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Democratic Contributions to UN Peacekeeping Operations. A Two-Step Fuzzy Set QCA of Unifil II

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ABSTRACT

What explains democratic participation in United Nations peacekeeping operations? Although the division of the burden of UN peacekeeping operations has attracted a considerable amount of scholarly attention, neither the impact of domestic variables, nor the interaction between the domestic and international determinants of peacekeeping contributions has been systematically analysed. This article aims to fill this gap in academic research. First, insights from research on peacekeeping burden sharing, democratic peace theory and integrated decision models are combined in a multi-causal framework. Subsequently, two-step fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis is used to assess whether this model explains diverging contributions to the 2006 enhancement of the UNIFIL operation. The results of this analysis show that contributions result from a complex interplay between domestic and international conditions. Two combinations of international level conditions allowed for large contributions. In the absence of significant military engagements, military capable states and states with a high level of prior involvement in UNPOs had an incentive to participate. Actual contributions, however, only materialized if such a conductive international context was combined with favourable domestic conditions: only states governed by a left-leaning government that was not constrained by either proximate general elections or a right-leaning parliament with extensive veto powers participated in the operation.

KEY WORDS: *burden sharing, UN Peacekeeping, QCA, democratic peace theory*

Introduction

Following the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah War, the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was reinforced significantly. The EU member states carried the

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brunt of the burden of this reinforcement. However, while many member states made sizeable personnel contributions, others did not contribute at all. This article aims to explain the pattern of contributions to UNIFIL II. Hereby, it addresses a substantial gap in the academic literature on peacekeeping burden sharing (e.g. Bobrow and Boyer, 1997; Shimizu and Sandler, 2010). The bulk of the research on the subject consists of empirical tests of collective-action-based models. Scarce studies that do take into account a wider range of conditions almost exclusively focus on international-level determinants. Hereby, the impact of domestic-level conditions remains largely unexamined.

A rare exception to this fixation on external explanations consists in the many studies that establish a link between a states' level of democracy and its propensity to contribute to (UN) peacekeeping operations. Several scholars have posited that democracies are more likely to contribute personnel to United Nations peacekeeping operations (UNPOs) than non-democracies (e.g. Andersson, 2002; Lebovic, 2004; Victor, 2010: 226). Explanations for this correlation generally build on the normative model of democratic peace: democracies are more inclined to participate in UNPOs because the latter's goal of promoting the peaceful resolution of conflict corresponds to their domestic political norms. More recently however, democratic peace research has emphasized the significant variation across democratic political systems, which, in turn, affects their international behaviour (e.g. Prins and Sprecher, 1999; Ireland and Gartner, 2001). Based on this logic, the domestic differences between democracies can be expected to affect their propensity to contribute to UNPOs. Unfortunately, previous studies have not systematically explored the impact of cross-democratic domestic variation on contributions to UNPOs.

The lack of attention to domestic conditions not only contrasts sharply with recent democratic peace research, but also with studies that build on integrated models to explain contributions to multilateral operations (e.g. Auerswald, 2004; Bennett et al., 1994). The latter consistently conclude that contributions result from a complex interplay between domestic and international conditions. However, such integrated models have been exclusively used to explain diverging contributions to operations conducted by coalitions of the willing or under the aegis of NATO or the EU. In consequence, a structured analysis that links cross-democratic domestic

variation to participation in UNPOs, let alone examines the complex interplay between domestic and international conditions, has not yet been produced.

This study aims to fill this gap. It combines international and domestic conditions in an integrated model that aims to explain varying contributions to UNPOs. It focusses on the 2006 reinforcement of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL II) because this is one of the few recent UNPOs to which traditional Western democracies made pivotal troop contributions. In consequence, it constitutes a particularly suited case for testing a model that aims to explain varying democratic contributions to UN-peacekeeping. Two-step fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis is used to examine whether the model can explain the varying contributions to this operation. The results of the analysis reveal that personnel contributions to UNIFIL II indeed depend on a complex interplay between domestic and international conditions. Contributions are only possible if the absence of military stretch is combined with either a high level of prior involvement in UNPOs or sizeable military capabilities. However, for large contributions to materialize, these international level conditions must be combined with favourable domestic conditions, more specifically with a left-leaning executive that is neither constrained by proximate elections or a right-leaning parliament with extensive veto powers.

The article proceeds as follows. The first section builds on the comprehensive literature on peacekeeping burden sharing and democratic peace theory to develop an integrated model that aims to explain diverging contributions to UNPOs. The next section justifies the case selection, introduces the methodological approach and discusses the operationalization of the condition and the outcome. The third section presents the results of the analysis, before the conclusions recapitulate the study's major findings.

Explaining democratic participation in UN Peacekeeping

I build on three partially overlapping areas of academic research to develop an integrated model for explaining democratic contributions to UNPOs. First, I derive plausible international level explanations from previous research on peacekeeping operations. Subsequently, I draw on democratic peace theory to identify cross-democratic differences that could be relevant for explaining varying contributions to UNPOs. Lastly, I build on integrated decision models to formulate hypotheses on how contribution decisions are produced by specific combinations of international

and domestic conditions. Although the resulting framework integrates hypotheses from the prevailing theories on military burden sharing and democratic peace, it does not incorporate all explanatory variables raised in previous research. Most importantly, the quality of a state's democracy is not included in the framework, since this study aims to explain the contributions of states that adhere to the fundamental standards of democratic governance, any variation above which should be explanatorily irrelevant. In consequence, an assessment of the impact of democratic quality on a state's propensity to participate in UNPO's is beyond the scope of this study.

International level explanations

The rich literature on UN peacekeeping offers a range of plausible international level determinants for contributions to UNPOs. The vast majority of academic research focusses on testing public goods theory (e.g. Bobrow and Boyer, 1997; Shimizu and Sandler, 2010). Peacekeeping produces a variety of public benefits. At the most general level, UN peacekeeping aims to achieve greater worldwide peace and stability, which benefits all nations, regardless of whether they contribute to operations. A testable implication of the public goods model is that peacekeeping burdens are expected to be shared unevenly. More specifically, because the contributions of larger states are expected to satisfy the amount of peacekeeping desired by smaller states, the former are expected to shoulder a disproportionately large share of the burden of UNPOs (Shimizu and Sandler, 2002: 655; Olson and Zeckhauser, 1966).

A number of empirical studies demonstrates that larger states indeed carry a disproportionately large burden of peacekeeping operations, hereby confirming public goods models (e.g. Shimizu and Sandler, 2002; Khanna et al., 1998). Recent research suggests that public benefits are especially important for UN-financed operations, which are expected to be less driven by self-interest than non-UN operations (e.g. Shimizu and Sandler, 2010; Gaibulloev et al., 2009). This is in line with studies that examine the pattern of UN involvement in violent conflicts, which generally conclude this closely reflects the degree to which a conflict poses a threat to international peace and security, not the 'parochial' interests of the members of the UN Security Council (e.g. Beardsley and Schmidt, 2012; Gilligan and Stedman, 2003).

Although empirical tests of public goods models generally focus on financial burden sharing, public goods theory is expected to have explanatory value for personnel contributions to specific operations. More specifically, states without sizeable military capabilities are unlikely to contribute solely to secure public benefits, since they can only hope to have a marginal impact on the total available amount of benefits, which, if public, cannot be denied to them if they do not participate (Baltrusaitis, 2010: 20). Previous research suggests that military capabilities are indeed positively correlated with personnel contributions. In a study of African contributions to peacekeeping operations, Victor (2010: 225), for example, concludes that 'states with larger armed forces tend to deploy more peacekeepers.' Similarly, the study of Bove and Elia (2011: 712) convincingly demonstrates that 'the size of a state's military predicts the contribution to UN peacekeeping.' States with large *military capabilities* can thus be expected to have an incentive to contribute to secure the public benefits of UNPOs.

While empirical evidence supports public goods models, previous research suggests that two country specific benefits also increase the likelihood and/or size of personnel contributions. First of all, several studies demonstrate that geographic proximity to the target country increases a state's inclination to contribute to a peacekeeping operation (e.g. Bove and Elia, 2011; Perkins and Neumayer, 2008). This correlation can be attributed to the specific benefits peacekeeping produces for states situated closer to a conflict, such as reduced refugee inflows, more secure supply lines, enhanced trade flows following the return of regional stability etc. (Khanna et al., 1998: 182; Shimizu and Sandler, 2002: 656; Shimizu and Sandler, 2010: 1480). *Geographic proximity* can therefore be expected to provide states an incentive to contribute to UNPOs.

A second contributor specific benefit is the status gained from being recognized as a major promoter of world peace (Khanna et al., 1998: 182). Although these gains are available to all potential contributors, states that invested a large amount of resources to support the UN peacekeeping system in the past can reasonably be expected to attach more importance to its benefits. This corresponds to the conclusion of Bobrow and Boyer (1997: 731) that peacekeeping 'activism can become a habit' and Lebovic (2004: 928), whose findings indicate that a country's level of previous commitment to UNPOs is a significant determinant of future

participation. In consequence, *prior peacekeeping involvement* is expected to have a positive impact on a state's propensity to contribute to UNPOs.

Previous research thus suggests several possible international incentives for contributing to UNPOs. However, conditions situated at the international level can also constrain a state's ability to contribute. A particular important constraint is the extent to which a state's military capabilities are stretched by engagements in other operations. Evidently, troops deployed in parallel operations can impossibly participate in a UNPO. Furthermore, states whose available military resources are already strained might not be willing to further constrain their future freedom of action by committing resources to a UNPO (Lebovic, 2004: 915; Bove and Elia, 2011). Victor (2010: 223, 225) and Lebovic (2004), for example, conclude that states that are engaged in external conflicts are less likely to participate in peacekeeping operations, Bove and Elia (2011) draw similar conclusions on the impact of the number of operations sustained at the same time as the UNPO. *Military stretch* can thus be expected to constrain a state's ability to contribute personnel to UNPOs.

Domestic level explanations

In contrast to the extensive research on the international determinants of peacekeeping contributions, few studies have examined the impact of conditions situated at the domestic level. A state's level of democracy is one of the few domestic factors that is consistently linked to peacekeeping contributions. The results of Andersson (2002), for example, reveal that democracies are significantly more committed to UN interventions than anocracies and autocracies. Similarly, Lebovic (2004: 933) demonstrates that a state's level of democracy 'accounts for whether and how much countries contributed personnel'; while Perkins and Neumayer (2008: 710) show that it is 'one of the most influential determinants governing the probability of country participation.'

The link between democracy and peacekeeping contributions parallels the strong academic consensus that democracies behave different from non-democracies in international relations (cf. inter alia Hegre, 2014; Maoz and Russett, 1993). Studies on the subject generally focus on examining whether and why democracies are less war-prone than non-democracies (Hegre, 2014: 624). A more recent strand of democratic peace research, however, emphasizes the significant differences between democracies, which, in turn, affect their propensity to resort to

military force (cf. e.g. Palmer et al., 2004; Mello, 2012; Ireland and Gartner, 2001). Based on this logic, domestic differences between democracies can also be expected to affect contributions to UNPOs. However, previous studies have not systematically explored the link between cross-democratic domestic variation and participation in UNPOs.

A first set of cross-democratic differences that might have an impact on peacekeeping contributions is the variation in institutional constraints on executive action. Building on the structural model of democratic peace, several scholars showed that states in which parliament has a veto on military deployments are less likely to resort to the use of force. Reiter and Tillman (2002: 824), for example, conclude that 'greater legislative controls over foreign policy (…) is associated with lower propensity to initiate disputes,' while Choi (2010: 438) shows that legislative constraints 'are likely to discourage democratic executives' use of force.' Similarly, Auerswald (1999) concludes that executives are more reluctant to use force if parliaments can overturn its decision to do so. Evidently, parliaments with extensive war powers can also constitute a veto point against contributions to a UNPO, and consequentially, prevent states from participating. The level of *parliamentary veto powers* is therefore expected to affect whether states contribute to UNPOs.

A second, possible, domestic determinant of democratic contributions to UNPOs is the temporal distance towards the next general election. Since governing parties might fear suffering at the polls for resorting to the use of force, several studies expect that democratic leaders will not initiate international conflict when elections are nearby (Auerswald, 1999: 474; Gaubatz, 1991). In contrast, research building on 'diversionary theory of war' predicts that executives will be more inclined to initiate conflict at the end of an electoral cycle, since this constitutes an opportunity to create a rallying around the flag effect and, hereby, improve their prospects for re-election (Meernik and Waterman, 1996). However, UNPOs cannot reasonably be expected to create such an effect, since there are generally no distinct adversaries in these operations. In contrast, governing parties might fear the negative electoral ramifications of contributing to UNPOs, which their domestic constituencies might consider superfluous. Therefore, *electoral proximity* is expected to have a negative impact on a political leader's inclination to contribute.

Lastly, several studies have examined the impact of party politics on the foreign policy of established democracies. Building on evidence that the electoral platforms of right-leaning parties are generally more pro-military than the electoral platforms of left-leaning parties; Palmer et al. (2004: 2) assert that the former should be more inclined to support the use of force in international relations. Their results confirm this inference. Similarily, Stevens (2014) asserts that supporters of right-leaning parties are less likely to disapprove war and Schuster and Maier (2006) conclude that rightist parties were more inclined to support the 2003 Iraq-war. Unlike the operations examined in the afore-mentioned studies, UNPOs are however 'deployed to support the implementation of a ceasefire or peace agreement' and guided by three basic principles: 'consent of the parties, impartiality and non-use of force.' In consequence, the distinction between the pro-military right and pro-peace left seems inadequate to explain participation in UNPOs.

Rathbun (2004) offers a more elaborate three-dimensional model on the link between ideology and the use of military force. This not only expects leftist parties to be more antimilitaristic, but also to prefer pursuing their interests through multilateral frameworks and to follow a more inclusive conception of the national interest, which comprises the promotion of the welfare of other countries (Rathbun, 2004: 18-21). Rightist parties on the other hand, have a more narrow conception of the national interest, consider the use of force an acceptable instrument in international relations and are more reluctant to delegate control to multilateral institutions.

Rathbun's model induces the expectation that leftist parties will be more supportive of UNPOs than of other military operations. The general goal of promoting peace and stability corresponds to their inclusive conception of national interests, supporting the UN peacekeeping system complies with their preference for multilateralism. Moreover, contributing to UNPOs does not contradict their averseness to the use of military means. Leftist parties are antimilitaristic because they consider the use of force an act of subordination, which strengthens inequality between nations (Rathbun, 2007). This is however not the case for UNPOs, since consent of local actors is a fundamental principle of UN Peacekeeping. Given their exclusive conception of national interests, rightist leaders will be less inclined to support UNPOs solely for securing the public good of greater worldwide stability. On top of that, they have less 'trust' in multilateral institutions, which makes them more

susceptible to the fear that others will free-ride on their efforts (Rathbun, 2011: 245, 254-255). Therefore, a history of contributing to UNPOs is not expected to induce support from rightist parties. Right-leaning parties can however be expected to participate in UNPOs when their state risks being affected by the negative externalities of a conflict, which depends on the spatial distance towards the target conflict.

Integrated Decision Model

Starting with a seminal article of Bennett et al. (1994), several scholars have developed integrated decision models to explain contributions to collective military operations (e.g. Auerswald, 2004; Baltrusaitis, 2010). The latter generally incorporate both international and domestic conditions, and formulate hypotheses on how specific combinations of domestic and international conditions produce contribution decisions. In line with these studies, personnel contributions to UNPOs can be expected to result from a complex interplay between the aforementioned conditions.

States with a high level of prior involvement in UN peacekeeping, sizeable military capabilities, or situated close to the area of operations are expected to have an incentive to make large personnel contributions; but only if their capabilities are not stretched by other military engagements. The impact of these international level conditions is however expected to depend on domestic conditions. Whether a specific incentive leads to actual contributions is contingent on the ideological preferences of the relevant actors. Whereas left-leaning parties are expected to support contributing to UNPOs to continue their state's peacekeeping tradition or to provide the public good of greater world-wide stability, right-leaning parties will only contribute if it is deployed to mitigate the negative externalities of nearby conflict.

Party politics not only interact with international level incentives, but also with parliamentary veto power. Choi (2010: 441) contends that the level of parliamentary constraints only increases if legislative veto players and the executive have different ideological orientations. Similarly, Mello (2012: 427) maintains that only the combination of a left-leaning parliament with extensive war powers could create an effective veto point against a right-leaning executive's decision to participate in the Iraq war. Parliamentary veto power can thus only constrain contributions if the legislative and executive branches have a different ideological orientation.

Several causal paths towards large personnel contributions can be derived from the above discussion. These are summarized in the integrated model presented in **Figure 1**. In the absence of military stretch, states with large military capabilities or a high level of past involvement in UNPOs are expected to have an incentive to contribute. In combination with a leftist government, that is neither constrained by upcoming elections or a right parliament with extensive veto powers, this is expected to cause large personnel contributions. States without significant competing deployments and situated closely to the area of operations, in turn, are expected to participate if they are governed by a right-leaning executive that is not constrained by upcoming elections or a left parliament with veto power over military deployment.

Figure 1



Source: author's own analysis

Research design

Empirical domain

The empirical focus of the study is on the 2006 enhancement of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). Although this operation has been deployed in Lebanon since 1978, its troop levels were augmented significantly following the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah War (Engberg, 2013). This reinforcement provides a rare opportunity for testing a model that aims to explain democratic contributions to UNPOs, since it is one of the few recent UN operations to which

traditional Western democracies made pivotal troop contributions (Bellamy and Williams, 2009: 43). Due to their long-established tradition of democracy, the latter can be expected to most closely resemble 'ideal type' cases for testing the domestic side of the integrated model (Goertz, 2006: 83).

The brunt of the reinforcement's burden was carried by the European Union member states, who contributed around 80% of the required forces. This significant European contribution was a consequence of Israel's insistence on the participation of European troops and the direct involvement of the European Council in the planning of the operation (Mattelaer, 2009). The resulting pressure on the EU member states produced considerable personnel contributions from, inter alia, France, Italy, Poland and Belgium (Engberg, 2013: 78). Other member states, however, did not contribute to the operation at all. Since the EU members are all full-fledged democracies, UNIFIL's reinforcement constitutes a most likely case of democratic contributions to UNPO's. In consequence, the diverging contributions to the reinforcement of UNIFIL constitute a particularly suited population for this research, including both positive and relevant negative cases of democratic contributions to UNPOs.

Methodological approach

Whether the integrated model explains the pattern of contribution to UNIFIL II is tested with Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA), an analytical technique geared towards establishing set-theoretic connections between one case property - defined as the outcome- and other properties - defined as the causal conditions (Wagemann and Schneider, 2010: 380). Such set-theoretic connections can be interpreted in terms of sufficient and/or necessary causes. The assessment of necessity and sufficiency is based on two parameters of fit: consistency and coverage (Ragin, 2008: 44-68). The former provides a descriptive measure of the extent to which the empirical data confirms sufficiency or necessity, the latter indicates the empirical relevance of a sufficient or necessary condition. Consistency approaches unity as the data provides stronger evidence for sufficiency or necessity, coverage as a condition becomes more relevant.

QCA can however be used to examine a more complex form of causality, generally captured under the expression 'multiple conjunctural causation.' This implies that there can be multiple paths towards the same outcome, each of which

might consist of a specific combination (or conjunction) of conditions (Rihoux, 2003: 353; Wagemann and Schneider, 2010: 383-385). QCA's ability to deal with this complex conception of causality makes it particularly apt to test the integrated model. This comprises several pathways towards making large contributions, which each consist of a specific combination of international and domestic conditions.

This study applies the fuzzy set variant of QCA (fsQCA), which allows to account for differences-in-kind between cases (qualitative difference) as well as difference-in degree (quantitative difference) between qualitatively identical cases. Fuzzy membership scores vary between 1 and 0, depending on the degree to which a case belongs to a set (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012: 28). The qualitative status of a case depends on its position towards the 0.5 anchor, which constitutes 'the threshold between membership and non-membership in a set – the qualitative distinction that is maintained in fuzzy sets.' (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012: 28). The assignment of fuzzy membership scores, or calibration, is of utmost importance in fsQCA and is detailed in the next section.

Calibration

With the exception of parliamentary veto power, the conditions and the outcome were calibrated using the direct method of calibration (Ragin, 2008: 85-94). This was carried out with the fsQCA 2.5 software, which employs a logistic function to fit raw data between three qualitative breakpoints: full membership (1), the cross-over point (0.5) and full non-membership (0) (Ragin and Davey, 2014). The following paragraphs discuss the base variables and qualitative breakpoints that were used to calibrate the conditions. The base variables, membership scores and qualitative breakpoints are respectively presented in **Table I, Table II** and **Table III**.

Table I: Base variables

		Outcome		**Conditions**						
cases		LC		MC	MS	PI	GP	LE	LP	ED
AT		0		2050	60	4.82	2128.81	-2.89	-10.24	68
BE		1.71		6984	10.79	0.37	2957.74	-16.98	-12.24	320
CZ		0		4566	19.69	1.27	2164.32	-10.87	0.67	1404
DE		0.6		63004	12.73	0.12	2381.23	11.81	6.36	1160
EE		0		563	39.26	0.6	2841.88	1.66	2.79	222
ES		1.98		39617	5.07	0.25	2623.43	-	-2.83	593

								12.39		
FI		1.87		6000	11.77	6.35	2934.18	-16.3	-14.03	236
FR		1.35		91000	11.35	1.08	2433.55	-7.73	-9.92	320
GB		0		74570	22.14	0.58	3319.78	-3.09	3.07	1381
GR		1.63		22182	7.93	0.3	717.25	-17.59	-13.44	418
HU		0.04		2122	33.23	3.13	1795.41	10.68	-3.82	1354
IE		1.4		850	73.42	5.49	3863.67	-6.58	-9.98	303
IT		2.25		54800	9.17	0.36	1650.23	-17.71	11.71	1719
LT		0		1140	19.48	0.07	2307.73	10.27	5.22	822
LU		0.09		311	11.9	0	2921.26	-18.79	-17.21	1048
LV		0		947	17.43	0	2434.19	1.52	-0.73	74
NL		0		17724	12.7	0.58	3002.86	12.6	6.4	120
PL		1.79		24300	17.29	10.47	1922.55	-1.14	-0.47	451
PT		1.39		7168	10.84	1.54	3728.24	-10.56	-6.85	1160
SE		0.2		3122	25.37	1.81	2812.02	-18.32	-4.33	54
SI		0		1579	19.76	0.63	2090.48	-3.66	-5.08	789
SK		0		641	98.76	22.03	1907.34	-11.01	-4.7	1418

LC: Large Personnel Contributions; MC: Military Capabilities; MS: Military Stretch; PI: Prior Peacekeeping Involvement; GP: High Geographic Proximity; LE: Left Executive; LP: Left Parliament; ED: Large Electoral Distance.

Source: author's own analysis

Table II: Fuzzy membership scores

		Outcome		Conditions							
cases		LC		MC	MS	PI	GP	LE	LP	ED	PV
AT		0.05		0.05	1	1	0.32	0.7	0.96	0.02	1
BE		0.89		0.51	0.06	0.02	0	0.99	0.98	0.91	0.2
CZ		0.05		0.22	0.48	0.69	0.27	0.96	0.45	1	0.8
DE		0.23		0.96	0.1	0.01	0.09	0.03	0.13	1	0.8
EE		0.05		0.02	0.95	0.08	0.01	0.38	0.3	0.66	0.8
ES		0.95		0.86	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.98	0.7	1	1
FI		0.93		0.42	0.08	1	0	0.99	0.99	0.71	0.8
FR		0.74		0.99	0.07	0.56	0.07	0.91	0.95	0.91	0
GB		0.05		0.98	0.58	0.07	0	0.72	0.28	1	0
GR		0.87		0.71	0.03	0.01	0.98	0.99	0.98	0.98	0
HU		0.05		0.05	0.88	1	0.65	0.04	0.76	1	0.8
IE		0.77		0.02	1	1	0	0.88	0.95	0.88	0.8
IT		0.98		0.94	0.04	0.02	0.74	1	0.03	1	0.4
LT		0.05		0.03	0.46	0	0.14	0.04	0.17	1	1
LU		0.06		0.02	0.08	0	0	1	0.99	1	0.8
LV		0.05		0.02	0.32	0	0.07	0.39	0.55	0.03	1
NL		0.05		0.65	0.1	0.07	0	0.02	0.13	0.12	0.8
PL		0.91		0.73	0.31	1	0.56	0.58	0.54	0.99	0.2
PT		0.76		0.51	0.06	0.83	0	0.96	0.89	1	0.2
SE		0.08		0.1	0.69	0.92	0.01	1	0.79	0.01	0.8
SI		0.05		0.04	0.48	0.1	0.37	0.75	0.82	1	0.2
SK		0.05		0.02	1	1	0.57	0.96	0.8	1	0.8

LC: Large Personnel Contributions; MC: Military Capabilities; MS: Military Stretch; PI: Prior Peacekeeping Involvement; GP: High Geographic Proximity; LE: Left Executive; LP: Left Parliament; ED: Large Electoral Distance; PV: Parliamentary Veto.

Source: author's own analysis

Table III: Thresholds Calibration

		Outcome		Conditions						
cases		LC		MC	MS	PI	GP	LE	LP	ED
1		2		60,000	40	2	1,000	-10	-10	365
0.5		1		6,500	20	1	2,000	0	0	180
0		0		2,000	10	0.5	2,500	10	10	90

LC: Large Personnel Contributions; MC: Military Capabilities; MS: Military Stretch; PI: Prior Peacekeeping Involvement; GP: High Geographic Proximity; LE: Left Executive; LP: Left Parliament; ED: Large Electoral Distance.

Source: author's own analysis

The ratio between the number of troops contributed to UNIFIL II and a state's GDP was used as base variable for the outcome, *large contribution* (in line with Bobrow and Boyer, 1997: 731-736; Shimizu and Sandler, 2002; Shimizu and Sandler, 2010). This was calculated according to the following equation (1):

$$\mathrm{lc_i} = \frac{(\mathrm{PC_i}/\sum \mathrm{PC_i})}{(\mathrm{GDP_i}/\sum \mathrm{GDP_i})} \quad (1)$$

where PC_i is the total number of a country's active personnel in UNIFIL II in November 2006, when the mission reached full deployment, and GDP_i a country's GDP in 2006 (Engberg, 2013: 78). The following qualitative anchors were used to calibrate this interval-level variable: the threshold for full inclusion was fixed at 2, corresponding to contributions twice the size of what could be expected by a state's GDP; the crossover threshold at 1, corresponding to contributions fully proportional to a state's GDP; the threshold for full non-membership at 0, corresponding to the absence of personnel contributions.

The base variable for *military capabilities* is the number of deployable forces, retrieved from the European Defence Agency (2008). The following qualitative anchors were used to calibrate this interval-level variable. The threshold for full inclusion was fixed at 60,000, separating the three large EU members, France, the UK and Germany, from the other cases (Brummer, 2006). The threshold for full exclusion was fixed at 2,000, in the significant gap between Austria and Slovenia. The crossover threshold was set to 6,500. This value corresponds to the median and is located in the significant gap between Belgium and Finland.

The base variable for prior *peacekeeping involvement* takes into account the size of past contributions to UNPOs and the dispersion of these contributions across operations (in line with Thiem and Haesebrouck, 2014). The latter is accounted for

because high absolute contributions can be a consequence of extraordinary large contributions to a single operation, which could be motivated by immediate security interests. In line with Thiem and Haesebrouck (2014), the dispersion parameter D_i was calculated according to the following equation (2):

$$D_i = 1 - \sum P_j^2 \quad (2)$$

where P_j is the proportion of personnel contributed to operation j = 1, 2,…, k.. Subsequently, the level of prior involvement was calculated and relativized by GDP according to the following equation (3):

$$ppi_i = \frac{(P_i * D_i / \sum(P_i * D_i))}{(GDP_i / \sum GDP_i)} \quad (3)$$

where P_i is the absolute personnel contribution to UNPOs. The following qualitative anchors were used to calibrate this indicator: the threshold for full inclusion was fixed at 2, corresponding to a level of prior contributions twice the size of what could be expected by a state's GDP; the crossover threshold at 1, corresponding to a level of contributions fully proportional to a state's GDP; the threshold for full exclusion at 0.5, corresponding to a level of prior contributions half of what would be expected by its GDP.

The operationalization of *high geographic proximity* builds on the minimum-distance measure, which calculates the distance between the two closest physical locations of a country dyad (Gleditsch and Ward, 2001; Weidmann et al., 2010). The following qualitative anchors were used to calibrate this indicator: the threshold for full inclusion was fixed at 1,000 km, corresponding to Gleditsch and Ward's assertion that states 'that are more than 1,000 km apart can hardly be considered geographically close' (Gledtisch and War, 2001: 745). The crossover threshold is fixed at 2,000 km; the threshold for full exclusion at 2,500 km.

To accurately reflect the impact of simultaneous military deployments on the resources available to contribute, the base variable for *military stretch* takes into account the size of a country's parallel deployments and its total available resources. In line with Thiem and Haesebrouck (2014), this was accomplished by setting the cases' deployed troops in 2006 (DT) in relation to their total deployable troops (DAT), according to the following equation (4):

$$ms_i = \frac{DT_i}{DAT_{i,}} \quad (4)$$

The following qualitative anchors were used to calibrate the indicator. The anchor for full inclusion was fixed at 40%. This corresponds to the deployability target for ground forces to which the NATO countries agreed at their 2004 Istanbul Summit. Since this target is also used by the European Defence Agency for internal assessments, it constitutes an appropriate threshold for assessing the extent of military stretch of the EU member states (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2008: 13). The crossover threshold and threshold for full exclusion at respectively half (20%) and a quarter of this target (10%).

The base variable for the *ideological orientation* of the cases' government (right executive) and legislature (right parliament) draws on the Right-Left (RILE) indicator of the Comparative Manifesto Project, which is based on quantitative content analyses of election programmes (Volkens et al., 2013). In line with previous studies (Mello, 2012: 436-437; Palmer et al., 2004), party positions (n) were aggregated into an overall measure of executive ideological orientation by summing up each government party's (i) ideological position on the RILE scale (rl), weighted by its proportion of the total number of government seats (s), as specified in the following equation (5):

$$\sum_{i=1}^{n} \frac{s_i rl_i}{s}. \quad (5)$$

Similarly, the positions of the parties represented in parliament (n) were aggregated into an overall measure of parliamentary ideological orientation by summing up each party's (j) ideological position on the RILE scale (rl), weighted by its proportion of the total number of seats in parliament (s). The following thresholds were used to calibrate the indicators for legislative and executive ideology: the crossover threshold was fixed at 0, since this score corresponds to parties that make an equal amount of right and left statements in their manifestos; the threshold for full inclusion in left executive/parliament was fixed at -10, the anchor for full exclusion at 10.

Large Electoral Distance was calculated by measuring the timespan between the decision on troop contributions and the date of the next general election. The reference date for the former is July 25th 2006, the first informal meeting of prospective troop contributors. The following thresholds were used to calibrate the resulting indicator. Since the research of Gaubatz (1991) has demonstrated that electoral considerations are expected not to matter if the next general elections are

still over a year away, the threshold for full inclusion is fixed at 365 days. On the basis of the tested assumption that electoral considerations matter most during electoral quarters, the threshold for full exclusion is fixed at 90 days (Meernik and Waterman, 1996: 580; Ostrom and Job, 1986: 534). The crossover threshold is fixed at 180 days, situating governments that face elections within half a year more in than out of the set.

The calibration of the condition *parliamentary veto power* is based on categorical differences between the cases. Since an ex ante veto is generally considered the strongest form of parliamentary oversight, cases were assigned a score above 0.5 if parliamentary consent was required before troop deployments (Mello, 2012: 432). Such cases still vary in two important ways. First, parliaments are expected to have a stronger veto if prior legislative approval constitutes a legal obligation rather than an unwritten rule (Hänggi, 2004: 14). Second, parliaments have more influence if consent from non-governmental parties is required, which is the case for countries governed by minority governments (Thiem and Haesebrouck, 2014). A score of 1 was assigned to cases that meet both requirements, a score of 0.8 to cases that meet one requirement and a score of 0.6 to cases with an ex ante parliamentary veto that meet neither of the two requirements. A score of 0.4 was assigned to cases where parliamentary approval was required after troops are deployed, since the military, strategic and reputational costs of calling troops back render such an ex post veto far less effective than an ex ante parliamentary veto (Wagner et al., 2010: 19). Cases where the executive was only obliged to consult or inform parliament about its decisions were assigned a score of 0.2. A score of 0 was assigned to states where the legislature hardly played any role in military deployment decisions.

Analysis and results

This section presents the results of the analysis, which was carried out with the fsQCA 2.5 software. The analysis of sufficiency builds on the truth table algorithm (Ragin, 2008: 124-144). A truth table lists all possible combinations of conditions and the associated outcomes. The cases' membership scores in the truth table rows are calculated with Boolean multiplication. Every row that contains at least one case with a membership score above 0.5 is assigned an outcome value, based on its

consistency as a sufficient condition for the outcome. The remaining rows are considered logical remainders; combinations of conditions without members. Such remainders are problematic because, depending on the choices made during the analysis, they can either render the results too complex to interpret in a theoretically meaningful way or, conversely, oversimplify them (Schneider and Wagemann, 2006: 758).

To dramatically reduce the number of logical remainders, this study follows the two-step approach suggested by Schneider and Wagemann (2006). In two-step QCA, conditions are divided into remote and proximate conditions. Only the former are included in the first step of the analysis. This results in combinations of remote conditions that make the outcome possible, which are considered 'outcome-enabling contexts.' In the second step, each of these outcome-enabling contexts is analysed together with the proximate conditions, in order to find the specific combinations of domestic conditions that are sufficient in each context. In this study, the international level conditions are expected to constitute outcome-enabling contexts, since states are expected not to contribute in the absence of international level incentives. Therefore, they are modelled as the remote conditions. Domestic factors are modelled as the proximate conditions, since actual contributions are only expected if there is a match between them and the international context.

Necessity

The results of the analysis of necessity, presented in Table IV, reveal that three conditions are necessary. The consistency scores of two conditions exceed the recommended 0.9 threshold: left executive and large electoral distance (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012: 278). With a consistency of 0.87, the absence of military stretch only nearly misses this threshold. The coverage of the three necessary conditions is however quite low, which suggests they might be trivial necessary conditions.

Table IV: Results necessity LC

	Consistency	Coverage
MC	0.709342	0.694915
~MC	0.432526	0.285171
MS	0.250288	0.247153
~MS	**0.870819**	**0.571104**

PI	0.516724	0.477103
~PI	0.579008	0.398097
GP	0.313725	0.558522
~GP	0.764706	0.387040
LE	**0.933103**	**0.529797**
~LE	0.164937	0.212481
LP	0.806228	0.494342
~LP	0.324106	0.357506
ED	**0.960784**	**0.483740**
~ED	0.103806	0.188285
PV	0.500577	0.328788
~PV	0.652826	0.643182
"**~**" indicates the absence of a condition; LC: Large Personnel Contributions; MC: Military Capabilities; MS: Military Stretch; PI: Prior Peacekeeping Involvement; GP: High Geographic Proximity; LE: Left Executive; LP: Left Parliament; ED: Large Electoral Distance; PV: Parliamentary Veto.		

Source: author's calculations

The relevance of the (alleged) necessary conditions is further assessed by constructing xy-plots. **Figures 2, 3** and **4** show the scores of the cases on the outcome and respectively large electoral distance, left executive and absence of military stretch. Cases are generally situated close to the vertical right axis in all three xy-plots, but especially in the plot of large electoral distance (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012: 146). This indicates the latter is strongly present in most cases, irrespective of whether they display the outcome, which further suggests large electoral distance constitutes a trivial necessary condition (Ragin, 2008: 60). The xy-plot of "absence military stretch" shows that one of the cases is a true logically contradictory case: Ireland has a score of 0 on the causal condition and a score of 0.77 on the outcome. This strongly disconfirms the necessity of the absence of military stretch, since it indicates that the outcome can be strongly present in the absence of the condition.

Figure 2: Large Electoral Distance



Source: author's calculations

Figure 3: Left Executive



Source: author's calculations

Figure 4: ~Military Stretch



Source: author's calculations

Step one sufficiency: international level conditions

Only the international level conditions are included in the first step of the two-step procedure. **Table V** represents the truth table, with each case located in the row where its membership exceeds 0.5. The consistency cut-off point, which separates truth table rows that correspond to outcome-enabling combinations from those that do not, was fixed at 0.6. This low threshold is acceptable because the analysis is expected to result in outcome-enabling, not sufficient combinations (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012: 254; Schneider and Wagemann, 2006: 771). The cut-off point was established by looking for a gap in the distribution of the consistency scores. Taken into account that a consistency below 0.5 indicates that there is more evidence against the claim of sufficiency than in favour of it, there are four gaps that might be useful for establishing the threshold: between row 2 and 3, row 3 and 4, row 4 and 5 and row 5 and 6 (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012: 279). The cut-off point was established in the last gap because row 5 contains two cases that have a membership score above 0.5 in the outcome. This nurtures the expectation that it corresponds to an outcome-enabling (although not sufficient) combination.

Table V: Truth table international conditions LC

		Conditions						Outcome		
row		MC	GP	PI	MS		Consistency	LC		*Cases*
1		1	1	0	0		0.91	1		GR, IT
2		1	0	1	0		0.91	1		FR, PT
3		1	1	1	0		0.83	1		PL
4		0	0	1	0		0.68	1		CZ, FI
5		1	0	0	0		0.61	1		BE, DE, ES, NL
6		1	0	0	1		0.49	0		GB
7		0	0	1	1		0.39	0		AT, IE, SE
8		0	0	0	0		0.32	0		LT, LU, LV, SI
9		0	1	1	1		0.27	0		HU, SK
10		0	0	0	1		0.23	0		EE

MC: Military Capabilities; GP: High Geographic Proximity; PI: Prior Peacekeeping Involvement; MS: Military Stretch; LC: Large Personnel Contributions.

