1
Appendices for Matthew Fuhrmann and Sarah E. Kreps “Targeting Nuclear Programs in
War and Peace: A Quantitative Empirical Analysis, 1942-2000,” Journal of Conflict
Resolution.
Appendix A: Cases Constituting Attacks and Considered Attacks of Nuclear Infrastructure
In this appendix we provide short descriptions of the cases where countries considered targeting
or actually targeted nuclear infrastructure in another country to delay its ability to produce
nuclear weapons. Each description includes a list of the sources we relied on in making our
coding decisions. At the end of this appendix we include a summary table indicating which
criterion (or criteria) each case satisfied to warrant inclusion in our dataset.
•Egypt – Israel (1967)
As early as 1959, Egypt realized that Israel had begun a nuclear weapons program. At various
points during 1960s, Egyptian President Nassar publicly threatened to attack Israeli nuclear
facilities. For example, in a speech given in December 1960, President Nasser threatened to
destroy Israel‘s nuclear infrastructure before that ―base of aggression is used against us.‖
Similarly, in early 1966 he noted on several occasions that ―Arab countries must immediately
wipe out all that enables Israel to produce atomic bombs.‖ These statements are insufficient to
warrant inclusion on our case list. Indeed, the available evidence indicates that these threats
were nothing more than attempts to score domestic political points by talking tough to Israel (see
especially Cohen 1998). In April 1963 President Nassar said to Robert Komer, a U.S. National
Security Council official, during a private meeting that he supported attacks against Israel‘s
nuclear facilities under certain conditions. A few months later, when asked by U.S. officials how
Egypt would respond if definitive evidence emerged that Israel was developing the bomb, Nassar
said, ―protective war. We would have no other choice‖ (Cohen 1998, 249). This is also
insufficient to be classified as serious consideration of military action because Washington was
not debating strikes at that time. This case illustrates why we exclude such exchanges, even
when they occur in private. The available evidence indicates that Nassar hoped that by
threatening Israel he would motivate the United States to do something about the nuclear issue.
In the mid-1960s Nassar conveyed to U.S. officials that Egypt aimed to put ―Israel back in the
icebox,‖ indicating that Dimona and Israel‘s nuclear program were not major issues (Cohen
1998, 354).1
Egypt first seriously considered attacks against Israel‘s nuclear program during the 1967 crisis.
On May 17, Egyptian MiG 21s made highly provocative reconnaissance flights over Dimona.
Ten days later the Egyptian Air Force issued orders to strike Israeli targets; Nasser vetoed this
order. When hostilities broke out on June 5, Dimona was among the ―high priority targets‖ in
Egyptian war plans. Indeed, Egypt would have struck Dimona (with Soviet assistance) had the
war not ended so quickly.
Sources: Schlomo Aronson, ―Israel‘s Nuclear Programme, the Six Day War and its
Ramifications,‖ Israel Affairs, Vol 6, No. 3 (Spring 2000), 83-95; Avner Cohen, ―Cairo,
1
See Cohen (1998, 254-255) for an excellent discussion of why Dimona was not a priority for Egypt from 1964 to
1966.
2
Dimona, and the June 1967 War,‖ The Middle East Journal Vol 50, no. 2 (Spring 1996), 190-
210; Avner Cohen, Israel and the Bomb. New York: Columbia University Press, 1998: pp. 243-
276; Warner D. Farr, The Third Temple’s Holy of Holies: Israel’s Nuclear Weapons (Maxwell
Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 1999), p. 11; John Finney, ―US Again Assured on
Negev Reactor,‖ New York Times, Jun 28, 1966, p.8; Isabella Ginor and Gideon Remez, Foxbats
Over Dimona: The Soviets' Nuclear Gamble in the Six Day War (New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press, 2007); Ariel Levite and Emily Landau, ―Arab Perceptions of Israel‘s Nuclear
Posture, 1960-1967,‖ Israel Studies, Vol. 1, no. 1 (1996), pp. 34-59; Ludmilla B. Herbst,
―Preventive Strikes on Nuclear Facilities: An Analytic Framework,‖ M.A. Thesis, University of
British Columbia, 1995; Yitzhak Rabin, A Service Record (in Hebrew). Tel Aviv: Ma'ariv, 1979:
136-137; ―Nasser Threatens Israel on A-Bomb,‖ New York Times, December 24, 1960; Hendrick
Smith, ―Warning on Bomb Given by Nasser,‖ New York Times, Feb 21, 1966, p.8.
•India – Pakistan (1982, 1984, 1986-1987)
On three separate occasions in the 1980s India seriously considered attacking Pakistan‘s nuclear
program. Israel approached India about orchestrating a joint raid against Pakistani nuclear
facilities as early as 1979 (see Israel-Pakistan below), but New Delhi did not seriously consider
this possibility until 1982. During meetings with cabinet level officials in that year, Prime
Minister Indira Gandhi voiced support for military action. The operational plans called for Israel
to carry out the raid on Kahuta, using an Indian air base in Gujarat as a launching point and
another base in northern India to refuel. Gandhi once again lobbied for strikes in 1984 and even
approved plans for a joint strike with the Israelis. In both cases (1982 and 1984), the attacks
were called off at the ―last minute‖ (Karnad 2008, 57). Thus, political decisions to attack had
been made but they were later reversed after India reconsidered the consequences of preventive
strikes. We found no evidence of considered attacks in 1985 but joint action with Israel was
again discussed in 1986-1987. Senior Indian officials including the chief of the Army Staff,
General Krishnaswami Sundarji orchestrated the Brasstacks crisis in 1986 as a potential means to
provoke a Pakistani response in order to justify attacks against Islamabad‘s nuclear program.
Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi expressed support for strikes in 1987 but other senior officials
argued that any preventive military action would be too costly. The later view ultimately
prevailed.
India considered attacking Kahuta on occasions after 1987, but these fall outside the scope of this
analysis since we are interested in attacks against non-nuclear weapon states. In 1991, India and
Pakistan ratify an agreement pledging not to attack nuclear infrastructure in either state.
Sources: Scott Sagan and Kenneth Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed
(New York: W.W. Norton, 2003), pp. 94-95; Douglas Frantz and Catherine Collins, The Nuclear
Jihadist: The True Story of the Man Who Sold The World’s Most Dangerous Secrets and How
We could Have Stopped Him (New York: Twelve, 2007), pp. 88-89; Sumit Ganguly and Devin
Hagerty, Fearful Symmetry: India-Pakistan Crises in the Shadow of Nuclear Weapons (Seattle:
University of Washington Press, 2005); Bharat Karnad, India’s Nuclear Policy (Westport, CT:
Praeger, 2008); Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott-Clark, Deception: Pakistan, the United States
and the Global Weapons Conspiracy (New York: Walker & Company, 2007); ―India and Israel
Planned to Hit Kahuta in 1980s,‖ Business Recorder, October 29, 2007; Bharat Karnad, Nuclear
Weapons and Indian Security: The Realist Foundations of Strategy (New Delhi: Macmillan,
3
2002), pp. 349-350; Barry Schneider, Radical Responses to Radical Regimes: Evaluating PreEmptive
Counterproliferation (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 1995); Peter
Feaver, Scott Sagan and David Karl, "Proliferation Pessimism and Emerging Nuclear Powers,"
International Security 22(2): 195; ―India, Israel Claimed Considering Attack," The Muslim
(Islamabad), 28 March 1988, Pg. 1; Nuclear Developments, 23 May 1988, pp. 26-27, in Nuclear
Threat Initiative Nuclear and Missile Database, 23 May 1988, http://www.nti.org/nuclear; Steve
Weissman and Herbert Krosney, The Islamic Bomb: The Nuclear Threat to Israel and the Middle
East (New York: Times Books, 1981).
•Iran – Iraq (1980)
In 1977 Israel approached Iran about the possibility of joint military action against Iraq‘s nuclear
program (see Israel-Iraq below). Iran did not, however, seriously consider attacking at that time.
Tehran‘s response to the Israeli overture was ―lukewarm‖ and there is no evidence that any
senior Iranian official lobbied for military action at any point in the 1970s (Perlmutter et al.
2003, xxxi). Iran did seriously consider striking Iraq‘s principal nuclear installation during the
early stages of the Iran-Iraq War, after receiving encouragement from the Israeli Chief of Staff.
In September 1980, two Iranian F-4 aircraft attacked nuclear facilities at Osiraq but caused only
minor damage. Iran did not seriously consider attacking Iraqi nuclear facilities after September
1980. Part of the reason for this is that Israeli‘s raid against Osiraq in 1981 had heavily damaged
the reactor, rendering future strikes unnecessary.
Sources: ―Developments in Iran-Iraq War,‖ Globe and Mail, 1 October 1980; Richard Homan,
―Iran Again Bombs Baghdad as Diplomatic Efforts Stall; Iran Bombs Iraqi Nuclear Site,‖
Washington Post, 1 October 1980, A1; Dan Reiter, ―Preventive Attacks against Nuclear,
Biological, and Chemical Weapons Programs: The Track Record,‖ in Hitting First: Preventive
Force in U.S. Security Strategy (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2006), pp.27-44;
Peter Scott Ford, Israel‘s Attack on Osiraq: A Model for Future Preventive Strikes? (Monterey,
CA: Naval Postgraduate School thesis, 2004), 19, Available at:
http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/iraq/facility/osiraq.htm; ―Iran Troops are Urged to Increase War
Effort,‖ Boston Globe, Jan 3, 1981, p.1; Stephen Pelletiere, The Iran-Iraq War: Chaos in a
Vacuum, (New York, NY: Praeger 1992); Author interview with Iranian scholar, Cambridge,
MA, April 26, 2008.
•Iraq – Iran (1984-1988)
Iraq did not consider attacking Iran‘s nuclear facilities until the move toward ―total warfare‖ in
1984, when it tried to shift the momentum by initiating a strategic bombing campaign in the IranIraq
war.2
A series of attacks occurred between 1984 and 1988. The first attack took place on
March 24, 1984, followed by subsequent attacks each year until 1988.3
Iraq‘s early strikes on
Iran consisted of Iraqi Air Force attempts to hit Iran‘s economic and industrial centers of gravity,
which included oil-related facilities but also the nuclear facilities. Despite an Iranian-sponsored
2
In the early phases of the war, the Bushehr facility was still under construction; it did not begin to near completion
until 1984—in Sept 1984, 80% of the first unit and 60% of the second were finally complete—so targeting early in
the war would have had limited value at relatively high risk given the distance into Iran. ―Iran Nuclear Power
Project,‖ IRNA in English, 8 Sept 1984.
3
The number of attacks on Bushehr during the middle of November 1987 is disputed but Iraq clearly staged a series
of attacks in 1987 that proved to be the most destructive of any during the Iran-Iraq War. It appears that the Iraqi air
force launched two strikes on 17 November 1987 and another on 19 November.
4
resolution from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that outlawed strikes against
nuclear installations, Iraqi jets bombed a nuclear power plant, steel factory, and gas station in
Bushehr. Iraqi officials defended the Iraqi Air Force‘s actions, claiming that the nuclear plant
was a legitimate military target.4
Sources: Ronald Bergquist, ―The Air War,‖ in The Role of Airpower in the Iran-Iraq War
(Montgomery, AL: Air University Series, 1988), pp. 41-68; Mark Hibbs, ―Bushehr Construction
Now Remote after Three Iraqi Air Strikes,‖ Nucleonics Week, 26 November 1987, pp.5-6; Dilip
Hiro, The Longest War: The Iran-Iraq War, (London, UK: Grafton, 1989), 129-166, 192;
Andrew Koch and Jeanette Wolf, ―IAEA delegation to Inspect Bombed Bushehr Nuclear Plant,‖
IRNA, 27 February 1988; ―Iran Head of Atomic Energy Organisation Sees Attack on Power
Station as ‗Treason‘ Against Resolution 598,‖ IRNA, 21 July 1988; ―Iran‘s Nuclear Facilities: A
Profile,‖ Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 1998, available at
http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/reports/pdfs/iranrpt.pdf; ―Nuclear News Briefs,‖ Nuclear News,
(December 1987), 19; ―Iran-Iraq war air raids and denials by both sides,‖ BBC World
Broadcasts, 20 November 1987; ―Iran Nuclear Power Project,‖ IRNA in English, 8 Sept 1984;
―New Attack on Iranian Nuclear Plant is Reported,‖ The New York Times, 20 November 1987,
p.5; ―Iran Says Iraqis Raided a Nuclear Plant,‖ New York Times, 18 November 1987; Global
Security Bushehr site, available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/iran/bushehrintro.htm;
―New Attack on Iranian Nuclear Plant is Reported,‖ New York Times, 20 November
1987, A1; Stephen Pelletiere, The Iran-Iraq War: Chaos in a Vacuum, (New York, NY: Praeger
1992); David Segal, ―The Air War in the Persian Gulf,‖ Air University Review, Mar/Apr 1986;
―Bushehr Construction Now Remote after Three Iraqi Air Strikes,‖ Nucleonics Week, 26
November 1987, p.5.
•Israel – Iraq (1977-1981)
Beginning in the late 1970s Israel began seriously considering attacks against Iraq‘s nuclear
program. In 1977 Israel‘s Foreign Minister Yigal Alon held covert discussions with a senior
Iranian official to discuss joint attacks against the Iraqi reactor known as Osirak. In June 1977,
Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin argued privately that the destruction of the reactor was a
top national priority and he continued to support this measure until the eventual strike in 1981.
The Begin cabinet raised the prospect of striking Al-Tuwaitha in a 1978 cabinet meeting. During
the meeting, several senior officials—including Begin himeself—voiced support for air strikes
against Iraqi nuclear facilities. After this meeting, officials were instructed to ―delay the Iraqi
nuclear program by all possible means‖ (Perlmutter et al. 2003, xxxiii). In 1979, unknown
Israeli saboteurs attacked the facilities in southern France that were responsible for constructing
the reactor cores and shipping them to Iraq and in another incident bombs destroyed the Rome
offices of SNIA-Techint, the Italian nuclear company responsible for the Iraqi separation plant.5
The Israeli Air Force followed up in 1981 with Operation Babylon—known as Operation Opera
4
Western military analysts suggested that perhaps Iraq had intended to strike tankers in the Persian Gulf but that
may have been influenced by Western support for Iraq during the war. Mark Whitaker and Rod Nordland,
―Teheran‘s Blunder: A Decisive Defeat?‖ Newsweek, 1 April 1985, p.36.
5
Israel also assassinated scientists working on the Iraqi nuclear program. They targeted an Egyptian nuclear
engineer who had been supervising the Iraq-French nuclear deal, Yehia al-Meshad, as well as two Iraqi scientists.
These do not constitute attacks against infrastructure, but they are worth noting.
5
to Israel—that employed eight Israeli F-16 Falcons flanked by eight F-15 Eagles for cover to
destroy Osirak and other nuclear facilities at Al Tuwaitha.
Sources: Rodger Claire, Raid on the Sun: Inside the Secret Campaign that Denied Saddam the
Bomb (New York, NY: Broadway Books, 2004), pp. 41-44; Saad El Shazly, The Arab Military
Option, (American Mideast Research, 1986), p. 47; Shai Feldman, ―The Bombing of Osiraq—
Revisited,‖ International Security, Vol 7, No. 2 (Autumn 1982), 114-142; Khidir Hamza,
Saddam’s Bombmaker: The Terrifying Inside Story of the Iraqi Nuclear and Biological Weapons
Agenda (NY: Touchstone, 2000); Robert Litwak, ―The New Calculus of Pre-Emption,‖ Survival,
Vol 44, No. 4 (2002), 53-79; Karl Mueller, Jasen Castillo, Forrest Morgan, Negeen Pegahi, Brian
Rosen, Striking First: Preventive and Preventive Attack in U.S. National Security Policy.
Washington, D.C.: RAND, 2006: 211-215;; Mahdi Obeidi and Kurt Pitzer, The Bomb in my
Garden: The Secrets of Saddam’s Nuclear Mastermind (New york: Wiley, 2004); Amos
Perlmutter, Michael I. Handel, and Uri Bar-Joseph, Two Minutes over Baghdad (New York:
Routledge, 2003); Jed Snyder, ―The Road to Osiraq: Baghdad‘s Quest for the Bomb,‖ Middle
East Journal, Vol 37, No. 4 (Autumn 1983), 565-593; Richard Wilson, ―A Visit to the Bombed
Nuclear Reactor at Tuwaitha, Iraq,‖ Nature, Vol 302, (31 Mar 1983), 373-376.
