Political Studies (1999, XLIII, 25-40
Are there Collective Human Rights?
MICHAELFREEMAN*
The Problem of Collective Rights in Political Theory
The doctrine of human rights affirms two fundamental principles of Western
liberalism. The first is that the human individual is the most fundamental moral
unit. The second is that all human individuals are morally equal. These two
principles express a commitment to egalitarian individualism. Yet the doctrine
belongs to an international discourse which also affirms two collectivist
principles. The first is that states are the primary agents of international
relations. The second is that states represent nations. Liberal theory and
international law reconcile the claims of individuals and states by affirming that
states are obliged to respect the human rights of individuals. The status of
nations is less clear. The common Article 1 of the two international humanrights
covenants of 1966 declares that all peoples have the right to selfdetermination.
This proposition has generally been interpreted to mean that
the populations of colonial territories have the right to form nation-states. It
has, however, also been cited to express the aspirations of various national and
ethnic minorities, and of indigenous peoples. The logical and practical relations
between these collective claims and individual human rights is uncertain.
The problem inheres in liberal-democratic theory. The classical liberal theory
of Locke held that every individual equally had a set of natural rights, and that
government was legitimate only if it was based on the consent of the governed
and protected the fundamental rights of all. In such political communities the
majority had the right to bind the rest.’ Thus Locke derived from the premises
of equal and individual rights conclusions about collective rights of majorities.
In the republican democratic tradition associated with Rousseau sovereignty
is placed not in the majority but in the general will. Rousseau maintained that
this will was indivisible. If it was to prevail, there must be no partial
associations in the state.2 Locke and Rousseau both located the problem of
political authority in the relation between the individual and the state.
Minorities in Locke’s theory and partial associations in Rousseau’s had no role
in legitimate government. This approach to the problem of political authority
was introduced into world-historical politics when the French Revolution
proclaimed individual rights and the sovereignty of the nation, while
manifesting its hostility towards minorities and partial associations.
* I should like to thank other contributors to this volume, especially David Beetham and Allan
Rosas, for their helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper, and Will Kymlicka for
stimulating exchanges of views on this subject and for references to Canadian sources.
’J. Locke, The Second Treatise of Government (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1970),
para. 95.
’J. J. Rousseau, The Social Contract (London, Dent, 1966), Book 11, chs 2 and 3.
0Political Studies Association 1995. Published by Blackwell Publishers, 108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 IJF, UK and 238 Main
Street, Cambridge,MA 02142, USA.
26 Are thew col1ectii.e Hurnun Rights?
Classical liberalism normally took the culturally homogeneous nation-state
for granted. The republicanism of Rousseau and the French Revolution was
explicit about the need for a civil religion.3 John Stuart Mill held that free
institutions required a united public opinion and were ‘next to impossible’ in a
country made up of different nati~nalities.~John Rawls has continued the
tradition of nation-state liberal individualism.’ Lord Acton, by contrast,
argued that the association of the state with the nation violated the ‘rights of
nationality’ by subordinating all nationalities not associated with the state.6
The principles of equal individual rights and majority rule have provided the
theoretical basis of liberal-democratic nation-states. The concept of a ruling
majority. however. implies that of a subordinate minority. Liberal-democratic
theory treats such minorities as sets of outvoted individuals. Their situation is
legitimate because their individual rights are guaranteed, because these rights
give them the opportunity to become part of the majority from time to time,
and because it is the outcome of the rules of the democratic game. In this
system there is majority rule. but no minority problem.
The construction of modern nation-states has. however, been accomplished
partly by the domination and attempted assimilation of traditional communities.
Many contemporary nation-states also contain minorities produced by
immigration. Modern societies therefore include collectivities bound by
common values that may be distinct from those of the majority. Such
collectivities may form permanent minorities whose interests are persistently
neglected by the majority. The state and the cultural majority may form a
hegemonic bloc. Many social groups-for example. women, gays and the
disabled - niay be structurally disadvantaged in liberal democracies, and may
require special rights in order to achieve equal citizenship. These rights might
be collective (for example. quotas in the political representation of women) but
the claims of these groups can generally be met by implementation of the
individual right to be free from arbitrary discrimination and appropriate
measures of positive discrimination. Because ethnic groups have common
comprehensive cultures and national groups a sense of political distinctiveness,
they raise special problems for nation-state political cultures based on the
principle of majority rule. The doctrine of equal and universal rights may
support the hegemony of the majority culture over various subordinated
cultures.’
The problem of collective rights. therefore. arises in two ways. It arises firstly
because the concept of individual human rights has been introduced into an
international discourse committed to various forms of collectivism. It arises
secondly because liberal-democratic theory and practice have traditionally
concerned themselves with the relation bctween individual rights and the
collective rights of nation-states. It is a mistake to believe that liberal
democracy has favoured the individual over the collective. Rather, it has given
Rousseau. The Social C‘ontrucr. Book IV. ch. 8.
’J. S . Mill. Cotisideratiotis oti Rrpesentrtiii.c Gowrrinient (London, Dent, 1910).pp, 361-2.
‘J. Rawls. ’The law of peoples‘ in S. Shute and S . Hurley (eds), On Human Righis; The Oxfbrd
Lord Acton. Ex7aj.r i n the Liberal Interpretntion of Histor,: Sefected Papers (Chicago,
1’.Van Dyke. Human Righrs, Ethnicitj,. arid Discrimkaticin (Westport CN, Greenwood, 1985).
Amnestj, Lectures l9Y3 (New York. Basic. 1993). pp. 41-82,
Lrliversity of Chicago Press, 1967), p. 157.
pp. 7 8. 59-60. 145-6. 220.
t I’oiilic.il Sludirr Association. 1995
MICHAELFREEMAN 27
the individual a special status within a particular collectivity, the nation-state.