Source: author's calculations

Subsequently, Boolean minimization was used to remove logically redundant conditions from the rows above the threshold. Depending on the remainders included in the process, minimization results in different solution types. If no remainders are included, it results in the conservative solution; if all remainders that lead to a less complex solution are included, it results in the parsimonious solution. While the former tends to be overly complex, the latter risks resting on untenable assumptions (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012: 175, 279). Therefore, this study focusses on the intermediate solution, which results when only remainders that correspond to theoretical expectations are included in the minimization process.

The intermediate solution is presented in the first column of **Table VI**. The formula suggests two outcome-enabling combinations, which correspond to the first two pathways of the international-level-side of the model. The first confirms that the absence of military stretch combined with sizeable military capabilities is a conductive context for contributing to UNIFIL II. The second reveals that the absence of military stretch combined with a high level of participation in UN peacekeeping also constitutes an outcome-enabling context. High geographic proximity is not included in any of the causal paths, suggesting that it is not relevant for explaining contributions to UNIFIL II. This explains the necessity of 'left executive', since right-leaning leaders are only expected to support UNPOs if these are deployed in conflicts that pose a threat to their national interests.

Table VI: Intermediate solutions LC

	International Conditions					Domestic Conditions				
		Coverage		Consi s-tency			Coverage		Consi s-tency	*Cases*
		Raw	Unique				Raw	Unique		
1	MC*~MS	0.694348	0.395617	0.748756		MC~MS*ED*LP*LE	0.516724	0.111880	0.885375	FR, ES, GR, BE, PL, PT
						MC~MS*ED*~PV*LE	0.476355	0.071511	0.856847	FR, IT, GR, BE, PL, PT
						Total	0.588235		0.868951	
2	PI*~MS	0.389850	0.170704	0.784223		PI~MS*ED*LP*LE	0.334487	0.334487	0.843023	PT, FI, FR, PL
	Total	0.785467		0.714585		Total	0.625144		0.877797	

"~" indicates the absence of a condition; multiplication "*" refers to conjunction of conditions; LC: Large Personnel Contributions; MC: Military Capabilities; MS: Military Stretch; PI: Prior Peacekeeping Involvement; GP: High Geographic Proximity; LE: Left Executive; LP: Left Parliament; ED: Large Electoral Distance; PV: Parliamentary Veto.

Source: author's calculations

Step two sufficiency: domestic level conditions

In the second step of the analysis, the two outcome-enabling contexts are linked to specific domestic conditions. Since the goal is to identify sufficient combinations, the consistency cut-off point is fixed at 0.75. This corresponds to the minimal advisable threshold (Ragin 2009; Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 279). However, the truth table rows above this value only contain cases that are good instances of the outcome. This indicates that these rows do not cover true logical

contradictory cases and, hereby, provides further support for the sufficiency of the corresponding combinations (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012: 185).

The truth table of the analysis with the context "military stretch absent - military capabilities present" is presented in **Table VII**, the resulting intermediate solution is in the second column of **Table VI**. It reveals that, in the presence of this context, the combination of large electoral distance, left executive and either parliamentary veto absent or left parliament is sufficient for the outcome. The truth table that results from the analysis with the context "military stretch absent – prior peacekeeping involvement present" is presented in **Table VIII.** The intermediate solution corresponds to one sufficient path which combines the presence of the context with large electoral distance, left executive and left parliament.

Table VII: Truth table domestic conditions - ~MS*MC

		Conditions							Outcome		
row		~MS*MC	LE	LP	PV	ED		Consistency	LC		*Cases*
1		1	1	1	1	1		0.92	1		ES
2		1	1	1	0	1		0.86	1		BE, FR, GR, PL, PT
3		1	1	0	0	1		0.75	1		IT
4		0	1	1	0	1		0.62	0		SI
5		1	0	0	1	1		0.54	0		DE
6		0	1	1	1	1		0.53	0		FI, IE, LU, SK
7		0	1	0	1	1		0.47	0		CZ
8		0	1	0	0	1		0.47	0		GB
9		0	0	1	1	1		0.4	0		HU
10		0	0	0	1	1		0.32	0		EE, LT
11		0	1	1	1	0		0.28	0		AT, SE
12		0	0	1	1	0		0.24	0		LV
13		1	0	0	1	0		0.17	0		NL

MS: Military Stretch; MC: Military Capabilities; LE: Left Executive; LP: Left Parliament; PV: Parliamentary Veto; ED: Large Electoral Distance; LC: Large Personnel Contributions.

Source: author's calculations

Table VIII: Truth table domestic conditions - ~MS*PI

		Conditions							Outcome		
row		~MS*PI	LE	LP	PV	ED		Consistency	LC		*Cases*
1		1	1	1	0	1		0.9	1		FR, PL, PT
2		1	1	1	1	1		0.76	1		FI
3		0	1	1	0	1		0.67	0		BE, GR, SI
4		0	1	0	0	1		0.55	0		GB, IT
5		1	1	0	1	1		0.54	0		CZ
6		0	1	1	1	1		0.53	0		ES, IE, LU, SK

7		0	0	1	1	1		0.41		0		HU
8		0	0	0	1	1		0.29		0		DE, EE, LT
9		0	0	1	1	0		0.24		0		LV
10		0	1	1	1	0		0.23		0		AT, SE
11		0	0	0	1	0		0.16		0		NL
MS: Military Stretch; MC: Military Capabilities; LE: Left Executive; LP: Left Parliament; PV: Parliamentary Veto; ED: Large Electoral Distance; LC: Large Personnel Contributions.												

Source: author's calculations

The results confirm the theoretical model. First of all, only states governed by left-leaning governments made a large contribution to the operation. Since high geographic proximity was not a relevant condition, this is in line with theoretical expectations on the impact of party politics on participation in UNPOs. Second, the results indicate that left-leaning governments were only able to contribute if the combination of a rightist parliament and parliamentary veto power did not constitute a veto point against personnel contributions. Lastly, large electoral distance is included in every solution term, which suggests that states only participate in UNPOs if elections are still far away.

Analysis absence outcome

Standards of good practice dictate that the outcome and its absence should be dealt with in separate analyses (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012: 279). The analysis of necessity, presented in **Table IX**, shows that the consistency values of the conditions do not exceed the 0.9 threshold, indicating that none of them is necessary for the outcome's absence.

Table IX: Results necessity ~LC

	Consistency	Coverage
MC	0.294824	0.444068
~MC	0.797449	0.808365
MS	0.574644	0.872437
~MS	0.504126	0.508321
PI	0.430608	0.611289
~PI	0.631658	0.667724
GP	0.212303	0.581109
~GP	0.838710	0.652656

LE	0.602401	0.525868
~LE	0.461365	0.913819
LP	0.621155	0.585573
~LP	0.463616	0.786260
ED	0.335334	0.507955
~ED	0.764441	0.771970
PV	0.339085	0.547879
~PV	0.762941	0.739636
"~" indicates the absence of a condition; LC: Large Personnel Contributions; MC: Military Capabilities; MS: Military Stretch; PI: Prior Peacekeeping Involvement; GP: High Geographic Proximity; LE: Left Executive; LP: Left Parliament; ED: Large Electoral Distance; PV: Parliamentary Veto.		

Source: author's calculations

The sufficiency of the international and domestic level conditions was assessed separately, since both the absence of the outcome-enabling international conditions, as the absence of the proximate domestic conditions is expected to be sufficient for the outcome's absence. **Table X** represents the truth table of the international level conditions. In line with the analysis of the outcome's presence, the consistency cut-off point is fixed at the 0.75 threshold.

Table X: Truth table international conditions ~LC

		Conditions						Outcome		
row		MC	GP	PI	MS		Consistency	~LC		*Cases*
1		0	0	0	1		0.99	1		EE
2		1	0	0	1		0.99	1		GB
3		0	1	1	1		0.92	1		HU, SK
4		0	0	0	0		0.88	1		LT, LU, LV, SI
5		0	0	1	1		0.78	1		AT, IE, SE
6		0	0	1	0		0.64	0		CZ, FI
7		1	0	0	0		0.65	0		BE, DE, ES, NL
8		1	1	1	0		0.53	0		PL
9		1	0	1	0		0.51	0		FR, PT
10		1	1	0	0		0.34	0		GR, IT

"~" indicates the absence of the outcome; MC: Military Capabilities; GP: High Geographic Proximity; PI: Prior Peacekeeping Involvement; MS: Military Stretch; LC: Large Personnel Contributions.

Source: author's calculations

The intermediate solution is presented on the left-hand side of **Table XI**. The results show that three combinations of international-level conditions are sufficient for the outcome's absence. In line with theoretical expectations, the presence of military stretch, and the absence of prior peacekeeping involvement, military capabilities and high geographic proximity are associated with the absence of large contributions. In contrast to the results of the presence of the outcome, the results thus suggest that geographic proximity matters for contributions to UNIFIL II. However, this might be an artefact of the theoretical assumptions made for the production of the intermediate solution, as it is not included in the parsimonious solution (presented in the appendix).

Table XI: Intermediate solution ~LC

International Conditions						**Domestic Conditions**				
	Coverage		Consis-	*Case*			Coverage		Consis-	*Case*
	Raw	Unique	tency	*s*			Raw	Unique	tency	*s*
MS*~MC	0.523631	0.299325	0.875784	EE, IE, SK, HU, AT, SE		PV*~LE	0.406602	0.241560	0.973070	LT, DE, HU, NL, EE, LV
~GP*MS	0.474869	0.065266	0.861225	IE, EE, SE, AT, GB						
~GP*~PI*~MC	0.409602	0.185296	0.908486	LU, LV, EE, LT, SI		PV*~ED	0.309828	0.144786	0.938636	AT, LV, NL, SE
Total	0.759940		0.869528			Total	0.551388		0.945946	

"~" indicates the absence of a condition; LC: Large Personnel Contributions; MC: Military Capabilities; MS: Military Stretch; PI: Prior Peacekeeping Involvement; GP: High Geographic Proximity; LE: Left Executive; LP: Left Parliament; ED: Large Electoral Distance; PV: Parliamentary Veto.

Source: author's calculations

Table XII represents the truth table of the international level conditions. The consistency cut-off point is fixed at the 0.75 threshold.

Table XII: Truth table domestic conditions ~LC

		Conditions							**Outcome**		
row		LE	LP	PV	ED		Consistency		~LC		*Cases*
1		0	0	1	0		1		1		NL
2		0	1	1	0		1		1		LV
3		0	0	1	1		0.96		1		DE, EE, LT

4		0	1	1	1		0.95		1		HU
5		1	1	1	0		0.92		1		AT, SE
6		1	0	1	1		0.72		0		CZ
7		1	0	0	1		0.67		0		GB, IT
8		1	1	1	1		0.63		0		FI, ES, IE, LU, SK
9		1	1	0	1		0.48		0		FR, PL, PT, BE, GR, SI
"~" indicates the absence of the outcome; LE: Left Executive; LP: Left Parliament; PV: Parliamentary Veto; ED: Large Electoral Distance; LC: Large Personnel Contributions.											

Source: author's calculations

The intermediate solution is presented on the right-hand side of Table XI. The results show that two combinations of domestic-level conditions are sufficient for the outcome's absence. In line with theoretical expectations, the presence of parliamentary veto, the absence of left executive and the absence of distant elections are associated with the absence of large contributions.

Conclusion

What explains democratic participation in United Nations peacekeeping operations? Although the division of the burdens of UN peacekeeping has attracted a considerable amount of academic attention, neither the impact of domestic conditions, nor whether specific conjunctions between domestic and international conditions explain contribution decisions had been systematically analysed. This study set out to fill this gap in academic research. Insights from studies on peacekeeping burden sharing, democratic peace theory and integrated decision models were combined in a multi-causal framework, which was tested on the 2006 enhancement of the UNIFIL operation.

The results revealed that a complex interplay between domestic and international conditions accounts for different levels of engagement in UNIFIL II. Two combinations of international level conditions allowed for large personnel contributions: in the absence of military stretch, states with sizeable military capabilities or a high level of prior involvement in UNPOs had an incentive to contribute. Actual contributions, however, only materialized if a state was governed by a left-leaning government that was not constrained by either proximate elections or a right-leaning legislature with extensive veto powers. Contrary to prior research, this study did not suggest that geographic proximity to the target conflict is relevant for explaining participation in peacekeeping operations.

More generally, this study confirms that domestic conditions must be taken into account to fully understand the circumstances under which democracies contribute to UNPOs. Furthermore, its results show that the impact of executive ideology depends on the type of military operation. While prior research suggests that right-leaning governments are more likely to support military engagement, this study shows that leftist executives are actually more inclined to participate in peacekeeping operations. These conclusions can however not easily be generalized, since this study examines only one operation. Future analysis should therefore assess the impact of domestic conditions on contributions to a larger population of peacekeeping operations. Prospective studies could specifically focus on states that have narrow interests at stake in the target conflict of a UNPO, in order to assess whether this affects the propensity of right-leaning leaders to support the operation.

Appendix 1: Parliamentary veto power

This appendix provides a description of the parliamentary involvement on decisions on contributions to UN peacekeeping operations. It reflects the situation on July 25th 2006, the date of the first informal meeting of prospective troop contributors (Mattelaer, 2011, p. 101).

In **Austria,** the deployment of troops required the prior approval of the main committee of the parliament (Born, Fuior, & Lazzarini, 2008). This was composed of 32 of the 183 members of the parliament, reflecting the composition of the entire parliament (Kammel, 2013). Therefore, Austria was considered a country with legal ex ante parliamentary veto power. Since it was governed by a minority government, it was assigned a score of 1.

Belgium was a country with weak parliamentary war powers (Dieterich, Hummel, & Marshall, 2010, p. 53). The decision to send armed forces abroad was exclusively in the hands of the executive (Wagner, Peters, & Glahn, 2010, p. 34). The government only had to inform parliament, but not seek its prior or ex post approval (Biscop, 2013, p. 36). In line with the coding scheme, Belgium was assigned a score of 0.2.

In the **Czech Republic,** troop deployment required ex ante parliamentary approval. However, if the deployment was part of a peace operation following a decision of an international organization of which the Czech republic was a member, the government could decide on the troop deployments for up to 60 days (Dieterich et al., 2010, p. 50; Jires, 2013, p. 76). Asking prior parliamentary approval was however an unwritten norm in the Czech Republic (Jires, 2013, p. 76). Since it was governed by a minority government, the Czech Republic was assigned a score of 0.8.

In **Estonia,** parliamentary approval was required before troop deployment, without any exception (Dieterich et al., 2010, p. 17; Salu & Männik, 2013, p. 107). Since it was not governed by a minority government, it was assigned a score of 0.8.

In **Finland,** the government had to consult prior to each decision to deploy military forces abroad with the parliament's foreign affairs committee, which had to approve or reject this decision (Seppo & Forsberg, 2013). According to Dieterich et al. (2010, p. 20), this corresponds to a legal ante veto power. Since it was not governed by a minority government, Finland was assigned a score of 0.8.

In **France**, there was no need for securing parliamentary approval, nor for informing the parliament when it decided to contribute to UNIFIL (Dieterich et al., 2010, p. 65; Irondelle & Schmitt, 2013, p. 129). In consequence, it was assigned a score of 0.

In **Germany,** prior parliamentary approval was required for all deployments of the armed forces (Dieterich et al., 2010, p. 22; Wagner et al., 2010, p. 55). The German parliament had "far-reaching rights in mandating, mandate renewals, and the withdrawal of German troops participating in international missions abroad" (Junk & Daase, 2013, pp. 142-143). It was not governed by a minority government. In line with the coding scheme, Germany was therefore assigned a score of 0.8.

In **Greece,** the government had almost total control over the deployment of armed forces (Economides, 2013, p. 157). Parliamentary approval was not required, the government was not even obliged to inform parliament (Dieterich et al., 2010, p. 66; Wagner et al., 2010, p. 57). In consequence, it was assigned a score of 0.

In **Hungary**, participation in UN peacekeeping operations required prior parliamentary approval (Born et al., 2008, p. 18; Tálas & Csiki, 2013, p. 174; Wagner et al., 2010, pp. 58-59). Since it was not governed by a minority government, Hungary was assigned a score of 0.8.

In **Ireland,** parliament had an ex ante veto on participation in military operations abroad, without exceptions (Keohane, 2013; Wagner et al., 2010, p. 61). Since it was not governed by a minority government, it was assigned a score of 0.8.

In **Italy**, parliamentary competences for troop deployments were not clearly defined, resulting in competing views of the legal procedures for participation in military operations (Wagner et al., 2010, p. 63).The Italian government had many ways to deploy troops, some of which exclude parliamentary involvement. Consequently, there exists disagreement on parliamentary involvement on decisions on the use of force, with assessments ranging from very strong over medium to inconclusive (Born et al., 2008, p. 19; Dieterich et al., 2010, p. 26; Wagner et al., 2010, p. 64). According to Marrone and Di Camillo (2013, p. 197), "international deployment authorisation is usually based on a decree law issued by the government and adopted as law by parliament within the 60-day period foreseen in the legislation." The use of such degree laws limited the parliament's role, which gives ex post endorsement by approving these laws. Furthermore, according to Born et al. (2008, p. 19), parliamentary debates usually took place after troops are deployed. Italy was therefore considered a state with an ex post parliamentary veto; and assigned a score of 0.4.

.In **Latvia**, the decision to participate in military operations had to be taken by the parliament, which thus had a strong ex ante veto (Dieterich et al., 2010, p. 29; Rikveilis, 2013, pp. 210-211). Since it was governed by a minority government, it was assigned a score of 1.

Lithuania's parliament had an ex ante veto on the use of the armed forces beyond Lithuanian borders (Dieterich et al., 2010, p. 30; Šešelgytơ, 2013, p. 224). Since Lithuania was governed by a minority government, it was assigned a score of 1.

In **Luxembourg**, prior parliamentary approval was required for participation in all operations (Born et al., 2008, p. 5; Dieterich et al., 2010, p. 33; Lorenz, 2013, pp. 233-235). Since it was not governed by a minority government, it was assigned a score of 0.8.

In the **Netherlands**, the parliament did not have a veto on military deployments, but the government was obliged to inform the legislature before any military operation abroad (Noll & Moelke, 2013, p. 260; Wagner et al., 2010, pp. 74-75). In spite of the absence of a formal veto, "political reality, however, requires government to obtain a majority to support its plans" (Noll & Moelke, 2013, p. 260). The Netherlands was therefore considered a country with an informal ex ante veto. Since it was governed by a minority government, it was assigned a score of 0.8.

Poland's parliament did not have a veto to block its governments decisions on the deployment of armed forces, it only has to be informed once a deployment decision has been made (Born et al., 2008, p. 18; Terlikowski, 2013, pp. 276-279; Wagner et al., 2010, p. 81). In line with the coding scheme, Poland was therefore assigned a score of 0.2.

Portugal's parliament did not hold a veto position on external deployment of Portuguese forces, but had the right to be informed (Cardoso Reis, 2013, p. 283; Dieterich et al., 2010, p. 60; Wagner et al., 2010, p. 83). In consequence, Portugal was assigned a score of 0.2.

The **Slovak Republic's** parliament had to consent prior to external military deployment, except when troops were dispatched for a for a maximum period of 60 days and the deployment was part of an obligation resulting from international treaties on common defence (Dieterich et al., 2010, p. 51). The reinforcement of UNIFIL did not correspond to such an exception. Since the Slovak Republic was not governed by a minority government, it was assigned a score of 0.8.

In **Slovenia**, the parliament only held a veto in cases of 'all-out war' (Wagner et al., 2010, p. 86). Other decisions on the use of force were taken by the government, which only has to inform the parliament (Born et al., 2008, p. 18; Malešič, 2013, p. 323). In line with the coding scheme, Slovenia was therefore assigned a score of 0.2.

In **Spain**, prior authorization of parliament was mandatory for all operations not linked to the defence of Spain or its vital interests (Arteaga, 2013, p. 336; Born et al., 2008, p. 19). Since it was governed by a minority government, it was assigned a score of 1.

In **Sweden,** prior parliamentary approval was required for the use of military force in missions abroad, but deployments of less than 3000 soldiers to peacekeeping operations mandated by the UN were exempt from this obligation (Dieterich et al., 2010, p. 47). However, government had a tradition of consulting with the parliamentary committee on foreign affairs in these cases and since parliament is in charge of budget control, the latter still has indirect control over these operations (Ruffa, 2013, p. 347). Consequently, Sweden can be considered a country with an informal ex ante parliamentary veto on military deployments. Since it was governed by a minority government, it was assigned a score of 0.8.

In the **United Kingdom**, parliament had no power to participate in decision making on the deployments of troops (Dieterich et al., 2010, p. 69). In consequence, the UK was assigned a score of 0.

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Appendix 2: QCA results

This appendix presents supplementary material for the QCA presented in the main manuscript. The first section presents two robustness checks. The second section presents the XY-plots of the truth table rows that were coded 1 in the second step of the two-step analysis. The third section presents the conservative and parsimonious solutions.

Robustness Tests

This section presents the results of two robustness tests, in which the calibration of two conditions was changed.

Robustness Test 1

In the first test, the threshold for full inclusion in the set "Military Capabilities" was changed from 60,000 to 50,000, so that it includes Italy, the fourth largest EU member state in terms of military capabilities.

	MC	MC'
AT	0.05	0.05
BE	0.51	0.51
CZ	0.22	0.22
DE	0.96	0.98
EE	0.02	0.02
ES	0.86	0.91
FI	0.42	0.42
FR	0.99	1
GB	0.98	0.99
GR	0.71	0.75
HU	0.05	0.05
IE	0.02	0.02
IT	0.94	0.97
LT	0.03	0.03
LU	0.02	0.02
LV	0.02	0.02
NL	0.65	0.68
PL	0.73	0.77
PT	0.51	0.51
SE	0.1	0.1
SI	0.04	0.04
SK	0.02	0.02
MC: Fuzzy Membership scores in original analysis; MC': Fuzzy membership scores in robustness check		

Source: author's calculations

The same consistency threshold and directional expectations were used as in the original analysis. The truth table and outcome enabling combinations of international-level conditions that result from this analysis (presented in the tables below) are identical to the solutions that resulted from the original analysis, although the consistency scores are slightly higher in the new analysis.

Truth Table MC'

		Conditions						Outcome		
row		MC'	GP	PI	MS		Consistency		LC	*Cases*
1		1	1	0	0		0.92		1	GR, IT
2		1	0	1	0		0.91		1	FR, PT
3		1	1	1	0		0.83		1	PL
4		0	0	1	0		0.67		1	CZ, FI
5		1	0	0	0		0.61		1	BE, DE, ES, NL
6		1	0	0	1		0.49		0	GB
7		0	0	1	1		0.38		0	AT, IE, SE
8		0	0	0	0		0.30		0	LT, LU, LV, SI
9		0	1	1	1		0.25		0	HU, SK
10		0	0	0	1		0.22		0	EE

MC': Military Capabilities; GP: High Geographic Proximity; PI: Prior Peacekeeping Involvement; MS: Military Stretch; LC: Large Personnel Contributions.

Source: author's calculations

Intermediate Solution Robustness Test 1

		coverage		consistency		
		raw	unique			*Cases*
MC'*~MS		0.707036	0.408305	0.749389		FR, IT, DE, ES, NL, GR, BE, PL, PT
PI*~MS		0.389850	0.170704	0.784223		FI, PT, PL, FR, CZ
Total		0.798155		0.715615		

Source: author's calculations

Robustness Test 2

The goal of the second robustness test is to assess the robustness of the finding that geographic proximity is not relevant for explaining contributions to UNIFIL II. A possible reason for this finding is that membership scores in high geographic proximity are generally rather low. Therefore, the threshold for full inclusion the set geographic proximity is changed from 1,000km to 2,000km, the crossover threshold from 2,000km to 2,500km and the threshold for full exclusion from 2,500km to 3,000km. This results in a significant rise in the membership scores in this condition.

	GP	GP'
AT	0.9	0,9
BE	0.06	0,06
CZ	0.88	0,88
DE	0.67	0,67
EE	0.11	0,11
ES	0.32	0,32
FI	0.07	0,07
FR	0.6	0,6
GB	0.01	0,01
GR	1	1
HU	0.99	0,99
IE	0	0
IT	0.99	0,99
LT	0.76	0,76

LU	0.07	0,07
LV	0.6	0,6
NL	0.05	0,05
PL	0.97	0,97
PT	0	0
SE	0.13	0,13
SI	0.92	0,92
SK	0.97	0,97
GP: Fuzzy Membership scores in original analysis; GP': Fuzzy membership scores in robustness check		

Source: author's calculations

The same consistency threshold and directional expectations were used as in the original analysis. The truth table and outcome enabling combinations of international-level conditions that result from this analysis are presented in the tables below. The inclusion of the absence of GP in the intermediate solution strongly disconfirms that states that were situated closer to Lebanon were more inclined to participate in UNIFIL II. This further strengthens the assertion that geographic proximity did not spur contributions to UNIFIL's enhancement.

Truth Table GP'

		Conditions						Outcome		
row		MC	MS	PI	GP'		Consistency	LC		Cases
1		1	0	1	0		0.93	1		PT
2		1	0	1	1		0.9	1		FR, PL
3		1	0	0	1		0.83	1		DE, GR, IT
4		0	0	1	0		0.81	1		FI
5		1	0	0	0		0.67	1		BE, ES, NL
6		0	1	1	0		0.58	0		IE, SE
7		0	0	1	1		0.54	0		CZ
8		1	1	0	0		0.51	0		GB
9		0	0	0	0		0.42	0		LU
10		0	0	0	1		0.37	0		LT, LV, SI
11		0	1	0	0		0.31	0		EE
12		0	1	1	1		0.21	0		AT, HU, SK
MC: Military Capabilities; GP': High Geographic Proximity; PI: Prior Peacekeeping Involvement; MS: Military Stretch; LC: Large Personnel Contributions.										

Source: author's calculations

Intermediate Solution Robustness Test 2

		coverage		consistency		
		raw	unique			*cases*
~MS*MC		0.694348	0.395617	0.748756		FR, IT, DE, ES, NL, GR, BE, PL, PT
~MS*PI*~GP'		0.288351	0.091119	0.850340		FI, PT
solution		0.785467		0.745077		

Source: author's calculations

XY-plots analysis sufficiency

This section presents the XY-plots of the truth table rows that were coded as sufficient conditions in the second step of the two-step analysis. These XY-plots demonstrates that none of the rows cover true logically contradictory cases. There are no cases in the lower right quadrant of the XY-plots,

which indicates that none of the cases with a membership above 0.5 in the rows has a membership lower than 0.5 in the outcome.

XY-plot Row 1 truth table domestic conditions - ~MS*MC



XY-plot Row 2 truth table domestic conditions - ~MS*MC



XY-plot Row 3 truth table domestic conditions - ~MS*MC



	A	B	C
1	country	LC	VI R3
2	AT	0,05	0
3	BE	0,89	0,02
4	CZ	0,05	0,2
5	DE	0,23	0,03
6	EE	0,05	0,02
7	ES	0,95	0
8	FI	0,93	0,01
9	FR	0,74	0,05
10	GB	0,05	0,42
11	GR	0,87	0,02
12	HU	0,05	0,04
13	IE	0,77	0
14	IT	0,98	0,6
15	LT	0,05	0
16	LU	0,06	0,01
17	LV	0,05	0
18	NL	0,05	0,02
19	PL	0,91	0,46
20	PT	0,76	0,11
21	SE	0,08	0,01
22	SI	0,05	0,04
23	SK	0,05	0

XY-plot Row 1 truth table domestic conditions - ~MS*PI



	A	B	C
1	country	LC	VII R1
2	AT	0,05	0
3	BE	0,89	0,02
4	CZ	0,05	0,2
5	DE	0,23	0,01
6	EE	0,05	0,05
7	ES	0,95	0
8	FI	0,93	0,2
9	FR	0,74	0,56
10	GB	0,05	0,07
11	GR	0,87	0,01
12	HU	0,05	0,04
13	IE	0,77	0
14	IT	0,98	0,02
15	LT	0,05	0
16	LU	0,06	0
17	LV	0,05	0
18	NL	0,05	0,02
19	PL	0,91	0,54
20	PT	0,76	0,8
21	SE	0,08	0,01
22	SI	0,05	0,1
23	SK	0,05	0

XY-plot Row 2 truth table domestic conditions - ~MS*PI



Conservative and parsimonious solutions

Alternative solutions international conditions

Conservative Solution

		coverage		consistency		
		raw	unique			*cases*
~MS*MC		0.694348	0.395617	0.748756		FR, IT, DE, ES, NL, GR, BE, PL, PT
~MS*PI*~GP		0.361015	0.091119	0.770936		FI, PT, FR, CZ
solution		0.718467		0.714585		

Source: author's calculations

Parsimonious Solution

		coverage		Consistency		
		raw	unique			*Cases*
~MS*MC		0.694348	0.395617	0.748756		FR, IT, DE, ES, NL, GR, BE, PL, PT
~MS*PI		0.389850	0.170704	0.784223		FI, PT, PL, FR, CZ
solution		0.785467		0.714585		

Source: author's calculations

*Solutions domestic conditions - ~MS*MC*

Conservative Solution

		Coverage		consistency		
		raw	Unique			*cases*
~MS*MC*LE*~PV*ED		0.516724	0.111880	0.885375		FR, ES, GR, BE, PL, PT
~MS*MC*LE*LP*ED		0.476355	0.071511	0.856847		FR, IT, GR, BE, PL, PT
solution		0.588235		0.868951		

Source: author's calculations

Parsimonious Solution

		Coverage		consistency		
		raw	Unique			*cases*
~MS*MC*LE		0.653979	0.653979	0.885938		IT, FR, ES, GR, BE, PL, PT
Solution		0.653979		0.885938		

Source: author's calculations

*Solutions domestic conditions - ~MS*PI*

Conservative Solution

		Coverage		consistency		
		raw	Unique			*Cases*
~MS*PI*LE*LP*ED		0.334487	0.334487	0.843023		PT, FI, FR, PL
Solution		0.334487		0.843023		

Source: author's calculations

Parsimonious Solution

		Coverage		consistency		
		raw	Unique			*Cases*
~MS*PI*LP		0.371396	0.371396	0.789216		FI, PT, FR, PL
solution		0.371396		0.789216		

Source: author's calculations

Conservative Solution International Conditions ~LC

		Coverage		consistency		
		raw	Unique			*Cases*
MS*~GP		0.474869	0.065266	0.861225		IE, EE, SE, AT, GB
~MC*~PI*~GP		0.409602	0.185296	0.908486		LU, LV, EE, LT, SI
~MC*MS*PI		0.356339	0.296324	0.830420		IE, SK, HU, AT, SE
Solution		0.756939		0.869078		

Source: author's calculations

Parsimonious Solution International Conditions ~LC

		Coverage		consistency		
		raw	Unique			*Cases*
MS		0.574644	0.349587	0.872437		AT, IE, SK, EE, HU, SE, GB
~MC*~PI		0.446362	0.221305	0.886736		LT, LU, LV, EE, SI
Solution		0.795949		0.850842		

Source: author's calculations

Conservative Solution Domestic Conditions ~LC

		Coverage		consistency		
		raw	Unique			*Cases*
~LE*PV		0.406602	0.299325	0.973070		NL, DE, HU, LT, EE, LV
~ED*LP*PV		0.225806	0.118530	0.929012		SE, AT, LV
solution		0.525131		0.948510		

Source: author's calculations

Parsimonious Solution Domestic Conditions ~LC

		Coverage		consistency		
		raw	Unique			*Cases*
~LE		0.461365	0.282821	0.913819		NL, DE, HU, LT, EE, LV
~ED		0.333083	0.154539	0.928870		SE, AT, LV, NL
solution		0.615904		0.899233		

Source: author's calculations

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Voter Characteristics and Leader Effects in a Post-Communist Context: The Case of the 2012 Legislative Elections in Romania[1]

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ABSTRACT

In the contemporary political environment, the added value brought by leaders to the electoral performance of the parties appears to be significant and growing. However, the impact of leader evaluations on the vote choice is likely to vary from one voter to another. This article explores the influence of voter characteristics on the magnitude of leader effects in the context of the 2012 legislative elections in Romania. Five such characteristics are considered: objective political knowledge, subjective political information, party identification, political engagement, and time of voting decision. For this purpose, the paper employs data from the 2012 Romanian Election Studies (RES) three-wave panel survey. The analyses prove a significant influence of political knowledge and party identification and negligible effects of the other three voter characteristics considered. Thus, political knowledge appears to stimulate the manifestation of leader effects. Similarly, voters holding partisan ties appear to experience higher levels of personalization. The implications of these findings are discussed extensively.

KEY WORDS: *leader effects, voter characteristics, electoral politics personalization, political knowledge, party identification*

Introduction

In the contemporary political environment, the added value brought by leaders to the electoral performance of their parties appears to be significant and growing. Although the degree to which such a contribution is decisive for the results of elections is

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unclear, the increased public attention to leaders instead of issues is a finding hard to contest. This phenomenon is largely referred to in the literature as 'personalization of (electoral) politics' (Kaase, 1994; Karvonen, 2010; McAllister, 2007), 'electoral face of presidentialization' (Mughan, 2000; Poguntke and Webb, 2005), 'candidate-centred politics' (Wattenberg, 1991) or simply as 'leader effects on voting' (Aarts et al., 2011; Barisione, 2009). Most of the research on leader effects focuses on enduring Western democracies and regards the phenomenon as an aggregate effect of a sequence of transformations: changes in the patterns of mass communication in the age of electronic media (Bean and Mughan, 1989; King, 2002; McAllister, 2007, 1996; Poguntke and Webb, 2005), a significant erosion of traditional electoral alignments (McAllister, 2007, 1996; Schmitt and Ohr, 2000; Wattenberg, 1991), an increase in the complexity of political issues correlated with a shift of interest from local to national politics (McAllister, 1996), and the internationalization of politics (Poguntke and Webb, 2005).

Although extensively studied for the case of Western polities, the scenario of a similar shift from parties to leaders as main actors of the electoral scene occurring in the Eastern post-communist bloc is largely ignored in the literature. The exceptions are rather few (Colton, 2000, 2002; Flacco, 2014; Gheorghiţă, 2014; Grbeša, 2004; Rudi, 2014; Ștefuriuc, 2003). Still, it is very likely that many CEE countries have reached the same outcome of electoral personalization following an alternative pathway, as a consequence of several local-specific evolutions: an accelerated development of media systems, with fast-growing audiences of privately-owned, commercially-targeted TV stations (Hallin and Mancini, 2013), a lack of solid party alignments, reflected in rather fluid structures of political cleavages and high volatility rates (Evans and Whitefield, 1993), inexperienced electorates, unprepared to deal with the complexity of political issues after the fall of communism (Lewis, 2002), and a rapid internationalization of politics due to NATO or EU accession issues. Added to the historical tradition of almighty leaders in the region, all these developments may have facilitated a 'fast track' towards leader-centred electoral politics in post-communist CEE countries, in contrast to the traditional evolutions in Western democracies.

The personalization literature is rather discordant in assessing the magnitude of leader effects on the vote[3]: while some studies discuss big and growing effects across recent elections (Costa Lobo, 2006; Mughan, 2000; Stewart and Clarke, 1992), others identify small effects or inconsistent evolutions (Dinas, 2008; Holmberg and Oscarsson, 2011; Schoen, 2007). At least up to a certain point, such variations in results might rely on differences in the conceptual definitions and methodological strategies employed (Barisione, 2009). But an increasing number of voices in the literature suggest that, in order to understand better the variations in the magnitude of personalization, a closer look at the 'conditionality' of leader effects is needed (Barisione, 2009). In other words, the research on personalization should give more consideration to the *conditions mediating the manifestation of leader effects*, acting as stimuli or inhibitors. In a theoretical article, Barisione (2009) discusses four categories of such conditions: structural constraints (institutional, political, territorial and media contexts in which elections take place), political opportunities (opinion climate, economic situation, systemic crisis and campaign environment), individual moderators (availability of leader-oriented segments of voters) and image variables (features of the leader). Aardal and Binder (2011) discuss three large categories of conditions: individual factors (either linked to voters or candidates), system-specific factors (party systems and electoral laws) and party-related factors (type, functional characteristics, organizational structure and ideological platform).

In spite of such a diversity of possible pathways of investigation, rather few of them have been empirically explored. This article aims to bring a contribution to the understanding of how individual voter characteristics moderate the occurrence of leader effects in legislative elections. It investigates the influence of *objective political knowledge*, *subjective political information*, *party identification*, *political engagement* and *time of vote decision* on the mechanisms of personalization in the context of the 2012 legislative elections in Romania. The case of Romania is particularly challenging for investigating the conditionality of leader effects in post-communist polities for several categories of reasons. First, it fits perfectly the 'fast track' profile of

[3] Although it may look so, the literature on the personalization of electoral politics does not always regard political leaders as converting their popularity into support for their parties. The reverse scenario of voters defecting from a party (or being mobilised to vote against it) because of its leader or candidate is also considered (see Barisione, 2009). The two scenarios are frequently conceptualised as *positive leader effects (direct and indirect)* and *negative leader effects* (Barisione, 2009) or as *pull and push effects of political leaders* (Aarts and Blais, 2011). Both scenarios are considered in this article.

electoral personalization for CEE post-communist countries (for an extensive discussion, see Gheorghiţă, 2014). Second, it is a semi-presidential system, with a directly elected President, hence more likely to experience stronger leader effects (Curtice and Hunjan, 2011; Curtice and Lisi, 2014). Moreover, given the unclear power settlements between the President and the Prime Minister, top political leaders are even more visible during cohabitation periods. Third, the 2012 Romanian legislative election provides an excellent opportunity to investigate simultaneously the positivity and negativity scenarios of leader effects on vote choice, given the particular one-leader-centred electoral context.

