I N T R O D U C T I O N
Imperial Abduction Lore and
Humanitarian Seduction
Maximilian C. Forte
“I am serious about making sure we have the best
relationship with the NGOs who are such a force
multiplier for us, such an important part of our combat
team”.—US Secretary of State Colin L. Powell (2001)
“The countries that cooperate with us get at least a free
pass. Whereas other countries that don’t cooperate, we
ream them as best we can”.—A senior US official
specializing on Africa (quoted in Whitlock 2013/4/13)
wo of the most enduring beliefs, among at least the
political elites and a substantial portion of the wider
population in North America, are that military intervention
abroad and all sorts of other less forceful interventions,
are: (a) for the good of other societies, whose
lives and whose very nature as human beings will experience
progress as a result of our intervention; and, (b) that
the security of the intervening society will thus be enhanced,
while its global leadership will also be secured.
These constitute beliefs akin to any other beliefs that anthropologists
and sociologists have studied in the value
systems of other, discrete populations: as beliefs they
maintain contradictions without resolving them, and as beliefs
they can thrive in the absence of serious questioning,
and in the absence of empirical support. One main difference
about these beliefs, however, is that situated as we are
T
MAXIMILIAN C. FORTE2
in North America, we do not require the minimalistic yearlong
ritual of “fieldwork” abroad in order to discover
them: we are all already immersed in this value system,
and have been all of our lives. So let us proceed to extricate
ourselves and question what we have received.
We proceed not only by “studying up,” but also studying
horizontally in social terms (the society as we experience
it directly), and introspectively (reflecting on the
meanings of various codes we have been taught by parents,
schools, the media, and what we then hold as if they
had always been our very own). We can become aware of
our own very deeply planted faith in the value and necessity
of our interventions abroad when we find ourselves in
situations where such beliefs are openly questioned, contested,
or refuted. This is especially the case when we are
faced with seemingly hard-line rejections of western interventionism:
then, we invariably always ask, and we feel
impelled to ask, “But aren’t there times when we should intervene?”
This is always the immediate default question,
and one that not coincidentally also preserves our belief in
our own special role in history, as the special people with
the right answers, as special forces who have either the
right or the duty to impose our solutions from the top
down. We will even rewrite history to mandate the only
allowed “positive” answers, so we tell each other that we
intervened in World War II to put a stop to the Holocaust,
and that our alleged “non-intervention” allowed Rwanda’s
“genocide” to happen (instead, see Philpot, 2014).
We believe that our right to safety or security is an absolute
imperative. The ultimate default question/belief,
behind or beyond this one, concerns our very nature as
human beings—is it not an essential part of human nature
to engage in war? Deconstructing such an ostensibly
straightforward question takes time (and many others
have done so), especially since the question elides violence
with war, and war with empire, and renders both war and
empire as “natural” and thus normal. At the same this position
assumes a single human nature that is everywhere
the same, and always has been. It is interesting to witness
INTRODUCTION 3
that when our “culture” of interventionism suffers setbacks,
we always beat a hasty retreat back to “nature”.
Much of the same pattern of elision and naturalization
occurs when it is assumed that either war and/or empire
are essential to the maintenance of our ultimate security,
and all human beings, we believe, assert their security
through violence—never through cooperation, collaboration,
solidarity or reciprocity. Under the constraints of
what is ideologically amiable to the power elites, we thus
toil at reimagining our most distant human ancestors as
prototypical warrior capitalists. What makes all of this
possible is belief—not that beliefs unilaterally determine
the imperial system.
The Humanitarian Syndrome of
Western Interventionism
The dominant ideology of US-led globalization since September
11, 2001, is one that configures society as existing in
a state of emergency—one that constructs exceptional circumstances,
where exceptional rules and exceptional selfrepresentations
prevail. A defining feature of this post-
9/11 orientation is therefore one that frames perceptions or
constructions of global disorder in terms of emergency and
threats to security. As in the case of the pre-9/11 “neocon”
classic, Robert Kaplan’s “The Coming Anarchy” (1994/2),
the ideological expressions of the state of exception as a
normative framework for constructing practical action,
gained not just currency but authority. In this framework,
other people—especially in Africa—are problems. They
are an immediate “threat” to themselves, and an eventual
threat to “us”. As Kaplan (1994/2) put it:
“West Africa is becoming the symbol of worldwide
demographic, environmental, and societal stress, in
which criminal anarchy emerges as the real ‘strategic’
danger….West Africa provides an appropriate
introduction to the issues, often extremely unpleasant to
discuss, that will soon confront our civilization”.
MAXIMILIAN C. FORTE4
The “crisis” in West Africa, the causes of which Kaplan
essentially sees as inherent to West Africa itself, is not just
a mortal threat to West Africans, it is a security threat. Repeatedly
Kaplan frames these issues in his essay in terms
of “national security,” the “core foreign-policy challenge”
and the “strategic impact” of these African problems for
the US. Here again we see the power of belief in holding at
bay any acknowledgment of self-contradiction: if problems
for the US can come from abroad, why is the same not true
for West Africa? How is Kaplan’s West African crisis sui
generis, while any eventual crisis for the US is always of
exogenous provenance? It is a very useful belief if anything:
it preserves American exceptionalism by positing
the innate inferiority of other societies. Moreover, it casts
Americans as innocent and self-sufficient, and foreigners
as menacing and dependent.
It follows logically that if these others are the problem—and
a problem for us ultimately—then we must be the
solution. Constructing other people’s situations as problems,
and the West as the source of solutions, has meant
(a) the fusion of the military and humanitarian into a single
form of governance (Fassin & Pandolfi, 2010, p. 10),
and (b) a situation where we in the West renew our former
colonial right to intervene against militarily and economically
weaker states, now dubbed “failed states” (Helman &
Ratner, 1992–1993; Gordon, 1997). In this process, both the
sovereignty and self-determination of the formerly colonized,
limited as they have been by the persistent realities
of neocolonialism, have been challenged, eroded and deliberately
undermined. The ideal way to justify this new
wave of western interventions since the end of the Cold
War has been “humanitarianism”. Ideal, because this
mode of justification can, (a) simultaneously pay some respect
to international law (by revitalizing international
law’s colonial roots and making renewed use of the trusteeship
model); (b) immobilize potential critics at home,
lest they be accused of not wanting to “help” others and
“save lives”; and, (c) using the language of salvation and
freedom out of necessary recognition that the residue of
INTRODUCTION 5
the world’s anti-colonial struggles of the 1960s would not
tolerate an outright return to blunt statements of the
West’s “civilizing mission” (Mooers, 2006, p. 2).