It is precisely collectivities systematically unrepresented by states that are
anomalies in liberal-democratic theory. Do such groups have moral (as distinct
from positive, legal) rights? If they do, how are these rights logically related to
individual human rights?
Collective Rights in International Politics and Law
The protection of minority rights by treaty has been practised for centuries.
Such protection has been exceptional, however, since international law has
normally recognized the sovereign power of states: it was, indeed, sovereign
states that made treaties to protect minorities. The most extensive system of
minority-rights protection was that of the League of Nations. This system
recognized collective rights of various kinds (for example, equal rights for
individual members of minority collectivities, special rights for minority
collectivities and collective rights to cultural autonomy) and thereby weakened
the dogma of state sovereignty in favour of human-rights concerns. It was,
however, neither universal in principle nor effective in practice, and it vanished
with the League.8
After the Second World War the UN adopted its Universal Declaration of
Human Rights. Almost every right in this declaration is expressed as an
individual right (for example, Article 3 states that ‘everyone’ has ‘the right to
life, liberty and security of person’). The Declaration does, however, have some
collectivist features. Individuals have rights to participate in collective practices
(Articles 20 and 27); families have the right to protection by society and the
State (Article 16); parents have the right to choose the kind of education that
shall be given to their children (Article 26); the ‘will of the people’ is the basis of
the authority of government (Article 21); everyone is entitled to a social and
international order in which the rights set out in the Declaration can be fully
realized (Article 28); and all rights are subject to such limitations as are
determined by law to meet ‘the just requirements of morality, public order and
the general welfare in a democratic society’ (Article 29).
Attempts were made to include an article on minority rights. The
Representative of the USSR said that minority rights were ‘fundamental
human rights’. The Representative of the USA opposed the inclusion of a
minority-rights article, stating that the best solution of the problem of
minorities was to encourage respect for human rights. There was therefore a
conceptual disagreement as to whether minority rights were human rights or
whether human rights did not include minority rights but were the means to
solve minority problems. The Universal Declaration does not mention
minorities. The UN Human Rights Commission did establish a SubCommission
on the Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of
Minorities, but the theoretical and practical relations between the prevention
of discrimination and the protection of minorities has remained ~ n c l e a r . ~The
most important minority-rights provision of international law, Article 27 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, declares that persons
P. Thornberry, International Law and the Rights of Minorities (Oxford, Clarendon, 1991),
Thornberry, Internutional Law, Part 111.
Part 1.
C)Political Studies Association, 1995
28 Are there collective Human Rights?
belonging to certain minorities shall not be denied the right, in communify with
others, to participate in the culture of their group. Some commentators have
argued that Article 27 bears a collectivist interpretation, but the extent to
which it does?if any, is uncertain.'O
The different policies of the League and the UN towards minority rights can
be explained to a considerable extent by their different beliefs about the
implications of minority rights for the stability of nation-states and of the
international order. The League believed that its minority-rights regime would
contribute to peace as well as to justice. UN state Clites have considered
minority rights to be threats to national unity, territorial state integrity, peace
and economic development. ' I In the face of increasingly insistent minority
demands and violent ethnic conflicts, however, cautious changes have taken
place. Article 1 of the UN Declaration on Minority Rights of December 1992,
for example. imposes on states the obligation to protect the existence and
identity of minorities.''
A number of so-called peoples' rights have also been introduced into
international law. There is an African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights.
Article 25 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights recognizes 'the inherent right of all peoples to enjoy and utilize fully and
freely their natural wealth and resources'. Other people's rights include those to
self-determination, international peace, economic. social and cultural development,
and a satisfactory environment.'? The conceptual character of these
rights is unclear and their relation to individual human rights uncertain.
Towards a Theory of individual and Collective Rights
The concepts of individual rights and collective rights have a similar history
and a similar general theoretical rationale. Individuals and collectivities have
been oppressed throughout history and in the modern period protection has
been sought in the form of institutionalized rights. Collective rights as such are
not controversial: associations and corporations clearly can have moral and
legal rights and duties. However, some human-rights theorists have insisted
that only individuals can have liurizan rights. Others have argued for collective
human rights. To analyse this disagreement. we need to consider the nature
and justification of human rights.
I propose to defend a conception of collective human rights. In order to
show that these collective rights lire human rights, I shall argue that some
collective rights have the same nature and justification as well-established
human rights. To this end I shall argue that a particular conception of rightsthe
'interest' conception - must and can be defended against some plausible
criticisms. I shall then argue that the interest conception of human rights must
and can be defended against communitarian and relativist objections. I shall
conclude by presenting the argument for collective human rights, while
'" P. Thornberry, 'International and European standards on minority rights' in H. Miall (ed.),
" Thornberry. Internotional Law. pp.47-8, 122. 129. 136-7, 202, 206.
''A. Phillips and A. Rosas (eds), The CJ" Minorit?. Rights Declaration (Turku, Abo, 1993),
I'J. Crawford (ed.). The Rig/zt.s of P~op1e.c(Oxford. Clarendon, 1988).
.Minorfry Rights in Europe: rhe Scope .for n Trurrsriuriotid R q h i e (London. Pinter, 1994), p. 15.
p. 124.
( I'oliti~dl Studics A\wciarion. 19YS
MICHAELFREEMAN 29
identifying some problems raised by the attempt to reconcile individual and
collective human rights.
The Nature of Rights
It is generally agreed that rights are constituted by norms that govern relations
between those who have rights and those who have duties arising from those
rights. These norms impose constraints on the actions of the duty-bearer~.'~
There are said to be two competing views of how these relations should be
analysed. The interest conception of rights is said to hold that the grounds of
rights are the interests of the rights-holders, whereas the choice conception
maintains that a right exists when the necessary and sufficient condition of
imposing or relaxing the constraint on the duty-bearer is the right-holder's
choice to this effect.15 The two conceptions are, however, not necessarily
mutually incompatible, for the interest conception emphasizes thejustijication
of rights-constituting norms, whereas the choice conception is concerned with
the identijication of such norms. Thus, an interest of A may justfy attributing
to A the right to x, and we may know that A has the right to x because the
correlative duty of B may be enforced or waived by the choice of A. The two
conceptions may nevertheless have different and even mutually incompatible
implications.
