1   Community  Broadcasting:  Publics,  Participants  and  Policies         4.  The  Public  Sphere       In  the  middle  of  the  20th  century,  new  technologies  such  as  radio  and  film  were  gaining  mass   audiences,  extending  the  ubiquitous  reach  of  newspapers,  to  form  what  Horkheimer  and   Adorno  (1992)  named  the  “culture  industries”.  They  theorized  that  the  rise  of  large  cultural   industry  players  had  created  a  structured,  supply-­‐driven  system  that:  “integrates  its  consumers   from  above”  and  was  negating  the  opportunities  for  individuals  and  small  groups  of  producers   to  comprise  “a  more  diverse  and  pluralistic  platform  for  societal  understanding"  (Adorno  1991,   99).  The  term  culture  industries  evolved  to  gain  acceptance  in  the  collective  consciousness  of   western  societies  as  “media”,  but  retained  the  components  of  social  and  cultural  activities   (Briggs  and  Burke  2009).  Horkheimer  and  Adorno  also  recommended  that  sociology  needed  to   take  a  deeper  look  at  how  individuals  and  structures  interact,  and  that  researching  the   development  of  public  policy  should  include  not  just  an  examination  of  the  actors'  behavior,   but  also  an  exploration  of  the  value  systems  upon  which  the  actions  were  based.  Jurgen   Habermas,  a  student  and  protege  of  Horkheimer  and  Adorno  at  the  Frankfurt  School,  published   his  1961  habilitation  thesis  The  Structural  Transformation  of  the  Public  Sphere,  a  landmark  work   that  explores  themes  of  democracy,  social  developments,  civil  society  and  the  role  of  media.  It   also  generated  numerous  critiques  and  further  discussions  on  these  subjects  that  still  resonate   today  and  form  a  theoretical  foundation  for  this  research  project.       The  Structural  Transformation  of  the  Public  Sphere  argues  that  a  participatory  bourgeois  public   sphere  of  real  discourse  among  equals  that  transformed  into  a  site  of  spectator  politics   manipulated  by  elites  who  took  control  of  the  medium  (Habermas  1989,  159).  For  Habermas,   the  public  sphere  merged  the  private  concerns  of  literate  individuals  regarding  family  and  social   integration  with  the  larger  public  concerns  of  society  in  spaces  reserved  for  open  discourse   among  citizens  in  "the  two  roles  assumed  by  the  privatized  individuals  who  came  together  to   form  a  public:  the  role  of   property  owners  and  the  role  of  human  beings  pure  and  simple"  (ibid,  56).  These  concerns   were  delineated  through  argumentative  discourse  intended  to  identify  and  prioritize  interests   for  the  common  good.  Individuals  could  inform  and  influence  public  opinion,  even  if  it  was  in   opposition  to  the  current  political  status  quo.  He  stated  "The  public  sphere  as  a  functional   element  in  the  political  realm  was  given  the  normative  status  of  an  organ  for  the  self-­‐ articulation  of  civil  society  with  a  state  authority  corresponding  to  its  needs"  (74).         2   Populating  this  public  sphere  are  the  citizens  who,  through  their  participation,  seek   communication,  representation,  and  association.  They  participate  as  individuals  initially,  but   also  constituting  groups  that,  aggregating  around  shared  issues  and/or  interests,  become   “publics”  (Newman  and  Clarke  2009).  Enabled  by  the  democratic  revolutions  of  the  late  18th   century,  participation  in  these  public  meetings  became  protected  by  law,  representing  early   examples  of  free  speech,  freedom  of  assembly,  and  freedom  of  the  press  (Antonio  and  Keller   1992).  The  resulting  protections  facilitated  the  role  of  the  public  sphere  as  a  secure  place  for   individuals  and  groups  to  discuss  issues  of  common  interest  and  organize  against  what  they   viewed  as  the  sources  of  social  and  political  oppression.       