•Israel – Pakistan (1979; 1982-1984; 1986-1987)
In 1979 the United States shared intelligence with Israel that Pakistan might be within two years
of acquiring nuclear weapons (see also India-Pakistan above). At this time Israel began planning
for a preventive strike against Pakistani nuclear facilities and approached the Indians about
cooperating in a joint strike.6
Based on the available evidence, Israel did not seriously consider
strikes again until 1982 when senior officials asked Subramaniam Swamy, an Indian official, to
approach the leadership in New Delhi about a joint strike against Pakistan. The proposed plan
called for Israel to carry out the raid on Kahuta, using an Indian air base in Gujarat as a
launching point and another base in northern India to refuel. In 1983 Israeli Defense Minister
Ariel Sharon again proposed that both states jointly attack key Pakistani nuclear installations.
These plans also received careful consideration in both Israel and India in 1983, according to the
British newspaper The Observer. In March 1984, Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi approved
this operation but later vetoed the plan before it could be executed. We found no evidence that
attacks were seriously considered in 1985, but in 1986 senior Israel officials again met with
Indian officials and Paris and pushed for joint military action against Pakistan‘s nuclear program
(Kumaraswamy 2000, 44). Senior officials continued to lobby for strikes against Kahuta in
1987, just before Pakistan assembled its first nuclear weapon.
Sources: Douglas Frantz and Catherine Collins, The Nuclear Jihadist: The True Story of the Man
Who Sold The World’s Most Dangerous Secrets and How We Could Have Stopped Him (New
York: Twelve, 2007), pp. 88-89; Adrian Levy & Catherine Scott-Clark, Deception: Pakistan,
The United States, and the Secret Trade in Nuclear Weapons (New York: Walker & Company,
2007), pp. 86-87, 177; Bharat Karnad, ―Knocking Out Kahuta,‖ Sunday Observer (New Delhi),
January 17, 1988; Bharat Karnad, Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security: The Realist
Foundations of Strategy (New Delhi: Macmillan, 2002), pp. 349-350; P.R. Kumaraswamy,
―Beyond the Veil: Israel-Pakistan Relations,‖ Jaffe Center for Strategic Studies, Memorandum
no. 55, March 2000; Barry Schneider, Radical Responses to Radical Regimes: Evaluating Pre-
6
Note that consideration of a Pakistani raid preceded the 1981 Osirak strike.
6
Emptive Counterproliferation (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 1995); Barry
Schneider, Future War and Counterproliferation: U.S. Military Responses to NBC Proliferation
Threats (Santa Barbara, CA: Greenwood, 1999); Steve Weissman and Herbert Krosney, The
Islamic Bomb: The Nuclear Threat to Israel and the Middle East (New York: Times Books,
1981).
•Norway – Germany (1941-1944)
Between 1941 and 1944, Norway engaged in joint operations with the British to destroy facilities
related to the German nuclear program. In late 1941, Norwegian and British intelligence
identified Norsk-Hydro heavy water facility as a key bottleneck in the German nuclear program.
The two began collaborating in planning a bombing or sabotage of the facility and later
undertook rigorous intelligence collection and planning exercises. In July, ―the British War
Cabinet assigned the operation to troops from Combined Operations‖ (Powers 1999). In October
1942, a thirty-four person British sabotage team in two Horsa gliders undertook Operation
Freshman to destroy the Norsk-Hydro heavy water facility in German-occupied Norway. The
operation failed when poor weather caused them to crash into the mountains. Several of the
saboteurs were killed on the spot and those that survived the crash were tortured and executed by
the Germans. The intention was for the commandos from the First Airborne Division, aided by
intelligence from an advance team of Norwegian commandos, to land in the plateau and proceed
by bicycle to the Norsk Hydro facility, kill the German guards, destroy the machinery and heavy
water, then divide and proceed to Sweden to return steel flasks of heavy water.
In February 1943 Operation Gunnerside was carried out by expert skiers from the Royal
Norwegian Army seeking to exact revenge for the Germans‘ victory over the Norwegians in
1940. An advantage of employing indigenous team is that they had knowledge of the area and
terrain that the MI6-directed British mission had lacked. The plan called for the skiers to land
near the plant, dispense of the eighteen cells of heavy water, then proceed by skis to Sweden. In
terms of execution, the operation was a partial success and the Norwegian saboteurs dynamited
the heavy water facility‘s electrolysis chambers and delayed production by two months, with no
loss of life on either side and no damage to the hydroelectric station itself, which was central to
Norway‘s civilian economy. Saboteurs again attacked the facility in April 1943.
A fourth incident involving Norway occurred in 1944. En route to Germany, a Norwegian
saboteur tipped off by British intelligence on timing and route, intercepted the ferry Hydro. All
of Germany‘s heavy water, apparatus, catalyzers, and concentrates involved in the production of
heavy water sank in Norway‘s Lake Tinnsjoe.
Sources: Per F. Dahl, Heavy Water and the Wartime Race for Nuclear Energy (London, UK:
Taylor and Francis, 1999); Knut Haukelid, Skis against the Atom: The Exciting, First-Hand
Account of Heroism and Daring Sabotage During the Nazi Occupation of Norway, (North
American Heritage Press, 1989); Thomas Gallagher, Assault in Norway: Sabotaging the Nazi
Nuclear Program, (Lyons Press, 2002); Lesley Groves, Now it Can be Told: The Story of the
Manhattan Project, (Da Capo Press, New Ed, 1983): 188-189; ―Nazi ‗Heavy Water‘ Looms as
Weapon: Plant Razed by ‗Saboteurs‘ in Norway Viewed as Source of New Atomic Power,‖ New
York Times special cable, 4 April 1943, p.18; ―New Secret Weapon Suspected in Norway,‖ New
York Times, Nov 18, 1944, p.6; Thomas Powers, The Secret History of the German Bomb, (New
7
York, NY: Penguin Books, 1993), pp. 195-202, 212-213; ―‘Suicide‘ Rains Foiled Nazis‘ Atomic
Quest,‖ New York Times, Sept 9, 194, p.35; Richard Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb,
455-457; Olav Riste, Norway, 1940-1945: The Resistance Movement (Oslo, Norway: Tanum
1973).
•Pakistan – India (1984)
Although India was worried about potential attacks against the Bhabha Atomic Research Center
during the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war, we found no evidence that Islamabad seriously considered
attacks at that time. According to the public record, the first time Pakistan considered attacking
Indian nuclear facilities was during the 1984 crisis. During this crisis, Pakistan was aware of
India‘s interest in attacking Kahuta. In response, Islamabad considered attacking nuclear
installations in India. Pakistani leaders ―sent an explicit message to New Delhi through
diplomatic channels:‖ the Pakistani air force would ―strike every nuclear installation in India,
civilian as well as military‖ if the crisis escalated (Ganguly and Hagerty 2005, 58). This alone is
insufficient to warrant inclusion in our case list, given that it could have been nothing more than
a deterrent threat.7
Senior government officials, however, indicated that Pakistani interest in
preventive strikes against the Indian nuclear complex at Trombay was serious and privately
advocated this response in the event that India raided Kahuta.8
Moreover, senior officials
advocated preemptive strikes against Indian facilities if they perceived that an attack against
Pakistan was imminent. Although there is evidence indicating the India continued to consider
this possibility during the 1986-87 Brasstacks crisis, the public record does not reveal any
evidence that Pakistan did so after 1984.
Sources: Itty Abraham, The Making of the Indian Atomic Bomb: Science, Secrecy and the
Postcolonial State, (Zed Books, 1998); Author‘s interview with former Pakistani government
official, March 23, 2008; Milton Benjamin, ―Atomic Power; Nuclear Energy Brings Promise,
Peril to Developing World,‖ The Washington Post, December 3, 1978; William Burrows and
Robert Windrem, Critical Mass: The Dangerous Race for Superweapons in a Fragmenting
World (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), pp. 349-350; Sumit Ganguly and Devin Hagerty,
Fearful Symmetry: India-Pakistan Crises in the Shadow of Nuclear Weapons (Seattle: University
of Washington Press, 2005), 57-58; Devin Hagerty, The Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation:
Lessons from South Asia (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997), pp. 85-87; Don Oberdorfer,
―Pakistan Concerned About Attack on Atomic Plants,‖ The Washington Post, October 12, 1984;
George Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb : The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley, CA:
University of California Press, 1999).
•South Korea – North Korea (1991, 1993-1994)
In April 1991, South Korean defense minister Lee Jong Koo indicated that Seoul considered
raiding North Korean facilities at Yongbyon. Lee again endorsed this option during a private
meeting with U.S. Defense Secretary Dick Cheney in November 1991. There is no evidence that
7
Recall that advocacy of military action must take place privately either in internal deliberations or in consultations
with foreign officials who are also considering strikes.
8
Also note that Munir Khan, the chairman of Pakistan‘s atomic energy commission privately voiced support for
strikes against Indian nuclear facilities under such circumstances. This alone is insufficient to warrant inclusion on
our case list since Khan was not a cabinet-level official but it does illustrate the prevalence of these views within
Pakistani elite.
8
Seoul considered strikes against Yonbyon in 1992 but military action was again raised during the
1993-94 crisis. During a cabinet meeting in November 1993, South Korean President Kim
Young-sam voiced support for strikes under certain conditions, telling his advisors to ―prepare
for any eventuality in dealing with communist North Korea‘s suspected nuclear arms program‖
(USA Today 1993). Seoul proceeded to prepare plans for an air-raid against ―nuclear facilities‖
in the DPRK. Kim continued to voice support for military action in 1994. Any military action
would likely have been coordinated with the United States. Indeed, the two countries were in
close contact throughout the crisis and held frequent consultations on possible responses to
ending North Korea‘s nuclear program. While South Korea gave serious consideration to
attacking Yongbyon, in the end it was more cautious about this option than the United States
because Seoul would have faced the brunt of any North Korean retaliation. As one American
official put it, the South Koreans were not fully ―prepared to be sacrificed on the altar of
nonproliferation.‖
Sources: Michael Breen, ―South Korea Prepares for Attack from North,‖ Washington Times, 9
February 1994; ―South Korea Preparing for Possible Clash with North,‖ USA Today, November
10, 1993; ―South Korea Prepares for Attack From North,‖ The Washington Times, February 9,
1994; Andrew Mack, ―North Korea and the Bomb,‖ Foreign Policy 83 (Summer 1991): 96; Leon
Sigal, Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1999), p. 33; Joel Wit, Daniel Poneman and Robert Gallucci, Going Critical:
The First North Korean Nuclear Crisis (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 2004), pp. 210-11, 219-
220, 244; ―North Korean Nuclear Issue,‖ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, May 1, 1993.
•Soviet Union – Israel (1967)
In the context of the Six Day War, the Soviet Union planned to attack Dimona, Israel‘s key
nuclear facility. Just prior to the war, the Soviets flew sorties over the facility and had plans to
destroy it with Egyptian assistance. The war ended so quickly that there was never an
appropriate opportunity to take out Israel‘s nuclear infrastructure. All of this has been confirmed
by the chief spokesman of the Russian Air Force, Col. Aleksandr Drobyshevsky.
Sources: Schlomo Aronson, ―Israel‘s Nuclear Programme, the Six Day War and its
Ramifications,‖ Israel Affairs, Vol 6, No. 3 (Spring 2000), 83-95; Avner Cohen, ―Cairo,
Dimona, and the June 1967 War,‖ The Middle East Journal Vol 50, no. 2 (Spring 1996), 190-
210; Isabella Ginor and Gideon Remez, Foxbats Over Dimona: The Soviets' Nuclear Gamble in
the Six Day War (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007),pp. 121-137; David Horovitz,
―Russia Confirms Soviet Sorties Over Dimona in ‘67,‖ The Jerusalem Post, August 23, 2007.
•Soviet Union – South Africa (1976)
In 1976, the Soviet Union approached the United States and asked for assistance in attacking the
Y Plant, one of South Africa‘s key nuclear installations. In 1977, Soviet satellites detected
preparations for a nuclear test in South Africa and continued to explore options (including the
use of force) to prevent it from crossing the nuclear weapon threshold. It is plausible that the
Soviets continued the consideration of force between 1977 and 1979, but an exhaustive search of
primary and secondary documents failed to yield any evidence of this. Thus, we code the Soviet
Union as considering targeting South African nuclear facilities only for 1976.
9
Sources: Davis Albright, "South Africa and the Affordable Bomb," Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists, July/August 1994; Nuclear Threat Initiative, ―South Africa Profile: Nuclear
Overview,‖ May 2007: http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/SAfrica/Nuclear/index.html;
Bennett Ramberg, "Preemption Paradox," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 62, No. 4
(July/August 2006), p. 56; Mitchell Reiss, Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Constrain Their
Nuclear Capabilities (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1995).
•Taiwan – China (1963)
Taiwan considered joint operations with the United States to infiltrate, sabotage, or attack
Chinese nuclear facilities (see United States – China below). Note that we code Taiwan as
considering strikes for only one year, whereas there is evidence that U.S. consideration extended
from 1961-1964. This case makes it in to our dataset because during a visit to Washington in
September 1963, General Chiang Ching-kuo—Chiang Kai-shek‘s son—lobbied for strikes
against nuclear Chinese nuclear facilities in private meetings with U.S. officials, including
Kennedy and National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy. Taiwanese consideration of force
may have extended to 1964 but we did not find evidence of this in the available historical record.
Sources: William Burr and Jeffrey Richelson, "Whether to Strangle the Baby in the Cradle,"
International Security 25(3): 54-99; Gordon Chang, Friends and Enemies: The United States,
China, and the Soviet Union, 1948-1972 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990); Gen. Curtis
LeMay, acting chairman, JCS, to Secretary of Defense, April 29, 1963, ―Study of Chinese
Communist Vulnerability,‖ Office of the Country Director for the Republic of China, 1954-1965.
•United Kingdom – Germany (1941-1945)
The United Kingdom was involved in three attempts to destroy German nuclear infrastructure
during WWII. These incidents are described above (see Norway – Germany and US-Germany).
Sources: George Axelsson, ―Chutist Hide-Out in Norway Cited: British Sabotage Headquartere
Established on Moorlands, German Sources Say,‖ New York Times, April 1, 1943, p.10; Jeremy
Bernstein (1996). Hitler’s Uranium Club (Woodbury, NY: American Institute of Physics);
Jeremy Bernstein and David Cassidy. (1995). ―Bomb Apologetics: Farm Hall, August 1945,‖
Physics Today Vol 48, No. 8 part 1, 32-36; John S. Craig, Peculiar Liaisons in War, Espionage,
and Terrorism in the 20th
Century, (Algora Publishing, 2005), 119; Samuel A. Goudsmit, Alsos
(Woodbury, NY: American Institute of Physics, 1947); ―Nazi ‗Heavy Water‘ Looms as Weapon:
Plant Razed by ‗Saboteurs‘ in Norway Viewed as Source of New Atomic Power,‖ New York
Times special cable, 4 April 1943, p.18; Thomas Powers, The Secret History of the German
Bomb, (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 1993), pp. 195-202; Richard Rhodes, The Making of the
Atomic Bomb (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986); Paul Lawrence Rose, Heisenberg and the
Nazi Atomic Bomb Project (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1998.
•United Kingdom – Iraq (1998)
In 1998, the United Kingdom and the United States made the decision to strike Iraqi military
targets and undertook Operation Desert Fox (see United States – Iraq below). In the four day
operation, Royal Air Force Tornados struck Iraq‘s Zaa‘faraniya nuclear complex.
10
Although Britain was a crucial member of the 1991 Gulf War coalition, the nuclear sites were
targeted by American aircraft during this conflict. There were no British aircraft in the Air
Tasking Order that assigned aircraft to targets at Ash Sharqat, Al Atheer, and Tarmiya. Rather,
the RAF and Royal Navy were involved in offensive counter air, air defense, and tactical
reconnaissance operations. One reason for the omission of British may be that the United States
had found unguided bombs to be ineffective against targets such as nuclear facilities. Instead, it
had to use laser-guided bombs (LGBs), which were used by F-117s and F-111Fs for attacks on
Iraqi nuclear sites. Laser-equipped Buccaneers arrived in theatre about two weeks into the air
war and helped guide Tornado GR1s to bridges and airfields using LBGs; however, they were
limited in their ability to designate targets and facilitate attacks at night.
