Self, Social Structure, and Beliefs
Explorations in Sociology
EDITFD BY
Jeffrey C. Alexander, Gary T. Marx, and Christine L. Williams
1 NIYKRSITY Or CALIFORNIA PRKSS llriluliy    I aw ;\>lgulfs liindim
CONTENTS
University of California Press Berkeley and Los Angeles. California
University of California Press, Ltd. Ixindon, England
© 2004 by die Regents of the University of California
Library of Congress Catahiging-iii-Piiblication Data
Self, social structure, and beliefs: explorations in sociology / edited byJeffrey C. Alexander, Gary T. Marx, and Christine L. Williams
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index. Isen 0-580-24136-3 (he : acid-free)—isE\ o-^m^f^-i (pb : acid-free)
1. Social structure.   2. Sociology.   3. Sociology—Philosophy. I. Alexander, Jeffrey C.   II. Marx, Gary T.   III. Williams, Christine L., «959-
HM70Ö.S445 2004
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1.   Mastering Ambivalence:
Neil Smelser as a Sociologist of Synthesis
Jeffrey C. Alexander. Gary T. Marx, ant! Christine I... Williams   / 1
PART l: SELF
Introduction
Christine. L. Williams   / /;
a.   The Sociological Eye and die Psychoanalytic Ear \:ancy j. Chodoro
3. The Commodity Frontier
Artie Russell Hochschild /
4. The Glass Cage:
Flexible Work, Fragmented Consumption, Fragile Selves Yiannis Gabriel   / 5-
PART II: SOCIAL STRUCTURE
Introduction
Gary T. Marx   / --
-,.   Rational Choice and Sociology AWerto Martinelli   / S2
(i.   Enlisting Smelser's Theory of Ambivalence to Maintain Progress in Sociology of Religion's New Paradigm it. Str/iliin Warner   / itij
7.    ( .111 nils of < loltllllCH'C
1 'it'ltlUrl . \ /I'll ^1' I I.:.'
8. Trust as an Aspect of Social Structure
Robert Wuthnou)   / 14$
9. The Organizational Foundations of University Capability: Differentiation and Competition in the Academic Sector of Society
Burton H. Clark   / r$$
PART Hi: BELIEFS
Introduction
Jeffrey C, Alexander   / icji
m. Primordial Beliefs and Immigration Policy: The Case of Britain's Patrials Christian jopphe   / ;yj
11. Causal Reasoning, Historical Logic, and Sociological Explanation
Lyn Spillman   / 216
12. Intellectual Cycles of Social Movement Research: From Psychoanalysis to Culture?
James M. Jasper   / 214
13. Shaping Sociological Imagination: The Importance of Theory
Piotr Sztompka   / 254
LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS    / £$g INDEX     / 2T}
Chapter 1
Mastering Ambivalence
Neil Smelser as a Sociologist of Synthesis Jeffrey C. Alexander, Gary T. Marx, and Christine L. Williams
Future historians will write about Neil Smelser as an iconic figure in twentieth-century sociology's second half. Smelser has had an extraordinarily active career not onlv as a scholar but also as a teacher and organizational leader. Every participant in this volume has proudly been a "Smelser student" in one form or another. The distinction of these contributions speaks directly to Smelser's power as a teacher. His immensely impressive and varied performances as organizational leader are perhaps less well known, but ihev speak equally Clearly of scholarly power exercised in a more political manner. His roles have included being advisor to a siring of University of California chancellors and presidents; referee of the nation's most significant scientific training and funding programs, from the National Science Foundation to the departments of leading universities: organizer of the Handbook of Sociology and the new International Encyclopedia of the Social and behavioral Sciences; and, most recently, director of the Center for Advanced Siudv in the Behavioral Sciences.
