Thomas Hegghammer:
"The recruiter’s dilemma. Signalling and rebel
recruitment tactics,"
Journal of Peace Research January 2013 vol. 50 no. 1, pp: 3-16.
(a discourse analysis of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula 2001-2003)
Recruit Infiltrators Place
quality security x opennesstrying to mimic recruits
TRUST GAME
Screening Outreach
internet
mosques
commitment
trustworthiness
private gatherings
1. social networks
2. private lectures
initial evaluation
probing
costly induction
Recruitment of terrorists
Recruitment for terrorist organization is like any other job
interview - just with some differences caused by the nature of
the recruiting organization
One for all – danger – organization operates in asymmetric
conflict at the territory of an enemy who
is trying to infiltrate the group
TRUST GAME
We want to impose high costs on infiltrators and low quality
recruits
Recruit
suitable for his positiont
● Quality
– illegal underground organization need members able to
remain hidden and conduct special operations
● Commitment
– it is very important to find out the motivated candidates
sharing values with the organization
● Trustworthiness
– and extremely important to recognize a mole mimicing
serious recruits
Infiltrators
pretending to be one of us
● Infiltrators are deadly for small illegal underground
organizations (such as in the Reservoir dogs)
● The more they know about us, the better will they mimic – they
are thus looking similary to real recruits
● They are trying to meet us in the same places where we are
recruiting and where recruits are looking for us
Place
secure, hidden, yet open to anyone interested
It is neccessary to choose place
– where recruits could find us
– where we can find suitable recruits
– where infiltators are easy to be exposed and face great
costs
Outreach
● Internet
– great for our outreach to make us known
– puts extremely low cost to contact us
– very easy to mimic interest for anybody
● Mosques
– possibly interested recruits
– public places for anybody to come and go
● Private gatherings
– vouching by known persons, closed for unknown people
– social networks or private lectures – trusted members
– high costs for infiltrator if caught
Private gatherings
In the studied example
– social network of former foreign jihad fighters
– private lectures of radical priests in their home
● Hard enough to enter (high cost)
● Qualite or at least committed members
Screening
signs we are looking for are CASE SPECIFIC
● Initial Evaluation (in our al-Qaeda example)
– ethnicity – rational (better communication) and irrational
reasons (jihad is Arabian)
– experience – foreign jihad fighter or lone wolf, easy to
verify by stories, arms expertise, jihad culture
● Probing
– steer conversation desired way
– look for signs – experience, weeping, poetry knowledge
(verification – weeping and poetry shows your emotional
investment in the deeply personal jihad, imposing high
cost for imposters)
Screening
al-Qaeda´s example
● Costly induction
– a) al-Qaeda originaly invited recruits at their lecture
meeting – imposing costs on interested recruits as they
could be arrested for such a participation
– the problem was, however, that police raided the
meetings and actually arrested all the participants
Screening
al-Qaeda´s example
● Costly induction
– b) al-Qaeda made recruit to be put on a radar of police
force
– lending phone or cars to older al-Qaeda members
– doing incriminating acts (such as in the Life of Brian)
– this practice however mean police does know your
members
Screening
al-Qaeda´s example
● Costly induction
– c) thus the last and most costly induction – immersion
training camps
– emotional, social, financial investment, as you are for
several weeks closed in a camp with other recruits and
members
– anashid, poetry, war stories, weeping – who proposed to
do such acts got most credit
The End
● In the end, al-Quade in the Arabian Peninsula
had around hundred members
● It conducted massive terrorist attacks in the
Saudia Arabia in 2003
● In response, security forces dispersed the
group, killing or arresting most of the members,
marking the end of al-Qaeda in the Kingdom