Sources: ―Air Operations during Operation Granby: An Overview,‖ available at
http://www.raf.mod.uk/bob1940/operations.html; Ian Black and Mark Tran, ―After the Missiles:
Frantic Effort to Heal Rifts in UN,‖ The Guardian, December 22, 1998; 4; ―British Warplanes
Hitting Iraq Hard, Says Blair,‖ Deutsche Presse-Agentur, December 18, 1998; Conduct of the
Persian Gulf War, Final Report to Congress (April 1992); Michael Evans, ―Stealth Jet Will Lead
Heaviest Allied Bombing Raids Since World War,‖ The Times, 15 January 1991; Gulf War Air
Power Survey, Volume 1, Planning and Command and Control (Washington, DC: Government
Printing Office, 1993), Vol II, Operations and Effects and Effectiveness, 431-434; Martin Kettle,
Julian Borger, and Richard Norton-Taylor, ―Tornado Pilots Bomb Iraq as US Tries to Rally
Faltering Support; Britain Joins Onslaught,‖ The Guardian, 18 December 1998; Lin Jenkins,
―Sixty RAF Tornado Missing,‖ The Times, February 15, 1991; ―Return to Expeditionary
Warfare,‖ available at
http://www.raf.mod.uk/rafcms/mediafiles/F21F8E7A_BD8A_55BA_43FA63F04FC5D6B4.pdf
(especially 284-285); David Sharrock and Richard Norton-Taylor, ―The Gulf War: Tornados
Suspend ‗Suicide Raids‘‖ The Guardian, 28 January 1991.
•United States – China (1961, 1963-1964)
The United States was aware of Chinese intentions as early as June 1955 and consistently
concluded that Beijing could test a nuclear device in the period 1963-64. Beginning in 1961,
Washington considered a variety of policies aimed at delaying the Chinese nuclear weapons
program. Among the options considered was using force to ―take out‖ China‘s nuclear program.
The United States proposed a variety of forceful measures to restrain China‘s nuclear capability
including: infiltration, sabotage, or invasion by Chinese nationalists; maritime blockades; a
South Korean invasion of North Korea; conventional air attacks on nuclear facilities; the use of a
tactical nuclear weapon on selected Chinese targets. President Kennedy privately advocated for
the use of force against in meetings with his cabinet and he ordered classified assessments of the
likelihood that they could be effective in delaying the Chinese program. Washington approached
the Soviet Union about cooperating in a raid against Beijing‘s nuclear facilities. Kennedy
privately discussed the issue with Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev during a summit in Vienna in
1961. There is no evidence that military force was seriously considered in 1962, but in 1963
Kennedy directed W. Averell Harriman, an experienced diplomat who was preparing to meet
with Khrushchev to ―go as far as he wished in exploring the possibility of a Soviet-American
understanding with regard to China.‖ Declassified documents reveal that Kennedy‘s cryptic
instructions included the exploration of joint preventive attacks. Lyndon Johnson was less
enthusiastic about strikes against China than Kennedy, but consideration of military action
11
continued through 1964. Indeed, as late as September 1964, Bundy discussed the possibility of
joint military action with Anatoly Dobrynin, the Soviet Ambassador to the United States.
Sources: William Burr and Jeffrey Richelson, "Whether to Strangle the Baby in the Cradle,"
International Security 25(3): 54-99; Gordon Chang, "JFK, China, and the Bomb," Journal of
American History 74(4): 1289-1310; Gordon Chang, Friends and Enemies: The United States,
China, and the Soviet Union, 1948-1972 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), p. 243;
Central Intelligence Agency, Office of National Estimates, ―Chinese Communist Capabilities for
Developing an Effective Atomic Weapons Program and Weapons Delivery Program,‖ June 24,
1955; Policy Planning Council (PPC) Director George McGhee to Secretary of State Dean Rusk,
"Anticipatory Action Pending Chinese Demonstration of a Nuclear Capability," September 13,
1961, Digital National Security Archive; Jeffrey Richelson, Spying on the Bomb: American
Nuclear Intelligence from Nazi Germany to Iran and North Korea (New York: Norton, 2006).
•United States – Germany (1942-1945)
The United States considered attacking facilities relevant to the German nuclear program as early
as 1942, when General Groves prompted General Eisenhower to begin planning for an attack on
the heavy water plant in Norway. After the joint British-Norwegian operations (described
above) failed, the United States conducted airstrikes against the German heavy water production
facility. On 16 November 1943, the RAF and American Eighth Air Force and the allies dropped
over seven hundred 500-pound bombs at the Vemork plant and one hundred 250-pound bombs at
the town of Rjukan. Many missed and the operation only inflicted light damage on the
hydroelectric plant‘s pipelines, power station, and adjacent hydrogen-electrolysis plant, but
enough to set back production for a few months.
In 1942, the United States also began considering bombing Germany‘s nuclear research efforts,
including ―the plants and laboratories where such work is in progress‖ (Powers 1993, 209). The
United States worked with the British Bomber Command to pick German targets; highest on the
priority list was the Kaiser Wilhelm Gesellschaft in Berlin, which was a key scientific research
institute. The heavy water facility in Norway remained the primary target until the second half
of 1944, when the facility was dismantled. Subsequent raids struck the Kaiser Wilhelm
Gesselschaft (see Powers 1993, 338).
In 1944, the US turned its attention more fully to other facilities related to Germany‘s nuclear
program, including uranium mines in Czechoslovakia, a suspected research laboratory in
Hechingen-Bisingen (initially thought to be Germany‘s ―Oak Ridge‖), and another suspected
facility at Oranienberg. Much of this work was in the area of surveillance to determine what was
and was not a facility, with the intention of ―assembl[ing] a revealing picture of the German
nuclear program‖ (Groves 1983, 222). The United States was reluctant to target one of the
facilities until it had confirmation, lest they prematurely tip the Germans off to their intentions.
In March 1945, Washington sought to delay Germany‘s nuclear developments by targeting the
Auergesellschaft Works in Oranienberg (15 miles north of Berlin) with 1500 tons of high
explosives and 178 tons of incendiary bombs, destroying the facility (Groves 1983, 230-231).
The United States began planning Operation Harborage, which entailed destroying the remaining
German atomic energy facilities and capturing the relevant scientists. It undertook Operation
Harborage in April 1945, with the assistance of its British allies, but German resistance was thin
12
and many facilities had been destroyed by previous bombings. The ALSOS mission, tasked with
locating and confiscating facilities and scientists towards the end of the war, ultimately
systematically detained the scientists and destroyed or exported (to the United States) remaining
material, including at Haigerloch, site of Germany‘s uranium and heavy water.
Sources: Jeremy Bernstein (1996). Hitler’s Uranium Club (Woodbury, NY: American Institute
of Physics); Jeremy Bernstein and David Cassidy. (1995). ―Bomb Apologetics: Farm Hall,
August 1945,‖ Physics Today Vol 48, No. 8 part 1, 32-36; John S. Craig, Peculiar Liaisons in
War, Espionage, and Terrorism in the 20th
Century, (Algora Publishing, 2005), 119; Samuel A.
Goudsmit, Alsos (Woodbury, NY: American Institute of Physics, 1947); Lesley Groves, Now it
Can be Told: The Story of the Manhattan Project, (Da Capo Press, New Ed, 1983), 188-189;
John S. Craig, Peculiar Liaisons in War, Espionage, and Terrorism in the 20th
Century, (Algora
Publishing, 2005), 119; Drew Middleton, ‗‖Forts‘ and Liberators Fly 1300 Miles to Hit Mines,
Power Station,‖ New York Times, 17 November 1943, p.1; Thomas Powers, The Secret History
of the German Bomb, (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 1993), pp. 195-202; 209-211; Richard
Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986); Jeffrey
Richelson, Spying on the Bomb: American Nuclear Intelligence from Nazi Germany to Iran and
North Korea (New York: Norton, 2006); Paul Lawrence Rose, Heisenberg and the Nazi Atomic
Bomb Project (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1998).
•United States – Iraq (1990-1991, 1993, 1998)
The United States seriously considered attacking Iraqi nuclear facilities for the first time in 1990,
when it drew-up plans that included the destruction of Iraq‘s nuclear capability, a goal authorized
by the highest levels of the U.S. government. During the Gulf War in 1991, the United States
attacked several facilities thought to be key components of the Iraqi nuclear program. During the
early stages of the campaign, American F-16s struck the well-known Tuwaitha Research Facility
near Baghdad, and F-117s made repeated visits to target the site on February 18, 19, and 23,
1991. F-111Es and F-16s struck suspected a nuclear target later known as Al Jesira near Mosul.
In the twenty-five strikes launched over the period of the air war, four F-111Es equipped with
four 2,000 pound bombs targeted the facility at night, four F-16s equipped with two 2,000 pound
bombs or six 500-pound bombs during the day, producing substantial damage to Jesira. Most of
these bombs were unguided and few actually hit their intended targets but one of the key war
aims was to degrade Saddam Hussein‘s nuclear capability.
Following the Gulf War, the United States attacked Iraqi nuclear infrastructure on two additional
occasions. In January 1993 the United States launched roughly 40 cruise missiles against the
Zaa‘faraniya nuclear complex. In December 1998, the United States and U.K. carried out
Operation Desert Fox, which targeted a number of military facilities, including the Republican
Guard, command and control facilities, and suspected nuclear facilities. In 1999, the United
States war-gamed an invasion of Iraq—referred to as OPLAN 1003-98 or the ―Zinni Plan‖— but
this does not constitute a considered use of force because there is no evidence that President
Clinton or anyone in his cabinet advocated strikes against nuclear facilities at this time.
Sources: Dan Byman and Matthew Waxman, Confronting Iraq: US Policy and the Use of Force
Since the Gulf War, (Arlington, VA: Rand Corporation, 2000), 38-71; Burrus Carnahan,
13
―Protecting Nuclear Facilities from Military Attack: Prospects after the Gulf War,‖ American
Journal of International Law, Vol. 86, No. 3 (July 1992), pp. 524-541; William Cohen, News
Transcript of Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Briefing on
Operation Desert Fox,‖ December 19, 1998, available at:
http://www.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=1791; Gulf War Air Power
Survey, Vols. 1-2, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1993); Michael Gordon,
―Bush Launches Missile Attack on a Baghdad Industrial Park as Washington Greets Clinton,‖ 18
January 1993, A1; Allison Kaplan, ―US Bombs Iraqi Nuclear Installation,‖ The Jerusalem Post,
18 January 1993; Fred Kaplan, ―Clinton, Advisers Meet Today to Consider Ending Bombing of
Iraq,‖ Boston Globe, Dec 19, 1998, A1; Lee Michael Katz, ―Tomahawk Attack on Iraq a ‗ShakeUp‘
Call,‖ USA Today, 18 January 1993, 4A; Richard Norton-Taylor, ―Britain and US Hail
Success, but Remain Vague about How Much Damage was Done to Saddam‘s War Machine,‖
The Guardian, 21 Dec 1998, p.02; Alfred Prados, ―Iraq: Former and Recent Military
Confrontations with the US,‖ Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service Issue Brief,
Oct 2002; Dan Reiter, ―Preventive Attacks against Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons
Programs: The Track Record,‖ in Hitting First: Preventive Force in U.S. Security Strategy
(Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2006), pp.27-44; Roger Strother, ―The War Game:
‗Desert Crossing‘ 1999 Assumed 400,000 Troops and Still a Mess,‖ National Security Archive
Electronic Briefing Book, No. 207, available at
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB207/index.htm ; Paul Stone, ―Desert Fox
Target Toll Climbs Past 75 Iraqi Sites,‖ 18 December 1998, Armed Forces Press Services,
available at http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=41727 ; Simon Tisdall, ―Missiles
hit ‗nuclear factory‘; US Attack Follows Growing Confrontation with Saddam,‖ The Guardian,
18 January 1993, 1.
•United States – North Korea (1994)
During a crisis in the mid-1990s the United States seriously considered attacking North Korea‘s
nuclear infrastructure to prevent Pyongyang from building nuclear weapons. There are some
indications that Washington may have entertained the use of force against North Korea in the
early 1990s. For instance, in the fall of 1993, Secretary of Defense William Perry ordered the
Joint Chiefs John Shalikashvili to draw up plans for ―destroying key components of the reactor
site with a military attack.‖ However, military action was not seriously considered (as we define
it) until 1994. In June of that year U.S. President Bill Clinton and his national security team
privately discussed the possible responses to the North Korean problem. Senior advisors
recognized that there were risks associated with using military force; consequently few were
willing to embrace this option without reservations. The evidence indicates, however, that
officials did advocate for striking nuclear infrastructure under certain conditions. Secretary of
Defense William Perry, for example, noted: ―we believed that the nuclear program on which
North Korea was embarked was…dangerous, and were prepared to risk a war to stop it.‖
Washington made this clear by mobilizing forces to attack the principal nuclear facility at
Yongbyon and reinforce the troop presence in South Korea to prepare for a possible
counterattack. Washington requested cooperation from Seoul in any military action it might take
against North Korea. Just as an armed confrontation seemed inevitable, the United States
reached a political/diplomatic agreement known as the Agreed Framework, which entitled North
Korea to aid in exchange for ending its nuclear weapons program. Washington did not seriously
14
consider force for the remainder of the 1990s (although strikes may have been considered
beginning in 2001, which is temporally beyond the scope of our analysis).
Sources: ―U.S. Considered Attacks on N. Korea, Perry Tells Panel,‖ Washington Post, January
25, 1995; Ashton Carter and William Perry, Preventive Defense: A New Security Strategy for
America (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1999), pp. 123, 131; Ashton Carter and William Perry,
―Back to the Brink,‖ The Washington Post, October 20, 2002; Lyle Goldstein, Preventive Attack
and Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Comparative Historical Analysis (Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press, 2006): 133-135; Michael Gordon, ―US is Bolstering Forces in Korea,‖ New
York Times, 27 March 1994, 9; Steve Komarow, ―Clinton Walks Thin Line on North
Korea/More Pressure Could Set off Powder Keg,‖ USA Today, 6 December 1993, 9A; Steve
Komarow, ‗US to Ship Missiles to South Korea,‖ USA Today, 27 January 1994; Thomas
Lippman, ―Perry Offers Dire Picture of Failure to Block North Korean Nuclear Weapons,‖
Washington Post, 4 May 1994, A29; William Perry, ―Proliferation on the Peninsula: Five North
Korean Nuclear Crises,‖ Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol.
607, No. 1 (2006), pp. 78-86; Bennett Ramberg, "Preemption Paradox," Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists, Vol. 62, No. 4 (July/August 2006), pp. 48-56; David Sloss, ―Forcible Arms Control:
Preemptive Attacks on Nuclear Facilities,‖ Chicago Journal of International Law, Vol. 4 (2003),
pp. 39-58; Joel Wit, Daniel Poneman and Robert Gallucci, Going Critical: The First North
Korean Nuclear Crisis (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 2004), pp. 210-11, 219-220, 244;
15
Table A-1: Coding Criteria for Considered Attacks against Nuclear Programs, 1942-2000
Case Coding Criteria
Attacking
State
Target
State
Year(s)
Considered
Attacking
Private
Advocacy
for
Attacks
Request
3rd
Party
Cooperati
on
Political
Decision
to Attack
Attack
Launched
Egypt Israel 1967   
India Pakistan 1982, 1984,
1986-87

Iran Iraq 1980 
Iraq Iran 1984-88 
Israel Iraq 1977-81  
Israel Pakistan 1979, 1982-
84, 1986-87
 
Norway Germany 1941-44 
Pakistan India 1984 
South Korea North
Korea
1991, 1993-
94

Soviet Union Israel 1967 
Soviet Union South
Africa
1976 
Taiwan China 1963 
United
Kingdom
Germany 1941-1945 
United
Kingdom
Iraq 1998 
United States China 1961, 1963-
64
 
United States Germany 1942-1945 
United States Iraq 1990-91,
1993, 1998

United States North
Korea
1994 
16
Appendix B: Well Known Cases Not Constituting Attacks or Considered Attacks of
Nuclear Infrastructure
In this appendix we discuss a small number of cases that are mentioned in the historical literature
but excluded from our study because they do not meet our definition of ―consideration.‖
Iraq-Israel (1991)
During the 1991 Persian Gulf War, Iraq attempted to target Israel‘s facility at Dimona, launching
scud missiles that fell short of the target. We exclude this case because Israel already had
nuclear weapons at the time of the Gulf War.
Sources: Bob Hepburn, ―Is Nuclear Plant Iraq‘s New Target in Israeli Desert?‖ The Toronto Star,
19 February 1991, A13; ―Iraq Reports ‗Destructive‘ Attack on Israeli Reactor ‗Dedicated to War
Purposes,‖ BBC, 18 February 1991; Richard Owen, ―Missiles Aimed at Dimona Nuclear
Reactor,‖ The Times, 18 February 1991; Stewart Stogel, ―Iraq Fired Scuds at Israeli Reactor; ‘91
Attack Sought to Crack Dome,‖ Washington Times, 1 January 1998, p.A1.
