THE ISLAMIC STATE, LEGITIMACY AND THE
INSTITUTION OF CALIPHATE
A REFLECTION ON THE THEOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL
LEGITIMACY OF THE JIHADIST GROUP
by Romain Jaquier
Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
Bachelor of Arts
in
Politics and International Relations
University College Dublin
School of Politics and International Relations - SPIRE
April 2015
THE ISLAMIC STATE, LEGITIMACY AND THE INSTITUTION OF CALIPHATE
1
Table of contents
Introduction .................................................................................................................... 2
Profiling the Islamic State .............................................................................................. 4
The caliphate: how the Islamic State monopolizes an institution .................................. 6
The caliphate in the Qur’ān and Islamic history......................................................... 6
The caliphate mobilized by the Islamic State ............................................................. 9
Political perspectives on the caliphate.......................................................................... 12
One caliphate to rule them all? ................................................................................. 13
The IS: political organization or militant movement?.............................................. 14
Conclusion.................................................................................................................... 15
Acknowledgments ......................................................................................................... 15
Annexes ........................................................................................................................ 16
References .................................................................................................................... 17
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Introduction
Considered as the “world’s richest terrorist organization” (Moore 2014), perpetrator of
an extreme and highly-mediatized violence, the organisation that calls itself the “Islamic
State” (IS)1
disconcerts and perturbs both public opinion and world leaders. A jihadist
movement that proclaims a return to what its leaders consider to be traditional forms of Islam
as laws of mankind, the Islamic State is a complex actor on the Middle East stage, which
became even more complex in mid-2014. On June 29 2014, the organization released a press
statement entitled “The promise of Allāh” in which they declared the “establishment of the
Islamic khilāfah” (Islamic State 2014; 5)2
. Even though this declaration is only words and has
“very few capacities to change the balance of power on the field”* (Dupret 2014), the
announcement has been highly mediatized and has driven numerous reactions worldwide. A
caliphate (khilāfah) is a form of Islamic government led by a caliph, who is considered as the
successor of the prophet Muhammad and theoretically the leader of all Muslims in the world.
Although the large-scale reactions to the announcement were clear and sound, the legitimacy
attached to the concept of Islamic caliphate is rather vague. In this work, I would like to
approach the IS in regard of its declaration of a caliphate, and its importance within its
strategy.
My work is articulated around the following question: “Why has the IS proclaimed an
Islamic caliphate on Iraq and Syria and how best should it be understood?” On the one hand,
the research does not pretend to present the exact incentives of IS leaders, but to present a
reflexive insight on the nature of the organization as a political actor in the Middle East. On
the other hand, the research shall not aim at giving a complete picture of the IS’ propaganda
strategy but to place one of its key element – the declaration of a caliphate – in a theoretical
and geopolitical context.
The question is relevant for several reasons. First, the IS has proved to be, until now, a
relative long lasting movement that has great significance for a large number of near and
distant actors (states, individuals, ethnic groups), mainly in the Middle East, but also in other
regions of the world. Second, the beliefs and norms carried by this organizations matter for
1
Note on nomenclature. In this work, I consciously use the different terms that the organization calls itself,
depending on the time period in which I am considering it. Far from being neutral, the name “Islamic State” is
however at the centre of the discussions in this work, and I consider not using it for political or ideological
reasons as a bias.
2
Regarding the references to the statement of the IS, I numbered the pages of the document according to the
pages of the PDF document provided on the link in the bibliography.
* All quotations indicated with an asterisk - “*” - are translations made by the author.
THE ISLAMIC STATE, LEGITIMACY AND THE INSTITUTION OF CALIPHATE
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numerous religious and political groups. Finally, as it is presented in this work, some features
of the IS are relatively new and unexpected and therefore deserve a careful attention.