In many respects, both Neil Smelser and the social sciences matured together in the second half of the last century, Smelser expanded his areas 1 if research to include sociology, psychology, economics, and history at the same time that newly synthetic cross-disciplinarv programs, area studies, and applied programs appeared. Through his work with commissions and foundations and as a spokesperson for the social sciences, he sought a greater public role for sociology and helped to foster the gradual infiltration of their findings and methods into other disciplines, practical settings, and popular 1 uliui r. .Smelser's early interest in comparative international studies anticipated 1 heir expansion, an increase in international collaboration, and gieaiei awareness of globalization issues. His move from optimism about I it im 1 i\ist ippi 11.11 lies and lii m lion al ism in I lie 1 <)r,os to a more guarded opti-
Chapter 13 Shaping Sociological Imagination
The Importance of Theory Piotr Sztmnpka
I had my first taste of sociological theory in Neil J. Smelser's graduate class at Berkeley in 197^-1973. Following on the themes already developed in his Essays in Sociological Explanation (1968), he discussed the works of the greai classical scholars: Karl Marx, Max Weber, Emile Dürkheim, and Alexis dc Tocqueville. It struck me immediately that he was not just contemplating, commenting on, or analytically dissecting them. Instead he was using them, trying to unravel the structure and logic of their theoretical explanation of concrete issues: social inequality in ihe case of Marx, power in the case ol Weber, cultural cohesiveness in the case of Dürkheim, and the functioning of democracy in the case of Tocqueville. It was the ability to explain such crucial social issues that made them great sociologists, because theory, in theii view, and clearly in the view of Smelser, was empirically and historically rooted general explanation. It was, as Smelser was defining it, "an enterprise of accounting for regularities, variations, and interdependencies among tin-phenomena identified within the sociological frameworks" {1968: -,5).
1 looked up Smelser's own major theoretical contribution, Theory of Col lective Behavior (1963), and found the same focus on explanation, but not jusi any explanation. He put forward a dynamic explanatory model incorporating a temporal dimension in the "value-added sequence." According to his model, the necessary preconditions for episodes of collective behavior 01 social movements cumulatively emerge in stages: from structural con-duciveness; to structural strain, initiating events, spread of generalized beliefs, and attempts at social control; to the emergence of the explained social phenomenon. This account, "logical patterning of social detcrnn nants, each contributing its 'value' to the explanation of the episode" (i<|(iS: 99), was obviously the realization ol Smelser's creed (hat "sociological expl.i nation consists in bringing rotisiiu< inms Midi as hvpoihescs. model* and
SHAPING SOCIOLOGICAL IMAGINATION
SSI
theories to bear on factual statements" (58). This theory was causal, empirical, genetic, and operational and demonstrated forcefully that social facts do not exist statically but are in a state of continual emergence, "social becoming," as I later called it (Sztompka 1991)- To this day Smelser's model is an exemplar of what sociological explanation (that is, sociological theory) should look like.
Soon after my Berkeley class, I had the opportunity to study under two other American theorists who, in spite of basic differences in the orientation and substance of their theories, seemed to share with Smelser the focus on explanation. One was Robert K. Merton, who put forward his influential program of middle-range theory to resolve the dilemma between abstract "grand theory," seen in Talcott Parsons's style, and the narrow-empirical data gathering, which dominated some subdisciplines of sociology. The other theorist was George Homans, with his critique of Parsonian functionalism in the name of the covering-law model of explanation, borrowed from Carl Hempel's classic logical work. Both Merton and Homans were trying to show what sociological explanation—that is, sociological theory—should look like.
1 have become more and more convinced that explanatory theory is the most important, illuminating, and useful aspect of that vast and multifaceted enterprise that runs today under the label of theory. In my sociological education, and later my own academic work, it was explanatory theory that turned out to be crucial. In this chapter, 1 argue why explanatory theon should remain in the forefront of sociological teaching and not he put aside by some other, trendy modes of theorizing.
THE E D Ľ CAT I OX AI. l-OCCS; SOCIOLOGICAL IMAGINATION
The education of sociologists has four aims: (1) to teach the language of the discipline, a set of concepts with which social reality is understood, (2) to develop a particular vision, a perspective from which social reality is approached, (3) to train in the methods, procedures, and techniques of empirical inquiry, and (4) to provide information about main facts and data concerning contemporary social life. Let us put the points 1 and 2—language and perspective—under one label, "sociological imagination," borrowed from the classic book Sociological Imagination by C. Wright Mills. He explains the notion as follows: "The sociological imagination enables us to grasp historv and biography and the relation between the two within society" (1 i|r,«): ••). Let us elaborate the full meaning of this statement and extend dre (oncepl bevoud Mills's insight.