According  to  Habermas,  the  degradation  of  the  public  sphere  began  in  the  late  19th  century   concurrent  with  the  societal  transition  to  a  system  marked  by  merging  economic  and  political   forces,  the  decline  of  the  individual,  and  the  manipulation  of  the  culture  industries.  In  this  new   environment,  public  opinion  became  the  province  of  newspapers  with  large  circulations   controlled  by  powerful  corporations  seeking  to  direct  the  masses  away  from  participatory   discourse,  and  towards  a  passive  consumption  of  information,  opinion  and  culture.  In  this  new   20th  century  dynamic  of  mass  media  as  the  public  sphere,  citizens  become  mere  spectators,   reverting  from  participants  in  discursive  activity  into  commodities  of  a  consumption  society,   reminiscent  of  their  original  feudal  status  in  the  Middle  Ages.  He  also  noted  the  problem  was   exacerbated  with  the  development  of  the  newly  powerful  broadcast  media:  "With  the  arrival  of   new  media  [radio  and  television]  the  form  of  communication  as  such  has  changed;  they  have   had  an  impact,  therefore,  more  penetrating  (in  the  strict  sense  of  the  word)  than  was  ever   possible  for  the  press...They  draw  the  eyes  and  ears  of  the  public  under  their  spell  but  at  the   same  time,  by  taking  away  its  distance,  place  it  under  “tutelage,”  which  is  to  say  they  deprive  it   of  the  opportunity  to  say  something  and  to  disagree"  (Habermas  1989,  170).       Despite  his  somewhat  dire  view  of  the  state  of  post-­‐modern  society  and  the  re-­‐feudalization  of   its  public  sphere,  Habermas  did  not  end  the  volume  in  a  defeatist  manner.  He  instead   responded  by  postulating  on  some  tentative  solutions  to  the  revitalization  of  the  degraded   public  sphere.  Early  in  his  text,  he  described  the  evolution  of  the  public  sphere  and   participatory  democracy  as  existing  first  in  the  exchange  of  texts  and  discussions  of  culture,   then  later  including  political  content,  distributed  to  the  public  via  pamphlets  and  newsletters.   He  wrote:  "The  public  sphere  in  the  political  realm  evolved  from  the  public  sphere  in  the  world   of  letters;  through  the  vehicle  of  public  opinion  it  put  the  state  in  touch  with  the  needs  of   society"  (Habermas  1989,  31).  Proposing  a  solution  to  the  degradation  of  the  public  sphere,  he   suggests  a  return  to  that  original  form,  ostensibly  after  the  reform  of  current  mass  media   structures  and  environments.  He  hoped  it  would  enable  true  discourse  in  a  "critical  process  of     3   public  communication  through  the  very  organizations  that  mediatize  it"  and  foster  a  "a  critical   publicity  brought  to  life  within  intraorganizational  public  spheres"  (232).       Because  of  its  iconic  stature,  Habermas'  Structural  Transformation  of  the  Public  Sphere  has   come  under  considerable  scrutiny  by  media  scholars.  Critics  argue  that  the  theory  has  flaws,   chiefly  concerning  the  questions  of  how  his  idea  can  be  applied  universally  in  democratic   societies  (Burnett  and  Jaeger  2008).  They  contend,  for  example,  that  even  the  idealized  version   of  the  public  sphere  described  by  Habermas  excludes  large  portions  of  society,  such  as  women   and  marginalized  groups  (Fraser  1992).  Other  argue  that  he  mistakenly  limits  public  discourse   to  a  single  sphere  when  in  fact  many  spheres  (and  counter  publics)  of  discourse  can  be   identified  (Thompson  1995,  Hauser  1999).  Michael  Edwards  (2004)  asserts  that  public  spheres   are  present  at  different  levels  in  most  societies,  varying  according  to  societal  and  political   influences.  He  says  “a  single,  unified  public  sphere  would  be  impossible  at  any  significant  scale”   (57).  