J Evol Econ
DOI 10.1007/s00191-008-0110-z
REGULAR ARTICLE
In defence of generalized Darwinism
Howard E. Aldrich · Geoffrey M. Hodgson ·
David L. Hull · Thorbjørn Knudsen ·
Joel Mokyr · Viktor J. Vanberg
© Springer-Verlag 2008
Abstract Darwin himself suggested the idea of generalizing the core
Darwinian principles to cover the evolution of social entities. Also in the
nineteenth century, influential social scientists proposed their extension to
political society and economic institutions. Nevertheless, misunderstanding
and misrepresentation have hindered the realization of the powerful potential
in this longstanding idea. Some critics confuse generalization with analogy.
Others mistakenly presume that generalizing Darwinism necessarily involves
biological reductionism. This essay outlines the types of phenomena to which a
H. E. Aldrich
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, NC, USA
e-mail: howard_aldrich@unc.edu
G. M. Hodgson (B)
The Business School, University of Hertfordshire, De Havilland Campus,
Hatfield, Hertfordshire AL10 9AB, UK
e-mail: g.m.hodgson@herts.ac.uk
D. L. Hull · J. Mokyr
Northwestern University, Evanston, IL, USA
D. L. Hull
e-mail: david.lee.hull@etss.net
J. Mokyr
e-mail: j-mokyr@northwestern.edu
T. Knudsen
University of Southern Denmark, Odense, Denmark
e-mail: tok@sam.sdu.dk
V. J. Vanberg
University of Freiburg, Freiburg, Germany
e-mail: viktor.vanberg@vwl.uni-freiburg.de
H.E. Aldrich et al.
generalized Darwinism applies, and upholds that there is no reason to exclude
social or economic entities.
Keywords Socio-economic evolution · Generalized Darwinism · Selection ·
Replication
JEL Classification B52
1 Introduction
Both biology and the social sciences address diverse systems of enormous com-
plexity.1
Historical and other empirical details will always remain of immense
importance and thus we cannot expect to obtain a single explanatory theory of
everything. However, as the triumph of Darwinism in biology demonstrates,
it is possible to derive a powerful over-arching theoretical framework in
which theorists can develop auxiliary, domain-specific explanations. This is the
promise of a generalized Darwinism. Although biologists and social scientists
have pointed to other important mechanisms, such as self-organization and
path dependence, none of these offers a general over-arching explanatory
framework for beginning to understand the evolution of all these systems.2
Darwin himself recognized the potential broader significance of his core
ideas, proposing that natural selection operates upon the elements of language
and that natural selection favoured tribal groups with moral and other propensities
that served the common good (Darwin 1859, pp. 422–423; 1871, vol. 1,
pp. 59–61, 106, 166). Following this lead, other writers such as Bagehot (1872),
Ritchie (1896), Veblen (1899) and Keller (1915) argued that the principle
of selection could help explain the survival not only of individuals, but also
of groups, customs, nations, business firms and other social institutions. The
idea of generalizing Darwinism was later revived by Childe (1951), Campbell
(1965), Dawkins (1976, 1983), Hayek (1988), Dennett (1995) and others.3
Although the idea of generalizing core Darwinian principles in the social
sciences has a long history, it has not proved popular. Resistance to abstract
Darwinian ideas probably results from a general wariness by social scientists
to the importation of concepts from biology (Degler 1991), rather than from
1The November 2006 issue of the Journal of Evolutionary Economics was a ‘Special issue on
universal Darwinism’. However, while containing critiques such as Cordes (2006), it contained no
overall defence of the idea of generalizing Darwinian principles to the social or economic domain.
This essay attempts to fill this gap. The authors are very grateful to Pavel Pelikan and Sidney
Winter and anonymous referees for comments.
2Leading proponents of self-organization themselves recognize this. See Kauffman (1993, p. 644)
and Camazine et al. (2001, p. 89).
3Dawkins’s (1983) term ‘universal Darwinism’ may misleadingly suggest that Darwinism covers
everything or has ‘universal validity’ (Dawkins 1976, p. 205). As explained below, Darwinian
principles apply to complex population systems only, notwithstanding that this covers a highly
capacious set of phenomena.
In defence of generalized Darwinism
any adequately detailed critique of the proposal for a generalized Darwinism.
Dismissals of the idea have typically been brief. We explain why such critiques
are off target below.
Other critics mistakenly conflate ‘universal Darwinism’ with ‘genetic reductionism’
or ‘ultra-Darwinism’.4
Although Dawkins is responsible for the term
‘universal Darwinism’ and is also associated with a gene-centred view of biological
evolution, the idea of generalizing Darwinism is logically independent
of whether or not a gene-centred view is appropriate in biology. Furthermore,
generalized Darwinism does not claim that social or economic phenomena can
be explained in biological terms. It is not a version of biological reductionism
and logically it does not apply principally or exclusively to biology. As Metcalfe
(1998, pp. 21–22) puts it:
That evolution is a core concept in biology does not mean that it is an
inherently biological concept. Evolution can happen in other domains
providing that conditions for an evolutionary process are in place. Thus,
as economists applying evolutionary ideas to economic phenomena, we
can learn from the debates on evolutionary biology in order to understand
better the logical status of concepts such as fitness, adaptation and
unit of selection without in any sense needing to absorb the associated
biological context.