The high mediatisation of the IS and its actions led to high number of analyses,
debates and controversies on some key features of the organisation. In September 2014, the
French government, through the input of Laurent Fabius, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
started to use the word Daesh instead of Islamic State, to refer to the organisation. The word –
which is actually the Arabic acronym of “ad-Dawlah al-Islāmiyah fīl-ʿIrāq wash-Shām”;
Islamic State in Iraq and Sham (ISIS) – is expressly preferred by the French government,
followed by journalists and most of media actors, to clearly differentiate ISIS from both Islam
and any form of legitimate state (Annaix 2014). The debate grew worldwide, especially in the
U.S when President Barack Obama stated in a speech that “ISIL [Islamic State in Iraq and the
Levant] is not Islamic and [...] certainly not a State” (CNN News 2014). In this context, the
article by Graeme Wood published by the Atlantic in March 2015 came as a bombshell as it
clearly stated that “the Islamic State is Islamic. Very Islamic” (Wood 2015). Thus,
categorizing the IS has become a political struggle, given that accepting some of its feature –
even its name – seems to intrinsically imply the legitimation of what it is claiming itself:
being a legitimate Islamic state. A number of reactions – some from Islamic organisations –
have been expressed against the article to qualify the categorization as Islamic. They mainly
highlight that interpretation is a central part of Islam, which Wood got wrong (Rachid 2015),
or that religion is not the best framework to set the discussion on the IS (Berger 2015). The
appropriation of Islam by the IS is also refuted by Shadi Hamid (2015) and Jack Jenkins
(2015) as the latter argues that “just because a group can appropriate Islamic sources and
Islamic symbols [...] doesn’t mean that they get to be the ones who define for the world what
Islam means”.
In such debates, the return to a theoretical background to have a deep understanding of
the IS as a political actor is essential. A reflection around the concept of caliphate, within
Islamic political thought and Islamic historiography, as suggested by the work of Baudoin
Dupret (2014) and Afzal Ashraf (2014), is relevant in this context. On the one hand, Dupret
(2014) argues that the declaration of a caliphate is usurped and, on the other hand, according
to Ashraf (2014), Islamic unity under the same political organization has no basis in history
and was constructed as a myth, since the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1924. Therefore,
my hypothesis is the following:
THE ISLAMIC STATE, LEGITIMACY AND THE INSTITUTION OF CALIPHATE
4
 The caliphate declared by the IS has no foundation in Islamic political thought and no
correspondence with any form of caliphate throughout Islamic history.
Moreover, the question of the legitimacy of the IS as a state is also a large debate.
Even though the recognition as a legitimate member of the international state-based system is
refuted by most of the governments and analysts, some of them recognise that some IS’
features could make this organisation a proto-state: “courts, a tax system, and security and
social services” (Haykel and Bunzel 2014). Based on an approach suggested by Tanisha M.
Fazal (2015) and Peter Harling (2015), I discuss those elements, in a second part, and the
political implications of the declaration of the caliphate.
The first part of this work will present some historic facts and global insight of the IS
as a jihadist movement. Second, I will mobilize some elements of Islamic political thought
and historiography to better understand the concept of caliphate and how the IS’ caliphate has
very few theoretical and historical foundations. Third, I analyse some features of the IS as a
political actor on the regional and international stage to show that they are part of a traditional
perspective of human governance and that the IS has no intention to match with and be
included within a state-based international order.
Profiling the Islamic State
The IS is one of many jihadist organisations active in the Middle East. Its origins
could be dated back to the late 1990s when Abū Mus῾ab al-Zarqāwῑ, an Islamist activist from
Jordan, set up a jihadist training camp in association with al-Qa’eda. Al-Zarqāwῑ had left
Jordan in the late 1980s and joined the jihad against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
(Bunzel 2015; 13). Fleeing from Afghanistan after the U.S. invasion in 2001, al-Zarqāwῑ
headed a jihadist group in Iraq that became known under the name of Jama‘at al-Tawhid
wal’-Jihad (“the Group of God’s Unity and Jihad”) (Bunzel 2015; 14). Al-Zarqāwῑ’s
ideology, one of the main foundational elements of current IS strategy, was considered as
extreme, even for a group such as al-Qa’eda – with which the IS gradually parted.
