**Department of Political Science**

**Faculty of Social Studies**

**Masaryk University**

**Managing 21st Century Conflict – Crisis Simulation**

**BSS 187/487 – Managing 21st Century Conflict**

**Spring 2017**

This course had a compressed schedule, meeting almost daily after Easter. After five days of substantive lessons on the course material, the class (19 students) role-played a variety of roles in a projected Darfur/Sudan crisis situation to examine the difficulties of negotiating an outcome in an entrenched sectarian conflict with external power involvement, and the possibilities and limitations on the United Nations.

The following package is a complete set of the materials used in the simulation:

* Background (briefed [PowerPoint] the day before the simulation) pp. 2-3
* Simulated Situation as of April 2018 (briefed the day before the simulation) P. 4
* Morning Press Report #1 (briefed at the start of the simulation) p. 5
* Day #1 “Breaking News” (introduced at 15-30 minute intervals during play) p. 5
* Morning Press Report #2 (briefed at the start of the second day) p. 6
* Day #2 “Breaking News” (introduced at 15 minute intervals during play) p. 6
* Text of final agreement produced by the simulation participants pp. 7-9

The background package was briefed in class the day before the simulation. Before that, students only knew that it would be an African sectarian conflict situation, with teams consisting of:

1. Government
2. Opposition
3. UNSC veto-bearing member supporting the Government
4. UNSC veto-bearing member supporting the Opposition
5. A team from the Office of the Deputy UN Secretary General for Peacekeeping
6. Commanders of UN peacekeeping forces on the ground

Each TEAM was required to turn in at the beginning of play a statement of their objectives and principal in the simulation. This was critical to helping them focus on and get into their roles.

The simulation was a great success, with the students effectively getting “in their roles,” with a good amount of outside research. The ultimate outcome of their work—surprisingly—was an agreed political resolution of the conflict, to which all parties agreed after extensive negotiation. This required thoughtful examination of each party’s interests in the situation and how those interests might be better served by not following the “script” which perpetuated deadlock. The outcome, although perhaps unlikely, was nonetheless logical and credible, highlighting for the students that creativity and imagination in politics—as well as good leadership—are often indispensable in effectively managing entrenched conflict.

Please feel free to use or adapt these materials as you see fit.

Schuyler Foerster, DPhil

Fulbright Distinguished Chair in Social Studies, Spring 2017

Masaryk University

**BSS 187/487 – Seminar on Managing 21st Century Conflict**

**Faculty of Social Studies, Masaryk University**

**Crisis Simulation – Darfur 2018**

**Background (real world) to the Situation**

****Cross-cutting sources of conflict

* Arab vs. non-Arab (blacks)
* Islamist vs. non-Islamist or Christian
* Sedentary agricultural communities vs. nomadic herders
* Drought since 1980’s … loss of land & water, famine
* 2003 uprising against Sudanese government in Khartoum
* Rebels successful hit-and-run tactics
* Government embarrassed ~ responded violently
* UN estimates (since 2003):
  + 400,000 killed
  + 3 million displaced
  + Sep 2004 – US Sec State Colin Powell called it “genocide”

**Government and Opposition**

Government of Sudan:

* President Omar al-Bashir
* Indicted by ICC for crimes against humanity, war crimes, genocide
* Supported by military, police, *Janjaweed* Arab militias
* Supported by China, which imports 70% of the oil that flows through pipelines from the south to Port Sudan, whose oil terminal China built
* Supported by Iran until 2016; al-Bashir turned to Saudi Arabia after 2016 in Yemen
* Government principally interested in regime survival
* *Janjaweed* funded/supplied by government, which denies it
* *Janjaweed* interested in its own survival, potentially independent of government

Rebels:

* Sudanese Liberation Movement (SLM)
  + Factions with SLM differ on desirability of fighting vs. compromise with government
* Justice & Equality Movement (JEM)
* Supported by France, other Western countries, who want al-Bashir arrested
* But no desire to send Western military forces to do so

**Role of the United Nations**

2005 Humanitarian Cease Fire

* African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) – 2005
* “Monitoring mission” … grew from 300 to 7,000