I consider sm iological imagination to be a complex skill or abilitv made npol I'm- 1 Dtnponriits. im"hiding the abilities to (1) sec all social phenom-in.i ,is j n ■ id u i i<l 1>\ soiiH  soi      ageitis, individual or collective, and to
2$6 BELIEFS
identify those agents, (2) understand deep, hidden, structural, and cultural resources and constraints that influence social life, including the chances foi agential efforts (as Mirra Komarovsky puts it, "It takes patient training of the sociological sight to enable the students to perceive the invisible social strut race" [1951]),. (3) recognize the cumulative burden of tradition, the pei sisting legacies of the past, and their continuing influence on the preseni. (4) perceive social life m its incessant, dynamic, fluid process of "social becoming" (Sztompka 1991), and (5) recognize the tremendous variety and diversity of the forms in which social life may appear. Everett Hughes defines one of the main goals of sociological education: "The emancipation through expansion of one's world by penetration into and comparison with the world of other people and other cultures is not the only aspect of sociology al imagination. . . . But it is one great part of it, as it is of human life itseii" (jqjo: 16).
To put it another way: Sociological imagination is the ability to relate am thing that happens in a society to a structural, cultural, and historical con text and to the individual and collective actions of societal members, retoj; nizing the resulting variety and diversity of social arrangements. Mills gn. , us an example:
One result of reading- sociology ought to be to learn how to read a newspaper. To make a sense of a newspaper—which is a very complicated thing—one mnsi learn how to connect reported events, how to understand them by relating them to more general conceptions oi' the societies of which they are token-, and the trends of which the}' arc a part. . . . My point is sociology is a way ol going beyond what we read to the newspaper. It provides a set of conceptions and questions that help us to do this. If it does not, then it has failed as part ol liberaleducation- (i960; 1(5-17)
Teaching sociology cannot be limited to sociology in books. It must beyond that toward sociology in life, allowing deeper interpretation, bcii< 1 understanding of everything that surrounds us. As another classical authoi Robert Park, emphasizes, "When there is no attempt to integrate the tliiu;; learned in the schoolroom with the experience and problems of actual lii< learning tends to become mere pedantry—pedantry which exhibits itsell 111 a lack of sound judgement and in a lack of that kind of practical mid. . standing we call common sense" (1937: 25). Mirra Komarovsky makes th same point: "There is no greater educational danger than this: thai (he si 11 dents learn the sociological concepts on a purely formal verbal level will) toil the richness and fullness of meaning; that this body of words remains a m< ■ ile segment of mentality, relatively unrelated to the conht.se«I stream ol hi< which it sought to interpret" (1945).
I consider the training of the sociological imagination, :ui»| tin- skill in apply it to concrete problems, ol social hie. m Ik- absolutely < 111; ,.\\ U» tin
shaping sociological imagination 2}j
education of sociologists, both those who think about academic careers and those who go on to practice-oriented professions.
SOCIOLOGICAL IMAGINATION AND THEORETICAL RESOURCES To a great extent, training the sociological imagination is synonvmous with training in sociological theory. However, this is not in the sense of memorizing names, schools, definitions, and arguments, but rather in the sense of using theorv—that is, referring to concrete experience, looking at the current problems in the surrounding society, its dilemmas and opportunities. It also applies to our personal biographies and life chances. Sociological imagination should provide a map to ensure a better orientation in the chaos of events, change, and transformation. It should give us a deeper understanding, more thorough enlightenment, and, in this way, provide more opportunities for informed, rational life and sound practice. In this chapter 1 review the resources for such indispensable theoretical training that we possess in the sociological tradition, as well as in recent social theory.