Contrary to the misconceptions of some of its critics, the idea of generalizing
Darwinism has little to do with biological metaphors or analogies. Instead
of drawing analogies, which are often inexact and sometimes treacherous,
generalized Darwinism relies on the claim of common abstract features in both
the social and the biological world; it is essentially a contention of a degree of
ontological communality, at a high level of abstraction and not at the level
of detail. This communality is captured by concepts such as replication and
selection, which are defined as precisely and meaningfully as possible but in a
highly general and abstract sense.
What is the difference between analogy and generalization? With an analogy,
phenomena and processes in one domain are taken as the reference
point for the study of similar phenomena or processes in another domain.
Differences are regarded as dis-analogies. On this basis, for example, social
evolution is clearly dis-analogous to genetic evolution, because of the very
different entities and mechanisms of replication. By contrast, for example,
the Keynesian ‘circular flow of income’ may have some analogous features
with hydraulic mechanisms, as illustrated by the famous Phillips Machine that
simulates money flows through water in transparent tubes. Some theories
of the business cycle use the analogy of a pendulum and thereby deploy
4Rose (1997) has a long chapter entitled ‘Universal Darwinism?’ which very briefly (pp. 175–
176) mentions memes and ‘neural Darwinism’ (Edelman 1987), dismisses them without detailed
criticism, and then devotes its remaining 20 pages to biological issues that have no relevance to the
claim that core Darwinian principles can be applied to social entities and social evolution.
H.E. Aldrich et al.
similar differential equations. These analogical claims are different from
generalizations.
Generalization in science starts from a deliberately copious array of different
phenomena and processes, without giving analytical priority to any of them
over others. Where possible, scientists adduce shared principles. Given that the
entities and processes involved are very different, these common principles
will be highly abstract and will not reflect detailed mechanisms unique to any
particular domain.
For example, the laws of motion in physics apply equally to planets, rockets
and billiard balls, despite huge differences of size, composition and shape.
We can generalize across these domains because, at an abstract level, the
same principles apply to all the phenomena, despite major differences in
their features. In biology and in the social sciences, the phenomena are so
complex that scientists supplement general principles by many auxiliary and
particularistic explanations, thus differentiating these sciences from physics
(Mayr 1985).
Critics of generalized Darwinism have often failed to distinguish between
analogy and generalization, different levels of abstraction, and different domains
of similarity or dissimilarity. Some critics have emphasized the dissimilarity
between the social and biological domain (Buenstorf 2006; Cordes 2006;
Nelson 2007; Witt 2003, 2004, 2006). The claim that social and biological evolution
are different at the level of detail is important and true, but ultimately
irrelevant to the project of generalizing Darwinism.
Generalizing Darwinism does not rely on the mistaken idea that the mechanisms
of evolution in the social and the biological world are similar in a
substantive sense. Not only do natural and social evolution differ greatly in
their details, but also detailed mechanisms differ greatly within the biological
world. Biological organisms differ enormously in size, lifespan and reproductive
fertility. Some biological species are sexually differentiated, others not.
Some biological species are social, others not. Replication among invertebrates
is different from that among vertebrates. To say that two sets of phenomena
are similar in highly general terms does not imply that they are similar in
detailed respects.
Even for biological phenomena the high degree of generality required to
accommodate the full range of diversity turns out to be extensive enough
to include the processes of social and cultural evolution as well (Hull 1988,
p. 403). Because the processes of selection and replication vary greatly in the
biological domain, the general principles adduced from biological evolution
turn out to apply to other complex phenomena as well.
The differences between the biological and the cultural domains are real and
important. Cultural selection processes are different from biological selection
processes. The expression of the underlying core Darwinian principles of
variation, inheritance and selection differ in important ways, yet the overarching
general principles remain.
For example, Witt (2003, 2004) claims that the core Darwinian principles are
inappropriate for the cultural domain because of many important differences
In defence of generalized Darwinism
to biological reality.5
Ironically, this has led Witt to formulate a ‘continuity
hypothesis’, according to which cultural evolution continues beyond that point
and within the biological the constraints of Darwinian theory. As Witt (2004,
pp. 131–132) writes, biological evolution has ‘shaped the ground, and still
defines the constraints, for . . . cultural, evolution . . . The historical process of
economic evolution can be conceived as emerging from, and being embedded
in, the constraints shaped by evolution in nature.’ As far as we are aware, all
proponents of generalized Darwinism would concur.6
The irony is that Witt
also emphasizes a radical discontinuity between biological and social evolution,
where generalized Darwinian principles apply to one but not to the other. On
this point we disagree.
Admittedly, proponents of generalized Darwinism still disagree over many
subsidiary points, including aspects of the precise definitions of replication
and selection. It is an unfinished research project. Our essay represents a
catholic view, drawing on several authors with some differences of opinion on
finer points, but all upholding the possibility and importance of a generalized
Darwinism. We also concur with Metcalfe (1998, p. 36) when he writes:
Nothing I have said is intrinsically a matter of biological analogy, it
is a matter of evolutionary logic. Evolutionary theory is a manner of
reasoning in its own right quite independently of the use made of it by
biologists.