Consequently, the narrative and practice of “humanitarianism”
can serve as a new (possibly preemptive) counterinsurgency,
on both the domestic and global levels, that
seek to neutralize critiques, limit the range of acceptable
options, build new civilian-military coalitions, overthrow
noncompliant governments, and thus delay the decline of
western hegemony. Humanitarianism may thus be very
much a sign of a late imperialism.
While humanitarian notions of some sort have been
expressed by almost every modern empire, off and on
throughout the course of a given empire’s existence, one
should note however that the last two global hegemons,
the UK and the US, both heightened the “humanitarian”
ethos in the final decades of their imperial dominance.
Why? There are a number of possible reasons. One is to
shift the cost burden to a wider array of partners recruited
by the politics of humanitarianism, partners both local and
international, whether sovereign or among the collaborator
class of the colonized, in order to preserve the expanse of
empire while trying to manage its increasingly unaffordable
costs. Also trying to ward off rising challengers is
common to both the UK and US examples. “Everyone to
the frontlines” might be the rallying call at this stage of increasing
desperation—and one way to rope in everyone is
to appeal to intimate values and emtions. Another is the
attempt to minimize the costs of resistance by attempting
to “win hearts and minds”—“we,” after all, are undertaking
all this trouble and expense just for “your” welfare.
Such a narrative is possibly more successful at home than
anywhere else: witness the countless right-wing media
pundits in the US who speak as if they sincerely believe
that US military forces launch expeditions primarily to
help others—invasion as a form of charity. Another reason
for the humanitarian turn may be the legacy factor, a lastditch
effort to rewrite history to preserve at least the symbolic
capital of exceptionalism, to be converted into politi-
MAXIMILIAN C. FORTE6
cal capital as post-imperial leadership entitlements (as
with the UK, sitting on the UN Security Council, and
Queen Elizabeth II formally leading the Commonwealth of
Nations).
Of great assistance in spreading the burden of “humanitarian
intervention,” while simultaneously working
to roll back the state, is the ever-expanding complex of
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), whose number
worldwide is perhaps several million. Western NGOs, and
especially those in receipt of government funding and
whose work abroad meets with the approval of the US
and/or the EU, have been instrumental in promoting topdown
solutions that strengthen “civil society” at the expense
of states in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Car-
ibbean.
Outsourcing Empire,
Privatizing State Functions: NGOs
First, we need to get a sense of the size and scope of the
spread of just those NGOs that work on an international
plane, or INGOs, many of which are officially associated
with, though not part of, the UN. Estimates of the number
of INGOs (such as Care, Oxfam, Médecins Sans Frontières)
vary greatly depending on the source, the definition of
INGOs used, and the methods used to locate and count
them. In broad terms, INGOs numbered roughly 28,000 by
the mid-1990s, which represented a 500% increase from the
1970s; other estimates suggest that by the early years of
this century they numbered 40,000, while some put the
number at around 30,000, which is still nearly double the
number of INGOs in 1990, and some figures are lower at
20,000 by 2005 (Anheier & Themudo, 2005, p. 106;
Bloodgood & Schmitz, 2012, p. 10; Boli, 2006, p. 334; Makoba,
2002, p. 54). While the sources differ in their estimates,
all of them agree that there has been a substantial
rise in the number of INGOs over the past two decades.
INTRODUCTION 7
Second, there is also evidence that INGOs and local
NGOs are taking on a much larger role in international development
assistance than ever before. The UK’s Overseas
Development Institute reported in 1996 that, by then, between
10% and 15% of all aid to developing countries was
channeled through NGOs, accounting for a total amount of
$6 billion US. Other sources report that “about a fifth of all
reported official and private aid to developing countries
has been provided or managed by NGOs and publicprivate
partnerships” (International Development Association
[IDA], 2007, p. 31). It has also been reported that,
“from 1970 to 1985 total development aid disbursed by international
NGOs increased ten-fold,” while in 1992 INGOs,
“channeled over $7.6 billion of aid to developing
countries”.1 In 2004, INGOs “employed the full time
equivalent of 140,000 staff—probably larger than the total
staff of all bilateral and multilateral donors combined—
and generated revenues for US$13 billion from philanthropy
(36%), government contributions (35%) and fees
(29%)” (IDA, 2007, p. 31). The budgets of the larger INGOs
“have surpassed those of some Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD) donor countries”
(Morton, n.d., p. 325). For its part, the US government
“gave more than twice the amount of aid assistance in 2000
($4 billion) through nongovernmental organizations than
was given directly to foreign governments (est. $1.9 billion)”
(Kinney, 2006, p. 3).
The military is one arm of the imperialist order, and
the other arm is made up of NGOs (though often these two
arms are interlocked, as even Colin Powell says in the introductory
quote in this chapter). The political-economic
program of neoliberalism is, as Hanieh (2006, p. 168) argues,
the economic logic of the current imperialist drive.
This agenda involves, among other policies, cutbacks to
state services and social spending by governments in order
to open up local economies to private and nongovernmental
interests. Indeed, the meteoric rise of NGOs,
and the great increase in their numbers, came at a particular
time in history: “the conservative governments of
MAXIMILIAN C. FORTE8
Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher made support for
the voluntary sector a central part of their strategies to reduce
government social spending” (Salamon, 1994). By
more or less direct means, sometimes diffuse and other
times well-coordinated, the interests of the US and its allies
can thus be pursued under the cover of humanitarian
“aid,” “charity,” and “development assistance”.
In his extensive critique of neoliberalism, David Harvey
(2005) credits the explosive growth of the NGO sector
under neoliberalism with the rise of, “the belief that opposition
mobilized outside the state apparatus and within
some separate entity called ‘civil society’ is the powerhouse
of oppositional politics and social transformation”
(p. 78). Yet many of these NGOs are commanded by unelected
and elite actors, who are accountable primarily to
their chief sources of funds, which may include governments
and usually includes corporate donors and private
foundations. The broader point of importance is that this
rise of NGOs under neoliberalism is also the period in
which the concept of “civil society” has become central not
just to the formulation of oppositional politics, as Harvey
(2005, p. 78) argues, but also central to the modes of covert
intervention and destabilization openly adopted by the US
around the world. More on this just below, but first we
need to pause and focus on this emergence of “civil society”
as topic in the new imperialism.
