5
The Czech Parliamentary Regime After 1989:
Origins, Developments and Challenges1
Miloš Brunclík, Michal Kubát
Abstract:
The article discusses the major trajectories of the developments of the Czech
democratic polity after 1989. It also discusses institutional traditions of the
Czech parliamentary regimes dating back to the period of the First
Czechoslovak Republic in the inter-war period. The article also analyses the
major problems which the Czech parliamentary regime now faces. It is
argued that the direct election of the president introduced in 2012–2013
was a serious blunder made by Czech political elites. Instead, the authors of
the article argue, the desirable reform efforts should focus on rationalizing
the regime in terms of strengthening of the prime ministers within the
cabinet and the cabinet itself within the parliamentary system. The reform
of the Czech democratic polity should also include putting in pace an
electoral system that would facilitate making stable and ideologically
coherent government majorities.
Keywords:
Czech Republic; parliamentary regime; consensus democracy; majoritarian
democracy; rationalized parliamentarism; electoral system
This article is a comprehensive analytical introduction to the monothematic
issue of Acta Politologica dedicated to the political system of the Czech
Republic and its problems. The objective of this article is twofold. First, its
task is to provide an analytical overview of the development of the Czech
democratic polity from 1989 to the present. Of course, it is not a historical
essay mapping the past 25 years. Rather, we are concerned with main
principles (including key systemic changes that occurred in the Czech
Republic and which have modified its democratic regime) on which the
Czech democratic polity is built. The article also focuses on certain critical
moments which the Czech democratic polity has faced. This aim is related to
the second objective of our article, which is to provide an international
readership with a Czech expert discussion on the nature of the Czech
democratic polity, on its crisis and also – and perhaps primarily – on
perspectives of its reform.
1
This article has been elaborated within research project no. 15-01907S (title: “Does
Direct Election Matter? Analysing the Effect of Direct Election of President on the
Working of the Political Regime in the Czech Republic”). The project is sponsored by the
Grant Agency of the Czech Republic.
2016 | Vol. 8 | No. 2
6
Our text is divided into three main parts. In the first part, entitled
“Origins”, we identify main systemic traditions on which the contemporary
Czech polity is built. It is above all the political system of the First
Czechoslovak Republic (1918–1938), which became the main source of
inspiration for the restoration of the Czech democracy after 1989. We also
briefly discuss the era of the communist Czechoslovakia (1948–1989), which
out of natural reasons did not become a source of inspiration for the later
democratic polity, yet it left its marks on the developments of the
Czechoslovak and Czech political system.
The second part is called “Developments”. Here we present an overview
of the basic principles of the Czech democratic system with a particular focus
on classifying the Czech polity among democratic regime types. This
question is particularly relevant, especially in connection with the change of
the method of electing the president, who was originally elected by the
parliament, but following the 2012 constitutional change the Czech head of
state is now elected by a direct popular vote. This institutional change
sparked a debate about the nature of the Czech regime, not only in the
Czech political science, but also in foreign literature.
The third part of the article, “Challenges”, is devoted to problems of the
Czech polity that are systemic in nature. In our analysis we bring answers to
three questions: What are the problems? What are their causes? What are
the possibilities of eliminating or at least mitigating these problems? We also
examine how these three questions are addressed by Czech political science
and also (in part) by Czech constitutional law.
1. Origins
The Czech Republic was established as a new state on 1 January 1993 as a
result of the so-called “Velvet Divorce”, as the peaceful division of
Czechoslovakia is sometimes called (e.g. Agnew 2004: chapter 15). This
dissolution of the former federal state was not a spontaneous event, but a
process prepared and planned in advance (Kipke, Vodička et al. 1993; Musil
et al. 1995). This process also included setting constitutional and institutional
foundations of the new state. In fact, the two successor countries – the
Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic – designed and approved their
respective constitutions before 1993. Slovakia did so in September and the
Czech Republic in December 1992. Hence, although the Czech Republic
became a new state, its institutional foundations were laid down earlier.
Moreover, the new institutional structure was not built from scratch. The
founding fathers of the constitutional and political system of the Czech
Republic had to deal with its historical heritage, be it of positive
(continuation) or negative (rupture) significance.
The Czech Parliamentary Regime After 1989: Origins, Developments and Challenges
7
1.1. The First Czechoslovak Republic (1918–1938)
The constitutional system of the Czech Republic largely carried on the
tradition of the constitutional system of the so-called First Czechoslovak
Republic (1918–1938). Indeed, the architects of the Czech constitution,
adopted in 1992, were significantly inspired by the 1920 constitution of
Czechoslovakia (Gerloch, Hřebejk, Zoubek 2002: 78; Mlsna 2011: 24-31). In
order to understand peculiarities of the contemporary Czech democratic
regime (and its constitutional system), it is necessary to briefly outline key
principles of the Czechoslovak constitution as well as the political situation
after 1920.
Although Czechoslovakia became one of the successor states of the
Austro-Hungarian Empire, its constitutional and political settings were (with
few exceptions2
) created deliberately from scratch, i.e. with no connection
to the previous Austro-Hungarian tradition. Both Czechoslovak constitutions
– the interim one of 1918 and that of 1920 – drew from various sources. A
major inspiration for the constitution of 1920 was played by the American
and French models (Third Republic). While the U.S. constitution became an
important model for the preamble, as well as for sections on the separation
of powers and the judiciary, the French constitution influenced mainly the
nature of the Czechoslovak parliament (Broklová 1992: 22-23).
Although the American and French constitutions are significantly
different, because they represent very different types of democratic
regimes, the essential characteristic of the Czechoslovak constitution
became a republican parliamentarism. A strictly parliamentary, not a
presidential, form of government was enshrined in the constitution. It was a
parliamentary system based on the principle of proportionality and
consensus3
. The Czechoslovak parliamentarism was, however, marked by a
series of specifics, one of which became a special position of the president.
