Chenoweth & Stephan: Why civil resistance sometimes fails: The Burmese uprising 1988-1990 Alexandra Baliaková, 363 648 BURMESE UPRISING 1988 š1988: a popular uprising in Burma posed an unprecedented challenge to that country’s military dictatorship (came to power in 1962) šSpontaneous student-led protests against police violence in Rangoon quickly grew into a nationwide campaign to dismantle the junta involving large numbers of Burma’s ethnically and linguistically diverse population FEW OPPOSITION GAINS š šthe temporary replacement of military with civilian rule šholding of multiparty elections in 1990 won by the opposition National League for Democracy (NLD) šthe 1988 campaign is best characterized as a failure- a new military dictatorship came to power that ignored the election results and maintained power- stays highly repressive military dictatorship š OUTCOME OF THE RANGOON MASSACRE šGeneral Ne Win – steps down as president and chair of the Burmese Socialist Program Party (BSPP) šMan responsible for the Rangoon Massacre was installed as new chairman šNationwide strike, mass protest- 8. august 1988 šDemands end of military dictatorship and the installation of an interim government in order to prepare for multiparty elections šGovernment opens up fire šOver 1000 dead demonstrators in three days š š 1990 MULTIPARTY ELECTIONS šNational League for Democracy (NLD)- over 80 % šState Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) – military-led, refused to respect the election šAung San Suu Kyi- under home arrest- JULY 1990 šGuerilla resistance šAung San Suu Kyi-unsuccesful dialogue with military leaders on democratic reforms šSLORC- renamed to State Peace and Development Council (SPDC)- remains in control šOpposition not in position to resist through campaigns of noncooperations š INTERNATIONAL FACTORS šAung San Suu Kyi- won the Nobel Peace Prize – 1991 šSanctions from UN for human rights abuses šSubstituitions from China and India šU.S. sanctions were weak šInternational sanctions did not raise the political costs to the Burmese regime of repressing the nonviolent opposition š DOMESTIC FACTORS šNonviolent campain was ineffective in producing loyalty shifts within the securityforces šFailed to present itself as a viable political alternative to junta šFailed to to alter the self-interest equation of the security forces- no incentives to challenge or disobey regime orders šRegime divided and co-opted groups of Buddhist monks, preventing them from unified front šNonviolent mobilization was massive and cross-cutting NONVIOLENT MOVEMENT šOverreliance on single personalities šInability to reconcile across competing factions šLack of consistent information about human rights abuses šInability to mobilize masses at all šSmall gurrilla units with a passive support base divided along ethnic lines š RESULTS šBoth violent and nonviolent campaings failed to raise the costs of regime repression to threatened the regime šThe domestic costs were inadequate to produce the desired results šMobilization was selective and leader dependent š š š CONLUSION šMobilization may be critical determinant of success, given that a widespread, cross-cutting, and decentralized campaign may be more effective in raising the political costs of repression because of its operational resilience, mass apeeal, and anonymity SOURCE šChenoweth, Erica and Stephan, Maria J, “Why Civil Resistanace sometimes Fails: The Burmese Uprsing 1988-1990” chapter 7 in Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict. (Columbia Studies in Terrorism and Irregular Warfare, 2011): 172-191. QUESTIONS ? šThank you for your attention!