



## Lithuania's foreign policy under Grybauskaite: change or continuity?

Ausra Park & Milda Paulionyte

To cite this article: Ausra Park & Milda Paulionyte (2016): Lithuania's foreign policy under Grybauskaite: change or continuity?, *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*, DOI: [10.1080/14782804.2015.1129941](https://doi.org/10.1080/14782804.2015.1129941)

To link to this article: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14782804.2015.1129941>



Published online: 16 Feb 2016.



Submit your article to this journal [↗](#)



Article views: 13



View related articles [↗](#)



View Crossmark data [↗](#)

## Lithuania's foreign policy under Grybauskaite: change or continuity?

Ausra Park<sup>a</sup> and Milda Paulionyte<sup>b</sup>

<sup>a</sup>Department of Political Science, Siena College, Loudonville, NY, USA; <sup>b</sup>Faculty of Political Science and Diplomacy, Vytautas Magnus University, Kaunas, Lithuania

### ABSTRACT

In 2009, Lithuania's incoming president was signaling that the country's foreign policy priorities were about to change. Under what circumstances and to what extent can a high-ranking political leader change a state's foreign policy singlehandedly? This study, drawing on insights from foreign policy analysis literature, integrates individual decision-makers profiling to offer explanations of initiated changes in Lithuania's foreign policy. We argue that personal preferences, worldviews, and leadership style allowed Grybauskaite to become the main initiator of foreign policy changes, but that personality-driven foreign policy changes were temporary and were eventually subdued by domestic and international structural factors.

### ARTICLE HISTORY

Received 30 November 2014  
Accepted 6 December 2015

### KEYWORDS

Political leadership;  
personality studies;  
Grybauskaite; foreign policy;  
leader-driven change

When the first female President Dalia Grybauskaite won the highest political office in Lithuania in 2009, she signaled that her foreign policy priorities would be different from those of her predecessor, Valdas Adamkus. The new president implied that foreign policy decisions of her administration would be based first and foremost on pragmatism; that Adamkus's 'unbalanced' foreign policy of befriending 'beggars' in Eastern Europe would be re-evaluated; and that Russia-phobic tendencies would be terminated. Such public statements implied that Lithuania's foreign policy was to experience pronounced changes under Grybauskaite. How successful was the new president in implementing such changes that she outlined in 2009? How much of an impact did she personally have in the country's foreign policy given her individual traits and exercised leadership style? Since Grybauskaite won a second presidential term in the summer of 2014, it is worthwhile to critically examine how much change in Lithuania's foreign policy she was actually able to achieve. This paper analyzes Lithuania's foreign policy during Grybauskaite's first term, 2009–2014, particularly focusing on two directions—Western (EU/Transatlantic) and Eastern (Belarus, Russia, and the Black Sea states) using personality trait profiling and an inferential approach that is applied to primary and secondary sources.<sup>1</sup>

The article is divided into three sections: the first one comprises a brief literature review that draws from the foreign policy analysis (FPA) subfield, which provides an incredible richness of works devoted to a study of leaders, particularly within the context of foreign

policy-making and shows significant correlations between an individual leader, his/her personal traits, leadership style, and personality effects on the state's foreign policy behavior. Given the focus of this paper, we situate our analysis on the individual level of analysis. The second section discusses the initiated changes in Lithuania's foreign policy under Grybauskaitė, while integrating explanations from the FPA literature. The last section concludes by summarizing key findings, suggesting that Grybauskaitė succeeded in making *temporary* foreign policy changes to *some degree* in both western and eastern directions based on her personal preferences, leadership style, and worldviews, but that domestic and international structural factors forced her to return to her predecessor's policy that she initially staunchly repudiated. This finding, we claim, is in line with FPA literature inferences, satisfying two necessary conditions needed for foreign policy change to take place: (1) domestic and international environments have to be fluid or ambiguous to permit individual impact and opportunities for a leader-driven change, and (2) a leader needs to be *eager, capable, and desire* to introduce changes based on his/her convictions, experiences, professional expertise/interest in foreign policy, and leadership style (Doeser 2013). We find that both conditions were satisfied and in place during 2009–2013 years of Grybauskaitė's presidency, but it was no longer the case in 2014.