The following section addresses the types of evolving phenomena to
which Darwinian principles apply. Section 3 outlines these general principles.
Section 4 discusses the significance of the modern Darwinian concepts of
replicator and interactor. Section 5 considers the relevance and value of a
generalized Darwinism in the social sciences. The final section summarizes and
concludes the argument.
5For a discussion of Witt’s argument see Vanberg (2006).
6Witt (2003, 2004) makes the point that diffusion of novelty rather than selection forces drive
cultural evolution. While this point appears controversial to Witt (2003, 2004), Cordes (2006) and
others, it is does not contradict general Darwinian principles. It is merely the (feasible) empirical
claim that the second term of the Price equation is more important than its first term. The Price
(1970, 1995) equation addresses changes of average fitness due to selection for a population
property related to the characteristics of individual members. It shows that this population level
outcome can be regarded as the sum of two distinct effects. The first term in the equation is the
covariance of the individual properties and their individual fitness values, showing the extent to
which possession of the property bestows fitness on individuals. The second term is a transmission
effect, whereby changing properties of existing individuals lead to modifications of their individual
fitnesses, such as through innovation or learning. With the first effect the population changes
through selection; with the second effect the change comes through the transformations of
individuals or entities. Witt and Cordes suggest that the second effect is more important. This
is a matter of empirical enquiry and not a test of the principles of generalized Darwinism. Indeed,
without Darwinian selection there would be no way of removing useless novelties (Pavel Pelikan,
private correspondence).
H.E. Aldrich et al.
2 The ontological domain of a generalized Darwinism
We could develop our argument in one of two ways from this point. One would
be to examine inductively a number of evolutionary processes in nature and
society and determine what common principles apply to them, whereas the
other would be to identify some general ontological characteristics that must
apply to all evolving systems. With regard to the first approach, for example,
Hull et al. (2001) compare processes of evolutionary selection regarding genes,
the reaction of the immune system to antigens, and operant learning. They
show that deriving a general definition of selection that applies to all these
processes without becoming vacuous is far from easy. Ultimately, the project
to generalize Darwinism must roll up its sleeves and delve into such empirical
issues.
Unfortunately, the application of Darwinian principles to social or economic
evolution has been impaired by a lack of consensus concerning what is actually
selected or replicated. Dawkins (1976) famously dubbed the unit of cultural
evolution as a ‘meme’. However, disputes have raged concerning the nature of
a meme and no consensus has emerged.
One legitimate reaction to this impasse would be to adopt the strategy
described above and empirically compare many processes of social selection
and replication, in an attempt to induce common general principles. However,
a lack of consensus among evolutionary social scientists means that few
commonly accepted domains and entities have been identified as a basis for
comparison.
With regard to the second approach, we can accept that at some later stage,
detailed comparisons will be essential, but in the interim we can make progress
by approaching the problem from the other end. Instead of working upwards
from detail to generality, it is possible to consider some general ontological
characteristics that must apply to the relevant systems and populations under
consideration. We describe the relevant phenomena as ‘complex population
systems’.7
The term refers to both biological and social phenomena. By outlining the
general, shared features of complex population systems we identify the ontological
communality to which we referred above. We posit that all complex
population systems can be analysed in terms of general Darwinian principles.
The systems considered here involve populations of entities. Populations are
defined by members of a type that are similar in key respects, but within each
type there is some degree of variation, due to genesis or circumstances.8
We assume that entities within these populations have limited capacities to
consume some materials and energy from their environment and they have
7This account of complex population systems makes use of material from Hodgson and Knudsen
(2006a), where some further details of the argument appear.
8See Mayr (1976, p. 28; 1982, pp. 46f.) for a discussion of the contrast between ‘population thinking’
and the outlook of the ‘typologist.’
In defence of generalized Darwinism
gained the use of mechanisms with which to process some information useful
for survival. These entities may or may not have a developed brain or memory.
They may or may not be capable of reflecting on their circumstances and
remembering past or imagining future behaviours.
All these entities are mortal and degradable, and they need to consume
materials and energy in order to survive or minimize degradation. However,
because they do not have access to all environmental resources at once, these
entities face an omnipresent problem of local and immediate scarcity, as well
as the possibility of binding resource constraints.9
These circumstances present
specific problems that the entities must solve to minimize degradation and raise
their chances of survival. In short, these entities are engaged in a struggle for
existence, to use the term adopted by Darwin (1859, pp. 62–63).
Finally, we assume some capacity to retain and pass on to others workable
solutions to problems they have faced. The advantages of retaining such
problem solutions or adaptations are obvious in avoiding the risks and costs
of learning them anew. We assume that the entities possess some capacity
to pass on to others information about such workable solutions, providing
the foundation for a trans-generational cumulative growth of problem-solving
‘knowledge.’
This is the basis of the Darwinian principle of inheritance, which refers to a
broad class of mechanisms, including those of ‘replication’ and ‘descent’ (Mayr
1991), by which information concerning adaptations is retained, preserved,
passed on or copied through time.