Although the U.S. model of presidency was not transferred to the
Czechoslovak constitution, it was considered. Even the founder of the First
Republic and its first president, Tomáš G. Masaryk, was positively inclined
towards the American model of presidency (Masaryk 1938: 258, 576-577), as
he did not want to be just a passive and representative head of state
(Broklová 2001: 34; Kopeček, Mlejnek 2013: 34)4
. However, the final version
2
E.g. the concept of civil rights was borrowed from the Austrian model (Broklová 1992:
23).
3
In particular, it is an extremely proportional electoral system which was for elections of
both parliamentary chambers (Chytilek et al. 2009; Novotná 2004). The political system
of the First Republic was in Lijphart’s eyes so “proportional” that he hailed it as one of
the typical examples of consociational democracy (Lijphart 1977: 33).
4
On the other hand, Masaryk had a certain scepticism of the presidency (i.e. a sort of
monarchical rule of one man) (Bankowicz 2015: 139). He feared its presumed
incompatibility with democracy, but finally acknowledged its inevitability: “Any form of
directorate would be in the letter compatible with democracy, but even if there were
2016 | Vol. 8 | No. 2
8
of the constitution did not provide for the existence of a strong or “ruling”
president, although she/he received some significant powers in relation to
the government and parliament. On the other hand, it was primarily a
political practice that made him an important and influential figure of the
Czechoslovak politics, society and culture. First of all Masaryk, but also the
second Czechoslovak president, Edvard Beneš – through their political as
well as moral significance – clearly moved beyond the formal constitutional
powers (Bankowicz 2015; Klimek 1996; Kopeček, Mlejnek 2013). “The
president liberator”, “Daddy Masaryk”, as the first president was commonly
nicknamed, significantly contributed to the general image and perception of
the president as a “monarchist” or perhaps even almost a sacred institution
seated at the Prague Castle – the traditional seat of Czech kings (Pithart
2014)5
. Constitutional and political traditions of the First Republic were
therefore based on two essentially contradictory elements –
parliamentarism on the one hand and influential presidency on the other.
1.2. Communist Czechoslovakia
The tradition of the presidency was so strong that even the communists
after the February 1948 coup d’état did not dare to replace the institution of
the president with a collective head of state on the Soviet model. Thus,
communist Czechoslovakia was the only country of the Eastern Bloc which
kept the individual head of state for the entire duration of the communist
regime from 1948–19896
. On the face of it, the political system of
communist Czechoslovakia maintained some “First Republic” elements (e.g.
the institution of the president of the republic). However, the communist
system brought about a major rupture in the developments of the
Czechoslovak political systems, and nearly all ties with the previous period
were cut. While the former communist constitution of May 1948 still
contained the principles of separation of powers and parliamentary regime
(e.g. a responsible government, president, etc. which were of course purely
formal, and in practice these principles were not respected), the “socialist”
constitution of July 1960 enshrined the principle of unity of state power,
whose only formal bearers were representative bodies. None of these
principles was affected by the constitutional law on the Czechoslovak
more presidents, one of them would inevitably have the greatest influence and
authority” (Masaryk 1938: 576).
5
According to some authors, the roots of this perception can be found in the worship of
the Austro-Hungarian Emperor and King Franz Joseph I. (Rak 2013).
6
In addition to the historical traditions, there were other reasons for maintaining the
institution of the president. First, the regime sought to incarnate symbolically in one
person the leading role of the Communist Party and the state. In other words, the aim
of this move was to symbolize the links between the authority of the party and the
state. Second, there was a pragmatic interest in appointing the Communist Party’s chief,
Klement Gottwald, as the president. This move was to symbolically accomplish the
communist coup in 1948. Third, individual ambitions of communist leaders to become
the head of state also played a role (Šimíček, Kysela 2009: 323-324).
The Czech Parliamentary Regime After 1989: Origins, Developments and Challenges
9
Federation from October 1968, which formally transformed a unitary state in
the two-member federation consisting of the Czech Socialist Republic and
the Slovak Socialist Republic. The National Assembly was then transformed
into the bicameral Federal Assembly, which was characterized as the highest
body of the state power7
. It was therefore a kind of government by the
assembly which was, of course, purely formal, because the real holder of
power in the state was the Communist Party, which was built on the
principle of democratic centralism. Moreover, the party monopoly in the
state was constitutionally enshrined (Šimíček, Kysela 2009; Balík et al. 2003).
Even though the institution of the president was retained in the
constitution as a formal element of continuity with the democratic
Czechoslovakia, it did not enjoy any constitutionally privileged status. His
constitutional role was purely representational (Šimíček, Kysela 2009: 325).
The political practice varied, though. Given the fact that the centre of power
in the state resided in the hands of the Communist Party’s leadership and
not in formal state institutions, the presidents (Klement Gottwald, Antonín
Novotný, Gustáv Husák), who were simultaneously the heads of the
Communist Party, became de facto ruling presidents. Paradoxically enough,
this peculiar and rather crooked means actually preserved the tradition of
influential presidents.
2. Developments
The fall of communism in 1989 opened the door for the democratic
transformation of the political system. The short period of the postNovember
Czechoslovakia (1989–1992) did not provide much inspiration for
the constitutional system of the successor Czech Republic.8
Czechoslovakia –
after the necessary amendments to the Socialist constitution (particularly
the abolition of the leading role of the Communist Party) – did not accede to
the adoption of a new democratic constitution9
. The political system
developed largely spontaneously10
, as the main themes of the period were
7
The Federal Assembly was designed as a purely symmetrical bicameralism, where
neither of the chambers could outvote the other. In addition, there was a ban on
national outvoting, which meant that Members of Parliament elected in the Czech
Republic could not override the MPs elected in the Slovak Republic and vice versa. In
practice, however, this did not matter, because the Federal Assembly passed its laws
unanimously (Šimíček, Kysela 2009: 318-319).
8
Needless to say, this conclusion does not apply to the political system as a whole. For
example, foundations of the Czech political parties and party system were laid at that
time.