The “Civil Society” of the New Imperialism:
Neoliberal Solutions to Problems
Created by Neoliberalism
There has been a growing popularization of “civil society,”
that James Ferguson, an anthropologist, even calls a “fad”.
Part of the growing popularity of this concept is tied to
some social scientists’ attraction to democratization, social
movements and NGOs, and even some anthropologists
have been inspired to recoup the local under the heading of
“civil society” (Ferguson, 2007, p. 383). The very notion of
INTRODUCTION 9
“civil society” comes from 18th-century European liberal
thought of the Enlightenment, as something that stood between
the state and the family. “Civil society” has been
universalized, with “little regard for historical context or
critical genealogy”:
“this new conception (of ‘civil society’ as the road to
democracy) not only met the political needs of the
Eastern European struggle against communist statism, it
also found a ready export market—both in the First
World (where it was appropriated by conservative
Reagan/Thatcher projects for ‘rolling back the state’)
and in the Third World…”. (Ferguson, 2007, p. 384)
Today “civil society” has been reconceived as the road
to democratization and freedom, and is explicitly promoted
as such by the US State Department. Whether from
the western left or right which have both appropriated the
concern for “civil society,” Ferguson argues that the concept
helps to legitimate a profoundly anti-democratic politics
(2007, p. 385).
The African state, once held high as the chief engine of
development, is now treated as the enemy of development
and nation-building (especially by western elites), constructed
as too bureaucratic, stagnant and corrupt. Now
“civil society” is celebrated as the hero of liberatory
change, and the aim is to get the state to become more
aligned with civil society (Ferguson, 2007, p. 387). Not only
that, the aim is to standardize state practices, so as to lessen
or remove barriers to foreign penetration and to increase
predictability of political outcomes and investment decisions
(see Obama, 2013/7/1).
In practice, most writers conceive of contemporary
“civil society” as composed of small, voluntary, grassroots
organizations (which opens the door, conceptually, to the
focus on NGOs). As Ferguson notes, civil society is largely
made up of international organizations:
“For indeed, the local voluntary organizations in Africa,
so beloved of ‘civil society’ theorists, very often, upon
inspection, turn out to be integrally linked with national
MAXIMILIAN C. FORTE10
and transnational-level entities. One might think, for
instance, of the myriad South African ‘community
organizations’ that are bankrolled by USAID or
European church groups; or of the profusion of ‘local’
Christian development NGOs in Zimbabwe, which may
be conceived equally well as the most local, ‘grassroots’
expressions of civil society, or as parts of the vast
international bureaucratic organizations that organize
and sustain their deletion. When such organizations
begin to take over the most basic functions and powers
of the state, it becomes only too clear that ‘NGOs’ are not
as ‘NG’ as they might wish us to believe. Indeed, the
World Bank baldly refers to what they call BONGOs
(Bank-organized NGOs) and now even GONGOs
(Government-organized NGOs)”. (Ferguson, 2007, p.
391).
That NGOs serve the purpose of privatizing state functions,
is also demonstrated by Schuller (2009) with reference
to Haiti. NGOs provide legitimacy to neoliberal
globalization by filling in the “gaps” in the state’s social
services created by structural adjustment programs
(Schuller, 2009, p. 85)—a neoliberal solution to a problem
first created by neoliberalism itself. Moreover, in providing
high-paying jobs to an educated middle class, NGOs serve
to reproduce the global inequalities created by, and required
by, neoliberal globalization (Schuller, 2009, p. 85).
NGOs also work as “buffers between elites and impoverished
masses” and can thus erect or reinforce “institutional
barriers against local participation and priority setting”
(Schuller, 2009, p. 85).
Thanks to neoliberal structural adjustment, INGOs and
other international organizations (such as the UN, IMF,
and World Bank) are “eroding the power of African states
(and usurping their sovereignty),” and are busy making
“end runs around these states” by “directly sponsoring
their own programs or interventions via NGOs in a wide
range of areas” (Ferguson, 2007, p. 391). INGOs and some
local NGOs thus also serve the purposes of neoliberal in-
terventionism.
INTRODUCTION 11
Trojan Horses: NGOs, Human Rights, and
Intervention to “Save” the “Needy”
David Harvey argues that “the rise of advocacy groups
and NGOs has, like rights discourses more generally, accompanied
the neoliberal turn and increased spectacularly
since 1980 or so” (2005, p. 177). NGOs have been called
forth, and have been abundantly provisioned as we saw
above, in a situation where neoliberal programs have
forced the withdrawal of the state away from social welfare.
As Harvey puts it, “this amounts to privatization by
NGO” (2005, p. 177). NGOs function as the Trojan Horses
of global neoliberalism. Following Chandler (2002, p. 89),
those NGOs that are oriented toward human rights issues
and humanitarian assistance find support “in the growing
consensus of support for Western involvement in the internal
affairs of the developing world since the 1970s”.
Moreover, as Horace Campbell explained,
“During the nineties military journals such as
Parameters honed the discussion of the planning for the
increased engagement of international NGO’s and by
the end of the 20th century the big international
NGO’s [like] Care, Catholic Relief Services, Save The
Children, World Vision, and Medicins Sans Frontieres
(MSF) were acting like major international corporations
doing subcontracting work for the US military”.
(Campbell (2014/5/2)2
Private military contractors in the US, many of them
part of Fortune 500 companies, are indispensable to the US
military—and in some cases there are “clear linkages between
the ‘development ‘agencies and Wall Street” as perhaps
best exemplified by Casals & Associates, Inc., a
subsidiary of Dyncorp, a private military contractor that
was itself purchased by Cerberus Capital Management for
$1.5 billion in 2010, and which received financing commitments
from Bank of America Merrill Lynch, Citigroup,
Barclays, and Deutsche Bank (Campbell (2014/5/2). Casals
declares that its work is about “international develop-
MAXIMILIAN C. FORTE12
ment,” “democracy and governance,” and various humanitarian
aid initiatives, in over 25 countries, in some instances
working in partnership with USAID and the State
Department’s Office of Transition Initiatives (Campbell
(2014/5/2).
In order for NGOs to intervene and take on a more
prominent role, something else is required for their work
to be carried out, in addition to gaining visibility, attracting
funding and support from powerful institutions, and
being well placed to capitalize on the opportunities created
by neoliberal structural adjustment. They require a “need”
for their work. In other words, to have humanitarian action,
one must have a needy subject. As Andria Timmer
(2010) explains, NGOs overemphasize poverty and stories
of discrimination, in order to construct a “needy subject”—
a population constructed as a “problem” in need of a “solution”.