Considering the Sh’ite community as a greater threat than the Western powers, al-Zarqāwῑ
had a highly polarized perspective on his political fight: those who were not with him on one
side and those who were against him on the other. Between 2002 and 2006, his group
developed itself in Northern Iraq, becoming the branch of al-Qa’eda in Iraq (AQI). In early
2006, the group merged with 5 other jihadist organizations, approaching the structure wanted
by al-Zarqāwῑ. However, the latter was killed in an airstrike in June 2006. In October 2006,
THE ISLAMIC STATE, LEGITIMACY AND THE INSTITUTION OF CALIPHATE
5
the leaders of AQI declared the establishment of “the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI)”. But the
group’s leaders, Abū ‘Umar al-Baghdādῑ and Abū Hamza al-Muhajir as his deputy, were not
very efficient and the organization has had very limited political relevance and legitimacy
until the death of its two leaders in April 2010 (Bunzel 2015). One month later, Abū Bakr alBaghdādῑ
was elected as the new leader of the organization. Sharing the same beliefs as alZarqāwῑ,
al-Baghdādῑ revitalized ISI and, taking advantage of the chaos in Syria, set up a
branch of ISI through the inception of Jabhat al-Nusrah. Though the allegiance of the latter to
ISI was denied by its leader, a large number of fighters joined al-Baghdādῑ, leading to the
inception of “the Islamic State in Iraq and Sham” in April 2013. “After six years and a half of
contraction, the Islamic State was back on the path of expansion” (Bunzel 2015; 25). From
May 2013, the ISIS increased its control in Syria and especially on the town of Raqqa – which
would become its main stronghold in Syria (Fritel 2015). The organisation became well
known of the public in June 2014 when they conquered Mosul and most of the country’s
Sunni territories. On June 29, Abū Muhammad al-‘Adnani – chief spokesman of the ISIS –
official declared on radio the establishment of the caliphate and that the organisation should
be known as the “Islamic State” and no longer as the “Islamic State in Iraq and Sham”. In
parallel, the IS released a press statement, translated in 5 different languages (The Islamic
State 2014). Five days later, al-Baghdādῑ delivered his first speech as a declared caliph in the
great mosque of the newly conquered Mosul.
The IS distances itself from other jihadist and terrorist3
groups because of three main
groups of reasons: a substantial and very varied financial portfolio (al-‘Ubaydi et al. 2014), its
control, until now, over large portions of the Iraqi and Syrian populations and a very active
and efficient propaganda apparatus that spread both an extreme violence and ideology. First,
the IS can count on various sources of income as the exploitation of oil and other natural
resources, agriculture, ransoms and donations. Moreover, the IS raises taxes in the regions it
controls in Iraq and Syria. Those incomes – which would reach US$ hundreds of millions secure
a substantial wealth for the IS, whose “profile and the power of this group are a first in
the history of contemporary terrorism” (Brisard and Martinez 2014). Second, the IS
successfully claims the control on large urban areas in Northern Iraq (the town of Mosul,
North al-Anbar and Salah al-Din governorates) and Syria (the town of Raqqa and Aleppo
governorate)4
. Under its controls, there are also dams, main roads, border crossings and
3
I try to avoid the term “terrorist group” to define the IS because I consider terrorism to be a method, which is
used among many others, by the IS.
4
See annex 1 for more detail.
THE ISLAMIC STATE, LEGITIMACY AND THE INSTITUTION OF CALIPHATE
6
strategic communication routes. The IS has therefore between six and seven million people
under its control throughout Iraq and Syria (Gartenstein-Ross 2015). Finally, the IS, through
its Al-Hayat Media Center, is capable of very broadly diffusing its extreme and brutal tactics,
that include mass killings, beheadings, immolations and other atrocities. In very high quality
and elaborate videos – careful staging, sound and music, the IS broadcasts, in an
unprecedented and extremely crude manner, violent acts that profoundly shock public opinion
worldwide.
The caliphate: how the Islamic State monopolizes an institution
The caliphate in the Qur’ān and Islamic history
Discussing the issue of the caliphate is discussing the question of the exercise of
power in Islam, and especially the question of succession. When the group Islamic State in
Iraq and Sham (ISIS), led by Abū Bakr al-Baghdādῑ, declared the reestablishment of the
caliphate on the territories it controls and its renaming to “Islamic State” in June 2014, most
Western medias presented it as the revival of an ancient – almost mythical - institution, that
was dormant since the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1924 (see for example L’Obs 2014;
Le Figaro 2014 or Withnall 2014 for The Independent). But what exactly is this institution?
Understanding the concept of caliphate as an institution implies understanding its foundations
in the Qur’ān, how it has been understood by the first Muslims and how it has been theorized
and recuperated in the development of Islamic political thought.
Without going into too much theological detail – which are not, as we are going to see,
the main focus of IS leaders – the concept of caliphate has to be replaced within its
foundational context. The first step is to get back to the roots of the word. The Arabic term
khalῑfah – which has “a rich and varied semantic development” (Watt 1968; 32) - has the
generally accepted meaning of “successor”, as the “one who takes the place of another after
him in some matter” (Watt 1968; 32). It occurs in the Qur’ān several times – under its
singular and plural forms – but do not refer to any form of political succession. Indeed,
according to most commentators, the meaning of the word in the Qur’ān refers more to a
concept of peoples and tribes; successive generations of mankind that Allāh put on Earth
(Watt 1968; Paret 1970). Lamrabet (2010) clarifies this perspective by arguing that the
khalῑfah is the human race, that Allāh blessed by granting it the management of His Inception.