Habermas  himself  questioned  the  overarching  primacy  of  the  concept,  suggesting  that   perhaps  it  takes  a  more  fragmented  form  for  discussions  of  social  cultural  and  political   representations  not  effectively  propagated  in  society  by  the  mainstream  media,  conceding  that   he  presents  a  "stylized  picture  of  the  liberal  elements  of  the  bourgeois  public  sphere"  (1992,   xix).     Another  important  societal  dynamic  that  critics  contend  Habermas'  original  work  generally   ignores  is  the  division  of  class,  and  the  resulting  divisions  in  spaces  for  discussion  represented   by  alternative  public  spheres  (Garnham  1986).  Habermas'  original  conceptualization  of  the   bourgeois  public  sphere  afforded  access  to  citizens  as  equal  parties.  However,  he  acknowledged   in  his  preface  the  existence  of  an  alternative  sphere  -­‐  the  plebian  public  sphere  -­‐  that  arose  as  a   counter  public  to  the  literary  public  sphere  in  the  late  19th  century  period  of  the  French   revolution.  While  holding  similar  philosophies  of  access  and  participation  as  their  literary   contemporaries,  the  plebian  public  sphere  was  a  product  of  an  underclass  of  workers  and   peasants.  Habermas  wrote  in  his  later  critique  that  "from  the  beginning  a  dominant  bourgeois   public  collides  with  a  plebeian  one"  (1992,  430),  and  that  the  original  work  "underestimated  the   significance  of  oppositional  and  non-­‐bourgeois  public  spheres".     That  class  division  is  further  exemplified  by  the  concept  of  the  "proletariat  public  sphere".   Following  the  19th  century  transformation  into  a  more  consumer-­‐centric  society,  the  upward   mobility  of  participants  from  business  and  government  created  a  new  more  exclusive  bourgeois   class.  These  new  more  powerful  individuals  then  proceeded  to  co-­‐opt  the  phenomenon  for   their  commercial  and  political  interests.  That  led  to  the  development  in  the  20th  century   industrial  age  of  another  alternative  counter  public,  labeled  in  the  Marxist  context  as  the     4   "proletariat  public  sphere"  (Knodler-­‐Bunte  1975).  This  form  arose  among  groups  of  workers,   anarchists  and  Marxists  in  the  political  spectrum,  and  progressed  to  be  a  formidable  site  for   discourse  counter  to  the  dominant  narrative  of  wealthy  oligarchs  and  the  corporations  they   controlled.  Scholars  have  identified  a  similar  dynamic  in  the  formation  of  alternative  public   spheres  by  other  societal  groups  seeking  sites  for  discourse  and  inclusion.  Nancy  Fraser  argues   that  minority  groups:  "have  repeatedly  found  it  advantageous  to  constitute  alternative  publics   or  subaltern  counterpublics  engaging  in  parallel  discursive  arenas  in  order  to  invent  and   circulate  counterdiscourses  to  formulate  oppositional  interpretations  of  their  identities,   interests,  and  needs"  (Fraser  1992,  123).  However,  this  dynamic  has  created  publics  that  are:   "differentially  empowered  or  segmented"  leading  to:  "the  weak  character  of  some  public   spheres  in  late  capitalist  societies  that  denudes  public  opinion  of  practical  force"  (ibid,  137).       Alternative  media  often  provide  the  frameworks  for  citizens'  participation  in  a  public  sphere  of   democratic  processes,  not  just  as  a  receiver  of  media  outputs,  but  through  the  production  and   delivery  of  their  own  opinions  (Langlois  and  DuBois  2005).  In  alternative  media,  citizens  can   actualize  their  political  power  and  protect  themselves  from  dominant  powerful  political  forces   by  mitigating  the  inherent  imbalance  of  societal  power  relations  (Held  1996).  The  critical   theorist  Foucault  (1980)  recognized  the  significance  of  discursive  activities  in  developing  and   producing  ideas  in  a  political  sphere  where  power  could  be  generated  in  a  multidirectional   fashion,  countering  the  hegemonic  stature  and  top-­‐down  structure  of  mainstream  media.   