The needs identified by NGOs may not correspond
to the actual needs of the people in question, but
need, nonetheless, is the dominant discourse by which
those people come to be defined as a “humanitarian project”.
To attract funding, and to gain visibility by claiming
that its work is necessary, a NGO must have “tales that inspire
pathos and encourage people to act” (Timmer, 2010,
p. 268). However, in constantly producing images of poverty,
despair, hopelessness, and helplessness, NGOs reinforce
“an Orientialist dialectic,” especially when these
images are loaded with markers of ethnic otherness
(Timmer, 2010, p. 269). Entire peoples then come to be
known through their poverty, particularly by audiences in
the global North who only see particular peoples “through
the lens of aid and need” (Timmer, 2010, p. 269). In the
process what is also (re)created is the anthropological
myth of the helpless object, one devoid of any agency at all,
one cast as a void, as a barely animate object through
which we define our special subjecthood. By constructing
the needy as the effectively empty, we thus monopolize
not only agency but we also corner the market on “human-
ity”.
INTRODUCTION 13
Humanitarian Imperialism as the
Globalization of Residential Schooling
In Canada, there have been official government apologies
for the abuses committed during the residential schooling
era (which lasted until 1996), plus monetary compensation,
and a truth and reconciliation commission that was constituted
and recently finished its work. Nonetheless the fundamental
ethos of residential schooling has not only been
preserved, it has been amplified into a template containing
the basic operating instructions for how to approach peoples
around the world who are understood to be inferior.
Such inferiority can be understood, for example, in the
way that other people’s governments, no matter how indisputably
democratic or legitimate they may be, are consistently
treated as if they were disposable.
Residential schooling in Canada and its counterpart
systems in Australia and the US, all intended to “save” Native
children, to “educate” and thus “improve” them, is reflective
of a classic settler state ideology of the late 1800s,
which emphasized evolutionary progress through assimilation.
It is not an unfamiliar ideology either, for those familiar
with the thinking behind “modernization” theory
and the basic thrust of international developmentalism.
What is interesting to note is that it is only out of these
same settler states that ideas of the “responsibility to protect”
(R2P) emerged and were propagated at the UN in recent
years. The main actors who articulated and advocated
for R2P have been primarily Canadian and Australian.
The globalization of residential schooling means that
certain basic working principles now constitute a template
that is applied to a broader set of international relations, as
well as revamped forms of counterinsurgency in foreign
military occupations. This template consists of the following
elements:
(a) the binary between racially and/or culturally differentiated
tutors and wards;
MAXIMILIAN C. FORTE14
(b) a process of abduction, understood broadly, and
exemplified by such phenomena as the international
traffic in non-western babies in the adoption
industry, to the re-implementation of the trusteeship
system, to the neoliberal destruction of stateregulated
economies and the military occupation of
other nations—thus the seizure of individuals and
nation-states, rendering them more or less captive
to agendas imposed by western powers; and,
(c) what is still essentially a civilizing mission cloaked
as “humanitarianism,” the defence of “human
rights,” or “democracy promotion”—that is, ideological
narratives and their corresponding practices
whose aim is sill that of “saving the natives from
themselves” and to prepare them for life in the
white man’s world (the “international community,”
or “the community of civilized nations”), so that
they may lead productive lives as law-abiding, well
mannered servants of the global capitalist econ-
omy.
What “abduction” can also mean is that in order for “us”
(the interventionists) to presume to “care” for little known
and even less understood strangers, these “others” must be
seen as living in a state of some sort of neglect and unfulfilled
need. That other thus becomes like an object that is
first “seized” so that it can be set free. That other is an object
set low within a hierarchy, one that resembles old cultural
evolutionist schemes where Europeans were always
at the top, and Africans locked far down below in a Paleolithic
time zone awaiting redemption. Western “humanitarianism”
thus works within an imperialist ideological
framework: that object—for example an Africa once again
imagined as a zone of ultimately helpless destitution—
needs our “protection” (we are the prime actors, they are
the terrain upon which we act). This requires that we do at
least two things that one would expect of imperialists.
First, we need to construct images of “Africa” as a dark
place of gaunt, hungry, pleading quasi-humans, where we
effectively open the door to ourselves, and usher ourselves
INTRODUCTION 15
in as their self-appointed saviours. This is not the same
thing as abduction in the form of kidnapping (not yet
anyway): it is more of a virtual abduction, an imaginary
capture that places “Africa” on a lower scale of welfare
and self-fulfillment, and implies our “duty” to rescue them
by “raising” them “up” to where we are. Second, we can
work to ensure that the material conditions of need are effectively
reproduced: we can do that with “aid,” with “investment”
(an odd word, because in practice it means
taking away), with “trade” (where the preconditions are
that Africans privatize themselves3), and with direct military
intervention to bomb back down to size any upstart
that threatens to guard his dignity (Libya). These too constitute
capture. And then there is actual capture: seizing
children, indicting “war criminals,” or inviting students to
come on over and “learn” like we do so that they can become
“educated”—or stay there, and let our students teach
you.
Two of the most widely read proponents of this application
of a neocolonial form of residential schooling, more
properly known in international law as “trusteeship” and
“conservatorship,” were Gerald B. Helman and Steven R.
Ratner, both of whom served in the US State Department
in different capacities at different points in their career. In
what is in many ways an intellectual continuation of Kaplan’s
“Coming Anarchy,” “Saving Failed States” by Helman
and Ratner not only posits the existence of such a
phenomenon as a “failed” state, they assert that it was
brought about by rapid decolonization since 1945 (Helman
& Ratner, 1992–1993). They frame their argument in terms
of risk and emergency, and demand: “something must be
done” (Helman & Ratner, 1992–1993, p. 3). Fortunately for
them, intervention does indeed constitute “something,” and
it is precisely the kind of “something” for which they were
looking.
Nations, they argue, need to be “saved” because selfdetermination
has been a failure (they would let the leader
assume it is largely due to internal inadequacies), especially
in Africa which becomes the primary focus of their
MAXIMILIAN C. FORTE16
article. They object, almost mock, the “states that achieved
independence after 1945,” who attach great and “almost
exaggerated” importance to the concept of sovereignty
(Helman & Ratner, 1992–1993, p. 9). What matters is “survivability”
and this only comes from external benefactors,
such as a suitably restructured UN which has increasingly
become a leading agent of neoliberal transformation (see
Cammack, 2006). If it seems like Helman and Ratner are
articulating something like a global application of the basic
template of residential schooling, as argued above, it is an
observation that is commended by their own wording:
“The conceptual basis for the effort [UN-led nationsaving]
should lie in the idea of conservatorship. In
domestic systems when the polity confronts persons
who are utterly incapable of functioning on their own,
the law often provides some regime whereby the
community itself manages the affairs of the victim.