9
According to the memoirs of President Václav Havel, no one was willing to accept the
task of writing a new constitution, so Havel himself took on the challenge. His proposal
for a democratic federal constitution reached the parliament, but it was never passed
(Havel 2006: 93-94).
10
The first non-communist Prime Minister of the Czech Republic, Petr Pithart, recalled in
his memoirs that he could not obey the federal constitution, which was for the new
democratic system completely unsuitable. On the other hand, there was no Czech
2016 | Vol. 8 | No. 2
10
the development of political pluralism, free elections, economic
transformation (especially privatization of state property) and also, or
perhaps above all, discussions on relations between the Czech and Slovak
parts of the federation which then resulted in debates on the division of
Czechoslovakia. Instead of debates on the Czechoslovak constitution, the
debates on future constitutions of the Czech Republic and the Slovak
Republic became eventually much more relevant.
2.1. Major principles of the Czech political system
As mentioned above, the Czech constitution was approved by a large
majority of the Czech National Council on 16 December 199211
. The only
historical heritage, which was suitable to follow, were the constitutional and
political traditions of the First Republic12
. This is precisely what Czech
politicians largely did. As Czech political scientist Josef Mlejnek put it (2015:
50): “(...) the Czech constitution was essentially a creative copy of the first
Czechoslovak constitution (...)”, although of course with many changes.
Above all, two main principles of the Czechoslovak political system were
incorporated into the new constitution: a consensus model of democracy
and a parliamentary form of government. The consensual nature of the
Czech political system can be well demonstrated through the well known
theory of majoritarian and consensus democracy by Arend Lijphart.
Table no.1: Lijphart’s models of democracy and the Czech Republic
Majoritarian model Consensus model
Concentration of executive power
in single-party majority cabinets
versus
executive power-sharing in broad
multiparty coalitions
rather yes
Executive dominance over
legislature
versus
executive-legislative balance of
power
rather yes
Two-party system versus
Multiparty system
Yes
Majoritarian and disproportional
electoral systems
versus
Proportional representation
Rather yes
Pluralist interest group systems versus Coordinated and “corporatist”
constitution to define the scope of his competence. Although he backed the policies of
his cabinet, Pithart could hardly influence its composition. This was in line with the still
valid constitutional principle of unity of state power. The prime ministers still depended
entirely on the Czech National Council, respectively its presidium (Pithart 2015: 283-
286).
11
The constitution was approved by the 200-member Czech parliament, not by a
referendum. All but two MPs were present for the vote. In total 172 deputies voted in
favour, 16 voted against and 10 abstained (Gerloch, Hřebejk, Zoubek 2002: 77).
12
Similar to the cases of the communist Czechoslovakia, the semi-democratic tradition of
the so-called Second Republic (1938–1939), the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia
(1939–1945) and the so-called Third Republic (1945–1948) were completely
unacceptable (Balík et al. 2003).
The Czech Parliamentary Regime After 1989: Origins, Developments and Challenges
11
with free-for-all competition
among groups
interest group systems aimed at
compromise and concertation
Rather yes
Unitary and centralized
government
Rather yes
versus
Federal and
decentralized government
Concentration of legislative
power in a unicameral legislature
versus
Division of legislative power
between two equally strong but
differently constituted houses
Rather yes
Flexible constitutions that can be
amended by simple majorities
versus
Rigid constitutions that can be
changed only by extraordinary
majorities
Rather yes
Systems in which legislatures
have the final word on the
constitutionality of their own
legislation
versus
Systems in which laws are subject
to a judicial review of their
constitutionality by supreme or
constitutional courts
Yes
Central banks that are dependent
on the executive
versus
Independent central banks
Rather yes
Source: own elaboration based on (Lijphart 1999: 3-4).
The Czech political system does not fully meet all the features of Lijphart’s
consensual model of democracy, but the consensual features clearly
predominate. Czech cabinets are usually coalition governments, but they are
rarely “broad” ones. There is a general balance between the executive and
legislative power, but looking at this feature closer, the parliament has an
upper hand at the expense of the government. The electoral system is
proportional, but with slight majority effects13
. The parliament is bicameral,
but it is not a symmetrical bicameralism, because the Chamber of Deputies
(the lower house) is significantly stronger than the Senate. And so on.
Nevertheless, it is clear that the Czech political system is much closer to the
consensual democracy than to the majoritarian democracy.14
The features of the parliamentary form of government are also clearly
identifiable in the Czech political system. The Czech democratic regime is
based on the principle of separation of powers, which, however, is not strict,
because the legislative and executive powers in fact are closely connected.
The functions of the head of state (president) and the chief executive (prime
minister) are separated. Although the president is formally (i.e. in line with
the structure of the constitution) a part of the executive of power (Chapter 3
of the Constitution), he/she has no real executive power, which is clearly
attributed to the government headed by the prime minister. The key
13
This holds true only for the elections to the lower house of parliament (the Chamber of
Deputies) (for details see Tomáš Lebeda’s article in this issue); the upper house (the
Senate) is elected by a double ballot majority system.
14
The issue of majoritarian/consensual character of the Czech political system and Czech
scholars’ opinions about it are discussed below.
2016 | Vol. 8 | No. 2
12
principle is that the real holder of executive power – the government
headed by the prime minister – is derived from the parliament, respectively
from the Chamber of Deputies (not the Senate). The government is
politically responsible to the Chamber of Deputies and can work only with
the latter’s consent. The president is not politically responsible to the
parliament (the Chamber of Deputies), as it is the government which bears
responsibility for presidential acts and which countersigns the vast majority
of the president’s decisions15
. The president can dissolve the Chamber of
Deputies (the Senate may not be dissolved), but under very specific and
well-defined circumstances. In other words, the president may not dissolve
the Chamber of Deputies at will, but it is a rather “safety valve” measure to
unblock a deadlocked parliamentary situation (Bureš et al. 2012; Wintr
2013).