•Libya – Israel (1981)
Libya considered launching a retaliatory raid against Israel‘s key nuclear installation following
the destruction of Iraq‘s Osirak reactor in 1981. Muammar Qaddafi pondered smuggling a
Syrian rocket within range of the Dimona facility and he reportedly suggested this plan to the
Libyan ambassador to Jordan. To implement this operation, Libya requested support from both
the Soviet Union and Iraq. Both states quickly dismissed Qaddafi‘s plea and there is no evidence
that either Moscow or Baghdad advocated for strikes at that time. The Soviets in particular were
caught off guard by Libya‘s request. Despite meeting some of our criteria we do not code this
case as a considered attack because Israeli possessed at least one nuclear weapon by 1981.
Sources: Isabella Ginor and Gideon Remez, Foxbats Over Dimona: The Soviets' Nuclear
Gamble in the Six Day War, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007), p. 121; Ludmilla B.
Herbst, ―Preventive Strikes on Nuclear Facilities: An Analytic Framework,‖ M.A. Thesis,
University of British Columbia, 1995, p. 8; George Russell, ―Attack – and Fallout,‖ Time, June
22, 1981.
•Soviet Union – China (1969)
During the 1969 border crisis, the Soviet Union seriously contemplated strikes against Chinese
nuclear facilities and American intelligence detected preparations for such an attack. We do not
include this case because we are interested in attacks against non-nuclear weapon states; China
had conducted its first nuclear test five years previously. The Soviet Union and China did break
party ties as of 1963, but tensions and border disputes did not arise until late in 1964, after the
Chinese nuclear test is October 1964. Between October 1964 and March 1969, there were 4,189
border incidents (Wishnick 2001, 33); border incursions did not begin until 1967 (18 between
1967 and 1969), suggesting that antagonism in the form of military force was incipient in late
1964 but was mostly concentrated in the second half of the 1960s.
17
Sources: William Burr, ―Sino-American Relations, 1969: The Sino-Soviet Border War and Steps
Towards Rapprochement,‖ Cold War History, Vol 1, No. 3 (April 2001), 73-112; Lyle
Goldstein, Preventive Attack and Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Comparative Historical
Analysis (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), pp. 80-83; Arkady Shevchenko, Breaking
with Moscow (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1985); Scott Sagan and Kenneth Waltz, The Spread of
Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed (New York: W.W. Norton, 2003); Elizabeth Wishnick,
Mending Fences: The Evolution of Moscow's China Policy from Brezhnev to Yeltsin (Seattle,
WA: University of Washington Press, 2001), pp. 34-36.
•United States – Cuba (1962)
During the Cuban Missile Crisis, the United States considered a preemptive attack against Soviet
nuclear warheads stationed in Cuba. We exclude this case from our analysis because the attack
was not intended to delay Cuba‘s ability to produce nuclear bombs (since Cuba did not even
have a nuclear weapons program). Further, missiles—not reactors or other nuclear facilities—
were the intended target.
Sources: McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival: Choices about the Bomb in the first Fifty
Years (NY, NY: Random House, 1989); Laurence Chang and Peter Kornbluh, The Cuban
Missile Crisis National Security Archive Documents Reader (New York, NY: The New Press,
1998); Robert F. Kennedy, Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis (WW Norton,
1999); Marc Trachtenberg, ―The Influence of Nuclear Weapons in the Cuban Missile Crisis,‖
International Security, Vol 10, No. 1 (Summer 1985), 137-163; Transcript of the ExComm
Meeting, 16 October 1962.
•United States – Libya (1996)
During the mid-1990s a crisis arose when the United States received intelligence about Libya‘s
ongoing work at a chemical weapons facility at Tarhunah. The United States considered a
preventive strike against this facility in 1996. Secretary of Defense William Perry privately
endorsed this option and he discussed it with Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak during a trip to
Cairo. This case is excluded from our dataset because it dealt exclusively with a chemical
weapons complex. There is no evidence that the United States considered action against Libyan
nuclear facilities.
Sources: Lyle Goldstein Preventive Attack and Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Comparative
Historical Analysis (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), pp. 136-137; Philip Shenon,
―Perry, in Egypt, Warns Libya to Halt Chemical Weapons Plant,‖ The New York Times, April 4,
1996.
•United States – Japan (1945)
In raids on Tokyo on April 13, 1945, the United States destroyed facilities related to the Japanese
nuclear program in the course of its widespread incendiary raids. We do not include this in our
analysis since the United States was not aware of the program‘s existence and did not intend to
explicitly target nuclear facilities.
Sources: Bruce Rae, ―B-29‘s Set Great Tokyo Fires; Explosions Heard 100 Miles,‖ New York
Times, April 14, 1945, p.1; Richard Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb (New York: Simon
18
and Schuster, 1986), 612; Dan Reiter, ―Preventive Attacks against Nuclear, Biological, and
Chemical Weapons Programs: The Track Record,‖ in Hitting First: Preventive Force in U.S.
Security Strategy (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2006), pp.27-44; Richard Rhodes,
The Making of the Atomic Bomb, 457-459
United States-North Korea (1993)
In late 1993, tensions in the Korean peninsula escalated over North Korea‘s suspected nuclear
facilities and Pyongyong‘s unwillingness to admit full international inspections of its facilities.
The US verbally threatened North Korea and likely even drew up contingency plans, but does
not appear to have given serious consideration until 1994.
Sources: Thomas Friedman, ―US and Seoul Differ on Appeal to North Korea on Nucelar Sites,‖
New York Times, 24 November 1993, A16; B McGowan, ―US Missile Attack Plans,‖ Courier
Mail, 8 November 1993; Martin Walker, ―US Warns Off North Korea,‖ The Guardian, 8
November 1993, 1.
•United States – Pakistan (1978-1979)
In the late 1970s, the United States discussed covert strikes against Kahuta, Pakistan‘s uranium
enrichment facility but there is no evidence that senior officials advocated for this policy. In
1978 Secretary of State Cyrus Vance issued a private memo asking the State Department to
conduct a study assessing the costs and benefits of launching air strikes against the Pakistani
facility. Ambassador Gerard Smith prepared a paper that outlined how the United States could
attack Kahuta and analyzed the value of doing so. Nonproliferation specialist Joseph Nye
prepared a similar report for Vance. These conclusions reached in these analyses were far from
ringing endorsements of the preventive strike option. The Nye report, for instance, stated ―it
would be very difficult to pull off successfully‖ (Corera 2006, 28). On September 13, 1979
senior U.S. officials met in a classified setting to discuss options for responding to Pakistan‘s
nuclear program. Officials discussed military plans prepared by the Pentagon as well as the
reports written by Smith and Nye. Two options raised during the meeting were strikes against
nuclear facilities and the extension of security guarantees. Officials were not thrilled with either
possibility. According to Nye, all of the discussions in 1978-79 on the issue were ―just
contingency planning‖ and neither Vance nor any other cabinet-level official lobbied for the use
of military force.9
Sources: Author‘s e-mail exchange with Joseph Nye, December 22, 2009; Richard Burt, ―U.S.
Aides Say Pakistan is Reported to be Building an A-Bomb Site,‖ The New York Times, August
12, 1979; Gordon Corera, Shopping for Bombs: Nuclear Proliferation, Global Insecurity, and the
Rise and Fall of the A.Q. Khan Network (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006); Douglas
Frantz and Catherine Collins, The Nuclear Jihadist (New York: Twelve, 2007), pp.88-89, 100-
101; Devin Hagerty, The Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation: Lessons from South Asia
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997), p. 85; ―Pakistan Reaction to Alleged US Threat to Nuclear
Plants," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 15 August 1979.
9
It is noteworthy that the United States warned the Pakistanis of joint Israeli-Indian plans to attack Kahuta in the
early-1980s.
19
•United States – Soviet Union (1945-1949)
Beginning in 1945, some observers in the United States began calling for preventive action
against the Soviet Union to limit its ability to produce nuclear weapons. General Leslie Groves,
who had supervised the Manhattan Project, argued that the United States should strike Soviet
research facilities to ―guarantee American supremacy‖ in the area of nuclear weapons. Other
senior military leaders such as Generals Carl Spaatz, Henry Arnold, Ira Eaker, Ely Culberton,
Curtis LeMay, and Frank Everest all made similar arguments in the late 1940s. According to
diplomatic historians these ideas were ―surprisingly widespread,‖ among public intellectuals and
military leaders. However, there is no evidence that President Harry Truman shared these views
in the 1940s. Additionally, senior officials with real decision-making, such as Secretary of State
Dean Acheson, opposed the preventive war option in their public and private statements on the
issue. Aside from the statements of Truman and his cabinet there are no other indications in the
available historical record that Washington seriously considered attacking Soviet nuclear
facilities prior to 1949 (e.g., there is no indication that the U.S. approached the British about
cooperating in an attack against the Soviets, which is something we would have expected to
happen if strikes had been seriously entertained). The United States did seriously consider
strikes against Soviet nuclear facilities—but only after Moscow acquired the bomb. Following
the completion of National Security Council Document 68 in April 1950 President Truman and
others in his cabinet thoroughly addressed this issue. Preventive strikes were also considered
during the early years of the Eisenhower administration. We exclude this case because our
theoretical interest is in considered attacks against non-nuclear weapons states.
Sources: ―International: How Close is War?‖ Time, October 4, 1948; ―Acheson Rules out
‗Preventive War,‘‖ The New York Times, June 14, 1950; Lyle Goldstein, Preventive Attack and
Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Comparative Historical Analysis (Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press, 2006), pp. 37-42; David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and
Atomic Energy, 1939-1956 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994), p. 267; George
Quester, Nuclear Monopoly (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2000); Scott Sagan
and Kenneth Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed (New York: W.W.
Norton, 2003), pp. 56-57; Scott Sagan, ―The Perils of Proliferation in South Asia,‖ Asian Survey
41(6): 1067; Randall L. Schweller, ―Domestic Structure and Preventive War: Are Democracies
More Pacific?‖ World Politics, Vol. 44, No. 2 (January 1992), pp. 234-269; Scott Silverstone,
―Can Democracies Initiate Preventive War? America‘s Confrontation with the Soviet Union and
Iraq,‖ West Point, NY: United States Military Academy, 2003; Marc Trachtenberg, ―A ‗Wasting
Asset:‘ American Strategy and the Shifting Nuclear Balance, 1949-1954,‖ International Security,
Vol. 13, No. 3 (Winter 1988/89), pp. 5-51; Marc Trachtenberg, History and Strategy (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1991), p. 105;
•United Kingdom – Soviet Union (1946-1949)
Winston Churchill publicly and privately advocated for preventive strikes against Soviet nuclear
facilities as early as 1946. In that year Churchill indicated that ―We ought not to wait until
Russia is ready,‖ indicating that he believed war with the Soviets would take place in
approximately eight years and it would be better to strike sooner rather than later. In 1948
Churchill again argued for ―bringing matters to a head‖ before Moscow broke the American
nuclear monopoly. However, Churchill made these remarks as opposition leader—not as Prime
Minister (he was voted out of office in July 1945 and did not return as Prime Minister until
20
October 1951). There is no evidence that Prime Minister Clement Attlee or other senior officials
expressed interest in preventive strikes against the Soviet Union prior to 1949.
Sources: ―Winston Churchill‘s Llandudno Speech,‖ The New York Times, October 9, 1948;
Richard Betts, Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance (Washington, D.C.: Brooking Institution
Press, 1987), p. 25; Margaret Gowing, Interdependence and Deterrence: Britain and Atomic
Energy, 1945-1952, Vols. 1 and 2 (London: Macmillan, 1974); David Holloway, Stalin and the
Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939-1956 (New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press, 1994), p. 267; Herbert Matthews, ―Briton Warns U.S.,‖ The New York Times, October 10,
1948; George Quester, Nuclear Monopoly (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2000);
Marc Trachtenberg, History and Strategy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), p. 105;
Marc Trachtenberg, ―A ‗Wasting Asset:‘ American Strategy and the Shifting Nuclear Balance,
1949-1954,‖ International Security, Vol. 13, No. 3 (Winter 1988/89), pp. 5-51; Ken Young, ―A
Most Special Relationship: The Origins of Anglo-American Nuclear Strike Planning,‖ Journal of
Cold War Studies, Vol. 9, No. 2 (Spring 2007), p. 9.
21
Appendix C: Sources Consulted for Non-Cases of Considered Attacks against Nuclear
Infrastructure
In addition to the sources listed in Appendix A, we consulted a variety of books, historical
articles, and primary documents that did not reveal evidence of attacks or considered attacks
against nuclear programs within a particular dyad. We list these sources here so that readers
have a clear sense of why we concluded that attacks or considered attacks did not occur in a
particular instance. We organize this appendix by country and include all 25 states that at one
time explored nuclear weapons.10
The sources listed for the United States, for instance, are those
we consulted to determine how other countries responded to the American nuclear weapons
project prior to 1945. These sources do not necessarily address how the United States responded
to other countries‘ nuclear programs; such sources are listed under each respective proliferator.
Readers should note that we consulted what we believed to be the seminal historical literature for
each nuclear program. There are definitive nuclear histories written for many of the states that
explored nuclear weapons. Relevant examples include Henry DeWolf Smyth‘s Atomic Energy
for Military Purposes (the United States), Margaret Gowing‘s Independence and Deterrence (the
United Kingdom), David Holloway‘s Stalin and the Bomb, Avner Cohen‘s Israel and the Bomb,
and George Perkovich‘s India’s Nuclear Bomb. These histories were often written by scholars
who had access to classified documents. They tend to include rich information on all aspects of
a state‘s nuclear program, including the ways in which other countries responded (or thought
about responding). If attacks were considered against a particular country, it is reasonable to
expect that such events would be mentioned in these definitive historical accounts. Yet, our
efforts did not end after consulting these sources. We drew on other historical literature on
nuclear proliferation and international crises that discussed how countries responded or
considered responded to proliferation in a given case. We paid especially close attention to
dyads not included in Appendix A that were characterized by hostile relationships or rivalries
(e.g., Argentina-Brazil in the 1970s and 1980s) because this is where we might expect attacks to
have been considered. As of result of this strategy, we did not consult an equal number of
sources for all countries. If one or more countries could have plausibly given an attack serious
consideration there will be more sources listed than if few conceivable attackers existed
(compare, for instance, the U.S.S.R. to Switzerland).
We consulted primary documents dealing with states‘ responses to nuclear proliferation
whenever possible. In each case we searched databases such as Lexis-Nexis and World News
Connection and included press reports below when appropriate. We also mined declassified
documents from the U.S. government. Unless otherwise noted, the declassified documents listed
below were obtained from the Digital National Security Archive. Although these documents are
from U.S. sources they sometimes provided useful information about how other states considered
responding in a given case of proliferation. This is obviously not a perfect substitute for
obtaining declassified documents from all other possible attacking governments, but it is the best
that we are currently able to do. Finally, in a few instances we contacted former government
officials or scholars with area expertise to inquire whether we had properly coded certain cases.
10
For a discussion of what constitutes ―explore,‖ see Sonali Singh and Christopher Way, ―The Correlated of Nuclear
Proliferation: A Quantitative Test,‖ Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 48, No. 6, pp. 859-885.
