Former Head of Policy Planning at Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Eran Etzion,
explores the state of U.S.-Israel relations and their likely future trajectory under a
new U.S. administration. Etzion notes a strategic drift has widened between the
two allies in recent years, and that is likely to continue regardless of the outcome
of the U.S. presidential elections. The United States and Israel diverge on a number
of key points, including strategic priorities and, increasingly of late, values. These
differences will sustain the negative trend in relations moving forward, but military
and defense ties will remain strong and compartmentalized from the friction at the
political level.
Key Findings
♦♦ Benjamin Netanyahu’s “new Israel,” which is more conservative and religious,
is shifting further away from core American liberal values of democracy and
human rights.
♦♦ The Arab Spring and the Iran nuclear deal widened the strategic differences
between the United States and Israel.
♦♦ Military cooperation is expected to remain strong, and compartmentalized
from troubled political relations.
♦♦ The Israeli-Palestinian conflict will continue to be a major bone of contention
between Washington and Tel Aviv.
♦♦ The next U.S. administration is unlikely to see a reversal in the negative trend
in U.S.-Israel relations.
♦♦ Israel has taken note of the U.S. pivot away from the region, and is trying to
expand its economic interests with Asia.
April 2016
Middle East Institute
Policy Focus Series
The Next Administration and
Recalibrating U.S.-Israeli Ties
MEI Policy Focus 2016-9
Eran Etzion
1 The Next Administration and Recalibrating U.S.-Israeli Ties
Introduction
Relations between the United States and
Israel in the Obama-Netanyahu era
underwent what is arguably the most severe
crisis in their history. Prime Minister
Benjamin Netanyahu’s ‘circle of trust’ was
visibly concerned over President Barack
Obama’s‘enigma’evenbeforethepresident’s
election, and certainly after he was elected.
Netanyahu—an extremely savvy politician—was
quick to identify a fundamental
gap between Israeli and American interests
as perceived by himself and Obama. That
gap would later unfold in front of the entire
world and culminate in the unprecedented
battle on Capitol Hill over the Iran nuclear
agreement.
The Iran nuclear issue was the most prominent
manifestation of an increasingly divergent
strategic agenda, which has been
driving the growing split between the two
countries in recent years. Beyond partisan
politics and campaign rhetoric, this divergence
will also carry over to the next administration
irrespective of the identity of
the 45th President. The two countries have
a fundamentally different outlook regarding
the Middle East, as well as very different
threat perceptions and strategic priorities.
While the basic asymmetries between a remote
global superpower and a small regional
power play a part in this widening gap,
the dynamics of divergence are rooted in
the two administrations’ values, ideologies,
and political agendas. Thus, Netanyahu and
Obama spent the better part of their first
joint term twisting each other’s arms over
their main strategic priorities. For Obama,
it was the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict, which he and his close circle
judged to be the core of the Middle East
problem, the resolution of which would
positively impact other regional conflicts
and U.S. credibility in the region. For Netanyahu,
the clear priority was the elimination
of the Iranian nuclear program, which
he perceived as the one and only existential
threat to his country.
This debate, which began almost immediately
after Obama’s entry into office, became
wider and more bitter, trickling down to
the defense and foreign policy professional
echelons and dominating the bilateral discussions
on all levels. With the two leaders
unable to come to an agreement on their
common strategic sequencing, the ‘Iran-orPalestine-first’
dilemma would continue to
fester and become a primary source of discord
and ongoing tension. Looking ahead
Eran Etzion
Eran Etzion is a
diplomat and strategist
with more than 20 years
of experience in senior
government positions.
He was Head of Policy
Planning at Israel’s
Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, and Deputy
Head of the National
Security Council in the
Prime Minister’s office.
He currently serves as the Executive Director of
the Forum of Strategic Dialogue (www.f-sd.eu), an
NGO working to enhance Israeli-European strategic
relations.