One huge pool of theoretical ideas is found in the history of the discipline, from the early nineteenth century onward. Teaching the historv of sociology' is not an antiquarian pastime. The tradition of our discipline is still extremely vital. Most of the concepts, models, issues, and queries that yve study today have been inherited from the nineteenth-century masters. They put solid foundations under the sociological enterprise, and their work is still verv much alive. They should be studied, not in a historical or biographical wav, but in the context of our time, as their seminal ideas throw light on our present realities. Of course they must be studied critically and selectively, because not all have left ait equally relevant heritage. My personal selection includes, of course, the "big three": Weber, Durkheim, and Marx—the true undisputed giants of sociology—as well as Augttste Comte, Herbert Spencer, Georg Simmel, Ferdinand Toennies, Vilfredo Pareto, Alexis de Tocqneville, Charles Cooley, William Sumner, and George H. Mead. Reading and rereading them are crucially important to discovering new insights and questions and formulating sociological problems by entering into a sort of dialogue with them to assess our own ideas. Perhaps most important, they can show us the best models for intellectual work. As Robert Merton puts it, "Exposure
10 such penetrating sociological minds as those of Durkheim and Weber helps us to form standards of taste and judgement in identifying a good sociological problem—one that has significant implications for theory—and to learn what constitutes an apt theoretical solution to the problem. The classics an- what Salvemini liked to call 'libri fecondatori'—books that sharpen the faculties of exacting readers who give them their undivided attention" (in S/ioiupka ii)t)(>a: 31-32). There is one additional benefit: the sindeui
11 -ai us 1 hat 1 he social world is multidimensional and rvlientelv complex, and
I Ii
2y8
that it therefore requires manv approaches to understand it. Studying the history of sociological theories is a great lesson in theoretical pluralism, tolerance for variety, and diversity of perspectives, and the best medicine against narrow-minded dogmatism and orthodoxy.
But let us leave sociological tradition, as mv main focus here is current sociological theory and its relevance for teaching. I argue that we have foui types of theorv and theorizing in contemporary sociology, and that they are of"unequal importance for educational purposes in training the sociological imagination. In order of diminishing importance, I discuss explanatory the on-, heuristic theory, analytic theory, and exegetic theorv. This classification partly overlaps with the triple distinction of "theories of," presupposition;il studies, and hermeneutical dicory as proposed by Jeffrey Alexander (1998b 1 But his preferential order is different from mine, and he does not recogni/e my third category: analytic theory.
THEORETICAL BOOM
In general, the last decade of the twentieth century was a good time for son ological theory. Only half a century ago, in the middle of the twentieth ecu tury, there wTas a lot of talk about the crisis of sociological theory (e.g., Gould ner 1971). Even quite recently, a rather pessimistic appraisal was given In Alexander, who perceived diminishing influence of sociological theory in the recent period, both within the discipline and without, accompanied \ t\ the growing importance of theoretical work in economics, philosophy, ami literary studies (1988a). But now the situation seems to have changed. I share the opinion of a British sociologist, Gerard Delanty: "Social theon i-. in a position of great strength at the moment" (1998: 1).
To support this claim; I offer some institutional or organizational fails The Research Committee on Theory (RC 16), which I founded together wiili Jeffrey Alexander in 1986, has grown to become one of the biggest of iiium than fifty committees of the International Sociological Association. In tin American Sociological Association (ASA), the theory section is one of the largest groups. During the last decades of the century, the circulation 1.1 theoretical journals dramatically increased, and many new titles appeared Theory, Culture, and Society; European journal of Social Theory; Sociological lh ory (published by the ASA); and Theory and Society. A new publication, (11111 nal of Classical Sociology, has been launched bv Sage under the editorship ul Brvan Turner. A number of major compendia of theoretical knowledge ha> ■ come out: Polity Reader in Social Theory (1994), Blackwel! (UiuifMnihu U< ,SV« ml Theory (199b), Major Social Thmrish (201x1). and ikiiiiikttili "/ Vr» ml I'In m \ (2000). New monographs are taking sun k ol rum-til litem \: lm example Patrick Bai'rt's Social riieni v 111 lh- lu'ru/icl/i (yiilm v ( m|(|S) ant I [oil 11 Ss it'll"', StU'ioUlj*ii nl llicni y; < jiiih 111 jit 11 m v / hint I, s { up):,). M.ijoi publishers, n n ludini*
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Polity Press, Cambridge University Press, and Sage, put out rich lists of theoretical work, both classical and recent, including important book series: for example, Cambridge Cultural Social Studies (edited bv Jeffrey Alexander and Steven Seidman). All around the world, there are theoretical conferences focusing on theoretical issues, including for example, "Reappraising Theories of Social Change" at Montreal (2000) and "New Sources of Critical Theory" at Cambridge (2000).