In sum, a complex population system involves populations of non-identical
(intentional or non-intentional) entities that face locally scarce resources and
problems of survival. The entities retain some adaptive solutions to such
problems and may pass them on to other entities. Examples of populations in
such systems are plentiful both in nature and in human society. They include
every biological species, from amoeba to humans. They would include selfreplicating
automata, of the type discussed by von Neumann (1966). In addition,
and importantly for the social scientist, they include human institutions,
as long as we regard institutions as cohesive entities having some capacity for
the retention and replication of problem solutions.
In this manner, the common ontological features of all complex population
systems, including in nature and human society, are established, without
ignoring the huge differences of detail between them.
3 The core Darwinian principles
Having sketched in broad terms the type of evolutionary system we are
considering, it becomes evident that the evolution of such a system must
involve the three Darwinian principles of variation, selection and retention
9See Hodgson and Knudsen (2006a, p. 4) for a discussion of this specific concept of scarcity.
H.E. Aldrich et al.
(Campbell 1965). These abstract principles do not themselves provide all the
necessary details, but nevertheless they must be honoured, for otherwise the
explanation of evolution will be inadequate.
Consider the three Darwinian principles in turn. First, there must be some
explanation of how variety is generated and replenished in a population. In
biological systems the answers—established since Darwin’s death—involve
genetic recombination and mutations. By contrast, the evolution of social
institutions involves imitation, planning and other mechanisms very different
from the detailed processes found in biology (Aldrich and Ruef 2006). The
general problem of the existence and replenishment of variety remains a
vital question of evolutionary research in the social and technological domain
(Metcalfe 1998; Nelson 1991; Saviotti 1996).
Second, there must be an explanation for how useful information concerning
solutions to particular adaptive problems is retained and passed on.
This requirement follows directly from our assumptions concerning the broad
nature of complex population systems, wherein there must be some mechanism
by which adaptive solutions are copied and passed on. In biology, these
mechanisms often involve genes and DNA. In social evolution, we may include
the replication of habits, customs, rules and routines, all of which may carry
solutions to adaptive problems. Some mechanism must exist that ensures that
some such solutions endure and replicate; otherwise the continuing retention
of useful knowledge would not be possible (Vanberg 1994).
Third, and not least, there must be an explanation of the fact that entities
differ in their longevity and fecundity. In given contexts, some entities are more
adapted than others, some survive longer than others, and some are more
successful in producing offspring or copies of themselves. Here we invoke
the principle of selection. Briefly, selection involves an anterior set of entities,
each interacting with its environment and somehow being transformed into
a posterior set where all members of the posterior set are sufficiently similar
to some members of the anterior set, and where the resulting frequencies of
posterior entities depend upon their properties in the environmental context
(Price 1970, 1995). Through selection, a population will gradually adapt in
response to the criteria defined by an environmental factor.
Although this is a broad definition of selection, it is nevertheless sharp
enough to distinguish itself from the principle of variation. The latter requires
some explanation of the sources and replenishments of variety. Selection refers
to the mechanisms that bring about the survival of some variations rather than
others, often reducing variety. Even when both variety-creation and selection
involve human agency, as often is the case in the human domain, the two
processes are quite distinct. Innovation is about the creation of new variations,
whereas selection is about how they are tested in the real world.
Note that the outcomes of a selection process are necessarily neither
moral nor just, even though as politically organized communities, humans
may impose moral constraints on social processes by adopting ‘rules of the
In defence of generalized Darwinism
game’ or institutional provisions that replace ‘natural selection’ by ‘artificial’
or ‘purposeful’ selection (Commons 1934; Vanberg 1997; Hodgson 2004a).
Furthermore, there is no requirement that the outcomes of a selection process
be necessarily optimal or an improvement on their precursors. Insofar as these
outcomes carry connotations of refinement or efficiency, it is efficiency relative
to the given environment, and efficiency that is tolerable rather than optimal.
Darwinism does not assume that selection brings about globally efficient or
(near) optimal outcomes, and in certain instances, selection can even lead to
systematic errors or maladaptions (Hodgson 1993; Hull et al. 2001).
Without the principle of selection, we have no way of explaining how some
entities or their offspring prevail over others. The principle is widely held to
apply in the natural world; some members of a species often have greater
chances of survival and procreation. This helps to explain how species, over
the long term, become adapted to their environment. Note that the move from
the natural to the social world does not undermine the principle of selection.
Even if there is not a fierce life-and-death struggle between rival customs or
institutions, some explanation is required of why some enjoy greater longevity
than others, why some are imitated more than others, and why some diminish
and decline. Any such explanation must come under the general rubric of
selection, as defined above.
Overall, as long as there is a population within which entities display
variation in the acquisition of characteristics vital to survival, then Darwinian
evolution will occur. However, Darwin’s principles of evolution do not themselves
provide a complete explanation. Darwinism does not provide a complete
theory of everything, from cells to human society. Instead, these principles
are a kind of ‘meta-theory’, or an over-arching theoretical framework wherein
theorists place particular explanations. Crucially, explanations additional to
natural selection are always required to explain any evolved phenomenon. For
example, natural selection alone cannot explain why some birds have dull and
others colourful plumage. Different auxiliary explanations are required, such
as camouflage against predators in some cases, or competition for mates and
sexual selection in others. Selection is a general principle, but it operates in
different ways in different contexts. Likewise, the general Darwinian principle
of variation applies, but it does not itself explain how variation occurs.