Indeed,  this  meaning  also  applies  to  media  organizations  and  their  philosophy  of  external   interrelation  in  the  democratic  media  and  political  environments,  as  this  interrelatedness   contributes  to  the  dialogue  necessary  for  an  open  and  functional  democracy  (Dahl  2001).  The   interactive  approach  to  political  action  is  also  noted  by  Sandoval  and  Fuchs  (2009,  4),  who   assert  “rooted  in  social  political  and  historical  contexts,  the  interrelations  between  individual   media  actors  and  media  structures  constitute  the  societal  impacts  of  the  media  system”.       The  concept  of  media  power  is  also  illustrated  in  the  debate  over  media  ownership.  When   communities  are  mere  users,  but  not  owners  of  the  platform,  they  have  limited  control  over   the  ultimate  role  the  medium  plays  in  society.  For  many  alternative  media  advocates,  this   system  is  merely  an  endorsement  of  Habermas'  contention  that  the  public  sphere,  while   initially  providing  a  real  opportunity  for  citizens'  participation,  is  subsequently  co-­‐opted  by  the   acquisition  and  concentration  of  ownership  by  power  elites  (McChesney  2008).  In  addition,   negative  stereotypical  misrepresentations  by  dominant  mainstream  media  can  be  especially   damaging  to  many  marginalized  segments  of  society,  causing  deep  feelings  of  resentment   towards  otherwise  recognized  and  respected  societal  institutions.  According  to  the  American   civil  rights  activist  Malcolm  X  (1963)  “The  media  is  the  most  powerful  entity  on  earth.  They  have     5   the  power  to  make  the  innocent  guilty  and  to  make  the  guilty  innocent,  because  they  control   the  minds  of  the  masses".       The  function  of  community  broadcasting  as  an  independent  site  for  political  engagement  and   action  is  an  important  one  for  the  organizational  development  behind  ideology.  These   alternative  broadcasters  can  be  seen  as  “discursive  spaces”,  according  to  the  political  scientist   Susan  Herbst  (1994,  4).  She  continues:  “Within  marginal  publics,  community  building  is  critical.   Political  groups  create  parallel  public  spaces  where  they  develop  political  community  and   mobilize  political  resources.”.  Both  internal  and  external  development  of  communication  and   collaboration  in  the  organizational  context  of  community  broadcasting  are  seen  as  effective   platforms  to  build  media  power.  Indeed,  the  media  power  of  community  broadcasting  is   generated  by  individuals  and  communities  with  strong  ideological  agendas  constructing  and   elaborating  narratives  in  a  genuine  public  sphere  of  democratic  discourse  (Price  2007).       Habermas,  in  his  proposed  solution  to  revitalizing  a  truly  democratic  public  sphere/s,  never   envisioned  the  technological  turn  taken  in  the  development  of  new  online  social  media   platforms.  Computer-­‐networked  communication  systems  have  introduced  the  potential  for   more  participatory  democracy  through  a  multiplicity  of  information  sources  and  forums  for   discourse.  David  Winston  (2012)  writes  that  the  internet  has  created  a  new  digital  public  sphere   by  facilitating  the  "Four  C's"  of  the  digital  world:  communications,  content,  collaboration,  and   community  that  will  revolutionize  democratic  participation.  Like  its  traditional  broadcasting   counterparts,  this  new  digital  meeting  place  is  populated  by  interests  from  across  the  societal   spectrum,  all  pursuing  their  own  agendas.  The  rise  of  social  media  has  expanded  the  public   sphere/s  into  new  territories  and  possibilities  where  participants  and  communities  can  transmit   images  and  ideas  with  greater  speed  and  power  than  ever  before  (Macek  2016).       While  many  scholars  have  written  about  the  role  of  social  media  in  extending/  expanding  the   concept  of  the  public  sphere/s,  much  of  the  theory  and  research  focuses  on  the  use  of  social   media  by  elites,  connecting  with  citizens  in  outward  public  relations  and  marketing  functions   (Wright  2007,  Jackson  and  Lilleker  2009,  Poell  and  van  Dijk  2016).  