Matthew Kroenig and Tristan Volpe
3-D Printing the Bomb?
The Nuclear
Nonproliferation Challenge
Arevolution in manufacturing is underway that may enable the most
sensitive pieces of a nuclear weapons program to be transferred and produced
around the globe. In the Additive Manufacturing (AM) process, 3-D printing
machines build objects of virtually any shape from digital build files—the essential
data telling printers how to construct an object—by laying down successive layers
of material.1
Since objects are built from scratch, one can make products in shapes
and to standards impossible under any other method, and the digital nature of this
automated process takes most of the skill out of fabrication. AM allows the manufacture
of better products, with less effort, and at a fraction of the cost of traditional
methods. As a result, it is hardly surprising that General Electric,
Aerojet Rocketdyne, and the Chinese People’s Liberation Army are already
using AM to print sophisticated metal parts for jet engines, rocket propulsion
systems, and fighter aircraft, respectively.2
Like many disruptive technologies, however, AM has a dark side. The widespread
adoption of AM will make it easier for countries to acquire nuclear
weapons, and more difficult for the international community to detect and stop
them. If building the bomb is like solving a giant jigsaw puzzle, one of the
hardest parts is simply getting all the necessary pieces.3
Attempts to buy or build
Matthew Kroenig is Associate Professor of Government and Foreign Service at Georgetown
University, a Senior Fellow at the Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security at The
Atlantic Council, and author of Exporting the Bomb: Technology Transfer and the Spread of
Nuclear Weapons (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010). Follow him on Twitter at
@kroenig or email him at matthew.kroenig@georgetown.edu. Tristan Volpe is a Stanton
Nuclear Security Fellow and an associate in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace. Email him at tvolpe@ceip.org or follow him on Twitter at
@teeandersvolpe.
Copyright © 2015 The Elliott School of International Affairs
The Washington Quarterly • 38:3 pp. 7–19
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2015.1099022
THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY ▪ FALL 2015 7
these items—such as the components of a gas centrifuge—are fraught with
obstacles and set off alarm bells to the existence of a covert weapons program.
In contrast, with a 3-D printer and the right digital build files, a country can
print many of the specialized components for a nuclear program quickly, with
little technical skill, and at low cost. Moreover, hiding such a fabrication effort
would be much easier than under traditional manufacturing methods, rendering
obsolete many of the international community’s tools for spotting illicit nuclear
activity. In short, AM may provide a way for countries to print the pieces of the
nuclear jigsaw indigenously before anyone
notices.
Fortunately, the proliferation potential of
AM has not yet fully materialized, so the
United States can still lead an international
effort to prevent an AM-enabled cascade of
nuclear weapons proliferation before it is too
late. This multifaceted problem demands a
strategy that combines the bottom-up efforts
of expert working groups and top-down attention
from the highest levels of national governments and international organizations.
Together, they can work to create new multilateral frameworks, update
existing control regimes, and develop technical fixes that will allow the world
to reap the benefits of AM while mitigating its proliferation dangers.
The Allure of Printing Anything, Anywhere, Anytime
Additive Manufacturing (AM) harnesses major innovations in robotics, digital
computing, and the flow of global information over the Internet to give its users
the ability to “make (almost) anything, anywhere,” to use the words of Neil Gershenfeld
in a recent article.4
Contemporary 3-D printers create solid items in
almost any form by depositing layer upon layer of metal, ceramic, or plastic
powders. Each strata of material is then welded or melted together using a laser
or electronic beam. This new method of building components from the ground
up stands in contrast to traditional “subtractive” manufacturing. Since the
Stone Age, humans have crafted objects by removing material from a larger
block. The ancient Egyptians developed the first machines to facilitate this
process. The modern metalworking lathe, for example, still follows the same
basic principle employed in antiquity: spin a piece of metal along its axis so the
operator can cut material away from it in a precise and controlled fashion to
create, for example, a symmetrical baseball bat. A 3-D printer, however, frees
engineers from this ancient method, thereby giving them the ability to dream
3-D printing will
render obsolete
many of the tools
for spotting illicit
nuclear activity.