The concept of human rights appears to presuppose the interest conception.
Article 3 of the Universal Declaration, for example, states that everyone has
'the right to life, liberty and security of person'. Thejustification of such rights
surely relies on our intuition that everyone normally has a legitimate interest in
life, liberty and security.
Steiner has, however, argued that the interest conception of rights should be
rejected in favour of the choice conception. His principal argument is that,
since interests can conflict, the interest conception entails conflicts of rights. If
rights conflict, so do their correlative duties. And if duty-bearers have
conflicting duties, they cannot carry out all their duties. Those duties that they
cannot carry out cannot really be duties. So their correlative rights cannot
really be rights. The interest theory of rights is therefore incoherent, he
concludes.l6
Interests certainly can conflict and the interest conception of rights entails
that rights can conflict. But conflicting rights do not entail incompossible
duties. Conflicting rights entail duties to balance rights. A government that
discharges its duty to protect the right to privacy by limiting the right to
freedom of speech is not violating its duty to respect the right to freedom of
speech but fulfilling its duty to balance these rights. The problem of balancing
conflicting rights may not have a determinate rational solution, but this does
not mean that particular solutions are necessarily unreasonable. Steiner's
critique of the interest conception is therefore not persuasive, for it rests on the
rational unacceptability of indeterminacy. Conflicts of rights, with their
consequent indeterminacy, are, however, stubborn facts of human-rights
politics. Steiner's attempt to sacrifice the interest conception for the sake of
l4 H. Steiner, An Essay on Rights (Oxford, Blackwell, 1994), pp. 567.
''Stelner, An Essay on Rights, pp.568, 61, 73.
l 6 Stemer, An Essay on Rights. pp. 8G1, 92.
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30 Are there collective Human Rights?
complete logical coherence is to accord priority to logic over (moral and
political) experience.
The interest conception of rights has been systematized by Raz. He suggests
that A has a right to s only if the interest A has in having x is a suficient
reason for imposing a duty on B. Conceptions of interests are determined by
ultimate values. Thus, rights are dependent on ultimate values, which, Raz
allows, are contested. Although those with different values may agree on
certain rights, nevertheless rights claims will remain vulnerable to disagreement
deriving from conflicting ultimate values. ’’Despite this weakness,
however. Raz’s analysis is useful in several ways. Firstly, in grounding rights
in interests, it captures a central feature of the concept of natural or human
rights in the classical tradition from Locke to the UN. Secondly, it provides a
systematic framework for relating ultimate values, interests, rights and duties.
Thirdly, by providing this framework. it makes possible a systematic analysis
of the relation between individual and collective rights. Since value-based
interests groutid rights. the conceptual relations hetiixeen individual and collective
riglrts depend on thr kinds qf d u e s atid interests thut may ground the putative
riglits.
Raz‘s account thus allows for the derivation of both individual and
collective rights from fundamental interests. Individuals, he argues, have an
interest in living in communities. Communities can have collective interests,
such as the interest in self-determination. There is. however, no individual
right to collective self-determination. because the realization of collective selfdetermination
imposes far-reaching constraints on the actions of others: the
interests of no individual are sufficient reasons for imposing such heavy
burdens on others. But nations can have such rights. Raz suggests two
reasons why nations and other collectivities may have rights that are not
reducible to individual rights. The first is that only the interests of
collectivities are of sufficient weight to justify the imposition of the correlative
duties. The second is that some interests are interests in collective goods-such
as the interest in collective self-determination - and only collectivities may be
the holders of rights to collective goods.I8 Moreover, there is no general rule
giving either individual rights or collective goods priority in cases of conflict.’’
Raz thus does not recognize that individual human rights have the special
status in relation to collective goods that they are given in international law;
and he leaves individual rights more vulnerable to violation by governments
claiming to promote the common good than is permitted by human rights
considerations.
Raz’s analysis is useful in identifying interests as the grounds of rights and in
giving a coherent account of the conceptual relation between individual and
collective rights. He fails to give a plausible account of hurnan rights. however,
because he gives no sort of priority to individual rights over collective goods
and because he grounds rights in contestable values. Thus, Raz is too
‘communitarian’ and too ‘relativist‘ to provide theoretical support for the idea
of universal human rights.
” J Rar. The Mortrlrri of Freedom (Oxford,Clarendon. 1986). pp 166, 18&1
’’Raz, The Morolrti off-reechi. pp 174. 190. 194, 207-9, 288-9
‘’R u . TIIr 4loriilrti of firedoorit pp 216. 150-7 308-1 3
, Polltlinl Studlri As,~xiat,on l W 5
MICHAELFREEMAN 31
Universal Human Rights
Human rights are universal: everyone has, for example, the right to life, liberty
and security. Raz derives rights from interests and values and thereby leaves
the universality of human rights in question. Gewirth, in contrast, derives
universal human rights from what he claims to be a universal feature of
morality. All moralities, he holds, impose duties on individuals, and thereby
require actions. Because ‘ought’ implies ‘can’, duties presuppose rights to the
generic requirements of action: freedom and well-being. There are therefore
universal human rights to freedom and well-being.20
Gewirth can recognize collective rights but collective rights are necessarily
derivative from individual human rights. This attempt to derive the priority of
individual human rights logically from a supposedly universal conception of
morality attempts to prove too much. Those moralities that do not recognize
individual rights but only duties to the collective good are not logically
incoherent. Even if they must logically recognize that each individual has the
right to the freedom and well-beingnecessary to do his or her duty, they are not
logically required to recognize the priority of individual human rights over the
collective good. Gewirth attempts to establish the universality of human rights
and the priority of individual rights by claiming that a liberal conception of
agency is implicit in all moralities. This claim is implausible.