To repeat: acknowledging the role of Darwinian principles in social evolution
does not imply that the detailed mechanisms of selection, variation and
inheritance are analogous or similar to biological evolution. Consequently, the
application of general Darwinian principles cannot do all the explanatory work
for the social scientist. Darwinism alone is not enough.
Accordingly, the use of these general Darwinian principles does not mean
any neglect of other features or mechanisms at the level of detail. The use of
these principles does not amount to the kind of generalization where specific
important features or additional processes are neglected. On the contrary they
remain vital for the explanation.
H.E. Aldrich et al.
4 Replicators and interactors
Modern Darwinian theory makes a distinction between ‘replicators’ and ‘interactors’
(Hull 1988). A number of authors have developed and refined the definition
of a replicator. An emerging consensus argues that replication involves
a causal relationship between two or more entities, where there is substantial
similarity between the original and replicated entities, and where information
concerning adaptive solutions to survival problems is passed from one set of
entities to another (Sterelny et al. 1996; Godfrey-Smith 2000; Sperber 2000).
The definitional characteristics of causality, similarity and information transfer
are common to these accounts.
However, the consensus definition requires further refinement. Furthermore,
there are very different types of replicators, even in the biological
domain. For example, prions are widely regarded as replicators. Prions involve
the accumulation of an abnormally folded variant of the normal prion protein,
which spreads by direct contact through which the normal form also becomes
misfolded and thus converted to an abnormal and equally infectious form
(Prusiner 1998). By contrast, DNA contains information in its molecular
structure that conditions the growth and behaviour of organisms. Unlike the
prion, DNA involves context-responsive construction mechanisms that hold
adaptive information attuned to past environments. Consequently, there may
be different types of biological replicators, where DNA is a more sophisticated
variant permitting the transfer of richer and more complex information
(Szathmáry 2000; Hodgson and Knudsen 2008).10
A consequence of this observation regarding diversity among replicators is
that when we consider the social world, the possibility of different types of
replicators emerges. None will be similar in detail or mechanism to DNA. If
they exist, those social replicators that involve context-responsive construction
mechanisms holding adaptive information will constitute a rather special and
important case. The existence of social replicators cannot be denied simply
because DNA-like mechanisms are absent.
Turning to the interactor, this has been defined as ‘an entity that directly
interacts as a cohesive whole with its environment in such a way that this
interaction causes replication to be differential’ (Hull 1988, p. 408). Some theorists
have suggested enhancements of this definition (Hodgson and Knudsen
2004b). Furthermore, more work is necessary to show how the interactor relates
to the replicator, especially if multiple levels of replication or interaction
occur.
Clearly, there are cohesive evolving entities, in both the biological and
social domains, such as organisms and organizations. The question arises as
to whether such entities in the social world interact with their environments
in ways that cause the differential replication of relevant stored information.
10The general concept of information itself requires clarification in this context and has been
subject to some debate. See for example Maynard Smith (2000a, b), Griffiths (2001) and GodfreySmith
(2007).
In defence of generalized Darwinism
If we consider economic competition between firms, then the elimination
of some and the prosperity of others leads to the differential copying (by
collaboration or imitation) of routines, techniques, management procedures,
and so on (Nelson and Winter 1982; Aldrich and Ruef 2006). If any of these
elements qualify as social replicators, then clearly they are very different from
biological replicators such as genes. There are crucial differences concerning
how the information is stored, how it is replicated, and how faithful is the
replication. The general definition of a replicator has to be deployed with care.
Nevertheless, there is at least a prime facie case for identifying interactors and
replicators in the social domain.
Although so far there is no consensus on what social replicators or interactors
are, three of us have argued that business firms are examples of
social interactors, and individual habits and organizational routines qualify
as replicators (Aldrich and Ruef 2006; Hodgson and Knudsen 2004b, 2006b,
2008). Other Darwinian theorists consider individuals or groups as interactors,
and ideas as social or cultural replicators (Hull 1988; Mokyr 2006). These
debates remain important among proponents of a generalized Darwinism.
Some critics claim that a sharp replicator-interactor distinction is unviable
or inappropriate in social evolution. It is interesting that they share this stance
with other, quite different, theorists. The subset of evolutionary economists
who resist a generalized Darwinism, exclusively gene-centred theorists, and
biological reductionists, all deny the existence of social replicators (i.e. social
entities that are copied in some way and conform to the general definition of a
replicator).
The distinction between replicators and interactors, their clear definition,
and the discussion of different types of each, are important for further reasons.