2006 Darfur Peace Agreement -- Government & SLA

* Rejected by JEM and rival SLA factions
* 115 page agreement ~ power sharing, demilitarize militias, referendum on future status, humanitarian aid
* Bashir rejected 20,000 UN peacekeeping force ~ sent 10,000 Sudanese “peacekeepers”
* More casualties, dislocations, rape, aerial bombardment of civilians

2006 UNSC Res 1706 – United Nations Africa Mission in Darfur

* First joint UN-African Union peacekeeping effort ~ cited Responsibility to Protect (R2P)
* Cited UN Charter Chapters VII & VIII
* 12-0 … China, Russia, Qatar abstained
* Expand UNMIS mandate ~ 17,300 troops & 3,300 civilians
* … to monitor and verify implementation …
* … to observe and monitor movements of armed groups …
* … to investigate violations …
* … to maintain a presence … and assist …
* … to prevent attacks and threats against citizens

2007 UN and African Union peacekeeping efforts merged into “hybrid” force

* UNAMID extended annually ever since, with refined mandate
* By 2016-17 reduced to 15,000 military, 3,500 civilian/police

**Situation (real world) Since 2006**

Persistent but lower levels of violence, with occasional flare-ups

* Occasional government offensives
* 2016 – reported CW attack on civilians by Government forces

2011 Diplomatic breakthrough – Doha Peace Accord

* UN-brokered … establish Darfuri Vice President *[never happened]*
* Compensation fund for victims *[never paid]*

International Criminal Court

* 2008 – al-Bashir indicted for genocide, murder, crimes vs. humanity
* Arab League & African Union reject orders to arrest al-Bashir as “imperialist”
* At one point, France threatened to force down airplane carrying al-Bashir to the Persian Gulf and arrest him

**SIMULATION Situation – April 2018**

* UNAMID mandate extended until June 30, 2018 (in 2017)
* 15,000 military personnel + 2,500 civilian police
* January 2018 – Chad expelled 200,000 refugees back to Sudan
* Refugees seeking to return to Darfur under protection
* February 2018 – Government offensive against Darfur region
* Aerial bombardment, Janjaweed raids, reported CW use
* 1,000+ killed … 25,000 displaced in one week
* Government arms came from China, Russia; funding from Saudi Arabia
* Debate among rebel factions about utility of continued talks
* UN Sec Gen seeks guidance on next steps … including extension

**Roles**

***Government***

Omar al-Bashir Žilinčík, Samuel

Vice President Salazar, Lucero

Foreign Minister Nevrayeva, Darya

*Janjaweed* Commander Dvořáček, Marek

***Opposition***

SLA Leader Kyselý, Vojtěch

SLA Faction Leader Kozová, Petra

JEM Leader Vorda, Alana

Rebel Militia Commander Bátria, Michael

***Government of China***

Premier Kling, Katharina

Foreign Minister Matiushenko, Viktoriia

Energy Minister Rekšáková, Terézia

***Government of France***

President Brezden, Barbara

Foreign Minister Chlustinová, Natálie

Defense Minister Jakobczyk, Monika

***Representatives of the UN Deputy Secretary General for Peacekeeping***

Goksadze, Tamar [Taco]

Shanidze, Dachi

Vinkler, Pavel

***Commanders of UN/Africa Union Hybrid Peacekeeping Force in Darfur***

Alekseeva, Alexandra

Janičatová, Silvie

**SIMULATION Press Briefings / “Breaking News” Injects – Day 1**

***Morning Press Briefing – Day 1***

***Sudan Tribune*.**

Bombs rocked the capital of Khartoum this morning as 3 explosions occurred in the main market square, in a government services building, and in the main tourist information office.

Al Qaeda in the Maghreb has taken credit for the attacks.

Interior Ministry spokesman declared that this was further proof that the so-called Sudanese Liberation Movements was really a front organization for radical Islamist terrorism.

***Riyadh Times*.**

A member of the Saudi Royal Family is quoted as having referred to President Omar al-Bashir as an “opportunist” whom we can use but should not trust.

***Breaking News – Day 1***

***Reuters****.*

Following earlier explosions in Khartoum, a suicide bomber rammed a truck full of explosives into a critical control facility for the Greater Nile Oil Pipeline outside Khartoum. The building suffered extensive damage. The pipeline carries oil from South Sudan and the Nile valley to the Port of Sudan facility.