“If the human beings are khalῑfah, they are not in its literal meaning – representatives of Allāh
on Earth – but the depositories of His noble Mission whose the Creator assigned them”*
THE ISLAMIC STATE, LEGITIMACY AND THE INSTITUTION OF CALIPHATE
7
(Lamrabet 2010) There is no direct and explicit reference to any form of representation or
delegation of power, but only of human generations. The institution of caliphate has therefore
no direct root in the Qur’ān.
However, the most important perspective is not how the term is best conceptualized
within the Holy Texts but how it has been interpreted by the first followers of the Prophet
Muhammad during the early Islamic era, in the 7th
century. When Muhammad died in 632,
neither his teachings nor the Qur’ān clearly stated the process to appoint its successor, even
though “it was assumed [...] that someone has to succeed him as Imam (Leader) [after his
death]” (Black 2001). Three Imam were successively elected: Abū-Bakr (r. 632-4), ῾Umar (r.
634-46) and ῾Uthmān (r. 646-56). All three were chosen from Muhammad’s tribe, the
Quraysh – the first by Muhammad’s companions and the two latter by a council of notables
(Black 2001). According to Watt (1968), a Meccan leader (that is, from the Quraysh tribe)
was considered as a necessary condition to ensure the unity of the Ummah5
. During
῾Uthmān’s reign, tribal dissensions appeared among the Ummah. After ῾Uthmān died and ῾Alῑ
– a cousin of the Prophet – took his place as Imam, the Ummah divided itself and endured a
civil war. Ali and its supporters were defeated and Ali assassinated in 661, leading to the
establishment of Ummayad dynasty (Esposito 1984).
During this period of the four first Imam, as it is highlighted by Watt (1968) and
Miquel (1982), the title of khalῑfah rasūl Allāh (the caliph of the Messenger of God) – mainly
attached to Abū-Bakr – had a secular origin and its power did not stem from the Qu’rān.
Indeed, except for the leading of public prayers, Abū-Bakr did not deputize for Muhammad.
The title of khalῑfah slowly institutionalized itself as designating the Imam of the Community
through repeated practices and customs. Indeed, both authors emphasize that the prime mover
of the decision was the cohesion and unity of the Ummah. The election of the four first
successors of Muhammad were therefore based on a social and political need – the need of
having someone leading the Ummah. It is important to raise that the Qur’ān was essential,
even though it is not the direct foundation of the caliphate, as the central inspiration and guide
of the first Muslims. They considered at that moment that the social and political organization
they were setting up was a legitimate one, regarding the teachings of the Holy Texts.
However, during the Ummayad era (661-750) – whose first ruler was Mu῾awiya I and
was from the Quraysh tribe, the caliphs of the new empire – whose capital was established in
Damascus – started to “place a new interpretation on the word in order to exalt their office”
5
An Arabic term to refer to the whole community of Muslims.
THE ISLAMIC STATE, LEGITIMACY AND THE INSTITUTION OF CALIPHATE
8
(Watt 1968; 33). The process of institutionalization continued. They considered themselves as
appointed by Allāh and built their theory by quoting the Qu’rān. One of the main verse which
was mobilized was Sūrah 2:30: “And (remember) when your Lord said to the angels: “Verily,
I am going to place (mankind) generations after generations [khalῑfa] on earth” [...]”6
. The
concept attached to the initial word was therefore re-appropriated and justified by an adapted
approach of the Qur’ān to legitimize a form of political organization (Watt 1968).
In 750 however, after 30 years of growing instability, the Umayyad dynasty felt
replaced by the ῾Abbāsid caliphate (750-1258) – whose rulers were also from the Quraysh
tribe. Throughout this empire – at least until the early 11th
century, the Islamic civilization
flourished, politically and culturally. It is considered as the “Golden Age” of Islam (Esposito
1984). During this dynasty, the institution of caliphate strengthened itself, again to legitimize
the power exercised by the successive caliphs, who enjoyed an absolute power, both political
and religious. Moreover, the institution, which had hardly been theorized previously, became
the subject of several Islamic scholars’s works, among whom al-Māwardi’s Al-ahkām assultāniyya
(“the Ordinances of Government”) is the most recognized. As highlighted by
Esposito (1984; 30), those theorizations were closer to the “delineation of a moral ideal” than
the “draft of government regulations or guidelines”. Indeed, from the 11th
century, the empire
were slowly collapsing. In his work, written between 1045 and 1058, al-Māwardi presented
the ideal features of the caliphate as a political and religious institution. Among others, he
defined the seven condition of the Imamate (Leadership) – that is, to become caliph – and one
of which is being a member of the Quraysh tribe. The informal rule thus became a written
institutional condition.
