**Cleavages, protest or voting for hope? The Rise of New Populist Parties in the Czech Republic**

**1 Introduction**

Over the past two decades, populist parties have become a well-established part of many European party systems. Their rise has provoked extensive scholarly discussion aiming both at their conceptualization of and explanations for the reasons behind their electoral success, analyses of their electorate and the impact of populist political parties on the structure of party competition.

Nevertheless, these conclusions have been derived from studies focusing either on populist radical right (Betz 1994; Mudde 2007) or populist radical left parties/social populists (Barker 1998, March 2012) while the relatively new species of centrist populist political parties (Učeň 2004; Pop Eleches 2010) has been neglected in this regard. Furthermore, the results of analyses are often driven by the content of host ideologies (i.e. populism is not analytically disentangled from its particular host ideology) and therefore the information about *populist* voting is limited in this sense. Not having a clear host ideology, centrist populist political parties are a “purer” version of populist political parties and consequently a more suitable case for an examination of the effects of populism on electoral behaviour.

The article contributes to filling the described gap in the research of populism by analysing the supporters of centrist populist parties (CPPs) in the Czech Republic. Certainly, the Czech Republic is not the only country that has experienced the emergence of CPPs, with Bulgaria (Cholova 2012), Slovakia (Spáč 2012) and the Baltic states (Balcere 2012) being other interesting cases. Moreover, Slovenia underwent a party system change of a similar intensity in the early 2010s. Nevertheless, there are serious doubts about the populist character of the newly emerged parties in Slovenia (Krašovec 2012). Moreover, the lack of suitable data on voters does not allow us to conduct an analysis of the electorate of the newly emerged parties in Slovenia.

Consequently, there are at least two reasons that make the Czech Republic a more suitable case for conducting an analysis of CPPs supporters. First, the Czech party system has experienced long-term stability. While the party system in the Czech Republic enjoyed a high level of stability until the emergence of CPPs, both in terms of volatility and cleavage structure (Casal Bértoa 2014; Powell and Tucker 2014), the rise of centrist populism in Slovakia took place in the environment of continuous changes characterized by transformation of the main political conflicts. Although it was possible to trace some signs of stability in Bulgaria before 2001, the level of both extra-system and intra-system volatility was considerably higher in comparison to the Czech case (Powell and Tucker 2014). The argument about the higher level of volatility applies to the Baltic countries as well. The second reason is the richness of empirical material. The analysis of the case enables us to examine three different parties in two general elections. All the parties analysed here can be described as centrist populist. All the same, they differed in proposed solutions which had implication for the profile of their voters and it is also important for the discussion about the one species of centrist populist parties as we will show later.

The paper is structured as follows. First, we introduce the concept of centrist populism as part of a description of the rise of the new CPPs in the context of the relative stability of Czech party politics. Second, employing the most widely used approaches in electoral behaviour research we will analyse 1) who supports CPPs and 2) how the rise of CPPs have helped transform Czech electoral politics. Since there has been very little effort dedicated to the analysis of CPPs, we seek to test various approaches in order to understand the electoral base of the new populist challengers in the Czech Republic. We then describe our data and our method of analysis before presenting the results. Our conclusion sums up our findings and considers their implications.

**2 Centrist populism – the concept and the Czech context**

It has become some sort of a cliché to state that there are a very few terms in the contemporary comparative political research as contested as populism (Canovan 1999; Stanley 2008). Nevertheless, the recent research has led to the emergence of a consensus on the “nucleus of populism” (Rooduijn 2014) constituted around three interrelated elements: 1) the virtuous people that are 2) betrayed by the essentially bad elites, and 3) the restoration of the people`s sovereignty allegedly driven by populists themselves. As Stanley stated, the “thin nature [of populist ideology] means that it is unable to stand alone as a practical political ideology: it lacks the capacity to put forward a wide-ranging and coherent programme for the solution to crucial political questions” (Stanley 2008: 95). Indeed, history has shown a wide variety of populist actors that reflected the specifics of the environment in which they arose, including populist radical right parties, agrarian populism and social populism (Pauwels 2015) as the most prominent empirical expressions of “chameleonic” (Taggart 2000) populist ideology.