For the purpose of investigating the influence of voter characteristics on the magnitude of leader effects, this article employs data from the Romanian Election Studies (RES) three-wave panel survey. It starts with a review of the previous findings in the literature on the effects of voter characteristics on the personalization of electoral behaviour. Then it introduces the general context of the 2012 legislative elections in Romania. The following sections are dedicated to the methodological aspects of the research. The main findings and conclusions are then discussed extensively.

Voter characteristics and leader effects in the literature

The assumption of working with a heterogeneous electorate (Bartle, 2005) is frequently ignored in the study of personalization of electoral behaviour. However, it is quite reasonable to believe that some voters place more weight on the leaders than others in making electoral decisions: for some of them, leader evaluations might be the main thing to consider, while for the others they might be more or less irrelevant (Gidengil, 2011). Some recent studies have explored the degree to which several individual-level variables do moderate the magnitude of leader effects on vote choice: political sophistication, political engagement, political indecision, party identification, and exposure to television news. The findings were frequently inconsistent, leaving a lot of room for debate on the comparability of measures or on the importance of the context of elections. Nevertheless all these studies addressed the issue of leader effects in Western democracies. Let us have a look at the main findings.

The conventional wisdom used to place *political engagement* in a negative relation with the personalization of electoral choice (Campbell et al., 1960; Nie et al., 1976): leader evaluations should matter most to voters who are less politically aware, as it is a less sophisticated behaviour. However, subsequent research has cast serious doubt on this assumption. Gidengil et al. (2000) find that leader effects tend to be strongest among the Canadian voters who are the most interested in the election. Similarly, leader evaluations appear to weight more for the Swiss voters with higher levels of involvement (Lachat, 2014). In a comparative study, Gidengil (2011) comes out with mixed findings: Canadian and Dutch voters who are more interested in the elections are more likely to weigh the leaders in their vote choice, while it is quite the reverse for the American voters.

Things are rather similar in the case of *political sophistication*, traditionally regarded as an inhibitor of leader effects: sophisticated voters (more knowledgeable, more educated) will make choices based on political issues and policy concerns, while the less sophisticated ones will pay more attention to candidate images (Converse, 1964; Popkin and Dimock, 1999). However, many influential studies do contradict this classical assumption, arguing that highly educated/knowledgeable individuals are more concerned with candidate personal attributes than less educated/ knowledgeable ones (Bean, 1993; Clarke et al., 2013; Glass, 1985; Kroh, 2003; Miller et al., 1986; Rico, 2014). This trend appears to be a consequence of the fact that sophisticated voters use leader personal qualities as a guide to how he/she will perform in office and, consequently, are more focused on performance-related characteristics (Brown et al., 1988; Miller et al., 1986). There are also studies who formulate 'softer' conclusions, arguing in favour of little or no effects of political sophistication on the salience of leader evaluations (Gidengil, 2011; Pierce, 1993). An additional perspective comes from Catellani and Alberici (2012), who investigate the effect of political sophistication in interaction with the time of voting decision: in the Italian case, high-sophisticated early deciders appear to rely more on the challenger traits, while low-sophisticated late deciders rely even more on the incumbent.

Party identification is widely regarded as following a negative relation with the magnitude of personalization: leaders' personalities and personal characteristics are likely to weigh more in the decision of voters holding feeble partisan ties (King, 2002).

Alternatively, strong party identifiers will evaluate the entire political environment through the partisan lens, which makes political leaders unimportant or largely irrelevant for the electoral decision. The empirical investigations result in mixed findings: while the theoretical expectation appears to be the norm in most of the elections (Brettschneider and Gabriel, 2002; Brettschneider et al., 2006; Clarke, 1991; Clarke et al., 1979), the literature indicates a respectable number of competitions where leader effects were stronger for party identifiers: Germany/1998 (Brettschneider and Gabriel, 2002; Brettschneider et al., 2006), Netherlands/1998, Canada/2000 and Spain/2000 (Gidengil, 2011), Italy/2006 (Costa Lobo, 2014). Tentative explanations for these latter counter-intuitive findings were sometimes formulated in terms of leader evaluations serving to reinforce party predispositions (Gidengil, 2011; Greene, 1999).

In a time of declining partisanship (Dalton and Wattenberg, 2000) and extensive access to information, *voter indecision* is expected to increase: people need more time to decide how to vote, and late decision is widespread. In a context of generalized uncertainty, the role of mass communication in the electoral campaign is expected to grow (Barisione, 2009). In such a context, campaign deciders are likely to experience a stronger impact of candidates' images on their choice (Dalton, 2005). This theoretical expectation is largely contradicted by empirical findings. Bartle (2005) finds that 'leadership voters' are more likely to be found among early deciders. A similar pattern is found by Gidengil (2011) in a comparative study across nine Western democracies. A more refined explanation is formulated by McAllister (2002), who differentiates between 'capricious' late deciders (apathetic, superficial, likely to rely only on leaders in the decision-making process) and 'calculating' late deciders (cognitively mobilized, regarding the campaign as an opportunity to gather more information, less susceptible to leader effects). As a consequence, the sign of the relation between political indecision and leader effects will be dependent upon the ratio between 'calculating' and 'capricious' late deciders in a society at a given election.

The 2012 legislative election in Romania

The December 2012 election in Romania was not by any means a typical one, either by context or by the structure of competitors. It apparently concluded a series of

particularly stormy evolutions on the Romanian political scene (King and Marian, 2014). In a country deeply divided by the narrow 2009 re-election of the controversial President Traian Băsescu (see Gheorghiţă, 2011) and severely hit by the economic crisis, the year 2012 began in a general atmosphere of discontent within society, still under the shock of a severe program of austerity and structural reform started in 2010: a 25% cut in the public sector salaries, a 5 point increase in VAT up to 24%, 45 categories of social programs dropped, an unprecedented reduction in the number of public employees, a new labour code more favourable to the employers. Confronted with extensive street protests against a plan of health care reform, the Democrat-Liberal (PDL) Prime Minister Emil Boc has decided to resign on February 6th, in an attempt to 'defuse political and social tension' over austerity cuts (BBC, 2012). A new government coming from the same coalition was formed, under the leadership of Mihai Răzvan Ungureanu, former head of Foreign Intelligence Service (SIE). However, it only lasted for about ten weeks, being dismissed by a parliamentary vote of no-confidence on April 27th.

In early May 2012 an alternative coalition was formed around the new left-right Social Liberal Union (USL) with Victor Ponta, the social democrat leader, as Prime Minister. Formed as an alliance between the Social Democrats and Liberals with the main purpose to 'reverse the social injustices of the Băsescu regime,' the Social-Liberal Union successfully passed the first electoral test on June 10th, with a landslide victory in the local elections. Fuelled by its own electoral success and frustrated by an exacerbated controversy on who should represent the country at a meeting of the European Council in late June (either the President or the Prime Minister), on July 6th the USL initiated the process of impeaching President Băsescu on grounds of constitutional violations.

The parliamentary vote for suspension was followed by a series of quick changes in the institutions, expected to facilitate a positive result in the impeachment referendum to follow: removal of the Ombudsman, replacement of both heads of Parliament Chambers, attempts to change the referendum legislation. Although regarded favourably by a large majority of citizens identifying Traian Băsescu with the unique source of the harsh austerity measures, these USL actions raised severe concerns (and reactions) among Western partners of the country. They were frequently condemned by Western Executives and qualified as unprecedented attack

on the rule of law (King and Marian, 2014; Pop-Eleches, 2012). The impeachment referendum was held on July 29th and the 46.2% turnout has not passed the minimal legal threshold. However, 88% of the voters favoured the impeachment. The failure of the July impeachment referendum has added an enormous amount of divisiveness within the Romanian society, with unequal sides blaming each other for hindering the democratic path of the country: the will of the many became frequently opposed to the rule of law in the public discourse.

This extreme antagonism, constantly nurtured by side-taking television stations, has been the main context variable for the December 9th legislative election. In such a contentious environment, the electoral campaign rapidly turned into an extension of the previous impeachment referendum, with being against or in favour of President Băsescu as the central topic of public discourse. As there has been almost no debate on social or economic plans for the future government, but only on the presumed lack of legitimacy of Traian Băsescu's mandate as President post-referendum or need to reverse the social injustices of his regime, the election turned to be dominated by an extreme personalization.

Two unequal party blocks have been the main competitors for the popular vote. On the one side there was the *Social Liberal Union (USL)*, the alliance of the Social Democratic Party (PSD) with the National Liberal Party (PNL) and the small Conservative Party (PC), which also included candidates of the switching sides National Union for the Progress of Romania (UNPR). On the other side there was the *Just Romania Alliance (ARD)*, a smaller alliance built around the presidential Democrat-Liberal Party (PDL), including the rather minor National Peasant Party (PNȚ-CD) and the Civic Force (FC). The USL achieved an overwhelming victory (60.07% of the votes for the Senate and 58.61% of the votes for the Chamber of Deputies), with more than three times the votes received by the ARD (16.72% and 16.52% respectively). Only two other parties gained enough votes to pass the threshold and enter the Parliament: the People's Party of media personality Dan Diaconescu (PP-DD) and the Hungarian Democratic Union (UDMR).

In spite of President Traian Băsescu not being an active competitor, the 2012 legislative election has been decisively about him. The hatred towards him was the key element holding together the traditional enemies forming USL and the vote for this left-right alliance was largely a negative vote towards the President, his team and

the austerity measures implemented (see also King and Marian, 2014). On the other side, the vote for ARD was largely a vote of confidence for him. Set into the larger picture of the electoral context discussed, there are strong reasons to presume that the liking capital of Traian Băsescu has been decisive for the result of the election, acting both as a 'pull' and a 'push' factor (Aarts and Blais, 2011). This is why the President Băsescu's image will be treated as a core explanatory variable of the vote for both competing blocks, USL and ARD.[4] The consequence of this analytical choice is that this article explores the personalization hypothesis simultaneously under two scenarios: the negativity one for the USL and the positivity one for the ARD, with a unique leader of reference.

Data and methodology

In order to assess the influence of individual voter characteristics on the magnitude of leader effects in the context of the 2012 vote for the Romanian Parliament, this article employs data from the Romanian Elections Studies (RES) panel survey. The statistical analyses were run on a pooled sample of 2,008 respondents, combining two sub-samples: one of 928 cases from a three-wave panel (before campaign, pre-election, and post-election) and one of 1,080 cases from a two-wave panel (pre-election, post-election). Data measuring public opinion previous to the campaign were collected during the last two weeks before the beginning of the electoral campaign, pre-election data during the campaign, while post-election data within one month after the date of election.

The analytical strategy is designed to follow a sequence of three steps. First, it uses a logistic regression in order to assess the overall contribution of leader effects to the vote choice in the 2012 legislative elections. The model (M1) controls for respondent's ideological orientation, government retrospective evaluations and socio-demographic characteristics. Second, it employs a sequence of logistic regression models (M2) run in order to assess whether voter individual characteristics do

[4] This analytical choice might posit this investigation in the reader's mind rather close to the thin border between leader effects studies and presidential approval studies. However, such a design allows for a simultaneous investigation of the positive and negative effects of leaders, particularly for very polarising political leaders. The items employed here for leader evaluations are like-dislike scores, specific for leader effects studies, and not satisfaction measures, usually employed in approval studies (although they are naturally correlated). Thus, the conclusions of the investigation are able to reflect all the range of attitudes towards Traian Băsescu, and not only the ones related to his activity in office.

moderate the manifestation of leader effects. The moderation effect is treated as a statistical interaction and calculated as a product term of the leader rating and a particular voter characteristic. Each of the M2 models extends the M1 by adding two predictors: a measure of one voter characteristic and its corresponding interaction term. Third, it assesses the impact (direction and strength) of each significant voter characteristic on the magnitude of leader effects. Multiplicative factors are calculated and the Johnson-Neyman method tests whether the relation is significant on the entire observed range of the moderator. The analyses are run using SPSS 20 and the PROCESS macro for SPSS by Andrew Hayes (2014). In the following section, all the variables employed are subject to an extensive presentation. The continuous variables were mean centred in order to reduce the risks of collinearity in models using interaction terms, but also to make the interpretation of coefficients more meaningful (Garson, 2012).

(M1) *USL vote = Băsescu evaluation + controls*

(M2) *USL vote = Băsescu evaluation + voter characteristic + (Băsescu evaluation * voter characteristic) + controls*

Dependent variable

The dependent variable across all models is the self-reported *vote for the Senate*, measured after the election. Answers are coded '1' for a vote in favour of the *Social Liberal Union* (USL) and '0' for a vote for the *Just Romania Alliance* (ARD). The two alliances have gained 76.73% of the popular vote according to the official results and covered approximately 85% of the valid answers for the self-reported vote survey question. Alternative reported electoral choices were excluded from the analyses, with the consequence of a drop in sample size (1,067 valid cases). This choice in terms of data management, although rather radical, allowed a simultaneous investigation of both the negativity personalization scenario for the USL and the positivity scenario for ARD (most divergent party vote choices) with a unique leader of reference (popularity rating of President Traian Băsescu).

Independent variables

The focal independent variable, widely employed in the assessment of leader effects, is the *leader evaluation* rating (liking score) for President Traian Băsescu.

The RES questionnaire measured the leader liking score on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means 'I don't like him at all' and 10 'I like him very much.' Before the analyses, it was mean centred. As the dependent variable measures the vote in favour of USL, this core predictor is expected to bring a negative contribution to the explanatory model.

Five individual characteristics of the voters are entered one by one in the M2 logistic regression models: objective political knowledge, subjective political information, time of voting decision, party identification, and interest in politics. *Objective political knowledge* is measured before the election through a battery of three knowledge questions. The questions requested the respondents to select from a list of political parties the ones forming the USL, then the ARD, and finally the governing coalition. The political knowledge measure is calculated as the sum of 'correct' party selections minus the sum of 'wrong' party selections and ranges from 0 to 10. It was mean centred for the analysis.

Subjective political information is a dummy variable, resulted from recoding the answers to the question 'How well informed do you consider yourself about the candidates in your constituency?' into two categories: '0' for respondents stating 'not at all informed' and '1' for respondents answering 'very well informed' and 'to some extent informed.'

Party identification is also a dummy variable, measuring whether respondents declare themselves as 'feeling closer to one of the political parties than the others.' It does not take into account the party of reference mentioned by the voter, as the general expectation is that party identifiers experience weaker leader effects, given their long-term affective ties to a particular party (Gidengil, 2011). Party identifiers (either feeling 'very close' or 'somewhat close' to one political party) are coded as '1', while all other cases are coded as '0.'

Political engagement is measured as self-declared interest for politics, on a scale from 0 to 3, where: '0' means 'not at all,' '1' is 'a little', '2' is 'pretty interested,' and '3' means 'very interested.' It was mean centred in order to be employed in the regression models.

Time of the voting decision is also a dummy variable coded as '0' for early deciders and '1' for late deciders. It is based on the transformation of answers to the post-election survey question about the moment 'when you have decided what

candidate or party to vote for in the Senate election.' A decision taken 'before the campaign' is considered an *early decision*, while a decision taken 'during the electoral campaign,' 'in the last week of campaign' or 'in the day of the vote' is seen as a *late decision*.

Aside these, *an interaction term* (calculated as arithmetic product) between the liking score in relation to President Băsescu and the voter characteristic considered is calculated and entered in each of the five M2 regression models. The contribution of the interaction term to each of these models is expected to show whether that particular voter characteristic does moderate the manifestation of leader effects or not.

Control independent variables

However, leader effects represent only one of the many alternative explanations for a given vote choice. In order to avoid inflated effects of leader evaluations on the decision who to vote for, alternative predictors of vote choice should be controlled for across all regression models (both M1 and M2). Three categories of controls are considered: *left-right ideological orientation*, *retrospective evaluations of government performance*, and *socio-demographic variables*.

Self-reported *left-right ideological orientation* of the respondent is measured on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 is left and 10 is right. As the dependent variable measures the vote choice for USL, a left-right alliance, against ARD, a right-wing alliance, this control variable is expected to work as an inhibitor: the more a respondent self-places to the right, the less likely to give a vote to the social-liberals. Two transformations were applied to the variable before the analyses: a simple mean imputation, followed by mean centring.

The *retrospective evaluation of the government performance* is the second control variable. Its Cabinet of reference is the one formed by USL in May 2012 and headed by Prime Minister Victor Ponta; this means that a better evaluation of the government activity should increase the probability of a vote in favour of USL. The satisfaction with the Ponta Cabinet performance in office is measured on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means 'very poor performance' and 10 'very good performance.' The scale was mean centred before the analyses.

Four *socio-demographic variables* were controlled for: *age*, *gender*, *education*, and *cultural area*. *Age* is a continuous variable and was mean centred. *Gender* is coded as '0' for 'female' and '1' for 'male.' *Education* is measured as years of education completed and was mean centred. In terms of *cultural area*, a dummy variable was created for having the residence in Transylvania, an area traditionally less favourable to left-wing parties than the rest of the country (see Dragoman, 2007; Rotariu, 2012). Residence in Transylvania is regarded in a broad meaning, namely belonging to one of the following cultural areas: Banat, Crișana-Maramureș, Transylvania, and Eastern Transylvania (for details, see Rotariu and Iluţ, 2006: 187-191).

Analyses and results

The first component of the analytical design involves an overall assessment of the personalization of voting decision in the 2012 legislative election. In other words, for this particular case, it means providing an evidence-based answer to a particular research question: did the image of President Băsescu (likes-dislikes) provide a significant contribution to explaining vote choice in this particular electoral competition? A negative answer would mean, of course, that it makes no sense going further with the analyses: one cannot discuss about moderators of leader effects in the absence of the latter.

For this purpose, a stepwise logistic regression model (M1) was run, explaining the vote in favour of the Social Liberal Union (USL) against the vote for the Just Romania Alliance (ARD). Control predictors are entered into three blocks: socio-demographic characteristics, left-right ideological orientation, and Ponta government retrospective evaluation. The core independent variable, *Traian Băsescu liking*, is entered as a fourth block. Such a strategy provides a particularly useful tool for assessing the personalization of electoral decision: on the one side, it evaluates the contribution of leader evaluations in the explanatory model of electoral choice across other predictors (strength, direction, statistical significance); on the other side, it allows to measure the explanatory power of leader evaluations in the most unfavourable scenario, as additional contribution ($\Delta PseudoR^2$) when alternative predictors are statistically controlled. This is generally referred to in the literature as

improved-prediction strategy (Crewe and King, 1994; King, 2002). The results are presented in **Table 1**.

Table 1: Binary logistic regression model explaining the vote for USL over ARD (Baseline model M1)

Predictor	**b coeff. (S.E.)**	**sig.**	**exp(b)**
Male	-0.233		0.792
	(0.287)		
Age (mean centred)	-0.002		0.998
	(0.010)		
Transylvania	-1.203	***	0.300
	(0.299)		
Years of education (mean centred)	-0.083	*	0.921
	(0.041)		
Left-right ideological orientation (mean centred)	-0.362	***	0.696
	(0.065)		
Ponta government retrospective evaluation (mean centred)	0.440	***	1.553
	(0.056)		
Traian Băsescu liking (mean centred)	***-0.541***	*****	***0.582***
	(0.056)		

R^2 Nagelkerke = 0.655

ΔR^2 Nagelkerke = 0.183 (change after entering Traian Băsescu liking score in the regression model)

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.10

Source: author's calculations

The data indicate a significant and large impact of the Traian Băsescu liking score on the vote choice. The relation works as predicted: better perceptions of the President in office drastically diminish the probability of a vote in favour of USL (exp(b) = 0.582). A further clarification is needed at this stage: given the specific of the dependent variable in the logistic regression model, the impact of Băsescu's evaluations in the positivity and negativity scenarios should be regarded as mirrored images. Following this logic, it means that each 1-unit increase in the liking score of President Băsescu is theoretically reflected in a higher probability of a vote for ARD and a lower one for the USL. As the logistic regression model explains the odds of a

vote for USL over a vote for ARD, better evaluations of Traian Băsescu will reduce this odds ratio.

Furthermore, adding the leader evaluation score to the base regression model brings a noteworthy increase in its explanatory power, from a Nagelkerke Pseudo R^2 of 0.472 to 0.655. This means that, in a most negative scenario where alternative explanations of vote are already considered, Traian Băsescu's liking score extends the vote prediction by a $\Delta PseudoR^2$ of 0.183. In other words, the relation of love-or-hate developed by the voters in relation to President Băsescu was largely responsible for the vote choice in the 2012 legislative election. It is a quite solid finding in favour of dealing with a highly personalized electoral competition, which appears to be particularly appropriate for investigating how individual voter characteristics moderate the manifestation of leader effects.

Holding this optimistic intermediate conclusion in mind, the second step of the investigation involves running a sequence of M2 logistic regression models for each of the five voter characteristics considered (objective political knowledge, subjective political information, party identification, political engagement, and time of the vote decision). Compared to the M1, the M2 models add two predictors: a measure of the individual voter characteristic and its corresponding interaction term (product term with the leader evaluation score). The analysis of the M2 regressions (**Table 2**) gives the opportunity of an answer to a second question, namely: do voter characteristics moderate the occurrence of leader effects and hence their magnitude? In other words, which of these five attributes have an influence on how much weight voters put on political leaders for making party vote choices?

Table 2: Extended binary logistic regression models explaining the vote for USL over ARD (with interaction terms – M2, without interaction terms – M3)

Predictor	M2 and corresponding M3 regression models									
	M2_1	**M3_1**	**M2_2**	**M3_2**	**M2_3**	**M3_3**	**M2_4**	**M3_4**	**M2_5**	**M3_5**
	b (S.E.)	b (S.E.)	b (S.E.)	b (S.E.)	b (S.E.)	b (S.E.)	b (S.E.)	b (S.E.)	b (S.E.)	b (S.E.)
Male	-0.200	-0.178	-0.221	-0.228	-0.298	-0.288	-0.218	-0.198	-0.183	-0.176
	(0.294)	(0.290)	(0.303)	(0.302)	(0.291)	(0.289)	(0.294)	(0.292)	(0.293)	(0.292)
Age (mean centred)	-0.002	0.000	-0.006	-0.006	-0.001	-0.003	-0.001	-0.001	-0.004	-0.003
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Transylvania	-1.359 ***	-1.307 ***	-1.206 ***	-1.218 ***	-1.242 ***	-1.197 ***	-1.197 ***	-1.202 ***	-1.173 ***	-1.185 ***
	(0.316)	(0.309)	(0.311)	(0.311)	(0.301)	(0.300)	(0.300)	(0.300)	(0.309)	(0.307)
Years of education (mean centred)	-0.058	-0.060	-0.094 *	-0.095 *	-0.090 *	-0.088 *	-0.077 †	-0.079 †	-0.083 *	-0.082 *
	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.042)
Left-right ideological orientation (mean centred)	-0.330 ***	-0.347 ***	-0.375 ***	-0.378 ***	-0.350 ***	-0.370 ***	-0.358 ***	-0.359 ***	-0.357 ***	-0.359 ***
	(0.066)	(0.066)	(0.067)	(0.067)	(0.066)	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.066)	(0.065)
Ponta government retrospective evaluation (mean centred)	0.440 ***	0.455 ***	0.439 ***	0.442 ***	0.431 ***	0.452 ***	0.436 ***	0.441 ***	0.438 ***	0.444 ***
	(0.058)	(0.056)	(0.059)	(0.058)	(0.057)	(0.057)	(0.056)	(0.056)	(0.057)	(0.056)
Traian Băsescu liking (mean centred)	-0.593 ***	-0.545 ***	-0.516 ***	-0.554 ***	-0.471 ***	-0.557 ***	-0.539 ***	-0.538 ***	-0.585 ***	-0.540 ***
	(0.064)	(0.056)	(0.086)	(0.059)	(0.066)	(0.057)	(0.056)	(0.056)	(0.072)	(0.056)
Objective political knowledge (mean centred)	0.024	-0.104 †	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	(0.070)	(0.056)								
Objective political knowledge * Traian Băsescu liking (both mean centred)	***-0.059 ******	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	(0.020)									
Subjective political information (1=informed)	-	-	0.320	0.199	-	-	-	-	-	-
			(0.378)	(0.316)						
Subjective political information * Traian Băsescu liking (mean centred)	-	-	***-0.063***	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			(0.109)							
Party identification (1=party identifier)	-	-	-	-	1.157 *	0.449	-	-	-	-
					(0.479)	(0.309)				
Party identification * Traian Băsescu	-	-	-	-	***-0.280 ****	-	-	-	-	-

liking (mean centred)					***(0.126)***					
Political engagement (mean centred)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-0.030 (0.249)	-0.125 (0.199)	-	-
Political engagement * Traian Băsescu liking (both mean centred)	-	-	-	-	-	-	***-0.046*** ***(0.072)***	-	-	-
Time of voting decision (1=late decider)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-0.045 (0.373)	0.204 (0.297)
Time of voting decision * Traian Băsescu liking (mean centred)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	***0.116*** ***(0.106)***	-
R^2 Nagelkerke	0.671	0.660	0.665	0.664	0.664	0.658	0.656	0.655	0.661	0.659

Source: author's calculations

In order to answer that, a particular focus should be given to the interaction term in each of the M2 regression models. Thus, an individual voter characteristic will have an impact upon the manifestation of leader effects only if *the interaction term between that characteristic and the leader rating brings a nontrivial contribution to explaining vote choice*. There are two strategies for determining the statistical significance of the interaction in a logistic regression: either by examining the significance test of the logistic coefficient associated with the product term, or by conducting a hierarchical test of changes in χ^2 values ($\Delta\chi^2$) reflecting model fit (Jaccard, 2001: 16).

Both strategies are employed in relation to the interaction terms corresponding to the five voter characteristics considered (Table 3). Under the header *Strategy 1*, the table presents the exponents of the coefficients (exp(b)'s) for the interaction terms (individual characteristic * Băsescu liking score) issued from the five M2 regression models and the corresponding significance tests. Under the header *Strategy 2*, the table presents the changes in χ^2 between each M2 regression model and its reduced M3 version, lacking the interaction term. For each change $\Delta\chi^2$ it displays the corresponding statistical significance for the difference in degrees of freedom between the two models.

(M3) *USL vote = Băsescu evaluation + voter characteristic + controls*

As expected, the two strategies generate identical results. *Political knowledge* and *party identification* appear to be the only two voter characteristics having a significant effect on how important was the image of President Băsescu for the electoral decision. On the other side, the magnitude of vote personalization is not dependent upon voter's *subjective political information*, *political engagement* or *time of vote decision*.

Table 3: The contribution of interaction terms (leader evaluation * voter characteristic) to the explanation of electoral choice (USL over ARD) in M2 models

Interaction term	Strategy 1		Strategy 2	
	exp(b)	sig.	$\Delta\chi^2$ (Δdf)	sig.
Objective political knowledge * Traian Băsescu liking	0.943	**	9.156 (1)	**
Subjective political information * Traian Băsescu liking	0,939		0.336 (1)	
Party identification * Traian Băsescu liking	0.756	*	5.427 (1)	*
Political engagement * Traian Băsescu liking	0.955		0.414 (1)	
Time of voting decision * Traian Băsescu liking	1.123		1.179 (1)	

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.10

Source: author's calculations

Figure 1 provides a graphical representation of predicted probabilities of vote choice in relation to the evaluation of President Băsescu for the fully specified models, by the five voter characteristics considered: *political knowledge* (average, average plus/minus 1 or 2 units), *subjective political information* (informed, uninformed), *party identification* (identifier, non-identifier), *political engagement* (average, average plus/minus 1 unit), and *time of vote decision* (late decider, early decider). Chart 1A shows a noticeable sharpening of the curve of leader effects with every additional unit in political knowledge. According to chart 1C, the probability of a vote in favour of USL in relation to the sympathy for Traian Băsescu drops faster for party identifiers than for non-identifiers. Thus, at the highest level on the liking scale, the probability to vote for USL is of 29% for partisans and 50% for non-partisans. There appears to be no relation between subjective political information and leader effects, as the two curves of predicted probabilities almost coincide (chart 1B). Electoral personalization appears to slightly increase in relation to political engagement (chart 1D), but, as stated previously, the relation is not statistically significant (Tables 2 and 3), at least not on the entire range of variation of the Băsescu liking score. Similarly, the curve sharpens for late deciders (chart 1E), still not enough to gain statistical significance.

Figure 1: Predicted effects of Traian Băsescu evaluations on voting for USL (over ARD) by voter characteristics

By political knowledge (1A)



By subjective political information (1B)



By party identification (1C)



By political engagement (1D)



By the time of voting decision (1E)



Source: author's calculations

The third step of the analysis aims to assess more precisely the impact of voter characteristics on leader effects in terms of *direction and strength*. This component is restricted to the moderator variables short-listed in the previous step, namely *political knowledge* and *party identification*. First, the multiplicative factors are estimated for the influence of the two voter characteristics. Then, in the case of the continuous moderator (*political knowledge*), the significance of the impact is tested on variable's entire range of variation using the Johnson-Neyman method.

Political knowledge appears to be in a positive relation with leader effects: the more knowledgeable a voter is, the stronger is the impact of the 'Băsescu factor' for his/her vote choice. Still, in order to be able to interpret the magnitude of its impact on leader effects, a short exercise of interpretation inspired by Jaccard (2001) would be the easiest solution. Let us imagine a theoretical individual scoring 0 on all predictors (for mean centred continuous variables, this would be the mean). The individual's odds of a vote for USL versus ARD would be, let's say, *x*: this means, it is *x* times more likely he/she will vote for USL than for ARD. *Ceteris paribus*, for an individual with a knowledge score of 0, a 1-unit increase in Băsescu evaluation score 'increases' the odds of a vote for USL versus ARD by a multiplicative factor of 0.553 (exponent of the focal independent variable). This is actually a decrease in odds, since it means multiplying *x* by 0.553. Let us imagine a 1-unit increase in the knowledge score, again all others remaining unchanged. In the context of this change, a 1-unit increase in Băsescu liking score changes the odds of a vote for USL versus ARD by a multiplicative factor of 0.553 * 0.943 (exponent of the interaction term) = 0.521. Again this is a decrease in odds, as it implies multiplying *x* by 0.521. The compared odds of voting for USL versus ARD multiply by 0.553 at the mean political knowledge and by 0.521 at the mean-plus-one knowledge score: this means a more drastic USL/ARD vote odds reduction under the effect of a 1-unit change in Băsescu liking when the individual is more sophisticated politically. In conclusion, under equal conditions, the *impact of a 1-unit increase in leader evaluation in the odds of vote USL/ARD is larger when the political knowledge score grows* by 1. But one question remains: how much larger are leader effects when political knowledge increases by 1-unit? The answer involves calculating the ratio between the two multiplicative factors: 0.553 / 0.521 = 1.061. Leader effects are multiplied by 1.061 when knowledge increases by 1-unit.

Still, this is not the final answer. If this relation works this way when the political knowledge score increases from 0 to 1, one can argue it might work differently in the case of a 1-unit increase at higher values. This scenario can be rejected using the Johnson-Neyman method, integrated in the PROCESS macro for SPSS by Andrew Hayes (2014). The results show that the *relation between political knowledge and leader effects is significant and works in the direction predicted on the entire observed range of the moderator*. This allows to state, without any doubt, that political knowledge worked as a stimulus for the personalization of voting decision in the 2012 parliamentary elections in Romania.

Rather surprisingly, *party identification* is also in a positive relation with the personalization of voting. *Party identifiers appear to experience higher leader effects than non-identifiers*. Leader effects are multiplied by 1.324 in the case of a party identifier compared to a non-identifier. This finding is rather counter-intuitive, since partisans were expected to make vote choices based more on the party lens than on leader evaluations. However, as discussed previously, a positive moderation influence of party identification on leader effects is not a singular finding in the literature (Brettschneider and Gabriel, 2002; Brettschneider et al., 2006; Gidengil, 2011; Costa Lobo, 2014). The implications of this finding are discussed in the next section of this article.

Discussion and conclusions

Investigating the leader-centeredness of an electoral competition is never easy. In the widely accepted logic of personalization, political leaders are expected to bring an added value to the electoral performance of their parties: it might be less or more, but still is a positive contribution. The negativity scenario, where leaders weigh heavily on the wings of their parties, is largely ignored or treated as a 'theoretical' one. And this is the point where the 'beauty' of the 2012 legislative election in Romania comes: a one-leader-centred election or, as it might be referred to, a Băsescu-centred election. By the manner the mainstream political competitors have positioned themselves, the entire election became 'about the President,' allowing a simultaneous investigation of both the positivity and negativity scenarios of leader effects on vote choice. Beyond the public perception, this article provided strong empirical evidence of the fact that the love-or-hate relation developed by the electorate in relation to President Traian Băsescu has weighed heavily in the vote choice for each of the two main political

alliances, USL and ARD. The central focus of this investigation was to explore whether and how individual voter characteristics moderate the magnitude of this 'Băsescu effect.' In other words, did the image of President Băsescu systematically matter more to some voters than to others? In order to achieve this goal, the article tested the conditioning effects of five voter characteristics on the personalization of vote choice in the 2012 elections in Romania. The results of the analyses did not prove any significant influence for three of the moderators: *self-assessed stock of political information*, *interest in politics*, and *time of the vote decision*. However, findings are supportive in relation to the other two moderators: *political knowledge* and *party identification*.

Political knowledge appears to have stimulated the manifestation of leader effects. Although coming against the conventional wisdom, this is not an isolated finding in the contemporary political environment. Many studies have come with similar results during the last decades, arguing that sophisticated voters pay more attention to candidate images (Bean, 1993; Clarke et al., 2013; Glass, 1985; Kroh, 2003; Miller et al., 1986; Rico, 2014). It is a reasonably plausible scenario that more knowledgeable voters were particularly informed and careful about the way Traian Băsescu performed in office in the eight years preceding the election.

Still more challenging is the second finding: *voters holding partisan ties experienced higher levels of personalization* in these elections. At the origins of such a relationship might be the very nature of the USL as a negative coalition (see Pop-Eleches, 2012) *against* Traian Băsescu: for the social democrat or the liberal supporter (the large majority of party identifiers in the sample), such a left-right alliance is a 'necessary evil' to defeat the President in office. Thus, a Băsescu-centred choice might turn into the most vivid reason to vote for an alliance with the traditional enemy (PSD for the liberals, PNL for the social democrats). In the absence of further empirical data, this explanation remains largely speculative. Although partisanship stimulating personalization is a conclusion coming against the results of many studies in the Western literature, it isn't a one-off finding. Similar conclusions are formulated for at least five other national elections: Germany/1998, Netherlands/1998, Canada/2000, Spain/2000, and Italy/2006 (Brettschneider and Gabriel, 2002; Brettschneider et al., 2006; Gidengil, 2011; Costa Lobo, 2014). Even though it is almost impossible to find pattern similarities that fit all these electoral

contexts, this certainly is a path deserving further investigation in the future.

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Government engagement in co-operative service delivery in Romania: knowledge and acknowledgement[1]

Cristina Stănuș[2]

ABSTRACT

This paper approaches the engagement of successive Romanian governments with service delivery by third sector organisations and uses policy discourse to assess governance practices associated with collaborative service delivery. The topic is approached by a theoretically-informed qualitative analysis of policy documents spanning a decade. Results point out that the most important subjective factors shaping collaborative service delivery in post-communist Romanian are the conditionality of EU accession and the polarisation of policy-making in key sectors. The paper identifies three stages of cooperative service delivery in Romania, each characterised by a specific mix of governance elements. It shows hierarchical and market governance discourse to be prevalent as compared to the network governance discourse, with policy consequences in the area of co-operative public service delivery in Romania

KEY WORDS: *third sector organisations, co-operative service delivery, governance, policy discourse, Romania*

Introduction

There is a global trend towards increased presence of third sector organisations in the provision of health, social, educational and cultural services[3] as instruments of public sector action, as a result of policies associated with new public management (Anheier 2009). The creation of a partnership between the government and key stakeholders in public service provision is thought to be the key in making the

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[3] Throughout this paper, a narrow interpretation of the notion of 'public service' is used, referring to services carried out by third sector organisations on behalf of the state.

government both more effective and more legitimate (Pollitt & Bouckaert 2011, p.22). This trend is associated with the addition of market and network governance elements to the traditional hierarchical governance of the public sector (Meuleman 2011; Pollitt & Bouckaert 2011, pp.20–1) and increasingly blurred demarcation lines between the state and the third sector (Brandsen & Pestoff 2006).

While in Western states new public management and market principles precede the discourse on networks and governance in public sector reforms, in Central and Eastern European countries the engagement of the states with third sector service delivery is defined by reforms introducing concomitantly both market and network governance principles (Kuti 2011). This raises questions as to what characterizes the governance of state - third sector service delivery organisations relationships in Central and Eastern European contexts, a topic which is relatively absent in the literature. One reason for the relative absence of this topic is the significant variation of government engagement with third sector service delivery from country to country, which was documented by studies made in the Western countries and was linked to subjective factors (Phillips & Rathgeb Smith 2011) and individual level attitudes (Snavely and Desai 2001). Thus, attention was unavoidably averted towards national case studies (such as those reflected in Phillips & Rathgeb Smith 2011).

In Romania's case the relationship between the state and third sector service delivery organisations has been usually approached in documents stemming from the third sector itself, which generally place much emphasis on the adversarial rather than the collaborative aspects of this relationship (Pralong 2009, Lambru & Vameșu 2010, CCN-PROIS 2013). This relationship has not been approached as a governance practice, taking into account the concomitant introduction of market and network governance principles and mechanisms in the Romanian public sector. Therefore, we know very little about the state's take on the partnership and interdependence unavoidably embedded in collaborative service delivery and the specific factors shaping state engagement in this new policy space.