### Theoretical frameworks

The study of leaders and their personality has been a preoccupation of social and behavioral scientists since the 1940s. Literature in this field is so rich that it would be impossible to do justice in reviewing all the works that were published thus far. Hence, this article will draw on scholarship that is most pertinent to answer questions examined here, namely the FPA literature. Until present, the most contentious question debated in FPA is 'When or under what circumstances can we expect leaders to matter?' Several qualifiers need to be satisfied before a personality-focused study is undertaken, and the effect of personality on foreign policy is established (Winter 2003; Breuning 2007; Hudson 2013).

First, certain conditions must prevail to open opportunities for a personal impact. Greenstein (1986) argues that political environments need to be either in a 'precarious equilibrium' or otherwise 'unstable.'<sup>2</sup> Thus, leaders usually leave personal imprints when a state experiences a political regime change; when there is political uncertainty and ambiguity in domestic politics (i.e. new political parties come to power); or when a country faces unusual circumstances such as an international or domestic political and/or economic crises (Hermann 1993; Hermann and Hagan 1998; Park 2010; Doeser 2013). Note that change initiated by a leader in foreign policy may be substantive, meaning, *in kind*, or it can be just *a matter of degrees* (i.e. re-ranking of preferences within a particular direction), if a leader has favorable domestic and/or international environments, which provide 'windows of opportunity' for leader-initiated changes to take place (Hey 2003).

Second, for high-ranking policy-makers to make an impact, it is also important to consider a political actor's hierarchical position in political environment (Hermann 1976; Elcock 2001; Cottam et al. 2004; Hudson 2013). The higher the position an actor holds in political hierarchy, the greater possibility that a personal impact can be achieved, if opportunities are present, and if a leader is willing to push beyond constitutional boundaries given to his/her political position.

The next qualifiers pertain to certain personal characteristics a leader has to have to make an impact. FPA literature suggests that if a leader shows strong interest in foreign policy, has had diplomatic training, has gained expertise in a particular policy/issue area or world region, and exhibits a certain leadership style, then such a leader would matter and should be examined closely when foreign policy is analyzed<sup>3</sup> (Post 2005; Hudson 2013; Hermann 2014). If a leader has no interest or experience in a particular issue area, then it is very likely that s/he will delegate decision-making to subordinates or other agencies, thus having little to no personal impact. If a leader is untrained, then such an individual often tends to rely on personal beliefs and views rather than to subordinate personal preferences and characteristics to a foreign policy situation at hand. Also, if a leader maintains a hands-on leadership style, then we can expect that there will be a '[...] more prominent effect of the leader's personality on decision making' (Hudson 2013, 41).

Leadership style analysis can be comprised of various elements, but generally among the characteristics one finds the following components: (1) individual's perception of his/her role within political environment; (2) strategies used by the leader when dealing with conflict/disagreements and information management and processing; (3) the decision-making style exercised by the leader; and (4) individual trait analysis, which includes the leader's belief in ability to control events, conceptual complexity, need for power, the degree of trust in others, self-confidence, and task orientation (Kaarbo 2001; Hermann 2003; Post 2005).

In the last few decades, another dimension—gender—became an important focus in FPA studies, particularly when female political leaders rose to prominence in their countries. Although there is a growing number of studies on women in power, the most recent research suggests that no direct correlation exists between gender, exhibited leadership style, exercise of political power, and/or policy agenda or choices made by leaders of either sex<sup>4</sup>; rather, more influential factors within a gender dimension appear to be existing social structures<sup>5</sup> and the expectations of society toward gender<sup>6</sup> (Genovese 1993; Hoogensen and Solheim 2006; Steinberg 2008; Campus 2013; Genovese and Steckenrider 2013; Skard 2014).