22
•Algeria
David Albright and Corey Hinderstein, ―Algeria: Big Deal in the Desert?‖ Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists 57 (May/June 2001); ―Algeria and the Bomb,‖ The Economist, January 11, 1992,
p.60;―Algeria Is Planning to Launch a Nuclear Program,‖ Nucleonics Week, March 12, 1981;
―Algeria: Nuclear Reactor Update,‖ The Risk Report, Volume 1 Number 5 (June 1995), p. 12,
(http://www.wisconsinproject.org/countries/algeria/reac-updt.html; Eldad Beck, ―An Islamic
Bomb in Algeria,‖ The Jerusalem Report, May 9, 1991, p.30; Youssef Bodansky, ―Nuclear
Weapons and Radical States Pose New Situations,‖ Defense and Foreign Affairs’ Strategic
Policy, June 1992, p.6; William Burr, ed., The Algerian Nuclear Problem, 1991;Joseph
Cirincione with Jon Wolfsthal and Miram Rajkuar, Deadly Arsenals: Tracking Weapons of Mass
Destruction, (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2002), p. 299-
303;―China Exports to Syria, Algeria Covered by IAEA,‖ Nuclear News, April 1992, p.65;
―China Rebuffed,‖ Aviation Week and Space Technology, May 6, 1991, p.17; Controversy over
the Es Salam Nuclear Reactor (Washington, D.C.: George Washington University, The National
Security Archive, 2007): http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb228/index.htm; John
Deutch, ‗The New Nuclear Threat,‖ Foreign Affairs, Fall 1992, 120; ―Evaluation of a 1MeterSatellite
Image of the Algerian Reactor Site,‖ 1 May 2001, available at http://isis-
online.org/isis-reports/detail/evaluation-of-a-1-meter-satellite-image-of-the-algerian-reactorsite/;Shai
Feldman, Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control in the Middle East (Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press, 1997), pp. 65-66; Bill Gertz, "Algeria, China teamed on nukes", The Washington
Times, September 17, 2007; Bill Gertz, "China Helps Algeria Develop Nuclear Weapons,"
Washington Times, April 11, 1991; Hirsh Goodman, ―Which Side is Egypt On?‖ Jerusalem
Report, March 23, 1995, p.56;Mark Hibbs, ―China Attends Zangger Meeting, Might Join
Committee after Talks,‖ Nuclear Fuel, 2 June 1992; Rodney Jones and Mark McDonough,
Tracking Nuclear Proliferation: A Guide in Maps and Charts, 1998 (Washington, D.C., Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, 1998), pp. 163-168; Richard Kessler, ―Argentina to Start
Algerian Research Reactor in Late March,‖ Nucleonics Week, 16 March 1989; Richard Kessler,
―Argentina Announces Sales of Research Reactor and Fuel to Algeria,‖ Nucleonics Week, May
30 1985; ―Nuclear Non-Proliferation: Between the Bomb and a Hard Place,‖ The Economist,
March 25 1995, p.23; Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium 1996: World Inventories,
Capabilities, and Policies SIPRI, (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1997); Elaine Sciolino with
Eric Schmitt, ―Algerian Reactor Came From China,‖ New York Times, November 15, 1991
•Argentina
Itty Abraham, Pakistan-India and Argentina-Brazil: Stepping Back from the Nuclear
Threshold? Occasional Paper 15 (Washington, DC: Stimson Center, 1993); ―Argentina: Going
its Own Nuclear Way,‖ The Economist, November 26, 1983, p.32; Milton Benjamin, ―Argentina
on Threshold of Nuclear Reprocessing,‖ Washington Post, October 16, 1978, A2; E. Michael
Blake, ―A Better Kind of Rivalry,‖ Nuclear News, (February 1986), p.29; Julio César Carasales,
De Rivales a Socios: El Proceso de Cooperación Nuclear entre Argentina y Brasil, (Buenos
Aires, Argentina: Nuevohacer, 1997); ―Europe‘s Boost for a Latin Bomb,‖ Washington Post, 6
April 1980, E6 (editorial); ―Falklands Defeat Could Speed Argentina A-Bomb,‖ Christian
Science Monitor, June 16, 1982, p.22; Paul Leventhal and Sharon Tanzer, Averting a Latin
American Nuclear Arms Race, (New York, NY: Nuclear Control Institute 1992); David Marsh,
―Argentina Could be Top Dog in Latin American Natural Uranium,‖ Globe and Mail, 30 April
1979; ―A Nuclear Argentina,‖ Globe and Mail, December 2, 1986 (editorial); ―Nuclear
23
Proliferation: Keeping Up With the Neighbours,‖ The Economist, May 25, 1985, p.33; Lisa
Owens, ―Confidence-Building in Latin America: Nuclear Controls between Argentina and
Brazil‖ in Regional Confidence Building in 1995: South Asia, the Middle East, and Latin
America, Jill Junnola and Michael Krepon (Washington, DC: Stimson Center, 1995); John R.
Redick, Nuclear Illusions: Argentina and Brazil (Washington, DC: Stimson Center, 1995); John
R Rredick, ―Regional Nuclear Arms Control in Latin America,‖ International Organization, Vol
29, No. 2 (Spring 1975), 415-445; Edward Schumacher, ―Argentina Says its Nuclear Plants Will
Not Comply with Safeguards,‖ New York Times, 25 July 1981, 3; Etel Solingen, Industrial
Policy, Technology, and International Bargaining: Designing Nuclear Industries in Argentina
and Brazil (1996), 3-50; Author‘s correspondence with Sonia Fernandez Moreno, Nuclear
Affairs and Institutional Communication, Argentina Nuclear Regulatory Authority, December 2,
2009; author‘s correspondence with Viviane Simões, International Relations Analyst, National
Nuclear Energy Commission (CNEN), December 10, 2009.
•Australia
Lorna Arnold, A Very Special Relationship: British Atomic Weapon Trials in Australia (London:
HM Stationery Office, 1987); Ian Bellany, Australia in the Nuclear Age: national Defense and
National Development (Sydney: Sydney University Press, 1972); Richard Broinowski, Fact or
Fission? The Truth about Australia’s Nuclear Ambitions (Melbourne: Scribe Publications,
2003); Alice Cawte, Atomic Australia: 1944-1990 (Kensington: New South Wales University
Press, 1992); S. Encel and Allan McKnight, ―Bombs, Power Stations, and Proliferation,‖
Australian Quarterly Vol. 42 (March 1970); Jacques Hymans, The Psychology of Nuclear
Proliferation: Identity, Emotions, and Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2006), pp. 114-140; Roy MacLeod, ―The Atom Comes to Australia: Reflections on the
Australian Nuclear Programme, 1953-1993,‖ History and Technology, Vol. 11 (1994), pp. 299-
315; Daniel Mulhall, ―Intimations of Neutrality: Australian Perspectives on the benefits and
Drawbacks of Alignment,‖ Irish Studies in International Affairs, Vol. 2, No. 2 (1986), pp. 79-90;
George Quester, The Politics of Nuclear Proliferation (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1973); Wayne Reynolds, Australia’s Bid for the Atomic Bomb (Melbourne: Melbourne
University Press, 2000); B. B. Schaffer, ―Policy and System in Defense: The Australian Case,‖
World Politics, Vol. 15, No. 2 (Jan., 1963), pp. 236-261; J. L. Symonds, A History of British
Atomic Tests in Australia (Canberra: Australian Government Publications Service, 1985); Jim
Walsh, ―Surprise Down Under: The Secret History of Australia‘s Nuclear Ambitions,‖
Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 4, No. 1 (1997), pp. 1-20.
•Brazil
Itty Abraham, Pakistan-India and Argentina-Brazil: Stepping Back from the Nuclear
Threshold? Occasional Paper 15 (Washington, DC: Stimson Center, 1993); Milton Benjamin,
―Brazil Takes Step Toward Developing Nuclear Weapons Potential,‖ Washinton Post, 3
February 1983, A29; E. Michael Blake, ―A Better Kind of Rivalry,‖ Nuclear News, (February
1986), p.29; Jim Brooke, ―Dateline Brazil: Southern Superpower,‖ Foreign Policy, No. 44
(Autumn 1981), 167-180; Julio César Carasales, De Rivales a Socios: El Proceso de
Cooperación Nuclear entre Argentina y Brasil, (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Nuevohacer, 1997);
Karen DeYoung, ―Vance, Brazilians Remain Apart on Nuclear Issue,‖ Washington Post, 23
November 1977, A15; Norman Gall, ―Atoms for Brazil, Dangers for All,‖ Foreign Policy, No.
23 (Summer 1976), 155-201; Jean Krasno, ―Non-Proliferation: Brazil‘s Secret Nuclear
24
Program,‖ Orbis, Summer 1994; Paul Leventhal and Sharon Tanzer, Averting a Latin American
Nuclear Arms Race, (New York, NY: Nuclear Control Institute 1992; Ernest McCrary,
―Defusing the Rivalry Between Brazil and Argentina,‖ Business Week, 7 May 1979, 63;
―Nuclear Proliferation: Keeping Up With the Neighbours,‖ The Economist, May 25, 1985, p.33;
Juan de Onis, ―Brazil Pushes Nuclear Effort in Spite of US,‖ New York Times, 21 August 1980,
p.A10; Lisa Owens, ―Confidence-Building in Latin America: Nuclear Controls between
Argentina and Brazil‖ in Regional Confidence Building in 1995: South Asia, the Middle East,
and Latin America, Jill Junnola and Michael Krepon (Washington, DC: Stimson Center, 1995);
John Redick, ―Regional Nuclear Arms Control in Latin America,‖ International Organization,
Vol 29, No. 2 (Spring 1975), 415-445; John R. Redick, Nuclear Illusions: Argentina and Brazil
(Washington, DC: Stimson Center, 1995); John R Rredick, ―Regional Nuclear Arms Control in
Latin America,‖ International Organization, Vol 29, No. 2 (Spring 1975), 415-445; Alan Riding,
―Brazil and the Bomb: Questions Arise Anew,‖ New York Times, 21 September 1986, p.20; John
Sanders, ―Of Arms and Sovereignty: A Report on Latin America,‖ Defense and Foreign Affairs,
Aug/Sept 1981, p.9; Author‘s correspondence with Sonia Fernandez Moreno, December 2, 2009;
author‘s correspondence with Viviane Simões, International Relations Analyst, National Nuclear
Energy Commission (CNEN), December 10, 2009.
•China
William Burr and Jeffrey Richelson, "Whether to Strangle the Baby in the Cradle," International
Security 25(3): 54-99; Gordon Chang, "JFK, China, and the Bomb," Journal of American
History 74(4): 1289-1310; Central Intelligence Agency, Office of National Estimates, ―Chinese
Communist Capabilities for Developing an Effective Atomic Weapons Program and Weapons
Delivery Program,‖ June 24, 1955; Ken Coates, China and the Bomb (Atlantic Highlands, NJ:
Humanities Press, 1986); Joseph Fitchett, "Chinese Nuclear Buildup Predicted," International
Herald Tribune, 6 November 1999; Karsten Frey, India’s Nuclear Bomb and National Security,
New York, NY: Routledge 2006), 112; Bates Gill and Taeho Kim, China's Arms Acquisitions
from Abroad: A Quest For 'Superb and Secret Weapons' (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1995) pp. 14-32; Paul Godwin, "China's Nuclear Forces: An Assessment," Current History,
September 1999; Morton Halperin, China and the Bomb, (New York: Praeger, 1965); Impact of
Chinese Communist Nuclear Weapons Progress on United States National Security: A Report,
(Washington, DC: Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 1967); Matthew Jones, ―‘Groping toward
Coexistence,‘: US China Policy during the Johnson Years,‖ Diplomacy and Statecraft, 12, No. 3
(2001): 175-190; Arnold Kramish, ―The Chinese People‘s Republic and the Bomb,‖ (Santa
Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1960); Gen. Curtis LeMay, acting chairman, JCS, to Secretary
of Defense, April 29, 1963, ―Study of Chinese Communist Vulnerability,‖ Office of the Country
Director for the Republic of China, 1954-1965; John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China Builds
the Bomb (Stanford: Stanford University Press), 1988; Michael S. Minor, ―China‘s Nuclear
Development Program,‖ Asian Survey, Vol 16, No. 6 (Jun 1976), 571-579; Robert S. Norris,
Andrew S. Burrows and Richard W. Fieldhouse, British, French, and Chinese Nuclear Weapons
(Boulder: Westview Press. 1994), pp. 350-352, 358; "Nuclear Weapon Systems in China," DIA
Defense Estimative Brief, 4 April 1984 (Washington, DC: National Security Archive,
declassified1995); Washington, DC 1999; Jeffrey Richelson, Spying on the Bomb: American
Nuclear Intelligence from Nazi Germany to Iran and North Korea (New York: Norton, 2006);
Steve Weissman and Herbert Krosney, The Islamic Bomb: The Nuclear Threat to Israel and the
Middle East (New York, NY: Times Books, 1981), 51; Policy Planning Council (PPC) Director
25
George McGhee to Secretary of State Dean Rusk, "Anticipatory Action Pending Chinese
Demonstration of a Nuclear Capability," September 13, 1961, Digital National Security Archive.
•France
Pierre Billaud and Venance Journe, ―The Real Story Behind the Making of the French Hydrogen
Bomb,‖ Nonproliferation Review, Vol 15, No. 2 (2008): 353-372; Wade Boese, "France
Upgrades, Trims Nuclear Arsenal." Arms Control Today 38, no. 3, (1 April 2008), 35-36; Declan
Butler, "France seeks to clean up nuclear image," Nature 380, no. 6569, 7 March 1996, p.8;
Joseph Cirincione, Jon B. Wolfsthal, and Miriam Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals: Nuclear,
Biological, and Chemical Threats, Second ed. (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, 2005); Elone Evans, ―Nuclear Tests Case (Australia v. France), The
American Journal of International Law, Vol 69, No. 3 (Jul 1975), 668-683; France’s First
Atomic Explosion, (New York: Ambassade de France, 1960); ―France‘s Nuclear Weapons:
Origin of the Force de Frappe,‖ Nuclear Weapon Archive, 2001, available at
http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/France/FranceOrigin.html; Fernand Gigon, The Bomb (New
York: Pyramid Books, 1960); Gabrielle Hecht and Michael Callon, The Radiance of France:
Nuclear Power and National Identity after World War II, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2009);
Meirion Jones, ―Britain‘s Dirty Secret,‖ New Statesman, 13 March 2006; Catherine McArdle
Kelleher, ―Western Europe: Cycles, Crisis, and the Nuclear Revolution,‖ Annals of the American
Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol 469, (Sep 1983), 91-103; Robert S. Norris and
Hans M. Kristensen, "French Nuclear Forces: 2008," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 64, no. 4
(2008), pp. 52-54; Robert S. Norris, Andrew S. Burrows and Richard W. Fieldhouse, British,
French, and Chinese Nuclear Weapons (Boulder: Westview Press,1994); Mervyn O‘Driscoll,
―Missing the Nuclear Boat? British Policy and French Military Nuclear Ambitions During the
Euratom Foundation Negotiations, 1955-1956,‖ Diplomacy and Statecraft, Vol 9, No1 (1998):
135-162; Jean-Marc Regnault, ―France‘s Search for Nuclear Test Sites, 1957-1963,‖ Journal of
Military History, Vol 67, NO. 4 (Oct 2003), 1223-1248;Jeffrey Richelson, Spying on the Bomb:
American Nuclear Intelligence from Nazi Germany to Iran and North Korea (New York:
Norton, 2006);Lawrence Scheinman, Atomic Energy Policy in France under the Fourth
Republic, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1965); Georges-Henri Souto, ―The French
Military Program for Nuclear Energy, 1945-1981,‖ Nuclear History Program, Occasional Paper
3 (College Park, MD: Center for International Security Studies, 1989).
•Germany
Jeremy Bernstein (1996). Hitler’s Uranium Club (Woodbury, NY: American Institute of
Physics); Jeremy Bernstein and David Cassidy. (1995). ―Bomb Apologetics: Farm Hall, August
1945,‖ Physics Today Vol 48, No. 8 part 1, 32-36; Beyerchen, Alan D. Scientists Under Hitler:
Politics and the Physics Community in the Third Reich (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press,
1977); John S. Craig, Peculiar Liaisons in War, Espionage, and Terrorism in the 20th
Century,
(Algora Publishing, 2005), 119; Per F. Dahl, Heavy Water and the Wartime Race for Nuclear
Energy (London, UK: Taylor and Francis, 1999); John Gimbel, Science, Technology, and
Reparations: Exploitation and Plunder in Postwar Germany (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford, 1990);
Samuel A. Goudsmit, Alsos (Woodbury, NY: American Institute of Physics, 1947); Lesley
Groves, Now it Can be Told: The Story of the Manhattan Project, (Da Capo Press, New Ed,
1983); Knut Haukelid, Skis against the Atom: The Exciting, First-Hand Account of Heroism and
Daring Sabotage During the Nazi Occupation of Norway, (North American Heritage Press,
26
1989); Dieter Hoffmann, Between Autonomy and Accommodation: The German Physical Society
during the Third Reich, Physics in Perspective Vol 7, no.3 (2005), 293-329;Lesley Groves, Now
it Can be Told: The Story of the Manhattan Project, (Da Capo Press, New Ed, 1983): 188-189;
Gale Mattox, ―West German Perspectives on Nuclear Armament and Arms Control,‖ Annals of
the American Academy of Political and Social Science, (Sept 1983), 104-116; Pavel V
Oleynikov, German Scientists in the Soviet Atomic Project, The Nonproliferation Review Vol 7,
No 2, (2000: 1–30; Thomas Powers, The Secret History of the German Bomb, (New York, NY:
Penguin Books, 1993), pp. 195-202; Jeffrey Richelson, Spying on the Bomb: American Nuclear
Intelligence from Nazi Germany to Iran and North Korea (New York: Norton, 2006);Paul
Lawrence Rose, Heisenberg and the Nazi Atomic Bomb Project (Berkeley, CA: University of
California Press, 1998); Mark Walker German National Socialism and the Quest for Nuclear
Power 1939–1949 (New York, NY: Cambridge, 1993).
