Peter Spáč 10.4.2017 Electoral systems —Mechanisms which transform votes of citizens into seats of the elected body (e.g. Parliament, local assembly) § —Areas included: —Geography —Mathematics — —No such thing as a perfectly neutral electoral system — —No such thing as the best electoral system § § Electoral systems - division —Many possibilities how to classify electoral systems — —Most common criterion – electoral formula (the main „logic“ of the system): — —Single-member district systems — —Proportional representation systems — —Mixed systems — —(only a very rough list) Single member district systems —„The winner takes all“ — —Country is divided into constituencies — —In each constituency only 1 person is elected and gets the seat — —How many votes does the winner need? —Plurality – the most votes from all candidates —Majority – at least 50 % + 1 vote § § UK election 2010 —Constituency: Chichester (southeastern England) — — — — — — — — —Sarah Newton elected as MP for Chichester constituency § § § Candidate Party Votes Votes in % Sarah Newton Conservative 20 349 41,7 Terrye Teverson Liberal Democrat 19 914 40,8 Charlotte MacKenzie Labour 4 697 9,6 Harry Blakeley UK Indep. Party 1 911 3,9 Loic Rich Mebyon Kernow 1 039 2,1 Ian Wright Green 858 1,8 Czech Senate election 2012 —Constituency: Zlín — — — — — — — —No candidate got more than 50 % of votes – what now? — —A second round (runoff) § § § § Candidate Party Votes Votes in % Ludvík Hovorka KDU-ČSL 6 398 16,5 Tomio Okamura Independent 11 772 30,3 Stanislav Mišák ČSSD 9 740 25,1 Jana Jurenčáková STAN 4 736 12,2 Others 6232 15,9 Czech Senate election 2012 —Constituency: Zlín, second round — — — — — —Tomio Okamura elected as senator for Zlín constituency — — § § § Candidate Party Votes Votes in % Tomio Okamura Independent 17 401 66,23 Stanislav Mišák ČSSD 9 740 33,76 Proportional representation —Aim – the composition of the elected body (Parliament) should be a copy of the public opinion — —Ideally – a party which gets 30 % of votes should receive 30 % of seats etc. — —The reality may be quite different — —Less wasted votes, more parties can get seats — —Main category – List PR systems List PR systems —Constituencies: —Only multi-member —The bigger the constituencies, the better for smaller parties and vice versa — —Threshold: —Amount of votes which a party needs to get to be included to the allocation of seats — —How to transform votes into seats? —Divisor —Quota Quota —A number of votes which are needed to obtain a seat — —Political party gets as many seats as many times it acquired the quota — —Example: —Quota = 10 000 votes —Votes of party = 263 000 —Party gets 26 seats as it acquired quota for 26 times — —Many types: Hare, Hagenbach-Bischoff, Imperiali.. — — Hagenbach-Bischoff quota —Q = V / (S + 1) — —Q – quota —V – valid votes —S – seats — —Example: —We want to divide 100 seats and all political parties got 250 000 votes together —Q = 250 000 / (100 + 1) = 250 000 / 101 = 2475 — — Hagenbach-Bischoff quota —Q = 2475 — — — Party Votes Quota Division Seats Remaining votes Seats A 95 438 2475 38,56 38 1 388 38 B 76 522 30,92 30 2 272 31 C 47 183 19,06 19 158 19 D 30 857 12,47 12 1 157 12 Sum 250 000 99 100 Divisor —A line of numbers by which the parties’ votes are divided — —The results are ranked according to their size — —The highest results are awarded with seats — —Advantage – all seats are allocated altogether and there are no remaining votes — —Many types: D’Hondt, Danish, Imperiali… — Divisor D’Hondt —1, 2, 3, 4, 5 … —We want to allocate 10 seats — Divided by number Party Votes 1 2 3 4 5 A 120 120 60 40 30 24 B 100 100 50 33,3 25 20 C 60 60 30 20 15 12 D 40 40 20 13,3 10 8 Divisor D’Hondt —Allocation of seats if we are dividing: — 4 seats — 10 seats Divided by number Party Votes 1 2 3 4 5 A 120 120 60 40 30 24 B 100 100 50 33,3 25 20 C 60 60 30 20 15 12 D 40 40 20 