2 The Next Administration and Recalibrating U.S.-Israeli Ties
unto the next American administration,
the basic mismatch in terms of
strategic priorities will continue regardless
of the identity of the next
president. Iran will continue to be a
bone of contention and the Palestinian
issue will be a fountain of disagreements.
In the bigger scheme of things,
the U.S. pivot away from the region,
its newfound energy independence, and
the historic collapse of the Sykes-Picot state
system will accelerate the U.S.-Israel drift.
With one side watching from a safe distance
and the other immersed in multi-front and
multi-layered crises, there is hardly any reason
to foresee a changed bilateral dynamic.
Whoever is elected president will necessarily
adapt his or her approach to those realities.
Diverging Values
Even more than diverging perceptions, at
the core of this Netanyahu-Obama hostility
lay different sets of values. The progressive,
liberal Obama stands in direct contrast to
the conservative and increasingly illiberal
Netanyahu. Unlike U.S. presidents, Israeli
prime ministers have no term limits, and
Netanyahu is safely on his way to becoming
the longest-serving prime minister, surpassing
the founding father of the Israeli
state, David Ben-Gurion. Netanyahu’s place
in the history books will not be earned on
the basis of a bold foreign policy record or
brilliantly planned and executed military
campaigns. He will be remembered for his
steady and masterful transformation of Israel’s
unwritten and unlegislated—Israel
has no constitution—set of values, as well
as its political, spiritual, and cultural elites.
The ‘new Israel’ Netanyahu will have helped
create by the time he leaves office will be
less liberal, more conservative, more religious,
and generally less ‘westernized’ than
the Israel he inherited from the assassinated
Yitzhak Rabin or from his former Likud
colleague, Ehud Olmert.
It is not clear which America this ‘new Israel’
will be forced to deal with after the 2016
elections. Still, it is safe to say that a permanent
gap has opened with regard to shared
values, the set of democratic, Western, Judeo-Christian
beliefs that are constantly
mentioned as an integral feature of the special
relationship between the two countries.
This gap will persist regardless of the next
American president’s identity. The width
and depth of this gap will be measured in
relation to the value set of the next president.
A conservative commander in chief
will likely reduce the gap, but it will nevertheless
remain a visible, palpable political
factor in future bilateral relations.
On issues such as the legitimacy of authoritarian
Arab regimes—Egypt’s current
regime being one case in point—and human
rights in general, particularly within
“the basic mismatch in terms
of strategic priorities will
continue regardless of the
identity of the next president.”
3 The Next Administration and Recalibrating U.S.-Israeli Ties
the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict,
a Clinton administration will not see
eye-to-eye with a Netanyahu government.
A Trump administration, to the extent it
is possible to grasp its future policies, will
probably be much less attentive to these
‘liberal agenda’ issues and adopt a minimalist
strategic posture with respect to the
region. Absent a major attack on U.S. soil
emanating from the Middle East, a President
Donald Trump will have no reason to
devote political resources, let alone military
or financial resources, to this part of
the world. In his case, his politics, to be distinguished
from his campaign rhetoric, are
expected to be in alignment with the sound
strategic rational of offshore balancing that
was developed in the U.S. policy community
and implemented by the Obama administration
in recent years. One might expect
a more aggressive posture with regard to
China and Russia, but even there we may
very well witness a ‘world of difference’ between
candidate Trump and Commander-in-Chief
Trump.
A Cruz administration will probably follow
a similar path, with one potential deviation.
Given Ted Cruz’s strong religious
strand and evangelical political affiliations,
which are in correlation with Netanyahu’s
American power base, one cannot exclude
a personal inclination to strengthen Israel’s
hand in its conflict with the Muslim world
in general, and with the Palestinians in particular.
However, given the built-in checks
and balances within the
American system and the
overall Middle East aversion
in U.S. public opinion, it is
hard to see a major American
intervention even under
a President Cruz. A possible
change of stated positions
on Israel-Palestine is in the cards, but it will
inescapably be perceived as a personal and
political maneuver, rather than one rooted
in strategic considerations.