At the end of the 1990s, however, East-Central Europe witnessed the emergence of political parties which lacked a clear ideological foundation and, at the same time, expressed very strong populist appeals. The term CPP has been used to capture the unusual identity of these new political parties based solely on populist appeals. In his analysis of party politics in post-communist Europe, Grigore Pop-Eleches (2010) defined new/centrist populism as one of the four types of unorthodox parties. New/centrist populist parties do not present a radical ideology. In contrast, they try to sidestep any ideology altogether and claim that they represent a non-ideological, anti-political alternative to the established parties. Their programmes are based on the claim that they fight the corrupt elite and pursue the interests of the people, promising to enhance living standards. As Pop-Eleches states (2010: 231), “such parties are almost completely unencumbered by ideological constraints and are therefore free to tell the voters what they want to hear”.[[1]](#footnote-1) Similarly, Peter Učeň (2004) used the term centrist populism to describe political parties that entered the Slovak parliament in the 1998 and 2002 general elections. Učeň explains the “centrism” of these populist parties in terms of their self-presentation as alternatives to mainstream parties without taking extremist positions and being located “directly or indirectly [in] the ideological or geometric centre of the party system.” (Učeň 2004: 47). Not only do these parties not present extreme or radical political attitudes, they lack a clear ideological profile altogether. Therefore, instead of a coherent ideology, the appeal of CPPs is often based on the promised competence of the leader, or on the claim to increase the participation of the people in the policy-making process. Both variants are supposed to lead to the same promise – a better representation of the people. Going back to Stanley`s argument, CPPs lack a clear and coherent host ideology, the core of their identity is populism itself and solutions stemming from it, be it a competent leader, “common sense” or introduction of different forms of participatory or direct democracy.

In the previous paragraphs we briefly introduced what the concept of CPPs means. Now, we turn to the description of the Czech party system and the emergence of CPPs here. After the fall of communism and the first “grounding years” characterized by the turbulent development of political parties, Czech party politics became one of the most stable party systems in Central and Eastern Europe, typified by low levels of volatility (Powell, Tucker 2014) and a structure of well-institutionalized party competition established around the dominant left-right divide (Casal Bértoa 2014; Hloušek and Kopeček 2008). However, the 2010 and 2013 parliamentary elections called the previous stability of party politics into question (Havlík 2015a; Hanley 2011). The most spectacular feature of the general elections in 2010 and in 2013 was the success of CPPs, namely of Public Affairs (*Věci veřejné*, VV), Action of Dissatisfied Citizens (*Akce nespokojených občanů*, ANO) and Tomio Okamura`s Dawn of Direct Democracy (*Úsvit přímé demokracie Tomia Okamury*, Dawn).[[2]](#footnote-2) Inclusion of Dawn may be surprising because of the xenophobic elements of Okamura`s discourse (Císař and Štetka 2016). Despite occasional anti-Roma statements, radical right elements became the central part of party profile *after* the election. Until then, the most important message presented by the party was the change of the political system aimed at the empowerment of the people through the introduction of direct democracy measures and other reforms of the polity. In this context, Havelka (2016) described Dawn as an example of “populist anti-politics”. On the contrary, TOP 09 – another newcomer from the 2010 general election – is not a part of analysis. Although TOP 09 showed some elements of an anti-establishment appeal and an anti-corruption agenda, the anti-establishment appeal was not in the core of the profile of the party. The party presented itself as a “purifier” seeking to heal a right-wing part of the spectrum. As Séan Hanley (2011: 124) put it, TOP 09, “tried to present itself primarily as representatives of the mainstream centre-right, offering purer versions of conservatism or liberal conservatism […], as actors that could fix the failure of the established parties to transform the Czech Republic into a modern Western-like market-based society”. In other words, TOP 09 does not see itself as an alternative to all *established parties* (as CPPs did) but merely as an alternative in the centre-right part of the party system.

Table 1 about here

What the CPPs had in common was a strong anti-establishment appeal which depicted the old political parties as incompetent and corrupt. Indeed, corruption was presented as the most important feature of the established parties and the way they approach politics and governance (Havlík 2015b). VV, for instance, called politicians from the entire political spectrum “robber barons” or “political dinosaurs”, i.e. those “who [have] been in politics for more than ten years, can’t do anything other than politics, [understand] it as his trade and [start] to make deals.… who’[ve] lost touch with reality and [ceased] to be useful.” (Právo 2009) Three years later, ANO spoke of the “corrupt system of political parties” (ANO 2013b) and Dawn described the current state of affairs as “not real democracy (…). In our case it’s a government of the big mega-firms, the godfathers, and as their tools they have the individual parties” (Okamura 2013a). All three parties can be classified as populist – using strong anti-establishment appeals to construct a moral division between the two homogeneous groups – the “pure people” and “the corrupt elite” (Mudde 2004, Stanley 2008) although the purity of the people expressed mostly through numerous references to the common sense of the people and their ability to make right decisions was more visible in the case of VV and Dawn than in the case of ANO (Havlík 2015b). All the same, none of the Czech populist newcomers presented a coherent programme in terms of “host ideologies”. Instead, VV declared that it pursued “common sense” in contrast to standard ideological solutions, claiming that “ideologies are totally empty” (Česká televize 2010). Similarly, ANO’s electoral platform was typical of the high proportion of valence issues as opposed to positional issues (Eibl 2014), and they stressed common sense, and added an emphasis on “simple and effective managing of the state” (ANO 2013a). Okamura also did not self-position his party in terms of classical political categories, referring to “left-right perception of the world as anachronism” (Haló noviny 2015). In other words, the populist appeals and programmatic vagueness of the three new political parties fit the definition of CPPs.