From 1258 and the fall of Baghdad – and thus of the ῾Abbāsid caliphate, invaded by
the Mongols – the caliphate as an institution that had been quite successful in ensuring the
unity of the whole Ummah since the early Islamic era disappeared and was replaced by
several sultanates. The title of caliph had lost most of its signification. Only the Mamlūk
sultan of Egypt, Baybars, saw an opportunity to legitimize his rule and installed a member of
the ῾Abbāsid family as a caliph in Cairo (Watt 1968; 108). After the Ottoman invasion of
Egypt in 1517, the current caliph was shortly taken to Constantinople by the invaders, but its
influence was null. He died in 1543 without any successor. Only 200 years later – probably
after 1750, the Ottoman sultans claimed that the last caliph had transferred the legitimacy
attached to the caliphate to them. According to most historians and commentators, this was a
6
All quotes from the Qu’rān are excerpted from the English translation by Dr. Muhammad Taqῑ-ud-Dῑn al-Hilālῑ
and Dr. Muhammad Mushin Khān.
THE ISLAMIC STATE, LEGITIMACY AND THE INSTITUTION OF CALIPHATE
9
fiction and the monopolization of the caliphate by the Ottomans rulers was only a strategic
move (Watt 1968; Enayat 1982). Since then, however, the institution regained “some
recognition from Muslims throughout the world [...] due to the fact that the Ottoman sultan
had become by far the most powerful Muslim sovereign” (Watt 1968; 109). In 1924, after the
defeat of World War I and the pressure of secularization, the Ottoman caliphate was
abolished.
The caliphate is thus a body of political and social institutions; constructed, modified
and theorized by Muslims leaders and scholars. Like any form of arrangements of power and
of leadership of a society, its legitimation stems from the people’s acceptance of the
relationship of domination (see Weber 1921). But it would be flawed to clearly divide the
religious approach to the social and political aspects. As Black (2001; 13) highlights, the very
concept of Islam is the fusion between “religion and government, sacred and secular”. One
cannot separate one from the other. The concept of caliphate, rooted in the beliefs of the first
Muslims, has been gradually adapted to the circumstances imposed by the course of events
and constructed around the community, to ensure its unity and cohesion. The concept of an
ideal caliphate – a unique power, stemming from Allāh, owned by the community and
represented by the caliph, even when suffering from the vicissitudes of History, maintained
and adapted itself unregularly, under one form or the other of legitimized governmental
institutions (Miquel 1982).
The caliphate mobilized by the Islamic State
The question is then how is the caliphate mobilized by the IS, regarding the elements
just explored? The analysis of the statement “This is the promise of Allāh” – released by the
IS propaganda apparatus on June 29 2014 in five different languages (Arabic along with four
translations) – allows us to paint a broad picture of the IS’ use of the concept of caliphate. The
categories of recipients targeted by this message – at least the English version – are quite
easily identifiable. As every single Islamic concept is translated or explained, we can figure
out that the objective is to make their assertions understandable even by non-Muslim or
individuals not accustomed to Islam. But more importantly, I argue that the main targets of
the IS scholars are all Muslims who are already aware of, or involved in, a form of Islamic
radicalism and who are, in a way or another, stuck in a situation of inferiority or humiliation.
The whole argumentation is based on the reference to the Arabs before Islam – who were “in
THE ISLAMIC STATE, LEGITIMACY AND THE INSTITUTION OF CALIPHATE
10
the depths of ignorance and blinding darkness” (The Islamic State 2014; 2) – and to whom the
Revelation gave a tremendous power. This power allowed them to defeat their enemy, even in
a situation of high inferiority. In an audacious way, the text compares the Revelation, through
which Allāh “unified [the Muslims], united their rank” and which made the first believers
unbelievably stronger, to what the IS offers through the re-establishment of the caliphate.
Their goal is then to convince more Muslims to join their movement. Thus, the caliphate is
the cornerstone of their argumentation. I analyse the question in regard with two different
perspectives: the caliphate as a fixed and timeless institution and the caliphate as the unique
legitimate community.