They are vital to distinguish between more superficial cases of contagion or
diffusion, on the one hand, and more meaningful replication or inheritance on
the other. For example, the spread of laughter or some fashions, are examples
of diffusion that often do not necessarily involve inheritance. Diffusion may
mean little more than the reception of a signal that triggers behaviour according
to existing dispositions. For replication to occur, significant developmental
dispositions and capacities must be copied that are new to the recipient, and
these new capacities must themselves be capable of replication. An important
feature of some replicators is that by the copying of such capacities they have
the potential to increase the level of complexity in the system as a whole
(Hodgson and Knudsen 2008).11
11The replicator-interactor distinction also relates to the question of Lamarckism, which typically
is taken to mean the inheritance of acquired characteristics. The replicator-interactor distinction
is necessary to establish adequately the concept of inheritance in this context (Hull 1982;
Hodgson and Knudsen 2006b). Consequently, whether true or not, claims that social evolution is
Lamarckian depend on a replicator-interactor distinction. Notably, Darwinism and Lamarckism
are not mutually exclusive: Darwin (1859) himself believed in Lamarckian inheritance. However,
Lamarckism alone is inadequate because it cannot explain why dysfunctional acquired characteristics
are inherited without the invocation of a selection mechanism (Dawkins 1983).
H.E. Aldrich et al.
If there were no social replicators, then the principles of generalized
Darwinism suggest that there is no mechanism in social evolution by which
information concerning adaptations to the environment can be copied with
some degree of fidelity through time. This would further imply that social
evolution is less sophisticated than biological evolution, and has a more limited
potential for the evolution of more complex phenomena. We see no reason at
this stage to accept the premise of this argument. We assert that there is at
least a prima facie case for identifying interactors and replicators in the social
domain.
Some critics fall prey to the unfounded assumption that unitary persistence,
associated with high fidelity replication, is a necessary condition for selection to
work. We do not have to establish that social replicators copy their information
as reliably as genes (they certainly do not) in order to identify social replicators.
As Gould (2002) argued, it is plurifaction that matters, i.e. the increase in
relative representation of a bundle of heritable attributes. Whether or not
plurifaction happens by hi-fidelity replication is besides the point.
While the replication of behaviour seems uncontroversial, it has recently
been argued that the notions of replication and replicators are inappropriate
for studying the spread of cognitive frames and representations (Atran 2001,
2002; Boyer 1994, 1999; Sperber 1996). According to these critics, cognitive
representations are non-discrete, cultural transmission is very inaccurate and
therefore favours diversity over convergence, and strong cognitive attractors
in any case swamp the influence from selection forces. Even though cultural
evolution is commonly non-discrete, low fidelity and strongly affected by cognitive
processes, these observations are entirely an empirical matter. Henrich
and Boyd (2002) convincingly demonstrate that continuous attractors often
reduce to the standard discrete replicator model and low fidelity replication
does not preclude adaptation or accumulation at the cultural level.
Our discussion in this section shows how the idea of a generalized
Darwinism can be extended to help obtain important propositions concerning
the general nature of evolution in complex population systems and how they
apply in particular to evolution in human society. We have also highlighted
recent work that demonstrates the usefulness of the Darwinian principles
under conditions that are commonly ascribed to the social domain, i.e. noisy
replication and possibly continuous traits. The following section explores
further implications for our understanding of social evolution.
5 Generalized Darwinism—its relevance and importance
Appropriate generalization is at the core of all scientific endeavours. However,
generalization should not go so far as to become vacuous. We believe that a
generalized Darwinism sustains important substantial propositions that have
application and relevance to evolution in human societies. We have already
given some reasons for this claim. We add further supporting arguments below.
There are a number of advantages of a general analysis of selection
processes that builds on core Darwinian principles. It provides a focus for
In defence of generalized Darwinism
inquiry and enables a more systematic accumulation and organization of
knowledge pertaining to a wider array of selection processes. A generalized
Darwinism offers a broad definition of selection within which we can classify
and compare different types of selection process. Even at an abstract level, two
basic types of selection can be distinguished, namely subset and generative selection
(Hodgson and Knudsen 2006c). Further subdivisions and classifications
are clearly possible, according to both mechanisms and outcomes. For instance,
the Price (1970, 1995) general definition of selection allows the diffusion of
information or other features as a special case, but excludes random outcomes
such as drift.
Furthermore, as Hull et al. (2001) demonstrate, a generalized Darwinism
can lead to comparative analyses of selection processes across empirical domains.
We see a strong possibility that such empirical comparisons will lead
to further revisions and refinements of our understanding of general selection
principles. This is an important agenda for future research.
For social scientists, the application of Darwinian ideas to social phenomena
has important implications concerning the rationality and psyche of human
agents. Assumptions concerning human agents must be susceptible to causal
explanation, and be consistent with general Darwinian principles and our
understanding of human evolution. These implications have been long acknowledged
by a number of philosophers, psychologists and social scientists
(James 1890; Dewey 1910; Veblen 1914; Richards 1987).
One of these arguments concerns the concept of rationality. Darwin (1974,
pp. 84, 115) himself wrote in 1856: ‘Men are called “creatures of reason,” more
appropriately they would be “creatures of habit.”’ Although Darwin did not
elaborate further, we can draw out some of the implications from a generalized
Darwinism.
The principles of generalized Darwinism focus on the development, retention
and selection of information concerning adaptive solutions to survival
problems faced by organisms or other relevant entities in their environment.