Matthew Kroenig and Tristan Volpe
8 THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY ▪ FALL 2015
up novel designs and print unique shapes at standards previously thought to be
impossible.
Another important characteristic of AM is that a digital build file provides
the 3-D printer with all the information it needs to make a final component.
The digital nature of 3-D printing takes much of the skill out of fabricating
precise components. Once the build program is loaded, the printer operates
autonomously on a continuous basis. Subtractive
machine shops require a team of skilled technicians to
operate multiple and highly specialized machines,
even when automated processes such as computer
numeric control are employed to assist the human
operators. Furthermore, AM simplifies logistics trains
because there is no need to ship and store parts and
virtually no waste; the end user can just download
the digital file and print the component whenever
and wherever it is needed.
While AM, more commonly known as 3-D printing,
has been in the spotlight for its ability to
produce plastic toys, artificial limbs, and even biotechnology, less noticed in the
public sphere is its potential in advanced industrial production, including for
items with sensitive defense and national security applications.5
In March, The
Economist reported that Rolls Royce plans to use AM to construct a critical part
of its Trent XWB-97 jet engine.6
GE followed suit by producing components
for its Leap jet engine, which received Federal Aviation Administration certifica-
tion.7
Engineers at Airbus leveraged AM to produce titanium structural brackets
for its A350 XWB aircraft.8
Government agencies are also getting into this
game. NASA astronauts onboard the International Space Station used a zerogravity
3-D printer to fabricate a wrench from a digital build file transmitted
from the ground in December 2014. And on the military side, the U.S. Department
of Defense highlighted the introduction of AM into the U.S. defense acquisitions
and manufacturing process as one way to maintain U.S. strategic
capabilities in a constrained fiscal environment by boutique printing the sort of
special parts needed in weapons platforms, rather than purchasing them in large
batches.9
The AM process is attractive to the aerospace and defense sectors because it
facilitates the production of precision components on demand and around the
world far more cheaply (and often of higher quality) than with subtractive
machines. Indeed, given 3-D printing’s unique ability to cut costs, simplify logistics,
and spur innovation, it is hard to overstate its upside potential; AM could
lead to significant reductions in the U.S. defense and nuclear weapons budget,
The digital nature
of 3-D printing takes
much of the skill out
of fabricating
precise
components.
3-D Printing the Bomb?
THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY ▪ FALL 2015 9
to a revival of U.S. manufacturing, and even to a worldwide manufacturing
revolution.10
While much of AM’s impact will be positive, it also presents a vexing threat to
international security. Machines that can print an infinite range of precise metallic
components from digital files obtained over the Internet are quite appealing to a
country or non-state actor that wants to produce small arms, major conventional
weapons systems, or even nuclear weapons.
The Next Chapter in Nuclear Proliferation
To build nuclear weapons, a state must first produce the fissile material that fuels
the nuclear explosion either by enriching uranium or reprocessing plutonium from
spent reactor fuel and then assembling this nuclear material into a functioning
nuclear device.11
Enrichment and reprocessing are difficult technical feats, made
more complicated by the need to manufacture thousands of metal component
parts to extremely high standards and very close tolerances at each stage, such
as structures to hold the core of a nuclear reactor or the specially-designed rotating
components of a gas centrifuge.12
At present, nuclear suppliers are likely to deny requests for turnkey enrichment
or reprocessing facilities, or their key component parts, due to the proliferation
risks. Stringent international export controls regulate the transfer of related
materials and technology. Transfers of maraging steel or multi-axis computer
numerical controlled lathes, for example, trigger close scrutiny because they can
be used to produce the components in a uranium enrichment centrifuge. Even
if they could acquire samples or designs for component parts, less developed
countries need a long period of time for trial and error to master indigenous production
processes. Iran’s nuclear program provides a case in point: the Iranians
took advantage of lax export controls and illicit supply networks to procure
model centrifuges and centrifuge designs in 1987, but it took another fifteen
years before Tehran broke ground on its first enrichment facility.13
Beyond the inherent technical challenges, international monitoring and
response create further obstacles. Export controls slow down proliferators by
forcing them to comb illicit procurement markets in relative secrecy and at
great risk of discovery by the international community. Attempts to buy controlled
items set off alarm bells to the existence of a covert weapons program, thereby
giving the international community time to respond.