Firstly, IS scholars clearly present the caliphate as a strong and unambiguous
institution. Indeed, they first explain that the caliphate directly stems from the Qur’ān. They
state Sūrah 2:30 to justify it: “Allāh (the Exalted) said, {And mention when your Lord said to
the angels, “Indeed, I will make upon the earth a khalῑfah”}” (The Islamic State 2014; 4). As
we have seen previously, the implicit meaning has nothing to do with a form of political
organisation and is therefore consciously misused by the IS to justify their declaration.
Indeed, the translation by Dr. al-Hilālῑ and Dr. Khān (1977) mentions “(mankind) generations
after generations” instead of khalῑfah7
. Moreover, it is interesting to note that, according to
Watt (1968), the same Sūrah has been used by the first Umayyad caliphs to justify their rule.
Second, as it has been explained at length, the institutions corresponding to the
caliphate were transformed throughout the centuries. From the first four traditional and
“ideal” caliphates, the institution completely changed until it was re-mobilized by the
Ottoman Empire in the 18th
century. But the statement (The Islamic State 2014; 4-5)
emphasizes this perspective several times by repeating the khilāfah, using the determiner the:
“It is the khilāfah [...]. It is the khilāfah”, “[i]ndeed, it is the State. Indeed, it is the khilāfah”
on the next page or “[i]t is the State – the state for the Muslims” a few lines later. Therefore,
the single institution that the IS statement refers to as an almost mythical single institution
does not actually exist nor existed.
7
Others translations of the Qur’an present a literal translation for khalῑfah as a vice-regent (Ali 1934), viceroy
(Pickthall 1930) or successive authority (Saheeh International 2010). Commentators and analysts are however
almost unanimous, as it has been presented previously.
THE ISLAMIC STATE, LEGITIMACY AND THE INSTITUTION OF CALIPHATE
11
Third, the IS statement refers to some “essentials necessary for khilāfah” (The Islamic
State 2014; 4) and the fact that “khālifah Ibrāhῑm [...] has fulfilled the conditions for
[establishing the] khilāfah [...]”. As explained before, the mentioned conditions and essentials
were completely constructed through uses and customs, associated with theories of the
institution constructed by scholars. The unilateral declaration of a caliphate is barely
justifiable on those legal and objective conditions presented as such.
Secondly, this statement’s approach of IS’ caliphate strongly refers to it as the only
legitimate Muslims community. First, the uniqueness of the first Islamic communities successively
under the first four caliphs and both the Umayyad and ῾Abbāsid dynasties – is
mobilized to legitimize their caliphate and delegitimize any other form of social Muslim
organization – especially other jihadist groups; “after the consolidation and the establishment
of the khilāfah, the legality of your groups and organizations has become invalid” (The
Islamic State 2014; 6). But the situation is completely different in the early 21st
century than
between the 7th
and 10th
centuries. As we have seen previously, the legitimacy that was
accorded to the caliphate as a form of government rooted in its social construction by the
leaders and consciously recognized by the people under its rule. One the one hand, there is
very little recognition of the IS’ caliphate among the Muslim community – except other
Salafist militant groups such as Boko Haram (Alkhshali and Almasy 2015), which represent
only a very tiny proportion of Muslims throughout the world. On the other hand, the IS is not
the only group that has declared a caliphate since the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. The
Ahmadiyya Muslim Community, created in India in the late 19th
century, also claims to be led
by a caliph, His Holiness Hadhrat Mirza Masroor Ahmad (Ahmadiyya Muslim Community
2015). The Ahmadiyya Muslim Community claims a “membership exceeding tens of
millions” and their leader has been received by U.S. Senators on Capitol Hill and the
European Parliament in Brussels in 2012, which confirm that to some extent it is considered
as a very legitimate organization. Even though the legitimacy of this organization will not be
discussed here, the simple fact that another strong group also claims to be led by a caliph
strongly undermines IS claim to uniqueness as the legitimate caliphate.
Second, the statement refers to a certain form of religious obligation to establish a
caliphate, when conditions are met. Indeed, they state that “[i]t is the khῑlafah – the
abandoned obligation of the era”, “[the khῑlafah], which the Muslims are sinful for if they do
not try to establish” because the “Islamic State has no shar’ῑ (legal) constraints or excuse that
THE ISLAMIC STATE, LEGITIMACY AND THE INSTITUTION OF CALIPHATE
12
can justify delaying or neglecting the establishment of the khῑlafah [...]” (The Islamic State
2014; 4). Such an obligation appears nowhere is the Holy Texts or in Islamic political theory.