Based on a brief review of the relevant literature, this paper builds an interpretive framework which can be used to assess collaborative service delivery in Romania as a governance practice. This framework is then used to analyse policy discourse on the Romanian third sector in public service provision and infer the

characteristics of state engagement in this new policy space. The next three sections of the paper describe the context, review the relevant literature and detail the analytical framework used. Then, the paper briefly presents the method and data used. In the second part of the paper the results of the analysis are detailed and discussed. The final section discusses the preparedness of Romanian governmental structures for co-governance in public service delivery, as well as the broader relevance of the findings for the existing literature on collaborative service delivery in Central and Eastern Europe.

Context: the service delivery third sector in Romania

The development of the Romanian third sector after 1989 is shaped by international donors and European Union accession requirements (Lambru & Vameşu 2010; Pralong 2009) and the concomitant introduction of market and network governance mechanisms. However, the development of the third sector is not a policy priority. It takes twelve years to finally produce a governmental ordinance regulating the third sector and several more to have it approved by the Parliament. Meanwhile, key pieces of regulation do set the stage for policy advocacy by third sector organisations and their formal involvement in local and national policy making[4]. The introduction of the percentage designation mechanism, allowing individuals to support the activity of a third sector organisation of their choice by re-directing a part of their income tax, is the most significant example of political involvement in supporting the third sector in Romania.

The social role of Romanian third sector service delivery organisations is mitigated by the public trust in the sector and its financial strength. While 40 percent of the Romanian third sector organizations are involved in social, educational, or health service delivery, the need for state funding, severely increasing following the withdrawal of international donors after 2007, is not met (Lambru & Vameşu 2010). Public trust in the Romanian third sector is quite low and was contributed to, prior to 2000, by the use of prior legal loopholes to disguise profit-oriented operations (Dakova et al. 2000; Pralong 2009). The current state of the service delivery third sector in Romania is also dependent on the characteristics of the engagement of the Romanian state with this sector which are explored in more detail this paper.

[4] The law on free access to public information (no. 544 from 2001) and the law on decision-making transparency in public administration (no. 52 from 2003).

Literature review: the state and third sector service delivery

The increasing importance of service-delivery third sector organizations is explained by the literature with reference to a multitude of factors. Among the explanations, the most compelling is the limited capacity of states to effectively and efficiently provide certain public services, along with an increased ability of third sector organisations (largely donor-driven) to act effectively in difficult areas of public policy and improve policy-making on national level (see for example Rhodes 1994; Brandsen & Pestoff 2006; Rosenbaum 2006). Another explanation focuses on market failure and suggests that, given this failure, citizens prefer to use public services provided by organisations that do not allow for the distribution of ill-gotten gains (Brandsen 2007, pp.1–3). The legitimacy and the direct links these organisations may have with the potential recipients of services become a key factor (Nevile, 2010). Moreover, the rapid expansion of third sector service delivery might also be explained by policy transfers across policy domains and national borders (Phillips & Rathgeb Smith, 2011) and, in the European context, by the importance granted to third sector service delivery by the European Union (Osborne 2008).

The increased reliance of the state on third sector service delivery is sometimes described as a retreat of the state, but research has suggested that, instead of a reduction of government, there is a dispersal of government power and authority (Acheson 2010), as the government finds new ways of controlling service delivery even when it seems to have withdrawn completely. This is reflected into the discussions concerning the organisational and sector level effects of engaging the state: value and mission changes, the adoption by third sector organisations of operational governance mechanisms of procurement and performance and quantitative measures of success specific to the public sector (new public management principles and procedures), changes in the ability of third sector organisations to effectively perform policy advocacy in their area of expertise, and the creation of a two-tier third sector which separates organisations able to maintain independence from the rest of the sector (Carmel & Harlock 2008; Nevile 2010; Casey et al. 2010; Brandsen & Hout 2006).

Three types of relationships between government and the third sector have been identified by the literature: (a) co-production, or the arrangements where citizens produce their own services at least in part; (b) co-management, or the

arrangements in which third sector organisations produce services in collaboration with the state; and (c) co-governance, or the arrangement in which the third sector participates in the planning and delivery of public services (Brandsen & Pestoff 2006). These arrangements show that instead of a clear separation and opposition between the state and the third sector we have increased interdependency (Brandsen 2007; Osborne 2006, p.384).

The state engages these third sector service delivery organisations in three different capacities as regulator, funder, and service provider, and the policy decisions being made reflect whether the state emphasizes one or another of these capacities. The role of the state as funder of these services is quite significant, as the single most important determinant of the size of the non-profit sector around the world tends to be the extent of government support (mostly financial) for it (Salamon et al. 2003). The state's financial involvement in service delivery by non-state actors is strongly linked to the issue of independence, the literature discussing the ongoing 'commercialization of non-profits' (Anheier 2009, p.1089). The involvement of third sector organisations in policymaking is largely a function of the structure of opportunities provided by the state (see Pop 2007 for an example in the area of educational policy).

Differences across countries in terms of institutionalization of co-governance have been explained by a subjective factor, a vision of the role of the third sector as more than deliverer of services, which advances the value of the sector for democracy, citizenship and economic development (Phillips & Rathgeb Smith 2011). The importance of the attitudes of government officials toward third sector service delivery organisations in the success of collaboration between government (central and local) and civil society organisations has also been pointed out (Snavely & Desai 2001). These attitudes are mostly visible in direct interactions between the governmental structures and these service delivery organisations and, on an upper level, play a significant role in the social recognition of the third sector's role in a given society, due to the manner in which they are translated into governmental plans, strategies, and regulations. This sheds light on why exploring these subjective attitudinal factors, instead of focusing on more traditional approaches such as measuring the financial involvement of the state, can help provide a clearer picture of the bidirectional relationship between the state and third sector service providers.

A framework for analysis: governance in the policy discourse concerning collaborative service delivery

Previous research has suggested that states tend to use their power over both discourse and administrative arrangements to constitute the third sector as a public (technocratic) service provider governed by public procurement procedures (Carmel & Harlock 2008). In this situation, the service delivery organisations become an extension of the state, with problematic independence in terms of agenda formation and prioritization, and have a limited capacity to engage the public sector as civil society organisations. The state's policy discourse on this matter has real effects on the third sector's social role (broader social role and specific service-delivery role) and legitimacy, especially if state discourse fails to build a broader understanding of this role. Differences from one policy domain to another, stemming from characteristics of the policy domain or political priorities of a given moment, may be envisaged.

The involvement of service-delivery third sector organisations in policy-making is largely a function of the structure of opportunities provided by the state when it embarks upon managing policy networks. In a context defined by the concomitant introduction of network and market governance principles and instruments, there are two possible models of the structure of opportunities states provide to third sector organisations engaged in service delivery: complementarity and partnership (or co-governance, the state and the organisations share both service design and service delivery) and limited policy interactions and partnership (or co-management, strictly delivery by the organisations of services designed by the state). The first model emphasizes the quality of democracy and looks at how this relationship reflects into policy dialogue, the independence of the service providers, and the wider social meaning of such engagement. The second puts this discussion into a quality of service framework, and looks at how this relationship is framed in terms of effectiveness, cost efficiency, performance standards for the services involved, as well as top-down accountability, very much in line with the new public management principles. This reflects the fact that partnership between the state and the third sector embodies a tension between two policy principles, effective democratic guidance and control and effective programme/service delivery (Skelcher et al. 2005, p.574).

This topic is approachable from an interpretive policy analysis point of view (Hajer & Wagenaar 2003; Stone 2002), emphasizing the importance of the emerging vocabulary of governance for the rethinking of government and policy. This approach is relevant in the context provided by post-communist Romania since it allows for examining just how governance practices are, beyond formal rules and institutional settings. Policy discourse theory emphasizes that different discourses about policy-making contain distinct emphases on particular elements, with prevailing discourses influencing institutional design, for example rules for governance by partnership (Skelcher et al. 2005, p.578).

Building on these aspects, the specific research question approached in the reminder of this paper concerns what the prevailing discourse on collaborative service delivery in Romania is: Does the Romanian state employ a quality of democracy and co-governance or a quality of service and co-management approach to its relationship with third sector service providers?

Method and data

To answer this question a theoretically informed qualitative analysis (Altheide 1996) of relevant national policy documents covering a decade (2000-2010) is employed. This particular timeframe corresponds to concomitant development of the service delivery functions of the Romanian third sector and policy-making and decentralisation reforms initiated by the Romanian state. The advantage of this approach lies in the opportunity to identify possible disparities between the policymakers' attitudes and the laws and regulations governing the sector and to highlight the dominant views in this matter. The limitation is that it does not allow us to assess fully the interactions between actors (the state and third sector service delivery organisations), as some of the informal channels of communication escape analysis.

The coding scheme was developed by analysing a small sample of policy documents, which were not used in later analysis. The main theoretically relevant themes included in the analysis focus on identifying patterns of interactions between governmental and third sector representatives (at different levels of the government), attitudes toward the financial involvement of the state in the service delivery third sector, assessing the degree of contestation from the third sector allowed by the

state, as well as the identification of policy domains where the state is more open to co-governance (higher policy influence of the third sector). The first theme approaches behavioural elements, while the others emphasize attitudinal elements. Each of the relevant documents was then analysed, seeking to identify these themes. The coding process approached these themes taking into account mentions concerning key actors involved, situational factors, routines and variations, significant events, and the actors' perspectives and meanings (for details of the coding see **Table 1**).

The paper analyses official policy documents concerning third sector service provision as well as the content of *Observator*, a governmental publication by the office in charge of third sector relations, focused explicitly on the relationship between central and local government and third sector organisations in Romania. This publication was deemed relevant due to the fact it aggregates documents relating to the state – third sector relationship in Romania from a variety of sources (central government, first and second tier of local government, county prefectural offices, individual NGOs, coalitions of NGOs, third parties issuing documents relevant for the state of the third sector). Moreover, this publication includes both central and local government policy documents and presentations of meetings, public events, information campaigns, projects implemented by third sector organisations, funding opportunities, tools for NGOs, and protests formulated by NGOs on different topics. All 31 issues of this publication were analysed, totalling 2565 pages (the shortest issue has 42 pages, while the longest has 191 and the average is 82.7 pages).

Table 1: Brief summary of the coding scheme

Theme	***Actors involved***	***Contextual elements***	***Routines and variations***	***Significant events***	***Perspectives, meanings***
Interactions between governmental and third sector representatives.	Different levels of government. Individual third sector organisations.	Initiator of the first contact. External stimuli at work. Policy domain(s) referred to.	Frequency and degree of institutionalisation of contacts. Interaction is policy sector specific or not.	Significant events which triggered a discussion	Positive or negative evaluations of the overall relationship

Attitudes toward the involvement of the third sector in service delivery and policy-making; the degree of contestation allowed.	Groups of organisations. Third sector organisations as global actor. Other actors intervening on the issue.	Policy domain(s) referred to. Existence of top down incentives and/or bottom up pressures for engagement.	Persistently negative or positive attitudes towards 3rd sector involvement in service delivery and influence in policy-making. (Non-)Acceptance of interdependence. (Non-)Acceptance of criticism coming from the third sector or other actors supporting the sector.	on these specific themes. Significant events which were triggered by discussion on these themes.	between the government and the third sector. Role attributed to third sector organisations in Romania's development.
Attitudes toward the financial involvement of the state in the service delivery third sector.			Persistently negative or positive attitudes towards financial involvement. Independence of service providers and/or the "bureaucratization of the third sector" are problematized.		
Policy domain-related attitudes.		Policy domain(s) referred to. Pre-existent legal framework already requires some degree of partnership and co-operation.	Practical aspects of service delivery (cost, efficiency, effectiveness) are emphasized. Accountability of service providers to state authorities is emphasized.		

Source: Developed by the author following the preliminary analysis of a sample of relevant policy documents.

Because *Observator* was discontinued in 2009, a website reflecting the activity of the third sector (www.stiriong.ro) was used as the main source of information regarding the relationship between the government and organisations between 2009 and 2010. This particular source was selected as it provided a significant degree of continuity with the *Observator* newsletter; the last issues of the latter actually included a selection of documents also published by the stiriong.ro website systematically. All 460 news pieces posted on the website between January 1, 2009 and December 31, 2010 were preliminary analysed with the purpose of deciding whether they are relevant for the topic of collaborative service delivery. Based on the preliminary analysis, 114 texts, fully or partially relevant for this investigation, were selected. These were then analysed using the coding scheme detailed above.

Results and analysis: prevailing discourses on collaborative service delivery in Romania

The analysis shows that several elements characterise the prevailing policy discourse concerning collaborative service delivery in Romania: conditionality, slow acceptance of the increasing interdependence, and political aspects of the policy-making process. Conditionality, of which both sides of this relationship are deeply aware, is probably the key contextual factor at work and the defining element of this new policy-making space. The slow acceptance of the increasing interdependence, which is a key aspect of co-governance, seems to be the defining attitudinal element. The analysis reveals important differences from one electoral cycle to the other in terms of policy discourse on government partnership with the third sector, differences arising from both the political views on the problem and the natural evolution of both the public and the third sector. Also, it showcases an emphasis on collaborative educational and social service delivery. In what follows we detail the most important result of the analysis. As the longitudinal variations seem quite important, we will use the electoral cycle as the organising unit of the analysis. The main findings detailed below are also summarized in **Table 2**.

Table 2: Stages of state engagement with collaborative service delivery in Romania, 2000-2010

Stage	*Electoral cycle*	*Government characteristics*	**Interactions**	**General attitudes towards collaborative service delivery and degree of contestation**	**Attitudes towards financial involvement of the state**	**Elements specific to certain policy domains**	**Observations**
Knowledge building	2000-2004	Leftist social-democrat government.	Formalism associated with top-down incentives (hierarchical governance); government passivity; initiatives come from the 3rd sector.	Too formalized mechanisms of consultation result in little or no influence of service providers in policy-making. Contestation is allowed. 3rd sector as a necessary `nuisance`.	High degree of reluctance. Openness at local government level – general funding schemes, not limited to service delivery.	Reliance on the problem-solving capacity of the third sector (Roma issues)	Significant top-down and bottom up pressure at central government level (EU accession). Government self-restraint; central government pressuring of local governments.

Acknowledgement of interdependence	2004-2008	Centre-right coalition (liberal and Christian-democrats) followed by a minority liberal government.	High frequency of interactions, initiatives coming from both directions. Focus on central government level. Shift away from hierarchical governance.	Explicit governmental strategy to develop collaborative service delivery in specific sectors. 3rd sector representatives effectively involved in policy-making in various domains. Open contestation present.	Shift of focus to the central government, explicit discussion on funding service delivery.	Strong emphasis on social service delivery accompanied by a diversification of policy domains.	Significant pressure associated with the EU accession process. Higher degree of openness due to political reasons.
Adjustment	2008-2010	Centre-right and social-democrats in coalition, followed by a centre-right (Christian-democrat leaning) government.	Decrease in interactions; initiative is still shared. Highly conflictual interactions with the central government, focused on technical aspects of service delivery.	Reluctance towards 3rd sector involvement in policy-making. 3rd sector accepted as service provider. Open contestation still present.	Funding programmes created by the previous government are scrapped.	Government criticism of how 3rd sector has dealt with service delivery in specific areas (Roma issues).	Austerity policies enacted.

Source: Author's own analysis

Knowledge building and formalism (2000-2004)

During the analysed period, a first stage of state engagement with collaborative service delivery in Romania (see **Table 2**) corresponds to the 2000-2004 electoral cycle when the Social-Democrat Party (Partidul Social-Democrat, PSD), widely seen as the successor to the Romanian Communist Party and the dominant party during the 1990s, held political power. The PSD returns to political power on a negative vote resulting from the perception of a lack of real political alternatives (Ciobanu 2007, p.1438) and despite its poor democratic credentials. The general context of the government – third sector organisations relationship is defined by the ongoing accession negotiations with the European Union (EU), accompanied by the EU stressing the importance of government – third sector co-operation in the area of service delivery and an increased amount of EU pre-accession and World Bank

funds dedicated to strengthening the third sector (especially service-delivery and advocacy organisations).

The government - third sector organisations partnership in the delivery of social services is central to both central and local government discourse. In fact, policy discourse emphasizes the third sector is depended on by government officials because these organizations are more in touch with local communities and consequently, more able to identify problems and their underlying causes (*Observator* no. 2). An important area characterized by central and local government reliance on the problem-solving capacity of the third sector regards Roma issues. In 2001, it was claimed that one of the most important aspects of the collaboration between the central administration and NGOs was the adoption of the *Strategy for the Improvement of the Situation of the Roma* and the creation of a National Office for the Roma (*Observator* 1). Partnership in the educational sector is, as reflected in the official documents analysed here, also linked to the Roma situation and the effort to increase the rate of school enrolment of Roma children, especially in the educational sector (*Observator* 1).

The interactions between central and local government officials usually occur in formal meetings with discussions dominated by the general feeling that both parties have unrealistic expectations. In the beginning of this decade, local and county level governments were passive in their relationships with the third sector. To illustrate, most of the partnerships on specific projects resulted from third sector organisations' initiatives. The analysis pointed out a certain degree of confusion among county authorities as to what constitutes a partnership with the third sector, some of them believing that it is their role to steer the local third sector in a manner similar to the one in which they steer and co-ordinate first tier local governments (see specific documents from these authorities published in *Observator* no. 1-3 and 6-7). Actual partnerships appearing between 2000 and 2004 were stimulated by pre-accession funding programmes (mostly PHARE), which conditioned the granting of funds for local projects by the existence of a partnership structure between local governments or authorities and the third sector (see *Observator* no. 6 and 7). The same is true for the central government and its devolved institutions, for example in the area of youth policy (see the review of 2002 activities by county level Youth and

Sports Directorates, *Observator* no. 4). Both parties involved recognise this conditionality and the new policy-making domain created by it.

There is great uncertainty as to what are the institutional rules and structures governing this, especially in terms of what sort of accountability is to be expected. In 2001, various documents included in the *Observator* series show several county level prefectural offices pointing out the need to set up institutional mechanisms in charge of the relationship with local civil society. However, they formulate this in hierarchical governance terms, with little openness towards seeing local civil society as equal partner. The incentive came from the centre, as one county level office reports that the local strategy includes the elements regarding the relationship with NGOs as stipulated in the Governing Programme, and, sometimes, from local NGO resource centres. The effectiveness of the incentives coming from the central government became obvious as county authorities became more informed if not more involved with what was happening in the local third sector (see for example *Observator* no. 2). Some county authorities explicitly state they assume the role of developers for the local third sector and mention that they provide consultancy services for setting up NGOs and accessing different sources of funding (for example Caraș-Severin, *Observator* no. 4, or Bihor, *Observator* no.5). It is very unlikely that this has happened and we are unable to verify whether the consultancy services actually existed. What is relevant is the fact that local governments and prefectures believe this to be socially desirable, with top-down incentives coming from a central government incentivised in the same manner by the EU accession process as the most likely explanation. This is, however, a reflection of hierarchical governance principles, as civil servants and local elected officials struggle with the notion that entities beyond their control might provide public services.

The financial engagement of the central government is discussed in a sector-specific manner, with a focus on Roma issues, cultural projects (*Observator* no. 9), and youth projects (*Observator* no.4), rather the more costly social or educational service delivery. Funding for social service delivery is mostly discussed in relation with local governments (detailed in sections of the *Observator* no. 1-2 which include documents coming from first-tier local governments). At the same level we find progress toward the institutionalisation of generic funding programmes, addressed to the entire third sector, based on methodologies usually inspired or written by NGO

activists (see for example Cluj-Napoca, *Observator* no. 1). During the 2000-2004 electoral cycle the Parliament passed the law regarding the introduction of the percentage designation system, allowing citizens to redirect one percent of their personal income tax to a non-governmental organisation of their choice.[5]

The rather formal meetings between third sector organisations and local governments sometimes result in minimal inputs from these organisations being taken into account and included in local policymaking process (see *Observator* no. 3). At the central government level, there are even direct meetings of ministers with the third sector on topics such as fiscal facilities for non-governmental organisations or financial programming for civil society (*Observator* no. 11). The degree of interaction between central government authorities and the representatives of the organisations delivering social services is high, but there is little impact on the policy process. For example, representatives of non-governmental organisations claim that few changes were made to a proposed piece of regulation regarding the accreditation of social services as the result of a public debate organised by the central government (see *Observator* no. 13).

Some representatives of the public institutions recognize pitfalls for non-governmental organisations when trying to advance the public-third sector relationship. A civil servant writing a summary of a meeting between local authorities and third sector organisations in a south-eastern county of Romania in 2001 observes:

> "(...) the representatives of the associational sector are unhappy with the manner in which they are treated by civil servants and the leaders of some institutions, and they have expectations that there will be a higher involvement in the problems of the non-governmental sector on behalf of the administration, but without noticing that such an involvement might be in conflict with the interests of the organisations" (*Observator* no. 3).

This stage of the government – third sector relationships in Romania can be summarized through the words used in a digest of a local meeting between representatives of the two sectors – 'finding more effective ways of collaborating and

[5] The mechanism was later on modified to allow the redirection of two percent of the personal income tax and extend its usage to the funding of private scholarships schemes.

the need to train both NGO leaders and civil servants' (*Observator* no. 4). Partnership is still rather declarative, while there is plenty of conflict on hot policy topics such as the reform of the Penal Code, anti-corruption laws, the creation of the national equality body, the implementation of the Strategy for the Improvement of the Situation of the Roma, changes to the legal framework regarding associations and foundations, and changes to legal provisions regarding pensions etc. The most disputed topic is the governmental ordinance from 2003 that brought significant changes to the procedure for establishing NGOs and preconditioned their access to public funding by the public benefit status, which can only be granted by central government authorities and is subject to political decisions. Third sector organisations were not consulted in the process of elaborating the policy proposal despite legal provisions requiring public consultation and considered these legal provisions to be a restriction on the constitutional freedom of association (*Observator* no. 8).[6]

The degree of contestation allowed is relatively high. To illustrate, the official government publication analysed by us regularly publishes documents in which the third sector criticises the government and, starting with a 2003 issue, actually includes a separate section labelled 'protests.' Progress is, to some extent, being made at the local level due to the initiation of some contacts between local governments and central government devolved institutions and the third sector. However, the general attitude of government officials towards the sector is best summarized by a declaration of the Minister of Tourism regarding the controversial project of a new seaside resort:

> "I will only speak about Europa [author's note: the proposed name of the resort] when construction begins. […] Otherwise, there will be again some NGO run by a dentist without clients, which will suddenly defend two lost seahorses, three dizzy jellyfish, and one penguin."[7]

A one sentence characterization of this stage of collaborative service delivery in Romanian would most necessarily emphasize knowledge building, as both parties involved are getting acquainted with each other and what collaborative service delivery involves, and a strong tendency on behalf of the state and its representatives

[6] This governmental ordinance was rejected by the Parliament in July 2005, after the PSD lost political power as a result of the 2004 elections.

[7] Statement made during a press conference on April 12, 2002 and reflected in the local media and protest letters issued by NGOs such as Mare Nostrum.

on various level to deal with the service delivery third sector in hierarchical governance terms.

Acknowledgement and acceptance of interdependence (2004-2008)

The next stage of state engagement with collaborative service delivery largely corresponds to the 2004-2008 electoral cycle (see Table 2). A coalition of centre-right and liberal parties comes into power, following the defeat of the PSD, after an election campaign which saw third sector representatives trying to put the issue of government-third sector partnership on the political and electoral agenda. This adds a strong political component to the issue of state engagement in collaborative service delivery. Moreover, the third sector increases bottom up pressure in an attempt to place the state and problems of the sector on the public political agenda. This became quite obvious when, before the 2004 elections, the National NGOs Forum asked the political parties to state their views on the sector in their electoral programmes (see *Observator* no. 13).

The general context of the government-third sector relationship is still defined by conditionality. Negotiations for EU accession represented a significant impulse toward higher engagement with the third sector on behalf of the state, as ministry level structures were created to help formally involve non-governmental organisations in the accession process (an EU requirement). An addition to this is a somewhat higher degree of openness towards the sector displayed by the two political parties coming into power – the National Liberal Party (Partidul Naţional Liberal, PNL) and the Democrat Party (Partidul Democrat, PD), both part of the centre-right Justice and Truth Alliance. During an electoral process marred by accusations of corruption and fraud, the civic non-governmental organisation and the political opposition sided together against the PSD (Muntean & Gheorghiță 2010).

The change in political configuration at central government level results in changes to policy regarding the third sector. The domains of interest are definitely becoming more diverse, with significant progress being made to the government–third sector organisations relationship in domains such as cultural, environmental, and social policy. There is a strong focus on social service delivery, as one of the objectives of the governing programme is to have 45 percent of the social services contracted out to third sector providers by 2008. In light of Romania's EU accession

in 2007 and of the need to raise the awareness of the Romanian public on European issues, there is a strong emphasis on the role of non-governmental actors as disseminators of 'European information.' The role of the third sector in providing public information on other topics as well is highlighted in official documents. For example, a report by the Agency for Governmental Strategies on the implementation of freedom of information legislation in 2004, which states that there is still enough residual institutional opacity and civic passivity to compel both the administration and the civil society to continuously promote the citizens' right to know (see *Observator* no. 19). In the cultural sector, a national funding programme for cultural programmes, whose conditions and procedures were fine-tuned in public debates with strong participation from the third sector, is introduced. In the environmental sector there is the same emphasis on the public communicator role of non-governmental organisations, the introduction of a national funding mechanism for environmental projects and an increasingly conflicting situation centred on the Roşia Montană mining project.

This expansion of the domains where partnerships between the government and the third sector can be identified is also reflected in multiple central government funded programmes for organisations working in areas such as culture, youth projects, inter-ethnic relations, public information on citizen access to information and mechanisms for public participation and policymaking, and arts and crafts.

The patterns of interaction have changed, as the highest degree of third sector consultation on a range of topics, starting with legal framework for their operation, happens. In early 2005, a consultation process initiated by third sector organisations and the president of the lower chamber of the Parliament resulted in the annulment of the controversial ordinance of the previous government regarding the establishment of NGOs and the public benefit status (*Observator* no. 16). This restored the equality in third sector organisations' access to public funding. The third sector is able to effectively shape changes to policy concerning their activity, as these entities organise public debates and formulate proposals changing the general legal framework for their operation and manage to convince several members of parliament to forward their proposals to the legislative body. In social service delivery, there is a high degree of third sector involvement in shaping the national strategy for the development of social services in Romania and pieces of legislation introducing

compulsory accreditation for social services providers, minimal quality standards, and an inventory of service providers. Third sector organisations effectively influence policy in the area of child protection as well. There is a strong emphasis of the central government on the partnership with these organisations and a preoccupation to showcase all situations in which they are consulted on policy issues. A shift of focus from the local government level to the central government one is visible. Third sector organisations are increasingly seen as partners who may help shape national policy rather than as mere local organisations dealing with local problems. The unchartered policy space from the previous cycle is replaced by institutionalized participation structures, which are highly formalized.

At the local government level change does not occur much, especially in terms of attitudes towards the third sector. There are particularly negative attitudes when mechanisms for funding the third sector from local budgets are under discussion. This is also manifest in the projects developed in partnership by local governments and third sector organisations, with the initiative and the responsibility to secure funding remaining strictly with the third sector organisation (see *Observator* no. 17). A local official mentioned that the involvement of third sector organisations in implementing the Information and Communication Strategy of the county is praiseworthy (see *Observator* no. 17), stressing the capacity of the sector to better communicate with the citizens. Nevertheless, especially when smaller local governments are involved, a different, positive, attitude is dominant, as third sector organisations are seen as able to help local authorities cope with the problems arising from their new resulting from decentralisation.

Anti-corruption legislation, a proposal regarding the creation of a special fund for social work services, the financial programming for development, and, as part of an overhaul of social benefits, a project to reduce the amount of the maternal leave benefits are among the disputed topics. Civic and social services delivery organisations argue they are only sporadically involved in the planning and implementing of EU funded programmes and that the National Development Plan does not make any reference to them and proposes no action to develop the sector (*Observator* no. 20). This has become the most disputed topic throughout this period. Open contestation is still present and is centred on EU structural instruments programming, funding for education (the third sector supports a Minister of Education

resigning because the government failed to meet the legal requirement of providing a 6 percent of the GDP budget for education in 2005), and funding programmes for environmental projects. There is open conflict between environmental protection organisations and the Ministry of the Environment, as a coalition of organisations refuses to apply to a funding scheme in order to convince the ministry that certain changes to the eligibility requirements are needed.

A summary of this stage of collaborative service delivery in post-communist Romania should definitely include references to the acknowledgement of increased interdependence and complementarity and the bi-directionality of the relationship between governmental actors and third sector service delivery organisations, which signal a shift away from hierarchical governance towards a more inclusive network governance approach.

Adjustment in an austerity context (2008-2010)

Following the November 2008 elections, a coalition between the centre-right Democrat-Liberal Party (Partidul Democrat-Liberal, PD-L) and the PSD came into power. After ten months, as the government proved dysfunctional, the coalition disintegrated and a minority PD-L government ensued. This government was replaced by a new one, also dominated by the PD-L, two months later (December 2009). Despite the significant changes in the political composition of the cabinet, there seemed to be some policy coherence. This was linked to the fact that the government had to deal with the consequences of the international financial crisis. It must be noted that most of the major reforms were implemented after December 2009 by the PD-L dominated government.

The need to deal with the consequences of the financial and economic crisis soon reflected into government – third sector relations and attitudes towards collaborative service delivery. First, the central government stopped the publication of the *Observator* newsletter. Months later, in a major reshuffle of central government agencies, the governmental structure in charge of the relationships with the third sector was absorbed by a different structure. Theoretically, the new structure inherited duties regarding the relationship with the third sector, but no activities were apparent. Moreover, the new government has chosen to pass major legislation in areas where third sector organisations were involved in public service delivery by

using a procedure forcing the Parliament to either give a no confidence vote or accept a piece of legislation proposed by the government without any changes. Most of these pieces of legislation, most notably a new law on education, were fast forwarded without being accompanied by serious public debate. In the area of third sector social service delivery, the key contentious issue regards a new framework law for social benefits and social service – labelled The Social Code – drafted by the Ministry of Labour and Social Protection without consulting third sector service providers.

The attitude of the central government toward third sector organisations can be summarized by a statement made by Traian Băsescu, President of Romania, in a period when Romania was under heavy international criticism for its lack of progress in integrating the Roma community: '...until now the EU has given money to the NGOs and results are discernible' (Pepine 2010). Another interesting fact is the government handling of third sector opposition to the Roşia Montană mining project,[8] going as far as excluding a representative of a coalition of environmental issues organisations contesting this project from the list of people proposed to represent Romania in the European Economic and Social Council.

A significant shift of attitude is also visible in terms of government funding for the third sector available outside the EU's Structural and Cohesion Instruments. Some programmes created by the previous governments have disappeared completely. While some of this may have resulted from necessary budget cuts, the fact that funding programmes were completely scrapped illustrates a pattern. A similar story can be told about the manner in which the central government has managed the relationship with the third sector in the context of the Structural and Cohesion Instruments funding. In the area falling under the European Social Fund, there has been some heated debate between the central government and the third sector on issues such as the use of the 'first come, first served' system in granting 130 million Euro for social inclusion projects and some of the eligibility requirements for projects in the social economy sector, including a highly bureaucratised procedure for proving that beneficiaries belong to a disadvantaged group.

[8] The Roșia Montană project is a highly controversial gold mining project, which has been on hold for more than a decade. If approved it would become the largest open-pit gold mine in Europe, with consequences such as relocating entire communities and dismantling four mountains. The project has been met with significant resistance from Romania and abroad and has become subject to nation-wide protests.

This stage of collaborative service delivery in Romania can best be described in terms of adjustment. This can be linked to the reluctance towards third sector involvement in policy-making and partial acceptance of third sector involvement in service delivery (see Table 2). Therefore, there is a change in governance practices, a move towards a more managerial, market governance approach. However, the adjustment goes deeper when the reluctance of the political decision-makers towards the third sector combines itself with the need to pursue austerity policies.

The politics of collaborative service delivery (2000-2010)

The changes in governmental attitudes towards collaborative service delivery from one electoral cycle to another reflect the significant disagreement on policies among the main political actors (see Table 2). Researchers have linked this to the polarised pluralism built upon the Communist – anti-Communist division (Stănuş 2003) and the on-going argument about the country's Communist and pre-Communist past (Ciobanu 2007, p.1434). Given Romania's weakness in formulating and implementing coherent policies (Stark & Bruszt 1998, pp.112–23), showcased by the lack of a coherent vision and lack of concrete implementation tools in key sectors such as public administration reforms (Cepiku & Mititelu 2010), political polarisation has easily translated into policy-making. In practice this has meant successive governments were reluctant to implement the reforms enacted by the previous government and have tended to replace them with new reforms.

The effects of this polarisation were mitigated by the conditionality of the EU accession process. The first two electoral cycles analysed in this paper present linear progress in government attitudes toward collaborative service delivery, with a quite obvious move from formal to more genuine acceptance of the role of third sector organisations in public service delivery. This progress is linked to the manner in which the non-governmental sector in Romania manages to empower itself using EU conditionality as an opportunity (Dimitrova & Buzogány 2014; Parau 2008). Thus, NGOs use governmental sensitivity to external criticisms during the EU accession process to further their cause and go as far as entering in informal coalitions with the European Commission and other significant international actors (Dimitrova & Buzogány 2014; Parau 2008). While the use of such mechanisms is visible in critical discourse moments related to specific issues such as the Roșia Montană mining

project or the Dracula Park project,[9] effects seem to have spread sector-wide. We can also assume that furthering the accession process has led to increased impact of EU rules on specific policy measures rather than institutional features (Sedelmeier 2011), which incrementally contributed to a slow change in attitudes toward collaborative service delivery. Behind this top-down mechanism some bottom-up elements are also at work. Despite the pronounced lack of appreciation towards the third sector, the attitudes of the Năstase government towards collaborative service delivery seem to be explained by a combination of NGO empowerment and governmental self-restraint in view of the EU accession process (Parau 2008). In the following cycle different factors were at play.

After the 2004 elections, the good relationship established between the new centre-right governing coalition and civic and pro-democracy NGOs as a result of their joint criticism of how the previous government had organised elections, as well as the government's ambition to reform policy-making processes, facilitated the active involvement of third sector service providers in drafting rules which would govern collaborative service delivery in several sectors. Moreover, the Tăriceanu government was keen in proving its European credentials, as opposed to the previous government. However, using the EU for legitimation purposes is a two-way process which increases the EU's leverage and makes governments vulnerable to 'naming and shaming' strategies (Dimitrova & Buzogány 2014, p.142).

The set-backs described for the third electoral cycle (2008-2010) are likely the result of a combination of austerity politics and lack of policy foresight. The new government comes into power as the first consequences of the international financial crisis are visible in Romania. Its policy discourse rapidly centres on reigning in government spending and shrinking the Romanian welfare state, a strategy which would have reasonably implied an increased focus on service delivery by non-state actors. However, collaborative service delivery does not seem to be perceived as a viable enough alternative to service provision by governmental entities, an example being the fact that service grants were significantly reduced (Sum 2011).

[9] The Dracula Park project is a controversial government project initiated in 2001 which aimed building a themed amusement park near the Sighișoara medieval town; the project was abandoned due to disputes concerning opportunity and discussions concerning environmental consequences.

Conclusion

This paper has approached government engagement with collaborative service delivery in Romania, with an emphasis on how the state uses its discursive power to constitute the third sector as a key partner in policy-making and policy implementation. It has examined state - third sector service delivery organisations relationships in an Eastern European context as a governance practice and has discussed the manner in which successive Romanian governments have dealt with the third sector in general and collaborative service delivery in particular. The paper set out to examine these practices taking into account the significant differences across countries in terms of institutionalisation of (co-)governance of service delivery and has tried to identify the mix of specific subjective factors shaping state engagement in this new policy space in Romania. The analysis presented in this paper has its limitations, derived from the timeframe covered by the analysis and the fact that the focus on policy documents is bound to offer a limited view of the actual interactions between the actors, with more informal channels escaping analysis. Therefore, the results of the analysis are interpreted with caution.

The analysis shows that several of the challenges to policy-making and politics in the era of network society (Hajer & Wagenaar 2003) have found their way into policy discourse in Romania. The new policy space created by the conditionality of EU accession is handled rather reluctantly by a governmental structure which perceives potential limitations to its policy functions. Hierarchical governance takes effect and central and local government alike cope with difficulty with the notion of service providers they do not control, as well as with the involvement of these entities in policy-making. Slowly, the awareness of increased interdependence makes room for a more inclusive policy process and the use of a network governance approach. Progress in this direction is later on tempered by political change and austerity policies, and the incipient network governance discourse is replaced by the more formal, managerial, market governance discourse. Corresponding to these developments, three stages of collaborative service delivery were identified in the analysed period, which were labelled knowledge building, acknowledgment of interdependence, and adjustment. Practically, the need to deal with market and network governance elements at the same time is dealt with quite differently by different political decision-makers in different contexts. Co-operative service delivery

is shown to be linked to the capacity and will of policy-makers to balance the three components of public sector governance (hierarchical, market and network governance). How the Romanian public sector balances the three components of contemporary public sector governance and responds to the introduction of governance instruments is a topic which merits more in-depth investigation, in relation to organizational innovation in Romanian local government (Junjan & Balogh 2014) and the internalisation of public sector reforms.