Forms of guardianship or trusteeship are a common
response to broken families, serious mental or physical
illness, or economic destitution. The hapless individual
is placed under the responsibility of a trustee or
guardian, who is charged to look out for the best
interests of that person”. (Helman & Ratner, 1992–1993,
p. 12)
“The very fact that scholars and commentators are seriously
advocating this approach,” Ruth Gordon comments,
“is an indication of how negatively we view certain communities”
(1997, p. 907). As Gordon, a professor of international
law, further explains, advocacy such as that of
Helman and Ratner and other western “humanitarian interventionists”
is necessarily based on conceptions of infe-
riority:
“The ‘civilized’ nations of Europe and the United States
had the right to control their own destinies free of
foreign intrusion. The less civilized Asian and Latin
American States, however, were fair targets of
intervention. While this view has partially dissipated in
this century, ‘the power of intervention remains the
INTRODUCTION 17
power to stigmatize and political meaning is in large
measure rooted in historical memory’”. (Gordon, 1997,
p. 908 fn. 15)
The same binary applies to the military instruments
themselves: a US President can declare a “red line” against
the alleged use of chemical weapons in Syria, while still
using white phosphorous, depleted uranium, and various
cluster munitions in the US weapons stockpile. Poisoned
gas becomes the weapon of the “uncivilized,” and the
cruise missile the weapon of the “civilized”.
The basic operating premise is that “certain human beings,
who were predominately black and brown peoples,
were inferior to Europeans and simply incapable of governing
themselves” and this is part of the same baggage of
assumptions that, to varying degrees, “underlie current
paradigms to utilize forms of conservatorship” (Gordon,
1997, p. 909). The abductive narrative here is framed in a
manner that “makes this result seem logical and in the interest
of both the peoples of the Third World and their
kindhearted patrons in the West” (Gordon, 1997, p. 910).
Gordon goes even further, noting that the western tradition
on which international law itself was founded, a
tradition whose “underlying subcontext…was a belief in
racial and cultural inferiority”—indeed, the “very roots of
international law are mired in the heritage of colonialism”
(Gordon, 1997, p. 911 fn. 30). Again, the basic structural
logic of residential schooling comes back to the fore:
“Once it is determined that particular states have
‘failed,’ these states would be deemed victims and
incapable of managing their own affairs in much the
same way we view children as being incapable of
managing their own affairs. The international
community would then be designated to act on their
behalf”. (Gordon, 1997, p. 924)
Thus when we in Canada “apologize” for an institution
such as residential schooling, for what are we really apologizing?
What have we learned about ourselves and our ba-
MAXIMILIAN C. FORTE18
sic values and working assumptions? The answer to both
questions unfortunately appears to be: little or nothing.
We thus turn to the contributions by authors in this
volume which, I must stress, are not ordered in terms of a
rank based on their quality or importance, but are instead
grouped according to three broad themes. Part One thus
concentrates on the work of “doing good,” with a special
focus on NGOs and human rights. Part Two deals with the
creation of a state of exception in terms of global and domestic
political economy. Part Three involves what might
be termed the work of ideologically-informed cultural
mystification, where the chief opponents and targets of US
imperialism are profoundly demonized and thus dehumanized,
western troops are bestowed with a monumental
status as heroes, and, as we are taught, US military training
consists of teaching young Asian girls how to skip
rope. After all of this, can “humanitarianism” be redeemed?
I address this conclusion at the end of this chap-
ter.
Good Intentions, NGOs, and Violence
In Part 1, chapter 1, “Iatrogenic Imperialism: NGOs and
CROs as Agents of Questionable Care,” Émile St-Pierre examines
the role of NGOs and Contract Research Organizations
(CROs) in the formation and propagation of a
neoliberal paradigm in health care. As St-Pierre explains,
neoliberal policies beginning in the 1980s forced many
states to retract from health care provision. NGOs and
CROs have emerged as gap fillers in the wake of these policies.
The activities of NGOs and CROs in conjunction with
states and pharmaceutical corporations produce changes
in the everyday lives of people, offering new possibilities
for some at the same time that they dominate and classify
populations in new ways. NGOs, CROs and the actors
they are tied to, rely on patterns of illness and inequality to
continue existing, and securing revenues. Iatrogenic imperialism
is used by St-Pierre as an analytic to bring to light the
INTRODUCTION 19
way “good intentions,” expertise and humanitarianism
play into efficiency-driven, neoliberal configurations of
health care that fail to produce benefits for all, that undermine
public health systems and that tend to reproduce
global inequalities. In exploring the roles of lesser-known
but increasingly important actors in health care worldwide,
St-Pierre’s research critically analyzes some of the
newest phenomena in the neoliberal turn health care has
been experiencing and speaks to their penetration into the
everyday lives of people.
In chapter 2, “US Imperialism and Disaster Capitalism
in Haiti,” Keir Forgie details some characteristic actions of
the new, that is, US imperialism enforced upon Haiti leading
up to and following the earthquake of January 2010:
military and CIA intervention, the UN-administered
MINUSTAH occupation, US-funded NGOs, the militarization
of humanitarian aid. These tools of disaster capitalism
are all part of the new imperialism, Forgie argues. The US
military and CIA have repeatedly intervened against Haitian
sovereignty to impose US “democratic” systems that
favour neoliberalism. Meanwhile, MINUSTAH enforces
US objectives repressing free-speech and effectively acting
as a large gang, one opposed to supporters of the overthrown
president, Jean-Bertrand Aristide. NGOs, for their
part, provide a means through which the US can funnel
aid money and pursue self-interests while undermining
local authority. In addition, the militarization of humanitarian
aid in Haiti exemplifies a masked occupation under
the guise of altruistic rhetoric. And as Forgie argues,
predatory impositions of neoliberalism and corporate interests
that pushed through disaster capitalism serve to
subvert Haiti to a US means of production and sponge for
capital overflow. Each of these coercive methods ensures
US hegemonic globalization, acting as distinguishing features
of the new imperialism, Forgie explains.