All in all, the basic principles of the Czech democratic regime simply
match all the main characters of the definition of parliamentarism (see
Strøm, Müller, Bergman 2003; Verney 1959). In addition, the parliamentary
form of government is anchored by Czech constitutional law and by the
jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court (Wintr 2013: 57). This does not
mean that the Czech Republic is an example of a pure parliamentary regime
(if it is possible to define a pure parliamentary regime). The regime is faced
with various modifications or perhaps deformations. Probably the most
visible among them is the position of the president and the mode of his/her
election.
2.2. Direct election of the president16
The Czech democratic regime developed and underwent several changes
from 1993 to the present, but we can say that there were only few
substantial changes that significantly affected the regime. The 1992
constitution has been amended eight times so far17
. Most of these
15
The president is constitutionally accountable, but this is a completely different matter.
The president can be impeached for treason or a gross violation of the constitution or
any other segment of the constitutional order. Such a decision must be taken by the
Constitutional Court on the basis of a resolution by the Senate with the consent of the
Chamber of Deputies (art. 65; Wintr 2013: 35).
16
The direct election of the president and its impacts on the constitutional system of the
Czech Republic are discussed in more detail in the article by Jan Wintr, Marek Antoš and
Jan Kysela in this issue.
17
The first change came in 1997, when the regional tier of government was established.
The self-government at the regional level was enshrined in the constitution. The second
change was related to the Czech Republic’s NATO membership in 1999 and dealt with
the question of sending Czech troops abroad, the presence of foreign troops on the
Czech territory, Czech participation in the defence systems of NATO and the like. The
third amendment to the Constitution, of 2001, was of a merely legislative and technical
nature with the aim of harmonizing the constitution and the law on the Czech National
Bank with European law. The fourth amendment to the constitution – the so-called
“Euroamendment” (2001) – was related to the issue of compliance of the constitution
with obligations arising from international law. The fifth amendment (2002) was very
The Czech Parliamentary Regime After 1989: Origins, Developments and Challenges
13
amendments did not have a major impact on the design or operation of the
Czech democratic system, with only one exception: the introduction of the
direct election of the president in 2012 (and its implementation a year later).
While previously the president was elected at a joint session of both
chambers of the parliament in up to three rounds, now the president is
elected popularly in a two-round system. Why and how did this change
come about?
The idea to introduce the direct election of the president is nothing new
in Czech politics. For the first time, such a proposal appeared as early as in
December 1989, when the communists proposed that presidents be directly
elected. At that time, the communist party sought to take advantage of the
relatively high popularity of the last communist federal Prime Minister,
Ladislav Adamec, with the aim of getting a communist elected instead of
Václav Havel, who was still a relatively less known person at the end of 1989.
Later, various proposals to introduce the direct election of the president
emerged more or less regularly, and always in connection with other similar
political demands or interests. After nearly 25 years the direct popular
election of the president was finally approved. This major change was
accompanied by two waves of controversies and discussions that rolled
through the Czech public space. The first discussion was polemics of
proponents and opponents of such reforms. The second discussion has been
concerned with the implications of this constitutional change. Both
discussions are very interesting.
In the first debate, supporters of the introduction of direct universal
elections of the president clashed with their opponents. This debate was
notable for one thing: it created two opposing and substantially uniform
camps. On the one hand, there were almost all politicians and the vast
majority of the media. On the other hand, there was the almost united
professional community of political scientists and constitutional lawyers.
While the first group passionately advocated for a direct election, the second
group strongly opposed this idea and warned against negative impacts of
such reforms. This is not a simplified generalization. Indeed, both groups can
be (with few negligible exceptions) this clearly defined. While supporters of
the direct election relied primarily on public opinion, which according to
specific as it was to enact the referendum on joining the European Union (which it did in
May 2004). Once the referendum concluded, the constitutional amendment became
obsolete and was eventually dropped from the constitution. The Czech Republic lacks a
constitutional article that would allow holding a referendum on the national level. The
sixth amendment (2009) introduced the possibility of “self-dissolution” of the Chamber
of Deputies. Thus, the president is obliged to dissolve the Chamber at its own request, if
such a motion is supported by a three-fifths majority of all the deputies. The seventh
amendment introduced direct universal presidential election (see the main body of the
article) and finally the eighth amendment (2013) limited the immunity of deputies,
senators and constitutional judges (only for the duration of their mandate). For details
on all the constitutional changes, see the website of the Chamber of Deputies
[http://www.psp.cz/sqw/hp.sqw?k=321; online; cit. 2016-01-09].
2016 | Vol. 8 | No. 2
14
various surveys wished to introduce the direct and general presidential
elections that were presented as more “democratic” than the indirect
elections, opponents argued that such a method of electing the president is
detrimental (given the fact that the direct election is an alien feature vis-ávis
the parliamentary nature of the Czech political regime) and that it may
significantly distort the Czech democratic regime (Hloušek 2008; Kubát 2003;
Charvát et al. 2014).
However, regardless of the warnings against the direct and universal
election of the president, political elites approved this constitutional change.
Peculiarly, they did so irrespective of political and ideological differences
among them. The finale vote took place in the Chamber of Deputies in
December 2011, and all parliamentary parties backed the motion except for
the communists, who abstained18
. The Senate approved the direct and
general election of the president in February 2012. In the Senate the motion
was passed by a relatively narrow margin. The important fact is that senators
from all the parties (except for the Christian and Democratic Union –
Czechoslovak People’s Party (Křesťanská a demokratická unie –
Československá strana lidová – KDU-ČSL), whose Senators were unanimously
against the amendment) voted yes19
.
2.3. Parliamentary or semi-presidential regime?
The introduction of direct universal presidential elections in the Czech
Republic unleashed a second discussion on this matter which has to some
extent an international outreach. The basic question is as follows: Did the
Czech Republic experience a shift from a parliamentary to a semipresidential
regime?