The next section examines linkages between domestic and international contexts, evaluating how much of the freedom of maneuver was available to Grybauskaite, and how much of a personal impact she had on the country's foreign policy during her first term in office.

### **Establishing linkages: international and domestic environments, leader-driven changes in Lithuanian foreign policy, and the president's personal characteristics**

Local political analysts labeled the 2009 presidential campaign as the most boring one in the 20 years of independent Lithuania, despite the fact that seven candidates ran for the highest office. In the words of a Vilnius University professor, 'The Lithuanian presidential race [resembled] a cemetery: There [was] deadly silence. One [was] walking, respectfully looking at the candidates. The candidates [were] looking at you, too, but nothing [was] happening' (Leka 2009a). Out of seven candidates, three were women, and one of them, Dalia Grybauskaite, was clearly seen as a winner on the day when she officially announced her candidacy for the presidency (Samoskaite 2009a). Two factors in particular contributed to her electoral victory.

First, her open and continuous criticism of the Lithuanian Government's failure to respond to the 2009 global crisis allowed Grybauskaite to establish herself as a household name. Lithuanians believed that she was the only one whom they could trust '[...] to work hard [...] to solve

day-to-day problems' (Leka 2009b). In other words, the electorate saw Grybauskaite as *the* candidate capable of achieving a miracle, especially in the economic crisis (Leka 2009b; Afanasyeva 2011).<sup>7</sup> The population's focus being on competence rather than on gender was also a reason why gender dimension was neither dominant during the 2009 presidential campaign nor captured public attention. In fact, public opinion surveys showed that the majority of Lithuanians (81.2%) would elect a female president, and that the electorate's vote was based on each presidential candidate's *competency* in helping the country to overcome an economic crisis, rather than on the candidates' gender (BNS, March 17, 2009; Samoskaite 2009a).

By emphasizing her extensive financial knowledge, expertise, and economic background as a Minister of Finance (2001–2004) and European Commissioner for Financial Programming and Budget (2004–2009), especially noting her high-ranking position in the EU, Grybauskaite was sending the message that she was both competent and experienced in dealing with problems on a European and global scale and was ready to use her experience in helping Lithuania. 'I want to and I can [help Lithuania]; she announced during presidential campaign (quoted in Leka 2009b). She reiterated to the local electorate that she would help the country to come out of crisis *on its own terms*, which would not under any circumstances be detrimental to the country's national interests, and that she would do her utmost to prevent Lithuania being subjected to external institutional demands (i.e. the IMF).

Arguably, Grybauskaite saw the financial crisis as a unique moment, which was beneficial to her in realizing her political ambitions. 'Each [critical] point in time needs a [suitable] leader. That is why my name is among presidential candidates,' explained Grybauskaite (Leka 2014b). Her strong credentials, financial expertise at the time when the economic crisis became the central issue of the 2009 presidential campaign, and her determination to use all tools, including decrees,<sup>8</sup> to address any major political challenge, allowed Grybauskaite to successfully '[present] herself as a strong president and [she] was dubbed a Thatcher-style "iron lady" by the country's [and foreign] mass media' (Peceliuniene 2009a; Leka 2009c; Krupavicius 2010a). Local political analysts uniformly claimed that her previous experience and authority in the EU Commission became vital factors in her astounding victory; she received 69% of the vote in the very first round.

Domestic political environment was also fortunate for the incoming president: the government that came into power in 2008 was weak, while the parliament was not willing to challenge a highly popular president (Jurkynas 2010; Samoskaite 2010a). Thus, within months of assuming the office, Grybauskaite was successful in removing several high-ranking state officials, including the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, who was, according to the president, conducting his 'own' foreign policy (Laurinavicius 2010; Afanasyeva 2011).