•India
Itty Abraham, The Making of the Indian Atomic Bomb: Science, Secrecy and the Postcolonial
State, (Zed Books, 1998); Milton Benjamin, ―Atomic Power; Nuclear Energy Brings Promise,
Peril to Developing World,‖ The Washington Post, December 3, 1978; Andrew Bilski and
Wililam Lowther, ―In the Shadow of the ‗Islamic Bomb‘‖ Maclean’s , March 23, 1987, p.24; E.
Michael Blake, ―India Plans Purchase of Units from USSR,‖ Nuclear News, August 1988, p.59;
William Burrows and Robert Windrem, Critical Mass: The Dangerous Race for Superweapons
in a Fragmenting World (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), pp. 349-350; Karsten Frey,
India’s Nuclear Bomb and National Security, New York, NY: Routledge 2006); Sumit Ganguly,
―India in 2008: Domestic Turmoil and External Hopes,‖ Asian Survey, Vol 49, No. 1 (Jan/Feb
2009), 39-52; Sumit Ganguly and Devin Hagerty, Fearful Symmetry: India-Pakistan Crises in
the Shadow of Nuclear Weapons (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2005), 57-58; Sumit
Ganguly, ―Avoiding War in Kashmir,‖ Foreign Affairs, Winter 1990, p.57; ―India, Pakistan
Agree Not to Attack N-Sites,‖ Nuclear News, February 1989, p.96; Holger Jensen, Kathy Evans,
and William Lowther, ―A Threat of Nuclear War,‖ Maclean’s, June 11, 1990, p.52; Ashok
Kapur, Pokhran and Beyond: India’s Nuclear Behavior (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2001); Onkar Marwah, ―India and Pakistan: Nuclear Rivals in South Asia,‖ International
Organization, Vol 35, No. 1 (Winter 1981), 165-179; Neville Maxwell ―China‘s ‗Aggression in
1962‘ and the Hindu Bomb,‖ World Policy Journal, Vol 16, No. 2 (June 1994), p.111; Nomi
Morris and William Lowther, ―The New Arms Race: India‘s Nuclear Tests Cause Global
Fallout,‖ Maclean’s, May 25, 1998, p.30; George Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb : The Impact
on Global Proliferation (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999), 106-111; 164-
165; Sanjiv Prakash, ―Détente in South Asia?‖ Defense and Foreign Affairs, January 1989, p.41;
Sanjiv Prakash, ―Is India on the Verge of Unveiling a Nuclear Weapons Program,‖ Defense and
Foreign Affairs, June 1987, p.64; Sanjiv Prakash, ―Tension Mounts, but Chances of India-China
War Slim,‖ Defense and Foreign Affairs, Jul/Aug 1987, p.40; Raju GC Thomas, ―India‘s
Nuclear and Space Programs: Defense or Development?‖ World Politics, Vol 38, No. 2 (Jan
1986), 315-342.
•Iran
―Agreements, Disagreements in US/Russia Protocol,‖ Nuclear News, August 1995, p.75;
Richard Beeston, ―Britain in Secret Iran Nuclear Offer,‖ The Times September 20, 2003, p.21;
Ronald Bergquist, ―The Air War,‖ in The Role of Airpower in the Iran-Iraq War (Montgomery,
27
AL: Air University Series, 1988), pp. 41-68; ―Bushehr Construction Now Remote after Three
Iraqi Air Strikes,‖ Nucleonics Week, 26 November 1987, p.5; Paul Carrel, ―Iran has Secret
Nuclear Plan says France,‖ Irish Times, February 17, 2006, p13; Gordon Corera, Shopping for
Bombs (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006); ―Envoy to UN Complains of US Violations of
Iran‘s Airspace,‖ IRNA News, Tehran, 7 August 1996; David Filking, ―IAEA Rebuffs Congress
over Iran,‖ The Guardiank September 15, 2006, p.25; Dilip Hiro, The Longest War: The IranIraq
War, (London, UK: Grafton, 1989); F. Gregory Gause III, ―The Illogic of Dual
Containment,‖ Foreign Affairs, Mar/Apr 1994, p.56;―Iran Slows its Nuclear Development
Program,‖ Chemical Week, November 1, 1978, p.28. ―Iranian Feelers,‖ Aviation Week and Space
Technology, July 23, 1979, p.13; Andrew Koch and Jeanette Wolf, ―Iran‘s Nuclear Facilities: A
Profile,‖ Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 1998, available at
http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/reports/pdfs/iranrpt.pdf; Jonathan Landay, ―US‘s Delicate Dance with
Iran,‖ Christian Science Monitor, March 2, 1996, p.5; MacLachlan, Ann (1986). ―Iran Seeking
Way to Finish Bushehr Plant but Bonn Denies Exports,‖ Nucleonics Week.
―Nuclear News Briefs,‖ Nuclear News, (December 1987), 19; ―Iran-Iraq war air raids and denials
by both sides,‖ BBC World Broadcasts, 20 November 1987; ―New Attack on Iranian Nuclear
Plant is Reported,‖ The New York Times, 20 November 1987, p.5; Global Security Bushehr site,
available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/iran/bushehr-intro.htm;; Simon Rippon,
―IAEA Delegate Protests German, US Actions,‖ Nuclear News, November 1994, p.36; Elaine
Sciolino, ―France‘s Tough Talker on Iran Adds Nuance to ‗War‘ Remark,‖ New York Times,
September 20, 2007, p.12; David Segal, ―The Air War in the Persian Gulf,‖ Air University
Review, Mar/Apr 1986; Leslie Susser, ―Iran‘s Nuclear Drive,‖ The Jerusalem Report, March 26,
1992; p.10
•Iraq
David Albright and Khidir Hamza, ―Iraq‘s Reconstitution of Its Nuclear Weapons Program,‖
Arms Control Today, Vol. 20, No. 7, 1998; Author interview with Iranian scholar, Cambridge,
MA, April 26, 2008; Rodger Claire, Raid on the Sun: Inside the Secret Campaign that Denied
Saddam the Bomb (New York, NY: Broadway Books, 2004), pp. 41-44; Saad El Shazly, The
Arab Military Option, (American Mideast Research, 1986), p. 47; Al Ellenberg, ―Iraq Has One
Bomb,‖ The Jerusalem Report, October 1, 1990, p.9; Keeley, Tim (1981). ―Angry French
Contend Osirak Couldn‘t Have Served Weapons Purposes,‖ Nucleonics Week, June 18, 3;
Thomas Mallison and Sally Mallison, ―Israeli Aerial Attack of June 7, 1981 upon the Iraqi
Nuclear Reactor: Aggression or Self-Defense,‖ Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law Vol 15
(1982), 417; Karl Mueller, Jasen Castillo, Forrest Morgan, Negeen Pegahi, Brian Rosen, Striking
First: Preventive and Preventive Attack in U.S. National Security Policy. Washington, D.C.:
RAND, 2006: 211-215; Schlomo Nakdimon, First Strike: The Exclusive Story of How Israel
Foiled Iraq’s Attempt to Get the Bomb (New York, NY: Summit Books, 1987); Dan Reiter,
―Preventive Attacks against Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons Programs: The Track
Record,‖ in Hitting First: Preventive Force in U.S. Security Strategy (Pittsburgh: University of
Pittsburgh Press, 2006), pp.27-44; Peter Scott Ford, Israel‘s Attack on Osiraq: A Model for
Future Preventive Strikes? (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School thesis, 2004), 19,
Available at: http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/iraq/facility/osiraq.htm; Khidir Hamza and Jeff
Stein, Saddam’s Bombmaker: The Daring Escape of the Man Who Built Iraq’s Secret Weapon
(New York: Scribner, 2001); Seymour M. Hersh, The Samson Option: Israel’s Nuclear Arsenal
and American Foreign Policy (New York: Random House, 1991); MacLachlan, Ann and
28
Margaret Ryan (1991). ―Allied Bombing of Iraqi Reactors Provokes No Safeguards Debate,‖
Nucleonics Week; MacLachlan, Ann (1987). ―France‘s Prime Minister Denies He Promised to
Rebuild the Osirak Reactor,‖ Nucleonics Week, Vol 28, No. 33, 16; MacLachlan, Ann (1983).
―French-Iraqi Accord Makes No Provision for Rebuilding Reactor,‖ Nucleonics Week, 1
September: 1; Amos Perlmutter, Two Minutes over Baghdad (New York: Routledge, 2003).
•Israel
ES Cochran, ―Deliberate Ambiguity: An Analysis of Israel‘s Nuclear Strategy,‖ Journal of
Strategic Studies, 19, no.3 (1996): 321-342; Avner Cohen, ―Before the Beginning: The Early
History of Israel‘s Nuclear Project,‖ Israel Studies, 3, No. 1 (1998), 112-139; Avner Cohen,
Israel and the Bomb. New York: Columbia University Press, 1998: pp. 243-276; MJ Engelhardt,
‗A Nonproliferation Failure: America and Israel‘s Nuclear Program, 1960-1968,
Nonproliferation Review, 11, No. 3 (2004): 56-69; Inigo Gilmore, ―Israel Reveals Secrets of
How it Gained Bomb: Peres Gives Details of How France Helped with Development of Nuclear
Programme,‖ Daily Telegraph, December 24, 2001, 21; Isabella Ginor and Gideon Remez,
Foxbats Over Dimona: The Soviets' Nuclear Gamble in the Six Day War, (New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press, 2007), pp. 121-137; David Horovitz, ―Russia Confirms Soviet Sorties Over
Dimona in ‘67,‖ The Jerusalem Post, August 23, 2007; ―Iraq and Israel: The Elephant and the
Hawk,‖ The Economist, April 21, 1990, p.50; ―Iraq Missile Threat to Israel,‖ Flight
International, April 11, 1990; ―Just a Touch of War Fever,‖ The Economist, April 7, 1990, p.47;
Meirion Jones, ―Britain‘s Dirty Secret,‖ New Statesman, 13 March 2006; Michael Karpin, The
Bomb in the Basement: How Israel Went Nuclear and What it Means for the World, (New York:
Simon and Schuster, 2006); John Keegan, ―Six-Day War: A Victory that Changed the Mideast
Map,‖ US News and World Report, June 8, 1987, p.35; Ariel Levite and Emily Landau, ―Arab
Perceptions of Israel‘s Nuclear Posture, 1960-1967, Israel Studies, 1, no. 1 (1996): 34-59; Zeev
Maoz, ―The Mixed Blessing of Israel‘s Nuclear Policy,‖ International Security, Vol 28, No. 2
(2003): 44-77; Yossi Melman and Dan Raviv, Friends in Deed: inside the US-Israel Alliance
(New York, NY: Hyperion, 1994); Peter Pry, Israel’s Nuclear Arsenal, (Boulder, CO: Westview
Press, 1984), 5-44; Yitzhak Rabin, A Service Record (in Hebrew). Tel Aviv: Ma'ariv, 1979: 136-
137; ―Nasser Threatens Israel on A-Bomb,‖ New York Times, December 24, 1960; Louis Rene
Beres, Security or Armageddon: Israel’s Nuclear Strategy, (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books,
1985); Zaki Shalom, Israel’s Nuclear Option: Behind the Scenes Diplomacy between Dimona
and Wahington (Portland, Oregon: Sussex Academic Press, 2005); David Snell, ―Japan
Developed Atom Bomb; Russia Grabbed Scientists,‖ Atlanta Constitution, 2 October 1946;
•Japan
Roger M. Anders, ―Review of Japan‘s Secret War,‖ Military Affairs, Vol 50, No. 1 (January
1986); Carl Boyd and Akihiko Yoshida, The Japanese Submarine Forcer and World War II
(Annapolis, MD: Naval Instiute Press, 1995); Shaun Burnie and Aileen Mioko Smith, ―Putting
Plutonium Away: Japan‘s Nuclear Twilight Zone,‖ Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol 57, No.
3 (2001): 58-62; Per Dahl, ―Heavy Water and the Wartime Race for Nuclear Energy,‖
(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 1999); John Dower, Embracing Defeat:
Japan in the Wake of World War II, (New York: WW Norton, 2000); Victor Gilinsky and Paul F
Langer, The Japanese Civilian Nuclear Program, (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1967);
Walter E. Grunden, ―Hungnam and the Japanese Atomic Bomb: Recent Historiography of a
Postwar Myth,‖ Intelligence and National Security, Vol 13, No. 3 (1998), 32-60; RW Home and
29
Morris Low, ―Postwar Scientific Intelligence Missions to Japan,‖ Isis, Vol 84, No. 3 (Sep 1993):
527-537; Ad Maas, Hans Hooijmaiers, Museum Boerhaave, Scientific Research in World War II:
What Scientists Did in the War, (New York: Routledge, 2009); Matake Kamiya, ―Will Japan Go
Nuclear? Myth and Reality,‖ Asia-Pacific Review, Vol 2, No. 2 (1995): 5-19; Morris Fraser Low,
―Japan‘s Secret War? ‗Instant‘ Scientific Manpower and Japan‘s World War II Atomic Bomb
Project,‖ Annals of Science, Vol 47, No. 4 (1995): 347-360;William Overholt, Asia’s Nuclear
Future, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1977); S Matsuura, ―Future Perspective of Nuclear
Energy in Japan and the OMEGA Program,‖ Nuclear Physics A, 652, No. 1-2 (1999): 417c-
435c; Richard Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995);
Joseph Scalia, Germany’s Last Mission to Japan: The Failed Voyage of U-234 (Annapolis, MD:
Naval Institute Press, 2000); Tatsumiro Suzuki, ―Japan‘s New Long-Term Program for Nuclear
Energy: Issues and Challenges Ahead,‖ Nuclear News, Vol 44, No3 (2001): 28-31; Ramesh
Chandra Thakur, Keeping Proliferation at Bay (Jakarta, Indonesia: Center for Strategic and
International Studies, 1998); Robert Wilcox, Japan’s Secret War: Japan’s Race against Time to
Build its Own Atomic Bomb, (New York, NY: Morrow, 1995)
•Libya
David Albright and Corey Hinderstein, "Libya's Gas Centrifuge Procurement: Much Remains
Undiscovered," (Washington, DC: Institute for Science and International Security, 2004); Joseph
Anselmo, ―US Faces Growing Arsenal of Threats,‖ Aviation Week and Space Technology, Vol
126, No. 4 (Feb 24, 1997), p.44; Barnaby, Frank, The Invisible Bomb, The Nuclear Race in the
Middle East (London: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd Publishers, 1993); Andy Bilski and William
Lowther, ―Khadafy‘s Visions,‖ Maclean’s, January 13, 1986, p.15; Youssef Bodansky, ―Nuclear
Weapons and Radical States Pose New Situations,‖ Defense and Foreign Affairs’ Strategic
Policy, June 1992, p.6; Ronald Bruce St. John, Libya and the United States: Two Centuries of
Strife (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2002), 123-148; Joseph Cirincione
with Jon Wolfstahl and Miriam Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals: Tracking Weapons of Mass
Destruction (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2002); Gordon
Corera, Shopping for Bombs: Nuclear Proliferation, Global Insecurity, and the Rise and Fall of
the AQ Khan Network, (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2006); "IAEA report on
Libyan nukes stuns the West," World Tribune.com, March 4, 2004; Fred Ikle, ―The Next Lenin:
On the Cusp of Truly Revolutionary Warfare,‖ The National Interest, Spring 1997;
―Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Socialist People‘s Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya,‖ IAEA Board of Governors, 12 September 2008; R. Jeffrey, "U.S. Complains to
China About Libyan Arms Shipment," Washington Post, 28 April 1992; Bob Levin, David
Martin, Ron Moreau, and Ray Wilkinson, ―Kaddafi‘s Dangerous Game,‖ Newsweek, July 20,
1981, p.40; Jeffrey Richelson, Spying on the Bomb: American Nuclear Intelligence from Nazi
Germany to Iran and North Korea (New York: Norton, 2006); Peter Slevin, "Libya Made
Plutonium, Nuclear Watchdog Says," Washington Post, February 21, 2004, p. A15; Joseph
Stanik, El Dorado Canyon: Reagan’s Undeclared War with Qaddafi (Annapolis, MD: Naval
Institute Press 2003); ―Turning Rivers Around,‖ The Economist, February 1, 1992, p.43;
Kenneth Timmerman, Weapons of Mass Destruction: the Cases of Iran, Syria, and Libya, Simon
Wiesenthal Center Middle East Defense News, August 1992, 89; Al J Ventner, Allah’s Bomb:
The Islamic Quest for Nuclear Weapons (Guilford, CT: Lyons Press, 2007); Yahia H. Zoubir,
―The United States and Libya: From Confrontation to Normalization,‖ Middle East Policy, Vol
XIII, No. 2 (Summer 2006): 48-70.