It is notable that theory has returned to its cradle, to Europe, after a long detour to North America (Nedelman and Sztompka 1993). Of course, apart from the continuing influence and presence of the "old guard"—Robert K. Merton, Neil Smelser, Seymour M. Lipset, Lewis Coser, Peter Blau, and odv ers—a number of influential theorists from the younger generation work and publish in the United States, including Jeffrey Alexander, Randall Collins, Craig Calhoun, and Jonathan Turner, to mention just a few. But Britain, France, and Germany currently provide the most fertile grounds for original theoretical work. As Neil Smelser admits, "In fact, in the past 50 years, the center of gravity- of general theoretical thinking has shifted from the United States to Europe, and this shift is represented in the works of scholars like Alain Touriue, Pierre Bourdieu, Jürgen Habermas, Niklas Luh-mann, and Anthony Giddens. Much of current theoretical thinking in the US stems from the influence of these figures on faculty- and graduate students" (1990: 47-48). From the European side, this is echoed by Bryan Turner, who predicts, "European social theory may once more emerge to evolve to a new-form of domination in the world development of social theory" (1996b: 16).
EXPLANATORY THEORY
How- can the above-mentioned facts and tendencies be interpreted? Sticking to the old, traditional opposition of "theory versus research" or "theoretical versus empirical sociology" (as exemplified by the Parsons-Merton debate in 1947 at the annual ASA convention; see Merton 1948) could lead one to conclude that the ascent of theory indicates a shift from research to scholasticism and the realm of pure ideas. In other words, empirical research is abandoned and real social problems and concrete social facts are ignored. In fact, nothing could be farther from the truth. The impressive reputation of theory is due to the fact that it won its way into all domains of empirical sociology, found a place in all specialist areas of sociology, and has finally become accepted as a valid and necessary component of sociological research. The separation of theory and research is no longer feasible. Instead we witness a pi i alteration of theories dealing w-ith various substantive social problems and issues.
Theorists and researchers now meet halfway. Most theorists no longer pursue piiieh abstract ideas, but are looking at real problems: globalization.
260
identity, risk, trust, civil society, democracy, new forms of labor, social exclu sion, cultural traumas, and so on. At the same time, empirical researchers m > longer confine themselves to fact-finding and data-gathering bul propov models, generalizations of their domains informed by accumulated research: theories of deviance, collective behavior, social movements, eili nicity, mass media, social capital, postmaterialist values, and so on. E>i example, the Handbook of Sociology, bv Stella Quah and Arnaud Sales (2000) which sums up the state of the art in various sociological subdisciplines, in fact includes a considerable amount of theorv in each chapter. The taeaH illustrates that dieorv is coming closer to addressing real social problems, ns opposed to esoteric sociological problems—that is, the problems expci 1 enced by common people as opposed to the professional concerns of so< 1 ologists. Theory can provide explanations of pressing social issues by gen crating more or less directly testable hypotheses and can thus influent < more people in society by providing them with guidelines for thinking ami mental maps of specific domains of their social life-world.
This first theoretical approach can be labeled 'explanatory theory." Ii represents what Bryan Turner calls a "strong program" for theorv (1996b: I i > First, we must ask three questions about a theory: It is a theory of what, 1m what, and for whom? A theorv of what? Of real social problems: vvhv mon crime, why new social movements, why poverty, why ethnic revival? Acconl ing Merton, Smelser, Bourdieu, and Bryan Turner, theory should grow 0111 of research and he directed toward research. "For theoretical contribution-to be worthwhile, they need to be question-driven" (Baert 1998: 20a). "So< i.il theorv thrives and survives best when it is engaged with empirical reseat< Ii and public issues" (Turner 1996b: v>). A theory for what? For providim; explanations, or at least models allowing better organization of dispersi <\ facts and phenomena, and interpretation of multiple and varied events and phenomena. A theory for whom? Not only for fellow theorists but also fm common people, to provide them with an orientation, enlightenment, ami understanding of their condition. An important role of theories is to "infoi in democratic public discourse" (Calhoun 1996: 429). This role will beconx even more pronounced as more societies become democratic, and even more in a "knowledge society" of the future, composed of informed, cdu cated citizens who care about public issues, and where democracy takes .1 form of "discursive democracy" (Dryzek 1990).