The storage and replication of such information is a general feature of complex
population systems. When we apply this framework to particular cases,
questions naturally arise concerning the nature, mechanisms and material
substrate of these adaptive solutions. Relevantly, the biologist and philosopher
Mayr (1988) developed the concept of ‘program-based behaviour’ involving
sets of conditional, rule-like dispositions, linked together into what he termed
“programs.”12
Instincts and biological genotypes involve programs. Human
ideas, habits and customs can also have program-like qualities. Sophisticated
replicators carry such behavioural programs. Generalized Darwinism highlights
their importance in evolutionary processes.
Darwinism is successful because it supplies a framework for causal explanation
of the evolution of complex, undesigned outcomes. Accordingly,
Darwinism constantly raises questions of causality and requires explanations
12In important respects the idea of ‘program-based behavior’ was foreshadowed by Simon (1957)
in his famous work on bounded rationality (March and Simon 1958; Vanberg 2002, pp. 24 ff.).
H.E. Aldrich et al.
of origin. This applies in particular to the dispositional programs behind human
behaviour. The consequences for the social sciences are important. Instead
of simply assuming that agents hold beliefs and preferences, the paradigm of
program-based behaviour requires an explanation of their evolutionary emergence,
through both natural selection and individual development. Evolution
involves both the adaptation of programs to changing circumstances and the
elimination of other programs through selection.
The conventional rational actor model in the social sciences simply sets
out assumptions that are consistent with a set of behaviours. By contrast, the
paradigm of program-based behaviour focuses on the explanation of the dispositions
behind any act. The concept of the program may be subdivided between
programs that do and do not involve deliberation or conscious prefiguration.
The paradigm of program-based behaviour has been applied to economics by
Vanberg (2002, 2004) and has strong similarities with Holland’s (1995) theory
of adaptive agents. This paradigm is more adequate than the primary focus
on rationality and beliefs. The related concept of habit—as a particular form
of a program—has also been revisited and refined in this evolutionary context
(Hodgson and Knudsen 2004a).
A generalized Darwinism provides a framework in which particular (nonuniversal)
evolutionary patterns and mechanisms can readily be considered.
One example of this is the wider use of Eldredge’s and Gould’s (1977)
concept of ‘punctuated equilibria’. Within biology, this concept has attracted
some criticism and debate (Somit and Peterson 1992). Some scholars have
misinterpreted it as a challenge to core Darwinian principles. It is not. Instead,
a viable concept of punctuated equilibria posits that under specific conditions,
Darwinian evolutionary processes can sometimes dramatically accelerate, and
the whole system can shift relatively rapidly from one chaotic attractor to
another. A number of authors have applied the concept of punctuated equilibria
to social, organizational, institutional, political, cultural, economic and
technological evolution.13
The viability of this concept in specific circumstances
depends on not only a reconciliation with the framework of generalized
Darwinism but also an examination of the specific mechanisms of replication
and selection that have the potential to generate such dramatic shifts in the
pattern of evolution.
Crucially, Darwinism focuses our attention on the possible mechanisms
through which variety is preserved and created. It is remarkable that two of
the most important mechanisms identified by Darwin (1859) and retained in
modern biology depend on locational considerations. First, the migration of a
group to another area with a different physical environment, and second the
use or creation of different niches, remain two of the most important mechanisms
to explain speciation. Related ideas would seem to transfer directly to
the social or economic domain, for example with the creation of new products
13See Miller and Friesen (1980), Tushman and Romanelli (1985), Collins (1988), Krasner (1988),
Hannan and Freeman (1989), Mokyr (1990), Gersick (1991), Gowdy (1993), Aoki (2001) and
others.
In defence of generalized Darwinism
or industries in different geographical and institutional contexts. In these cases
the new environment, and the (relative) isolation of a group from the majority,
create new opportunities for variation.
As the population becomes subdivided into (relatively) isolated subsets,
small mutations can have bigger overall effects for the population as a whole.
Furthermore, the different environments require different fitness characteristics
for survival. New species may emerge as a result of physical separation or
the demands of different environments.
Crucially, similar arguments apply to human institutions as well as biological
organisms, notwithstanding the fact that the nature and mechanisms of
mutation and separation are very different. The general ideas of mutation and
physical separation particularly apply to the evolution of languages and all
sorts of customs. For example, relative isolation and language change leads
to subdivision and often the creation of new languages.
In addition, there is now a growing literature on how firms may perform
differently in different contexts, such as under different regulatory regimes or
among different types of financial institutions (Amable 2000; Aoki 2001; Hall
and Soskice 2001; Boyer 2005; Kenworthy 2006).
The above examples show how the framework of a generalized Darwinism
can be helpful in organizing and promoting specific research programmes in
the social domain. A generalized Darwinism does not itself provide all the
answers. For example, it neither specifies the detailed sources of variation
nor explains individual innovations. Nevertheless, it identifies essential evolutionary
mechanisms in a general form, particularly concerning replication,
selection and the impact of variation. Applied rigorously, it forces authors to
be specific and precise in defining units of analysis. It also forces analysts to
be historical, because no matter what the exact set-up or units of analyses
are, such an evolutionary analysis forces attention on processes going back
into the past, their built-in tendencies to persist (through ‘replication’) and
how the present is created as variations on the past. In that sense, all social
scientists relying on this framework will be forced to take history into account
(Mokyr 1996).