Such presidential actions were signaling that Grybauskaite was setting new rules on how her office would conduct the country's foreign policy. Her activities and hands-on leadership style indicated that she was not inclined to pursue team playing in foreign policy-making because she was determined to decide all foreign policy issues by herself rather than seek advice from, or consult with, other domestic political actors or even her advisory team (Leka 2009d, 2014b; Samoskaite 2009b; Veidas, January 10, 2012). During her first interview with a local newspaper as president elect, Grybauskaite made it clear that 'There won't be important personalities in [my] office. The most important and only person in the presidential office that will matter will be me' (Jakilaitis 2009). Regarding her presidential team she noted that, 'There is too much emphasis put on my [presidential] inner circle. I am an independent person, who has her own views and expertise. It will be extremely difficult to influence me' (Leka 2014b).

Meanwhile, ministers of foreign affairs, who either disagreed or dared to challenge the president's foreign policy prerogatives, were either sidelined by Grybauskaite, or their opinions were ignored, or they were (c)overtly pressured to comply with presidential preferences (Girnius 2013b). Because Grybauskaite was eager to take policy matters, especially in political economic sphere, where she commanded expertise and which was of great personal interest to her, into her own hands, the president did not shy from encroaching on the government's sphere of action and constitutional responsibilities. Indeed, some local analysts even argued that during her first year, the president and prime minister appeared to have exchanged roles as the former was more engaged in solving domestic problems, while the latter traveled abroad representing Lithuania at international forums (Krupavicius 2010b).

Although Grybauskaite's presidency started with rare opportunities, presented by the external crisis and a favorable domestic situation, allowing her to have a personal imprint on the country's foreign policy, nevertheless, she would not have been able to *significantly* alter the country's foreign policy priorities because any initiated changes had to fit within the conceptual guidelines adopted after Lithuania's 2004 accession into NATO and the EU. Actually, in line with predictions from the FPA literature, Grybauskaite did not intend to change the *basic* or core content of the country's foreign policy. However, she seized a chance to distance and differentiate her foreign policy *priorities* from the ones pursued by the former President Adamkus. Specifically, the incoming president proclaimed that she was determined to uproot idealism or value-based ideology from Lithuania's foreign policy, move it from being a 'single-issue' focused state, and use *pragmatism* as the primary benchmark in outlining foreign policy objectives (Baciulis 2010a; ELTA 2010; BNS, July 7, 2011; Park 2015).

Having established linkage between the global financial crisis and a favorable domestic situation, both of which provided a 'window of opportunity' for a president-driven change in the country's foreign policy to occur, the next task is to show links between president's leadership style, personal traits, and foreign policy choices. Research studies in FPA have shown that different individuals, even when facing the same situation, act differently and their goals and choices are not the same (Greenstein 1969). Consequently, the foreign policy goals that Grybauskaite prioritized would not have been identical to those of another presidential candidates since no two people are alike in all personality traits, nor do they have the same experiences, backgrounds, and motives. By applying an integrated political personality framework from the FPA literature (Kaarbo 2001; Hermann 2003; Post 2005), the following Grybauskaite's personality profile emerges to help elucidate her foreign policy preferences.

When her appearances in public and the media became a common occurrence in 2008, Lithuanian electorate found Grybauskaite to be a 'different' type of policy-maker. She was described as an individual who is 'no-nonsense, punctual, resolute, knows what she wants, has her own opinion, speaks very fast, speech very concise, a workaholic, and her work desk is the most orderly desk in the world' (Leka 2009b). On multiple occasions, the president also stated that 'she values *independence* and the freedom to make *independent* decisions *more than anything else*' (emphasis added, Leka 2009b). This particular pronouncement is significant to understand the president's leadership style.

The value of being independent that Grybauskaite personally prizes suggests that she prefers to be a solo rather than a team player and that she strives to be in top decision-making positions where she can acquire freedom to make *independent* decisions. This explains why it was very difficult, even frustrating, for her to come to terms with the fact that Brazauskas' government—a structure based on consensus and teamwork—in which she held the position of



Finance Minister did not follow her exact recommendations and limited her freedom to make independent decisions (Leka 2009b; Sotvariene 2009). Her value of achieving independence is also evidenced, when Grybauskaite was delegated to the EU Commission and ambitiously sought to be in charge of the EU's finance programming and budget (Sotvariene 2009).