It simply used as an argument to legitimize – without any base – a so-called divine necessity
of the caliphate.
Thus, the IS appeals to the caliphate as a symbol of Islam golden era and political and
cultural very strong influence. As highlighted by Miquel (1982), the ideal represented by the
early Islamic community, closely knit around the Prophet and its direct successors and which
maintained itself despite all, is an extremely efficient representation of Islam. Indeed, as we
have understood, the caliphate, throughout its centuries of existence, has had great
significance for a lot of Muslims. But we can clearly see here that the IS mobilizes the
caliphate as a form of traditional government, without the social consensus that rooted its
legitimacy. It is a form of nostalgic hijacking of the institution that might be likened to the
concept of “folklorization”, which is mainly related to religious practices. In his sociological
thought, French scholar Michel de Certeau defines this concept as the new status of traditional
concepts and symbols, cut from their community and socials meanings in which they were
constructed and pulled out from the constraints of an authorized memory (Mary 1995). The
caliphate, as mobilized by the IS, has become a symbol of this revival of traditional concepts,
in which we can very clearly distinguish the “integral or literal connection to the Scriptures
which characterizes Islamic and Jewish fundamentalist movements”* (Mary 1995; 130-1).
Political perspectives on the caliphate
As we have seen in the previous section, the caliphate is closer to a nostalgic reference
to an ancient institution – with the instrumental purpose of touching the spirit and the heart of
potential new supporters - than the establishment of a recognize political structure. However,
the declaration of the caliphate by the IS has had some important consequences, which I
tackle in this part.
Discussing the IS as a political actor is delicate, because according to the approach
that is used, the implications – regarding theorizing but also policy making – are completely
different. For example, an approach discussing the IS as a state in the Western conception – or
trying to become a state – refers to principles of international law principles and conditions to
be a state within the international system. Both have foundations in the construction and
THE ISLAMIC STATE, LEGITIMACY AND THE INSTITUTION OF CALIPHATE
13
institutionalization of the “nation-state” since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. For example,
this approach is used by Shany et al. (2014) among others, as they compare the political
features of the IS to the conditions or rules to be a state in the current international system.
The approach mobilized in this work is slightly different. Following the conclusions reached
in the previous part, the analysis of the IS as a political actor and based on the concept of
caliphate cannot – and should not – be a state-based approach. Indeed, in this context, asking
the question of the IS as a state or not is a highly ethnocentric approach of human governance.
Moreover, it completely closes any form of analyses that are not included in the conventional
definition of state. Therefore, starting from the reflection on the caliphate, I tackle the
question under two different angles. First, I discuss how the caliphate allowed the IS to
position itself among jihadist groups. Second, I present how the institution of caliphate is
integrated in what I identify as two main goals of the IS.
One caliphate to rule them all?
The caliphate is not only mobilized by the IS, on the jihadist international scene. As it
is explained in length by Bunzel (2015) and al-‘Ubaydi (2014), the establishment of the
caliphate has been discussed between al-Zarqāwῑ and Ayman al-Zawahῑrῑ, current leader of
al-Qa’eda (AQ), in their correspondence in early 2000s. Moreover, Bunzel (2015) highlights
that the reestablishment of the caliphate had been frequently mentioned by Osama Bin-Laden.
Indeed, the institution of caliphate particularly resonates in the Salafist jihadist groups, which
consider themselves as the only true Muslims (Bunzel 2015). However, IS and AQ’s
perspectives strongly differs on the strategies to implement the caliphate. AQ has a long-term
strategy as and their governance and territorial incentives are less strong than the IS. The
latter, by defending a short-term strategy, and establishing the caliphate without consulting
AQ leadership, strongly positioned themselves on the jihadist scene, mainly toward potential
followers, who saw an increased legitimacy in their organization. Zelin (2014) highlights that
the caliphate “[...] is quite appealing to jihadists. ISIS is not only talking the talk about
establishing an Islamic state, it is walking the walk”. More recently, the IS and the Taliban
declared a mutual jihad against each other. This clearly show how the IS’ extreme strategy,
among which the declaration of the caliphate imposes a strong-perceived legitimacy, gave a
very clear and unambiguous identity to the IS, that placed it in the foreground on the race for
global jihad.
THE ISLAMIC STATE, LEGITIMACY AND THE INSTITUTION OF CALIPHATE
14
The IS: political organization or militant movement?