The fact that these stages largely correspond to electoral cycles suggests that, alongside conditionality, a very important subjective factor shaping collaborative service delivery in Romania seems to be the political polarisation of policy-making in key areas. The paper suggests that the government engagement in co-governance mechanisms with third sector organisations depends on the extent to which political actors are willing and able to ensure policy continuity across and within the main policy domains. Whether this linkage between the polarisation of policy-making and the oscillating approach towards collaborative service delivery is also characteristic of other new democracies / countries in the region could also be the topic of future research.

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Corruption Experience, Perception and Anti-Corruption Trust: Different Effects in Various Post-Communist States[10]

Pavel Baboš[11]

ABSTRACT

There is a well-established relationship between corruption perception and trust. However, the direction of causality is still an intensively discussed topic. This paper investigates relationships among corruption experience, perception and their impact on institutional trust. The main contribution of the paper is that it addresses the mutual causality issue between corruption perception and trust by structural equation modelling. This research uses the Eurobarometer data with a special module on corruption, which allowed this study to distinguish between corruption experience and the perception of it. Another novelty of this paper is that it narrows the conceptualisation of trust down to trust in the government institutions' anti-corruption fight. This dimension of trust has not been investigated before. Our findings suggest that the causal influence runs from the trust to corruption perception and not vice versa. Additionally, the analysis shows that the impact of corruption experience on the anti-corruption trust varies across countries with different cultural background.

KEY WORDS: *corruption perception, corruption experience, trust, Central Eastern Europe*

INTRODUCTION

Corruption has been gaining an increasing attention by media, politicians, policy-makers and many other relevant actors. Thus, it is hardly surprising that the academic research of corruption is growing as well. While some authors focus on explaining corrupt behaviour (e.g. Tavits 2010), others investigate the effects corruption has on economy (Uslaner 2007), society (della Porta 2000; Pharr 2000) or politics (Mishler& Rose 2005). Considerable amount of research is also devoted to

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the relationship between the corruption and trust (Anderson and Tverdova 2003; Chang & Chu 2006; Hakhverdian&Mayne 2012). And there is also research showing how the trust, corruption and economic growth are interdependent (Li & Wu, 2010).

This study focuses on three distinct dimensions of corruption and relationships among them. In this study we differentiate between the corruption perception and corruption experience and include both of the dimensions into our investigation. Additionally, we link these two issues to a special kind of trust: the trust in public institutions' anti-corruption performance. Although distinct types of trust, mainly personal and political/institutional have been investigated before (see Anderson & Tverdova 2003; Dalton 2004; Chang & Chu 2006, Hakhverdian&Mayne 2012; Wroe, Allen & Birch 2013; etc.) we have not found any similar research that would narrow down the institutional trust in this particular way. Therefore we believe that focusing on this specific type of trust presents a contribution to current research on corruption.

Another contribution of this paper is that we not only separate the corruption perception from experience, but also disentangle the previously suggested reverse causation between the corruption perception and trust (della Porta 2000; Wroe et al. 2013). There is a debate in the academic literature, whether it is the trust that influences the corruption perception, or vice versa (Wroe et al. 2013). This paper uses structural equation models to disentangle the two causal paths.

Four Eastern European countries are compared in this research. We have chosen Estonia, Slovakia, Slovenia and Romania to investigate and compare the causal mechanisms operating between corruption experience, perception and anti-corruption trust. The selected countries have different cultures, as demonstrated by different positions in various rankings comparing corruption. We decided to choose four countries that are different enough in order to also see the differences in the causal mechanisms under investigation. Since the Baltic countries are often considered to be relatively homogeneous, we chose one case representing the region. The same applies to the Visegrad group of countries, out of which we chose Slovakia. Slovenia is in many aspects one of the kind and therefore we included it in the analysis as well. Romania is representing the Balkan region. A more detailed discussion of the country selection can be found in the methodology part of this paper.

This study makes use of the Eurobarometer micro-data that is not so frequently used. However, it provides several items on corruption and thus allows us separating the three dimensions. As mentioned, we apply structural equation modelling techniques to estimate the direct and indirect effects as well as the reverse causal relationships.

The structure of the paper is as follows: after the introduction, we review the theories linking corruption and trust. In the following section we discuss the distinction between the corruption perception and corruption experience. Subsequently we define our variables and describe data and method in a more detailed way and discuss the instrumental variables employed in the model. What follows is the empirical analysis and presentation of the results. Before concluding, we discuss the main contribution of this study as well as the limitations encountered.

Trust and corruption

The link between trust and corruption has been very well established in the previous research. Most voluminous literature focuses on the effect of corruption on the general trust towards political institutions (Mauro 1995; Knack & Keefer 1995; dellaPorta &Vanucci 1999; Pharr & Putnam 2000; Seligson 2002; Rose-Ackerman 2005; Clausen, Kraay&Nyiri 2011; Hakhverdian&Mayne 2012; and others). There is a consensus among scholars, that corruption has negative effect on trust in government, political parties or other political institutions or actors. On the one hand, previous research that shows the relationship between the corruption and general political trust is large and convincing, therefore we feel no need to go into much details at this point. On the other hand, the causal direction of this relationship is not as clear as the link itself. This article thus addresses direction of the relationship between trust and corruption.

In addition to general trust in political institutions, several scholars investigated the link between corruption and specific elements of trust, or trust in particular sectors of public sphere. As the previous research show, higher corruption apparently also leads to lower trust in civil servants and state administration (Tverdova&Anderso, 2003; Hacek, Kukovic&Brezovsek 2013), lower evaluation of the performance of and trust towards justice system and police (Kaariainen & Siren 2007) and decreased satisfaction with public services (Bratton, 2007). Kaufmann and Wei (1999) analysed

firm-level data and found that the increased level of corruption leads to more time that managers waste with state officials.

However, the causal path does not necessarily lead solely from the corruption perception to the political (or other type of) trust. Several authors have analysed the opposite causal relation recently. Wroe, Allan and Birch (2013) claim that they excluded the possible causal mechanism from the corruption perception to the political trust by two factors: temporal order of the respective items in the questionnaire and the hypothetical nature of the corruption perception items (for further details see Wroe et al. 2013, p. 182). Using the OLS regression, authors found the effect of the corruption perception on the political trust. However, they admit that there is a possibility that "*respondents' level of trust will have been influenced by their previous real-life perceptions of corruption*" and thus the effect represents more the "quasi-experimental setting" of the data set "rather than the real world" (2013, p. 182).

Chang and Chu addressed the problem of mutual effect of the two phenomena in Asian countries differently. The authors employed the structural equation modelling and they modelled both of the causal effects simultaneously. They found the influence of the institutional trust on the corruption perception as well, and concluded that there is a "vicious cycle between corruption and institutional trust" and that the two reinforce each other. Morris and Klesner (2010) focused on Mexico and approached the endogeneity problem in the same fashion as the previous authors. Additionally, they included also the interpersonal trust in the analysis. They concluded that the corruption perception does not influence interpersonal trust. However, they confirmed the incidence of the "vicious circle that perpetuates corruption, the perception of corruption, and low levels of trust" (2010, p. 1275).

Corruption experience *versus* perception

Clausen, Kraay and Nyiri (2011) published an exhaustive study on the relation between the corruption's perception, corruption experience and trust towards public institutions (military, judicial system, national governments and fairness of elections). Their findings show that the corruption in both forms decreases public confidence in the state institutions. However, the lowering effect of the corruption's perception is three times larger than the personal experience of the corrupted behaviour. As noted

above, Morris and Klesner (2010) also highlighted the intertwined role of the corruption experience and perception in regard to institutional trust.

Olken (2009) studied the relationship between the corruption perception and corruption reality in Indonesian villages. He concluded that the link between the corruption perception and corruption reality (measured as 'missing expenditures') is rather weak. However, an important finding of Olken is that, in their perception, people can distinguish between the probability of general corruption in the country/district and corruption related to the specific project. The importance of this finding lies in the fact that it casts the shadow on the intuitive link between the corruption experience and perception. According to the logic of Olken's study, if people distinguish between the general corruption and the corrupt behaviour in the particular situation, there is no reason why the experience with corrupt behaviour should automatically lead to higher corruption perception in general.

As it is clear, some of the authors confirmed that there is a link between the corruption experience and perception (Clausen et al. 2011), while others provide contradicting evidence (Olken 2009) arguing that people distinguish the general perception of corruption from the corruption specific to a project or an issue in their village or district.

Hypotheses

It is sometimes argued that people might be capable of differentiating between the petty corruption they usually experience and the grand corruption they mostly read about. However, a vast amount of literature suggests that the petty corruption experience still contributes to corruption perception. Therefore we formulate our first hypothesis:

H1: the direct corruption experience leads to increase in corruption perception.

Secondly, we are convinced by the Wroe's argumentation that trust is more innate to people than corruption perception. Thus, our second hypothesis reads:

H2: higher trust leads to lower corruption perception.

We address this problem in the following way: our analysis tests distinct causal paths leading from corruption experience to the corruption-fighting trust. Firstly, we will model the direct causal influence between the two variables. Secondly, the

model will test also an indirect causal path from corruption experience to the anti-corruption, leading through the corruption perception. Additionally, the model will also include the reverse causation leading from the anti-corruption trust towards the corruption perception. The actual method is discussed in further details in the section below.

Data and methods

This paper uses the Eurobarometer microdata (edition 76.1), with data collected in September 2011. The survey included a special module on corruption perception, experience and trust in state institutions. This allows us to investigate the relationships among different dimensions of corruption and the corruption-related institutional trust.

Corruption perception is constructed from 13 questionnaire items asking respondents if they think "that the giving and taking of bribes, and the abuse of positions of power for personal gain, are widespread" (exact wording from the questionnaire) in any of the 13 listed sectors (e.g. police, justice, health, education). The corruption experience variable is based on the following question: "Over the last 12 months, has anyone in [your country] asked you, or expected you, to pay a bribe for his or her services?" Respondents were then showed the same 13 sectors as used in the perception question and would answer yes or no to each of the sectors. Our constructed variable thus indicates whether a person, at least once over the last 12 months, was asked or expected to pay a bribe regardless of who might be the bribe-taker.

Finally, the third variable indicating trust in the anti-corruption fights constructed based on four items: government efforts to combat corruption being effective, having enough successful prosecutions to deter people from bribery, court sentences in corruption cases being too light, and sufficient transparency in financing political parties.

We employ structural equation modelling to estimate the strength of the expected relationships. This method is especially appropriate in situations when the latent factors and/or reverse causation are present in the analysis (Hoyle 1995). One of the advantages of the SEM is that it allows disentangling the reverse causation and separate direct from indirect causal paths.

In order to model and estimate the reverse causation we need instrumental variables. Since the reverse causality is expected between corruption perception and the anti-corruption fighting trust, the first instrumental variables should be related to the corruption perception but not to trust, and the second instrumental variable should be vice versa.

We chose the following instrumental variables: firstly, it is the level to which a respondent feels he is informed about the corruption in a country. This level of being informed is related to the corruption perception; however, this is not to be trusted. Secondly, there is the question asking about respondent's opinion on the future economic development. Since the economic indicators and forecasts are given and same for all respondents within a country, we label this item as respondent's economic pessimism. We argue that a person's economic pessimism is related to the institutional trust and not related to the perception corruption.

For the control variables we use both the standard demographic variables (age, gender, education) and some specific variables that are closely related to the topic under investigation (social level, left-right political orientation, etc.). We also include a variable indicating whether a respondent or her family member had lost a job due to the crisis. This should control the possible effect of the job loss might due to the fact that respondent might blame the government for the family situation and this in might turn influence the trust. Therefore we include it as a control variable. The list of all the variables included in the model, together with the basic descriptive characteristics, is listed in **Appendix 1**.

As indicated in the introduction of this paper, we selected four countries in which we compare the causal mechanisms under study. The question is which countries to select, since Eurobarometer provides data for all the EU member states. Firstly, we cannot include all the countries and compare the effects among almost 30 them. Interpreting thirty different models would be confusing and not feasible within the limits of one study. On the other hand, pooling all the data as is often done in the comparative econometric analysis would not be a solution either. There is a number of reasons to believe that the effects might be different and also of contradictory direction across countries. Thus, there is a risk that this would cause the total effect to be biased and with no substantial interpretation.

We have decided to include four countries since it is still manageable to interpret and compare four models. We have chosen four post-communist countries that are relatively different in two ways. Firstly, there is a volume of literature pointing to different administrative and civic culture in the post-communist Europe (e.g. Adam, Tomsic&Matevz 2008, Goran 2010). The authors argue that the administrative culture, and, relatedly, administrative reforms are influencing the institutional trust of citizens. Goran studied administrative reforms in post-communist states and found several similarities, as well as differences among the states. While Estonia belongs to the best performers and could be "a model for public service delivery systems" (2010, p. 116), it is one of the states with only moderate progress, and Slovakia (together with the Czech Republic), according to the author, experienced "destructive reform reversals" (ibid.). In addition to that, Mishler and Rose (2001) provide an overview of several theories on how culture at both macro and micro level influences institutional trust. This provides a reason to study the effects of corruption experience and perception on trust separately in individually countries. Therefore we guided our selection by this difference so that each country represents different cultural space. Secondly, we choose countries that occupy different positions in the various corruption indexes. On the one hand, Slovakia and Romania are two countries with the highest perceived corruption and also with the most people claiming to have a direct corruption experience. On the other hand, Slovenia and Estonia have the lowest perceived corruption and the least people claiming to have direct corruption experience (see **Table 1** and **Figure 1** below).

Table 1: Corruption Perception Index

Country	CPI Rank / Score 2010	CPI Rank / Score 2011	CPI Rank / Score *2012**
Estonia	26 / 6.5	29 / 6.4	32 / 64
Slovenia	27 / 6.4	35 / 5.9	37 / 61
Poland	41 / 5.3	41 / 5.5	41 / 58
Hungary	50 / 4.7	54 / 4.6	46 / 55
Lithuania	46 / 5	50 / 4.8	48 / 54
Latvia	59 / 4.3	61 / 4.2	54 / 49
Czech Republic	53 / 4.6	57 / 4.4	54 / 49
Slovakia	59 / 4.3	66 / 4	62 / 46
Romania	69 / 3.7	75 / 3.6	66 / 44
Bulgaria	73 / 3.6	86 / 3.3	75 / 41

*TI has changed the methodology and the scoring method. However, the 2012 score should broadly correspond to the previous after divided by 10.
Source: Transparency International

Figure 1: Direct corruption



Source: Eurobarometer, September 2011

Empirical analysis

Before presenting the results of the SEM model estimation we will briefly inspect some of the descriptive statistics. Full table with descriptive statistics is shown below (**Table 2**).

People in Slovenia perceive corruption to be widespread more than in other countries, with the mean score of 8.22. Romanian citizens' perception is at the level of 6.79. In Slovakia and Estonia people perceive corruption to be the least widespread in comparison to the previous countries, the mean score being 5.56 and 5.52, respectively. On the other hand, the direct experience with bribery seems to be much more encountered, or at least admitted, in Slovakia and Romania than in the two other countries. In Slovakia and Romania, 30% and 35% of respondents, respectively, admitted that they have been asked or expected to pay a bribe. There are only around 8% and 6% of respondents admitting the same in Slovenia and Estonia, respectively.

Regarding the trust towards state institutions' fight against corruption, this is the highest in Estonia at the level of 7.89 (on 13 points scale, 0 being the absolute trust and 12 stands for an absolute distrust). The second highest anti-corruption trust

is recorded in Romania (8.77), then Slovakia (9.09) and the least trust in the government's anti-corruption fight is in Slovenia (10.17).

Table 2: Descriptive statistics

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
Slovakia					
Male (0 female; 1 male)	865	0	1	.50	.500
Age	865	15	90	43.81	16.590
Education (in years	856	0	39	16.87	6.468
Social level self-placement	852	0	5	2.47	1.419
Political left-right self-placement	738	1	10	5.18	2.594
Pessimism	859	1	4	3.12	.926
Job loss due to crisis (0 no; 1 yes)	863	0	1	.41	.492
Feeling informed about corruption (0 no; 1 yes)	858	0	1	.41	.493
Asked for bribe (0 no; 1 yes)	865	0	1	.30	.459
Anti-Corruption Trust	829	0	12	9.09	2.114
Corruption perception	865	0	14	5.56	3.443
Slovenia					
Male (0 female; 1 male)	928	0	1	.51	.500
Age	928	15	90	46.72	17.831
Education (in years	921	0	72	16.78	7.545
Social level self-placement	894	0	5	2.37	1.447
Political left-right self-placement	503	1	10	5.32	2.378
Pessimism	912	1	4	3.42	.732
Job loss due to crisis (0 no; 1 yes)	928	0	1	.26	.440
Feeling informed about corruption (0 no; 1 yes)	921	0	1	.50	.500
Asked for bribe (0 no; 1 yes)	928	0	1	.08	.266
Anti-Corruption Trust	889	3	12	10.17	1.782
Corruption perception	928	0	14	8.22	3.931
Estonia					
Male (0 female; 1 male)	784	0	1	.45	.497
Age	784	15	89	43.86	18.452
Education (in years	779	0	40	17.32	7.485
Social level self-placement	777	0	5	2.18	1.420
Political left-right self-placement	633	1	10	6.08	1.949
Pessimism	774	1	4	2.86	1.090
Job loss due to crisis (0 no; 1 yes)	781	0	1	.44	.497
Feeling informed about corruption (0 no; 1 yes)	781	0	1	.30	.457
Asked for bribe (0 no; 1 yes)	784	0	1	.06	.235
Anti-Corruption Trust	732	1	12	7.89	2.130
Corruption perception	784	0	13	5.52	4.013
Romania					
Male (0 female; 1 male)	804	0	1	.49	.500

Age	804	15	86	43.58	17.784
Education (in years	804	0	30	16.84	6.425
Social level self-placement	797	0	5	2.07	1.456
Political left-right self-placement	588	1	10	5.27	2.520
Pessimism	755	1	4	3.37	.731
Job loss due to crisis (0 no; 1 yes)	803	0	1	.40	.490
Feeling informed about corruption (0 no; 1 yes)	794	0	1	.59	.492
Asked for bribe (0 no; 1 yes)	804	0	1	.35	.479
Anti-Corruption Trust	783	1	12	8.77	2.259
Corruption perception	804	0	14	6.79	4.240

Source: author's calculation.

The four countries also differ in terms of the extent to which people feel they are informed about corruption. The least informed are seemingly the people of Estonia, where only 30% of people feel informed. On the other hand, Romanians feel to be the most informed, with almost 60% of people giving a positive answer. Slovakia and Slovenia lie in between with 41% and respectively 50% people feeling informed about corruption. The full table with descriptive statistics listed separately for Slovenia and Slovakia is in **Appendix 1**.

The results of empirical analysis can be presented in different ways, either in a form of a conceptual diagram with the regression coefficients filled in, or as a table with the regression coefficients or a table with the direct, indirect and total effects the predictors have. Since the main goal of our analysis is to explore and test the specified relationships in a comparative perspective, we present the results in a form of a table with the regression results (**Table 3** below). The table with all the direct, indirect and total effects is in **Appendix 2**.

Figure 2 shows the main relationships we investigated together with instrumental variables. Conceptual diagram with the estimates provide an easy-to-read form of the main findings. The full table with all regression coefficients and model fit statistics[12] can be found in **Appendix 1**. Although the model specification, i.e. the variables remains the same across models, the four models represent national samples, according to the countries under investigation. The idea behind comparing the selected four countries was to see whether the causal links connecting

[12]The RMSEA statistics is not below 0.08 in all four estimated models. However, the estimated models fit the data better than the baseline model in all cases.

different dimensions of corruption are the same in different administrative cultures. As it is clear from the results, not all the effects are shared across the selected models.

Figure 2: Regression result for individual countries, shown in a conceptual diagram



Source: Author's own calculations

ROMANIA



Source: Author's own calculations

SLOVAKIA



Source: Author's own calculations

SLOVENIA



Note: Asterisk marks the coefficient significance at 0.05 level. Diagram only shows selected variables. Control variables, error terms and their mutual covariances are omitted for the sake of readability.

Source: Author's own calculations

Firstly, we address the difference between the corruption perception and personal experience. The personal experience was measured as the respondents' admission that she was asked or expected to pay a bribe in any of the thirteen given sectors of public life. Although the questionnaire asked for each of the sector separately, we dichotomised the corruption experience variable so that it distinguishes between encountering either none or at least one situation when asked for a bribe. The empirical analysis shows that the effect of the personal corruption experience on the corruption perception varies across countries. Although there is a direct positive relationship between the two variables in question, this seems to be significant only in Slovakia (at 0.1 level) and Romania (0.05 level). This effect is almost twice as strong in the latter country than the former. In Estonia and Slovenia we cannot say with a big enough degree of certainty that persons who have been asked or expected to pay a bribe tend to perceive higher general corruption.

As for the trust in government institutions' anti-corruption fight, the analysis provides no evidence that the corruption experience would have a significant direct statistical effect. Also, the indirect effect leading to the trust, through the corruption perception, appears to be statistically insignificant in all four countries.

When modelling the relationship between the anti-corruption trust and corruption perception, our model takes into account the issue of reverse causality. Using two instrumental variables we estimate the separate influence the two factors have on each other. The results show that, on the one hand, there is no statistically significant influence that the corruption perception would exert on the anti-corruption trust with the exception of the Romanian case. However, also in Romania, the effect is relatively small and significant only at 0.1 level. On the other hand, it seems to be the anti-corruption trust that is shaping the perception directly. According to the findings the lower anti-corruption trust increases the corruption perception. Simply, people perceive higher general corruption because they don't trust public institutions to be fighting corruption effectively, and not vice versa.

Regarding the problem of reverse causality, we can also, in addition to the direct effects, compare the indirect and total (which is the direct and the indirect combined) effects. These are also computed as part of the SEM method, and the full table with all the effects are provided in **Appendix 2**. When we look at the indirect effects the corruption perception has on the anti-corruption trust, we see that this is rather marginal in Slovenia and Slovakia. In Estonia, the indirect effect is small and has the opposite direction to the direct effect. Generally, the total effect of the corruption perception on the anti-corruption trust in the four countries varies from -0.36 (Estonia) to 0.36 (Romania).

Secondly, let us investigate the total effects in the opposite direction, leading from the anti-corruption trust to the corruption perception. These varies from 0.66 (Estonia) to 3.95 (Romania). As it is clear, not only the direct, but also the total effects are much stronger in the path going from the trust to the perception than vice versa. This provides another reason to believe that the causal influence runs from the anti-corruption trust towards the corruption perception.

Discussion and conclusion

This paper studies the relationship among corruption experience, corruption perception and the anti-corruption trust. Several hypotheses were tested, and the structural equation modelling was used to address the possible reverse causality between the corruption perception and anti-corruption trust, as well as to estimate the direct and indirect effects of the factors of interest.

Firstly, we examined the relationship between corruption experience and corruption perception. Hypothesis one expected direct corruption experience to increase corruption perception. The analysis provides mixed evidence and the relationship is not homogeneous across countries. In Slovenia and Estonia, the relationship is not statistically significant. In Slovakia, the corruption experience has a positive direct effect on the corruption perception, significant at the level of 0.1. In Romania, the effect is larger and statistically significant at level of 0.05. Taking into account that the corruption perception is measured on a 15 points scale, we would argue that the direct corruption experience effect is not strong, since it increases the perception by 0.56 (Slovakia) or 0.97 (Romania) only. Therefore, we consider the first hypothesis to be only partially confirmed.

Secondly, we addressed the problem of the possible reverse causation between corruption experience and trust. There is only weak empirical evidence for the effect of the corruption perception on the anti-corruption fight trust. Rather on the contrary, the findings indicate, and our second hypothesis postulates, that it is the trust that influences person's perception of corruption in a negative way (i.e. higher trust leading to lower corruption perception). This conclusion is supported by comparison of both the direct and total effects. Our findings are in line with some of the recent research. In accordance with Wroe et al. (2013), our analysis shows that the causal path goes from the person's trust to the perception of corruption, not vice versa, as suggested by others (e.g. Seligson 2002; Hakhverdian & Mayne 2012).

Based on the results, we consider our second hypothesis to be confirmed. On the other hand, we admit that the result similarity to previous research might be also due to a rather narrow operationalization of trust. However, we don't see a reason why the relationship between corruption perception and general institutional trust on the one hand, and between corruption perceptions and the anti-corruption trust on the other hand, should be diametrically different.

Our findings do not necessarily mean that there is strictly no effect of corruption perception on the institutional trust. What matters is indeed the operationalization. In our case, both of the variables were at an individual level. In other words, we investigated the relationship between the trust a person holds towards the state institutions, and the corruption perception of the very same person. In our research, we investigated the abovementioned relationships in individual country models. However, there still is a possibility that corruption perception does have an effect on the institutional trust, if it is operationalized as a contextual variable in cross-country multilevel study design. This is also supported by our analysis that shows the effect of corruption perception on trust getting stronger with countries' position in the CPI ranking decreasing.

The effect of corruption experience on corruption perception in our analysis does not go against the Olken's conclusions (2009). Although there seems to be positive relationship between the two in Slovakia and Romania, the maximum effect is 0.56 and 0.97, respectively, on the 15-point scale. This leaves considerably large space for many other factors to determine the corruption perception other than direct experience. So the interpretation could be also that people with direct experience of corruption will only slightly increase their perception thereof, which is still compatible with Olken's conclusion that people can distinguish the general corruption and a specific case of bribery. Assuming that people would not be able to distinguish the general corruption from specific experience they have had, we would expect a considerably higher maximum effect.

Regarding the differences among countries, several findings are noteworthy. Firstly, the effect of corruption experience on corruption perception is significant only in Romania and Slovakia, two countries with rather higher share of population that actually have corruption experience. This could indicate that, in populations with relatively low corruption experience, this is not influencing the general perception. Another interesting result is that the effect of trust on corruption perception is more than twice as high in Romania and Slovenia as it is in Slovakia and Estonia. This could indicate that there is something common in the Balkan countries that drives people to rely on their trust when perceiving corruption. However, without further study and other data available, this remains in the position of one of many explanations.

Despite our best efforts to address the reverse causation issue and the relationship between the experience and perception of corruption, many questions remain still unanswered. Most of the previous research found that corruption perception influences the institutional trust, while our study shows that it is the anti-corruption trust influencing the corruption perceptions. Although this is not the first finding of this kind (e.g. Wroe et al. 2013), there is still large space open for future research to explain the variability in findings. Possible paths might lead to investigating the differences among general, interpersonal, institutional and more narrowly defined types of trust. To begin with, we would argue that trust, as we operationalized it, is a subcategory of more general institutional trust, therefore the narrower operationalization should not cause the difference in findings. However, intuition is not always right and further research is required.

There is a minor limitation of this research, which is the goodness of fit. The measure of absolute and comparative fit, root mean square error of approximation is below 0.8 in Slovenian model, slightly higher in Romanian one (0.082) and between 0.08 and 0.1 in the other two models. According to MacCallum, Browne and Sugawara (1996) the value of RMSEA below 0.08 is still a reasonable fit. MacCallum et al. (ibid) also consider the value of 0.01 as a cut-off point for poor fit. However, there are also some stricter limits (Hu &Bentler 1999). The reason behind slightly higher RMSEA in our models is most likely in the lack of parsimony. This is a price to be paid for testing more complex models with several control variables.

Another way to go in the future is to study the difference between corruption perception of an individual (with varying values within a single country) and the corruption perception as a contextual variable (that is of the same value for all individuals within a single country). Thirdly, when it comes to the reverse causation between the corruption perception and trust, we believe that more interdisciplinary research possibly including psychology could shed more light on the issue. Involving some processes regarding the formation of trust towards institutions and formation of opinions on corruption might reveal more causal mechanisms in the problem that remains the notorious vicious circle for political scientists and sociologists for now.

Appendix1: Regression coefficients for selected models

Dependent Variable	Predictor	Slovenia	Slovakia	Estonia	Romania
Trust	Corruption experience	0.113	0.327	0.647	-0.25
	Corruption perception	-0.17	0.055	-0.593	0.199*
	Job loss due to crisis	0.246	0.412*	0.298	0.310*
	Education (in years)	0.019*	-0.011	0.021	0.002
	Male	0.017	0.213	-0.274	-0.024
	Age (in years)	0	0.010*	0.003	0.009*
	Left-Right self-placement	0.034	-0.050	0.195	0.042
	Social level self-placement	0.028	0.004	-0.297	0.052
	Feeling informed	0	0	0	0
	Pessimism	0.241*	0.313*	0.545	0.216
Perception	Corruption experience	1.345	0.562*	0.472	0.967*
	Trust	3.627*	1.036*	1.090*	2.213*
	Job loss due to crisis	-0.446	0.100	0.281	-0.639
	Education (in years)	-0.007	0.022	0.001	0.004
	Male	0.960*	-0.247	0.078	0.414
	Age (in years)	-0.016	-0.016*	-0.023*	-0.009
	Left-Right self-placement	-0.196	0.073	0.056	-0.06
	Social level self-placement	-0.317	-0.040	-0.255*	-0.125
	Feeling informed	2.048*	0.804*	0.36	0.815*
	Pessimism	0	0	0	0
Sample size		***925***	***870***	***779***	***805***
Model Fit	RMSEA	***0.078***	***0.086***	***0.090***	***0.082***
	CFI	***0.506***	***0.707***	***0.719***	***0.826***

*Note: * - significant at 0.1 level; Sampling weight was used*
Source: Eurobarometer 76.1, author's calculation

Appendix 2: Table of Direct, Indirect and Total Effects in Slovenia, Slovakia, Estonia and Romania

Dependent Variable	Predictor	Slovenia Direct Effect	Indirect Effect	Total Effect	Slovakia Direct Effect	Indirect Effect	Total Effect	Estonia Direct Effect	Indirect Effect	Total Effect	Romania Direct Effect	Indirect Effect	Total Effect
AC Trust	Corruption experience	0,113	-0,184	-0,071	0,327	0,053	0,38	0,647	-0,424	0,223	-0,25	0,147	-0,104
	Corruption perception	-0,17	0,065	-0,105	0,055	0,003	0,059	-0,593	0,233	-0,36	0,199	0,156	0,355
	Job loss due to crisis	0,246	-0,047	0,199	0,412	0,031	0,443	0,298	-0,218	0,08	0,31	0,016	0,326
	Education (in years)	0,019	-0,006	0,012	-0,011	0,001	-0,01	0,021	-0,009	0,012	0,002	0,004	0,006
	Male	0,017	-0,107	-0,09	0,213	-0,002	0,211	-0,274	0,079	-0,195	-0,024	0,128	0,105
	Age (in years)	0	0,002	0,002	0,01	0	0,01	0,003	0,007	0,01	0,009	0,004	0,013
	Left-Right self-placement	0,034	0,008	0,041	-0,05	0,001	-0,049	0,195	-0,097	0,098	0,042	0,012	0,054
	Social level self-placement	0,028	0,023	0,051	0,004	-0,002	0,002	-0,297	0,208	-0,088	0,052	-0,004	0,048
	Feeling informed	0	-0,215	-0,215	0	0,047	0,047	0	-0,13	-0,13	0	0,29	0,29
	Pessimism	0,241	-0,092	0,149	0,313	0,019	0,332	0,545	-0,214	0,331	0,216	0,169	0,385
Perception	Corruption experience	1,345	-0,258	1,086	0,562	0,394	0,956	0,472	0,243	0,715	0,967	-0,229	0,738
	AC Trust	3,627	-1,382	2,245	1,036	0,063	1,099	1,09	-0,428	0,662	2,213	1,739	3,952
	Job loss due to crisis	-0,446	0,721	0,275	0,1	0,459	0,559	0,281	0,087	0,368	-0,639	0,721	0,083
	Education (in years)	-0,007	0,045	0,038	0,022	-0,01	0,012	0,001	0,013	0,015	0,004	0,013	0,018
	Male	0,96	-0,328	0,632	-0,247	0,219	-0,029	0,078	-0,212	-0,134	0,414	0,231	0,645
	Age (in years)	-0,016	0,007	-0,009	-0,016	0,01	-0,005	-0,023	0,011	-0,012	-0,009	0,028	0,02
	Left-Right self-placement	-0,196	0,15	-0,046	0,073	-0,05	0,022	0,056	0,107	0,163	-0,06	0,12	0,06
	Social level self-placement	-0,317	0,183	-0,133	-0,04	0,002	-0,038	-0,255	-0,096	-0,351	-0,125	0,107	-0,018
	Feeling informed	2,048	-0,78	1,268	0,804	0,049	0,853	0,36	-0,141	0,218	0,815	0,641	1,455
	Pessimism	0	0,54	0,54	0	0,344	0,344	0	0,361	0,361	0	0,852	0,852

Source: Eurobarometer 76.1, author's calculation

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Factors Affecting Green Party Development: Explaining the Decline of Green Parties in Slovenia

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ABSTRACT

This article tests the thesis that the internal agential characteristics of the Green party segment in a relatively open and dynamic party system are a crucial factor in the long–term success or failure of Green parties in that system. The case study of Slovenia offers a natural laboratory to test this thesis, because its political system is characterised by institutions and a party system that are favourable to the establishment of new parties and by a persistently relatively high environmental consciousness among voters. In such a context, internal party developments obtain critical importance for explaining the decline of the Green party segment in Slovenia.

KEY WORDS: *Green parties, Slovenia, party system, party competition, environmental consciousness*

Intorduction

Green parties face a number of challenges to achieving parliamentary success. Achieving long term success is particularly difficult. The Irish and Czech Greens, for example, managed to gain parliamentary seats, but forfeited their legitimacy in an unwise government coalition with the right (Jepps, 2010). In Romania, the Green parties achieved early success by taking advantage of a ballot structure which confused voters, thereby securing parliamentary seats without securing legitimacy (Pavlínek and Pickles, 2000: 190-191). By contrast, the Greens in the Netherlands have been a stable faction in the Dutch parliament despite the party system being predominantly determined by the Dutch consociational political system. In the UK, the Green Party only recently entered the House of Commons – although it gained

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over a million votes across the country it won only one parliamentary seat (Crossley 2015). Furthermore, while it has been argued that Green party support correlates with the shift from a modern industrial society to a post-modern, post-industrial society (Bürklin, 1985), this argument is not as applicable to post-socialist East European countries as to West European countries. While both structural and agential factors have been revealed to be critical for new parties seeking to enter parliament (Bolleyer, 2013), there has been little research into the factors affecting the maintenance of parliamentary seats by new political parties in general (Fink-Hafner and Krašovec, 2013) or by Green parties in particular.

So, what factors determine Green party electoral success? Researchers have so far focused only on a limited range of factors which could be generally described as *external* and *internal*. It has often been said that electoral rules and party systems (so-called 'external factors') are the primary explanation for the success (or lack thereof) of Green parties, as for example in the case of the UK.

By contrast, the case of Romania suggests a possible manipulation of electoral rules in favour of gaining non-legitimate parliamentary success, whereas the Greens in the Netherlands have succeeded in spite of the country's unfavourable external institutional characteristics. With the exception of a few brief observations (as in the cases of the Irish, Czech and Romanian Greens), this set of factors has not been systematically analysed. Nevertheless, Green parties have been observed to be organisationally fragmented since the early period of Green party development (e.g. Rüdig, 1985; Kitschelt, 1989; O'Neil, 2012). Indeed, the role of agency may appear to be critical.

Intra-party conflicts in European Green parties have led to party splits, particularly during their early stages of their development (O'Neil, 2012: 174-175). Furthermore, conflicts among Green parties within a particular milieu (for instance, in the Netherlands during the 1990s) have led to inter-Green party competition which has resulted in a poor parliamentary representation for the Greens (Lucardie, and Vorman, 2008). In spite of this, Green parties have been able to join forces to obtain positions in government, as happened in Belgium in 1999 (Buelens, and Deschouwer, 2002). Since there are clearly various Green party behavioural patterns, it is important to take into account the potential significance of political agency of Green parties (Blühdorn and Szarka 2004).

Likewise, the window of opportunity for Green party electoral success arising from the recent economic crisis has only been analysed in a few Western countries (Hernández and Kriesi, 2015). Our analysis aims to offer an insight into the possible strategic uses of the crisis circumstances (such as the decline in the legitimacy of 'ideological' parties in power) which could enable Green parties in a post-socialist context to succeed at the ballot box.

In short, this article tests the often overlooked thesis that the characteristics of the agency within the Green party segment in a given national party system may be a crucial factor in the long–term success or failure of Green parties within that system. Furthermore, we believe this to be a timely contribution, since most Green parties in Europe appear unable to capitalise on the crisis of legitimacy currently facing mainstream parties both nationally and in the European Parliament; they have failed to occupy the gaps in political representation that have opened up.

Our particular focus is on the post-socialist context in which the question remains: to what extent does the post-socialist context affect the development of Green parties? Our thesis is that there is no single answer to this question. Firstly, post-socialist party systems since the 1989 wave of transitions to democracy have been evolving dynamically: some have undergone gradual consolidation; in some cases the party system has been frozen; and in some cases it has been destabilised (Enyedi and Casal Bértoa 2011). Secondly, post-socialist countries have to varying degrees experienced constitutional and electoral engineering (Fink-Hafner and Hafner-Fink. 2009). Both aspects considerably co-determine the opportunities for Green parties to enter post-socialist parliamentary arenas. Furthermore, there is considerable variance in dominant values among post-socialist countries (Listhaug and Ringdal, 2006).

Although in some respects Europeanisation is a factor of domestic developments, we will exclude it as a relevant factor impacting on the national party system. This is because researchers have observed little evidence of Europeanisation having impacted either on national political party politics in general (Mair, 2000; Ladrech, 2002; Lewis and Mansfeldova, eds, 2006; Aylott, et al, eds, 2007) or on Slovenian politics in particular (Krašovec and Lajh, 2008).