Strategic Drift
Israel and the United States have been drifting
apart for decades with regard to their
strategic interests. This has been the case
since the collapse of the Soviet Union and
the end of Israel’s Middle East proxy role
during the Cold War.
Relations received an unexpected boost as
a result of 9/11 and the following global war
on terror, in which Israel was able to play
a small part, mainly in the intelligence domain.
The Bush-Sharon and Bush-Olmert
relations were based on a considerable level
of trust, as well as on the ability to cleverly
identify—albeit in the Sharon case only
“Israel and the United States have
been drifting apart for decades with
regard to their strategic interests.”
4 The Next Administration and Recalibrating U.S.-Israeli Ties
after heavy American pressure—areas of
strategic convergence, most notably the Israeli-Palestinian
issue and the Gaza disengagement
project. But as the Iran nuclear
challenge gradually loomed larger to the
point of dominating the bilateral agenda,
tensions grew. Olmert’s decision, according
to media reports, to implement the ‘Begin
Doctrine’ of preventing the rise of any
Middle Eastern nuclear power by striking
Syria’s plutonium reactor at Deir Ezzor in
September 2007 was, in retrospect, an early
indication of the Israeli-American clash
over a military option in the case of Iran’s
nuclear program.1
The majority of Israel’s policy community
interpret U.S. strategy in the Middle East as
offshore balancing, namely minimizing direct
interventions, narrowly and clearly de-
finingdirectthreatstoU.S.nationalsecurity
interests and displaying a strong preference
for a leading-from-behind approach.2
Some
have not shied away from labeling Obama’s
stated preference for engagement with adversaries
as appeasement.3
Israel’s government
is attentive to the negative reception
of Obama’s approach by other U.S. allies
and shares their frustration. Israel is actively
trying to divert its trade towards China,
India, and Asia at large, while pursuing a
‘respect and suspect’ strategic relationship
with Russia based on limited joint interests
in Syria, alongside an effort to limit Russian
arms sales to Israel’s adversaries.
Despite the harsh criticism, the indispensability
of strategic relations with the United
States continues to be a core principle
of Israel’s unwritten national security doctrine.
This is the view of the vast majority of
policy professionals and analysts. With the
signing of the Iran nuclear agreement, they
are now preaching for a ‘reset’ of the relations.
However, the leading politicians in
Netanyahu’s coalition link a potential reset
with the post-Obama era. Their assumption
seems to be that the next president will
change American strategy in the Middle
East, including its approach to Israel. They
are therefore not in a hurry to initiate such
a reset or to conclude the negotiations on
the new ten-year military assistance memorandum
of understanding.
Regional Outlook
The epic strategic surprise called the Arab
Spring served to escalate bilateral tensions
even further. With the administration initially
bursting with optimism and rosy predictions
of an Arab Spring, the dominant
narrative in Israel—shaped by the political
and military establishment—was of major
concern and even alarm at the loss of
the familiar authoritarian regimes. Israel’s
warnings against the rise of the Muslim
Brotherhood and other Islamist movements
initially fell on deaf ears. The result
was a rapid spread of anti-administration
sentiments in Israeli government and society
circles. The United States was widely
viewed as naïve, clueless and, on the fringes
of both internal and public discourse, even
dangerous and malicious towards Israel.
5 The Next Administration and Recalibrating U.S.-Israeli Ties
The last five years highlighted the fact that
for the first time in decades, the United
States and Israel do not share a single
major common strategic objective. With
regard to the main three issues at stake—
Iran’s nuclear program, the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict, and the crumbling regional
order—there are fundamental differences
in analyses, strategic prioritization, policy
options, and operational goals. In fact, the
two countries do not even agree on a common
term describing the collapse of the
old regional order. Israel initially referred
to the phenomenon as an ‘Arab Winter’
and later adopted the alarming ‘regional
turmoil.’ Washington moved from the
optimistic misnomer ‘Arab Spring’ to the
open-ended ‘Arab revolutions.’