However,  ordinary  citizens   and  their  communities  connect  and  communicate  online  in  social  media  networks  of  many   varieties,  all  of  which  can  effectively  create  and  transmit  cultural  and  political  discourse   (Romero  and  Molina  2011).  These  "third  space"  (Oldenburg  1989)  online  forums  facilitate   discussions  cultivating  political  agency,  solidarity  and  community  that  can  activate  individuals   and  groups  to  organize  and  mobilize  into  political  action.  Wright,  Graham  and  Jackson  (2015)   argue  that  it  is  actually  the  online  spaces  not  specifically  devoted  to  political  ideology  that   facilitate  a  large  amount  of  actual  political  discourse  by  participants  mixing  it  in  with  their  non-­‐   6   political  everyday  discussions.  These  community-­‐based  forums  are  what  Papacharissi  (2011,  78)   calls  "spaces  that  are  friendlier  to  the  development  of  contemporary  civic  behaviors”.       Participant  producers  are  using  new  social  media  tools  and  applications  for  their  content   delivery  and  discourse,  constructing  a  new  social  reality  online  with  "technological  optimism"   (Krier  and  Gillettt  1985,  Jenkins  2006).  These  new  sites  of  participation  facilitate  freedom  of   expression,  enabled  to  a  great  extent  by  profitable  business  models  of  many  providers,  which   constitute  an  ostensibly  sustainable  platform  for  the  new  digital  public  sphere/s.  The  stunning   financial  success  and  power  of  many  commercial  enterprises  in  this  new  social  media  realm  has   prompted  debates  that  connect  back  to  Habermas'  original  concept  of  a  public  sphere  co-­‐opted   by  the  rise  of  dominant  media  exerting  their  power  to  control  and  direct  passive  consumers.   Not  only  do  individual  sites  now  command  large  shares  of  usage,  but  a  strikingly  small  group  of   telecommunications  operators  now  dominate  the  ownership  of  communications  networks  that   form  the  backbone  of  the  new  digital  public  sphere/s  (Cringely  2014).       Thus,  the    battle  for  control  of  this  new  social  media  paradigm  is  taking  place  not  only  on   screens  and  networks,  but  also  in  board  rooms,  stock  exchanges  and  legislative  bodies.  As   traditional  mass  media  (including  community  broadcasters)  see  their  business  models  disrupted   by  social  media,  they  struggle  to  evolve  successfully,  seeking  to  retain  their  participants  and   primacy  in  the  new  digital  public  sphere  (Singer  2013).  These  linear  delivery  curators  of  audio   and  video  are  exploring  new  social  media  user-­‐generated  platforms  for  their  content  delivery  in   a  digital  convergence  strategy  (BBC  2016).  Indeed,  scholars  and  practitioners  argue  that  the   future  of  community  broadcasting  is  perhaps  in  the  strength  of  the  communities  themselves  as   generators  of  “branded”  content,  re-­‐curated  and  re-­‐transmitted  by  users  across  a  spectrum  of   online  social  media  channels  (Jenkins  2006,  Perrin  2015).     Media  policy  and  regulators,  delineated  by  national  boundaries  and  types  of  media  platforms,   have  traditionally  managed  the  public  sphere  of  terrestrial  broadcasting,  ostensibly  for  the   benefit  of  democratic  ideals.  Legislators  and  regulators  however,  are  now  challenged  to   conceptualize  the  public  sphere  in  this  new  digitally  converged  environment,  implementing   policies  that  adapt  to  the  way  participants  use  both  old  and  new  technologies;  especially  social   media.  Jonathan  Stray  (2011,  9)  writes  "what  we  have  now  is  an  ecosystem,  and  in  true   networked  fashion,  there  may  never  again  be  a  central  authority".                 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