Compare this to the realities made possible by AM. At present, an aspiring proliferator
can purchase a state-of-the-art 3-D printer on the open market for about
$1 million and the powders that form the raw material of the AM process for only
thousands more. This presents a serious challenge for international technology
Matthew Kroenig and Tristan Volpe
10 THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY ▪ FALL 2015
controls, made worse by the fact that much of the information needed to print a
component is contained in digital build files. Whereas traditional machining with
lathes or grinders requires substantial skill and tacit knowledge to produce a finished
piece, an unskilled technician can print perfect components once the
materials and relevant design files are in hand.
Accessing the necessary files will not be as challenging as one might think. The
United States and China are already using AM in their defense industries, and other
countries will likely follow suit—meaning that sensitive build files already, or will
soon, exist. While government and private contractor databases present tough
targets for cyber theft, they are not impenetrable.14
Beyond state-sponsored
hacking, rogue “insiders” might be willing to release or sell critical files. At a
minimum, nuclear suppliers might be more willing to export sensitive nuclear technology
as a matter of policy because it would be much easier to hide their finger-
prints.15
Alternatively, aspiring proliferators could get their hands on a single
model, or even high-quality photographs, of the necessary part and digitally scan
it to reverse-engineer a build file.16
To make matters worse, it will be much more difficult
for the international community to detect and
respond to such a production program because a 3-D
printer is the ultimate manifestation of dual-use technology.
While the purchase of specialized lathes may
trigger export controls, anyone can freely buy a
cutting-edge 3-D metal printer and associated metal
powders on the open market without raising alarm.
AM provides a true general-purpose fabrication capability. The latest 3-D printers
can make a wide range of components on a single machine, and even build multiple
and completely different parts at the same time. Unlike the specialized lathes
needed to make nuclear weapon components or low-noise submarine propellers,
the purpose to which an AM machine will be put is unknowable.
The international community will also find it increasingly difficult to detect
and respond to nuclear programs that utilize AM. Industrial 3-D printers are
about the size of a commercial refrigerator, use little energy, and produce close
to zero waste. Since the additive process eliminates the need for long production
lines housed in large factories, a bevy of metal printers could be dispersed in various
locations throughout a country. One could conceivably house a centrifugeproduction
program in garages, hiding signatures of suspect activity and rendering
detection by international inspectors or national intelligence agencies much
harder. Moreover, by simplifying the logistics train and relegating the transfer of
technical designs to the digital realm, AM reduces the nodes that authorities
monitor in order to regulate exports and interdict suspicious shipments around
the globe. In short, 3-D printing may provide a way for countries to assemble all
A3-D printer is the
ultimate manifestation
of dual-use
technology.
3-D Printing the Bomb?
THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY ▪ FALL 2015 11
of the necessary components for a nuclear weapons production program while
avoiding detection by the international community.