In chapter 3, “Who Needs Me Most? New Imperialist
Ideologies in Youth Centred Volunteer Abroad Programs,”
Tristan Biehn examines the new imperial ideologies present
in narratives manufactured by the websites of youth-
MAXIMILIAN C. FORTE20
centred volunteer abroad organizations. These narratives
serve to instil neoliberal, capitalist understandings of the
issues of global inequality and poverty in prospective volunteers,
resulting in the depoliticization and decontextualization
of such issues. Biehn finds that ideas of “change”
and “good” are ubiquitous and yet are left undefined, that
claims of “helping” and “immersion” are questionable,
and that the utility of international student volunteering
lies not in the benevolent donation of unskilled western
youth labour to underprivileged communities, but in the
production of ideal neoliberal subjects. The nebulous concepts
of help and change are commodified and made the responsibility
of individuals—the prospective volunteers—
who are inundated with the message that actions taken to
end global inequality will also benefit them personally. As
Biehn explains, such programs contribute to the neoliberal
project of redirecting efforts from the pursuit of larger
structural changes or solutions to these issues.
Chapter 4 by Hilary King which is titled, “Queers of
War: Normalizing Lesbians and Gays in the US War Machine”
is a very welcome addition to the subject of gender,
sexuality, and corresponding ideas of rights that we first
introduced in Volume 3 (see Pas, 2013). In her chapter,
Hilary King begins by noting how at a recent Human
Rights Campaign (HRC) gala in Los Angeles, US VicePresident
Joe Biden, the keynote speaker of the evening,
claimed that the rights of LGBT people are an inseparable
part of America’s promotion of human rights around the
world. This speech exemplifies the ways in national sovereignty,
and whether or not any nation is deserving of it,
has come to be decided by the extent to which a given nation
accepts the gay and lesbian subject, King points out. In
the past decade, the US has become a vocal advocate for
the legal rights of LGBT subjects. Through the careful governance
of liberal mentalities, as King explains, the appropriation
of these rights by the US government has heavily
aided the US in forwarding its imperial war machine. By
relying on Jasbir Puar’s theoretical framework of
“homonationalism,” King’s chapter looks specifically at
INTRODUCTION 21
the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes
Prevention Act, the repealing of Don’t Ask Don’t Tell
(DADT), as well as the HRC, in order to explore the ways
in which sexuality has become a formation in the articulation
of proper US citizens.
The Political Economy of Exception
One of the defining features of the existence of a global dictatorship
(hegemon and superpower might be too “soft” in
this “human rights era” of invasions and occupations), is
where one state gets to set the rules by which others live,
while raising itself above those same rules. This leads to
the idea of the practiced reality of “American exceptionalism”
as an aspect of the global state of exception imposed
by the US—two “exceptions” in one, combining both the
ideas of emergency and primacy. In this respect, chapter 5,
“The International Economic Sovereignty of the United
States of America: Integrating the Exception to our Understanding
of Empire,” by Karine Perron, addresses the
scope of US capacity to influence and set out rules for international
economic policies, rules which it then ignores.
By examining cases concerning the IMF, the WTO, and
even the overthrow of governments, US advocacy of capitalism,
free trade, and democracy, each is contrasted with
situations in which the US made exceptions for its own
benefit. The significance of US power to decide on “the exception”
is discussed by Perron in relation to the strategy
of enlargement openly promoted by the Clinton administration
and pursued by subsequent US governments. As
economic growth has been added to the US definition of
national security, exceptions have become a permanent
feature of American foreign policy. Using Schmitt’s definition
of sovereignty as the power to decide on the exception,
Perron argues that this capacity of the US to decide
on exceptions regularly in the international economic
realm is significant of its international sovereignty, and its
intended supremacy. In these respects, Perron is raising
MAXIMILIAN C. FORTE22
some critical points of interest similar to those of Scheppele
(2013): with respect to international law, what the US does
by erecting itself as an exception is to create a rule from the
exception. The US works to distribute this law, and uses its
rule to extract and centralize gain. What Perron also does,
like Scheppele (2013), is to pay respect to the fact that apart
from a brief period when economic globalization seemed
to reign supreme, powerful states (such as the US) have
proceeded to seize back much of the power they had allegedly
lost or ceded. A demonstration of the synergy between
corporate empire and US empire takes us to the next
chapter.
In chapter 6, “Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Wage
Labour: The American Legislative Exchange Council and
the Neoliberal Coup,” Mathieu Guerin produces a fascinating
investigation and theoretical discussion of the American
Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC), a not-for-profit
organization that brings together corporate representatives
and state legislators—thus “marrying” both capital and the
state. Behind closed doors, Guerin reveals, the representatives
and legislators design and vote on model bills. Legislators
then bring the model bills home to their respective
assemblies and attempt to implement them. The corporate
members of ALEC are, in this way, empowered to change
citizen’s rights without interference from the federal government.
By fostering close ties with state legislators, these
corporations have the power to impose their vision of society
without recourse to military or police violence. Guerin
also investigates the connection between the character of
gentrification in San Francisco and the bullying might of
Silicon Valley’s ALEC-affiliated corporate technocracy.
This case study demonstrates how capital co-opts the existing
state structure as a mode of subjugation and repression.
Guerin’s research and analysis conclude that ALEC is
an organization that symbolizes a corporate imperium
rooted in the rise of neoliberalism in the early 1970s and
emerging within the established imperial state of the US.
An in-depth look at the infamous Powell memorandum
INTRODUCTION 23
reveals an imperialistic ideological continuity between its
conception in 1971 and ALEC itself.
Pariahs, Princes, and Playthings
John Manicom’s “The Terrorist, the Tyrant and the Thug:
‘Anti-Anti-Imperialism’ in American Media and Policy”
(chapter 7), is a powerful examination of the discursive
and narrative practices of US politicians and media with
regard to non-US opponents of US power. These US actors
generate catastrophizing discourse classifying phenomena
in politically advantageous ways and seeking to arouse
certain reactions to events. The types of evaluations and
reactions that occur in this discourse, Manicom observes,
are relatively predictable and based on the subject’s level
of cooperation with US power. The most negative evaluations
are assigned to states and sub-state groups which actively
oppose US power. Mainstream western media
operate from similar ideological perspectives to governments
and benefit from a privileged discursive position in
society allowing them to produce knowledge seen as generally
legitimate, as Manicom demonstrates throughout.