**4 Voting for centrist populist parties in the Czech Republic – theoretical expectations**

Since there have not been any systemic CPPs studies published of yet, our study is partly explanatory in its character, relying on both the established literature on populist voting and on the specifics of the supply side of the CPPs described above. The literature has provided many explanations for why people vote for populist political parties. We agree with Pauwels who stated that “there is no reason to believe that ‘populist voters’ would make their choice fundamentally different from other voters” (Pauwels 2015: 53). Because it is reasonable to expect that specific populist factors drive the concrete voting choice, we use socio-demographic voting (i.e. cleavage-based), protest voting, issue voting, spatial and valence voting to explain the electoral support of CPPs in the Czech Republic.

**The sociological approach** which emphasises the importance of people’s social positions has a long tradition in the study of voting behaviour, going back to research conducted in the 1940s in the United States and to cleavage theory (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). The main assumption is that voting behaviour is shaped by social divides such as social class, religion or by place of residence. A social divide has to have three dimensions (structural, normative and organizational) to be considered a cleavage. In this part, we deal only with the structural dimension when we examine the effect of social structure. Deegan-Krause (2006) calls this aspect of cleavage voting as the census divide. The results of the research applying a sociological approach to the study of populist parties show that these parties are supported by the “losers of modernization” (Betz 1994) who face the changes in social dynamics with difficulties, as a consequence of the “integration-demarcation” cleavage (Grande et al. 2008). Indeed, empirical research has shown the overrepresentation of some groups of society among voters of populist radical right parties supported by male, less educated, unskilled workers or members of the old middle class (Ivarsflaten 2005; Lubbers et al. 2002). Regarding the analysis of voting for CPPs, the problem is that these studies were focused on populist *radical right* parties. Similarly, the results of analyses of radical left populist parties which describe their supporters as unemployed, less educated people are hardly applicable to CPPs.

Consequently, to analyse the sociodemographic characteristics of new populist parties in the Czech Republic, we need to start with the supply side. The crucial thing here is that the discourse of Czech CPPs is characterized by the lack of a coherent host ideology and specificity of the “people” (in contrast to the “working class” of social populists or “the nation” of the populist radical right). In other words, it does not predict the existence of a linkage to a specific population group. The study of the electorate of similar political parties in Slovakia (Učeň et al. 2005) or Italy (Maggini 2015) confirms the heterogeneous socio-demographic profile of supporters of these parties. In other words, while there has been broad agreement about the establishment of the socio-demographic (social class, religion) determination of the electoral bases of party competition in the Czech Republic after the fall of communism (Hloušek and Kopeček 2008; Evans and Whitefield 1998), we expect that socio-demographic characteristics do not explain the support for the new CPPs. To put it in a different way, the rise of the new CPPs since 2010 indicates that these pre-existing socio-structural conflicts no longer have the same ability to describe party competition as they had before. Therefore, we formulate the following hypothesis:

H1: The effect of the sociodemographic characteristics of voters will be lower in explanation of support for CPPs in comparison to support for the established[[3]](#footnote-3) political parties.

Segments of the population given by census divide are interconnected with political values. Basically, a value is an enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct or end-state of existence is preferable to the opposite modes or end-states (Rokeach 1973). Therefore, values can be seen as guidelines of peoples’ attitudes and behaviour regarding political issues (Campbell et al. 1960; Fuchs, Klingemann 1990). In the literature, two types of political values are often distinguished. Values connected to opposite sides of the “old” socio-political cleavages (Lipset and Rokkan 1967) are usually labelled as old political values. The second category captures new political values including Inglehart’s materialist/post-materialist values, environmental and economic growth values and libertarian/authoritarian values. Moreover, in the area of the former east bloc, the dimension communism/post-communism is important (Hloušek and Kopeček 2008). The literature shows that values are an important factor in the explanation of support for right wing populist parties. Oesch (2008) frames this explanation as “cultural”, with attitudes towards community and identity playing a crucial role (Kitschelt and McGann 1995). The emergence of RPPs thus represent the authoritarian response to the dominance of libertarian values and multicultural models of living (Ignazi 1992; Minkenberg 2001). Accordingly, it is argued that the RPPs’ success is explained by people’s unease about the cultural challenges posed by the inflow and presence of an increasing number of foreign residents.