Donnelly defends universal individual human rights but rejects the concept
of collectivehuman rights. He holds that one has human rights because one is a
human being. Only individual persons are human beings, so that only
individuals can have human rights. In the area defined by human rights the
individual has prima facie priority over social interests. Yet he acknowledges
that individuals must be members of social groups if they are to lead worthy
lives. Individuals, therefore, have duties to society and society has correlative
rights. Societies may legitimately constrain the exercise of many human rights,
and should balance individual rights with individual duties. But it does not
follow that society or any other social group has human rights, in his view.21
Donnelly’s position leads him to make some inconsistent judgments. On the
one hand he admits that the exercise of human rights may sometimes destroy
groups. In such cases, human rights should ordinarily be given priority. It is
morally preferable that groups disappear as a consequence of the exercise of
the human rights of their members than that they should be protected by
enforcement of group membership.22On the other hand, some societies do not
recognize human rights, but protect many of the interests that are protected by
human rights. The introduction of human rights into such societies might
diminish the prospects for a dignified life. In such situations Donnelly accords
priority to the collective
Donnelly therefore allows the collective good to ‘trump’ individual human
rights in some normal and some extraordinary situations, and yet would
protect individual human rights even at the expense of group survival. Because
2o A. Gewirth, Reason and Morality (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1978) and Human
*’J. Donnelly, UniversalHuman Rights in Theory and Practice (Ithaca, Cornell University Press,
22 Donnelly, Universal Human Rights, pp. 58-9, 70, 151-2.
23 Donnelly, Universal Human Rights, pp. 59, 67, 151-3.
Rights: Essays on JustiJicatiun and Applications (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1982).
1989), pp. 1, 9, 16, 19-21, 57-8, 68-9, 90, 143-5.
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32 Are there collective Human Rights?
he lacks a coherent theory of individual and collective rights, he arbitrarily
rejects the concept of collective humm rights while according considerable
weight to the collective social good. The concept of collective human rights, he
believes, is especially dangerous when it is proposed as a prerequisite for other
human rights.24 But it cannot plausibly be denied that there are collective
preconditions for the protection of individual human rights, and that, while
collective rights may be dangerous for individual human rights, it may be
important to recognize collective human rights as the preconditions for other
human rights.
Donnelly and Gewirth both attempt to escape the implicit relativism of
Raz’s conception of rights. Donnelly, however, fails to maintain consistently
the priority of individual human rights over the collective good, or to
acknowledge that, whatever their dangers, some collective human rights are a
precondition for individual ones. Gewirth for his part consistently treats
collective rights as derivative from individual human rights, but does so only by
implausibly claiming that a liberal conception of agency is presupposed by all
moralities. The inadequacy of both positions highlights the need for a coherent
account and an effective reconciliation of individual and collective human
rights. We must now see whether this is possible.
Collectire Human Rights
Van Dyke maintains that doctrines that recognize only individual rights are
not universally relevant to contemporary political problems. Many societies are
characterized by radical cultural heterogeneity and can function only on the
basis of collective rights. States have collective rights. Sub-state collectivities
may rightly become states and they do not acquire moral rights only when they
become states.? Liberal theory accords collective rights to nation-states but
not to nations without states. However. nation-states have rights because they
protect interests. Collectivities within nation-states have rights for the same
reason, he concludes.’6
Equally, we could argue, collective rights may be necessary to protect
individual rights. The individualistic, egalitarian form of democracy in
ethnically plural societies may lead to the violation of the human rights of
members of minority collectivities.” The targets of many of the worst humanrights
violations since 1945 have been ethnic groups as such.28These violations
are often conceived by the perpetrators and perceived by the victims in
collective terms. Victim-groups often plausibly believe that such collective
problems require collective solutions. Since the problem consists of attacks on
groups, the solution requires the defence of groups. Since the injustice is
’‘Donnelly, Universal Human Rights, pp. 146-7
’’V. Van Dyke, ‘The individual. the state and ethnic communities in political theory’, World
Politics. 29 (197677). 343-369. pp. 355. 357. 364, 367: Van Dyke, Human Rights. Ethnicity, and
Discrimination, pp. 195, 207-8: Van Dyke. ‘Collectiveentities and moral rights: problems in liberaldemocratic
thought’, Journal oJ Politics, 44 (1982), 2140. p. 25.
-b Van Dyke, Hurnan Rights, Ethnicitj, and Discrirnination, pp. 119, 207.
”Van Dyke. Humun Rights. Ethnicit?,. and Discriminution, pp. 146, 129, 205, 206, 219, 222-3;
28 T. R. Gurr and J. R. Scarritt, ‘Minorities at risk: a global survey’, Human Rights Quarterly, 11
’Collective entities and moral rights’, p. 24.
(1989), 380.
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MICHAELFREEMAN 33
promoted by hostile attitudes towards groups, the solution requires the
promotion of the dignity of groups.29This argument locates the human-rights
problematic not only in individual-state relations but also in the relations
among groups and in state-group relations.
If collectivities have rights, they surely have the right to exist. General
Assembly Resolution 96 (I) declared genocide to be ‘a denial of the right of
existence of entire human groups’. The UN Genocide Convention is intended
to protect groups from physical destruction. However, if groups have the right
to exist, they surely have the right to be protected from economic and cultural
de~truction.~~Yet cultural groups have no right to state support if their
decline is the outcome only of a set of free choices. Whether they have a right
to protection from the results of previous assimilationist policies is not
~ertain.~’Rights of such groups to state aid are certainly subject to the
condition that protection of their culture does not violate important rights of
others.32
If we look at actual practice, we can see a widespread recognition of
collective rights, as well as the difficulties which they pose. States often adopt
policies, such as affirmative action or positive discrimination, to provide special
advantages to members of groups that have suffered from historic injustice.