Slovenia makes a good case study for analysing the significance of Green parties' political agency for several reasons: Slovenian electoral rules are relatively non-stringent; it has an open party system; while Slovenian society is characterised

by a considerable level of post-modern values and post-modern / post-national citizenship compared to other post-socialist countries (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005: 60-63; Hafner-Fink, Malnar and Uhan, 2013). This can evidenced by the emergence of a significant post-modern Green consciousness among Slovenian voters as early as the 1980s (Slovensko javno mnenje 1987: 37-39; Malnar and Šinko 2012).

More illustrative arguments in favour of a Slovenian case study are presented in the following section on the research question and the analytical framework. This will be followed by a brief overview of the factors identified in the literature as affecting Green party developments. Following the case study of the Slovenian Green party segment we will conclude by summarising our findings.

Research question and analytical framework

Our thesis is that external factors (such as electoral rules, the characteristics of competition within a party system, the value orientation of the electorate) are important. However, external factors are neither the only factors nor the decisive factors that determine whether Green parties both enter parliament and endure the long term. The global economic crises which hit Slovenia at the beginning of 1990s and around 2011 cannot in themselves explain the persistently poor electoral results of either the existing Green parties or of the newly emerging Green parties. However, as the early 1990s confirmed, an economic crisis may provide a window of opportunity for old and new parties if their leadership is entrepreneurial enough take advantage of the circumstances. Indeed, not only have new parties with new leaders been able to enter the parliament in the recent circumstances, but they have even assumed control of the government (Slovenia being a case in point with two consecutive pre-term elections in the context of the most recent international crisis). For this reason, we argue that, where external factors make for a more accessible party system for new entrants, and where voters' (Green) values do not radically alter over time, it is the internal factor which best explain either the success or failure of Green parties in a particular national context.

Since Green parties first emerged in Western Europe in the context of the social and political changes peculiar to the 1970s and 1980s, researchers have been analysing the various factors (clusters of variables) that contributed to their emergence and development in this part of the world. As already mentioned, external factors have usually been understood in terms of the various characteristics

of the national political environment and, as a rule, the internal factors have included the organisational fragmentation of Green parties. Although our focus is on the post-socialist context, we will analyse the interplay of all three factors. Indeed, we will look at the dynamic between (1) the national political-environment factor and (2) the internal agency characteristics of Green party developments; and also take account of (3) the economic crisis as an intervening factor.

From a methodological point of view, Slovenia offers a valuable *case study* because its experiences provide an opportunity to study Green party politics in an institutional context that is relatively stable, inclusive and post-socialist, and which at the same time fosters an open party system. As such, it provides a 'natural laboratory' for studying the role of agency in the development of Green parties.

According to the 2008 post-national citizenship index data (composed of protest potential, universalism, international trust, institutional participation, supranational identity and self-direction), Slovenia appeared to be close to the average post-national citizenship index of 21 EU member states, together with Cyprus, Estonia, the United Kingdom and Spain (Hafner, Malnar and Uhan, 2013: 879). When the countries were clustered according to aggregate indicators of new (post-national) citizenship (i.e. institutional political participation, protest participation, universalistic values, self-direction values, supranational identity, and trust in international organisations) Slovenia fell within the same cluster as Portugal and Spain (Hafner, Malnar and Uhan, 2013: 880).

Slovenian attitudes had already begun to shift in this direction during the 1980s, at the time supporting the development of the new Green social movement. By the end of the 1980s, a greater number of adult citizens surveyed held that by year 2000, environmental damage would represent a greater threat to world security than an economic crisis (47 percent of respondents for the former compared to 44 percent of respondents for the latter) (Malnar 1993: 37). 67.1 percent of those surveyed were ready to participate in voluntary environmental cleaning initiatives, 54.5 percent would save household energy (petrol, electricity), 50.6 percent were ready to contribute to a cleaner environment by participating in or supporting political organisations with such policy goals, 33.6 percent were ready to pay green taxes to maintain a clean environment (Kos 1993: 46). While environmental consciousness in the 1980s was initially more prevalent among the more educated members of the population, it soon spread more widely and across all generations, due in part to the

inclusion of environmentalism in the state education system (Malnar and Šinko 2012: 489-490). While expressions of environmental concern in a narrower sense (opinions on particular environmental matters) have become less vociferous since 2011, this decline in public discourse should not be seen as an indication of a decline in environmental values (Anderson 1997; Malnar and Šinko 2012: 488). Indeed, the massive scope of mobilisation of citizens to solve environmental problems is ongoing proof that environmental values remain important to most citizens. For instance, the Let's Clean Slovenia/ *Očistimo Slovenijo* initiative, organised since 2010, draws volunteers from all parts of the country (Geopedia 2013). In 2012, around 270,000 volunteers - more than 13% of the Slovenian population – participated in the initiative (Statistical Office of Slovenia 22 March 2012; *Društvo Ekologi brez meja***,** 2012).

At Slovenia's first multi-party elections in April 1990, The Greens of Slovenia achieved a major electoral success compared to other Central European post-communist countries, winning 8.8 percent of votes and 8 out of 80 parliamentary seats. In spite of the inclusiveness of the national political environment, none of the Green parties have gained any parliamentary seats since 1992. Not even in the 2011 pre-term elections which took place in the context of the crisis-related new window of opportunity. Only in the most recent pre-term elections in 2014 did one small Green party enter the parliament – albeit as part of the United Left coalition *Združena levica* (see details in **Appendix 1**). Such developments can be explained by the internal characteristics of the Green party segment in Slovenia.

Our empirical analysis of the case of Slovenia is based on the following methods: a review of research into party politics in Slovenia and original Green party documents, some of which are accessible on the internet, and some of which are held in private archives; a secondary analysis of data from the Slovenian Public Opinion Survey; interviews with prominent Green politicians in Slovenia published in the Slovenian media (*Mladina, Dnevnik, Delo*); and a series of interviews conducted in 2013 and 2014 with representatives of Slovenia's Green parties.

Theortical framework: factors affecting Green Party developments

The Political Environment

The political environment is often defined as the institutional factors and characteristics of party competition (Kriesi, 1995; Rootes, 1995; Faucher 1999;

Lucardie 2000; Hino, 2006; Carter, 2007 and 2008). The electoral rules determining the openness of the party system for new parties are considered to be critical factors (Pennisi, 1998; Faucher 1999; Tavits, 2006; Carter, 2007; Selb and Pituctin, 2010). The characteristics of party system competition have been identified as a factor which co-determines both the degree of openness for new parties and the viability of new parties (Kitschelt, 1988; Kaelberer, 1993; Rootes, 1995; Lago and Martinez, 2011). To some extent, culture and values have been identified as an extension of the political environment in as far as they influence party politics in the voter-party linkage (Faucher 1999).

The Green party phenomenon has usually been explained by changes in the social structure and the predominant values, characterised as a shift from a modern condition to a post-modern condition (Inglehart, 1971; Dalton 1993). The key factors affecting Green party developments in Europe have been held to include the presence of post-modern environmental values, institutional structures and the nature of party competition (Rootes, 1995). Müller-Rommel (1998:192) has observed that Green parties also represent a form of protest vote against the established political institutions. Furthermore, in those countries with socialist systems, Green movements and embryonic Green parties (along with other oppositional movements and parties) first had to fight to establish the necessary democratic preconditions before being able to pursue their Green political and policy agendas (Fink-Hafner, 1992).

The national political environment has often been recognised as a relevant factor in the development of Green parties (e.g. Burchell, 2002; Carter, 2007; Richardson, 1995, 2005). In the post-socialist context, authors have focused on the role of the political environment to such an extent that they have even under-researched other factors (Fagan, 2004; Carmin and Fagan, 2010; Císař, 2010). In this article, we will consider the relevance of the national political environment for the value dimensions of both institutions and citizens.

The Internal Agential Characteristics of Green Party Developments

Green party agency has only been partially addressed in the literature. When it has been addressed, it has been mostly dealt with in one of two ways. *Firstly*, within the framework of Green political thought. Here, agency has been primarily perceived as a collective political actor in the form of a Green movement, with the

Green party in question as an internally complex organism composed of various social groups following the grassroots democracy values of a 'movement party' (Goodin, 1992; Talshir, 2002: 3-16). Indeed, the personalisation of politics in terms of charismatic leaders has been regarded as being incompatible with such values (Carter 2007:117). Rather, there have either been several political persons sharing the leading political roles or there has even been a large collective leadership of this kind of political agency (Carter 2007:121). Agency in terms of leadership has remained an under-estimated element in the Green party literature in spite of the importance of political leadership recognised in the general literature on party organisation in general (see e.g. Panebianco, 1988). Some authors of the 'Green party literature' segment have glossed over the question of political leadership as a 'relatively self-explanatory category' (Burchel 2002: 48). *Secondly*, analyses of particular Green party adaptations in order to gain a certain share of the vote in order to enter the parliamentary party system and the related strategic challenges have tended to take priority over analyses of Green party political leadership. Indeed, research reveals that factionalism among Green parties is not uncommon and represents a major problem for agency (Rüdig, 1985; Kitschelt, 1989; Kaelberer, 1993 and 1998; Rootes, 1995; Karamichas and Botetzagia, 2003), particularly in the early stages of a party's development (O'Neil, 2012). Examples in the media demonstrate how a Green party's success is often linked to the strengths of its leadership, as has recently been the case in the UK (Martin, 2015), just as a leader's eccentric behaviour may explain a party's failure - for example, the former Green leader in the UK who claimed to be the Messiah (Hattenstone, 2015).

Empirical cases have also shown that conflict is as common as collaboration among Green parties (Buelens, and Deschouwer, 2002; Lucardie, and Vorman, 2008). So far, Green parties have faced a dilemma between the 'fundamental ideological' and the 'pragmatic'. Here, the role of a competent political leadership becomes critical in steering a path between the 'fundamentalists' and the 'pragmatists'; a failure by the leadership to do so has led to the demise of Green parties (Karamichas and Botetzagias, 2003: 65). Furthermore, political leadership – especially when alienated from its members and supporters - may make strategic decisions (e.g. marriages of convenience in coalition-building) that cost the party its political survival (Jepps, 2010). Although collaboration has often contributed to Green party successes, the merits of this strategy should be questioned, not simply

due to the broader ideological and political differences, but also the personal animosities among the leaders of the different Green parties (see Nadenichek Golder, 2006:79, Lukaš and Outlý, 2008:80).

Despite the fact that it may be a critical factor in explaining the Green phenomenon, there has been little research into the factionalism among Green parties (Karamichas and Botetzagia, 2003:67). Nevertheless, researchers have identified internal distinctions between conservative ('purist') Green parties and New Left ('rainbow') Green parties, as well as distinctions in the degree of inclusiveness between Green parties, and distinctions between 'ideologists' and 'pragmatists' (Rüdig, 1985; Kitschelt, 1989; Kaelberer, 1993 and 1998; Rootes, 1995). The strategic decisions of various Green parties - whether beneficial or damaging - have usually been presented as party decisions and not as a question of leadership, as was the case in the collaboration among Green parties from Western and Eastern Germany following reunification (Burchell, 2002:54). The recent economic crisis, however, has demonstrated the importance of strategic leadership decisions for both the long-term survival of Green parties as well as the chance for Green parties to offer voters a viable non-corrupt and responsive political alternative.

The Economic Crisis

The economic crisis has presented a number of challenges. It may have had at least two potential impacts on Green party developments. On one hand, it may have impacted on the ranking of citizens' values in favour of materialist values (rather than post-materialist values). The crisis may also have affected the ranking of voters' preferences and public policies in a negative direction when it comes to the greening of politics. On the other hand, the nature of the political management of the economic crisis in some countries may have affected the legitimacy of those more mainstream parties in power and may have opened a window for opposition parties and new parties to enter the system. In any case, the global economic crisis has created a critical multidimensional situation that calls for strategic political reaction.

While Green parties emerging in the economically and politically destabilised socialist context of the 1980s joined the newly emerging opposition parties against the regime (Ramet, 1995), the post-socialist environment is no longer so different from modern political systems. Consequently, the reactions of Green parties in post-

socialist political systems to the recent international financial and economic crisis are comparable to the reactions of Green parties in Western political systems.

In the recent international financial and economic crisis, Green issues and their post-materialistic foundations appear to have been relatively 'crisis-proof' and Green parties do not appear to have suffered any systematic disadvantage in elections in Europe (Bukow and Switek, 2013). Moreover, the latest research **(**Hernández and Kriesi, 2015) reveals that the recent recession has in fact enhanced opportunities for dynamic changes to party systems. The mainstream parties have been losing to the radical populist right, the radical left, and to non-mainstream parties (chiefly among them have been Green parties). The crisis has in fact served to accelerate the existing long-term trends in the restructuring of Western European party systems (Hernández and Kriesi, 2015: 26). In the idiosyncratic post-socialist contexts, however, in which the incumbents have been punished less for economic hardship than for increased corruption (Hernández and Kriesi, 2015: 25), the predictability of the incumbent vote has increased while the volatility of CEE party systems remains considerably higher than in Western Europe (Hernández and Kriesi, 2015: 26). Although a strategic combination of environmental and socio-economic issues could arguably mobilise a significant share of the vote in such circumstances, the responses of Green party leaders in a post-socialist context (as well as in Western countries) can only be revealed based on an empirical analysis.

The development of Green parties in Slovenia

Although Slovenia has a century's old tradition of nature conservation activism within civil society, acquiring the modern environmental movement in the 1960s (including the creation of the national environmental umbrella organisation, the League for the Protection of the Environment in Slovenia / *Zveza za varstvo okolja v Sloveniji,* established in 1971), it was the post-modern environmental movement (a type of new social movement of the 1980s) which in fact became one of the sources of oppositional political parties to emerge at the end of the 1980s (Fink-Hafner 1992, Knep and Fink-Hafner 2011). The post-modern environmental movement began as a loosely organised but publicly-visible protest-movement against industrial development in the first half of the 1980s. Its most notable campaigns included the shutting down of the Krško nuclear power plant and the Žirovnica uranium mine, campaigning for the installation of cleaning devices in several of Slovenia's coal-

burning power stations, and cutting the price of lead-free petrol. For a while it found its political place beneath the umbrella of the increasingly oppositional League of Socialist Youth (*Zveza socialistične mladine*). As in other parts of Europe, The Greens of Slovenia / *Zeleni Slovenije* had their roots in new social movements (Feinstein 1992, Bomberg 1998, 2005, Burchell 2002, Müller-Rommel 2002, Jehlička *et al.* 2011). At the end of the 1980s, they joined an emerging bloc of oppositional political leagues demanding democratisation (Šešerko 1990 and 1992, Fink Hafner 1992, Klemenc 2011).

The Greens of Slovenia / *Zeleni Slovenije* not only achieved a remarkable success in the watershed elections of April 1990, but also entered the anti-communist governing coalition, *Demos*, led by Lojze Peterle (Slovenian Christian Democrats / *Slovenski krščanski demokrati*) before internal organisational consolidation. The then vice president of the Greens, Vane Gošnik, was even elected Vice President of the Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia. At the elections for the Presidency of the Republic of Slovenia on 8 April 1990, the prominent green activist, Dušan Plut, became a member of the collective Presidency. While the Greens gained important positions in the government, including ministerial positions in the fields of environmental protection and health and energy, which enabled them to influence crucial policy decisions, they also had to address some crucial macro political issues of the time. These included: the establishment of a new economic and political order; the creation of an independent Slovenian state; and repositioning the country for European integration. The Greens of Slovenia succeeded in re-entering parliament in the 1992 elections, which were held on the basis of the new constitution adopted in December 1991. However, since the 1996 general elections, no Green party has managed to enter the National Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia at the 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2011 elections, nor the European Parliament (EP) in the three European elections in 2004, 2009 and 2014 (**Appendix 1**). These series of electoral failures have been accompanied by the emergence of new Green parties, the formation of Green coalitions prior to elections, as well as attempts by Green parties to form new alliances both with established as well as non-parliamentary political parties.

At the 1996 general elections, a faction of The Greens of Slovenia, which had established a new party – Green Alternative/ *Zelena alternativa* – competed separately. Due to the electoral defeat of 1996, the factions of The Greens of

Slovenia formed a coalition (The Greens of Slovenia and Green Alternative) prior to the 2000 general elections, in which they competed (unsuccessfully) as The United Greens/ *Združeni zeleni*. At the 2004 general elections (under the influence of EP elections and representatives from the European Federation of Green Parties/ European Green Party), three Green parties negotiated a united Green list for the EP elections. The three parties were: The Greens of Slovenia, the Youth Party of Slovenia/ *Stranka mladih Slovenije* and the Party of Ecological Movements/ *Stranka ekoloških gibanj*. However, their inability to agree on a list of candidates led the Party of Ecological Movements to abandon further negotiations (Lipič 2013). Ultimately, all three parties competed independently and failed to gain a single parliamentary seat.

Following their extended period of defeat, the Green parties began to seek new alliances with the more established political parties and to form new Green alliances. At the 2008 parliamentary elections, The Greens of Slovenia competed independently, but two of its factions which had previously created two locally active Green parties, namely Green Progress/ *Zeleni progres* and The Green Party/ *Zelena stranka*, formed an alliance named The Green Coalition/ *Zelena koalicija* (Ogrin 2013). Additionally, the Youth Party of Slovenia allied with the centre-right Slovenian People's Party/ *Slovenska ljudska stranka*, while the Party of Ecological Movements allied with the centre-left Social Democrats/ *Socialni demokrati*. Although the two joint lists in which a Green party allied with an established party both won enough votes to enter the National Assembly, none of the Green candidates gained a single parliamentary seat. Prior to the 2009 European Parliament elections, the Greens formed a new Green alliance, again named The United Greens. It was formed from The Greens of Slovenia, Green Progress, The Green Party and the Party for Clean Potable Water. This new Green alliance was also unsuccessful. Prior to the 2009 European elections, the Youth Party added a Green label to the party's name and competed independently but nevertheless failed to elect an MEP. Prior to the 2011 pre-term general elections, the Youth Party allied itself with several small non-parliamentary political parties, including some of the smaller Green parties. They also negotiated to include The Greens of Slovenia, but the negotiations failed and The Greens of Slovenia decided to compete independently. Additionally, during the period of destabilisation of the Slovenian party system in 2011, notable activists, including former members of The Greens of Slovenia and the Liberal Democracy of Slovenia/ *Liberalna demokracija Slovenije,* established a new Green party – the

Party for Sustainable Development of Slovenia. Although this new party gained considerable public attention and achieved the highest electoral result of any Green party, it once again failed to gain enough votes to enter parliament. At the 2014 pre-term elections, the coalition between the Party for Sustainable Development of Slovenia and the parties of the new left together gained 5.97 percent of votes and six seats. In spite of this, there remains no visible change in Green parliamentary representation.

Explaining the development of Green parties in Slovenia

The Political Environment

Institutional rules. Slovenia's new constitution, adopted in December 1991, establishes Slovenia as a parliamentary democracy. A proportional electoral system has been in place since 1989 with only minor changes (Fink-Hafner 2010). Both the parliamentary political system and the proportional electoral system are recognised in political science literature as favourable to both political parties representing particular interests as well as to new political parties attempting to enter parliament. In fact, even after the introduction of a four percent threshold in 2004, new parties have not only been able to enter parliament, but have even joined coalition governments as the dominant party from which the Prime Minister has been chosen (Fink-Hafner and Krašovec, 2013).

Party system characteristics. The polarisation of the party system in Slovenia has been more moderate than in many other post-communist countries that joined the third democratisation wave (Enyedi and Casal Bértoa 2011). The major left-right political division in Slovenia runs along historical conservative-liberal lines (Kos 1996), but also overlaps with the strong communist-anti-communist divide, which is closely related to the opposing assessments of both the Second World War and the post-war domestic politics; furthermore, this division also increasingly encompasses the pro-welfare versus the minimal state debate (Fink-Hafner 2010, 2012). While this divisive fault line has challenged Green parties, the greening of the manifestos of non-Green parties has proved to have been a case of paying lip-service and has not particularly threatened the Green parties' support base. Indeed, as shown by Zajc, Kropivnik, Kustec Lipicer (2012: 90-91), government coalition agreements have only included environmental policies as a dedicated segment when there have been

Green representatives in the government. Even then, environmental policy has usually been packed together with spatial and planning issues, housing and water policy. Since 2004, it has gained a consistent representation in recent coalition agreements within the environment and spatial sector.

Party financing. The establishment of a cartel of parliamentary parties has deprived extra-parliamentary parties of considerable state financing, despite the intervention of the Constitutional Court (Krašovec and Haughton 2011). Green parties have been affected by this systemic exclusion of non-parliamentary parties from state financing; meanwhile numerous Green groups active at the sub-national level have been unable to count on the substantial resources from the highly fragmented and financially weak local communities. Additionally, the financing of Green parties in Slovenia has become problematic due to the internal divisions among The Greens of Slovenia. When Green MPs collectively joined the Liberal Democracy of Slovenia (constituting the LDS's Ecological Forum) in March 1994 mid-term, they continued to enjoy all the financial benefits available to them due to their occupation of Green parliamentary seats until the end of the term in December 1996. This episode both split the Greens of Slovenia and has poisoned relations between Green parties ever since.

Electorate. Initially, it was believed that The Greens of Slovenia were a new post-modern centre-left Green party attracting the support of those who had both turned their backs on the reformed political organisations of the old regime and who had shunned the new centre-right parties. Public opinion surveys clearly indicate that in the second half of the 1980s and the early 1990s there was an increase in general environmental concern among the general public. This can be traced to both the promotion of environmental awareness due to the mass media's coverage of a series of environmental catastrophes in Slovenia as well as to the Chernobyl disaster (Fink-Hafner 1992; Knep and Fink-Hafner 2011, Malnar and Šinko 2012). The Greens of Slovenia capitalised on the greening of Slovene political values in this period (Fink-Hafner 1992) and were able to attract voters from across Slovenia (Kropivnik 1993). Although concern for the environment had previously been higher among the more educated public and the youth segment, these differences among citizens over 18 years have decreased considerably during the last decade (Malnar and Šinko 2012). While perceptions of environmental risk have gradually decreased since 1990, attitudes towards the issue of environmental protection have remained relatively

positive (Malnar 1992, Malnar and Šinko 2012). In Slovenia, although environmental values still appear to be regarded as being less important than economic values (Hafner-Fink *et al.*, 2011) environmental values persist (Malnar 2002). In spite of this, Green parties have been unable to mobilise voters effectively since the early 1990s, and thus failed to make any impact on public opinion polls until 2011 (Toš *et al.* 1990, 1992, 1996, 2000).

Internal Agential Factors

The organisational development of Green parties in Slovenia

The Greens of Slovenia were established in 1989, taking as their model the German Greens (*Die Grünen*). Similar to many other oppositional parties at the time, the party soon faced internal left-right divisions. Problems also arose from the fact that the party had entered government before it had consolidated its organisation. In fact, after 1993, The Greens of Slovenia split into several Green parties while some leading Green political figures exited politics altogether in protest at the environmental conduct of the governing coalition. The Green MPs soon left the Greens of Slovenia and joined The Greens - Eco-social Party/ [*Zeleni – eko-socialna stranka*], which in March 1994 merged with the Liberal Democracy of Slovenia. Furthermore, together with some of the former members of The Greens of Slovenia, Leopold Šešerko (who had held the post of Minister for Environmental Protection and Regional Development before exiting the governing coalition), established a new Green party: The Green Alternative of Slovenia.

Since 2003, when Vlado Čuš became the president, The Greens of Slovenia have split further. Part of its membership joined the small non-parliamentary Progressive Party/ *Progresivna stranka* to form Green Progress/ *Zeleni progres.* Meanwhile, some local Greens organisations formed the independent Green Party/ *Zelena stranka* (Ogrin 2013).

Environmentalists who had allied with the successor to the transformed League of Communists (the current Social Democrats) competed separately and unsuccessfully at the 1990 elections as the Citizens' Green List. Karel Lipič, a former representative of several trade unions, was able to attract considerable membership and subsequently led the organisation's re-orientation toward a non-governmental environmental umbrella organisation which later served as the basis for the Party of Ecological Movements of Slovenia.

In 2002, some former members of The Greens of Slovenia joined the Party of Ecological Movements of Slovenia. Among them was Leopold Šešerko (previously the president of the Green Alternative of Slovenia) and Božidar Voljč (initially serving as a member of Liberal Democracy of Slovenia as Green Minister for Health until 1997). After failing to establish a coalition among Green parties prior to the 2004 EP and general elections, the Party of Ecological Movements of Slovenia again turned to the Social Democrats. At the 2008 general elections, two candidates from the Party of Ecological Movements of Slovenia (one of which was its president, Marinka Vovk) participated as a candidate on the Social Democrats' list. The Social Democrats also established an ecological-rural forum which managed to attract some members of the Party of Ecological Movements of Slovenia. The Party of Ecological Movements of Slovenia is now considered defunct as a result of its total merger with the Social Democrats (Lipič, 2013).

After losing its parliamentary position in 2004, the Youth Party of Slovenia announced its turn towards Green politics by joining the European Greens just prior to the 2004 EP elections. However, this failed to convince voters. Dušan Plut, one of the early leading Green activists, and Matjaž Hanžek, the former human-rights ombudsman, both contributed to the emergence of the Movement for Sustainable Development of Slovenia/ *Gibanje za tranjnostni razvoj Slovenije* in 2011 and its political wing, the Party for Sustainable Development of Slovenia/ *Stranka za trajnostni razvoj Slovenije (*TRS*)*. Some of the members of Liberal Democracy of Slovenia and the new party Zares–New Politics (established in 2007) joined the Party for Sustainable Development of Slovenia in 2011. However, TRS proved to be another disappointment. The party both lacked a charismatic leader and demonstrated breathtaking organisational incompetence by failing to comply fully with the administrative rules when returning its candidate list for the 2011 pre-term elections. As a result, it forfeited its chance to compete at the elections in all desired electoral wards and thus remained a non-parliamentary party. At the 2014 pre-term elections, TRS joined the United Left coalition led by Luka Mesec - ideologically close to Syriza - and once more fell into obscurity.

Ideological divisions and internal disputes among the Greens

The Greens of Slovenia were internally divided more or less evenly along the liberal-conservative ideological lines and were therefore unable to decide whether to

join the *Demos* party bloc at the first multi-party elections, and later hesitated again in joining the *Demos* government (Plut 2009). However, while voters positioned The Greens of Slovenia near the centre of the left-right ideological continuum in the period from 1991 to 1993 (Kropivnik 1994), the internal party disputes along left-right lines proved damaging for the party's sustainability. This fact, together with the public personal animosities, damaged the party's reputation leading to its split in March 1993. The centre-left (liberal) wing of the party, which included party leader Dušan Plut, created a new party: The Greens-Eco-social Party. The conservative (centre-right) faction under the leadership of Vane Gošnik remained within The Greens of Slovenia (since 2003, the party has been led by Vlado Čuš) (Trampuš 2000). The centre-left (liberal) wing of The Greens of Slovenia was represented within the ecological forum of the Liberal Democracy of Slovenia until its decline at the turn of the millennium.

The Party of Ecological Movements of Slovenia has offered voters a red-green option by having officially cooperated with the Social Democrats since 2008. Although the Youth Party of Slovenia had originally positioned itself on the centre-left, supporting the creation of a centre-left government following the 2000 elections, it has also been a pragmatic player, later entering pre-electoral party alliances with centre-right parties.

The recently established Party for Sustainable Development of Slovenia with its emphasis on social policy matters has positioned itself closer to the red-green than to the liberal-green option (Hanžek 2011, Košir 2011, Lipič 2013, Majhenič and Valič 2013, Ogrin 2013).

Bad political decisions and failures of leadership

On the basis of interviews with Green political leaders published in the mass media between 1989 and 2014 and interviews conducted in the period 2013-2014 we can identify a number of decision-making failures by Green political leaders as well as some leadership failures that have significantly contributed to the long–term decline of the Green party segment in Slovenia. The following six are among the most critical failures. *Firstly,* the decision by the Greens of Slovenia to join the Demos coalition proved to be a mistake. Not only was the broader leadership indecisive (the votes were 28 against 28), but the final decision came down to the deciding vote by the party leader, Dušan Plut. Plut's decision to lead the Greens of

Slovenia into the Demos centre-right government was based on an agreement with the government to close down the Krško nuclear plant. Failure by the Demos government to fulfil its promise not only resulted in disillusionment among the supporters of the Greens of Slovenia but also led to the splintering of the Green party segment. Plut has publicly accepted this as his personal failure – '*osebni poraz*' (Plut 2009). *Secondly*, various segments of the newly emerging Green parties (including the centre-left wing of the Greens of Slovenia together with all Green MPs) have tried to integrate closely with other (mostly centre-left) parties – Liberal Democracy of Slovenia and the successor of the reformed League of Communists. Decisions to collaborate or even integrate with such 'ideological' parties have proved to be primarily beneficial either to the non-Green parties or to the Green politicians who used the collaborations to further their political career rather than promote a Green party agenda. *Thirdly*, the increasingly fragmented Green leadership has been unable either to resolve the conflict over the alleged misuse of the parliamentary party funding following the initial split of the Greens of Slovenia or to take the allegation of corruption up with the appropriate institutions. Attempts at mediation by the European Green Federation failed as dialogue between Green party members broke down in acrimony. *Fourthly*, several locally self-made politicians have exploited local Green political organisations to shore up their own personal careers at the local level without contributing to the construction of a nationally strong Green party. *Fifthly*, even when the left-oriented Green party, TRS, was established and gained a surprisingly high level of public support just prior to the 2011 pre-term elections, the party leadership failed to file all candidate lists in accordance with official rules and thus forfeited their opportunity to win enough votes to enter parliament. *Sixthly*, in spite of the perceived mismanagement of the global economic crisis in Slovenia, which has led voters to shift their support to new centre-left parties, no Green party leadership has managed to take advantage of these circumstances to integrate the Greens with these new left anti-establishment sympathies. Rather, TRS joined the newly emerged leftist political groupings under the young leader of the new left in Slovenia.

The Impact of the economic crisis

The recent international financial and economic crisis, together with budget mismanagement and the numerous political scandals, have radically shaken up the

party system in Slovenia. New parties have not only gained a considerable share of seats in the parliament but have also succeeded in forming coalition governments with their leader as prime minister. By emphasising the economic and social agenda over the environmental agenda (Beltran, ed. 2012, Majhenič and Valič 2013), the newly established Party for Sustainable Development of Slovenia/*Stranka za trajnostni razvoj Slovenije* managed to appeal to the public mood more successfully than any of the newly-established political parties in the run up to the 2011 pre-term elections (Kurdija *et al.* 2011). Nevertheless, as mentioned, poor administrative management caused them to fail to capitalise on this support.

By contrast, the citizens' initiative (Ecologists without Borders/ *Ekologi brez meja*) using the slogan 'Let's clean up Slovenia in one day'/ *Očistimo Slovenijo v enem dnevu,* has - with the support of the mass media - managed to attract several hundred-thousand supporters each year since 2010. Additionally, a decrease in the already low levels of public trust in parliamentary political parties, coupled with greater radicalisation, has caused voters to become more open toward newly-emerging political parties. This was again evident in the 2014 pre-term elections.

Yet, not a single Green party has managed to integrate Green issues with the issues of rising unemployment, the anti-austerity mood and the de-legitimisation of mainstream parties leading unsuccessful governments. Unlike the 1980s, Slovenia's current Green parties have been unable to learn from the German Greens' successful 'green new deal' which managed to combine environmental policy with the need to create jobs (Rüdig, 2012). Slovenian Green parties have failed to enjoy any of the recent global rises in Green party fortunes (Wahtler, 2014; European Green Party, 2014).

Conclusions

Our paper has considered the interplay of three factors affecting the development of Green parties: (1) the national political-environment factor; (2) the internal agency characteristics of Green party developments; and (3) the economic crisis as an intervening factor.

As national political and environment matters and favourable external conditions do not automatically translate into electoral success for Green (or any other) parties, our analysis of Slovenia (a country with a supportive national political-environment and opportunities for a New Left orientation brought about by the recent

economic crisis) reveals that the internal – particularly agential - characteristics of Green party developments may be crucial for explaining the decline of Green parties in particular national circumstances. While Weber (1968: 58) notes that the charisma of political leaders cannot be learned but rather must be 'awakened' and 'tested', political scientists analysing Green party developments appear to have overlooked the fact that leaders' personal characteristics, motives and political experiences and skills do affect the success of the Green party segment. It is to be expected that some mistaken political decisions were made in the early post-socialist context when the new political party elites lacked political experience. Furthermore, it is to be expected that some individuals would prioritise the benefits of public office at the local and national level for their own personal gain – as has occurred in a number of countries during the early stages of democratic development. And, as the case of the UK Green Party demonstrates, a particular leader may prove decisive in a party's success at the ballot box even in the context of the United Kingdom's extraordinarily restrictive electoral rules.

In conclusion, our main finding from the case of Slovenia is that political agency matters, because it links internal party characteristics and the choice of party strategies with electoral success. Indeed, it seems to be a necessary (albeit insufficient) precondition for the success of a political party in general elections. In order to fully grasp the importance of the internal agency factor in relation to other factors that determine party electoral success, a comparative view of the variations among national contexts - as well as among party families - is required. Further research will need to identify not just the necessary but also the sufficient conditions for the short-term and long-term electoral successes of Green parties.

Appendix 1: List of Slovenian Green parties which competed at the national parliamentary elections and at the European Parliament elections, and their electoral results[1]

***Year of elections*/ Green political parties**	***1990***	***1992***	***1996***	***2000***	***2004 EP***	***2004***	***2008***	***2009 EP***	***2011***	***2014 EP***	***2014***
The Greens of Slovenia	8.84% (8)	3.7% (5)	1.76% (0)	---	2.3% (0)[5]	0.69% (0)	0.51% (0)	---	0.36% (0)	0.83% (0)	0.53% (0)
Green Alternative	---	---	0.52% (0)	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
United Greens[2]	---	---	---	0.90% (0)	---	---	---	0.73% (0)	---	---	---
Green Coalition[3]	---	---	---	---	---	---	0.21% (0)	---		---	---
Party for the Sustainable Development of Slovenia	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	1.22% (0)	See Coalition United Left	See Coalition United Left
Citizens' Green List/ Slovenian Ecological Movement/ Party of Ecological Movements of Slovenia	1.99% (0)	0.62% (0)	---	---	0.59 % (0)	0.41% (0)	---[6]	---[6]	---[6]	---	
Youth Party of Slovenia/ Youth Party – Greens of Europe	---	---	---	*4.33% (4)*[4]	*2.3% (0)*[5]	2.08% (0)	---[7]	1.96% (0)	0.86% (0)[8]	---	---
Coalition United Left[9]	---	----	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	5.47% (0)	5.97% (6)
Total	10.83 % (8)	4.32% (5)	2.28% (0)	0.9% (0)[4]	2.89% (0)[5]	3.18% (0)	0.72% (0)	2.69% (0)	2.44% (0)	0.83%+ (0)	0.53%+[9] n/a

Notes:
In brackets: % of votes and number of parliamentary seats won

[1] Several predominately local parties which appeared at the national level by chance are excluded from the list (The Green Movement of the Ljubljana Municipality of Moste-Polje, which competed at the 1992 parliamentary elections and won 0.06% of the vote; the List for Clean Potable Water, which competed in the 2008 parliamentary elections and won 0.39% of the vote and joined the United Greens for the 2009 European Parliament elections; and the

Acacias, which competed at the 1996 and 2004 parliamentary elections as the independent list of Marko Brecelj, and at the 2008 and 2011 parliamentary elections and won 0.11%, 0.05%, 0.02% and 0.02% shares of the vote).

[2] Different alliances of the factions of The Greens of Slovenia competed under the United Greens. At the parliamentary elections in 2000, an alliance was formed between The Greens of Slovenia and the Green Alternative (Trampuš 2000), while at the European Parliament elections in 2009 an alliance was formed between The Greens of Slovenia, Green Progress, The Green Party and the Party for Clean Potable Water (MMC RTV SLO/ STA 2009).

[3] The Green Coalition is an alliance between two factions of the former members of The Greens of Slovenia, established for the purpose of competing in parliamentary elections. Each of these factions established its own political party – Green Progress and The Green Party – active mostly at the local level.

[4] Prior to the 2004 elections, the Youth Party of Slovenia was not profiled as a Green party.

[5] The Greens of Slovenia and the Youth Party of Slovenia competed with a joint list of candidates at the 2004 European Parliament elections. The electoral result shown in the table refers to the joint list.

[6] The Party of Ecological Movements of Slovenia has competed on a joint list with the parliamentary party the Social Democrats since the 2008 parliamentary elections. However, none of the candidates from the Party of Ecological Movements has gained a parliamentary seat.

[7] The Youth Party of Slovenia competed at the 2008 national parliamentary elections on a joint list with the parliamentary party, the Slovenian People's Party. The joint list won 5.21% of the vote and gained 5 parliamentary seats. However, none of the Youth Party's candidates gained a parliamentary seat.

[8] At the 2011 parliamentary elections, the Youth Party formed a Green alliance called the Youth Party of Slovenia–The Greens, which incorporated non-parliamentary political parties, the Youth Party – the Greens of Europe, the Green Coalition, the Christian Socialists of Slovenia, the Democrats of Slovenia and the Union for the Slovenian Littoral (Mavsar 2011).

[9] A coalition of the Party for Sustainable Development of Slovenia with radical left parties.

Sources: Krašovec and Boh 2002, DVK 2004a, 2004b, 2008, 2009, 2011, Party for the Sustainable Development of Slovenia 2014.