Their practices thus help to enable and sustain the narratives
of politicians in demonizing and dehumanizing opponents
and thus legitimating the often brutal practice of
US interventionism.
Chapter 8 by Laura Powell, “Glorification of the Military
in Popular Culture and the Media,” fits well between
Manicom’s and the final chapter of the volume. In this
chapter Powell argues that while our military members are
generally perceived as heroes, this romanticized perception
of the military is more damaging than it is helpful.
The mainstream media are part of the problem, Powell
shows, as news coverage of conflicts is often incomplete or
wrong, and based on an idealized version of the military
as an unstoppable humanitarian force, while failing to discuss
the terrifying realities of war. The PentagonHollywood
union also helps propagate this distorted view
MAXIMILIAN C. FORTE24
of the military. Perpetuating this view of the military
works to disadvantage the men and women affected by
PTSD as a result of their deployments and, Powell argues,
attracts potential recruits who may not be aware of the
dangers associated with enlisting. In some respects then,
Laura Powell is furthering this seminar’s long-standing interest
in “militainment”.
On that note, my chapter 9, “A Flickr of Militarization:
Photographic Regulation, Symbolic Consecration, and the
Strategic Communication of ‘Good Intentions’,” is based
on a study of the US Department of Defense’s Flickr photostream,
from 2009 through February of 2014, examining
a total of 9,963 photographs (with some key examples reproduced
in the chapter), and two dozen US military directives,
manuals, and guides on public diplomacy,
strategic communication, social media use, and photography.
Having said that, the analysis is not a quantitative
one; instead, the project builds on Pierre Bourdieu’s ideas
about regulated images, consecrated works, and the objectification
and codification of (militarized) values, as well as
the works of a number of visual anthropologists. Rather
than an activity that expresses the randomness of individual
imaginations, US military photographs register a pattern
that reflects the prevailing political norms of a given
social order. The patterns to be found among these thousands
of images is in fact quite regular, and makes a series
of clear points. This public engagement is carried out by
the Pentagon with a belief that a major part of “the battle”
is a “battle of the narrative,” one that takes place in the
public’s “cognitive space,” in what is has been termed
“Fourth Generation warfare”. These photographs are intended
to represent the US military as a humanitarian,
charitable organization, working among many communities
around the world that are populated by children who
are only too happy to be vaccinated and to skip rope with
US soldiers. Female US soldiers have smiling close encounters
with little girls, or cradle babies. When not displaying
pure, motive-less good intentions, the photographs also
produce a celebration of the awesome power and sophisti-
INTRODUCTION 25
cation of US military technology: jets flying in formation,
shiny drones illuminated at night like alien UFOs, lines of
massive ships at sea, etc. Yet, there are virtually no images
of actual combat. The photographs collectively portray a
world rendered frictionless by the speed and ubiquity of
American power and technology. In addition, by being
studiously depoliticized, the photographs produce a political
effect, for political purposes—they do not tell the
horror stories of war, of blood shed and lives lost, of destruction
and grief, but rather portray something like a
birthday party, with a cycle of endless family reunions.
However, as the Pentagon understands that every action is
potentially a message, and there is an unresolved tension
between “perception effects” and military planning, strategic
communication in the form of disseminating photographs
through social media faces ultimate pitfalls.
About Those Good Intentions
There are many valid and unimpeachable reasons why
students, for example, might be considering humanitarian
work and/or working for a NGO. There is no gainsaying
that many students have genuine, sincere, and heartfelt
reasons for coming to the aid of others: those who come
from privileged backgrounds might feel the need to “give
back”; those who come from backgrounds of struggle
might be determined to lessen the burden of disadvantage
on others like them. Having read chapters such as the ones
in this volume, or several others, and having been asked to
question their beliefs in the value of humanitarian aid or
even foreign intervention to prevent atrocities, they might
be left wondering whether all forms of altruism are to be
forsaken. I would say: not so fast. The real challenge now
is to question our assumptions and envision or acknowledge
existing alternatives that further solidarity, collaboration,
and reciprocity without the paternalism and
Eurocentrism of the “white man’s burden”.
MAXIMILIAN C. FORTE26
One way to proceed is by questioning why helping
others should lead to work abroad. Do you really have any
special skills to offer other than the ability to articulate
good intentions? Has your assistance been requested by
those who would presumably benefit from it? How well
do you understand a different society that you can permit
yourself to undertake potentially transformative action?
What are your motives, and do you think the organization(s)
you support, or for which you work, share the same
motives? If it is a question of solidarity, is the solidarity
spontaneous and one-sided, or the product of actual dialogue
and mutual understanding? Why would you not
choose to work at home, where presumably you are not a
stranger, nor an intruder? Indeed, this last question is one
that gains salience particularly with anthropology students.
Frustrated with what they perceive as their inability
to change the politics of their own nation, some feel that
they might make more of an impact in a different nation
(Mathers, 2010, p. 169). Yet this assumes that other societies
are less complex, easier to change and even receptive
to outsiders bringing about change for them. If one feels
that Africa is oppressed, then why assume that is to Africa
that one must go, rather than work at home to change the
policies of one’s country, for example, supporting debt
forgiveness, challenging unjust trade and aid policies, reining
in your corporations, or pushing for the demilitarization
of the foreign relations of one’s own country? It is
important not to assume that others are simply waiting for
a stranger to come and lead them, like a Hollywood tale of
the usual white messiah who is always the hero of other
people’s stories. Ifi Amadiume—an African feminist who
noted that, increasingly, Black women had begun to expose
the racism in the women’s movement and accused
western feminists of “a new imperialism” (1987, p. 4)—
relates to us a story of a young anthropologist in a seminar
in which she participated:
“I asked a young White woman why she was studying
social anthropology. She replied that she was hoping to
INTRODUCTION 27
go to Zimbabwe, and felt that she could help women
there by advising them how to organize. The Black
women in the audience gasped in astonishment. Here
was someone scarcely past girlhood, who had just
started university and had never fought a war in her life.
She was planning to go to Africa to teach female
veterans of a liberation struggle how to organize! This is
the kind of arrogant, if not absurd attitude we encounter
repeatedly. It makes one think: Better the distant
armchair anthropologists than these ‘sisters’”.