Such policies accord priority to the collective rights of favoured groups over
individual rights to equality of opportunity of those who are not members of
these groups.33 These are collective-rights policies of which only some
individual members of the favoured collectivities are the beneficiaries. They
have generally been accepted as permitted, if not required by human-rights
principles.
The interests of collectivities may justify special representation in
government, even though this violates the principle of individual equality of
citizenship. The constitutions of many ethnically divided societies provide for
proportional ethnic representation. These are designed to protect the
individual human rights of members of minority groups, to protect collective
interests of such groups, and to maintain peace.34Similar collective rights are
recognized where constitutions provide for political devolution to sub-state
regions in which national minorities are regional maj~rities.~~A dilemma arises
when a community that has a plausible rights-claim to self-government to
protect some important rights of its members has political traditions which
29 R. Kuptana, ‘The universality of human rightsand indigenous peoples:new approaches for the
next millennium’, Rights and Humanity Roundtable, Strengthening Commitment to the Universality
of Human Rights (Amman, Jordan, April 1993),pp.4, 10.
30 Van Dyke, Human Rights, Ethnicity, and Discrimination, pp.20, 84, 130: V. Van Dyke. ‘Justice
as fairness: for groups?’, American Political Science Review, 69 (1975), 607414, p. 609.
31 Thornberry, International Law, Part 11, pp. 1767; ‘The UN Declaration on the rights of
persons belonging to national or ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities: background, analysis
and observations’, in Phillips and Rosas (eds), The UN Minority Rights Declaration, pp.22-3;
D. Sanders, ‘Collectiverights’, Human Rights Quarterly, 13 (1991), 370; Van Dyke, Human Rights,
Ethnicity, and Discrimination, pp. 80-1.
32 Sanders, ‘Collective rights’, p. 378; J. Waldron, ‘Minority cultures and the cosmopolitan
alternative’, University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform, 35 (1992), 751-93.
33 Van Dyke, Human Rights, Ethnicity, and Discrimination, pp. 1366, 153-4, 157-8.
34VanDyke, Human Rights, Ethnicity, and Discrimination, pp. I G l , 14-5, 2 6 8 , 554, 767,
35 V. Van Dyke, ‘Human rights and the rights of groups’, American Journal of Political Science,
967, 101, 125-6, 139.
18 (1974), pp.730, 734-5.
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34 Are there collective Hunian Rights?
violate some other human rights. including the equal right to political
participation.36
Recent proposals for the recognition of peoples’ rights to development,
peace. a satisfactory environment, etc.. are undoubtedly aimed at protecting
important human interests, but they also raise several conceptual problems: the
subjects of the rights are uncertain; potential conflicts between peoples’ rights
and individual human rights are not addressed; and the holders and the nature
of the correlative duties are unclear. The formulation of these rights may have
the merit of drawing attention to the structural dimensions of human-rights
violations, but it is conceptually unsatisfactory and potentially dangerous
insofar as it encourages states to violate individual human rights in the name of
people’s rights.37
The problems raised by some collective rights-claims, however, do not refute
the case for the recognition of the concept of collective human rights. Van
Dyke argues that liberal democracies in fact recognize collective rights and they
are right to do so because collective rights may be necessary to protect
individual rights and collective interests. and to maintain peace among groups.
He calls for a balance between individual and collective rights, but his
empirical and pragmatic approach to rights leaves the supporting theory
unclear. Can we identify any principle(s) to help determine how this balance
should be struck?
Raz suggested that the most fundamental human interest is in the quality of
life. One important element in the quality of life is well-being, which refers to
the goodness of a lifefrom the point of vieit. of the person living it.’* Kymlicka
argues similarly that the value of human lives derives not only from their
conformity to external standards of the good but also from the beliefs of the
individuals who lead them that they are good. Communities are necessary to
good individual lives, but individuals must have some autonomy from the communities
of which they are members to choose specific forms of good life.39
Individuals have autonomy (i.e.. the capacity to choose) because community
cultures are not fixed and homogeneous, and there are often internal
differences over their interpretation. Individuals should have autonomy (i.e.,
the right to choose) because communities can be oppressive. Communities are
also often stratified. Individuals who are required to conform to the
community are required to conform to the wills of those with the most power
in the community. It is obviously question-begging to assume that this power is
legitimate.“
Individuals have a fundamental interest in leading good lives, and in those
rights necessary to good lives, including the right to live in communities that
support good lives. The rights of individuals should be limited by the duty to
ib Narive Wornen’iA rsn of‘Cmada v. CanutkJ, L)oniiniorr Lon, Reports (Fourth Series). 95 (1993).
j7Crawford. The Rights of’ Peoples.
” W. Kymlicka. Liheralim, Cornmunirj, rind Culrztre (Oxford. Clarendon, 1989). pp. 1&11;
Conremporar?, Polirical Phi1osoph.v. an hrrodzrcrion (Oxford. Clarendon, 1990), pp. 203-5, 207-9,
2lC-I; ‘Liberalism. individualism. and minority rights’ in A. C. Hutchinson and L. 3. M. Green
(eds), LAN und the Conimunirj,. rhr End of hdi~i~/irulim”(Toronto, Carswell, 1989), pp. 188~94,
197M.
“’Kymlicka. Liberalism,Cornrntrtiirj, und Culrirre, pp.89, 95; Contenzporur! Political Piiilosophy,
pp. 2 2 3 4 228.
106-27.