FPA research shows that preference for independence and freedom in decision-making directly correlates with such leadership style components as a leader's power motivation, self-confidence, belief in ability to control events, and task orientation. A leader with a high need for power prefers a more hierarchical decision-making process, tends to be involved in policy-making to a greater degree, and often shows concern with personal prestige and authority (Hermann 2003). Grybauskaite's professional career trajectory, her self-perceived superiority and primacy over others that she voiced during interviews and press conferences, and occasional indirect comparisons with Churchill, Indira Ghandi, and Thatcher, indicate that she is an individual who possesses a high power motivation characteristic as well as a high self-confidence trait (Peceliuniene 2009b; Vidunaite 2009). Also significant is that leaders with high self-confidence often trust first and foremost their own judgment more than those of others. Her concern with personal prestige also explains why Grybauskaite does not tolerate nor accept any libel on her personality or the presidential office (Leka 2011, 2014b).

Meanwhile, when leaders tend to be highly proactive in policy-making by taking initiatives and specifying objectives, then it is assumed that they believe in their ability to control events (Hermann 2003). Not surprisingly, her former colleagues described Grybauskaite as a person who believes in action and task orientation rather than in taking a wait-and-see stand (Sotvariene 2009). The remainder of this article focuses on specific foreign policy changes initiated by the president evaluating the extent of her personal impact.

### **Westward-oriented foreign policy: prioritizing the EU and Nordic states, while...**

Some early indicators of a 'new' foreign policy that Grybauskaite intended to pursue were her statements made when she held the position of the European Commissioner for Financial Programming and Budget. While in Brussels, she criticized Adamkus's choices of partner countries. According to her, while Lithuania was befriending and supporting 'beggars,'<sup>9</sup> it had hostile and confrontational relations with key states in the EU, which led to Lithuania being perceived as a 'troublemaker' and a single-focus country (Veidas, March 3, 2011; Vilpisauskas 2013). Grybauskaite's statements implied that Adamkus's foreign policy too actively supported and promoted interests of the Black Sea region countries, while the country's relations with the EU were limited and formal. To *adjust* foreign policy, according to Grybauskaite, the country had to move to 'a multi-vector foreign policy [...] by paying more attention to Europe, especially Northern Europe [...]' (BNS, July 7, 2011). Some even claimed that by altering Adamkus' foreign policy priorities, Grybauskaite was reviving the early 1990s foreign policy pursued by Landsbergis (Baciulis 2010a).

Her initial rhetoric suggested that Grybauskaite intended on making the EU and the Nordic orientation the cornerstone of Lithuania's foreign policy (Veidas, April 17, 2010). She signaled that her highest priority was to develop closer ties with France and Germany—the two states that shape and define the EU agenda—in order to increase Lithuania's political weight and visibility in the EU. This goal, according to Grybauskaite, was to be achieved by signing strategic partnership treaties with as many EU countries as possible rather than just

concentrating on the immediate neighborhood, particularly on Poland (Volovoj 2009). Thus, after inauguration, instead of going to Poland for her first official state visit—a tradition that was established and followed by all presidents since 1994, when the two neighboring states signed Friendly Relations and Good Neighborly Cooperation Treaty and engulfed on closer collaboration resulting in a strategic partnership (Park and Salmon 1999)—she chose to go to Sweden. This was an open diplomatic signal that northern direction will be given higher priority by the new president.