13,3 10 8 Slovak electoral system Electoral systems in 20th century —No linear tradition — —Single member districts: —Era before 1918 —Later communist rule — —Proportional representation: —1st Czechoslovak Republic (1918-1938) —Slovak autonomy —3rd Czechoslovak Republic (1945-1948) —Early communist rule After 1989 — —Need to change the political system and its features — —Change of electoral system: —Symbolic —Pragmatic — —Adoption of historical tradition — —Electoral reforms in accordance with federal level — — Slovak parliament — —Name: —Until 1993 - Slovak National Council (SNR) —Since 1993 – National Council of Slovak Republic (NR SR) — —Features: —Unicameral —150 MPs — — http://img.cas.sk/img/4/article/660097_parlament-nrsr-poslanci-narodna-rada-slovenskej-republiky-cr op-crop.jpg http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/8/87/NR_SR.JPG Electoral system in 1990 —List PR system (unchanged until now) — —Slovakia divided into 4 constituencies: —Bratislava (the capital city), Western, Central and Eastern Slovakia —Great differences in their size – large constituencies (41, 46, 50 seats) except of Bratislava (13) — —Threshold of 3 % of votes —Hare quota (Q = V / S) — —Altogether – a highly proportional system — — — — Elections 1990 Party Votes (in %) Seats Seats (in %) ID VPN 29,4 48 32 1,09 KDH 19,2 31 20,67 1,08 SNS 13,9 22 14,67 1,06 KSC / KSS 13,4 22 14,67 1,1 Hungarian parties 8,7 14 9,33 1,07 DS 4,4 7 4,67 1,07 Green party 3,5 6 4 1,14 Others 7,6 0 0 0 Electoral reform 1992 —Increase of threshold: —5 % —Special threshold for coalitions: —7 % – 2 and 3 members —10 % - 4 and more — —Change of votes to seats calculation: —Hagenbach-Bischoff quota —No real impact of this change § — § Elections 1992 Party Votes (in %) Seats Seats (in %) ID HZDS 37,26 74 49,33 1,32 SDL 14,7 29 19,33 1,31 KDH 8,89 18 12 1,35 SNS 7,93 15 10 1,26 Hungarians 7,42 14 9,33 1,26 Others 23,8 0 0 0 Elections 1994 Party Votes (in %) Seats Seats (in %) ID HZDS 34,96 61 40,67 1,16 SV 10,41 18 12 1,15 Hungarians 10,18 17 11,33 1,11 KDH 10,08 17 11,33 1,12 DÚ 8,57 15 10 1,17 ZRS 7,34 13 8,67 1,18 SNS 5,4 9 6 1,11 Others 13,06 0 0 0 Era of Vladimír Mečiar — —Government 1994-1998: —HZDS and 2 small partners —Problematic style of politics —Decreasing support of population — — —Solution – change of electoral rules — — § § § — § http://i.sme.sk/cdata/1/64/6474471/meciar-r415_s300.jpg Non-realized reform —Aim to make a single member district system § —Logic: —HZDS still ranked as the most popular political party —Although the opposition had a high cumulative support, it consisted of heterogeneous parties — —First step – new administrative division of Slovakia: —76 districts (possible electoral constituencies) —Great differences in their population — § — § — § — § — § — § — § — § Non-realized reform — — — § — § Average number of citizens entitled to vote All districts (79) 42 521 „Slovak“ districts (64) 39 478 „Hungarian“ districts (15) 55 505 Non-realized reform —New administrative division: —Higher support of HZDS in smaller districts and vice versa —Areas of highest concentration of Hungarians joined into few very populated districts — —If such division would be used for elections: —Possible breach of the equality of voters —Advantage to voters of smaller districts = advantage to HZDS — —The reform was not realized possibly due to refusal of HZDS’s small coalition partners § — § — § The „Mečiar’s reform“ — —Adopted only a few months before election 1998 — —1 nationwide constituency (all 150 MPs) — —Ban of campaign in private media — —Coalitions: —Each party in coalition had to gain 5 % — — § — § The „Mečiar’s reform“ — —Impact of reform: —No change of proportionality —The name of the party leaders visible to all voters —No sense to create coalitions à measure against opposition (SDK, Hungarians) — —Reaction of opposition – transformation from