Raz. The Muralitj. qf Frecdotn. p. 289.
i P ~ r l l t i ~ d lStudiei Asscaation. IVY5
MICHAELFREEMAN 35
support communities of this kind. Kymlicka argues that communities and their
cultures should be protected only for the sake of individuals, but cultures
should be protected when such protection is necessary to maintain the basic
rights of individuals, and that the protection of group cultures may be
inconsistent with an absolute individual right to equal citizen~hip.~’Where a
set of individuals requires a particular culture for its chosen way of life, it has a
right to have it protected against certain actions of outsiders. The exercise of
certain rights may enable a majority to destroy the culture, and thereby the
opportunity for a good life of a minority. Sinceindividual rights arejustified by
their contribution to good lives, there is here a conflict of rights, and rights that
are helpful but not necessary to good lives should yield to rights that are
necessary.42Some restriction of the individual rights of insiders may also be
justified to prevent actions that would undermine communities which are
necessary for autonomous choices. What makes this justification of community
restriction of individual rights liberal is that its purpose is to protect a rightssupporting
community.43
The Problem of Toleration
Kymlicka proposes a liberal theory of collective rights. It is liberal because it
assumes that individuals have an interest in autonomy. It recognizes collective
rights because it holds that such rights may be necessary conditions of
individual autonomy. The theory is attractive because it provides a clearer and
more coherent solution than any rival to the problem of reconciling collective
and individual human rights. The collective rights that Kymlicka defends are
human rights because they are grounded in the same individual human interest
in self-determination that grounds individual human rights.
The liberal theory of collective rights has, however, been criticized for
endorsing cultural imperialism and thereby violating the liberal principle of
toleration. Liberal societies have been historically imperialistic, and those who
are still fighting the results of liberal imperialism sometimes characterize the
vocabulary of human rights as an alien discourse. Subject peoples, it is said, are
forced to use the master’s conceptual weapons to combat the master’s
domination. Indigenous peoples, for example, appeal to the discourse of
human rights, but only because the terms of discourse are themselves set by
liberal hegemony. From the point of view of the oppressed, oppression can be
adequately characterized only in terms of their own cultures. The discourse of
individual rights subverts collectivist cultures. Liberal societies may be
‘tolerant’, but dominant liberalism sets the terms of toleration. The discourses
of liberal rights and those of non-liberal communities are incommensurable,
and thus the imposition of the former is part of the liberal imperialist project.44
41 Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and Culture, pp.24, 64-6, 78, 80, 82, 162-3, 165-6, 175,
42 Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and Culture, p. 226.
43 Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and Culture, pp. 151, 169-71, 189, 200, 23940, 242;
Contemporary Political Philosophy, p.232.
44B. Parekh, ‘Decolonizing liberalism’ in A. Shtromas (ed.), The End of ’Isms? (Oxford,
Blackwell, 1994), pp. 85-103; M. E. Turpel, ‘Aboriginal peoples and the Canadian Charter:
interpretive monopolies, cultural differences’, Canadian Human Rights Yearbook, 6 (1989-90),
345.
177-8, 231, 254; ‘Liberalism, individualism, and minority rights’, pp. 1934, 1968, 200, 202.
I? Political Studies Association, 1995
36 Are there collectiw Humnn Rights.?
This argument is too strong. It treats pre-colonial cultures as authentic and
considers appeals to human rights as distortions imposed by liberal hegemony.
In fact imperialism produces various responses in traditional communities, and
it is arbitrary to treat only the most conservative as authentic. The liberal
theory of collective human rights may be 'alien' to traditionalists, but it may be
well suited to protect the collective interests of communities and the
fundamental interests of individuals under contemporary conditions. The
appeal to the value of cultural difference that supports the critique of
imperialism can also support the defence of individual rights against oppressive
communities.
The anti-liberal critique of collective human rights is not, therefore, a
plausible solution to the problem of defending collective and individual
interests. Kymlicka's liberal theory of collective rights has, however, also been
criticized on the ground that its conception of the good life is too narrow. Some
individuals, it is said, may have a conception of the good that requires them to
conform to the norms of communities that do not value autonomy. Liberalism
promotes an adversarial and competitive culture and it is not irrational to
prefer one that is co-operative and solidaristic. Kymlicka requires communities
to respect individual autonomy. On this view liberal societies are justified in
imposing their values on communities that have chosen other values.45
Kukathas, in contrast, argues that liberals should tolerate communities that do
not value autonomy, provided that they recognize a right of exit and certain
basic human rights.46
There are two important issues here. The first concerns the right of exit.
Individuals have the right to leave communities that they find oppressive. The
community certainly has a correlative duty not to use force to prevent an
individual from leaving. It is less clear whether the community may use social
pressure to the same end. There is no general solution to this problem, since
social pressure can vary from allowable friendly persuasion to intolerably
oppressive sanctions. The right of exit may also be nullified by the denial of the
information and skills that are necessary to make such a choice. Communitarians
are likely to emphasize the right of the community to socialize its
members into its values.47Liberals may well hold that education for autonomy
is necessary for an effective right to exit.48Liberal theory generates a dilemma
because it endorses collective and individual rights here that may be mutually
incompatible.
The second issue is that of liberal imperialism. This charge is overstated in
two ways. Firstly, the term 'imperialism' implies the self-interested use of
overwhelming power, which is not typical of human-rights enforcement.
Secondly, supporters of human rights normally seek to defend the weak against
the strong. The charge of unjust domination can therefore be turned back by
liberals against illiberal communitarians.
J5 J. Chaplin, 'How much cultural and religious pluralism can liberalism tolerate?' in J. Horton
46 C. Kukathas. 'Are there any cultural rights'?'.Politicd Theory. 20 (1992), 105-39, pp. 113, 114,
47 C. Kukathas. 'Cultural rights again: a rejoinder to Kymlicka', Politicul Theory, 20 (1992),
48 D. Fitzmaurice, 'Liberal neutrality, traditional minorities and eduction' in Horton, Liberalism.
(ed.), Liberalism, Mul~iculfuralismund Toleration (Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1993), pp. 3946.