One can formulate a hvpothesis in the framework of the "sociology "I knowledge": the driving force behind the developments in expinnatorv the ory are found in rapid, radical, and overwhelming social change. We an experiencing the next "great transition" (to paraphrase Karl Tolanvi). 11» ories are especially in demand in limes of change. Theit is pi r.ssui <■ on s<>< 1 ologists from both the common people and politicians to piovidr evpkm.i tionsof the chaos. F.vorvoiir wants to know when- we have < ittnr hunt, ulna r
SHAPING SOCIOLOGICAL IMAGINATION
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we are, and where we are going; Facts and data alone cannot answer such questions. Only generalized explanatory models can provide an overall view. "Nothing presses this theoretical venture on us more firmly than the experience of historical change and cross-cultural diversity" (Calhoun 1996:
431)-
Teaching explanatory theories is, in my opinion, the most important goal of sociological education, and particulars so in periods of overwhelming social change. This kind of theory provides the strongest stimulus in developing die sociological imagination, as it links theorizing with concrete experience.
HEURISTIC THEORY Let us move on to a second kind of theoretical approach: theoretical orientation, or what I call a heuristic theory (not directly testable but useful in generating relevant concepts, images, and models). It is closest to social philosophy, and particularly the ontology or metaphvsics of the social world, as it attempts to answer three perennial ontological questions about the constitution of social reality: What are the bases of social order? What is the nature of human action? And what is the mechanism and course of social change? Such questions have been addressed by al! classical founders of sociology. Good examples of the classical orientations dominating in the middle of the last centui \, which attempted to deal with such issues, were suuctural functionalism, symbolic interactionism, exchange theorv, and Marxism. Since then, several new trends have emerged, which I discuss later.
What are the characteristics of this kind of theorv? Again, let us ask our three questions. Theory of what? Of the foundations of social reality, it poses questions not of "vvhv" but of "how": How is social order possible (how do social wholes exist: how do people live together, cooperate, cohabit)? How is social action carried out? How does social change proceed? Theory for what? For the conceptual framework for more concrete explanatory theoretical work, for sensitizing us to specific types of variables, for suggesting strong categories to help us grasp the varied and dispersed facts. Theory for whom? Mostlv for researchers building explanatory models of specific domains of reality and answering concrete problems.
The formidable growth of such heuristic theories by the end of the century cannot be explained by reference to social facts, but rather bv intellectual developments. Heuristic tiieory should be seen in terms of the history of ideas rather than the sociology of knowledge. It seems to be related to new, contingent intellectual developments—that is to say, new trends and atnactive, innovative, original perspectives. There is the excitement of a "paradigmatic shift" (Kuhn 1970); in fact we have witnessed three parallel paradigmatic sltilis in recent theorv. The fust thill, from "first" to "sicond"
262
sociology (Dawe 1978), moves from a view of fixed organic systems to fluid fields of social forces. Social order is seen to be a constantly emerging ami constructed achievement of agents, produced and reproduced by human action. Examples of such perspectives are found in the work of Bergei. Thomas I.uckmann, Elias, Giddens, and Bourdieu. The second shift is from evolution or social development to social becoming. There is an emphasr-on open-ended historical scenarios, determined by decisions and choices bin also by contingent, random occurrences. Examples of this perspective an found in historical sociology—represented by authors like Tilly, Archil.
Theda Skocpol, and myself (S/.tompka 1991, 1996b). The third shift is IV.....
images of homo economkus, the calculating, rational, purposeful actor (still .11 the heart of rational choice theory, e.g., James Coleman and Jon Elster), anil homo sociolog'irus, the normauvely directed role player (still found in n<<. functionalism, e.g., Alexander, Luhmann, and Richard Munch), to homo 1 <<:\ items, the knowledgeable and meaningful actor informed and constrained 1 <\ collective svmbolic svstems of knowledge and belief. This shift is also seen .is an interpretative turn, cultural turn, or linguistic turn. "Contempoi.n \ social theory has done an about-face in analytical terms hy giving proim nence and priority to cultural phenomena and cultural relations," accordi 1 it-to Brvan Turner (1998). It has many varieties. In one, which is sonieiiim •. called mentalism, there is a stress on the invariant components of the luunaii mind. Examples include the structuralism of Claude Levi-Strauss or KckIi nand De Saussure and the phenomenology of .Alfred Schutz. The sc<on.l kind, what some authors call textualism, is represented by poststructuraliMn
or theor\ of discourses by Foucault, where social reality" appears as a for.....1
text with specific semantic meaning and its own rules of grammar. The titn H is sometimes also labeled intersubjectivism, to which Habermas made a gi<-.ii contribution in his theory of communicative action. Finally, there is the iv.u tion against the "overintellectualized image of man."The emphasis shifts «■ practical knowledge (Giddens) and ethno-methods (Harold Garfinke!) Inn
also to seeing the body as an instrument of action (Brvan Turner) and <.....