In the past, there was almost a uniform consensus within the Czech
political science and constitutional law community that the Czech Republic
was a parliamentary regime characterized by, as we mentioned above, the
specific (influential) position of the president (Filip 2003; Kysela 2008b: 235;
Vodička, Cabada 2003: 154; Wintr 2006: 51-52). If at all addressing it, some
political scientists and constitutional lawyers contemplated the presence of
“presidential elements” within the regime (given the president’s special
position), they still came to the conclusion that the Czech regime was after
all a parliamentary regime (Gerloch, Hřebejk, Zoubek 2002: 191; Klíma 2004:
44; Kysela, Kühn 2007: 113).
After the introduction of direct universal presidential elections in 2012
and the 2013 presidential election, few voices appeared suggesting that the
Czech Republic could move towards semi-presidentialism (Kysela 2013) or
18
Out of 192 deputies who were present, 159 voted for the motion, three MPs were
against and 30 abstained (the total number of deputies is 200) (Musilová, Šedo 2013:
32).
19
In the Senate, 75 out of 81 Senators participated in the vote. The motion was passed by
49 senators; 22 voted against and four abstained (Musilová, Šedo 2013: 34).
The Czech Parliamentary Regime After 1989: Origins, Developments and Challenges
15
that it might happen in the future. However, these conclusions were very
cautious: “in the long term there exists the possibility of converting the
parliamentary regime into a semi-presidential one” (Kopeček, Mlejnek 2013:
75). One scholar even argued that the Czech Republic became a semipresidential
regime (Kudrna 2013). Such statements, however, have been
rare. The prevailing scholarly opinion is that the Czech Republic after 2012
has remained a parliamentary regime (Bureš et al. 2012: 153; Kubát 2013b:
62-63; Wintr 2013: 66), or that the Czech regime is at most a parliamentary
regime “with a strengthened role of the president” (Mlejnek 2015: 60), or a
parliamentary regime which has “shifted from the ideal form of
parliamentarism” by the direct election of the president (Brunclík 2014: 77),
or a parliamentary regime which has become “deformed and inefficient”
(Kubát 2014: 55).
The Czech constitutional change is somewhat differently addressed by
foreign scholars (publishing in English). Before 2012 the Czech Republic used
to be almost always classified as a parliamentary regime (Baylis 1996: 299;
Colton, Skach 2004: 18; Easter 1997; Elgie 1998; Goetz, Wollmann 2001;
Krouwel 2000; Schleiter, Morgan-Jones 2009a: 673; Sedelius, Ekman 2008:
15; Stepan, Skach 1993: 4; Wolchik 1997: 171). However, after 2012 the
Czech regime began to be generally classified as a semi-presidential regime
(Elgie 2012; Elgie 2014; Elgie, Fauvelle-Aymar 2012: 1614).
This sharp difference is caused by a different methodological and
theoretical approach of both groups of authors. “English-language” authors
often come from the definition of semi-presidentialism outlined by Robert
Elgie. Some scholars even consider his definition as “standard” (Schleiter,
Morgan-Jones 2009b: 874; Schleiter, Morgan-Jones 2010: 1418). This
minimalist definition is largely based on the direct election of the
president20
. In this case, it is clear that Elgie himself and his followers define
the Czech Republic after 2012 as a semi-presidential regime. The majority of
Czech authors proceed differently. Their findings are not derived from a
single predetermined definition of semi-presidentialism, but they first
provide a detailed analysis of the case. They primarily focus on the issue of
the president’s power, or more broadly, on the executive power as such, i.e.
a president and a government led by a prime minister. Given the fact that in
general they are inclined to accept Duverger’s (1980) and Sartori’s (1997)
understanding of semi-presidentialism, they do not classify the Czech regime
as semi-presidential, because the president has no real executive power,
although he is not a purely ceremonial president. This conclusion is typical
not only for the Czech authors, but also more generally for Central European
scholars (Polish, Slovak and others) (cf. Brunclík, Kubát 2014a).
The Czech authors therefore admit that the position of the Czech
president is exceptional. According to constitutional lawyer Jan Kysela: “In
20
A system, where “a popularly elected fixed term president exists alongside a primeminister
and cabinet, who are responsible to parliament” (Elgie 1999: 13).
2016 | Vol. 8 | No. 2
16
the Czech Republic, we can perhaps speak about a particular type of
presidency as a charismatic ability to inspire loyalty, a charismatic authority
(...). The President is seated at the royal castle, he/she has its own standard
and military guards, on ceremonial occasions his/her arrival is heralded by a
fanfare of ‘Libuse’21
(...) the head of state’s portraits adorn school classrooms
and various state’s offices, disgruntled citizens have traditionally sought
rectifications of injustices of all sorts at the presidential office (...) etc.”
(Kysela 2006: 14). “The president’s uniqueness is rather of a cultural-political
nature given historical circumstances, including monarchical traditions”
(Pithart 2014). The direct election of the president paradoxically altered the
tradition of the Czech presidency. On the one hand, it violated the tradition
of indirectly elected presidents22
; on the other hand, through the greater
legitimacy enhanced by the popular election, it has created preconditions for
strengthening the tradition of the influential president. However, in terms of
the structure and functioning of the Czech democratic regime, the new way
of electing the president is rather harmful. The president has a certain
political (and in some cases even moral) influence, now reinforced by the
strong legitimacy derived from the direct election, but he/she has no real
executive power (neither in terms of the constitutional order, nor in terms of
political practice). The result is a strong deformation of the parliamentary
regime, which has been beset by a number of problems and faced with
several challenges.
3. Challenges
To be sure, the problems of the Czech parliamentary regime are related not
only to the president. They are complex in nature. In the past five years or so
an increasing number of books by Czech political scientists dealing with the
crisis in Czech politics began to appear in bookstores. One might even build a
decent home library from these books alone.