Much like the cleavage explanation of CPP, the “classic set” of political values (e.g. economic, libertarian/authoritarian) should not play a great role in voting for CPPs. This is due to their general programmatic “emptiness” in these categories. In contrast, since CPPs present themselves as an alternative to the old political parties and the old political conflicts, the lack of value rootedness should distinguish voting for CPPs from support for the old political parties.

H2: The effect of value voting will be lower in explanation of support for CPPs in comparison to support for the established political parties.

Another approach explaining why people vote for populist parties is based on **issue voting**, linked mostly to the host ideology of populism. In contrast to value voting, issue voting is driven rather by the actual situation (see Carmines and Stimson 1980), whereas value voting reflects one’s persistent patterns of thinking (Knutsen and Kumlin 2005). Deegan-Krausse (2006) differentiates between value voting and issue voting more subtly. He uses the term “attitudinal voting” to refer to “normative” or “value” categories of cleavage voting. The word “issues” then refers to the interplay between attitude and partisanship. Van der Brug et al. (2000) and Goodwin and Ford (2014) point out the anti-immigration positions of voters of populist radical right parties in the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Scandinavia. Pauwels (2015) identified the demand for a more regulatory role of the state in the economy as one of the drivers of voting for the populist left in Germany and in the Netherlands. While immigration, law and order and protectionist economy are not important issues for CPPs, the issue of corruption is a focal point of their populist discourse (Učeň 2007; Pop-Eleches 2010). As shown by Hanley and Sikk (2016), corruption was an important contextual factor behind the electoral success of anti-establishment reform parties in Central and Eastern Europe. Similarly, Engler (2016) showed an important effect of the perceived relative level of corruption on the electoral fortunes of new political parties, including the new populist challengers.

Therefore, we formulate the following hypothesis:

H3: Voters who perceive corruption to be a salient issue are more likely to support CPPs.

**Economic voting** is one of the most widely used explanations in the study of electoral behaviour. The main argument of the theory is that economic evaluation is an important factor for electoral behaviour in general. At the same time, the economy, as well as a moment of economic crisis and the feelings of frustration stemming from it in particular, is considered to be one of the most important driving forces of populist electoral success (Betz 1994; Kriesi and Pappas 2015). The main reason why economic voting is supposed to explain support for CPPs is that the established political parties are blamed for the economic malaise, while populist parties promise an economic turnaround either by returning the power directly to the people or through a populist leader who uses common sense to run the economy effectively. Although the economy was not of primary importance for the appeal of the Czech CPPs, it was a part of their general anti-establishment discourse, with political elites having been blamed for wasting public money and causing the state debt (Havlík 2015b). Since we are focusing on the individual level, we follow the approach based on the perception of economic conditions. This approach includes two basic perspectives: sociotropic and pocketbook voting. For pocketbook voters, it is how they evaluate their individual economic situation that matters. People who perceive that their economic situation got worse during the electoral term or could get better in next term tend to look for an alternative. In contrast, sociotropic voters put emphasis on the performance of a country`s economy in general (for an overview of economic voting see e.g. Harper 2000; Powell and Whitten 1993). The data allow us to test only sociotropic retrospective and pocketbook prospective voting related hypotheses. While retrospective sociotropic voting is based on an evaluation of the past state of the economy, prospective pocketbook voting is oriented around the evaluation of one’s future economic situation. Consequently, we formulate the next two hypotheses.

H4a: Voters who evaluate the past state of the country economy negatively are more likely to support CPPs.

H4b: Voters who evaluate their future economic situation negatively are more likely to support CPPs.

**Political cynicism** has had a prominent position in the study of populist voting. This is not surprising if we take into consideration the core of populism defined by the people centrism closely tied to strong anti-establishment appeals. Nevertheless, the question of how to define the targets of the populist protest vote arises. Two options are apparent. First, a populist protest appeal negatively targets the representatives of established political parties who are usually depicted as corrupt, incompetent, self-enriching, and otherwise incapable of representing the people, and thus form a specific political class (Schedler 1996). Although populism does not attack democracy as such (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2012), populist criticism is aimed at the particular face of democracy, i.e. the functioning of democracy as embodied in political practice represented by the established parties (Canovan 1999: 11). In his analysis of the populist radical right in Sweden, Rydgren (2006) showed the positive effects of political discontent on the vote for Sweden Democrats. Similarly, Pauwels (2014; see also Oesch 2008) identified the effects of low political trust and satisfaction with democracy on different populist political parties in Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands. As shown by Schumacher and Rooduijn (2013) in their study of voters for Dutch populist parties, “only protest attitudes distinguish voters for populist parties from voters for mainstream parties” (Schumacher and Rooduijn 2013: 1). On the other hand, Ivarsflaten (2008) and van der Brug et al. (2000) did not confirm that political cynicism is a common feature for voting for populist radical right parties. Although it seems that the effects of political cynicism on the support of populist parties vary, the *anti-elite* appeal aimed at the functioning of democracy run by the established parties has had a particular importance in the discourse of CPPs in the Czech Republic, while lacking a coherent ideological core.