Israel’s government and defense community
see the Middle East as a failed region
that will continue to disintegrate in the
foreseeable future. In a post-Iran deal environment,
Israel’s attention will be focused
on its immediate vicinity. Direct threats
include Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas
and Islamic Jihad in Gaza, and global jihad
organizations amassing in Sinai, the
Golan Heights, and potentially on Israel’s
eastern frontier and maritime borders. The
I.D.F. and the various intelligence agencies
are preoccupied with developing tactical
and operational responses to these threats.
The political leadership continues to prefer
a largely passive, strategically patient
approach based on surgical strikes against
imminent threats, fortified border regimes,
and smart fences—i.e. technologically sophisticated
systems, including multiple
cameras, drones, and other means—on
all fronts. The Israeli government hopes
to leverage what it views as shared strategic
interests with key Arab states such as
Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan. Such interests
include an ongoing rivalry with Iran
and proxies, as well as the campaign against
ISIS and other Sunni radicals.
Military Independence
versus Cooperation
In essence, the basic question that has complicated
U.S.-Israeli relations and will continue
to do so in the next political cycle is
simple. What, if any, are the limits that the
United States can or should impose on Israel’s
use of military force? In more colloquial
terms: who calls the I.D.F.’s shots?
The relevance of this question stretches
across Israel’s military fronts and conflicts.
According to some American policymakers,
it covers even the domestic domain of
Israel’s Arab and Bedouin citizens. Tensions
between successive Israeli governments and
U.S. administrations can be traced back to
this question, in cases like the 2006 Second
Lebanon War and the recurring campaigns
in Gaza. These tensions have risen again
during these very days with the so-called
‘wave of terror’ or ‘the individuals’ intifada’
currently raging in the West Bank and in Israel
proper. The pattern is clear; after a short
6 The Next Administration and Recalibrating U.S.-Israeli Ties
period of violence, the U.S. administration
tends to view Israel as utilizing excessive or
disproportional force and initiates various
diplomatic and media efforts to restrain it.
The Israeli government, in
turn, insists on maintaining
its operational freedom
to maneuver in terms of
concrete military operations,
but, as importantly,
in terms of perception on
all public opinion fronts—
domestic, regional, and international.
The Israeli side
sees the United States as ‘tying our hands,’
while Washington feels that ‘the Israelis are
reckless and ungrateful.’ These sentiments
are left to fester and have accumulated over
the years, aided by structural deficiencies
in the American-Israeli strategic dialogues.
They are now a permanent impediment.
However, their mutual interest in conducting
counter-terrorism operations against
ISIS and other global jihad outfits has ensured
military relations remain robust, especially
in terms of intelligence sharing.
Thus, curiously, with the overall strategic
agenda mismatch notwithstanding, the
United States has adopted Israeli operational
tools and methods. Targeted killings,
massive use of drones, intelligence,
and cyber warfare were all Israeli innovations
before becoming Obama administration
landmarks. Moreover, defense and
intelligence officials from both sides have
consistently emphasized and continue to
praise the ongoing intelligence sharing and
operational collaboration in certain fields.
As much as possible, the compartmentalization
of these mil-to-mil relations from
the troubled political ties should continue,
as it has throughout the crises of recent
years. Beyond its intrinsic mutual value, it
provides a certain safety net in the wider bilateral
context.
The massive, direct United States military
aidtoIsraelhas,ofcourse,beenrock-steady,
and chances are it will even be increased
in the coming years. The two countries
are in the final stages of negotiations on
a new MoU, which is expected to set an
even higher level of assistance for the next
ten years. According to media reports, the
current annual $3 billion will be increased
to approximately $4 billion.4
The joint
defense research and development projects,
most notably the extremely successful
multilayered missile defense mega-project,
will continue to serve as a living testament
to the sheer power and proven success of
the operational defense cooperation. This
type of project-based, mutually beneficial
and therefore balanced cooperation should
be the model for larger segments of the
“The massive, direct United States
military aid to Israel has been rocksteady,
and chances are it will even
be increased in the coming years.”