The analysis of the declaration of the caliphate also have relevance to categorize the
IS. As mentioned before, it is extremely important to see beyond the Western scheme of
thought incorporated in the concept of “state” and to comprehend the IS political authority as
a traditional form of governance. First, the IS strongly and expressly despises any form of
modern political organization. On the one hand, it strongly rejects the current map of the
Middle East. Abū Hamza al-Muhajir, leader of the Islamic State in Iraq, declared in 2006:
“We are not the sons of Sykes-Picot. We are the sons of the Prophet Muhammad” (in Bunzel
2015; 18). The current borders between states in the region have absolutely no meaning in
their ideology and the destruction of the border between Iraq and Syria proves it (see their
action in Vice News 2014). On the other hand, faithful to the Salafist ideology, the IS also
rejects any form of nationalism and democratic governance (The Islamic State 2014; 5-6).
Indeed, democrats “err in assigning “partners” to God in legislation, deemed the prerogative
of the Divine Legislator” (Bunzel 2015). The objective of the IS is clearly to implement a
form of traditional governance that is rooted in the Qur’ān and Muhammad’s teachings, which
expresses itself, among others, through the institution of caliphate. It is a central element to
have a better understanding of IS ideology but also the geopolitical situation in the Middle
East. However, an amalgam is occurring between features of IS’ caliphate and Western
conceptions of the state. Indeed, some of their features could be considered as similar, but are
not. Any form of social and political organization of a society – appointing leaders, creating
structures dividing responsibilities – does not necessarily refer to a “state”. Taxes, for
example, which are foundational features of the “nation-state”, do not have the same source at
all, as the taxes slapped by the IS (zakāt: obligatory alms, jizya: tax imposed on non-Muslims)
have a religious foundations in the Qur’ān (zakāt in 7:156 among others, and jizyah in 9:29).
As for the taxes that would be imposed on border crossing to truck drivers, it looks more like
criminal extortion than an institutionalized tax (Reed 2015).
The IS is therefore clearly not trying to be a state or to be included in the state-based
international system, which it hates so much. As suggested by Fazal (2015), the IS should not
be understood as a secessionist movement, which would “seek the benefits of statehood” but
more as a form of revolutionary and fundamentalist religious movement, whose claimed goals
were reasonably successful during the past years. Thus, the IS’ caliphate poses a tremendous
challenge to both the state-based international system and the ability – and wish - of the West
to understand a contradictory perspective on power. A further questioning would be here to
THE ISLAMIC STATE, LEGITIMACY AND THE INSTITUTION OF CALIPHATE
15
know to what extent the implementation of such a form of traditional political governance is
possible and sustainable within the current international system.
Conclusion
Is the Islamic State Islamic or not? This question is tackled in numerous works on the
IS and jihadist groups, and the answers – whatever they are - have extremely heavy
implications. Indeed, the underpinning question is “What is the IS?”, and eventually what the
possible policies to struggle against it are. The contribution of this paper among this broad
and delicate debate is a reflection on the institution of caliphate, which leads to two main
conclusions. First, the caliphate, as mobilized by the IS is very far from being rooted in the
Qur’ān and from the caliphates through Islamic history. It is a “folkorized” mobilization of
this political institution, which has been socially and politically constructed and has taken
several forms since the 8th
century. Second, the IS does not try to build a state in its Western
conception but a traditional form of political governance, which they claim to be rooted in the
Qur’ān and for which the caliphate is the symbol. They also claim to be the only legitimate
Muslim Ummah. However, the legitimation of the IS does not depend on sound foundations
in Islamic thought and history but on how Muslims could understand and being convinced –
and some are indeed - by those arguments. Understanding this point is extremely important to
avoid going on the very dangerous path of the conception of those events as a war of the West
against Islam, as some commentators have insinuated in their analyses (among others Cohen
2015). The religious issue is here very important in order to get a better understand of this
jihadist group, but replacing the IS in a social and political context is the cornerstone of a
productive reflection on the current situation in the Middle East.
Acknowledgments
The author would like to warmly thank Dr. Vincent Durac for his careful supervision
and helpful support.
THE ISLAMIC STATE, LEGITIMACY AND THE INSTITUTION OF CALIPHATE
16
Annexes
Annex 1: ISIS sanctuary (April 2015)
Annexe 1: Territories influences of the IS in Syria and Iraq. State: April 2015 (Source:
Institute for the Study of War).
THE ISLAMIC STATE, LEGITIMACY AND THE INSTITUTION OF CALIPHATE
17
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