coalitions to single parties — — § — § Elections 1998 Party Votes (in %) Seats Seats (in %) ID HZDS 27 43 28,67 1,06 SDK 26,33 42 28 1,06 SDL 14,66 23 15,33 1,05 SMK 9,12 15 10 1,1 SNS 9,07 14 9,33 1,03 SOP 8,01 13 8,67 1,08 Others 13,06 0 0 0 Development ‘after Mečiar’ §Partial corrections made by Dzurinda’s government § §Threshold for coalitions back to 7 and 10 % § §No special requirements for parties in coalitions § §1 nationwide constitution preserved § §Some features of Mečiar’s reform banned by the Constitutional court (campaign in private media) — Elections 2002 Party Votes (in %) Seats Seats (in %) ID HZDS 19,5 36 24 1,23 SDKU 15,09 28 18,67 1,24 SMER 13,46 25 16,67 1,24 SMK 11,16 20 13,33 1,19 KDH 8,25 15 10 1,21 ANO 8,01 15 10 1,25 KSS 6,32 11 7,33 1,16 Others 13,06 0 0 0 Elections 2006 Party Votes (in %) Seats Seats (in %) ID SMER 29,14 50 33,33 1,14 SDKU 18,35 31 20,67 1,13 SNS 11,73 20 13,33 1,14 SMK 11,68 20 13,33 1,14 HZDS 8,79 15 10 1,14 KDH 8,31 14 9,33 1,12 Others 13,06 0 0 0 Elections 2010 Party Votes (in %) Seats Seats (in %) ID SMER 34,79 62 41,33 1,19 SDKU 15,42 28 18,67 1,22 SaS 12,14 22 14,67 1,21 KDH 8,52 15 10 1,18 Bridge 8,12 14 9,33 1,15 SNS 5,07 9 6 1,19 Others 13,06 0 0 0 Elections 2012 Party Votes (in %) Seats Seats (in %) ID SMER 44,41 83 55,33 1,25 KDH 8,82 16 10,67 1,21 OLaNO 8,55 16 10,67 1,25 Bridge 6,89 13 8,67 1,26 SDKU 6,09 11 7,33 1,2 SaS 5,88 11 7,33 1,25 Others 13,06 0 0 0 Elections 2016 Party Votes (in %) Seats Seats (in %) ID SMER 28,28 49 32,67 1,16 SaS 12,1 21 14 1,16 OĽaNO 11,02 19 12,67 1,15 SNS 8,64 15 10 1,16 LSNS 8,04 14 9,33 1,16 SR - BK 6,62 11 7,33 1,11 Bridge 6,5 11 7,33 1,13 Network 5,6 10 6,67 1,19 Ostatní 13,20 0 0 0 Impact of electoral reforms § §High proportionality § §Number of relevant parties § §Personal composition of the parliament § Czech election 2006 Party Votes (in %) Seats (in %) ID ODS 35,38 40,5 1,14 SZ 6,29 3 0,48 Slovak election 2006 Party Votes (in %) Seats (in %) ID Smer 29,14 33,33 1,14 KDH 8,31 9,33 1,12 High proportionality Number of relevant parties Elections Threshold Change Parties in parliament Waster votes (in %) 1990 3 - 7 7,6 1992 5 + 2 5 23,8 1994 5 - 7 13,06 1998 5 - 6 5,81 2002 5 - 7 18,21 2006 5 - 6 11,89 2010 5 - 6 15,94 2012 5 - 6 19,36 2016 5 - 8 13,20 Personal composition of NR SR §Preferential voting § §1. half of 90s §Each voter has 4 preferential votes §To move to the top of the list a candidate needs to gain such amount of preferential votes which is at least 10 % of the votes of his/her party in the constituency § §1998: §1 nationwide constitution à paralysis of the system — § Personal composition of NR SR §MPs thanks to preferential votes: §1998 – 0 §2002 – 1 (out of 150!) § §Solution – lowering the amount from 10 to 3 % of party votes §Impact – more MPs thanks to preferential votes: §2006 – 7 §2010 – 11 §2012 – 15 §2016 - 13 § § § Share of preferential votes for candidates in elections 2006 (in %) Smer SDKÚ SNS SMK HZDS KDH 1-10 73,28 75,81 68,07 64,4 67,6 69,75 11-20 7,48 11,69 8,61 12 10,38 8,8 21-30 4,72 3,27 5,5 7,02 9,74 4,47 31-40 2,99 1,88 3,68 5,79 2,55 3,51 41-50 1,57 1,01 2,01 1,82 2,05 1,82 51-60 2,24 1,34 2,73 2,16 1,99 1,05 61-70 1,81 1,42 2,88 1,34 1,22 1,51 71-80 1,41 0,43 1,41 1,38 0,9 2,69 81-90 0,57 0,33 0,61 1,16 0,85 0,92 91-100 0,59 0,4 0,71 0,79 0,78 1,32 101-110 0,79 0,41 0,51 0,4 0,5 0,54 111-120 0,59 0,36 0,67 0,44 0,8 1,05 121-130 0,67 0,28 0,4 0,38 0,46 0,75 131-140 0,49 0,36 0,59 0,52 0,48 1,08 141-150 0,81 1 1,56 0,4 0,46 0,74 Preferential votes of candidates Summary —Since 1993 only a list PR system has been used — —Most important reforms: —Higher threshold in 1992 —Mečiar’s reform — —Impact of nationwide constituency: —Strong position of parties’ leaderships —Low influence of voters on personal composition of NR SR —No political party which passes the 5 % threshold can be harmed by the system