7 The Next Administration and Recalibrating U.S.-Israeli Ties
defense relations. In the long run, the old
Foreign Military Financing model should
be revised so as to reflect the maturity of
the I.D.F., Israel’s military industries and its
robust economy.
Few Expectations
Heading Forward
Against this backdrop, what can we expect
in the coming years with respect to U.S.-Israel
relations? To what extent are future developments
contingent upon the outcome
of the upcoming presidential elections?
When attempting to assess the next U.S.
administration’s regional strategy, one may
discern two dominant schools of thought.
The first attributes current U.S. policies to
President Obama and believes or rather,
hopes, for a major ‘correction’ beginning
in 2017. The degree of this predicted deviation
will differ in relation to the partisan affiliation
and particular identity of the next
president.
Thesecondschoolexpectstoseealargemeasure
of continuity across administrations,
even if the next president is not a Democrat.
They argue that the self-perceived U.S.
interest in the Middle East has fundamentally
changed due to its newfound energy
independence, the continued turmoil in the
region, and the need to focus on the home
front and on China, within the now-familiar
framework of ‘the pivot to Asia.’
By and large, there seems to be a relatively
low-level of expectation regarding the future
of U.S.-Israel relations. The ongoing Israeli-Palestinian
conflict, increasingly seen
as both irresolvable and unmanageable, is
expected to continue to be a major bone of
contention between the two countries. Iran
will also continue to serve as the subject
of major bilateral tension as the U.S. tries
to create a new strategic equilibrium and
Israel tries to deny Iran any policy or economic
achievements and limit its regional
clout. Any Iranian abrogation of its nuclear
agreement, no matter how small, will immediately
become a topic of major friction
between Israel and the next U.S. administration,
placing the two countries at opposite
policy ends. Israel will seek quick and
painful retaliation against Iran, and the U.S.
will strive to contain the situation and go
back to the path of agreed implementation.
Given these structural constraints, a recalibration
of the relations between the two
leaders and administrations, assuming it
is at all attempted, will most probably be
limited, rough, and fragile. The offsetting
factors, including political support for Israel
in Congress and the flourishing ties
between the high-tech communities of Silicon
Valley and ‘Silicon Wadi,’ will continue
to provide some counterweight to the strategic
tensions and disputes. However, the
bottom line is clear: the next political cycle
will not see a reversal of the negative trend
now apparent in U.S.-Israeli relations.
8 The Next Administration and Recalibrating U.S.-Israeli Ties
Endnotes
1.	 Erich Follath and Holger Stark, “The Story of ‘Operation
Orchard’: How Israel Destroyed Syria’s Al Kibar Nuclear
Reactor,” Spiegel Online International, November 2, 2009,
accessed March 28, 2016, http://www.spiegel.de/interna-
tional/world/the-story-of-operation-orchard-how-isra-
el-destroyed-syria-s-al-kibar-nuclear-reactor-a-658663.
html.
2.	 Guy Bechor, “The Jewel in the Crown of Barack Obama
and the End of the American Empire in the Middle East,”
GPlanet, June 4, 2012, accessed March 28, 2016, http://
www.gplanet.co.il/prodetailsamewin.asp?pro_id=1708.
A typical analysis from a conservative Israeli academician,
representative of mainstream conception of the
Obama Doctrine and its consequences in the the Middle
East.
3.	 Yossi Kuperwasser, “What really put a damper on relations
between Obama and Netanyahu,” Haaretz, December
7, 2015, accessed March 28, 2016, http://www.
haaretz.co.il/opinions/.premium-1.2681804.
4.	 Gili Cohen, “US Expected to Expand Its Security Aid to
Israel by a Billion Dollars Per Year,” Haaretz, October 10,
2015, accessed March 28, 2016, http://www.haaretz.co.il/
news/politics/.premium-1.2758016.