30
•North Korea
Michael Breen, ―South Korea Prepares for Attack from North,‖ Washington Times, 9 February
1994; ―U.S. Considered Attacks on N. Korea, Perry Tells Panel,‖ Washington Post, January 25,
1995; Ashton B. Carter and William J. Perry, Preventive Defense: A New Security Strategy for
America (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1999); Victor Cha and David Kang, Nuclear North
Korea: A Debate on Engagement Strategies, (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2005);
Lyle Goldstein, Preventive Attack and Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Comparative Historical
Analysis (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006): 133-135; Michael Gordon, ―US is
Bolstering Forces in Korea,‖ New York Times, 27 March 1994, 9; Steve Komarow, ―Clinton
Walks Thin Line on North Korea/More Pressure Could Set off Powder Keg,‖ USA Today, 6
December 1993, 9A; Steve Komarow, ‗US to Ship Missiles to South Korea,‖ USA Today, 27
January 1994; Thomas Lippman, ―Perry Offers Dire Picture of Failure to Block North Korean
Nuclear Weapons,‖ Washington Post, 4 May 1994, A29; Andrew Mack, ―North Korea and the
Bomb,‖ Foreign Policy 83 (Summer 1991): 96; ―North Korean Nuclear Issue,‖ BBC Summary of
World Broadcasts, May 1, 1993; John McBrewster, Frederic Miller, and Agnes Vandome, North
Korea and Weapons of Mass Destruction, (Alphascript Publishing, 2009); James Moltz, The
North Korean Nuclear Program: Security, Strategy and New Perspectives from Russia (London,
UK: Routledge, 1999); Larry Niksch, North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Program (Washington,
DC; Congressional Research Service, 2006); Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary
History (New York: Basic Books, 2002); William Perry, ―Proliferation on the Peninsula: Five
North Korean Nuclear Crises,‖ Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,
Vol. 607, No. 1 (2006), pp. 78-86; Bennett Ramberg, "Preemption Paradox," Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists, Vol. 62, No. 4 (July/August 2006), pp. 48-56; Leon Sigal, Disarming
Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999),
p. 33; Joel Wit, Daniel Poneman and Robert Gallucci, Going Critical: The First North Korea;
David Sloss, ―Forcible Arms Control: Preemptive Attacks on Nuclear Facilities,‖ Chicago
Journal of International Law, Vol. 4 (2003), pp. 39-58; ―South Korea Preparing for Possible
Clash with North,‖ USA Today, November 10, 1993; ―South Korea Prepares for Attack From
North,‖ The Washington Times, February 9, 1994; Sharon Squassoni, North Korea’s Nuclear
Weapons: How Soon an Arsenal? (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2006);
Joel Wit, Daniel Poneman and Robert Gallucci, Going Critical: The First North Korean Nuclear
Crisis (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 2004), pp. 210-11, 219-220, 244; Kim Yu-Nam, Soviet
Russia, North Korea, and South Korea in the 1990s: Nuclear Issues and Arms Control in and
around the Korean Peninsula (Seoul: Dankook University Press, 1992).
•Pakistan
Hassan Abbas, ―Causes That Led to Nuclear Proliferation from Pakistan to Iran, Libya, and
North Korea,‖ Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, 2008; Itty Abraham,
ed., South Asian Cultures of the Bomb: Atomic Publics and the State in India and Pakistan
(Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2009); Samina Ahmed, ―Pakistan‘s Nuclear
Weapons Program: Turning Points and Nuclear Choices,‖ International Security, Vol. 23, No. 4
(Spring 1999), pp. 178-204; Author‘s e-mail correspondence with former Pakistani government
official, April 12, 2008; Warren Donnelly, ―Pakistan and Nuclear Weapons,‖ Washington, D.C.,
Congressional Research Service, July 22, 1987; Sumit Ganguly and Devin Hagerty, Fearful
31
Symmetry: India-Pakistan Crises in the Shadow of Nuclear Weapons (Seattle: University of
Washington Press, 2005); Devin Hagerty, The Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation: Lessons
from South Asia (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997); Ashok Kapur, Pakistan’s Nuclear
Development (London: Croom Helm, 1987); Ashok Kapur, ―A Nuclearizing Pakistan: Some
Hypotheses,‖ Asian Survey, Vol. 20, No. 5 (May 1980), pp. 495-516; Ashok Kapur, Pokhran and
Beyond: India’s Nuclear Behavior (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); Feroz Hassan Khan,
―Nuclear Security in Pakistan: Separating Myth From Reality,‖ Arms Control Today Vol. 39,
No. 6 (July/August 2009); Peter Lavoy, ―Pakistan‘s Nuclear Posture: Security and
Survivability,‖ Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2007; Ziba Moshaver, Nuclear
Weapons Proliferation in the Indian Subcontinent (New York: St. Martin‘s Press, 1991); Joseph
Nye, ―Pakistan‘s Bomb Could Kill Us All,‖ The Washington Post, November 9, 1986;
―Pakistan‘s Nuclear Bombshell,‖ India Today, March 31, 1987; Robert Peck, ―Statement Before
the Subcommittee on Asia and Pacific Affairs,‖ House Foreign Affairs Committee, March 5,
1987; Scott Sagan, ―The Perils of Proliferation in South Asia,‖ Asian Survey Vol. 41, No. 6
(2001), pp.1064-1086; Scott Sagan, ed., Inside Nuclear South Asia (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 2009); Henry Sokolski, ed., Pakistan’s Nuclear Future: Worries Beyond War
(Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2008); U.S. State Department, ―Consultation with the
Shah on Pakistan‘s Nuclear Program,‖ Action Memorandum, May 11, 1976; U.S. Department of
State Talking Points, ―Secretary Shultz‘s Visit to Pakistan,‖ No date listed; Steve Weissman and
Herbert Krosney, The Islamic Bomb: The Nuclear Threat to Israel and the Middle East (New
York: Times Books, 1981), pp. 161-226.
•Romania
―Romania Planned Atom Bomb,‖ Reuters, May 26, 1993; Duane Bratt, The Politics of CANDU
Exports (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006); Dennis Deletant, Ceausescu and the
Securitate: Coercion and Dissent in Romania, 1965-1989 (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharp, 1995);
Yosef Govrin, Israeli-Romanian Relations at the end of the Ceausescu Era: As Observed by
Israel’s Ambassador to Romania, 1985-89 (New York: Routledge, 2002); Mark Hibbs,
―Romania Hopes to Save Remains of a $10 Billion Know-How Investment,‖ Nucleonics Week,
July 18, 1996; Rodney Jones and Mark McDonough, Tracking Nuclear Proliferation: A Guide in
Maps and Charts, 1998 (Washington, D.C., Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1998),
pp. 103-108; Ashok Kapur, ―Nuclear Policies of Small States and Weak Powers,‖ in Efraim
Inbar and Gabriel Sheffer, eds., The National Security of Small States in a Changing World (New
York: Frank Cass, 1997), pp. 107-126; Roger Kirk and Mircea Raceanu, Romania Versus the
United States: Diplomacy of the Absurd, 1985-1989 (New York: Palgrave, 1994); Ann
MacLachlan, ―Romania Produced Unsafeguarded Pu, Blix Tells IAEA Board of Governors,‖
Nuclear Fuel, June 22, 1992, p. 16; Daniel Nelson, Romanian Politics in the Ceausescu Era
(New York: Gordon and Breach, 1988); Carmen Rijnoveanu, ―Cooperation Beyond the Iron
Curtain: The Relations Between Romania and the United States During the 1960s and 1970s,‖ in
Robert Rush and William Epley, eds., Multinational Operations, Alliances, and International
Military Cooperation: Past and Future (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, United
States Army, 2006), pp. 139-146; Alison Smale, ―President Says Romania Has Nuclear Weapons
Potential,‖ Associated Press, April 15, 1989; Leonard Spector, Nuclear Ambitions: The Spread
of Nuclear Weapons, 1989-1990 (Boulder, Co: Westview Press, 1990); Sergiu Verona, Military
Occupation and Diplomacy: Soviet Troops in Romania, 1944-1958 (Durham, NC: Duke
University Press, 1992).
32
•South Africa
David Albright, "South Africa and the Affordable Bomb," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol.
50, No. 4 (July/August 1994), pp. 37-48; Richard K. Betts, ―A Diplomatic Bomb for South
Africa?,‖ International Security, Vol. 4 (Fall 1979); Jimmy Carter, ―Southern Africa,‖
Presidential Directive/NSC-5, March 9, 1977; Zdenek Cervenka and Barbara Rogers, The
Nuclear Axis: Secret Collaboration between West Germany and South Africa (New York: Times
Books, 1978); Steve Coll and Paul Taylor, ―Tracking S. Africa‘s Elusive A-Program,‖ The
Washington Post, March 18, 1993; David Fischer, ―Reversing Nuclear Proliferation: South
Africa,‖ Security Dialogue, Vol. 24 (1993), pp. 273-288; Leslie Gelb, ―Your Meeting with
Gromyko: South African Nuclear Issue,‖ Department of State Action Memorandum, September
21, 1977; Verne Harris, Sello Hatang, and Peter Liberman, ―Unveiling South Africa‘s Nuclear
Past,‖ Journal of Southern African Studies, Vol. 30, No. 3 (September 2004), pp. 457-475; Roy
Horton, ―Out of (South) Africa: Pretoria‘s Nuclear Weapons Experience,‖ U.S. Air Force
Academy, INSS Occasional Paper 27, August 1999; Peter Liberman, ―The Rise and Fall of the
South African Bomb,‖ International Security, Vol. 26, No. 2 (Fall 2001), pp. 45-86; Peter
Liberman, ―Israel and the South African Bomb,‖ The Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 11, No. 2
(Summer 2004), pp. 1-35; William J. Long and Suzette R. Grillot, ―Ideas, Beliefs, and Nuclear
Policies: The Cases of South Africa and Ukraine,‖ Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 7, No.1
(Spring 2000), pp.24–40; Murrey Marder, ―Carter Says S. Africa Denies Intent to Develop Any
Nuclear Explosives,‖ The Washington Post, August 24, 1977; Zondi Masiza, ―A Chronology of
South Africa‘s Nuclear Program,‖ The Nonproliferation Review Vol. 1 (Fall 1993), pp. 35-56;
J.D.L. Moore, South Africa and Nuclear Proliferation: South Africa’s Nuclear Capabilities and
Intentions in the Context of International Non-Proliferation Policies (New York: St. Martin‘s
Press, 1987); Frank V. Pabian, ―South Africa‘s Nuclear Weapon Program: Lessons for
Nonproliferation Policy,‖ Nonproliferation Review, Vol.3, No. 1 (Fall 1995), pp.1–19; T.V. Paul,
Power versus Prudence: Why Nations Forgo Nuclear Weapons (Montreal: McGill-Queen‘s
University Press, 2000), pp. 113-117; Helen Purkitt and Stephen Burgess, South Africa’s
Weapons of Mass Destruction (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2005); Mitchell
Reiss, Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Constrain Their Nuclear Capabilities (Washington,
D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1995), pp. 7-44; J.E. Spence, ―South Africa: The Nuclear
Option,‖ African Affairs, Vol. 80, No. 321 (October 1981), pp. 441-452; Waldo Stumpf, ―South
Africa‘s Nuclear Weapons Program: From Deterrence to Dismantlement,‖ Arms Control Today,
Vol.25, No.10 (December–January 1995/96), pp. 3-8; U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs
of Staff, ―Nuclear Test Facility at/near Uppington [in Kalahari Desert],‖ Confidential Cable,
October 21, 1977; Cyrus Vance, ―Guidance on Suspected Nuclear Event,‖ Department of State
Confidential Cable, October 26, 1979.
•South Korea
Jimmy Carter, Keeping the Faith: Memoirs of President (London: Collins, 1982); Victor Cha,
―Hawk Engagement and Preventive Defense on the Korean Peninsula,‖ International Security,
Vol. 27, No. 1 (Summer 2002), pp. 40-78; Kang Choi and Joon-Sung Park, ―South Korea: Fears
of Abandonment and Entrapment,‖ in Muthiah Algappa, ed., The Long Shadow: Nuclear
Weapons and Security in 21st
Century Asia (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008), pp. 373-
403; Robert Gillette, ―U.S. Squelched Apparent S. Korea A-Bomb Drive,‖ Los Angeles Times,
November 4, 1978; Young-sun Ha, Nuclear Proliferation, World Order and Korea (Seoul: Seoul
33
National University, 1983); Young Whan Kihl, ―Korea‘s Future: Seoul‘s Perspective,‖ Asian
Survey, Vol. 17 (1977), pp. 1064-76; Chong-Sik Lee, ―South Korea 1979: Confrontation,
Assassination, and Transition,‖ Asian Survey, Vol. 20, No. 1 (January 1980), pp. 63-76;
Narushige Michishita, North Korea’s Military-Diplomatic Campaigns, 1966-2008 (London:
Routledge, 2009); Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History (New York:
Basic Books, 2002); T.V. Paul, Power versus Prudence: Why Nations Forgo Nuclear Weapons
(Montreal: McGill-Queen‘s University Press, 2000), pp. 120-124; Don Oberdorfer, The Two
Koreas: A Contemporary History (New York: Basic Books, 2001), pp. 68-73; Jonathan Pollack
and Mitchell Reiss, ―South Korea: The Tyranny of Geography and Vexations of History,‖ in
Kurt Campbell, Robert Einhorn, and Mitchell Reiss, eds., The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States
Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2004), pp.
254-292; Mitchell Reiss, Without the Bomb: The Politics of Nuclear Nonproliferation (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1988), pp. 78-108; Cyrus Vance, Hard Choices, Critical Years
in America’s Foreign Policy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983); Kim Yu-Nam, Soviet
Russia, North Korea, and South Korea in the 1990s: Nuclear Issues and Arms Control in and
around the Korean Peninsula (Seoul: Dankook University Press, 1992); U.S. Central
Intelligence Agency, ―Prospects for Further Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,‖ National
Intelligence Estimate, September 4, 1974; Joseph Yager, ―The Republic of Korea,‖ in Joseph
Yager, ed., Nonproliferation and U.S. Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: Brooking Institution
Press, 1980), pp. 47-65.
