DEMOCRATIZATION, POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS, AND ETHNIC CONFLICT PRESENTATION MVZ489 Causes of Political Violence Lucie Sitarová April 2016 ¢Saideman, S., Lanoue, D., Campenni, M., Stanton, S. (2002): “Democratization, Political institutions, and Ethnic Conflict. A pooled-Time Series Analysis, 1985-1998”, Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 35, No 1., pp: 103-129. ¢ STRUCTURE ¢Democracy and conflict ¢Core assumptions ¢Ethnic security dilemma ¢Political institutions and conflict ¢Research design ¢Hypothesis and results ¢ ¢ DEMOCRACY AND CONFLICT ¢3rd wave of democratizatoin - increase in the number of ethnic groups in conflict ¢Questions: ¢If political competition exacerbates communal tensions, do increases in ethnic tensions coincide with democratization? ¢Are the differences in ethnic unrest among democracies due to variations in political institutions? ¢Are presidential systems more prone to ethnic conflict than parliamentary democracies? ¢Does the electoral system matter? ¢Does federalism cause more problems than it solves? SHOULD WE PRESCRIBE DEMOCRACY? giphy.gif CORE ASSUMPTIONS AND QUESTION ¢Groups can be perceived as unitary actors ¢Institutions matter because they can favor or deter organized groups and their dissent ¢ ¢Q: what conditions are associated with greater or less ethnic dissent, both peaceful and violent? ¢ ¢Ethnic protest X ethnic rebellion —Protest – „making an appeal to government leaders for redress of grievances“ —Rebellion – „conscious attempt to destabilize (and in some cases overthrow) the government itself“ —Important distinction, because some institutions favor protest to prevent violent rebelllion — ETHNIC SECURITY DILEMMA ¢Application of the international concept to domestic politics —Posen – collapse of an empire creates anarchy à security dilemma ¢Saideman – revises the concept to make it broadly applicable: ¢government of any state is the greatest potential threat to any groups inside (it usually takes a state’s resources to commit genocide) ¢à groups try to control the state (or secede if the state's neutrality cannot be assured) ¢à security dilemma ¢Q: what institutions might matter and what are their likely effects? Institutions that promote power sharing or provide some level of representation or self-government for minority groups are therefore assumed to be more likely to reduce conflict eth groups will be secure if they have access to decision makers, can block harmful politices, veto... Uncertainity - Because the tendency toward protest and violence is inversely related to group security, we assume that groups are more likely to act up when they are uncertain about their position and prospects for the future. -- more problems when there are first elections... bcs autocracies offer stability, ethnic unrest can be greater in democracies POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND CONFLICT ¢nature of the executive ¢type of electoral system ¢distribution of power between central government and subunits ¢ ¢How much power is held by the winners and what can do the losers ¢ ¢presidentialism vs parliamentarism - what is better? presidential systems are better because of greater accountability, greater identifiability, and the existence of mutual checks BUT The ethnic security dilemma theory suggests that presidential systems are superior in reducing conflict Parliamentarism,can be quite threatening to minority groups if they cannot get significant representation and especially threatening if one party tends to gain control with no need for coalitions - Ethnic groups may be safer in presidential systems because there are more points within the system to block unfavorable actions RESEARCH ¢Minorities at risk dataset ¢Group/years ¢Both democratic and authoritarian regimes DEMOCRACY ¢Hypothesis 1: Ethnic protests and rebellion are more likely in democracies than in authoritarian regimes. ¢ ¢Competition for the control of government ¢Costs of protesting are less and the perceived benefits are greater ¢Ethnic outbidding DEMOCRACY ¢Hypothesis 1: Ethnic protests and rebellion are more likely in democracies than in authoritarian regimes. ¢ ¢Competition for the control of government ¢Costs of protesting are less and the perceived benefits are greater ¢Ethnic outbidding REGIME AGE ¢Hypothesis 2: Ethnic protests and rebellion are more likely in states with younger political institutions. ¢ ¢State is more vulnerable to capture by one group at the expense of others during transitions ¢Older regimes are more likely to have „worked things out“ REGIME AGE ¢Hypothesis 2: Ethnic protests and rebellion are more likely in states with younger political institutions. ¢ ¢State is more vulnerable to capture by one group at the expense of others during transitions ¢Older regimes are more likely to have „worked things out“ ¢ ¢ ¢older - more violence, not significantly more protest —the fact of establishing a new dem is often a part od grievance-management YOUNG DEMOCRACIES ¢Hypothesis 3:Young democracies are less likely to experience severe ethnic strife. ¢ ¢The mere fact of the transitions to a democracy is an act of adressing grievances ¢Groups might try to use the system first YOUNG DEMOCRACIES ¢Hypothesis 3:Young democracies are less likely to experience severe ethnic strife. ¢ ¢The mere fact of the transitions to a democracy is an act of adressing grievances ¢Groups might try to use the system first FIRST ELECTION ¢Hypothesis 4: When a country undergoes its first election under the current political system, ethnic protests and rebellion are more likely ¢ ¢More dissent during a first election, because this is often the first opportunity to make clear what a group desires ¢Increases incertainity about who will rule ¢They don‘t necessarily lead to democracy FIRST ELECTION ¢Hypothesis 4: When a country undergoes its first election under the current political system, ethnic protests and rebellion are more likely ¢ ¢More dissent during a first election, because this is often the first opportunity to make clear what a group desires ¢Increases incertainity about who will rule ¢They don‘t necessarily lead to democracy ¢ ¢ ¢No significant influence ELECTORAL SYSTEM ¢Hypothesis 6: Ethnic conflict is more likely in systems characterized by plurality than those with proportional representation ¢ ¢Plurality systems - exaggerate the power of the strongest parties ¢Proportional representation —a distribution of seats proportional to the votes received ELECTORAL SYSTEM ¢Hypothesis 6: Ethnic conflict is more likely in systems characterized by plurality than those with proportional representation ¢ ¢Plurality systems - exaggerate the power of the strongest parties ¢Proportional representation —a distribution of seats proportional to the votes received ¢ ¢ ¢neither large-scale demonstrations nor violence is required for groups to have some say over their destinies FEDERALISM ¢Hypothesis 7a: Ethnic protest is more likely in systems characterized by federalism. Hypothesis 7b: Ethnic rebellion is less likely in systems characterized by federalism. ¢Facilitates collective action ¢Many groups have more control over the government of their territory ¢Put smaller minorities at risk FEDERALISM ¢Hypothesis 7a: Ethnic protest is more likely in systems characterized by federalism. Hypothesis 7b: Ethnic rebellion is less likely in systems characterized by federalism. ¢Facilitates collective action ¢Many groups have more control over the government of their territory ¢Put smaller minorities at risk OTHER ACTORS ¢Wealth —level of development matters more than how well it has been doing lately - groups in richer countries engage in less violence ¢Cultural differences —culturally distinct or politically disadvantaged groups engage in more dissent (peaceful and violent) ¢Concentration —positive relationship with both protest and rebellion ¢ CONCLUSION ¢no need to fear democratization ¢ THANK YOU