The themes of these texts address two main challenges facing the Czech
politics. Firstly, it is a crisis of politics as such accompanied by the decline of
political culture, the rise of political corruption and the rise of distrust in
politics and democracy (Drulák 2012; Dvořáková 2012; Fiala 2010; Pehe
2010; 2015; Pithart 2015; Klíma 2015). Secondly, it is a crisis of the Czech
parliamentary regime, especially in terms of its instability, dysfunctionality
and inefficiency (Hloušek, Kopeček 2012; Kubát 2013b; Kubát, Lebeda et al.
2014; Mlejnek 2015). Both streams of thought are, of course, related. Our
21
Libuše is an opera composed in 1871-1872 in three acts with music by one of the most
famous Czech composers, Bedřich Smetana. Libuše is a legendary ancestor of
the Přemyslid dynasty (who established the first Czech state) and the Czech people as a
whole. According to the legend she prophesied and founded the city of Prague in the 8
th
century. The opera was originally intended for the coronation of Franz Josef I as the
Czech king. This did not happen and Smetana saved Libuše for the opening of
the National Theatre in Prague in 1881.
22
All the Czechoslovak and Czech presidents were elected by the parliament until 2013.
The Czech Parliamentary Regime After 1989: Origins, Developments and Challenges
17
task is to discuss the second level of the crisis, i.e. the problems of the Czech
parliamentary regime.23
3.1. The inefficiency of the parliamentary regime24
The Czech parliamentary regime functioned well in the first half of the
1990s. The party system appeared stable and effective. It was embodied by
the ruling Civic Democratic Party (Občanská demokratická strana – ODS), the
largest Czech party, led by Václav Klaus, who was at that time the Prime
Minister and a major architect of the economic transformation. Still, the
seeming stability of the party system was soon to come to an end.
Between 1992 and 1996, Klaus led a majority right-wing coalition that
carried out a number of reforms. He chaired the cabinet even after the 1996
parliamentary elections, but only due to the “tolerance” of the Czech Social
Democratic Party (Česká strana sociálně demokratická – ČSSD), whose MPs
left the Chamber of Deputies in order to decrease the quorum required for a
vote of confidence. Hence, they helped Klaus’s minority coalition to win the
vote of confidence in July 1996. For the first time a minority cabinet was
created. It could rely on the support of only 99 members of 200 MPs. The
cabinet remained in power until January 1998 (Bureš et al. 2012: 395-396).
After that, a period of unstable cabinets started.
This phenomenon has persisted in the Czech Republic until the present
day and has become the most visible feature of the Czech parliamentary
regime. Why? Czech cabinets are not based on a clear and consistent
parliamentary majorities: cabinets are often minority governments (1996–
2002, 2006–2009), politically inconsistent, i.e. connecting right-wing and
left-wing political parties (2002–2006), based on controversial grounds (the
Opposition Agreement 1998–200025
, which was superseded by the more
explicit “Patent of Tolerance” in January 2000), based on shaky coalitions or
they are even dependent on a single MP (e.g. in 2002, 2004 and 2005, but
also later). Besides that, there were already three technocratic cabinets
(1998, 2009–2010, 2013–2014) (Brunclík, Kubát 2014b: 173).
The result of all of this is the chronic inefficiency and instability of
cabinets. Between 1996 and 2014 the Czech Republic had 11 cabinets and 10
prime ministers. The average durability of cabinets is about one and a half
23
Some of the issues related to the crisis in Czech politics, political culture and
democracy, etc. are examined in other articles in this issue.
24
This chapter is a revised and amended version of a part of our previous article
(Brunclík, Kubát 2014b: 172-173).
25
The opposition agreement was concluded by the two largest parties: the right-wing
(ODS) and the left-wing social democrats (ČSSD) after the 1998 elections. Although the
ČSSD won the elections, it failed to form a majority government. Thus, both parties
agreed that the ODS would tolerate a ČSSD government. At the key vote of confidence
in the new ČSSD cabinet, the ODS MPs left the Chamber and thus lowered the required
quorum and allowed the rise of the ČSSD cabinet (Kopeček 2015).
2016 | Vol. 8 | No. 2
18
year (Lebeda 2014: 12).26
Two cabinets failed to win confidence of the
Chamber of Deputies (2006 and 2013). Between 2006 and 2009, the
Chamber of Deputies attempted five times (sic!) to pass a vote of noconfidence
in the coalition cabinet led by Mirek Topolánek (ODS) (Kubát
2013b: 69). The left-wing opposition supported by several defections from
the government camp eventually brought the cabinet down in March 2009.
Unfortunately, this happened during the Czech Presidency of the European
Union, and the opposition (above all the ČSSD) was unable to put together
an alternative cabinet. The Czech EU presidency was rescued by a
technocratic government sustained by the ODS, ČSSD and the Green Party
(Strana zelených – SZ) (Hloušek, Kopeček 2012: 67-86).
3.2. Why it is so?27
There are political and constitutional reasons for this instability (Brunclík
2014; Kubát 2013b). From a political point of view, the problems are as
follows. Firstly, there has been an institutional weakness of the political
parties, which have – in addition to the vulnerability (e.g. succumbing to
corruption) – an extremely small membership base, a poor organization and
a lack of discipline (Brunclík, Kubát 2014b: 170-172; Mlejnek 2015: 78-114).
The second problem is a high ideological polarization of the party system,
mainly due to the still Marxist-Leninist Communist Party of Bohemia nad
Moravia (Komunistická strana Čech a Moravy – KSČM) having so far zero
coalition potential at the national level. The consequence of this is that
about 15% of parliamentary seats are blocked by the communists28
, who are
a priori excluded from any coalition. Hence, the ČSSD, which was not
established as a moderate successor to the former communist party but as a
renewed party (the ČSSD traces its origins back to the late 19th
century and
ceased to exist as an independent party in 1948), does not have a natural
left-wing coalition partner. Consequently, the ČSSD has had to form minority
(including, the Opposition Agreement with the ODS) or ideologically
inconsistent cabinets.
