Party system in the Czech Republic II. Voters and transformation of party politics • Electoral results (1996-2006) Others Stable cleavage structure • • ČSSD KSČM 1996 1998 2002 2006 2010 2013 1996 1998 2002 2006 2010 2013 pensioners 0.08 0.1 0.18 0.16 0.26 0.25 pensioners 0.19 0.16 0.19 0.14 0.11 0.11 high education -0.11 -0.17 0.07 0.03 0.02 0.05 high education -0.21 -0.23 -0.32 -0.23 -0.19 -0.22 industry 0.08 0.05 -0.01 0.03 0.02 0.03 industry -0.03 -0.04 -0.05 -0.04 -0.02 -0.03 unemployment 0.33 0.24 -0.07 0.07 0.06 -0.05 unemployment -0.03 0.01 0.08 0 0.01 0.04 bussinesmen -0.33 -0.33 -0.29 -0.43 -0.28 -0.27 bussinesmen -0.18 -0.19 -0.19 -0.16 -0.07 -0.12 catholics 0 0 0.04 0.06 0.03 0.04 catholics -0.04 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 0 -0.01 R2 0.44 0.44 0.16 0.38 0.43 0.4 R2 0.25 0.31 0.43 0.38 0.37 0.45 ODS KDU-ČSL 1996 1998 2002 2006 2010 2013 1996 1998 2002 2006 2010 2013 pensioners 0.1 0 0.02 -0.03 -0.02 0.01 pensioners 0.01 0.04 0.04 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 high education 0.33 0.36 0.16 0.26 0.2 0.09 high education -0.09 -0.11 0.15 -0.01 0.05 0.09 industry 0.02 -0.01 0 -0.02 0.06 -0.01 industry -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0 0.03 0.03 unemployment -0.3 -0.38 -0.28 -0.41 -0.31 -0.18 unemployment -0.21 -0.22 -0.21 -0.13 -0.02 -0.07 bussinesmen 0.44 0.53 0.4 0.7 0.4 0.15 bussinesmen 0 -0.01 0.15 0.02 -0.01 0 catholics -0.05 -0.09 -0.07 -0.1 -0.04 -0.02 catholics 0.26 0.24 0.18 0.2 0.14 0.16 R2 0.56 0.76 0.69 0.77 0.67 0.63 R2 0.7 0.72 0.62 0.72 0.65 0.68 • Electoral results (1996-2013) Others Volatility and the success of new political parties • Dinosauři.jpg Public Affairs (VV) Action of Dissatisfied Citizens 2011 (ANO 2011) Tomio Okamura`s Dawn od Direct Democracy Who are they? •Strong populist appeal •Lack of a clear host ideology •Solutions: direct democracy (VV, Dawn), managerial way of running the state (ANO 2011) • •New/centrist populist parties (Pop Eleches 2010, Učeň 2008) • • • Political crisis and the rise of populist parties •Similar political context preceding both the 2010 and 2013 elections •Crises and eventually falls of weak(ened) Topolánek and Necas cabinet •Formation of „non-political“ (and popular) caretaker cabinets •2009 – cancelled early election •2013 – corruption affair of Prime Minister and head of his Office •Trust to the parliament and satisfaction with political situation falling off Affiliation of voters Time of electoral decision Close to a party 2006 2010 2013 2002 2006 2010 2013 Always + long time 57.7 45.6 43.2 Yes 56 42.2 38.3 31.2 Last year - months 18 21.7 16.5 No 34.7 53.4 58 65.8 Weeks - election day 23.2 32.3 40.5 DK 9.3 4.4 3.7 3 Political cynicism Voting can change something 2006 2010 2013 Yes 62.3 58.2 53.1 No 15.6 19.6 20.3 Why should one vote for new parties? •H1: The effect of cleavage voting will be lower in explanation of voting for new centrist populist parties in comparison to voting for the established political parties. •H2: Voters who perceive corruption as a salient issue are more likely to vote for centrist populist parties. •H3: Voters who evaluate the state of economy negatively are more likely to vote for centrist populist parties. •H4: Voters who evaluate the future of economy negatively are more likely to vote for centrist populist parties. •H5: Voters with low satisfaction with democracy are more likely to vote for centrist populist parties. •H6: Voters who do not trust politicians are more likely to vote for centrist populist parties. •H7: Voters who position themselves in the centre of political space are more likely to vote for centrist populist parties. •H8: Voters who perceive centrist populist parties more competent to solve the most salient political issues are more likely to vote for them in comparison to other political parties. • • • • • • Results I. •Cartograms and correlations: •TOP 09: concentrated electoral support similar to ODS and SZ •VV: dispersed, weak positive correlation with ODS •ANO: dispersed, medium positive correlation with ODS, TOP 09 and VV •The Dawn: dispersed, very limited similarity to the established parties • • • Pearson ČSSD 2006 KDU-ČSL 2006 KSČM 2006 ODS 2006 SZ 2006 TOP 09 2010 -0,2 0 -0,33 0,6 0,3 VV 2010 0 -0,01 -0,19 0,21 0,15 ČSSD 2010 ODS 2010 TOP 09 2010 KSČM 2010 KDU-ČSL 2010 VV 2010 ANO 2013 -0,12 0,32 0,32 -0,19 -0,14 0,27 The Dawn 2013 0 -0,03 -0,03 -0,05 0,07 0,18 Results I. •Cartograms and correlations: •TOP 09: concentrated electoral support similar to ODS and SZ •VV: dispersed, weak positive correlation with ODS •ANO: dispersed, medium positive correlation with ODS, TOP 09 and VV •The Dawn: dispersed, very limited similarity to the established parties • • • Pearson ČSSD 2006 KDU-ČSL 2006 KSČM 2006 ODS 2006 SZ 2006 TOP 09 2010 -0,2 0 -0,33 0,6 0,3 VV 2010 0 -0,01 -0,19 0,21 0,15 ČSSD 2010 ODS 2010 TOP 09 2010 KSČM 2010 KDU-ČSL 2010 VV 2010 ANO 2013 -0,12 0,32 0,32 -0,19 -0,14 0,27 The Dawn 2013 0 -0,03 -0,03 -0,05 0,07 0,18 Results – model fit 2006 2010 2013 evolution class 0.41 0.34 0.36 ↓ values 0.56 0.47 0.43 ↓ position 0.14 0.11 0.15 satisfaction 0.44 0.35 ↓ cynism 0.18 0.09 issue and valence 0.12 0.19 0.32 ↑ economic voting 0.16 0.10 ↓ •H1: The effect of cleavage voting will be lower in explanation of voting for new centrist populist parties in comparison to voting for the established political parties. • √ •H6: Voters who do not trust politicians are more likely to vote for centrist populist parties. • ± •H7: Voters who position themselves in the centre of political space are more likely to vote for centrist populist parties. • √ •H8: Voters who perceive centrist populist parties more competent to solve the most salient political issues are more likely to vote for them in comparison to other political parties. • √ •H2: Voters who perceive corruption as a salient issue are more likely to vote for centrist populist parties. • X •H3: Voters who evaluate the state of economy negatively are more likely to vote for centrist populist parties. • X •H4: Voters who evaluate the future of economy negatively are more likely to vote for centrist populist parties. • X •H5: Voters with low satisfaction with democracy are more likely to vote for centrist populist parties. • X • Conclusion •General patterns of voting have changed •Differences between the established and the new populist parties in several ways: •Socio-structural and value based model X new populists •Political cynicism/dissatisfaction – Dawn •Valence voting •Prospective economic voting •Generally weakening of voters affiliation + cleavage voting • •