***BBC***.

Riots broke out in al-Junaynah (western Darfur) today, as food distribution points began to turn people away because of lack of food. A local spokesman for Oxfam said the system had been overwhelmed by the new flood of refugees expelled earlier this year from Chad. He also reported that local residents were becoming violent in their treatment of refugees, and angry mobs were forming outside the UNAMID base near al-Junaynah.

***Agence France Presse****.*

Anonymous French intelligence sources reported that there are indications from social media of growing impatience within the ranks of the SLM and a demand for a new offensive against the government of Sudan. One SLM rebel reportedly said on Twitter, “if the world will not get rid of the war criminal, al-Bashir, we will.”

**SIMULATION Press Briefings / “Breaking News” Injects – Day 2**

***Morning Press Briefing – Day 2***

***Sudan Times****.*

According to an Interior Ministry spokesman, yesterday’s bombings in Khartoum’s market, government, and tourist buildings resulted in 15 people dead, and several hundred had flooded area hospitals with injuries.

There were no casualties at the Greater Nile Oil Pipeline control station that had been hit by a suicide bomber in a truck. However, the station had been extensively damaged, and it would take several weeks before it return to service.

Additional inspections of the pipeline revealed several satchels of unexploded makeshift bombs, indicating a much more widespread attack. No one has yet claimed responsibility for that bombing.

***Breaking News – Day 2***

***CNN****.*

International press headlines highlighted the growing violence in Darfur, as thousands of refugees continued to overwhelm food distribution centers and other NGO services.

Protests built yesterday outside UN Headquarters in New York, after pictures of the chaos in Darfur went viral on social media.

***Reuters*.**

More explosions in Sudan this morning, this time near al-Junaynah (western Darfur), when a suicide bomber tried to ram a truck into the UN compound.

The truck blew up at the gate, and three Africa Union guards were killed along with the suicide bomber. No one else was injured.

Al Qaeda in the Maghreb claimed credit for this attack, but this could not be readily corroborated.

***Agence France Presse*.**

Homemade “Molotov” cocktails were thrown into the compound of the French Embassy in Khartoum this morning, as a mob of hooded militia, shouting *“Allahu Akbar,”* tried to force their way into the Embassy grounds.

Five attackers were killed before the mob was turned back.

Embassy personnel said they were trying to determine the identity of the dead attackers.

In a public statement, the French Ambassador said that the Government of Sudan had a legal responsibility to assist in ensuring the security of embassies.

# Agreement on the Future Status of Darfur

# Between

**The Government of the Sudan**

**And**

**Justice and Equality Movement and Sudanese Liberation Movement Factions**

**Preamble**

The Government of the Republic of the Sudan and the Justice and Equality Movement, the Sudanese Liberation Movement, the Sudanese Liberation Movement (Factions) (hereinafter jointly referred to as “the Parties“, and separately as “the Government” and the “Opposition”),

*Desiring* to cease ongoing hostilities on the basis of and mutual benefit a prosperity for all people of Sudan;

*Have agreed* as follows:

#### Article 1 – Objectives

#### [Blank]

#### Article 2 – Future Status of Darfur Region

The Government shall grant autonomy to the region of Darfur (hereinafter referred to as “the Region”) to be governed by the Joint Government of the Darfur Autonomous Region composed proportionally by the representatives of the Opposition as well as the Arab tribesmen not belonging to the Opposition.

Central Darfur, East Darfur, North Darfur, South Darfur and West Darfur shall be dissolved in favor of the Darfur Autonomous Region.

The Government shall set aside funds for the development of Darfur Autonomous Region.

Specific implementation of this Article shall be settled amicably through consultation and negotiations between the Parties under the auspices of the Office of the United Nations Deputy Secretary General for Peacekeeping.

#### Article 3 – Security of the Darfur Autonomous Region

Security in the Darfur Autonomous Region shall be provided jointly by the newly formed Darfur Autonomous Region Police Forces and Darfur Autonomous Region Border Guards (hereinafter referred to as “the Forces”). The Forces shall be proportionally manned, including senior and sensitive posts, by the security forces of the Opposition and Darfuri Arab Armed Forces (commonly referred to as the “*Janjaweeed*“).