The third – and most recent – problem is that of a crisis of “traditional”
political parties and the emergence of new parties in 2010–2013,
representing an anti-corruption and anti-political populism in the sense of
“anti-party sentiment” (Pasquino 2008: 21). The most successful party of
that kind is ANO 2011, which gained 19% of the vote in the 2013 elections
26
The Czech Republic belongs to countries with the least stable cabinets across Europe,
including the post-communist countries (cf. Courtenay, Golder 2010).
27
This chapter is a revised and amended version of a part of our previous article
(Brunclík, Kubát 2014b: 172-173).
28
The Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM) is a direct successor to the
Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (Komunistická strana Československa – KSČ), which
ruled the country between 1948 and 1989. It is an unreformed Marxist-Leninist party
that meets Sartori’s criteria of an anti-system party (see Sartori 1976: 132-134). At the
national level, the party has no chance of forming a coalition.
The Czech Parliamentary Regime After 1989: Origins, Developments and Challenges
19
and entered the coalition government with the ČSSD and the Christian
Democrats (KDU-ČSL) (Havlík et al. 2014). ANO’s anti-political populism and
anti-party rhetoric makes a distinction between politicians (incompetent,
selfish and often corrupt) and experts/professionals (with the opposite
characteristics) who can manage the government like a private enterprise29
.
Attitudes of that kind deepen the polarization of the party system, which in
turn can lead to further instability and therefore also to the instability of the
entire parliamentary regime.
As far as the Czech constitution is concerned, it can generally be said that
there are shortcomings. As mentioned above, the constitution is to a large
extent based on the constitutional traditions of the interwar Czechoslovakia.
The inspiration from the interwar constitutional setting resulted in a strong
asymmetry between the legislature and the weak executive. The Czech
constitution provides for a parliamentary regime, but not for a prime
ministerial type of the parliamentary regime (with a prime minister as “first
above unequals”) (cf. Sartori 1997: 109-110). This type of parliamentary
regime is completed with a relatively strong president (the heritage of the
interwar period). The constitutional authority of the executive – the
government led by the prime minister – is comparatively weak and heavily
dependent on the Chamber of Deputies. Likewise, the prime minister is
rather weak because he/she is not the true boss of his/her ministers.
Furthermore, the Chamber of Deputies operates under very loose
regulations of giving flexibility to individual MPs. In addition, the
proportional electoral system works in favour of the large parties, but very
moderately, so it does not facilitate the formation of parliamentary
majorities. All this leads to a dual fragmentation of the Chamber of Deputies
(political and personal). This fragmentation is not conducive to the stability
of the government. The second factor acting to the detriment of the
government’s political position is the president, whose influence was in 2012
enhanced by the introduction of direct presidential elections. The president
does not hold an executive power and cannot govern because the Czech
Republic is not a semi-presidential regime, as we explained in the second
chapter of this article. However, the strong legitimacy of the president and
the legacy of activistic presidents, who occasionally get into conflicts or
disputes with the cabinet, in turn weakens the chief executive – the cabinet.
It seems as if the Czech Republic experienced a backlash, coming back to the
earlier era of transition of democracy in a number of post-communist
countries, which were characterized by weak nascent political parties and
29
ANO means “yes” in Czech. It is a party (sometimes described as a civic movement)
which closely approximates the model of the business-firm party (see Hopkin, Paolucci
1999). Andrej Babiš, the founder and chairman of the ANO, a Czech businessman and
billionaire of Slovak origin, embodies this ideal as a wealthy businessman who manages
large companies. He became a deputy prime minister and the Minister of Finance.
2016 | Vol. 8 | No. 2
20
citizens’ high expectations of having responsible national leaders (mostly
presidents).30
Furthermore, the non-concurrent electoral cycles of the president and
the parliament increase the risk of conflict between the two branches
(Shugart 1995). The government branch, which went through the electoral
test more recently, is tempted to claim its political superiority and even to
demand extra constitutional powers on the grounds that its legitimacy has
more recent origins (Protsyk 2005). And this is what exactly occurred in
2013, when the first directly elected president, Miloš Zeman, came to office;
he immediately got into a conflict with the right-wing coalition government.
In sum, the government is thus situated between two mill wheels – the
Chamber of Deputies and the president.
Therefore, the Czech crisis of the parliamentary regime resides not only
in the inherent instability of the government, but also – and perhaps above
all – in the political and constitutional weakness of the cabinet and the prime
minister. The consequence of all this is a permanent crisis of the executive
and ineffectiveness of the whole parliamentary regime.
3.3. How to solve the problem?
In the scholarly Czech literature, a number of proposals to solve or at least to
mitigate the existing problems of the country’s parliamentary regime have
appeared (Hloušek, Kopeček 2012; Klíma 2015; Kubát 2013b; Novák 2001;
2008)31
. Most of these proposals basically aim to abandon the interwar
tradition of consensus democracy and instead to embrace (at least some of)
the principles of the majoritarian democracy. It must be pointed out that the
interwar Czechoslovak Republic was a completely different state than the
Czech Republic after 1993. At most, one could consider some similarities
between the First Republic and post-November Czechoslovakia (until 1992–
1993), but the Czech Republic is really quite a different polity, at least in two
intertwined aspects: the nature of society and the nature of political
partisanship.
While the interwar Czechoslovakia was a typical segmented society which
was split in ethnical, linguistic, religious and other terms which was clearly
reflected by a multipolar character of the Czechoslovak party system, the
30
As Klaus von Beyme (2000: 13) argued: “The greater the number of floating voters and
the less consolidated the parties, the more likely it was that a semi-presidential system
was chosen. This was even more the case when a charismatic leader was at the head of
movement, such as Walesa, Landsbergis and Yeltsin. The semi-presidential system ex
post facto has been justified in a ‘Gaullist’ way: when an interest representation is
diverse the popularly elected president has to serve as a representative of the ‘common
good’”.