(Amadiume, 1987, p. 7)
A second set of questions has to do with whether charity
is the best expression for one’s altruism. This raises
other questions especially when we turn to charity at
home. Why is it that in a society such as Canada’s where
virtually every activity, positive or negative, is taxed, we
are called upon more and more to give to charity? Rather
than mobilize to “raise awareness” about the homeless (as
if we were unaware of them), why do we not instead mobilize
the same numbers of those giving to charity to combat
austerity? Why should taxes not go to feeding our
hungry fellow citizens, instead of into funds to provide
“incentives” for corporate investors or into military expenditures
so we can bomb Libya? Indeed, by taking up
the social welfare slack, are we not facilitating the state in
increasing the power of the wealthy, in further militarizing
our international relations, and in increasing inequality at
home? Sure enough, without presenting heaps of documentary
evidence and considering all of the implications,
these questions may appear simple, or too ingenuous.
Nonetheless, is it acceptable that we do not at least ask
such questions to begin with?
A third bundle of questions has to do with supporting
intervention in another country to supposedly prevent or
stop mass violence. Assuming that one is in possession of
accurate information, that the information does not come
filtered through or created by vested interests, and that
one possesses the ability to fairly interpret such information
in the historical and cultural context of a given politi-
MAXIMILIAN C. FORTE28
cal conflict—something that daunts most “experts”—then
which instrument is best suited to end such violence?
Whose army, navy and air force are you calling on to carry
out your good intentions? Do militaries ever act in the absence
of other political and economic agendas or are they
answerable only to your personal concerns? What other
agendas are facilitated by military intervention, such that
the “cure” can end up being worse than the “illness”? How
is war consistent with the defense of human rights? How
do you avoid the risk of prolonging, widening and further
militarizing a local political conflict by intervening militarily?
Are you prepared for the aftermath of intervention,
and what degree of responsibility and accountability are
you prepared to shoulder? Should you feel comfortable in
calling for the sacrifice of the lives of your own soldiers,
and inevitably of civilians in another country, while you
remain physically detached from the conflict? Are you
prepared to intervene in all situations of conflict where
human rights are endangered, or is it just some, and if so
why just some? Which is the “lesser evil” that you are prepared
to live with and to justify: is it the survival of a local
regime that you consider to be a “dictatorship,” or the survival
and reinforcement of a global imperial dictatorship
that seeks any justification to renew and assert its military
dominance? These are just some of the first questions we
need to ask. We should, if we are being honest with ourselves,
also consider other norms and practices, such as
Cuba’s socialist internationalism. In the latter case, no
permanent military bases resulted from Cuba coming to
the aid of Angola; Cuban assistance was requested and
mutually understood as an act of solidarity; there was no
lucrative, extractive gain as a result of Cuba mobilizing to
send troops and doctors to Angola; and, Angola’s sovereignty
was not undermined, rather it was defended by
Cuba. Therefore, a consideration of the stakes, aims, methods,
and the whole politics of intervention need to be
clearly thought out and articulated. What there should not
be is any more of the reflex “cries”: “something must be
done,” “we cannot stand idly by,” and so forth—complex
INTRODUCTION 29
situations require maturity and political acumen, not trivial
passion.
A final set of questions concerns the prospect of a
graduating student working for a NGO. As I tell seminar
participants, no one will benefit from their starving and
being homeless; no argument will be “won,” or should be
won, at the cost of their own suffering. Life in a capitalist
society is always full of compromises, such that an extrasystemic
stance of total purity is unattainable. As a professor,
I should know all about complicity: working in an institution
essential to the training of new capitalist cadres,
with multiple ties to all sorts of corporate interests, under
neoliberal management, and even tied to the military and
military industries. The point then is not to automatically
forego the chance of earning an income in what is possibly
one of the few major growth industries left in the west—
that of the NGO complex—but to perhaps treat such employment
strategically, as a stepping stone perhaps, where
one acts as a critical insider, not allowing oneself to be digested
by the system, and always being ready to expose
hypocrisies and injustices as they arise. One should also be
sober about envisioning change purely by individual
means. “What am I to do” and “what can I change” are
always flawed questions because they first assume the centrality
of individual action, when transformation can only
ever be achieved collectively.
Inevitably (because it always happens) students and
others will doubt the value of studies in this area, feeling
that such work is not practical or applicable, and that it
lacks a “real world” extension—we need to “do”. It is true
that in sociology and anthropology we lack courses on
fundraising, writing brochures, community canvassing, or
installing electrical wiring and performing dental work—
and that is not a problem. We do not need to try to do everything,
and students with such interests and motivations
need not see sociology and anthropology as terminal
points of qualification. Courses in carpentry and financial
management are always available to those who are interested.
Yet, this is still not a satisfactory way of addressing
MAXIMILIAN C. FORTE30
the disquiet. The disquiet is itself rooted in a limited understanding
and appreciation of what we really do, by first
of all divorcing thought from action, and secondly not realizing
that it is often thinking itself that is a woefully absent
or minimized action in our society. Certain norms of
action in our society are taken for granted, and held as unquestionable,
in part because few are those who challenge,
criticize, unthink and rethink what is done (military intervention,
capitalist development, individualistic consumerism,
etc.), and why it is done. It’s the generalized absence
of such real questioning that precludes the possibility of
real debate and consideration of alternatives. Changing
what is considered to be unthinkable and unspeakable is itself
a form of practical action, arguably of the most essential
kind.
The intention here was not to provide some easy blueprint,
or a map of safe or recommended options. The aim
was also not to have students abandon their own good intentions.
The method is instead one that asks students:
what are your good intentions, what makes them good,
and how do you put your intentions into practice? Whose
roads are paved by your good intentions, and where do those
roads lead?
Notes
1 From Duke University Libraries’ “NGO Research Guide” archived
at:
http://web.archive.org/web/20100611063147/http://librar
y.duke.edu/research/subject/guides/ngo_guide/igo_ngo_c
oop/ngo_wb.html.
2 This brought back a slightly ironic realization. While Montgomery
McFate, the anthropologist who worked as the senior
social scientist of the US Army’s Human Terrain System,
argued that anthropologists would anthropologize the military
by joining HTS, dismissing claims that they would
make anthropologists seem like US military agents (even
though in uniform, and some carrying weapons), her own
husband was saying something different at the same time.
INTRODUCTION 31
Sean McFate told Voice of America that many NGOs and
many people in USAID were “leery” of working with
AFRICOM or any US military organization “because it
might impugn their neutrality or their impartiality which
they depend on for their own protection when they’re working
in countries” (Taylor, 2009/11/1).
3 In this regard I am referring to the African Growth and Opportunity
Act (AGOA), first instituted by US president
George W. Bush: http://trade.gov/agoa/.
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