A detailed sequencing and phasing schedule of the integration of the Opposition and Darfuri Arab Armed Forces into Darfur Autonomous Region Police Forces and Darfur Autonomous Region Border Guards shall be settled amicably through consultation and negotiations between the Parties under the auspices of the Office of the United Nations Deputy Secretary General for Peacekeeping.

The Government shall not station in or transfer through its military and security forces in the Darfur Autonomous Region until by consent of the Joint Government of the Darfur Autonomous Region.

**Article 4 – Disarmament and Demobilization**

Forces of the Opposition and Darfuri Arab Armed Forces (“Janjaweeed“) not included in the Darfur Autonomous Region Police Forces and Darfur Autonomous Region Border Guards shall be disarmed and demobilized under the auspices of the Office of the United Nations Deputy Secretary General for Peacekeeping.

The members of the Darfuri Arab Armed Forces (“Janjaweeed“) shall cease its membership in the Security Forces of the Government, including Sudanese Armed Forces, Popular Defense Forces and Border Guards.

A detailed sequencing and phasing schedule of the Disarmament and Demobilization shall be settled amicably through consultation and negotiations between the Parties under the auspices of the Office of the United Nations Deputy Secretary General for Peacekeeping.

**Article 5 – Land Reform in the Darfur Autonomous Region**

Land reform in the Darfur Autonomous Region shall be conducted in the framework of the legislation approved by the Joint Government of the Darfur Autonomous Region in order to determine separate territories for the Fur and Arab ethnicities.

Adoption of the Land Reform Law shall precede any other legislation by the Joint Government of the Darfur Autonomous Region. Zone A shall be established (technical specifics) under the control of the Fur population, zone B (technical specifics) under the joint control and zone C (technical specifics) under the control of the Arab population.

Status of any disputed land shall be settled amicably through consultation and negotiations between the Parties under the auspices of the Office of the United Nations Deputy Secretary General for Peacekeeping or by introduction to the Arbitration by the Permanent Court of Arbitration.

**Article 6 – Status of Refugees**

Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons shall freely and voluntarily return to the Darfur Autonomous Region for settlement according to their ethnicity.

International aid for the Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons shall be redirected towards reconstruction and socioeconomic development. This shall be guaranteed under the auspices of the Office of the United Nations Deputy Secretary General for Peacekeeping.

**Article 7 – Compensation for the Victims of the Conflict**

The Government shall provide $ \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ million in compensation to victims of the conflict.

**Article 8 – Reconciliation**

The Parties shall establish Truth and Reconciliation Committees for resolution and reconciliation of all parties further Office of the United Nations Deputy Secretary General for Peacekeeping.

**Article 9 – Future Status of Omar al-Bashir**

Omar al-Bashir shall be extradited to stand trial before the International Criminal Court.

Other cases of extradition for the individuals indicted by International Criminal Court shall be settled amicably through consultation and negotiations between the Parties.

This Article shall not be used as a precedent for the Government of Sudan to accede to the Rome statute.

**Article 10 – Status of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force**

Until the resolution of all disputes and reconciliation process, the Parties shall accept the presence of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in order to provide security and stability to the Darfur Autonomous Region.

The United Nations Peacekeeping Force will predominantly safeguard the borders of the Fur and Arab territories as well as refugee camps.

#### Article 11 – Final provisions

1. Each party shall notify to the other in writing through the United Nations Office for Peacekeeping of the completion of the procedures required by law and regulations of the Republic of the Sudan for bringing this Agreement into force. This Agreement shall enter into force on the first day of the second month following of the day of receipt of the last notification.
2. This Agreement shall continue to be in force for an indefinite period unless terminated in written form by mutual consent of the Parties. The Termination being effective no sooner than on the first day of the twelfth month (one year) following of the day of receipt of the last notification.
3. This Agreement may be revised or amended in written form by mutual consent of the Parties. Amendments or revisions to this Agreement shall enter into force in accordance on the first day of the second month following of the day of receipt of the last notification.

Done in Brno on April 27th *[2018]* in four originals, each English language, all texts being equally authentic.

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| For the Government of the Republic of Sudan | For the Justice and Equality Movement |
| For the Sudanese Liberation Movement Faction | For the Sudanese Liberation Movement Faction |