tions as accompanying actions, things one uses, objects encountered, <*n\i ronment providing context for action. Individuals are seen as the raniri s < .1 routine but complex, characteristic sets of practices (Bourdieu).
Thus we presently have a rich and varied menu of heuristic orientals 111 ■ Teaching should sensitize students to the necessity of using manv of these 1.11 entations to look at society" from various perspectives and dilfeieiii sules m order to attain a fuller understanding of social life.
ANALYTIC IHKOKV The third theoretical approach can be called analvti, il,< ,» a Wtun 11 d..cs rs generalize and clarify concepts, providing iv|>..loKi<-s. , \.\\\itn .Hums, c spli
SHAPING SOCSOLOOICAL IMAGINATION
z63
cations, and definitions applicable in explanatory theory. It has an important but subsidiary role to play. However, there is a danger that it can become merely a method to sharpen conceptual tools without ever resulting in a specific orientation or producing a binding system of concepts. The attempts to construct closed conceptual systems and special languages to cover the whole domain of sociology seem to have ended with Niklas Luh-mann's huge effort (earlier only Talcott Parsons had similar ambitions). But on a more limited level, this variety of theorizing is useful and necessary, coming close to what Merton labeled "middle range theory" (in Sztompka igg6a: 41-50). These are empirically informed conceptual schemes, applicable to concrete empirical problems {e.g., his theories of roles and role sets, reference groups, stratification, mobility, anomie, deviance, etc.).
What is the nature of such a theory? Again we must ask our three questions. Theory of what? Of rich concepts useful for grasping phenomena. Theorv lor what? For identifying, unraveling, explicating phenomena or important dimensions of phenomena. Theory for whom? For sociologists, providing them with a canonical vocabulary, the technical language to deal with their subject matter. Teaching analytic theory is crucial to developing students' abiliry to think and talk sociologically. It provides them with the basic tools of the trade. The focus in introductory courses of sociology should be on precisely this kind of theory.
EXKCETli: THEORV Finally, there is the fourth kind of theorv, which can be called exegetic theory. It comes down to analysis, exegesis, systematization, reconstruction, and critique of existing theories. It is, of course, a valid preparation for theoretical work. It should be seen as a stage of a scientific career, a period of apprenticeship. Most major theorists have gone through such a stage: Parsons with The Structure of Social Action (1937), Giddens with Capitalism and Modern Social Theory (1971), Alexander with his four-volume Theoretical Logic in Sociology (1982), and Smelser with Essays in Sociological Explanation (1968). I also include mv Sociological Dilemmas' (1979) in this category. However, we can lose sight of what is truly important if wTe let dissecting and analyzing the work of fashionable authors become the main concerns: what certain scholars said; how they/ could supposedly say it better; what they could have said hut did not; are they consistent; what do they, or do they not, really mean? The more esoteric, incomprehensible, and muddled a theory, the greater opportunity it provides for exegetic debate. It inspires the frantic search "in a dark room, for a dark dog, which is not there." This is die secret of some current theories (e.g., the whole school of postmodernism and deconstxue-imiiisiii) and explains their popularity among interpreters. If a theory is
264 BELIEFS
shaping sociological imagination
straightforward, problem-oriented, precise, and clear, there is not much i" interpret and criticize.