To be clear, there are limits to what an aspiring proliferator can accomplish
with 3-D printing. AM does not yet offer the promise of printing the bomb
from scratch. Even if a country already possessed significant quantities of highlyenriched
uranium or plutonium, no country has, to our knowledge, demonstrated
the ability to feed this fissile material into a 3-D printer to additively manufacture
the core of a nuclear weapon. But we do not want to be caught by surprise
down the road. Moreover, while the ability to print necessary parts in secret
greatly enables a potential proliferator, it does not guarantee success. Would-be
proliferators often run into other supply chain issues when they try to acquire
restricted materials. Even with all the necessary materials and machines in
place, proliferators may struggle to assemble all the pieces into a working fissile
material production capability. The enrichment process in particular presents
technical hurdles beyond production of the necessary parts, such as mastering
the ability to produce UF6—or uranium hexafluoride, a key compound used in
the uranium enrichment process to produce fuel for reactors and weapons—and
then scaling up centrifuge cascades.17
For example, Libya purchased complete
P-1 centrifuges off the black market, but the program struggled to move beyond
testing single machines.18
Moreover, AM may help a state to acquire the components needed for fissile
material production in relative secrecy, but countries can still be unmasked as
they move into the actual operation of facilities using these components. They
can be caught, for instance, in the act of associated tasks of uranium mining,
milling, purification, conversion, and enrichment. Similarly, the construction
and operation of nuclear reactors rarely goes unnoticed. Even if a country prints
everything needed for the front or back end of the nuclear fuel cycle, reactors
or centrifuges will still give off tell-tale signatures, such as effluent waste, which
make them prone to detection.19
In other words, 3-D printers will not make uranium conversion easier, plutonium
less toxic to handle, or nuclear reactors any easier to hide. But this new manufacturing
technology does promise to facilitate the procurement and production
of necessary component parts that often took countries years to produce on their
own or procure on the black and grey supply markets. AM thereby erodes an initial
and important bulwark to the diffusion of sensitive nuclear fuel cycle technology.20
At present, the international community is concerned that Iran may use its
known nuclear facilities to “break out” and build nuclear weapons. Ever since
Saddam Hussein surprised the world by the extent of his secretive nuclear
buildup in the 1990s, nonproliferation experts have also been concerned about
a so-called “sneak out” scenario, in which a country secretly builds nuclear
weapons using material from undeclared nuclear facilities.21
In the future, the
Matthew Kroenig and Tristan Volpe
12 THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY ▪ FALL 2015
ability to use 3-D printing technology to surreptitiously manufacture components
may create additional concerns. The ability to stockpile large quantities of centrifuge
parts in secret without being detected might turbocharge a covert “surge out”
towards the bomb. A hybrid approach is also possible, whereby a country uses its
secret jump-start to then assemble all the parts in plain view and quickly present a
fait accompli. Indeed, by reducing detection time and making it easier to fabricate
sensitive items, production workshops equipped with AM technology threaten to
enable unprecedented variants of the classic “sneak out” and “break out” proliferation
scenarios.
What Can Be Done?
This is not the first time the international community has grappled with the spread
of dual-use technology, but past efforts to control the bomb have largely been reactive.
Improvements to the nonproliferation regime almost always spring up in
response to major breakdowns or crises. Fortunately, it is possible to anticipate
the proliferation potential of AM. The United States and its partners should get
out in front of this problem by employing both topdown
and bottom-up approaches.
Top-Down: Improve Control Regimes
The United States and other countries have long
attempted to control the spread of sensitive nuclear
technology. In the early 1970s, worries that civilian
nuclear programs might spawn weapons proliferation
motivated representatives from nuclear supplier
nations to meet in Vienna. Under the chairmanship
of Claude Zangger, thus forming the Zangger Committee, these officials discussed
how to better implement export controls mandated by Article III of the Nuclear
Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). Unfortunately, business interests and politics
among the member states prevented consensus over strict regulations. On May
18th, 1974, India conducted a “peaceful” nuclear explosion, using plutonium
from a Canadian-supplied heavy water power reactor. The next year, then-U.S.
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger convened his counterparts in the other
advanced nuclear countries for a series of meetings in London, which culminated
in the establishment of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), a cartel of nuclear
suppliers that enacted further restrictions on the availability of sensitive nuclear
technologies.22
When Iraq circumvented these controls by purchasing unregulated items to
build its own sensitive components, the suppliers closed this loophole in 1992
It is possible to
anticipate the proliferation
potential,
not just respond to a
crisis.
3-D Printing the Bomb?
THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY ▪ FALL 2015 13
by subjecting dual-use technology to enhanced
scrutiny. Over the last few decades, members of
the NSG and the Zangger Committee
expanded the list of items that “trigger” controls
and conditional safeguards to keep pace
with advances in nuclear technology, and
established new guidelines to better deal with
the rise of illicit nuclear trade networks.
While imperfect, this system has proven effective
in retarding the global spread of nuclear
weapons, in part because the supplier regimes
continue to evolve, adding new members and reacting to troubling developments
by updating international regulations.23
Like the advent of nuclear technology over seventy years ago, AM represents a
new dual-use technology that presents economic opportunity and security risk.
The current leaders in AM production should take a page out of the nuclear supplier’s
playbook and work to set up a new system of multilateral controls and
update existing regimes, most notably the NSG and Zangger Committee but
also the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and Wassenaar Arrangement,
which establishes export controls for conventional arms and other dualuse
technologies. Such efforts would allow the world to harness the benefits of
AM while mitigating its downside dangers.
To begin, Washington should immediately convene a high-level meeting with
counterparts in the roughly ten other major AM-producing countries to put the
issue on the international agenda. The upcoming 2016 Nuclear Security
Summit, scheduled to be held in the United States, presents an ideal opportunity
for such a gathering. Fortunately, with the exception of China, all of the companies
that produce industrial-grade AM printers are U.S. allies in Europe and Japan.
Emerging producers—South Korea, New Zealand, Singapore, and South Africa—
must also be included. Some technical and policy experts within the U.S. (and
presumably other) governments are already aware of this issue, but the potential
magnitude of the problem demands that it be elevated to the highest government
levels in order to set the stage for a coordinated whole-of-government and, eventually,
international approach.24
This new group would work together to develop a set of common-sense standards
for controlling the export of metal 3-D printers, sensitive build files, and
specialized metal powders.
One obvious step would be to develop a multilateral system of end-user and
end-use controls, so that the approval of an export license for AM capabilities
depends on the nature of the intended recipient and the proposed activity. Building
upon “catch-all” rules used by the multilateral control regimes, these provisions
The 2016 Nuclear
Security Summit
presents an ideal
opportunity to
address this
problem.
Matthew Kroenig and Tristan Volpe
14 THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY ▪ FALL 2015
would prohibit the transfer of 3-D printers or build files to countries or non-state
actors of ongoing proliferation concern, while ensuring the availability of the technology
for industrial applications or even for some peaceful nuclear activities
under appropriate safeguards.
Working within existing nuclear trade regimes would be a pragmatic next step
to translate other conclusions from the AM suppliers conference into policy. The
export control regimes already have a formal set of standards to coordinate
actions among members, and AM-related materials and technology should be
controlled much like other sensitive inputs and information. First, technical
working groups should meet to build consensus on possible recommendations.
Next, the United States and its partners could hold special plenary sessions
devoted to updating respective guidelines so that exports of advanced AM printers,
sensitive digital build files, and special metallic powders trigger the same
robust scrutiny and requirements for end-user specification as subtractive manufacturing
equipment. As a leading member of the NSG, Washington will have
great sway in advancing this agenda from inside—and since the leading developers
of AM are located in countries that participate in either the NSG or the
Wassenaar Agreement, action within these institutions could have a significant
impact.
Bottom-Up: Control New Technologies
Beyond updating the export control regimes, the AM
suppliers should also develop an effective system for
protecting sensitive build files. States clearly need to
discover unauthorized intrusions into relevant databases
much more quickly. The Obama White House
has adopted a number of cybersecurity initiatives to
safeguard information in the digital realm and
develop standards with private stakeholders although
recent setbacks, including the OPM data breach,
demonstrate that much work remains to be done.25
Government and industry should explore methods for building safeguards
directly into the build files to make them intrinsically secure. Single-use build
files, programmed to corrupt themselves after completing a specified task, could
ensure proper use by the intended recipient. Designers could disperse information
for the most sensitive items across multiple files on segregated databases to prevent
cyber thieves or insiders from gaining access in one fell swoop. Private industry
may innovate and adopt creative safeguards to protect intellectual property and
share best practices. In the end, devising a solution will ultimately require close
collaboration between national authorities, the cyber community, and commercial
developers of AM technology.