Therefore, we formulate the following hypotheses:

H5: Voters who do not trust politicians are more likely to support CPPs.

H6: Voters with low satisfaction with democracy are more likely to support CPPs.

One of the most classical approaches to the study of electoral behaviour is the **spatial model** going back to Anthony Downs (1957). According to Downs, parties are strategic vote-maximizing actors, and voters have exogenously determined preferences on positional issues that present clear “pro-con” continua that divide public opinion. The basic assumption of the model is that voters choose political parties whose programme is closest to their political preferences. Van der Brug et al. (2000, 2005) showed that ideological proximity on the left-right scale (combined with anti-immigration stances) is a good predictor of voting for populist radical right parties in seven West-European countries, although this effect was moderated by the size of the preferred political party. Their conclusion supported the previous studies of populist radical right parties in the Netherlands (Tillie and Fennema 1998) and in other West European countries (Marsh and Wickham 1996). The position of CPPs in political space is more complicated in comparison to standard (“ideological”) political parties, for their centrism stems from two different sources. The first is the lack of extreme policies (Hanley and Sikk 2016), in terms of both economic and cultural conflicts. Second, there is an intentional lack of a clear position that results from the refusal to self-position in the political space, or there are combined contradictory political attitudes which lead to a centrist position “on average” (see above). Nevertheless, if not “truly” centrist, the moderate policy and unclear electoral platforms of CPPs lead us to the formulation of the following hypothesis:

H7: Voters who position themselves close to CPPs are more likely to support them, but the effect of proximity on support for CPPs is weaker than effect of proximity on voting for the established parties.

Valence voting is one of the newest strands of voting behaviour research. Valence can refer to various phenomena, including issues with one-sided opinion distribution, leaders’ evaluation or competence of the party in general (Clarke 2004; Ho et al. 2013). Economy and health care are good examples of valence issues, with everyone preferring a prosperous economy and accessible and affordable healthcare. Two assumptions are crucial for understanding the valence model. First, the valence issues are supposed to dominate the political agenda (see Clarke 2004; Green 2007; Galasso and Nannicini 2011). Second, political parties and leaders are evaluated according to their perceived competence in solving the issue. Despite the fact that the valence model has not been tested specifically in the study of populist parties, there is no reason to expect that the model should work differently. On the contrary, given the nature of populism and the stress it puts on the alleged incompetence of the established parties to deliver policies that meet public demands makes the valence model even more suitable for explaining populist voting. This thesis is also strengthened by the specific discourse of the CPPs in the Czech Republic, where “traditional”, ideologically-driven policies (positional statements) were replaced by “non-ideological” common sense solutions offered by leaders who were presented as being competent due to their experiences in everyday life. Therefore, we formulate the following hypothesis related to the valence model of voting:

H8: Voters who perceive CPPs to be more competent in solving the most salient political issues are more likely to support them in comparison to the established political parties.

**Data and methods**

This part presents the strategy toward answering the questions given in the introduction and testing the introduced hypotheses. The employed method and source of data are also introduced here. Our article has in principle two goals. The first is to examine the impact of the rise of CPPs on the party system. This impact will be measured by the model fit (Nagelkerke pseudo r-square) of multinomial logistic regression models. The logistic analysis is conducted because the dependent variable contains several unordered categories and therefore, for estimation of the effect of independent variables, a specific link function has to be used. In principle, multinomial logistic regression works as set of binomial logistic regressions while maintaining with the same reference category (support for ČSSD in our analysis). This party is selected because it is the strongest party in given period and because it remains stable in political space (see Linek et al. 2016). Because of the limited number of cases, the distinctive models are built to test different hypotheses. The dependent variable of analysis in all models is the nominal variable “party support” recoded from party choice. The categories of our variable do not cover people who vote for a given party, but people with a high propensity to vote for parties. In constructing a new variable, we follow the procedure used by Aichholzer et al. (2014) (see appendix for a detailed description).

For a more precise evaluation of the trend in the effect of categorical variables, the Kappa coefficient is computed (see Hout et al. 1995). Values of kappa close to zero mean the low effect of a variable on vote choice, higher values indicate stronger effects (see appendix for detail description). The second goal is to examine the individual factors which can explain support for CPPs. To meet this aim we use the coefficients for individual variables from our statistical models.

The analysis is run on the Czech election studies 2006, 2010 and 2013, conducted by the Sociological Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences. In our analysis, we use several sets of independent variables indicating the factors mentioned in the theoretical part. A list of variables with the detailed operationalization and accompanied by descriptive statistics is included in the appendix.