By breaking path and distancing from the traditional foreign policy partnership Lithuania had with Poland until that point, Grybauskaitė's actions implied that her presidency would not be bound by established conventional practices, that it would be independent, and that previous practices of affiliation between Lithuania and Poland were not to the president's personal liking. She was, and still is, unwilling to pursue a close personal relationship with her Polish counterparts and has recently stated that '[Lithuania] will not sell [itself] to Poland]' and that 'friendship will not be bought [at any price]' (Leka 2009b; Bruveris 2014). Additionally, her forceful leadership style leaves little possibility that Grybauskaitė would be inclined to share a spotlight on the international stage with anybody, including, but not limited to, counterparts of the neighboring Baltic countries and Poland (Leka 2009b; Bruveris 2014). Such instances suggest that the president prefers *primus inter pares* situations, when she launches certain initiatives, but then also takes full credit for achieving the goals.

In pursuit of her highest priority to develop closer ties with two of the most important states in the EU, less than three months into her presidency, Grybauskaitė achieved her first major foreign policy victory by signing a strategic partnership treaty with France. It is somewhat unclear what motivated France to sign this strategic treaty with Lithuania given that both countries have no close historical ties, tight collaboration, or common interests that complement each country's political, economic, or military strengths. Furthermore, Grybauskaitė's high hopes for this strategic partnership treaty were significantly dampened when France reached a deal to sell Russia four Mistral warships. Given the absence of common goals between the two states, it is not surprising that six years later realistic benefits of this treaty for both states are hard to identify.<sup>10</sup>

One of her presidency's biggest political disappointments is the elusiveness of a strategic partnership with Germany. Although Grybauskaitė decided to restrain discontent and criticism that had been voiced by her predecessor at the Russo-German *Nord Stream* pipeline project, these actions did not result in intensified talks with Berlin on a strategic partnership treaty. Germany's lack of interest in such a treaty did not discourage Grybauskaitė in her foreign policy ambitions. When a strategic investor for a new nuclear power plant construction in Lithuania withdrew, she directly asked Chancellor Merkel whether or not German investors might be interested in this project (POPR, September 6, 2010). With little political encouragement shown by the Chancellor's office, no German investors expressed any interest in the project. Disappointed, but determined to persevere despite such setbacks, Grybauskaitė eventually decided to resort to a forthright political rhetoric. In 2011 and, again, in 2013, Grybauskaitė confidently called Germany Lithuania's strategic partner, as if 'forgetting' the fact that the two states do not have such treaty (POPR, May 17, 2011).

Given Grybauskaitė's background and work at the European Commission some analysts claimed that Grybauskaitė was a project of 'Europoids', and, therefore, she was bound to be an advocate of Euro-centric foreign policies (Dvorak 2012). Her active engagement in the EU, particularly voicing her convictions as to how the EU should resolve the ongoing



financial crisis, and the president's continuous efforts to establish a tighter collaboration with the Scandinavian states, lends support to her personal prioritization of the EU in the country's foreign policy to a much greater degree and intensity than was the case under her predecessor (Gudavicius 2010). Additionally, it was an equally fortunate circumstance that Lithuania happened to hold the Presidency of the Council of the EU in the second part of 2013 and that the tasks identified by Lithuania primarily concerned economic and financial sectors. Because of her background and expertise in finance and economics, Grybauskaite not only had a personal advantage over all the other domestic actors in directing debates and conducting negotiations with the EU member states, but also successfully maneuvered to assure that her office was given exclusive credit for the work done. For her achievements in promoting 'Europe as a work of peace' and for her contributions to the EU, Grybauskaite was awarded the International Charlemagne Prize in May 2013—another acknowledgment of the president's EU-focused foreign policies.

### **... distancing from the US?**

During her inaugural address to the Parliament, the president urged to move away from 'a single vector [meaning US-oriented] foreign policy' (Grybauskaite 2009; *BNS*, July 7, 2011). She emphasized that representation and defense of her country's national interests in any organization or policy was not a foreign policy formulation based on personal ambitions—and that it would never be the case—but rather a view that foreign policy should be a natural extension of domestic politics and of public interests, and therefore reflect national priorities first and foremost (Volovoj 2009; *ELTA* 2010; Grybauskaite 2011). Grybauskaite became the first president to openly state and assert that Lithuania's foreign policy would not depend on, reflect, be held 'hostage' to, or be dictated by, the interests of other countries (allegedly, the US) or organizations (supposedly, NATO) (*BNS*, September 21, 2010).