Beyond updating
export controls,
suppliers should
also protect sensitive
build files.
3-D Printing the Bomb?
THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY ▪ FALL 2015 15
Finally, the international community needs new protocols and capabilities to
monitor AM-facilitated fabrication. Governments could track purchases of 3-D
printers able to produce components traditionally made by specialized cutting
lathes and grinders. Collaborative research by government, industry, and university
stakeholders into the art of the technically possible with nuclear-related AM would
help ensure that those charged with monitoring and verification remain a step ahead
of proliferators. Sales of special metallic, ceramic, and plastic powders used in the
additive fabrication process must be reviewed and controlled for the same way
that sales of billets of maraging steel or 7075 aluminum are today, as these materials
can be used to produce centrifuge components. To facilitate these efforts, AM producers
should consider placing a unique identifier on each and every metal 3-D
printer produced, even causing the ID to be embedded in any component made
on that machine. Countries could consider funding an international data fusion
clearinghouse, perhaps located at the IAEA, to collect and store information on
the transfer and operation of sensitive 3-D printers around the world.
To be sure, many of these efforts will not be easy. The NSG operates on political
consensus and countries may be unwilling or unable to control AM technology.
Some of these recommendations go beyond what is currently done with
lathes and grinders, so an expansion of obligations for both governments and
businesses could prove a tough sell. Further, and more fundamentally, some
might object that attempting to limit the spread of a fast-moving major technology
such as AM is a fool’s errand, akin to the failed attempt to control highperformance
computing (HPC) in the 1990s.26
HPC technology moved far too
quickly for governments to ever put in place effective export controls, and as a
result the United States and China continue to race to bring online the most
powerful supercomputers in the world.
Nevertheless, these are exactly the sorts of questions that expert working groups
must consider and that must move to a higher government level in order to focus
sustained attention on the issue. Vigorous discussion and debate will help separate
the wheat from the chaff so that solutions with technical merit and political viability
can be implemented before a crisis happens. At a deeper level, while the costs of
overcoming these various obstacles to the development of a successful AM nonproliferation
strategy are real, they pale in comparison to the risks of inaction. 3-D printing
represents a major step forward in production technology, and the nuclear
nonproliferation regime must adapt to meet this challenge.
No Time Like the Present
The emerging AM revolution will have profound implications for how technology
is produced around the world. As a result, the United States should engage in a
Matthew Kroenig and Tristan Volpe
16 THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY ▪ FALL 2015
broad-based effort to anticipate these likely consequences and position itself to
maximize its associated benefits and minimize risks. Among these efforts,
Washington should develop a national strategy for becoming a global leader in
AM fabrication and to incorporate AM into defense production to reduce
defense spending and the national deficit. Most importantly, however, the
United States must also consider the game changing effects of 3-D printing
beyond its borders and work with the international community to prevent an
AM-enabled cascade of nuclear weapons proliferation.
Some may argue that the measures we recommend are premature because states
are not yet using AM to build nuclear components. But if we wait until the next
proliferator uses AM workshops to surge out to a significant quantity of fissile
material, the international community will once again have been too late.
Others may argue that we are already behind the curve; multiple countries are producing
3-D printers and the machines are already in use in firms and research
organizations around the world. While true, efforts at control, especially if
implemented in a timely manner, can have a powerful and lasting effect. After
all, strict international nuclear supply controls were not adopted until nearly 30
years after the first nuclear test. Fortunately, we have identified the emergent
threat posed by AM much earlier. Now is the time to act.
Notes
1. “3D Printing Scales Up,” The Economist, September 7, 2013, http://www.economist.com/
news/technology-quarterly/21584447-digital-manufacturing-there-lot-hype-around-3d-
printing-it-fast.