**Results**

The results (see Figure 1 and 15 – 32 for full results of models) show that patterns of voting behaviour has undergone a significant change in the years connected to the success of CPP in comparison to the 2006 elections. In accordance with our expectations, the explanatory power of the socio-structural and value models including variables related to the “old” cleavages has been decreasing over time. In other words, while the explanatory power of both the socio-structural and value based model was high in 2006, it dropped significantly in 2010 and 2013 which indicates that the emergence of CPPs did not stem from the established cleavages. Surprisingly, neither political satisfaction nor political cynicism explains the general patterns of voting behaviour in 2010 and 2013 well. On the other hand, issue and valence voting models capture the changes related to the rise of CPPs well, especially in 2013.

Figure 1 about here

The pseudo r-square is sometimes blamed for distorting the real differences in the explanatory power because of the differences in frequency of each category of dependent and independent variables. Figure 2 presents the results of the kappa coefficient (designed for categorical variables) which allows us to overcome this problem. The values of coefficients show us almost the same pattern as the Figure 1 but with several more or less important distinctions. Firstly, the effect of cleavage variables decreased more between the 2010 and 2013 elections than between those in 2006 and 2010. This is not surprising given the greater electoral success of CPPs in 2013. The overall drop in explanatory power of the cleavage model is most prominently driven by the decrease in effect of generations, religion and residence. On the contrary, the change in the effect of occupation and education (which can be seen as class variables) is relatively weaker than in the case of other cleavage variables. The decline of “ideological voting” is more supported by the declining effect of the values and by the declining effect of proximity voting. Compared to the trend in the effect of cleavage variables, the effects of variables indicating valence and issue voting have increased. According to the values of kappa coefficients, we can make a more accurate claim about the increased effect of issue and valence voting. Whereas the level of issue voting is the same in 2010 as in 2006, the effect of valence voting has continually increased.

Figure 2 about here

The data thus confirm the hypothesis about the change of the character of electoral support after the rise of CPPs and the decrease in the explanatory power of the cleavage-based model that explained much of the variance before the rise of CPPs.

While the previous part of the analysis described the overall patterns of voting, the next part of the paper examines the effect of different variables on support for different political parties. According to the first hypothesis, we assume a weaker effect of variables defining cleavages in the case of CPPs (compared to the established political parties). Results in figure 3 (and in figures 1-4 in the appendix) lend some support to this hypothesis. Variables indicating voters’ positions in different segments of society have a much higher effect on support for established political parties in general. On the other hand, with the exception of the generations, these variables do not help us to distinguish the supporters of VV, ANO or Dawn from other parties, because supporters of these parties are more diverse in the term of sociodemographic composition than supporters of established parties (see table 3 in appendix). This is in accord with our expectation about the lack of a coherent socio-demographic base of electoral support for CPPs. There is only a significant positive effect of entrepreneurs in the case of VV, as well as a positive effect of inactive people and a negative effect of churchgoers in the case of ANO. However, we need to be careful with the interpretation of the results since the category inactive is very heterogeneous. It consists of students, retired people, unemployed people, housewives and NA’s. The only important finding is related to the age effect: young voters were more likely to vote for CPPs. This may be explained by young people’s generally lower levels of party identification and/or the tendency to be attracted by simplified populist promises

Figure 3 about here

Political values enable us to distinguish supporters of different established parties but do not tell us much about the supporters of CPPs. Figure 4 illustrates that there is no effect of any value included in our analysis (left-right, libertarian-authoritarian, religious-secular and post-communist/communist) on the probability of support for Dawn and VV. However, in the case of ANO, there is slight increase in probability of support for this party with more secular and more rightist values. This indicates that the rise of ANO was partly a “substitution” in the centre-right part of the political space. ANO’s greater ability to appeal to centre-right voters is logical in the sense that corruption scandals, the decline of the economy during the crisis and several policy measures that went against promises formulated by the centre-right governing parties (see e.g. Havlík 2015b) resulted in their former voters being more inclined to change their voting preferences. However, these effects are hardly comparable to those of ODS or TOP 09. In other words, there are different likelihoods to vote for ČSSD, KSČM, ODS, TOP 09 and KDU-ČSL among people with different preferences in organization of economy and society, but the differences in these preferences do not affect the probability of support for VV, ANO or Dawn in an important way. We know that CPPs supporters are mostly in the middle on the value scales. What is also important is that their position in the middle expresses their ambivalent opinion on the ways the state should shape economic and social life, so it is not “pure centrality” (see figure 1 in appendix). This finding is also in line with our expectation about the lack of a clear position of supporters for CPPs.