116, 120, 122, 124. 128.
674-80, pp. 677-8.
hfulticuliurali.sm and Toleration, pp. 67-8.
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MICHAELFREEMAN 31
It is now commonly suggested that the liberal principle of toleration requires
that conflicts between liberals and illiberal communities should be settled by
dialogue.49However, dialogue is an inadequate solution for two reasons. The
first is that it begs the question of the right to participate in the dialogue. The
second is that, if the community perpetrates serious violations of the rights of
its members, the liberal state should enforce those rights. Anti-imperialist
values cannot plausibly be advanced to defend tyrannical communities. Most
liberals value individual autonomy and cultural pluralism. Individuals may,
however, choose illiberal cultures. The liberal state may intervene in illiberal
communities for the sake of individual rights or tolerate a partly illiberal
pluralism in order to keep the peace between different communal conceptions
of the
Liberals from Locke to the UN have held that respect for rights is conducive
to p e a ~ e . ~ ’Kymlicka, however, objects to the argument that minority rights
should be recognized for the sake of peace on the ground that it sacrifices the
requirements of justice to those of power and would given the fewest rights to
the weakest minorities, who need rights most.52It is surely right to distinguish
between what is required by power and what by justice. However, peace, too,
has a moral value, which derives in part from the fact that human rights are
better protected in peace than in war. The dilemma is that giving priority to
peace can be a thugs’ charter, while giving priority to justice can be utopian.
There are, however, empirical grounds for believing that well-judged collectiverights
policies are conducive to peace.53
The question of collective human rights therefore leads to the familiar
problem of toleration in liberal theory. The problem arises because some,
though not all, versions of liberalism are committed to a pluralism of values
that may conflict with each other.54In particular, liberals may be committed to
some degree of toleration of communities that do not respect autonomy and
human rights. Contemporary liberal theory has not found a coherent
resolution of the dilemma of choosing between liberal imperialism and
illiberal collab~rationism.~~Raz’s value of individual well-being suggests that
toleration should be extended to some forms of life in which autonomy is not
valued and human rights are imperfectly recognized. This is a liberal principle
of toleration because it holds the fundamental interests of individuals to be
ultimate values. But the same values suggest that autonomy and individual
human rights are normally of the first importance and that liberals should have
49 Parekh, ‘Decolonizing liberalism’, p. 103;W. Kymlicka, ‘The rights of minority cultures: reply
to Kukathas’, Political Theory,20 (1992), pp. 143, 145.Kymlicka’s position on the enforcement of
the liberal rights of individuals in illiberal minority communities is ambiguous.At times he favours
judicial enforcement of individual rights, for example to protect women against discrimination:
‘Liberalism, individualism, and minority rights’, pp. 187-8.
Kukathas, ‘Are there are cultural rights?, pp. 112, 117-8; ‘Cultural rights again’, p. 680.
5’ Locke, Second Treatise,para. 224; Thornberry, ‘The UN Declaration’, pp. 25-6, 367; Phillips
52 Kymlicka, Liberalism. Community and Culture, pp. 215-6.
”T. R. Gum, Minorities at Risk: a Global View of Ethnopolifical Conflicts (Washington DC,
s4 G. Crowder, ‘Pluralism and liberalism’, Political Studies, 42 (1994), 293-305; I. Berlin and
ss For a strikingly incoherent attempt to resolve this dilemma by a leading liberal philosopher,
and Rosas, The UN Minority Rights Declaration, p. 123.
United States Institute of Peace Press, 1993).
B. Williams, ‘Pluralism and liberalism: a reply’, Poliiical Studies, 42 (l994), 3069.
see Rawls, ‘The law of peoples’.
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38 Are there collective Human Rights?
the courage to be intolerant of disregard of these values except when such
disregard is necessary to individual well-being.
Conclusions
Collective human rights are rights the bearers of which are collectivities, which
are not reducible to, but are consistent with individual human rights, and the
basic justification of which is the same as the basic justification of individual
human rights. Some human-rights theorists argue either that there are no
collective human rights or that there are collective human rights but all such
rights are derivative from individual human rights. I have argued that there are
non-derivative collective human rights which are justified by the grounding
value of the interest that individuals have in the quality of their own lives.
Dworkin has proposed that the ground of those individual rights that should
‘trump’ ordinary claims of the common good is the right to equal concern and
respect.56I have argued elsewhere that this is the most plausible ground for the
theory of human rights.57I wish now to suggest that the right to equal concern
and respect is itself grounded on the interest every individual has in the quality
of his or her own life. We have seen that the doctrine of human rights and the
associated liberal value of autonomy have been criticized on the ground that
they fail to recognize that individuals can lead worthy lives in societies which
do not recognize the claims of human rights and which do not value
autonomy.58However, such defences of heteronomous forms of life appeal to
principles of concern and respect for persons and of the interest that
individuals have in the quality of their lives which are similar to those that
form the bases both of individual and collective human rights. The principles
that support individual and collective human rights, therefore, make plausible
moral claims both in societies that value autonomy and in those that do not,
and consequently have considerable cross-cultural force.
The conditions under which, and the forms in which collective human rights
should be recognized are, nevertheless, contingent. This is because the
conditions under which the recognition of collective rights is necessary to
protect individuals are contingent. For example, the interests of individual
members of dominant ethnic groups may be adequately protected by their
individual human rights. By contrast, the interests of indigenous peoples or of
immigrant minorities and those of their individual members may require the
protection of collective rights, such as the right to collective cultural goods. The
contingency of collective rights does not, however, distinguish them sharply
from individual human rights. For, on my account, rights protect value-based
interests from threats, and the interests to be protected and the threats from
which they are to be protected must be at least in part subject to contingency.