2. Andrew Zaleski, “GE’s Bestselling Jet Engine Makes 3-D Printing a Core Component,”
Fortune, March 5, 2015, http://fortune.com/2015/03/05/ge-engine-3d-printing/; “Aerojet
Rocketdyne Successfully Demonstrates 3D Printed Rocket Propulsion System for Satellites,”
Reuters, December 15, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/12/15/
idUSnGNX8FQrs1+1d8+GNW20141215; Brooke Kaelin, “World’s Largest 3-D Printed
Titanium Aircraft Part on Display in China,” 3-D Printer World, August 19, 2013,
http://www.3dprinterworld.com/article/worlds-largest-3d-printed-titanium-aircraft-part-
display-china.
3. Matthew Kroenig, Exporting the Bomb: Technology Transfer and the Spread of Nuclear
Weapons (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010); David Albright, Peddling Peril: How
the Secret Nuclear Trade Arms America’s Enemies (New York: Free Press, 2010).
4. Neil Gershenfeld, “How to Make Almost Anything: The Digital Fabrication Revolution,”
Foreign Affairs 91, no. 6 (November/December 2012), pp. 43–57.
5. Jacqueline Mroz, “Hand of a Superhero: 3-D Printing Prosthetic Hands That Are Anything
but Ordinary,” The New York Times, February 16, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/
2015/02/17/science/hand-of-a-superhero.html?_r=0; Laurie Garrett, “Biology’s Brave
New World: The Promise and Perils of the Synbio Revolution,” Foreign Affairs 92, no.
6 (November/December 2013), pp. 28–46. But for exceptions, see Connor M. McNulty,
3-D Printing the Bomb?
THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY ▪ FALL 2015 17
Neyla Arnas, and Thomas A. Campbell, “Toward the Printed World: Additive Manufacturing
and Implications for National Security,” Institute for National Strategic Studies,
National Defense University, September 2012, www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a577162.
pdf; Matthew Hallex, “Digital Manufacturing and Missile Proliferation,” Public Interest
Report 66, no. 2 (Spring 2013).
6. “3D Printing: Entering the Jet Age,” The Economist, March 7, 2015, http://www.economist.
com/news/science-and-technology/21645712-aircraft-engines-may-soon-be-built-one-
layer-time-entering-jet-age.
7. Zaleski, “GE’s Bestselling Jet Engine.”
8. Larry Dignan, “Airbus A350 XWB used more than 1,000 3D printed parts,” ZDNet, May 6,
2015, http://www.zdnet.com/article/airbus-a350-xwb-used-more-than-1000-3d-printed-parts/.
9. Yasmin Tadjdeh, “Navy Beefs Up 3D Printing Efforts with New ‘Print the Fleet’ Program,”
National Defense Magazine, October 2014, http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/
archive/2014/October/Pages/NavyBeefsUp3DPrintingEffortsWithNewPrinttheFleetProg
ram.aspx; Cheryl Pellerin, “Hagel Announces New Defense Innovation, Reform Efforts,”
Press Release, U.S. Department of Defense, November 15, 2014, http://www.defense.gov/
news/newsarticle.aspx?id=123651; John Markoff, “Pentagon Shops in Silicon Valley for
Game Changers,” The New York Times, February 26, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/
02/27/science/pentagon-looking-for-edge-in-the-future-checks-in-with-silicon-valley.html.
10. Thomas Campbell, Christopher Williams, Olga Ivanova, and Banning Garrett, “Could 3D
Printing Change the World? Technologies, Potential, and Implications of Additive Manufacturing,”
Strategic Foresight Report, The Atlantic Council, October 2011, http://www.
atlanticcouncil.org/publications/reports/could-3d-printing-change-the-world.
11. Robert Harney et al., “Anatomy of a Project to Produce a First Nuclear Weapon,” Science
& Global Security 14, no. 2–3 (December 2006): 163–82.