31
Now we leave aside considerations about remedial politics and society as a whole (see
e.g. Fiala 2010). Our considerations relate only to the institutional level of problems,
although we are aware that the functioning of a democratic system cannot be
completely separated from the question of the functionality of society, politics and
democracy.
The Czech Parliamentary Regime After 1989: Origins, Developments and Challenges
21
Czech Republic enjoys a predominantly homogeneous society which is
reflected by a bipolar party system. It means that the Czech party system is
based primarily on one – socioeconomic – cleavage (Hloušek, Kopeček 2004:
71-101). This feature did not change even after the formation of new parties
in 2010–2013. Thus, if the consensus democracy was a must for interwar
Czechoslovakia, this model of democracy is unnecessary in the Czech
Republic: “From the perspective of the structure of society, there is no
continuity with the pre-war era of a segmented society. From this point of
view, the implementation of the majoritarian model of democracy would be
possible” (Hloušek, Kopeček 2002: 19). All in all, in empirical terms there are
no major obstacles for the use of the majoritarian model of democracy (and
thus simultaneously prioritizing principle of efficiency over the principle of
representativeness) in the contemporary Czech Republic. Hence, it is
possible to design reforms of the existing parliamentary system towards
strengthening of the majoritarian elements of the Czech democracy (Kubát
2013b: 69-75; Novák 2006).32
When considering the possibilities of the Czech democratic regime
change along the lines of the majoritarian elements, two options have been
outlined. Firstly, the transition to semi-presidentialism; secondly, the reform
of the existing parliamentary regime. The first option was mentioned mainly
as a theoretical possibility (Kubát 2013b: 75-79; Novák 2008: 9-15).
Otherwise, all considerations centred on the question of reforming the
existing parliamentary system in terms of its rationalization33
. The
parliamentary regime can be rationalized by two interrelated ways:
institutionally and politically. The institutional way resides in reforming the
constitutional institutions. In particular, it has been argued in favour of an
increased protection of government against parliament, mainly through the
constructive vote of no-confidence.
Furthermore, it is a new procedure of government formation that would
clearly: a) determine the tasks of respective institutional actors (president
and parliament); b) provide alternation of the roles in the initiation of the
government formation process; and c) last but not least, provide a real
threat to dissolve the parliament in case of a failure of the government
formation process. These features should be supplemented by setting clear
and short deadlines by which institutional actors are supposed to take their
steps so that the process may not be artificially and “indefinitely” dragged
out. The rationalization also includes strengthening the institutional
32
For the sake of objectivity, it should be noted that some scholars (e.g. Klíma 2001),
albeit in minority, argued in favour of strengthening of consensual features of the Czech
democracy.
33
The difference between semi-presidentialism and rationalized parliamentarism lies in
the fact that in the former case presidents have an important role in the executive (i.e.
the president is the chief executive, like in France), whereas in the latter case it is the
prime minister who dominates the executive (e.g. Germany), while the role of the
president is more or less ceremonial (Kysela 2008a; Matthews 2002; Tanchev 1993).
2016 | Vol. 8 | No. 2
22
competence of a prime minister in the government and of the government
in the regime. Conversely, there should be no further strengthening of the
president. Instead, the president should be weakened (ideally, the Czech
Republic would return to indirectly electing presidents, but this is a
politically unrealistic suggestion). Finally, it is appropriate to consider
adjustments to the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies in order
to achieve greater discipline of MPs, reduce obstruction, and hinder the
possibility of internal political fragmentation of party clubs within the
Chamber of Deputies during its term of office (Kubát 2013b).
The rationalization of the parliamentary regime, which has been
discussed at large in the Czech Republic, should also include the
concentration of the party system, the concentration of individual political
parties and elimination anti-system parties (mainly the KSČM). The most
effective way to alleviate the difficulties of the Czech party system is – as
mentioned above –electoral reform. The need for electoral reform in the
Czech Republic has been discussed at least since the mid-1990s (Balík et al.
2013; Charvát 2013; Klíma et al. 1999; Novák, Lebeda et al. 2004; Novák
1996). Basically, there are three major options: 1) to modify the existing
proportional representation; 2) to introduce some form of majority electoral
system; and 3) to implement some form of a mixed electoral system. While
the third option was always the least recommended one and mainly
considered only as a theoretical possibility, the first two options have been
discussed extensively. Some authors recommend modifying the existing
proportional electoral system in order to strengthen its majority effects, and
consequently to help larger parties at the expense of smaller ones, which in
turn could lead to easier formations of (government) majorities in
parliament. This approach was pioneered by Czech political scientist
Miroslav Novák, who proposed such a reform as early as in 1996 and who
has been championing this argument up to the present day (Novák 1996;
2013). Other authors have proposed introducing a majority voting system,
notably a double ballot system (rather than a plurality electoral system)
(Kubát 2013a). Thus, in the case of electoral reform, there has been a lack of
agreement on which type of electoral system is the most suitable one;
however, Czech political scientists generally agree that having an electoral
change is desirable and that it could help alleviate systematic problems in
Czech politics.
4. Conclusion
In our article we discussed the origins, developments and challenges of the
Czech polity. As can been seen, the Czech political system faces serious
problems subject to intense discussion by Czech political scientists and, to a
lesser extent, by constitutional lawyers. The aim of these debates is to
identify critical moments, identify their causes, and also – or perhaps above
all – to propose solutions that could either solve the problems described
above or at least mitigate them. These efforts have not been successful thus
The Czech Parliamentary Regime After 1989: Origins, Developments and Challenges
23
far. The problems of the Czech polity are very deep and multi-layered and
above all are of a structural nature. They are connected with all the main
aspects of a democratic polity, notably with the constitutional system, the
party system and the electoral system. In this article, we have tried to
provide such a comprehensive overview of the problematic issues of the
Czech democratic polity. A more detailed look at various aspects is provided
by the case studies contained in this issue.
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