By itself, a generalized Darwinism is insufficient to provide a complete
answer, but it provides a general framework in which additional and context
specific explanations may be placed. Its further usefulness depends on
additional and extensive work. Despite several earlier and partial starts, the
research programme is still in its infancy.
6 Summary and conclusions
Evolutionary theory has for a century been viewed by many scholars to be
highly useful to economics (Nelson 1995; Metcalfe 1998), but it has sometimes
been resisted because of a confusion between a general theory of change
and sometimes unsuccessful attempts to shoehorn concepts or analogies from
biology into economics. As we have insisted above, the idea of generalizing
H.E. Aldrich et al.
Darwinism is not about analogies and does not depend on the proposition that
the detailed mechanisms of social and biological evolution are similar. They
are certainly not. Furthermore, the mechanisms of selection and replication
are very different between different entities within the biological domain.
Consequently we should expect considerable evolutionary differences of entity
and mechanism both (a) between nature and society and (b) within society
itself. Instead of detailed similarity, the idea of generalizing Darwinism depends
on a degree of ontological communality at a highly abstract level. This
communality is captured by the broad idea of a complex population system
and the formulation of highly general concepts of selection and replication.
Proposals for a generalized Darwinism are also unaffected by the claim
that Darwinism, or the principles of selection, inheritance and variation are
inadequate to explain social evolution. They are definitely inadequate. They
are also insufficient to explain detailed outcomes in the biological sphere.
In neither domain are these core Darwinian principles sufficient. In both
cases auxiliary principles are required. However, none of this undermines the
validity of generalization at an abstract level. Insufficiency does not amount
to invalidity. Furthermore, given the existence of complex population systems
in both nature and society, a generalized Darwinism is the only over-arching
framework we have for placing detailed specific mechanisms.
Given these rebuttals, how could one criticize the idea of generalizing
Darwinism? Critics could argue that the ontology of complex population
systems does not apply to socio-economic evolution. Alternatively, critics
could attempt to show that explanations of complex population systems do not
require the Darwinian principles of variation, inheritance or selection. Finally,
the critics could apply the rigorous definitions of variation, inheritance and
selection to socio-economic phenomena and show that the outcomes are not
particularly meaningful or useful. The idea of generalizing Darwinism is not
immune to criticism, but previous critiques have generally been misconceived
or misplaced.
We hypothesize that much of the resistance to the idea of generalizing
Darwinism to include social evolution stems from an ingrained suspicion of
social scientists to ideas from biology. Students in the social sciences are
repeatedly warned against ‘social Darwinism’ and any idea of explaining
human behaviour in terms of genes. Not only are the issues more complex than
the students are often told, but also the idea of generalizing Darwinism has
nothing to do with standard (and often dubious) accounts by social scientists
of ‘social Darwinism’, ‘sociobiology’ or ‘genetic reductionism’.14
We urge that the idea of generalizing Darwinism not be confused with
‘genetic reductionism’ and other aforementioned ideas. On the contrary, many
opponents of a generalized Darwinism have something in common with the reductionists
they likewise eschew. Gene-centred theorists, biological reductionists,
and those evolutionary economists who resist a generalized Darwinism all
14See Bannister (1979) and Hodgson (2004b) on social Darwinism, and Segerstråle (2000) on the
reactions of social scientists to sociobiology.
In defence of generalized Darwinism
deny the existence of replicators at a social level. An adequately formulated
generalized Darwinism sustains replication and selection on multiple levels
and resists rather than endorses biological reductionism.
On the other hand, the idea of generalizing Darwinism to socio-economic
evolution challenges the longstanding idea among social scientists that social
and biological phenomena should be completely partitioned, that social scientists
have little to learn from biology, and vice versa. A generalized Darwinism
is consistent with the idea that human society is embedded in the natural world
and depends upon it for its survival.
We have also argued here that a generalized Darwinism sustains important,
non-vacuous propositions that are highly relevant to the evolution in human
societies, while other auxiliary explanations are also required. A generalized
Darwinism systematizes the process of empirical inquiry and organizes detailed
knowledge pertaining to a wide variety of evolutionary processes.
Furthermore, Darwinian ideas have important implications for social scientists
concerning the rationality and psyche of human agents. Assumptions
concerning human agents must be consistent with our understanding of human
evolution. Darwinian evolution involves the development, retention and selection
of information concerning adaptive solutions to survival problems faced
by organisms in their environment. Darwinism constantly raises questions of
causality and requires explanations of origin. This applies in particular to the
dispositional programs behind human thought and behaviour.
Overall, Darwinism by itself is insufficient to provide full and complete
answers, but it provides a general framework in which additional and context
specific explanations may be placed. Its further usefulness depends on additional
and extensive work. Despite several earlier historical efforts, this research
programme is still at the stage of elucidating the key concepts involved.
We are also entering an exciting phase of detailed empirical application. We
welcome others to join in these efforts.
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