12. Michael D. Zentner et al, “Nuclear Proliferation Technology Trends Analysis,” Pacific
Northwest National Laboratory, September 2005, fissilematerials.org/library/zen05.pdf.
13. Matthew Kroenig, A Time to Attack: The Looming Iranian Nuclear Threat (New York:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), pp. 15–18.
14. Ellen Nakashima, “Chinese Breach Data of 4 Million Federal Workers,” The Washington
Post, June 4, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/chinese-
hackers-breach-federal-governments-personnel-office/2015/06/04/889c0e52-0af7-11e5-
95fd-d580f1c5d44e_story.html.
15. On why countries have exported sensitive material in the past, see Matthew Kroenig,
“Exporting the Bomb: Why States Provide Sensitive Nuclear Assistance,” The American
Political Science Review 103, no. 1 (February 2009), pp. 113–133.
16. See, for example, Michael Moltich-Hou, “Afinia Unveils ES360 Tabletop 3D Scanner,” 3D
Printing Industry, July 28, 2015, http://3dprintingindustry.com/2015/07/28/afinia-
unveils-es360-tabletop-3d-scanner/.
17. On knowledge and experience barriers to the production of nuclear weapons, see Donald
MacKenzie and Graham Spinardi, “Tacit Knowledge, Weapons Design, and the Uninvention
of Nuclear Weapons,” The American Journal of Sociology 101, no. 1 (July 1995),
pp. 44–99; and Alexander H. Montgomery, “Stop Helping Me: When Nuclear Assistance
Impedes Nuclear Programs,” in Adam Stulberg and Matt Fuhrmann, eds., The Nuclear
Renaissance and International Security (Stanford, C.A.: Stanford University Press, 2013),
pp. 177–200.
Matthew Kroenig and Tristan Volpe
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18. Wyn Q. Bowen, Libya and Nuclear Proliferation: Stepping Back from the Brink, (London, U.
K., Routledge for the IISS Adelphi Papers, 2006), pp. 25–46.
19. For a good overview of the challenges faced in the collection of information on nuclear
programs, see Michael Crawford, “Exploring the Maze: Counter-proliferation Intelligence,”
Survival 53, no. 2, (2011), pp. 131–158.
20. In this sense, AM promises to significantly exacerbate the problem created by the spread of
computer numeric controlled machines and other technical advances that “shortened
timelines and allowed programmes to overcome or sidestep important hurdles.” See
Crawford, “Exploring the Maze,” p. 148.
21. Robert Gates, Director of Central Intelligence, “Weapons Proliferation in the New World
Order,” Statement before the Senate Government Affairs Committee, 102nd Cong., 2nd
sess., January 15, 1992.
22. J. Samuel Walker, “Nuclear Power and Nonproliferation: The Controversy over Nuclear
Exports, 1974–1980,” Diplomatic History 25, no. 2 (Spring 2001), pp. 215–249.
23. For an excellent overview of the past, current, and future challenges facing the NSG, see
Mark Hibbs, The Future of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (Washington DC: The Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, 2011).
24. For example, the Comptroller General of the United States recently convened a forum to
address the benefits and potential risks of AM technology with participants from
government, business, and academia. For a summary, see “3D Printing: Opportunities,
Challenges, and Policy Implications of Additive Manufacturing,” United States
Government Accountability Office, Report to the Chairman, Committee of Science,
Space, and Technology, House of Representatives, GAO-15-505SP, June 2015.
25. Katie Zezima, “Obama Signs Executive Order on Sharing Cybersecurity Threat Information,”
The Washington Post, February 12, 2015, http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
post-politics/wp/2015/02/12/obama-to-sign-executive-order-on-cybersecurity-threats/.
26. See Glenn J. McLoughlin and Ian F. Fergusson, High Performance Computers and Export
Control Policy (CRS Report No. RL31175) (Washington, DC: Congressional Resedarch
Service, February 10, 2003).
3-D Printing the Bomb?
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