Figure 4 about here

The 2006 election saw relatively distinctive political parties in terms of the proximity of their supporters. A voter close to a certain party had a much higher probability of support that party than any other party. However, the rise of CPPs has changed this pattern (see Figure 5). Supporters for new populist parties are dispersed on the scale and do not form a coherent block in comparison to supporters for the established political parties. In other words, the centrist position of CPPs supporters is not as strong of a predictor of support as it is with the ideological position of other political parties, since the profile of CPPs supporters is more dispersed.

Figure 5 about here

According to hypotheses H5 and H6, evaluation of several aspects of the political system is supposed to be important in explaining support for new CPPs. However, no variable covered by the data measuring political satisfaction proved to have a significant effect on support for CPPs. The only exception is the variable about the evaluation of former political governments in the 2006 and 2010 elections (see Figure 6). Voters satisfied with Topolánek’s government have a much higher chance of support for ODS and KDU-ČSL (and TOP 09) as former government parties (or parties including ministers of this government) than for VV. On the other hand, voters dissatisfied with Topolánek’s government were more likely to support ČSSD and KSČM. Results do not confirm the hypothesis that voters with low satisfaction with democracy are more likely to support for a CPP. In the case of Dawn and ANO there is no such effect, and in the case of VV, the real relationship is the opposite. This indicates that support for CPPs in the Czech Republic cannot be interpreted as voting driven by satisfaction with democracy and/or political institutions.

Data on political cynicism are available only for 2010 and 2013. In both years, the probability of support for oppositional parties increases as alienation from politics increases, and vice versa, the probability of support for parties in government decreases (see Figure 7). Nevertheless, the data also show that political cynicism measured by distrust in politicians increases the probability of support for CPPs but the effect is weaker even in comparison to ČSSD or KSČM. Therefore we cannot conclude that cynicism is the reason why citizens turn more towards CPPs. Instead, it is a factor which pulls citizens away from parties in government towards the oppositional parties, including CPPs. As the interaction term shows, the effect of cynicism is usually higher when people are dissatisfied with democracy. However, one needs to be careful with an interpretation, since the variables included in the analysis are not the best indicators of populist protest. The data suffer from the lack of some questions related to opinions on the political elites in the previous term. Since the survey was conducted after the elections, voters already knew who had got the seats and it is relatively questionable how even new parties voters could perceive politicians as not being competent, responsive or accountable, since the poll may have also contained their favourites.

Figure 6 about here

Figure 7 about here

The most important result of the model which combines issue and valence voting is that voters who perceive corruption as a salient issue do not have a higher chance of support for a CPP (with the exception of Dawn) than to vote for ČSSD (see Figure 8). Table 2 illustrates this relation in more detail. For ANO and VV it does not matter whether a voter emphasizes corruption or some socio-economic issue, the probability of support for the party is roughly the same. Furthermore, there is a higher probability of support for ANO if voters consider social or economic issues to be important than if they see corruption as the most important factor. The same also applies to the issue of “bad politicians”. An explanation of this surprising result may lie in the fact that voters supporting CPPs lost confidence in the ability of the established parties to solve *any* problems. In other words, support for CPPs is not driven by any specific issue but rather by a more general attitude towards how politics should be approached by politicians and what kind of people should enter politics. This interpretation is further supported by the valence model (see below). Nevertheless, the importance of the issue is not unique to CPPs, for the same effect can be observed in the case of KDU-ČSL and ODS.

Table 2 about here

Voters who perceive CPPs to be more competent in solving the most salient political problems should more likely to support them in comparison to other political parties. The categories of variables make the distinction between the established parties, other parties, nobody and do not know. According to the results, voters who see parties other than established parties as being competent to solve problems (compared to those who consider established parties to be competent) have a much higher chance of support for a CPP than support for ČSSD. The same, but to a lower extent, also applies for voters who think that no party is competent or who do not know which party is competent. This is in line with our expectation based both on the competence rather than ideological profile of CPPs and on explanations related to political cynicism (a sceptical view about the ability to resolve salient issues). If we turn back once again to the theoretical assumption about a necessary combination of populism with another ideology, the emphasis put on competency and/or an alternative vision of democratic politics might play the role of a host ideology.

Figure 8 about here

*for 2006, see appendix 6.3*

Economic voting is usually considered to be a good tool for distinguishing between voters of former government and former opposition parties. This pattern is quite obvious from the results of the 2006 election. However, the effect is weaker in 2013 than in 2006. This may be related to the “non-partisan” government that was in office during the last year of the electoral term before the 2013 elections. Regarding the support for CPPs, there is no effect of sociotropic economic voting. In this case it means that people who do not see the evolution of the economy as good have approximately the same chance of support for ANO, Dawn and ČSSD (but the odds of support for ANO or Dawn rather than ODS or TOP 09 are much higher). The effect of egotropic prospective evaluations is relatively surprising. Voters who are optimistic about their future, rather than pessimistic, have a higher chance of support for a CPP than ČSSD. This means that it is relatively misleading to see supporters of these parties as losers who are skeptical about their future. On the contrary, it seems that a vote for a CPP is related to the belief that “things will get better” in the future, as ANO claimed in its campaign.

