
Thomas Hegghammer:

"The recruiter's dilemma. Signalling and rebel recruitment tactics,"

Journal of Peace Research January 2013 vol. 50 no. 1, pp: 3-16.

(a discourse analysis of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula 2001-2003)



Recruitment of terrorists

Recruitment for terrorist organization is like any other job interview - just with some differences caused by the nature of the recruiting organization

One for all – danger – organization operates in asymmetric conflict at the territory of an enemy who is trying to infiltrate the group

TRUST GAME

We want to impose **high costs** on infiltrators and low quality recruits



Quality

 illegal underground organization need members able to remain hidden and conduct special operations

Commitment

 it is very important to find out the motivated candidates sharing values with the organization

Trustworthiness

and extremely important to recognize a mole mimicing serious recruits

Infiltrators pretending to be one of us

- Infiltrators are deadly for small illegal underground organizations (such as in the Reservoir dogs)
- The more they know about us, the better will they mimic they are thus looking similary to real recruits
- They are trying to meet us in the same places where we are recruiting and where recruits are looking for us

Place

secure, hidden, yet open to anyone interested

It is neccessary to choose place

- where recruits could find us
- where we can find suitable recruits
- where infiltators are easy to be exposed and face great costs

Outreach

Internet

- great for our outreach to make us known
- puts extremely low cost to contact us
- very easy to mimic interest for anybody

Mosques

- possibly interested recruits
- public places for anybody to come and go

Private gatherings

- vouching by known persons, closed for unknown people
- social networks or private lectures trusted members
- high costs for infiltrator if caught

Private gatherings

In the studied example

- social network of former foreign jihad fighters
- private lectures of radical priests in their home
- Hard enough to enter (high cost)
- Qualite or at least committed members

Screening

signs we are looking for are CASE SPECIFIC

- Initial Evaluation (in our al-Qaeda example)
 - ethnicity rational (better communication) and irrational reasons (jihad is Arabian)
 - experience foreign jihad fighter or lone wolf, easy to verify by stories, arms expertise, jihad culture

Probing

- steer conversation desired way
- look for signs experience, weeping, poetry knowledge (verification – weeping and poetry shows your emotional investment in the deeply personal jihad, imposing high cost for imposters)



Costly induction

- a) al-Qaeda originaly invited recruits at their lecture meeting – imposing costs on interested recruits as they could be arrested for such a participation
- the problem was, however, that police raided the meetings and actually arrested all the participants



Costly induction

- b) al-Qaeda made recruit to be put on a radar of police force
- lending phone or cars to older al-Qaeda members
- doing incriminating acts (such as in the Life of Brian)
- this practice however mean police does know your members

Screening al-Qaeda's example

Costly induction

- c) thus the last and most costly induction immersion training camps
- emotional, social, financial investment, as you are for several weeks closed in a camp with other recruits and members
- anashid, poetry, war stories, weeping who proposed to do such acts got most credit

The End

- In the end, al-Quade in the Arabian Peninsula had around hundred members
- It conducted massive terrorist attacks in the Saudia Arabia in 2003
- In response, security forces dispersed the group, killing or arresting most of the members, marking the end of al-Qaeda in the Kingdom