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Voters' Personalities and Ideal Party Personality. Evidence from Poland

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ABSTRACT

The objective of this article was to make an empirical attempt at reflecting the popular concept of brand personality within the realm of voting behaviour. We assumed that voters can perceive political parties in terms of features which are characteristic for people. Parties could be identified as separate brands which, in the process of communicating with voters, represent unique, more or less distinct personalities. The study used a set of eighteen selected adjectives to describe both the personalities of an ideal party, as perceived by a voter, and the personalities of the voters. Two factor analyses revealed a four-factor structure of voters' and ideal party's personalities. These factors were utilised to obtain personality profiles of the participants and of the ideal party, and to examine the relationship between them. Afterwards, a cluster analysis was applied in order to assess the types of the ideal party's personalities, which were next analysed in terms of the Polish political market. We found evidence that there was a positive relationship between preferred ideal party's personality and voting behaviour.

KEY WORDS: *political party, personality traits, ideal party, voting behaviour*

Introduction

A party which has just entered the political market needs to undergo a series of adjustments which will make it attractive for a potential voter. Many of these modifications have been defined by marketing professionals, in particular by researchers specialising in creating brands or personalities of product and service brands. Researchers find analogies both between consumer and voting behaviour as

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well as between the political market and the consumer market (Newman, 1994; Lock & Harris, 1996). The objective of this paper is to make an empirical attempt at reflecting a popular concept of brand personality within the realm of voting behaviour. The fundamental assumption underlying all further considerations is that voters perceive political parties in terms of features which are characteristic for people. As such, the parties are then assigned unique identities.

Both the "personality" of the ideal political party as perceived by the respondents and the personalities of the party's voters were diagnosed, since many studies confirm that the perceived similarity to a politician in terms of personality traits (Byrne, 1965; Caprara, Barbaranelli & Zimbardo 2002; Vecchione, González Castro & Caprara, 2011) and the supported views and ideas (NewComb, 1961; Rokeach, 1973; Fraley, 2007) is a significant variable in the determination of voting preferences. However, the vast majority of research to date has concentrated on politicians only. Thus, the present study can contribute to a better understanding this phenomenon.

A brand can be seen as a tangible or intangible characteristic that represents and communicates information about the functional and symbolic benefits of products, services or ideas (Aaker, 1997; Arvidson, 2006). Consumers, through recognisable brands, assign products with a system of meaning and concepts, thereby granting them certain values that make the product distinct from the others. On the political market a party will gain value and importance in the eyes of the voter if it is treated as a brand (de Chernatony & White, 2002). Political parties should be rooted in public consciousness; they should be recognizable as identifiers of certain ideas, they should have an ethos the voters can identify with, and finally, they should have tradition and experience, based on which voters can anticipate the party's next moves. By creating an analogy between a political party and the brand, we can transfer the mechanisms used for creating a brand over to the political party, along with all the positive anticipated outcomes, which the brand brings about. The branding of a political party is important in light of building voter loyalty, which mobilises the electorate during an election; it also rationalises voters' decisions and emotions, provides for easier understanding of the goals of a political party and distinguishes a party from other political actors (see Smith, 2001; Schneider, 2004; Needham, 2005; Lees-Marshment, 2009; Scremin, 2007). Moreover, Catherine Needham (2005) points out that voters' perception of the political party in terms of a

brand reduces the psychological costs of participation in the electoral campaign and the election. This is primarily associated with the fact that the brand in itself carries some information on the product, hence it shortens the time of exploration needed to find information on the political entity. It makes the political product more accessible within the respondent's cognitive field. In the voter's opinion, decisions made on the basis of attachment and loyalty are less risky and involve positive beliefs and attitudes such as credibility, confidence in better future and the belief that the promises made during the electoral campaign will come true.

One way to create a brand in the mind of the consumer is to give it a personality. The adoption of the idea that brands, companies or shops can be evaluated using personality traits, made it possible to use the achievements of personality theory in the analysis of brand personality (Pilch, 2012). The way brand personality features are perceived is shaped by the direct or indirect contact between a product and its consumer. One of the frequently emphasised functions of brand personality mentioned in the literature is its intermediation between a product and the identity of an individual (Aaker, Fournier & Brasel 2004). Consumers often focus their attention on personalities which are familiar to them, either because the consumer shares these traits or because he/she considers them to be ideal. A personality which is built on the foundation of traits considered to be of meaning to the consumer, can strengthen brand loyalty, bring it close to the individual, and invoke positive emotions. Similarly, attributing negative features to a brand may implicate negative emotions, resistance or disapproval. A defined brand personality also allows the consumer to specify who the product is meant for. This helps the product reach its target group more quickly.

A social image of a political party depends increasingly more often on politicians who are familiar to the general public. The platform of a political party is becoming more and more personalised because it is the image of the political leader (or other party members) which constitutes the actual product (see Caprara & Zimbardo, 2004). Recent evidence suggests that the personality traits of a politician, as seen by the voters, are becoming increasingly more important (McAllister, 2007). Numerous studies also emphasise the importance of similarities between a voter and a politician (Caprara, Barbaranelli, Consiglio, Picconi & Zimbardo, 2003). Voters are more likely to vote for these politicians whose personality is seen as compatible with the ideology of the political party of their preference, and whose traits are compatible

with their own (Caprara & Zimbardo, 2004). This policy is consistent with the congruence principle (Hong & Zinkhan, 1995; Kressman, Sirgy, Herrman, Huber, Huber & Lee 2006), which is used widely in commercial marketing, and which states that consumers are willing to choose those brands whose characteristics, as perceived by the consumers, are compatible with their own. Studies carried out in Italy and Spain have shown that the similarity between the traits of the voter and the elected political entity is higher if the similarity concerns traits characteristic for the leader and his party (Vecchione, Castro & Caprara, 2011).

What is important, however, is that the naming used in public discourse is not that much associated with the names of individual politicians, but with the political parties themselves. In light of this, studies showing not only the relationship between voters and politicians, but also those dealing with the relationship between voters and political parties, are of importance. One of the options available is to investigate the way in which parties are perceived by voters, making an assumption that voters characterise a party by means of the same features they use to describe people. A study by Hayes (2005) suggests that voters, perceiving political parties, use such features as compassion, morality, leadership and empathy. A Polish study of free associations connected with political parties indicates that 87% of the associations describe typically human features, of which 27% describe human personality traits (in the case of ideal party attributes 54%) (Holewa & Gorbaniuk, 2009).

There have only been a few attempts to transfer the construct of brand personality into the world of politics. In two of them, an adaptation of Aaker's (1997) brand personality scale was made. Aaker's study of brand personality reveals the five-factor structure of traits (Sincerity, Excitement, Competence, Sophistication, Ruggedness). Schneider (2004) used Aaker's tool to diagnose the personality of German politicians and political parties, but he did not test the structure of party's personality. Smith (2009), in turn, using the same scale, identified six dimensions of political party perception in Great Britain (Honesty, Spirited, Image, Leadership, Toughness, Uniqueness). However, Aaker's scale includes some characteristics (for example *good-looking, young*), which are not personality traits. It is additionally subject to a possible error resulting from the transfer to political marketing of the assumptions used in consumer marketing. For example, many features which can be used in the description of products and services cannot be used with equal success in the description of the political market. Gorbaniuk, Krzyszycha & Holewa (2010)

used a lexical approach to personality research which allowed them to identify three dimensions of political party personality in Poland (Openness to cooperation, Strength, Antisociality). These dimensions were used in another study (Krzyszycha & Gorbaniuk, 2011). The results showed that the greater the similarity between one's own perceived personality and the personality of a political party, the more positive is one's attitude towards a party and the greater its preference.

Although a political party can be treated as a brand, we need to remember that this perspective leads to certain simplifications. The specificity of a party in comparison to other brands is that it is composed of people and perceived through the people who represent it. Judgements concerning a party are at least partly based on judgements concerning particular politicians. Social psychology provides a useful theoretical background to analyse the phenomena connected with perception and factors affecting perception, such as labelling, stereotypes and prejudices (Aronson, 2011; Wojciszke, 2014).

The Current Study

The analysis carried out above shows that political parties may be perceived using the same characteristics which are attributable to people (Holewa & Gorbaniuk, 2009). The research methodology on party personality used so far is mainly acquired from the field of consumer marketing, but every consecutive attempt added new solutions (see Schneider, 2004; Smith, 2009; Turska-Kawa 2013). The results of prior studies also confirm that the preferences of voters with regard to politicians are linked to the dispositional attributions of the electorate. In this context, the congruency model of political preference was proven on numerous occasions, indicating the opening up of voters towards those politicians whose personalities are perceived by the voters as similar to their own (see Caprara & Zimbardo, 2004). Taking this into account, an assumption can be made that since personality traits make people different from each other, then the dispositions attributed to political parties also differentiate political parties on the political scene. In this context, parties will be identified as separate brands, which in the process of communicating with voters represent separate, more or less distinct, personalities. The electorate's preference will be based on the relationship between the personality of the voter, and the way they perceive the personality of the political party. Similarly, one can assume that voters, based on their experience with existing parties, are able to

produce their own picture of the ideal (i.e. preferred) political party which, in their opinion, represents their interests in the best way. As in the case of actual parties, the opinions about the ideal party can be accounted for in terms of personality traits. We can then expect the similarity between the personalities of the electorate and the description of the "ideal" party, as in the case of agreement between voter personality and preferred party personality, since the mechanisms underlying both types of similarity should be the same.

In the research presented here, both voter personality and ideal party personality, as perceived by the voter, were analysed. Using the concept of the *ideal political party* allows the respondents to express their opinions freely, thanks to which they do not narrow their answers down to the existing political entities they know from the world of politics, but are encouraged to create their own ideal party, one which caters to their needs. So far, the concept of "ideal" personality has been used in the studies concerning politicians' personalities (Roets & Van Hiel, 2009; Pilch, 2011). The evaluations of the ideal party's personality obtained in the study will be used to determine subgroups of voters sharing the opinions on the desired party traits. Identifying the profiles of features these subgroups attribute to the ideal party will allow constructing a typology reflecting the beliefs dominant in the investigated group. Ideal party's images thus distinguished will be discussed with regard to the parties functioning on the Polish political scene at the moment.[3] It will also be attempted to prove that – despite the multiplicity of factors affecting voting decisions – the image of the ideal party's personality preferred by the respondent can be related to his/her voting behaviour.

As in earlier research on brand and party personality, a procedure being an element of the lexical approach has been applied, which means that participants, using scales, rated both their own personality traits and the traits of the ideal party by means of adjectives. In accordance with the contemporary understanding of personality as a structure of features, for the purpose of this study, party personality has been defined as a set of human personality traits, which can be used to describe a party and which are considered important (Azoulay & Kapfener, 2004).

[3] Polish political scene is an interesting area of analysis. Using the conceptual framework applied in this study, we can see there both parties with vivid and recognisable "personalities" (LaJ, PM) and those whose "personality" is not so vivid, which do not evoke any particular emotions or attract attention (CP, DLA, PPP). The political scene with this layout allows research to be more interesting from the cognitive point of view, because it shows the marked differentiation between the respondents – voters of particular parties.

The present study has the following aims: (1) examine the factor structure of the personality of an ideal political party and the personalities of the voters on the basis of the responses of voters who rated personality traits (their own and of the ideal party) using the same set of selected adjectives; (2) utilise the factors obtained (i.e. personality dimensions) to create trait profiles of the voters and of the personality of the ideal party; check whether there are relationships between the evaluation of one's own personality and the personality of the ideal party in particular dimensions; (3) distinguish groups of voters which are formed based on the similarity of opinions concerning the personality of the ideal party; identify the personality profiles preferred by the voter groups – creating the types of an ideal party's images; determine the features which differentiate the groups of voters above; (4) discuss the types of ideal party's image in context of Polish political scene and (5) investigate the relationships between preferred ideal party's image and voting behaviour.

Method

Participants and procedure

An analysis was carried out of the results of a nationwide representative group of adult Poles (*N*=1,088), participating in a study of political attitudes and preferences in the fourth quarter of 2012. Quota and stratified sampling was employed in sample selection. The population was divided completely and disjoint into layers, which comprised provinces. Afterwards, quota sampling was used in relation to gender, age and place of residence (women: *N*=555; men: *N*=533; age 18-24: *N*=130, 25-34: *N*=209, 35-44: *N*=171, 45-54: *N*=198, 55-64: *N*=187, >65: *N*=193; urban areas: *N*=650, rural areas: *N*=438). The questionnaires were delivered to respondents by volunteer interviewers. Participation in the survey was voluntary and anonymous.

Measures

Selection of Adjectives. The study uses a set of eighteen adjectives selected in a pilot study. The starting point was 290 adjectives referring to human traits, identified by Szarota, Ashton & Lee (2007) in a study of the Polish personality lexicon. The adjective set was independently evaluated by three peer judges (psychologists). Their task was to form pairs of opposite traits being the extremes of continuum (e.g. intelligent-unintelligent, wise-silly); then, after reaching an agreement

concerning disputable issues, the word with negative connotations was removed from each pair of antonyms (so as to avoid differences in assessments related to the positive-negative asymmetry; Baumeister, Bratslawsky, Finkenauer & Vohs, 2001). Next, 96 peer judges (students of political science) were given the list of adjectives with the antonyms removed. They assessed the adjectives against a 3-point scale: 1 – not applicable to describing a political party, 2 – hard to say, 3 – can be used to describe a political party. Finally, 18 adjectives were selected for the study (three for each of the six high level personality factors, based on the six factor model developed by Szarota et al., 2007), which were most often given the evaluation "3" (Extroversion: *active, enterprising, communicative*; Emotionality: *brave*, *relentless*, *strong-minded*; Agreeableness: *agreeable, tractable*, *tolerant*; Conscientiousness: *diligent*, *consistent*, *responsible*; Honesty-Humility: *honest*, *unselfish*, *truthful*; Openness to experience: *ambitious*, *versatile*, *creative*).

*Measurement of Voter and Ideal Party Personality Features***.** A set of eighteen adjectives, along with a five-point response scale, was used twice: to determine the respondent's personality features and to describe the personality of the ideal party. The respondents were asked to assess how each of the presented features corresponds to the ideal political party (a party which would represent their interests in the best way) and rated the intensity of their own personality traits.

Voting choice. Political choice was measured by asking participants which party they would vote for if the general election were to be held next Sunday. The respondents could choose from the list of 11 possible answers (Civic Platform–CP, Polish People's Party–PPP, Law and Justice–LaJ, Palikot's Movement–PM, Democratic Left Alliance–DLA, Poland Comes First, United Poland, Polish Labour Party, Right Wing of Republic, `another party` and `I would not vote`). 23% of the respondents (*N*=255) indicated that they would not vote. The frequencies of party choice were as follows: CP 23% (*N*=247), LaJ 21% (*N*=228), DLA 10% (*N*=108), PPP 7% (*N*=76), PM 6% (*N*=64) and other parties 10% (*N*=110).

Measurement of Additional Variables. Additional variables were used in the analysis: age, education, financial situation in self-evaluation and opinions about the following statements: "I believe in democracy" and "I'm interested in politics" (answers: *definitely yes, probably yes, it's hard to say, probably not, definitely not*).

Results

Testing the Factorial Structure of Voters' and Ideal Party's Personalities

Raw responses to all eighteen adjectives were converted to ipsatised (within-subject standardised) scores. This procedure, although not free from limitations (for discussion see Dunlap & Cornwell, 1994, but also Saville & Wilson, 1991; Greer & Dunlap, 1997), allows to correct for response tendencies (it minimises individual differences in the use of response scale – elevation and extremity of responses), which seems to be beneficial as the group was extremely diversified. Since in previous studies examining personality in a political context the structure of personality factors was different from that observed in studies on general population, explanatory factor analysis (EFA) was used to find whether eighteen personality traits could be explained in terms of six HEXACO dimensions and whether these factors were the same for the participants' personality and the ideal party's personality. The size of the group (good subject to item ratio 60:1), correlations between the adjectives and the variance of the results (for a party, *SD* had the values from .51 (for honest) up to 1.1 (for tractable), and for a person, from .61 (for responsible) up to 1.0 (for tractable) allowed to perform EFA. Two principal axis factor analyses (which is recommended when the assumption of multivariate normality is violated; Costello & Osborne, 2005) with Varimax rotation were performed. Both analyses revealed a four-factor structure. In the further part of the analysis, thirteen adjectives were used, which were characterised by a comparable factorial structure with regard to the personality of the person and the party, and which had high loadings on one of the four factors. The factor analyses were rerun using these thirteen adjectives. The modified models explained 63% (respondents' personality) and 64% (ideal party's personality) of the variance, respectively (**Table 1**).

Table 1: Factor Analyses of Participants' Personality and Ideal Party's Personality (*N*=1088)

Personality traits	Participants' personality factors				Ideal party's personality factors			
	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4
Active	**.814**	.075	.090	.106	**.795**	.084	-.008	.086
Ambitious	**.770**	.102	.070	.148	**.733**	.121	.102	.160
Enterprising	**.700**	.093	.055	.228	**.729**	.076	.088	.257
Diligent	**.558**	.485	.047	.016	**.712**	.303	.050	.011
Truthful	.023	**.800**	.170	.085	.183	**.815**	.051	.085

Honest	.100	**.768**	.131	-.012	.368	**.703**	-.026	-.030
Responsible	.276	**.734**	.014	-.007	-.134	**.640**	.314	.251
Unselfish	-.044	**.487**	.449	.294	.548	**.598**	-.032	-.030
Tractable	-.049	.024	**.839**	-.062	.118	.039	**.822**	.028
Agreeable	.153	.119	**.804**	-.193	-.126	-.017	**.819**	.058
Tolerant	.139	.169	**.618**	-.015	.220	.181	**.605**	-.180
Relentless	.142	.093	-.128	**.835**	.079	.080	-.027	**.866**
Brave	.334	-.007	-.078	**.759**	.362	.088	-.029	**.718**
Eigenvalues	2.32	2.32	2.02	1.5	2.91	2.09	1.84	1.47
Percentage of total variance	17.9	17.8	15.5	11.5	22.4	16.1	14.1	11.3

Note: Principal axis factor analysis employing Varimax rotation with Kaiser normalization. Bold values represent the highest loadings.
Source: author's calculations

Four adjectives made up factor 1: *active*, *enterprising* *ambitious* and *diligent*. These qualities seem to be important and desirable in a situation where one has to compete with others for something. They ensure a high level of aspiration (*ambitious*), initiation and continuation of activities on the way to the goal (*active*, *diligent*), and efficient coping with problems (*enterprising*). Due to the nature of these characteristics, the factor is referred to as **Enterprise**. Factor 2 consists of four adjectives: *truthful*, *honest*, *unselfish* and *responsible*. This is a group of traits relating to morality, complemented by *responsibility* – ability to act correctly and make proper decisions, hence the name **Trustworthiness.** Factor 3 consists of all three adjectives constituting **Agreeableness** markers in the HEXACO model (*tractable*, *agreeable*, *tolerant*). Factor 4, on the other hand, is made up of two adjectives: *relentless* and *brave*, hence **Toughness** was chosen to describe this dimension.

Comparing Factor Profiles of Personality Dimensions for Voters' and Ideal Party's Personalities

For the purpose of determining the averaged personality profiles using the identified personality dimensions, the score for each personality factor was calculated as a mean of the ipsatised responses to corresponding items. The reliability of the scales created was acceptable (Cronbach's *Alpha* from .62 for Toughness-party to .79 for Enterprise-party). Trustworthiness was rated the highest in the description of the personality of the voters (*M*= 0.4) followed by Enterprise (*M*=0.1), Agreeableness (*M*=-0.25), while Toughness received the lowest rating (*M*=-0.47). In the description of the personality of the party, Enterprise (*M*=0.32) and Trustworthiness (*M*=0.29) were the highest rated, followed by Toughness (*M*=-0.39) and Agreeableness (*M*=-0.8).

In the next analysis we made a comparison between voter personality trait ratings and ideal party personality trait ratings, and verified their mutual relationships. In order to determine the relationship between these variables, correlations were calculated for ratings of the particular traits and personality dimensions. The correlation for all features and factors was positive and statistically significant (p<.05). For personality factors, the highest correlation was observed for Toughness (r=.433) and Agreeableness (r=.393). The strength of the linear association between person's personality and ideal party's personality was weaker for Trustworthiness (r=.277) and Enterprise (r=.141). The factors for which relatively stronger relationships between respondents' personality and ideal party's personality were observed (Toughness, Agreeableness) were rated by the participants as relatively least important in the image of the ideal political party.

Assessing Types of Ideal Party's Images – Cluster Analysis

An analysis of the averaged profile of the personality of the ideal party, created on the basis of evaluations, is a good way to determine the general preferences of Polish voters. However, it ignores the differences in the evaluations within the test group itself. In order to separate the groups of voters who share the same views on the features of the ideal party, a two-step cluster analysis was performed, which allows for identification of natural clusters in the data set. Four clusters were identified, which were distinguished on the basis of an evaluation of the four dimensions of the ideal party's personality. The model fit the data well (Silhouette coefficient=.4). The individual clusters consisted of the following number of respondents: cluster 1 – 158 (14,5%), cluster 2 – 414 (38.1%), cluster 3 – 171 (15.7%), cluster 4 – 345 (31.7%). Cluster profiles are presented in **Figure 1**.

Figure 1: Results of Cluster Analysis - Four Groups of Participants and Their Opinions about Ideal Party's Personality



Source: Author's calculations

The clusters 1 and 4 grouped together those who rate Enterprise and Trustworthiness equally high, but who differ in their evaluation of the remaining dimensions: the persons forming cluster 1 rated Toughness high and Agreeableness very low, while the participants belonging to cluster 4 considered both these dimensions as having relatively little usefulness. Respondents forming cluster 3 stood out for their highest rating of Trustworthiness as a feature which characterises an ideal party. In turn, individuals belonging to cluster 2 considered all the assessed party personality dimensions as useful to an average (medium) degree. The groups 2 and 3 rated the usefulness of the features of Agreeableness the highest, in relative terms.

Characteristics of Vote Groups Identified in Cluster Analysis

In order to characterise the groups of people who make up clusters of voters identified above, the Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of variance was carried out, with cluster affiliation treated as a grouping variable and age, education, financial situation and opinion on the statements "I am interested in politics" and "I believe in democracy" as dependent variables. All comparisons showed statistically significant differences between the groups. A comparison with regard to the level of education (H=28.286, df =3, p<.001) showed that individuals belonging to cluster 4 (HONEST-ACTIVE) had a higher education compared to the other groups. Group 4 is also characterised by a younger age (H=9.449, df=3, p<.02). The declared financial situation was higher in clusters 2 (FLEXIBLE) and 4 compared to the groups 1 (UNCOMPROMISING) and 3 (HONEST-MILD) (H=16.592, df=3, p=.001). Group 1 expressed more interest in politics than other groups (H=47.610, df =3, p<.001), and displayed weaker faith in democracy compared to groups 2 and 4 (H=14.625, df =3, p<.002).

Types of Ideal Party's Images and Voting Behaviour

Four clusters of the ideal party's personality were obtained via cluster analysis. How do the images of the ideal party's personality preferred by the respondents correspond to their declared voting behaviour? As mentioned before, the participants could choose between 11 parties that were active on the Polish political scene at the time of the study. The description of the current political scene in Poland (presented in the discussion below) was used to put forward the hypotheses about the possible connections between the four ideal party's images and the real parties' characteristics. It can therefore be hypothesized that the preference of ideal party's image and voting behaviour (or the party preference) would be related. The preference of the UNCOMPROMISING party would be positively related to voting for LaJ and negatively related to voting for CP. Additionally, the preference of the FLEXIBLE model would be positively associated with voting for CP.

Table 2: The Preference of Ideal Party's Image and Voting Behaviour (cross-tabulation)

		Ideal party's image				
		Uncompromising	Flexible	Honest-mild	Honest-active	Total
Voting behavior	CP	20% (22)$_a$	35% (99)$_b$	34% (35)$_b$	40% (91)$_b$	34% (247)
	PPP	13% (14)$_{a,b}$	10% (29)$_{a,b}$	15% (16)$_a$	8% (17)$_b$	11% (76)
	LaJ	53% (59)$_a$	27% (76)$_b$	27% (28)$_b$	29% (65)$_b$	32% (228)
	PM	5% (6)$_a$	12% (34)$_a$	7% (7)$_a$	8% (17)$_a$	9% (64)
	DLA	9% (10)$_a$	16% (45)$_a$	17% (18)$_a$	15% (35)$_a$	15% (108)
	Total	100% (111)	100% (283)	100% (104)	100% (225)	100% (723)

Note: *N* = 723. Each subscript letter denotes a subset of ideal party's image categories whose column proportions do not differ significantly from each other at the .05 level. Observed counts in parentheses. CP – Civic Platform, PPP – Polish People's Party, LaJ – Law and Justice, PM – Palikot's Movement, DLA – Democratic Left Alliance.
Source: Author's calculations

To investigate whether there is an association between the preference of the ideal party's image and the voting behaviour chi-squared test of independence for categorical variables was performed. Non-voters, respondents who chose the category "another party" and those who voted for less popular parties (N<30) were excluded from the analysis (see **Table 2** for cross-tabulation matrix). The results showed that there was the relationship between the variables, chi^2 (12, 723)=42,546, p< 0.001. The column proportions tests (z-tests) were used to determine the relative ordering of categories of the ideal party's image in terms of the category proportions of voting behaviour. The analysis showed that the proportion of respondents who prefer UNCOMPROMISING (UC) model of the ideal party and declare voting for CP (20%) was significantly lower than the proportions of those who prefer the remaining three types of ideal party's image and declare voting for CP (FB–35%, HM–34%, HA–40%). There were no differences between the proportion of subjects who prefer FLEXIBLE (FB) model and declare voting for CP and the proportions of those who prefer HONEST-MILD (HM) or HONEST-ACTIVE (HA) models and vote for CP. The relationships for LaJ supporters were the opposite: the proportion of persons who prefer UC model of the ideal party and vote for LaJ (53%) was significantly greater than the proportions of those who prefer the other three types of an ideal party and voting for LaJ (FB–27%, HM–27%, HA–29%). There were no differences between the proportions of subjects who prefer FB, HM or HA models and declare voting for LaJ.

Discussion

The first phase of the analysis involved verification of the factorial structure of voters' and ideal party's personalities. The four-factor solution was obtained, and then on the basis of analysis of the adjectives constituting the factors, they were given the following names: Enterprise, Trustworthiness, Agreeableness and Toughness. These four dimensions are comparable to the factors describing the personalities of political parties in Poland, which were obtained by Gorbaniuk et al. (2010) using a different set of adjectives (Enterprise and Toughness corresponds to Strength, Agreeableness corresponds to Openness to cooperation and Trustworthiness – to Antisociality, reversely related). This provides additional evidence that Enterprise, Trustworthiness, Agreeableness and Toughness may accurately reflect the structure of personality traits studied in the political context.

The second phase of the analysis involved calculation and comparison of factor profiles of personality dimensions for voters' and ideal party's personalities. The averaged personality profile of the respondents' personality showed that they see each other as mainly moral people (rule-abiding and trustworthy) and, to a slightly lesser extent, capable of acting effectively: *self-assertive* and *hardworking*. They gave a lower rating to their own agreeableness, a feature which ensures good contact with people, but which can result in them being taken advantage of or subordinated by others. Toughness, the lowest rated feature, was in a sense the opposite of agreeableness, as the traits it was described by (*relentless*, *brave*) are characteristic of individuals bent on rivalry, whereas agreeable people prefer compromise. Based on the feature profile obtained for the personality of an ideal party we can conclude that the respondents, as a group, have come to expect the ideal party to be as moral and effective as the respondents themselves. Features useful in competition (Toughness) were not as widely sought after. Agreeableness was by far the lowest rated in terms of its significance in the image of the ideal party. By comparing profiles, it was observed that the respondents wished the party to be more enterprising and less conciliatory than they were themselves. Hence, the obtained profile of the ideal party was not a simple reflection of self-images of participants.

Generally speaking, in evaluating ideal party personalities, voters rated Trustworthiness very high on the scale. This means that moral issues play an extremely important role in everything a party does. It needs to be responsible for the

decisions it takes. In addition, the selflessness and honesty which characterise the dimension of Trustworthiness means that the party needs to be able to represent its voters. In this meaning, the party has to be trustworthy and the voter needs to be sure that election promises do not remain just promises, but will translate into concrete actions. The differences in the other dimensions pointed to the way parties enforce the principles and values they stand by on the political scene in terms of how they behave with regard to other political parties, and in terms of their diligence and tenacity in enforcing these values.

Voter's personality ratings and ideal party personality ratings were related to each other – there were moderate correlations between them for Toughness and Agreeableness dimensions and weak correlations for Trustworthiness and Enterprise. Previous studies have shown that people prefer politicians who they believe share their own personality characteristics (Caprara & Zimbardo, 2004). The results of the current research show that such a similarity is also relevant when rating the personality of the ideal party. This similarity was related more to the dimensions which were considered by those surveyed as relatively less useful for the ideal party (Agreeableness and Toughness). It can thus be assumed that the assessment of those traits remained under the influence of the personality of the voter. In the case of the features whose usefulness for the ideal party is easier to question, the voter's own personality characteristics can provide a hint as to the degree in which a given feature is important and valuable.

The next stage of the analysis involved a two-step cluster analysis, whose aim was to identify groups of voters who have the same idea of what an ideal political party should look like. Four clusters were obtained. It was assumed that the feature profiles, which are the basis for this division, will be treated as the four main, competing "image" types of the desired ideal political party or the ideal party's personalities. Their descriptions are provided below.

The first ideal party personality appears to be extremely strong and tough. The party has a clear set of rules of conduct, which it requires to be followed not only by itself, but by other actors on the political market as well. It attaches great importance to morality and to acting in accordance with the values it represents. The said values are so important to the party that it will fight to see them introduced, justifying its occasionally aggressive stance by what it believes as the need to battle for the good and righteousness it sees as important. Note needs to be taken of the

significant extremity of the ratings of the individual features, which can additionally highlight the clearly defined values presented by this personality and its willingness to fight for their observance. Such a party personality can be referred to as UNCOMPROMISING. Resoluteness forms the core of its conduct.

The second of the highlighted party personalities is characterised by moderate levels of all personality factors: Enterprise, Trustworthiness and Toughness are all rated more or less equally and the party presents only slightly lower levels of Agreeableness. This party represents the lowest level of Trustworthiness compared to the other parties, which means that it is not an entity which places strong emphasis on the moral aspects of its conduct. In addition, Agreeableness and Toughness are rated relatively high in the structure of its personality. This party behaves rather quietly on the political market, it is tolerant to other points of view, and does not have a clearly defined system of internal rules which would define its goals. These goals are relative and are adjusted to the current needs, which also make the party appear somewhat “bland.” It is worth mentioning that in achieving its goals, the party demonstrates entrepreneurship and courage, which should translate into effectiveness of action, but rather in the context of realizing particular interests and not in terms of the observance of party ideology. A political party representing such a personality can be described as FLEXIBLE.

The third defined political party personality type puts the greatest emphasis on Trustworthiness. This is a party which acts responsibly, in accordance with the adopted rules system. Its activity on the political scene is characterised by honesty and sincerity of intentions. However, in contrast to the UNCOMPROMISING party, it does not exhibit extremity in its will to fight for the values it represents. This is the party, which demonstrates by far the lowest level of Enterprise, and as such, is not situated at par with the other, more aggressive party type. The feature structure is characterised by indicates that it is the party, which places great importance on the moral framework of its actions. However, it does not advocate its policies by force on the political scene nor does it present them as the only indisputable truth. By analysing the core of the personality of the third political party, the name HONEST-MILD seems to suit it best.

The last party personality highlighted by the voters is also characterised by a strong focus on moral issues relating to its own actions. Equally important is the party’s active involvement in pursuit of its goals, expressed in a high level of

Enterprise. This party scores high on the Agreeableness scale, but very low in terms of Toughness. The party is therefore an entity which has a clearly defined framework of conduct in the political arena, i.e. values which determine its course of action. It is also very conscientious and steadfast in delivering its goals; however, it lacks a bellicose attitude, which would see it take on the fight for its values courageously on the political arena. The fourth personality structure is referred to as HONEST-ACTIVE.

Above, four sets of features of personality ("images") of the ideal party are described, preferred by voter groups identified in the cluster analysis. The analysis of differences between clusters in terms of sociodemographic variables (age, education, financial situation) and the opinion on the statements "I am interested in politics" and "I believe in democracy", provided additional information on which qualities of voters were connected with the preference for particular types of the ideal party.

The analysis showed that the UNCOMPROMISING party was most appealing to voters who were interested in politics, but whose faith in democracy was weak. It can be speculated that to some extent, these factors may justify voter consent to a party's bellicose nature, which does not always fit in with the widely accepted democratic rules of conduct (for example: negative campaigning, difficulties arising in discussions and public debates). Mainly individuals faced with a significantly worse financial situation were found to be supportive of this party type. It is thought that lower income, which leads to lower quality of life, may force the subjects to seek the sources of this state of affairs. Government of various levels is most often seen as the culprit. The party which fights for its own and its supporters' interests will certainly be attractive for poorer people, who believe that such a party is capable of changing their situation. In addition, the previous analysis showed relatively stronger correlations between the features of voters and the features of the political party they desire in terms of the dimensions of Agreeableness and Toughness, which leads us to believe that this party type will have the support of voters with an entitlement mentality and who share similar methods of fighting for their own good.

The FLEXIBLE party is a party, whose supporters were in a better financial situation, and who had faith in democracy. It is interesting to note, however, what democracy means for these voters. It may be that they understand democracy as fighting for the fulfilment of self-interest and needs on the political market. This means that such voters are supportive more of parties which give a much higher

priority to their current interests than party ideology and platform. Slightly weaker, but statistically significant correlations were found between the personality features of the voters and of the ideal political party with regard to the dimension of Trustworthiness. This would mean that the voter group being described does not attach excessive importance to the ethical aspect of its actions, and does not find any issue with violations committed by the voters themselves nor by their ideal party.

The HONEST-MILD party found supporters mainly among people facing a worse financial situation. One can expect that this party will be supported by people who attach great importance to honesty, but aside from selfless and sincere action on the political arena, they did not require from the party any entrepreneurship nor bellicosity in enforcing its values. In turn, the HONEST-ACTIVE party was attractive for younger people, with higher education and who earn more money. Education is an important variable here. It provides for better understanding of the political and social situation and helps understand the way it functions as well as the mechanisms governing it. Many studies show that people with higher education feel less alienated and display lower levels of anomie (Turska-Kawa, 2011). Education is also associated with better paid work, which provides a higher financial status. These variables imply a better social situation of the individual and are associated with a higher level of faith in democracy demonstrated within this voter group.

The results of the analysis provide some evidence for the hypothesis that preference of the ideal party's image is connected with the voting behaviour. The relatively greater preference for UNCOMPROMISING among Law and Justice supporters and the relatively lower one among Civic Platform supporters is in accordance with our prediction. This result confirms the supposition that the image of an ideal party understood as a set of features more or less valued and desired by voters may be one of the factors which shape their voting behaviour.

Types of Ideal Party's Images in the Context of the Polish Political Scene

The research has been carried out in respect of the Polish political scene, which helped to capture the differences and trends specific to the country. Poland is a country with a strong socially inspired dichotomy between two right-wing parties, which are the main actors during election time – the Law and Justice (LaJ) and the Civic Platform (CP). Left-wing parties remain largely marginalised (see Wojtasik, 2010).

Taking into account the two major right-wing parties, we can observe that they are significantly different in terms of the social anchors at their disposal which are capable of garnering public support. The LaJ is a party arouses strong emotions both within its own electorate and among its opponents. The right-wing attributes it supports (the Church, law, tradition, the nation) are often emphasised in public discourse and the campaign message is based around them. In addition, the party is considered as uncompromising and unconditional, one which stands by its values, features which make it stand out. Based on the results of the study, the party is qualified as the UNCOMPROMISING type, ideal for individuals who support similar methods of action, who are interested in politics, but who represent weak faith in democracy. LaJ is the large right–wing opposition party in Poland, which could justify why mainly people in a poor financial situation, for whom it is easier to place blame on those holding power, support it.

In turn, CP – the ruling party, in power since 2007, is much less distinctive, more variable, open to new trends and not attached to any specific values, which could glue the electorate together. For this reason, CP does not match UN model. The electorate of CP, unlike that of LaJ, is very difficult to characterise, as its political platform makes references to a variety of socially and ideologically diverse groups. In the diagnosed classification of the personality of the ideal political party, CP is located closer to the FLEXIBLE party type, which is attractive for individuals in a rather good financial situation and who have faith in the functioning socio-political order.

The Polish People's Party (PPP) – a small coalition partner – is another party present in the Polish parliament, and one which is not very distinct either. The party does not raise much enthusiasm, nor does it invoke feelings of hatred (Turska-Kawa, 2012). In terms of party brand, PPP belongs to the HONEST-MILD party type – it has its own norms and values system, based largely on its attachment to tradition. However, it neither fights for its values nor does it show any effort in enforcing them on the political scene.

With regard to the Polish political scene, there have been numerous political initiatives appearing over the last several years, which have attempted to introduce the HONEST-ACTIVE party type (Poland Comes First, United Poland of Z. Ziobro, UP, or the current undertakings of J. Gowin). These are initiatives that are largely addressed to young people, who are discouraged, and who are losing their interest

in politics. These new formations contrast themselves with the already well-established parties. These parties do not act aggressively towards other political entities. So far, none of these initiatives have been able to secure a stable position on the Polish political scene. It also appears that with time, these parties are transforming their image from HONEST-ACTIVE to HONEST-MILD, which is an outcome of dwindling enthusiasm.

