclear Puzzle.’’
32. On the IAEA’s culture, see Lawrence Scheinman, ‘‘Assuring the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Safeguards
System,’’ Atlantic Council of the United States, October 1992, pp. 26Á29.
33. See IAEA, ‘‘IAEA Safeguards Overview: Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional
Protocols,’’ Bwww.iaea.org/Publications/Factsheets/English/sg_overview.html.
34. See, for example, McGoldrick, ‘‘International Nuclear Export Control Regimes.’’
35. See IAEA, ‘‘IAEA Safeguards Overview.’’
36. Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Article XII, para. 6, July 29, 1957, Bwww.iaea.org/
About/statute.html.
37. Communication to the author from Lawrence Scheinman, distinguished professor, James Martin
Center for Nonproliferation Studies.
38. See John Carlson and Russell Leslie, ‘‘Special Inspections Revisited,’’ paper presented at the Institute of
Nuclear Materials Management 2005 Annual Meeting, Phoeniz, Arizona, July 2005.
39. See ‘‘Multilateral Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Expert Group Report Submitted to the Director
General of the IAEA,’’ February 22, 2005.
40. See Glenn T. Seaborg, prepared statement, ‘‘Hearings on the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear
Weapons before the Committee on Foreign Relation,’’ p. 102. See also George Bunn, ‘‘The Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty: History and Current Problems,’’ Arms Control Today 33 (December 2003). For a
comprehensive and widely accepted study of the NPT negotiating history, see Mohammed I. Shaker,
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: Origin and Implementation 1959Á1979, three volumes (London:
Oceana Publications, 1980).
41. See George Bunn and Roland M. Timerbaev, ‘‘Nuclear Disarmament: How Much Have the Five Nuclear
Powers Promised in the Non-Proliferation Treaty?,’’ paper prepared for the Lawyers Alliance for World
Security, 1994, reissued June 1997. Bunn and Timerbaev were members of the U.S. and Soviet
negotiating teams, respectively.
42. Ibid., p. 12.
43. For a recent articulation of this position, see Christopher A. Ford, ‘‘Debating Disarmament: Interpreting
Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,’’ Nonproliferation Review 14
(November 2007), pp. 401Á28. In addition to Bunn and Timerbaev, a different assessment is provided in
Thomas Graham Jr., ‘‘The Origin and Interpretation of Article VI,’’ Nonproliferation Review 15 (March
2008), pp. 7Á9.
44. Bunn and Timerbaev, ‘‘Nuclear Disarmament: How Much Have the Five Nuclear Powers Promised in the
Non-Proliferation Treaty?’’ p. 24.
45. The following discussion draws partly on the author’s participation in the 1995 Review and Extension
Conference as an adviser to the U.S. delegation.
46. Graham, ‘‘The Origin and Interpretation of Article VI.’’
47. This judgment reflects the author’s own experience*directly and indirectly*in this area.
48. Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen, ‘‘Hearings on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty,’’ Senate
Committee on Armed Services, 106th Cong., 1st sess., October 6 and 7, 1999, p. 12.
49. Statement made to the author by French officials during his visit in March 2009 to the facilities at
Marcoule and Pierrelatte.
50. See Lewis A. Dunn, ed., ‘‘Foreign Perceptions of U.S. Nuclear Policy and Posture: Insights, Issues, and
Implications,’’ report prepared by Science Applications International Corporation for the Advanced
Systems and Concepts Office, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, December 12, 2006,Bwww.dtra.mil/
documents/asco/publications/ForeignPerspectivesUSNuclearPolicyCompleteReport.pdf.
THE NPT: ASSESSING THE PAST, BUILDING THE FUTURE 171
51. ‘‘China Profile*Nuclear,’’ Nuclear Threat Initiative/James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies,
March 2009, Bwww.nti.nti.org/e_research/profiles/China/Nuclear/index.html.
52. There are other more procedural NPT articles, including Article VIII on amendment process and Article
IX on entry into force and definition of ‘‘nuclear weapon state.’’ Due to space considerations, these are
not discussed here. Suffice it to note that the amendment process makes it virtually impossible to
amend the NPT. In addition, the definition of a NWS as ‘‘one which has manufactured and exploded a
nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967’’ precludes entry to the NPT
as such a state by India, Pakistan, and Israel. This definition has significantly complicated efforts to
bring these countries into a wider nuclear disarmament dialogue and into the overall nonproliferation
regime.
53. See on this issue, inter alia, George Bunn and John Rhinelander, ‘‘The Right to Withdraw from the NPT:
Article X is Not Unconditional,’’ Disarmament Diplomacy No. 79 (April/May 2005); ‘‘Working Paper on
Article X,’’ submitted by Australia and New Zealand, 2005 NPT Review Conference, April 28, 2005;
‘‘Withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,’’ European Union common
approach, working paper submitted to the 2005 NPT Review Conference, May 10, 2005; ‘‘Strengthening
the Implementation of Article X of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,’’
working paper submitted by the United States to the 2005 NPT Review Conference; Pierre
Goldschmidt, ‘‘Saving the NPT and the Nonproliferation Regime in an Era of Nuclear Renaissance,’’
testimony to the House of Representatives, Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation
and Trade, July 24, 2008.
54. This phrase was coined by Alton Frye. It remains apt today.
172 LEWIS A. DUNN