The right to privacy is a good example of an individual human right, the
precise formulation of which should vary in different circumstances.
Yet collective human rights have important features that distinguish them
from individual human rights. Social collectivities are highly complex, and the
56 R . Dworkin. Taking Rights Seriously (London, Duckworth. 1977), p. xii.
57 M. Freeman, ‘The philosophical foundations of human rights’, Human Rights Quarierly, 16
5B Kukathas, ‘Are there any cultural rights?’; Parekh. ‘Decolonizing liberalism’, p. 101; Turpel,
(I 994). 491-5 14.
‘Aboriginal peoples and the Canadian Charter’, p. 36. footnote 77.
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MICHAELFREEMAN 39
interrelations among collectivities, and between collectivities and individuals,
are consequently also very complex. The practice of proclaiming lists of
individual rights has been criticized for its insensitivity to the fine grain of
social and political life. The project of drafting declarations of collectiverights,
on which the international community is now embarked, has great potential for
conceptual confusion and political danger. The implication of this is not that
the concept of collective human rights should be rejected, but that the
conceptual and practical relations between collective and individual human
rights should be made as clear as possible.
The most difficult problem raised by the concept of collectivehuman rights is
how to reconcile the recognition of such rights with individual human rights
and other individual human interests, such as the interest in autonomy.
Collectivities can violate individual human rights.s9The recognition of a ‘right
to identity’ that is now associated with minority rights in international relations
may be well-intentioned, but is potentially dangerous.60For individuals to lead
good lives in a complex world, a set of rights more sensitive than the crude
‘right of exit’ from oppressive groups is required.61
This problem is related to another, which is the difficulty of identifying the
subject of collective rights. Membership of groups can be fluid and uncertain.
International law has experienced great difficulty in defining ‘minorities’.62
Collective identities can be manipulated and/or coercively imposed, and they
can form the basis of unjust demands. Liberal individualism has often been
characterized as egoistic and collectivism as altruistic. This is quite mistaken,
for individualism can emphasize responsibility as well as rights and collectivism
can be ruthlessly selfish.63Recognition of collective rights may fix collective
identities too rigidly and thus oppressively.64Identity formation is a complex
process, usually involving the interactions of different collectivities and
individuals. Communities and cultures are not static, so that the interplay of
identity, difference and rights should not be arbitrarily terminated for the sake
of some hegemonic interpretation of community.
Collective human rights are, however, not reducible to individual human
rights. The right to collective self-determination is not reducible to any set of
individual human rights, though it may be dependent on and necessary for such
rights.65 Liberal individualism has traditionally failed to recognize its own
59 T. Isaac, ‘Individual versus collective rights: aboriginal people and the significanceof Thomas
v. Norris’, Manitoba Law Journal, 21 (1992), 618-30; S. Poulter, ‘Ethnicminority customs, English
law and human rights’, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 36 (1987), 589-615; Native
Women’s Association of Canada, Press Statement, Native Women, The Charter and the Right to
Self Government (Ottawa, 9 May 1992).
6o Thornberry, ‘The UN Declaration’, pp. 19, 38; Phillips and Rosas, The UN Minority Rights
Declaration, pp. 1245.
61 Waldron, ‘Minority cultures’.
62 Gurr, Minorities At Risk, pp. 10-3; Thornberry, ‘The UN Declaration’, p. 33.
G. Hofstede, ‘Foreword’, in U. Kim et al. (eds), Individualism and Collectivism: Theory,
Method, and Applications (Thousand Oaks CA, Sage, 1994),p.xiii.
64 A. Phillips, ‘Democracy and difference: some problems for feminist theory’, Political
Quarterly, 63 (1992), pp.85, 87; R. G. Wirsing, ‘Dimensions of minority protection’ in R. G.
Wirsing (ed.), Protecfion of Ethnic Minorities: Comparative Perspectives (New York, Pergamon,
65 Julia Tao has suggested that the right to freedom of the press is a collective right that is not
reducible to a set of individual rights: personal communication, 22 September 1994.A similar idea
is expressed in Raz, The Morality of Freedom.
1981),pp. 7-8.
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40 Are there collective Human Rights?
dependence on the assumption that nation-states have collective rights. This
lacuna in liberal-democratic theory is manifested by the problematic status of
indigenous peoples, who are nations trithout states, and who have been
variously conceptualized by liberal states as alien peoples, as minorities with
special rights, and as aggregates of individuals, but rarely with respect for
either their collective values or the rights of their individual members. The
egalitarianism of both the liberal and republican theories of democracy has
also encouraged the neglect or even the oppression of intra-national minority
communities. These problems have now been recognized in international
relations, but international law has so far failed to produce a coherent account
of individual and collective rights.
Collective human rights are necessary in some situations for justice and
peace. There is, however, a tension between these two objectives of collectiverights
policy because the desire for peace may encourage capitulation to
collective demands that are unjust. This problem is, however, only one kind of
manifestation of the general problem that power is often unjust. This problem
lies at the heart of all politics. The theoretical concept of collective human
rights cannot solve the practical problems posed by unjust collectivities. It can,
however, solve an important problem of political theory, and this may have
beneficial practical consequences. Recognition of collective human rights and
the reconciliation of collective with individual human rights blur the distinction
between individualist and collectivist conceptions of rights. This does not
abolish all disagreements of value and policy between individualists and
collectivists, but it does create a 'third space' in which supporters of these two
kinds of value-system can engage in dialogue, and recognizes the value of both
individual autonomy and collective solidarity. The concept of collective human
rights, therefore, helps to reconcile the values of liberal universalism and
cultural pluralism, and thereby provides a theoretical framework for practical
policies that might reconcile justice and peace.