Figure 9 about here

**Conclusion**

The aim of the presented article was to analyse the supporters of CPPs and put the results into the wider context of the development of party politics in the Czech Republic. First, we described the profile of the new parties and set theoretical expectations derived from both the literature about populist parties in general and from the discourse of CPPs in the Czech Republic. The analysis showed significant differences between the supporters of CPPs and the established political parties. Unlike the established parties (Linek 2015), the supporters of CPPs can hardly be characterized using the socio-demographic model. In other words, it is impossible to describe them in terms of education, occupation, religion or gender. The only significant variable was age, with younger voters more likely to support CPPs; this may be related either to party identification or the vulnerability of younger voters to populist promises. Similarly, the lack of a clear profile of CPPs supporters was confirmed by the analysis of values, with supporters of CPPs locating in the centre of the political space. On the other hand, the rise of ANO indicates a partial substitution in the centre right part of the political space. Nevertheless, one needs to take into consideration the specific context before the 2013 election and the effect of centre-right positions on support for ANO was considerably weaker than in the case of the established centre-right parties. To sum it up, the rise of CPPs has also changed the general pattern of electoral politics in the Czech Republic, with a significant decrease of explanatory power of cleavages.

In contrast to our expectations, support for a CPP cannot be explained by political cynicism, with the exception of Dawn, whose voters evaluated democracy in a rather negative way. However, what needs to be added is that the data did not enable us to test the usual assumption related to institutional trust or use more precise measurements of populist voting (e.g. Akkerman et al. 2014). The valence model proved that new populist parties supporters believed that those parties (in contrast to the established parties) can solve the most important political issues. This is not so surprising. On the other hand, those who did not know and those who thought that nobody could solve the issues were also more likely to support new populist parties. This rather shows a sceptical evaluation of the politics of CPPs voters and their preference for a different approach to “how politics is conducted”, be it a managerial way referring to higher efficiency of political decisions or introduction of direct democracy measures. This indicates that support for CPPs means a move from an ideological perception of politics that dominated patterns of electoral behaviour in the Czech Republic since early 1990s to a competency or valence one. The economic model showed two things: first, new populist parties supporters can hardly be seen as economic losers. Quite surprisingly, support for CPPs can be seen as “a vote for hope”, since those who believe that the economy will get better were more likely to support ANO and Dawn (similar data were not available for 2010).

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Table 1: Electoral performance of CPP

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Political party (election) | Number of votes | Share of votes | Seats |
| VV (2010) | 569127 | 10.9 | 24 |
| ANO 2011 (2013) | 927240 | 18.7 | 47 |
| Dawn (2013) | 342339 | 6.9 | 14 |

Source of data: Volby.cz

Table 2: Probabilities of support for party depending on combination of values and issues

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **2010 valence** | **issue** | **CSSD** | **KDU** | **KSCM** | **ODS** | **VV** |  |
| established parties | corruption | 0.27 | 0.06 | 0.11 | 0.24 | 0.04 |  |
| established parties | socio-economic | 0.26 | 0.04 | 0.14 | 0.27 | 0.05 |  |
| new parties | corruption | 0.19 | 0.05 | 0.04 | 0.14 | 0.35 |  |
| new parties | socio-economic | 0.18 | 0.03 | 0.05 | 0.16 | 0.37 |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| **2013 valence** | **issue** | **CSSD** | **KDU** | **KSCM** | **ODS** | **ANO** | **Dawn** |
| established parties | corruption | 0.39 | 0.11 | 0.22 | 0.05 | 0.05 | 0.01 |
| established parties | socio-economic | 0.48 | 0.07 | 0.20 | 0.06 | 0.07 | 0.00 |
| new parties | corruption | 0.08 | 0.04 | 0.08 | 0.03 | 0.50 | 0.23 |
| new parties | socio-economic | 0.10 | 0.02 | 0.06 | 0.03 | 0.70 | 0.07 |



1. A similar argument was also formulated by Sikk (2005) who studied “genuinely new political parties” in Europe. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. In the 2010, two other small parties (the Party of Citizen`s Rights – the Zemanites and Sovereignty) were quite successful in running on a populist platform (gaining over 3% and 4% of votes, respectively). Nevertheless, none of them crossed the electoral threshold we set as a criterion of relevance. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. By the term “established political parties”, we mean ČSSD, KDU-ČSL, KSČM, ODS and TOP 09. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)