Our three questions arc especially revealing in the case of the fourth knnl of theory. Theory of what? Of other theories, certain books, texts, and piuin toms of sociological imagination, resulting in self-referential exercises. Tin ttfy for what? For apologies or destructions of proposed theories—which <'.v, ily implies factionalism, dogmatism, orthodoxy of schools, sects, and Inland which degenerates from the free market of ideas into a vicious battlefield of ideas. Theory for whom? For other theorists who play intellectual garm ■ within the sects of the initiated. Such theories are the least consequential ami often futile and irrelevant. They often deteriorate into epigonism. This opm ion is shared by several theorists: "Social theory is at once the most futile .11 n I the most vital of intellectual enterprises. It is futile when it turns uiwiM'il closes into itself, degenerates into a desiccated war of concepts or an iiivith ous celebration of the cognitive exploits of this author, that school, 11 n (1.1 di lion, votir orthodoxy" (Wacquant 1998: 132). "It is necessary to let fresh .hi into the often closed compounds of indoor theorizing. Social theory is (mm onlv conceptualizations and discourse on other tiieoretician's concept-. (Therborn 1998: 132). "Without these political and public commiini<m social theory is in danger of becoming an esoteric, elitist, and eccentric ml. 1 est of marginal academics" (Turner 1996b: 13). "Quite a number of si hol.n seem to assume that theoretical progress depends solely on close scriuim .11 id recycling of preceding social theories.. .. This strategy is unlikely topi <>\nli innovative and penetrating social knowledge" (Baert 1998: 203).
Needless to say, I would not recommend exegetic theories for sorii >J<t.i students. If included at all, their place in the curriculum should be onh m.n ginal, perhaps limited to graduate or postgraduate levels as a kind of m> u tal exercise in reading and debunking of esoteric texLs.
CONCLUSION"
It has been argued that the most important, fruitful, and promising l\p«■■• theory, crucial for sociological imagination, are the explanatory and In in 1 tic theories. Analytic theories have a subsidiary role in sharpening com < |. tual tools and providing the language for sociological thinking. Kxegetn tin ories are useful only in preparing a background for theorizing and tin development of critical skills, but they do not contribute 10 theory |j(<i|" < and they should not replace other forms of theorizing.
Explanatory and heuristic theories make up a pluralistic mosaii til 11m ■ > retical explanations and theoretical orientations. How should we de.il null this fragmentation of the theoretical field? The altitude o( "disi iplnn il eclecticism" is a good way to address explanatory, piai ii< a I Ihi-ut v, whn h ti useful for the people, not only lot tin- theorists (the c    >i * - is limn Met tuti
1976: 169). This should be imparted to sociology students. Being disciplined means having a critical approach, appraising theories on their internal merits, coherence, persuasiveness, and ability to generate hypotheses. Being eclectic means having an open, inclusive, tolerant attitude, free from onesided dogmatism. The spirit of Neil Smelser s work is clearly congruent with this strategy. He explicidv suggests "an attitude of permissiveness for a variety of theoretical and empirical activities, combined with an obligation to relate these to the core of sociology" (1968: 61). More recently, some other authors have argued in the same, ecumenical direction: "It is generally not possible to ask all the interesting questions about any reallv significant phenomenon within the same theory or even within a set of commensurable, logically integratable, theories" (Calhoun 1996: 435). "It is possible to gain cumulative knowledge about the world from within different and competing points of view" (Alexander 1988a: 79).
Disciplined eclecticism allows us to cross not onlv intertheoretical borders but also interdisciplinary borders, to go back toward social theory as practiced by the classics rather than engage onlv narrowly defined sociological theory. Already in die 1960s, Neil Smelser opted for this kind of true theoretical integration, which is not to be confused with creating interdisciplinary institutes: "A major requirement of integration is that some common language be developed so that the elements of the different social sciences can be systematically compared and contrasted with one another" (1968: 43). Twenty years later, Immanuel Wallerstein argued that, by intellectual necessity, sociology should link with psychology, economics, anthropology, cognitive sciences, and political science, and that it is important to abandon some pernicious interdisciplinary divisions which emerged in the nineteenth century and have proved resilient (198S). The same message was forcefully articulated a decade later by Mattei Dogan: "The networks of cross-disciplinary influences are such that they are obliterating the old classification of the social sciences. The trend that we perceive today is from the old formal disciplines to new hybrid social sciences" (1997: 442), The persistent emphasis i m the same need for integration over several decades proves in itself that the promise is not vet fulfilled. It remains as perhaps the biggest challenge facing sociological theory and sociological education today.
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