•Soviet Union
Richard Betts, Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance (Washington, D.C.: Brookings
Institution Press, 1987); Gordon Chang, Friends and Enemies: The United States, China, and the
Soviet Union, 1948-1972 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990); Thomas Cochran, Robert
Norris and Oleg Bukharin, Making the Russian Bomb: From Stalin to Yeltsin (Boulder, CO:
Westview Press, 1995); Jamie Glazov, Canadian Policy Toward Khrushchev’s Soviet Union
(Montreal: McGill-Queen‘s University Press, 2002); Michael Goodman, Spying on the Nuclear
Bear: Anglo-American Intelligence and the Soviet Bomb (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
2007); Margaret Gowing, Interdependence and Deterrence: Britain and Atomic Energy, 1945-
1952, Vols. 1 and 2 (London: Macmillan, 1974); David Holloway, ―Entering the Nuclear Arms
Race: The Soviet Decision to Build the Atomic Bomb,‖ Social Studies of Science (May 1981),
pp. 159-197; David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939-
1956 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994); Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear
Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,
1989); Arnold Kramish, Atomic Energy in the Soviet Union (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
1959); Frank Lindsay, ―Notes on Conversations with Australian, Canadian and Netherlands
Delegations,‖ Confidential memorandum to Bernard Baruch, September 14, 1946; George
Modelski, Atomic Energy in the Communist Bloc (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press,
1959); John Mueller, Atomic Obsession: Nuclear Alarmism from Hiroshima to Al Qaeda
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); Michael Nacht, ―The Future Unlike the Past: Nuclear
Proliferation and American Security Policy,‖ International Organization, Vol. 35, No.1 (Winter
1981), pp. 193-212; George Quester, Nuclear Monopoly (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction
Publishers, 2000); George Quester, Preemption, Prevention and Proliferation: The Threat and
Use of Weapons in History (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2009); Jeffrey Record,
―Nuclear Deterrence, Preventive War, and Counterproliferation,‖ Washington, D.C., CATO
34
Institute, July 2004; Jeffrey Richelson, Spying on the Bomb: American Nuclear Intelligence
from Nazi Germany to Iran and North Korea (New York: Norton, 2006); David Alan Rosenberg,
―The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 1945-1960,‖ International
Security, Vol. 7, No. 4 (Spring 1983), pp. 3-71; Jonathan Rosenberg, ―Before the Bomb and
After: Winston Churchill and the Use of Force,‖ in John Lewis Gaddis, Philip Gordon, Ernest
May, and Jonathan Rosenberg, eds., Cold War Statesman Confront the Bomb: Nuclear
Diplomacy since 1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 171-193; Scott Sagan and
Kenneth Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed (New York: W.W. Norton,
2003); Stuart Symington, ―Response of the United States to the Soviet Explosion of a Nuclear
Bomb,‖ Department of the Air Force Memorandum, November 8, 1949; Marc Trachtenberg,
History and Strategy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), p. 105; Marc Trachtenberg,
―A ‗Wasting Asset:‘ American Strategy and the Shifting Nuclear Balance, 1949-1954,‖
International Security, Vol. 13, No. 3 (Winter 1988/89), pp. 5-51; U.S. Central Intelligence
Agency, ―Soviet Capabilities for the Development and Production of Certain Types of Weapons
and Equipment,‖ National Intelligence Estimate, October 31, 1946; U.S. Joint Strategic Survey
Committee, ―Guidance on Military Aspects of United States Policy to be Adopted in Event of
Continuing Impasse in Acceptance of International Control of Atomic Energy,‖ J.C.S. 1762, July
14, 1947; U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, ―Estimate of the Effects of the Soviet Possession of
the Atomic Bomb Upon the Security of the United States and Upon the Probabilities of Direct
Soviet Military Action,‖ ORE 91-49, April 6, 1950; Vladislav Zubok, ―Stalin and the Nuclear
Age,‖ in John Lewis Gaddis, Philip Gordon, Ernest May, and Jonathan Rosenberg, eds., Cold
War Statesman Confront the Bomb: Nuclear Diplomacy since 1945 (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1999), pp. 39-61.
•Sweden
Samuel Abrahamsen, Sweden’s Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1957);
Nils Andren, ―Sweden‘s Security Policy,‖ Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 3, No. 4 (1972); Karl
Birnbaum, ―Sweden‘s Nuclear Policy,‖ Survival, Vol. 7, No. 9 (December 1965); Oliver
Clausen, ―Sweden Goes Underground,‖ New York Times Magazine, May 22, 1966; Steve Coll,
―Neutral Sweden Quietly Keeps Nuclear Option Open,‖ Washington Post, November 25, 1994;
Gunnar Jervas, Sweden and Nuclear Weapons (Stockholm: National Defense Research Institute,
1982); James Jasper, Nuclear Politics: Energy and the State in the United States, Sweden, and
France (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990); T.B. Johansson, ―Sweden‘s Abortive
Nuclear Weapons Project,‖ Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 42, No. 3 (March 1986), pp.
31-34; Arne Kaijser, ―Redirecting Power: Swedish Nuclear Power Policies in Historical
Perspective,‖ Annual Review of Energy and The Environment, Vol. 17 (November 1992), pp.
427-462; Efraim Karsh, Neutrality and Small States (London: Routledge, 1988); Holger
Lundbergh, ―Sweden‘s Atomic Energy Program,‖ Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 15, No.
5 (May 1959); William Long, Economic Incentives and Bilateral Cooperation (Ann Arbor, MI:
University of Michigan Press, 1996); William Nordhaus, The Swedish Nuclear Dilemma: Energy
and the Environment (Washington, D.C.: Resources for the Future, 1997); T.V. Paul, Power
Versus Prudence: Why Nations Forgo Nuclear Weapons (Montreal: McGill-Queen‘s University
Press, 2000); Jan Prawitz, ―A Nuclear Doctrine for Sweden,‖ Cooperation and Conflict (March
1968), pp. 186-186; George Quester, ―Sweden and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty,‖
Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 5 (1970), pp. 52-65; Mitchell Reiss, Without the Bomb: the
Politics of Nuclear Nonproliferation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), pp. 37-77;
35
W.W. Rostow, ―A Way of Thinking about Nuclear Proliferation,‖ Policy Planning Council,
Internal Paper, November 19, 1964; Lars Wallin, ―Sweden‖ in Richard Bissel and Curt
Gasteygar, eds., The Missing Link (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1990); Lawrence
Wittner, Resisting the Bomb: A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement, 1954-
1970 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997).
•Switzerland
Leonard Downie Jr, ―US, Swiss at Impass on A-Policy; US Suspends Nuclear Cooperation with
Switzerland,‖ Washington Post, 22 September 1980, A1; ―Swiss Will Seek Atomic Weapons,‖
New York Times, July 12, 1958; ―Swiss Vote on Ban on Nuclear Arms,‖ New York Times, April
1, 1962; ―Swiss Vote Down a Nuclear Curb,‖ New York Times, May 27, 1963; ―Swiss Raise
Objections to the Nuclear Arms Treaty,‖ New York Times, May 17, 1968; Richard Burt, ―Nuclear
Issue Mars U.S. Ties with Swiss,‖ New York Times, September 23, 1980; Leonard Beaton and
John Maddox, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons (London: Chatto and Windus, 1962); Peter
Capella, ―Swiss Planned A-Bomb,‖ The Independent, April 16, 1995; William Epstein, ―Why
States Go—And Don‘t Go—Nuclear,‖ Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social
Science, Vol. 430, No. 1 (1977), pp. 16-28; Marko Milivojevic, ―The Swiss Armed Forces,‖ in
Marko Milivojevic and Pierre Maurer, eds., Swiss Neutrality and Security (New York: Berg,
1990), pp. 3-48; Richard Nixon, ―Proposed Amendment Regarding the Agreement for
Cooperation with Switzerland Concerning Civil Uses of Atomic Energy,‖ Memorandum for
Dixy Lee Ray, October 23, 1973; T.V. Paul, Power Versus Prudence: Why Nations Forgo
Nuclear Weapons (Montreal: McGill-Queen‘s University Press, 2000); George Schwab,
―Switzerland‘s Tactical Nuclear Weapons Policy,‖ Orbis, Vol. 13, No. 3 (1969); Fred Tanner,
―Switzerland and Arms Control: Constraints and Opportunities,‖ in Marko Milivojevic and
Pierre Maurer, eds., Swiss Neutrality and Security (New York: Berg, 1990), pp. 137-161; Jurg
Stussi, ―Historical Outline on the Question of Swiss Nuclear Armament,‖ Swiss Government
report, April 1996.
•Taiwan
David Albright and Corey Gay, ‗‗Taiwan: Nuclear Nightmare Averted,‘‘ Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists (Jan./Feb. 1998), pp. 54-60; Milton Benjamin; ―Taiwan‘s Nuclear Plans Concern US
Officials,‖ The Washington Post, 20 December 1978, A21; ―Don‘t You Shove me Around,‖ The
Economist, 2 April 1998; stephen Engelberg, ―US Pressure Closes Taiwanese Reactor,‖ Sydney
Morning Herald, 24 March 1998, 12; Stephen Engelberg with Michael Gordon, ―Taipei Halts
Work on Secret Plant to Make Nuclear Bomb Ingredient,‖ The New York Times, 23 March 1988,
A1; Rebecca Hersman and Robert Peters, ―Nuclear U-Turns: learning from South Korean and
Taiwanese Rollback,‖ Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 13, No. 3 (November 2006), pp. 539-545;
―Hong Kong Paper Says Taiwan Developing Nuclear Weapons, Mid-Range Missiles,‖ BBC
Summary of Sing Tao Jih Pao (hong Kong), 31 July 1999; Ariel E. Levite, ‗‗Never Say Never
Again: Nuclear Reversal Revisited,‘‘ International Security, Vol. 27 (Winter 2002/2003);
Andrew Mack, ―Taiwan May Look to Nuclear Option,‖ The Age, 17 February 1996, p.27; Robert
S. Norris, William M. Arkin, and William Burr, ‗‗Where They Were,‘‘ Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists (Nov./Dec. 1999), pp. 26-35; Derek Mitchell, ―Taiwan‘s Hsin Chu Program:
Deterrence, Abandonment, and Honor,‖ in Kurt Campbell, Robert Einhorn, and Mitchell Reiss,
eds., The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices (Washington,
D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2004), pp. 293-316; R. Jeffrey Smith, Don Oberdorfer,
36
―Taiwan to Close Nuclear Reactor; US Voiced Concern on Spread of Weapons,‖ Washington
Post, 24 March 1988; ―Taiwan Denies Developing Nuclear Arms,‖ Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 13
September 1996; ―Taiwan‘s Claims of Nuclear Defence Capability ‗Not Bluff‘‖ BBC Summary
of Balov, 27 May 1983; ―Taiwan to Build Nuclear Reactor, Stresses Peaceful Purposes,‖
Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 28 November 1995; ―Taiwan Officials to Discuss Nuclear Storage on
Marshall Islands,‖ Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 27 May 1995; ―Taiwan Says its Received Offers of
Nuclear Material,‖ Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 24 August 1994; ―Taiwan Says US Report on
Secret Nuclear Weapons Programme ‗Groundless‘‖ BBC Summary of Central News Agency
(Taipei), 16 September 1996; ―‘Wen Wei Po‘ Editorial Criticizes Li Ten-Hui‘s Nuclear
Proposal,‖ BBC Summary of Hong Kong News, 4 August 1995;
•United Kingdom
Dean Acheson, ―Results of the Conversations Between the President and the British Prime
Minister,‖ State Department Memorandum to James Lay, Jr., December 12, 1950; Norman
Dombey, David Fischer, and William Walker, ―Becoming a Non-Nuclear Weapon State: Britain,
the NPT and Safeguards,‖ International Affairs, Vol. 63, No. 2 (Spring 1987), pp. 191-204;
David Fischer, Stopping the Spread of Nuclear Weapons: The Past and the Prospects (London:
Routledge, 1992); Margaret Gowing, Britain and Atomic Energy, 1939-1945 (London: St.
Martin‘s Press, 1964); Margaret Gowing, Interdependence and Deterrence: Britain and Atomic
Energy, 1945-1952, Vols. 1 and 2 (London: Macmillan, 1974); Philip Henshall, The Nuclear
Axis: Germany, Japan and the Atom Bomb Race, 1939-1945 (Thrupp, UK: Sutton Publishing,
2000); David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939-1956
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994); John Hopkins and Weixing Hu, eds., Strategic
Views from the Second Tier: The Nuclear Weapons Policies of France, Britain, and China (New
Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1995); Philip Jessup, ―US-UK Consultation on Atomic
Warfare,‖ Department of State Memorandum of Conversation, September 11, 1951; Arjun
Makhijani, Howard Hu, and Katherine Yih, Nuclear Wastelands: A Global Guide to Nuclear
Weapons Production and Its Health and Environmental Effects (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,
2000); Peter Malone, The British Nuclear Deterrent (New York: St. Martin‘s Press, 1984);
Andrew Pierre, Nuclear Politics: The British Experience with an Independent Strategic Force,
1939-1970 (London: Oxford University Press, 1972); Richard Rosecrance, Defense of the Realm
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1968); Avi Shlaim, ―Britain, the Berlin Blockade and
the Cold War,‖ International Affairs, Vol. 60, No. 1 (Winter 1984), pp. 1-14; John Simpson, The
Independent Nuclear State (London: Macmillan, 1986); Raymond Smith and John Zametica,
―The Cold Warrior: Clement Attlee Reconsidered, 1945-47,‖ International Affairs,” Vol. 61, No.
2 (Spring 1985), pp. 237-252; George Quester, The Politics of Nuclear Proliferation (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973); N.J. Wheeler, ―British Nuclear Weapons and AngloAmerican
Relations, 1945-54,‖ International Affairs, Vol. 62, No. 1 (Winter 1985/86), pp. 71-
86.
•United States
Gordon Chang, Friends and Enemies: The United States, China, and the Soviet Union, 1948-
1972 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990); F.G. Gosling, The Manhattan Project: Making
the Atomic Bomb (Washington, D.C.: The United States Department of Energy, 1999); Leslie
Groves, Now It Can Be Told: The Story of the Manhattan Project (New York: Da Capo Press,
1962); Vincent Jones, Manhattan: The Army and the Atomic Bomb (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
37
Army Center of Military History, 1985); Cynthia Kelly, The Manhattan Project: The Birth of the
Atomic Bomb in the Words of Its Creators, Eyewitnesses and Historians (New York: Black Dog
& Leventhal, 2007); Sean Malloy, Atomic Tragedy: Henry L. Stimson and the Decision to Use
the Bomb Against Japan (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008); Robert Norris, Racing for
the Bomb: General Leslie R. Groves, the Manhattan Project’s Indispensable Man (New York:
Steerforth Press, 200); Bennett Ramberg, Nuclear Power Plants as Weapons for the Enemy: An
Unrecognized Military Peril (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1980); Richard
Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995); Stephen
Schwartz, ed., Atomic Audit: The Costs and Consequences of U.S. Nuclear Weapons since 1940
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1998); Henry DeWolf Smyth, Atomic Energy
for Military Purposes: The Official Report on the Development of the Atomic Bomb under the
Auspices of the United States Government, 1940-1945 (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1945); Henry Stimson, ―The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb,‖ Harper’s Magazine (February
1947), pp. 97-107; Vladislav Zubok, ―Stalin and the Nuclear Age,‖ in John Lewis Gaddis, Philip
Gordon, Ernest May, and Jonathan Rosenberg, eds., Cold War Statesman Confront the Bomb:
Nuclear Diplomacy since 1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 39-61.
•Yugoslavia
―Congress of Federation of Socialist Youth of Yugoslavia,‖ BBC Summary of Yugoslav News
Agency, 17 June 1986; ―Ecologists Warn against Nuclear Waste Disposal,‖ BBC Summary of
Bosnian Serb SRNA, 10 December 1998; ―Enriched Uranium from Yugoslavia Delivered to
Russia for Recycling,‖ BBC Summary of NTV Mir (Moscow), 3 September 2002; Andrew Koch,
―Yugoslavia‘s Nuclear Legacy: Should We Worry?,‖ The Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 4, No. 3
(Spring/Summer 1997), pp. 123-129; ―Mounting Public Concern over Construction of Nuclear
Power Plant,‖ BBC Summary of Serbian (Tanjug) Broadcast, 26 February 1986; Mark
Lukasiewicz, ―Revived Nuclear Interest Encourages Canadians,‖ Globe and Mail, 23 March
1981; Judith Miller, ―International Monitoring of Serbia‘s Enriched Uranium to Resume,‖ New
York Times, 5 May 1999, A12; James P. Nichol and Gordon L. McDaniel, "Yugoslavia," in
Nuclear Power in Developing Countries, James Everett Katz and Onkar S. Marwah (eds.)
(Lexington: D.C. Heath and Company, 1982); ―Nuclear Power Construction Programme
Halted,‖ Vienna Home Service (via BBC), 7 Augujst 1986; Thomas O‘Toole, ―Parts for
Yugoslav Nuclear Reactor Stalled by US Export Policy Shift,‖ Washington Post, 16 March 1977,
A8; William Potter, Djuro Miljanic and Ivo Slaus, ―Tito‘s Nuclear Legacy,‖ The Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists, Vol. 56, No. 2 (2000), pp. 63-70; ―Public Discussion on Nuclear Power
Construction,‖ BBC Summary of Tanjug (Serbian) Broadcast, 16 January 1986; ―Russia‘s
Unused Nuclear Fuel Returned from Yugoslavia,‖ BBC Summary of Russian Public TV (ORT),
18 September 2002; ―Serbian Ecologists Warn against Nuclear Waste Disposal,‖ BBC Summary
of Bosnian Serb SRNA, 9 December 1998; Nada Stanic, "Yugoslavia Aiming to Define Next 20
Years of Nuclear Growth by Year End," Nucleonics Week, Vol. 22, No. 9, 5 March 1981; U.S.
Central Intelligence Agency, ―Main Trends in Soviet Capabilities and Policies, 1958-1962,‖
National Intelligence Estimate 11-4-58, December 23, 1958; U.S. Central Intelligence Agency,
―Probable Developments in Yugoslavia and the Likelihood of Attack Upon Yugoslavia, Through
1952,‖ National Intelligence Estimate 29-2, January 4, 1952; Joby Warrick, ―Risky Stash of
Uranium secured; US, Russia Remove Weapons-Grade Nuclear Material from Yugoslavia,‖
Washington Post, 23 August 2002, A01.