Conclusions

The main aim of the present study was to apply the concept of ideal party's personality in the analysis of Polish voters' preferences. The research approach treating a political party as a brand is well-grounded in the literature of the subject but researchers rarely refer directly to the concept of party personality. A methodological approach applied in the study, using the elements of psycho-lexical research of personality structure, has given the expected results, confirming the assumption that voters' impressions of political parties may be expressed using the same characteristics which are attributable to people. What is more, despite a relatively low number of adjectives used in the study, a coherent and interpretable structure of factors – structural elements typical of a party's "personality" has been obtained. Just like in previous studies, the factor structure of personality examined in the context of political scene was different from that obtained in personality psychology or in marketing research. This result confirms the necessity to determine this structure empirically prior to analysing different dimensions of the personality of political entities.

The present paper employed an original methodology to describe the personality of an ideal party. This approach has some advantage over the study of personalities of really existing political parties. Investigating ideal party's personality is easier and quicker than determining profiles of multiple specific parties, it does not require any knowledge of the political scene, and the evaluations may more directly reflect the respondents' preferences. The use of the *ideal party* construct may also have a practical value. Political experts who design image building and marketing strategies must take into account the dynamically changing preferences of voters. Although they can use various adaptation strategies, nowadays they mostly use dynamic and active strategies in the context of changes in the environment (*aggregator* – adapting the party policy to the position of its average voter and

following the changes in the electorate, and *predator* – adapting actions to the position taken by the largest part of the electorate; Laver, 2005). The use of the concept of the *ideal party* makes it possible to determine "pure" expectations which will help direct the party's activity in accordance with the voters' needs. The ideal party image may be also be used to project the images of new political entities. The use of the ideal party construct may allow both the presentation of differences between voters globally, and the search of typical constellations of traits attractive for particular voter groups. The typology of political parties obtained in the present study is an example of such an application of evaluations of ideal party personalities. We believe that processes of change of a political scene (Turska, 2006), connected with the process of personalising politics (Caprara & Zimbardo, 2004), will increase the importance of creating political parties' personalities.

The reported study lends some support for the thesis that the voter's personality and the personality of the ideal party preferred by the voter can be linked and that the construct of ideal party personality can serve as a predictor of voting behaviours. However, the strength of this correlation and the significance of ideal party personality as a predictor of voting behaviours against the background of other factors with an unquestionable impact on voting behaviour, such as gender (Denemark, Ward & Bean, 2012) and age (Martin, 2012; Niemi & Klingler, 2012) should be confirmed in the future.

The study was not free from limitations; hence, if its results are generalised, it should be done with care. The number of adjectives was low and they reflected the positive side of personality only, while the perception of positive and negative traits may differ. The reliability of some scales developed via factor analysis was relatively low. The relationship between the respondent's personality and the personality of the party he or she preferred was determined on the basis of simple correlations. It seems that future research on party personality may yield much better results if the measurements are performed using a standardised set of adjectives, which would allow to directly compare the results (see Gorbaniuk, Kusak, Kogut & Kustos, 2015).

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Stable or not? Patterns of party system dynamics and the rise of the new political parties in the Czech Republic[1]

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ABSTRACT

The text analyses the stability and dynamics of the party system in the Czech Republic after 1989. After summarizing the theoretical discussion about the stability of the party politics, the author applies selected tools for measuring the party system stability within the Czech party system environment. Besides the stability of individual political parties, the author also deals with systemic approaches by emphasising the importance of the inter-party relations and concludes that the Czech party system could be considered as a relatively stable one when taking into account the performance of individual parties, at least to the 2010 election, but relatively unstable when assessing the systemic relations. Moreover, the author assesses the changes of the party system after the 2010 and 2013 general elections and identifies the political crisis as the main reason for the rise of the new anti-establishment political parties.

KEY WORDS: *political parties, party system, the Czech Republic, stability, dynamics, volatility*

Introduction

The Czech party system has been considered among the most stable in post-communist Central and Eastern Europe, mainly due to the fact that the number; identity; and electoral support for relevant parties have remained comparatively constant. As such, it represented a remarkable exception in the post-communist context; that is, until the 2010 election of the Chamber of Deputies, which broke with the aforementioned trend (cf. Haughton et al. 2011, Šedo 2011). Not only did the support for the two largest parties decline to a historical low, but for the first time since its inception in 1919, the Christian and Democratic Union–Czechoslovak

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People's Party (KDU-ČSL) lost representation in the Chamber of Deputies (previously the National and Federal Assemblies, and the Czech National Council). Furthermore, two new political parties, TOP 09 and Public Affairs (VV), entered the parliament. The electoral disappointment for the Green Party, which failed to cross the electoral threshold, was another discontinuity with the results of the 2006 election. The 2013 general election followed the path made by the previous electoral contest: the support of the once biggest parties dropped again and two new parties – the Action of Dissatisfied Citizens 2011 (ANO) and the Dawn of Direct Democracy crossed the electoral threshold, gaining together more than one quarter of votes. The main aim of this paper is to analyse the development trends in the Czech party system, using selected methods of assessing party system dynamics, and to point out some specifics of Czech party politics and answer the following research question: how and why has the Czech party system changed in recent years? It will do so in the wider context of the theoretical discussion about party system change and the endeavours to conceptualise it in order to describe the dynamics of the Czech party politics. Additionaly, reasons for the rise of new political parties will be discussed and apply in order to explain the recent changes of the party system in the Czech Republic.

The results show that the party system in the Czech Republic can be no longer considered as a stable party system since both the number and electoral support of political parties and level of openness of the party system have changed dramatically in recent years. Moreover, these changes can be accounted for the combination of political and economic crises that struck the Czech Republic in recent years.

Volatility and party system institutionalization: different dimensions of party system stability

Issues of party system stability and dynamics have firmly established themselves in the study of party politics over recent decades. Party system stability is often thought to indicate the quality or consolidation of democracy (e.g. Jones 2012). Scholarly interest in party systems stability has also increased in connection with the emergence of new democracies (e.g. Jiglău & Gherghina 2011), particularly the transitions and transformations of Central and Eastern European political regimes during the 1990s. A few rare exceptions aside, the post-communist party

systems have become bywords for instability, especially so when compared with their Western European counterparts.

When studying party system dynamics, the crucial question of the subject of study arises. Does the party system stability stem from a change of electoral support of individual political parties (i.e. from the level of volatility, see below) or should it be seen as an expression of dynamics of political parties` interactions? To make it more confusing, several scholars use political parties stability and party system stability interchangably or claim that party system stability is dependent on stability of individual political parties (Meleshevich, 2007). Consequently, a complex analysis of dynamics of party politics in a particular country demands a researcher to be focused on the two more or less separate dimensions: (1) political parties as individual actors and (2) character of interactions among them.

The first dimension has been well covered by a bunch quantitave studies using various ways of measurement of number of political parties and changes of their electoral support by studying volatility as the most widely applied approach. The overall level of volatility expresses the aggregated level of change of electoral support of political parties in a completion in the two subsequent elections and results from the three following sources: 1) change in electoral support due to the preferences of voters participating in both subsequent elections, 2) change in electorate composition (loss of electorate, new voters, changes in voter turnout), and 3) change in the supply of political parties standing for the election (some parties might not stand; new parties might enter the competition; electoral coalitions could appear or transform themselves - Birch 2003: 121). The chief problem connected with studying volatility is that it is often incorrectly interpreted as indicating *individual* shifts in the electorate, even though the data has been aggregated to the overall level of support for individual political parties (e.g. Birch 2003, Tavits 2005). Therefore, volatility is 'merely' the sum of changes in electoral support for political parties between two subsequent elections, and cannot be interpreted as indicating change in the electoral behaviour of individual voters, even though statistical tests exist that point out the closeness of aggregated and individual change of electoral behaviour (e.g. Bartolini, Mair 1990). The basic calculation of volatility was set by Mogens Pedersen (1979) and modified by others who tried to reflect different sources of volatility (for more details see below).

Undoubtedly, the change of electoral support of individual political parties is an important feature of dynamics of party politics. On the other hand, stable electoral support of political parties does not tell us much about stability of interactions among them. Therefore, assessing dynamics of a party system solely on volatility would mean to miss the more important aspect of functioning of a party system. As Peter Mair put it, the core feature of a party system stability lies in predictability of interactions among political parties in the system (Mair 2001, see also Casal Bertoa 2014). In recent years, party system stability has been increasingly equaled with the concept of party system institutionalization (PSI) which dates back to the seminal work by Mainwaring and Scully (1995). We stick to the definition of PSI as „the process by which the patterns of interaction among political parties become routine, predictable, and stable over time“ (Mair 2001, Bakke, Sitter 2005, see also Casal Bertoa 2014). PSI thus leaves the perspective of electoral performance of individual political parties and moves to the systemic and interactive aspect of party system dynamics.

In addition to research on volatility, several tools for measuring fragmentation of party systems have been developed. A prominent position within this type of research was captured by so-called number of effective parties. The idea behind this measure is to count parties and, at the same time, to weight the count by their relative strength. The relative strength refers to their vote share (“effective number of electoral parties”) or seat share in the parliament (“effective number of parliamentary parties”). The number of parties equals the effective number of parties only when all parties have equal strength. In any other case, the effective number of parties is lower than the actual number of parties (Laakso, Taagepera 1979).

Volatility, PSI and measures of fragmentation of party systems will be used to analyse the development of party dynamics of party politics in the Czech Republic as they are able to capture different dimensions of its stability and change.

Data and methods

In order to answer the research question defined in the introduction of the article, we will analyze the two key aspects which are decisive for assessing the party system dynamics: (1) the change of electoral support of political parties; (2) the interactions among the parties referring to the level of institutionalization of the Czech party system.

To quantitatively measure the changes of the electoral support of political parties, we count the level of volatility by using the index constructed by Mogens Pedersen in his seminal work (Pedersen 1979). The formula of the Pedersen Index is as follows:

$$\text{Volatility} = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{n} \left| p_{it} - p_{i(t+1)} \right|}{2}$$

where *n* is the number of parties, and *p* represents the percentage of votes received by that party in time periods *t* and *t* + 1.

In addition to measurement of the overall level of volatility, it will be useful to identify the changes cause by the entrance of new political parties and by exit of the old ones. The different dynamics of the results achieved by established and new political parties have been emphasised by Mainwaring, Gervasoni and España-Nájera (2010), who have defined within-system and extra-system volatility. The analysis of the different types of volatility should express the different dynamics which attach to the frequent successes of new or young parties, as opposed to that occurring when electoral support merely shifts between the established actors (Mainwaring et al. 2010: 3). Powell and Tucker (2013) have likewise distinguished two types of volatility. Whereas Type B volatility refers, in their interpretation, to shifts of electorates between existing political parties,[3] Type A volatility corresponds to the electoral gains of new political parties, or to the decline of electoral success of those parties which had previously gained parliamentary representation but are not standing for the present election. According to Powell and Tucker, the Type A volatility better reflects party system instability, and is an extremely important indicator, especially in post-communist party systems (Powell, Tucker 2013: 6-7).

The formula for so-called Type A volatility is as follows (Powell, Tucker 2013: 6-7):

$$\text{Type A Volatility} = \frac{\left| \sum_{o=1}^{n} p_{ot} + \sum_{w=1}^{n} p_{w(t+1)} \right|}{2}$$

where *o* is old disappearing parties that contested only the election at time *t*, and *w* is new parties that only contested the election at time *t* + 1. Moreover, the net impact of new parties on the stability of the party system will be measured by the

[3] As already indicated above, this is a misleading interpretation as the aggregated data are unable, on their own, to uncover the direction of the shift of votes. Without availing oneself of the individual data, one cannot assume *a priori* that the dissatisfied voters of established parties will exclusively vote another established party.

electoral support of genuinely new political parties, defined in accordance with Sikk's approach. Sikk defined the genuinely new parties as those 'that are not successors to any previous parliamentary parties, have a novel name and structure, and do not have any important figures from past democratic politics among their major members' (Sikk 2005: 399). Parties that involve prime ministers or other government or parliament members are thus excluded from consideration as new parties. Sikk's definition is somewhat softened by the inclusion of parties which have been extra-parliamentary for more than one electoral term (Sikk 2005: 399).

The overall level of fragmentation of the party system will be assessed by counting the effective number of parliamentary parties in accordance with the classic formula suggested by Laakso and Taagepera (1979): $N = 1/\Sigma p_i^2$, where p_i refers to a seat share of the political party i. The results will show us the development and changes of the Czech party systém in terms of concentration and fragmentation respectively.

Several measurements of PSI have been developed in recent years. Nevertheless, the aim of the paper is not to summarize this discussion (for this purpose see Mair 2007, Casal Bértoa, Enyedi 2014). We will stick to the most recent measurement developed by Casal Bértoa and Enyedi (2014). Following earlier effort to conceptualize PSI (Mair, 1997, Mair 2007) Casal Bértoa and Enyedi define PSI in term of openness and/or closure of a party system. They proposed to measure three components of PSI as continuous variables. The three components are as follows: alternation in government, government formulae and access to goverment. The ways of measurement are described in details in Table 1.

Table 1: Operationalization of PSI components

Component	Operationalization
Government alternation	Based on ministerial volatility (MV) calculated by Pedersen index If MV is above 50% = MV If MV is below 50 % = 100 - MV
Government formulae	The very same combination of governing parties = 100% Entirely new combination or a new party forms single party government = 100% Part of the new government is familiar = % of the familiar part A party which was earlier in government forms a government on its own = 100% - the previous coalition partners` %
Access to government	% of ministers belonging to parties previously in government

Source: Casal Bértoa, Enyedi 2014

All the indicators are based on government participation measured by share (or the change of share) of portfolios held by political parties. The biggest advantage of the new indicators lie in the contiuousness of measurement and ability to capture different aspects of PSI. The new way of measurement is also reflective to specifics but also to long-term development of individual party systems and is suitable for comparative purposes.

The quantitative measures and qualitative assessment of the stability of the Czech party system will include the period 1990-2013 (for 1990 and 1992 the Czech National Council election results are used) with exception of measurement of PSI when only the period between 1996-2013, i.e. starting from the election which followed the first election after the breakup of the Civic Forum, will be taken into consideration.

A Brief Description of the Czech Party System

As already indicated in the introduction, the Czech party system has been usually described as one of the most stable in Central and Eastern Europe. A brief description of this system will now be provided, followed by an overview of selected studies which so far have analysed its stability – especially in terms of its volatility – as well as the position assumed by new political parties.

The founding election in 1990 was won, with almost 50% of the vote, by the Civic Forum (OF)[4] – a broad political entity which originated shortly after the events of 17 November 1989, and very quickly took on the role of initiator and chief agent in the Czech/Czechoslovak[5] transition to democracy (Pšeja 2004a, Suk 2009). The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, continuing to stand on ideologically unreformed positions, placed second in the election, with a considerably lower level of electoral support. In subsequent years, the party's support has regularly exceeded 10% of the vote. Only in 2002 did the Communists approach a high of 20% of the vote (see Fiala and Mareš 1999, Fiala and Mareš 2005a).

Another important party was the Christian and Democratic Union (KDU), which had already obtained parliamentary representation in 1990. KDU was a coalition of several primarily Christian Democratic parties, led by the Czechoslovak

[4]This is the figure for the Czech National Council. In the election of one chamber of the Federal Assembly, Civic Forum achieved more than 50% of the vote.
[5] It should be noted that both the democratic transition and the party system evolved in many respects differently in the two Republics constituting the Czechoslovak Federation.

People's Party, dating as far back as 1919. In later years, the Christian Democrats became a stable component of the party system under the name Christian and Democratic Union–Czechoslovak People's Party (KDU-ČSL), with support oscillating around 7% of the vote (Fiala and Suchý 2005).

The breakup of the Civic Forum in the spring of 1991 was an important point in the dynamic development of the Czech party system. It led to the rise of the liberal-conservative Civic Democratic Party (ODS) and social liberal Civic Movement. While the Civic Movement failed at the polls in 1992, ODS went on to become the strongest political force on the right over the next twenty years, with voter support averaging above 25% (Pšeja 2004a, Pšeja 2004b). Harsh criticism of the economic transformation process directed by ODS served as a major factor in the rise of the Czechoslovak (later Czech) Social Democratic Party (ČSSD). The party made use of a vacuum of sorts on the left of the political spectrum, and, after two not very successful electoral performances in 1990 and 1992, became the strongest opposition party under the leadership of Miloš Zeman, acquiring, in 1996, more than four times (!) the vote that it had previously received. ODS and ČSSD gradually assumed the positions of the two major poles of the party system, gaining between them more than 50% of the vote (in 2006, more than 67% of all valid votes cast (Kopeček and Pšeja 2008)). These four political parties (ČSSD, KDU-ČSL, KSČM and ODS) used to be accompanied by rather small right-centre formations such as the Civic Democratic Alliance (ODA), Freedom Union (US), or the Green Party (Pšeja Mareš, 2005, Dimun, Hamerský, 1999, Mareš, 1998, Fiala and Mareš, 2005 b, Kopeček, 2010, Pečínka, 2005). Specific to the Czech political party system of the first half of the 1990s were the relative electoral successes enjoyed by the radical-right Association for the Republic–Republican Party of Czechoslovakia (SPR-RSČ). The results of the 2010 and 2013 parliamentary election brought success of the four new political parties: liberal-conservative TOP 09 and anti-establishment Public Affairs (VV), ANO 2011 and Tomio Okamura`s Dawn of Direct Democracy (Havlík, in print).

A glance at the seat share of individual parties (Table 2) suggests that the party system was relatively stable until the 2010 election, at least as far as the number and identity of actors are concerned. Since 1996, the first election in the independent Czech Republic, three parties have repeatedly achieved parliamentary representation; and, if we were to exclude the 2010 and 2013 elections, whose

results deviated from the rest, we would see four stable parliamentary parties (the fourth would be KDU-ČSL, which, in 2002, stood as part of the Coalition). The positions of the two major poles in the system have been gradually assumed by ODS and ČSSD. These have been complemented by minor poles: KSČM and KDU-ČSL (cf. Strmiska 1998). This basic four party configuration has been repeatedly complemented by smaller right-wing parties (ODA and US); the Greens; and, during the 1990s, SPR-RSČ.

Table 2: Electoral results in 1990-2010 (number of seats)

	1990*	1992*	1996	1998	2002	2006	2010	2013
OF	127							
KSČ(M)	32	35	22	24	41	26	26	33
HSD-SMS	22	14						
KDU(-ČSL)	19	15	18	20	31	13		14
US(-DEU)				19				
ODS(-KDS)		76	68	63	58**	81	53	16
ODA		14	13					
SPR-RSČ		14	18					
ČSSD		16	61	74	70	74	56	50
SZ		16				6		
TOP 09							41	26
VV							24	
ANO								47
The Dawn								14

Source of data: volby.cz, results for the Czech National Council, ** the Coalition*

Analysis of Stability of the Czech Party System: two Waves of Openness

Let us first look at the level of volatility and support for the new parties which can provide us with a more detailed view on stability of electoral support of the parties in the system and capture the trends in the development and changes of electoral fortune of the established parties and their challengers.

Figure 1: Evolution of volatility and gains of new political parties in the Czech Republic (1992–2013)



Source: Powell and Tucker 2013, Sikk (2005), author's calculations

As seen in the **Figure 1**, the trends capturing the changes in party system stability and electoral gains of new parties are similar and clear. Following the initial period of high volatility (see the difference between the 1990 and 1992 elections) caused by acceleration in dynamics during the formative phase of the Czech party system, total volatility stabilised at around 20%. (During the formative phase, the Civic Forum disintegrated; new parties appeared, and some were successful electorally; and existing parties regrouped into various electoral coalitions whose subsequent existence was only ephemeral). The 2010 and 2013 elections brought a significant change, however, with total volatility climbing above 35%, caused by substantial increase of support of new political parties (Hanley 2011, Šedo 2011). Specifically, this concerned Public Affairs; the left-centre Citizens' Rights Party–Zemanites, and the nationalist populist Sovereignty party in 2010 and ANO and the Dawn in 2013. Were we to include TOP 09 among new parties (which makes sense to some extent), the total electoral gains of new entrants in 2010 would reach almost 40%. This also demonstrates that, despite the relative stability of the parliamentary parties (we have already mentioned the long-term presence of ČSSD, ODS, KSČM, and KDU-ČSL in the parliament), the electoral gains of the new parties contribute about half of the total volatility (with the exception of the year 2006).

Figure 2: Effective number of parties in the Czech Republic (1990-2013)



Source: Author's calculation

After the initial rise of number of effective parties in parliament in 1992 (mainly as a result of the end of the Civic Forum and success of many new political parties), Czech party system became stabilized with 3.5 effective parties on average. However, the increase of volatility in 2010 and 2013 was accompanied by growing fragmentation of the party system. As a result of the rise of the new parties and loss of support of the established ones, the number of effective parties rose up to 5.5. In other words, the new parties neither replaced the old parties, nor the old parties were capable to regain their support in 2013 and the Czech party system became even more fragmented than it had been in 1992.

The years 2010 and 2013 were extraordinary in terms of all of the quantitative indicators used in this study, with total volatility and gains of new parties reaching the highest levels since 1992, regardless of the method of calculation used. As the data shows, the Czech party politics entered its new era characterized by electoral success of new political parties and drop of support of the established actors, both related to the growing dissatisfaction with political situation.

In addition to the level of volatility, we calculated the level of the three components of party system institutionalization defined above. Table 3 shows both an overview of governments in the Czech Republic and calculation of indicators of party sytem institutionalization. Only elections after the dissolution of Czechoslovakia were included. Technocratic cabinets of Tošovský, Fischer and Rusnok (Hloušek, Kopeček 2014) and the first cabinet of Topolánek, which did not get the confidence

of the Parliament, were excluded from analysis. **Table 3** provides us with rather mixed results.

Table 3: Governments and PSI in the Czech Republic (1996-2013)

	Government	Alteration	Formulae	Access
1996	ODS – KDU-ČSL - ODA	0,737	1	1
1998	ČSSD	1	0	0
2002	ČSSD – KDU-ČSL - US	0,333	0	0,834
2006	ODS – KDU-ČSL - SZ	0,667	0,778	0,778
2010	ODS – TOP 09 - VV	0,2	0	0,4
2013	ČSSD – ANO – KDU-ČSL	1	0,576	0,576

Source: Author`s calculations

After the initial phase of high level of PSI related to right-centre cabinets of Václav Klaus, the formation of minority social democratic government in 1998 meant that the overall level of PSI dropped significantly since a new formula was introduced. This was followed by subsequent rise of PSI between 2002-2006 when the party system can be charaterized by a high level of closure. This period is related to intensified bipolarization of party competition driven by rivalry of ČSSD and ODS. On the other hand, the pariah-status of KSČM meant only partial government alteration, with KDU-ČSL participating in both right-centre and left-centre cabinets.

The 2010 election results and the rise of the new parties (and their subsequent inclusion into the government) are reflected in the lower level of PSI components or the higher level of party system openness rexpectively. The electoral success of the new parties and the significant drop of the support of the established parties in 2013 did not lead to the drop of the level of all of the PSI components since the new government, which completely altered the old centre-right cabinet, was predominantly formed by the old parties that has already governed together and the cabinet formula cannot be described as completely new and – in line with the construction of PSI indicators – unpredictable. On the hand, a new political party ANO 2011 formed an important part of the new coalition which refers to relative openness of the Czech party system (similarly to the situation after the 2010 election). In sum, the Czech party system has experienced two periods of relative openness, stemming from two different sources. The first period dates back to the late 90s and first years of the Millenium and is related to the entrance of ČSSD to the government in 1998 and subsequently to only a partial government alteration after

the 2002 and 2006 elections respectively. This openness was linked to two important aspects of the Czech party system. The first one is the specific position of some party actors, namely the pariah status of KSČM which was already mentioned above and then "unfriendly" relationship between ODS and US which made a coalition of these two ideologically close parties impossible and finally led to the minority government of ČSSD based on cooperation with ODS (Roberts, 2003) with sharp contrast with pre-election statements of the two rivals. Similarly, participation of US in the left-centre coalition after the 2002 election could not be easily predicted taking into consideration the liberal economic programme of US. Moreover, KDU-ČSL`s changes in preferences of coalition partners did not contribute to predictability of interactions among political parties.

The second period of unstability/openness of the party system started with the 2010 election and continued after the 2013 elections and is related to the rise of the new parties in particular. Furthermore, the significant drop of the electoral support of the once biggest parties brought a change in party system configuration formerly constructed around the two major poles a rivals in terms of competition between the right and the left (whereas in 2006 ČSSD and ODS got over two thirds of votes, it was only 42% in 2010 and 28% in 2013). All the same, the newly emerged parties have not taken the role of a new major pole for two reasons. First, their electoral support has not simply been big enough. Second, with exception of TOP 09, it is very difficult to characterize them in terms of socio-economic cleavage which has dominated the party competition in the Czech Republic (Hloušek, Kopeček 2008, Casal Bértoa 2014). A closer look at geographic patterns of electoral support (Havlík, Voda 2014) reveals no correlation with sociodemographic characteristic which makes the new parties (again with exception of TOP 09) significantly different from the established actors.

The question is what is the explanation behind the rise of the new parties. Explaining the emergence and success of new political parties, Lucardie (2000) mentions sufficient mobilization of resources and political opportunity structures as the key factors that determine the electoral fortune of newcomers. There are various types of resources necessary for founding and running a political party from ideology, members to money. As Lucardie put it, "a combination of sufficient members, publicity and funds seems a necessary (if not a sufficient) condition for success." (Lucardie 2000: 179). On the other hand, with gradual process of dealignment,

growing role of the (new) media and political marketing, parties on the grounds do not seem to be as important as it used to be (Katz, Mair 1995, van Biezen 2012). Still, a persuasive political platform, the personality of the leader, and money, all play a crucial role for viability of a political party. Although the concept of political opportunity structures (POS) was developed in studies about social movements (Tarrow 1998), it can also be useful for analysis of electoral breakthrough of political parties (Kitschelt 1988, Müller-Rommel 1993, Rydgren 2006). POS were defined as "consistent – but not necessarily formal, permanent or national resources that are external in relation to the parties or social movements under study" (Rydgren 2006: 14). POS include formal institutions such as electoral system or political parties regulation, societal changes (dealignment, realignment), issues salience or structure of party competition (e.g. convergence in political space). Given the more or less unchanged institutional setting (law regulating political parties, electoral system, public funding of political parties), the formal institutions will be ommited in the following text.

The first step which is necessary to explain the emergence and electoral success of new political parties in the Czech Republic, is a description of parties`s resources including funds, organizational structure, leadership and political platform. TOP 09 was founded in June 2009 and its name consists of the initials of the words "Tradition, responsibility, prosperity." The emergence of the party was a result of a split within KDU-ČSL: a group of right-centre leaning MPs led by Miroslav Kalousek was defeated by left-centre oriented wing at a party conference and decided to leave the party and to form a new party proclaimed itself to be conservative but sticking to liberal economic principles. The greatest personal asset came with the arrival of Karel Schwarzenberg, former Minister of Foreign Affairs in the cabinet formed after the 2006 election, who was elected the chairman of the party. Electoral campaign of the party before the 2010 election was highly personalised and extensively used Schwarzenberg`s public popularity (Matušková 2010). Another factor important for the electoral success of the party was its electoral alliance with Mayors and Independents, a political party of successful local politicians (Spáč, 2013). Alongside with the fact that number of former KDU-ČSL local branches joined TOP 09, collaboration with Mayors and Independents created a personal basis for the party candidacy in 2010. With a clear liberal-conservative ideological profile, TOP 09 naturally became a rival of ODS in the right-centre part of political space. Using a

typology of new parties developed by Lucardie (2000), TOP 09 can be classified as a purifier which "seek to articulate existing party traditions in more principled and authentic forms" (Hanley 2012). TOP 09 used skillfully the economic crisis which struck the Czech Republic and called for austerity economic measures with reference to Greek experience. "Purifying" position of the party was confirmed by specific patterns of its electoral support and by characteristics of its electorate. Regional distribution of support of TOP 09 was very similar to ODS support in previous years (Havlík, Voda 2014) and despite several differences (voters of TOP 09 were younger) its electorate demography resembles characteristics of ODS voters (Linek et al. 2011).

VV was established in 2001, as a civic association in Prague focused on issues concerning local city politics. In June 2009, the party announced that it would compete in the early election of the Chamber of Deputies with Radek John, a popular former writer and investigative journalist, as leader of the party's election campaign. John`s election increases party credibility since the chairman of the party became the most trustworthy politicians in opinions shortly before his election (Kunštát 2010). The party's election campaign was based on a combination of a strong anti-establishment appeal, calls for more direct democracy (including within the VV party itself), and anti-corruption slogans, but without targeting any particular social group (Matušková 2010, Eibl 2010) and clear ideological profile. Its main election slogan called for "The end of the political dinosaurs", i.e. "corrupted and incompetent" politicians of the established parties. VV appeals resonated with political crisis the Czech Republic which can be seen as the most important opportunity structure for the rise of political parties using anti-establishment appeals. The core element of this crisis was a long decline in satisfaction with politics and political institutions that began more than a year (Linek, 2010) before any economic decline, and indeed in a time of economic prosperity. In relation to the timing of the rise of the populist parties, it is necessary to emphasize a sharp decline of the political trust in the period after the 2006 general election which was related to the complicated process of government formation followed by weakness and instability of the government, and extensive (and often well-founded) allegations of corruption (Havlík 2011). While in previous years public satisfaction with the political situation

and trust in political institutions increased after elections (Linek 2010),[6] in 2006, the immediate reaction after the elections led to record lows in both indicators and did not return to higher number before the 2010 election. The weak position of the government vis-à-vis the Chamber of Deputies was supplemented by friction among the coalition parties, which led to the fall of the government in spring 2009 (Havlík, 2011), contributing significantly to the crisis of trust in political institutions and in politics in general. The political parties in the Chamber agreed to the formation of a caretaker government composed of non-partisans (but nominated by ČSSD, ODS and SZ), as well as announcing early elections (Hloušek, Kopeček 2014). However, due to the alleged unconstitutionality of the move,[7] the Czech Constitutional Court overruled the Chamber's call for early elections. This led to a de facto extension of the caretaker government's term (up to 13 months), which continued in spite of its low level of legitimacy and no clear support in the Chamber of Deputies (Balík 2011). Therefore, it was the political crisis what can be considered the most important political opportunity structures for the electoral success of VV.

In November 2011, a billionaire of Slovak origin and the owner of the biggest agro-chemical company in the Czech Republic, Andrej Babiš, released a document entitled "Action of Dissatisfied Citizens," in which he criticized the existing situation in Czech politics and the politicians, calling on citizens to take part in an initiative towards "a more just society, and a functional state with the rule of law" (ANO 2011). The initiative became the basis for the ANO 2011 party. The discourse of the party combined a very strong anti-establishment appeal but differed to some extent from the discourse VV had applied before the 2010 election. The cornerstone of ANO's anti-establishment rhetoric was a contrast constructed between practices typical for running companies – symbolized by the successful businessman Andrej Babiš – and a supposedly dysfunctional, spendthrift, and corruption-ridden state (run by the current set of politicians). Creating an efficient, private-sector style approach as the

[6] The only exception was the drop of political trust after the 1996 general election (Linek 2010). However, the context and consequences were very different in comparison to the period after the 2006 election. The Czech Republic was experiencing a severe economic crisis and dissatisfaction with political situation targeted mainly the centre-right government which had been in office since the beginning of the 1990s. Consequently, the main winner of the 1998 election was not the populist SPR-RSČ (on contrary, the party lost its parliamentary representation that year) but the Czech Social Democratic Party presenting itself as a leftist alternative to the previous right-centre governments.

[7] Dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies was quite difficult at that time. To make the process faster and following the procedure apllied in 1998, the Chamber of Deputies passed a special constitutional act which was supposed to shorten the term and call for early elections.

main solution for politics and public administration was reflected in the slogan "I will run the state like a business," which ANO took into the election campaign. The election slogan, "We're not like the politicians – we work!" also clearly illustrates the dichotomy constructed in the ANO discourse between the "incompetent" politicians of the established parties and the representatives of ANO (Babiš in particular), successful in "real" life. A factor which significantly contributed to the success of the party were *de facto* unlimited financial sources of Babiš and his companies used for running a professional and highly effective campaign before the 2013 election (Gregor, Macková 2014).

The Dawn was founded by Czech-Japanese businessman Tomio Okamura, owner of a firm that imported Japanese food as well as a travel agency. In 2012, Okamura was elected to the Senate (the upper house) and wanted to run in the historic first direct presidential elections in January 2013, but the Interior Ministry barred his candidacy for having an insufficient number of valid petition signatures. The key element of The Dawn's discourse was an unending emphasis on direct democracy as the most important element of any proposed reforms of the political system. The current setup of the political system of the Czech Republic – a representative parliamentary democracy with a proportional voting system – was understood by Okamura as the main culprit of the political crisis. Moreover, anti-Roma and xenophobic stances became a part – although not a key one – of the discourse of The Dawn. Okamura`s popularity (he became the second most trustworthy politician after President Zeman just before the 2013 election – Kunštát 2013a) was the cornestone of success of the party. Nevertheless, the key opportunity opened for the new parties was a deepening of the political crisis since the period after the 2010 election failed to bring about a significant shift in the perception of politics by the public. The starting position of the center-right government formed after the 2010 was better (118 deputies out of 200) than that of the previous cabinet. However, the government was seriously weakened by ongoing conflicts within the governing coalition (Hloušek, 2012), and by several corruption scandals.

Moreover, trust in politics slumped notably after an internal VV document was made public which clearly indicated that the party's election campaign against corruption was chiefly designed as a way to increase business opportunities for Vice-Chairman Bárta's private security firms through public procurement. Moreover, Bárta

allegedly paid off Deputies from his own party for their allegiance (Kmenta 2011). Subsequent speculation about a suspected intra-party putsch of “compromised” VV Deputies collaborating with ODS and TOP 09 (the other parties in the government) led to a split in the party, with some members of VV leaving the government altogether. In addition, internal ODS conflicts about party policy and whether or not the government was sufficiently “on the right” meant that eventually the government as a whole found itself without a secure majority in the Chamber of Deputies (Hloušek, 2012).

Allegation of corruption of the “rebelling” ODS deputies became one of the reasons for a police raid on the Office of the Government in spring 2013, and for charging Prime Minister Nečas and the rebel deputies. The Prime Minister was forced to resign under pressure, which brought down the entire government. The political crisis was prolonged by President Miloš Zeman, who refused to appoint a representative of ODS as the new Prime Minister, even though the new government had the declared support of a majority in the Chamber of Deputies. Instead, the President appointed Jiří Rusnok, a former Minister of Finance from his government in the early 2000s, as Prime Minister. However, the government did not win a vote of confidence. As a consequence, the Chamber of Deputies voted to dissolve itself. Elections were then scheduled for the end of October 2013, which meant the longest period in the Czech history with a cabinet without a clear legitimacy, as well as the longest period with a dissolved Parliament.

Even more often than during the previous election term, the media reported about various alleged corruption scandals involving almost all the parliamentary parties such as ProMoPro affair (overpriced purchase of various equipment used during the Czech presidency over the EU), purchase of CASA airplanes for the Czech army, non-transparent public tenders at the Ministry for Environment or several instances of misappropriation of the money from European Union operational programmes at the regional level (one of the MPs was even arrested for alleged bribery). As in 2006-2010, repeated corruption scandals and government instability led to another drop of trust in the Parliament and satisfaction with the political situation fell to another historical low. In the weeks after a part of VV had left the government, average satisfaction with the political situation collapsed to just 5 per cent of the population, while trust in the Chamber of Deputies crumbled to 12 per cent (Kunštát, 2012; Kunštát, 2013b).

Consequently, with a deepening of the crisis of political trust before the 2013 general elections conditions for the rise of populist parties were even more favorable than three years earlier. The role of political crisis in the success of anti-establishment parties with no clear ideological profilation is indirectly confirmed by patterns of electoral support of ANO and The Dawn. Unlike TOP 09, these two new parties were not electorally anchored in terms of socio-demographic characteristics (Havlík, Voda, 2014). It indicates that the "old" socio-economic cleavage has been supplemented by a new conflict defined by negative attitudes to politics or established political parties instead of being linked to socio-demographic characteristics or attitudes of voters.[8]

Conclusion

The main aim of the paper was to analyse stability of the party system in the Czech Republic which is usually described as one of the most stable systems in East-Central Europe. The analysis was conducted by using selected quantitative approaches including volatility and party system institutionalization. With regards to electoral support of political parties, after the first turbulent years after the fall of communism the Czech party experienced exceptional years of stability with the same four of main political parties. However, the two last general elections brought a sudden decrease of support of the old parties and the emergence of new challengers.

A detailed analysis of party system institutionalization which took into consideration interactions among political parties confirmed the growing instability of the Czech party system. On the other hand, it questioned the proclaimed *longterm* stability since even before the 2010 election, the institutionalization of the Czech party system varied considerably due to the pariha status of KSČM, complicated relationship between the centre-right political parties and broad coalition potential of KDU-ČSL. Though the extent of the changes the Czech party system underwent in recent years are exceptional.

Therefore, the second part of the analysis was aimed at explanation of the rise of the new political parties. First, it is necessary to distinguish between TOP 09 that made use of a weakened position of ODS and presented itself as purifying right-centre alternative to Civic Democrats and anti-establishment or populist group of

[8] Since data from the 2013 Election Study has not been released yet, thist statement needs to be conformed by a further analysis.

parties including VV, ANO and The Dawn. These parties are very difficult to classify in terms of party families and although they discourse differs, their rise can be best explained by a deepened political crisis related to weak government and growing number of medialized corruption scandals. The rise of the new parties undermined the contours which characterize the Czech party system in the past: the number of relevant parties increased, the support of the established actors weakened significantly and new coalition formulae were introduced. All in all, once stable party system has become on of the most unpredictable party system configuration in East-Central Europe.

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