Such open and, arguably, undiplomatic pronouncements by the president signaled to the US and NATO that a staunchly pro-US and pro-NATO foreign policy orientation instituted by the previous president would no longer hold. Grybauskaite was signaling in no ambivalent terms that during her presidency she would represent only the interests of Lithuania, abandoning the advocate–lobbyist role of US interests that Lithuania supposedly assumed until that point (Bagdonas 2010). At the same time, however, the president also sought to assure that she would not change Lithuania's commitments to Euro-Atlantic organizations and that the country would continue to participate in international missions. Such a pledge was supposed to serve as an assurance to NATO and the US that Lithuania would honor and uphold its commitments (*ELTA* 2010).

Indeed, Grybauskaite did not immediately act on her personal preferences to downgrade Lithuanian–US ties. She supported American-led programs when those initiatives were in line with her pragmatism-benchmarked preferences. For instance, Lithuania's head of state supported a US initiative on promotion of women's rights and gender equality worldwide, seeking to show that Lithuania was focusing not only on security, but was also interested in social justice issues. Similarly, Grybauskaite expressed her intentions to maintain NATO's open-door policy and participate in activities that addressed energy security/independence and cyber security issues, items that coincided with president's personal policy priorities (POPR, October 12, 2010).

However, Lithuania's relations with the US and NATO began to deteriorate within a year. Despite her short experience studying and working at the Lithuanian embassy in the US,

the expectation that the president would maintain close relationship with the US did not come to fruition. Two events in particular exemplify this.

In 2010 the US and Russia began discussing the new START agreement that provoked intense debates worldwide, with especially heated discussions erupting inside the post-communist states' political circles. The Lithuanian president also expressed her views by criticizing the agreement and arguing that it would have a negative impact on the country's security; she called for its rejection (*BNS*, September 5, 2010).

Arguably, Grybauskaite's personal preference for pragmatism and high self-confidence in understanding world affairs played a role at this juncture. Obama's geostrategic shift of US foreign policy from traditionally Europe toward Asia-focused and, of particular importance to the post-communist states, his administration's intention to 'reset' relations with Russia, signaled to Grybauskaite that Obama not only pursued new priorities, but had also downgraded the interests of small countries, 'including those of Lithuania' (*BNS*, September 5, 2010). Hence, as a leader who was determined to defend her country's interests, Grybauskaite voiced her disapproval. Surprisingly, however, shortly after calling to reject the treaty, the president changed her position, claiming that US.–Russian partnership initiatives would not negatively impact Lithuania's security (*POPR*, November 20, 2010).

Such contradictory pronouncements by Grybauskaite can be explained using leader's personality profiling. First, she lacks diplomatic training—as one political analyst observed about her background, she is a 'good technocrat, but not a skilled politician' (Leka 2009b). Despite her work at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, she is not considered to be a person with endowed diplomatic skills; and her duties at the ministry were almost exclusively in an economic rather than a political sphere. Hence, she lacks political acumen and expertise in international relations (*Veidas*, June 29, 2011).

Furthermore, because of her high self-confidence trait and hands-on leadership style, Grybauskaite is not inclined to delegate decision-making to anybody, treats her team of advisors as information collectors, and vets all choices, even in areas where she lacks expertise (Leka 2009b, 2014b; *Veidas*, January 10, 2012). As a result of expressing her opinions without deeper consultation with her staff because she trusts her own judgment, Grybauskaite is prone to make costly diplomatic blunders.

Once the new strategic arms reduction treaty between the US and Russia was signed, President Obama organized a dinner with Central and Eastern European heads of state in Prague in 2010 to ease their concerns. Policy analysts from international and local media were shocked to learn that Lithuania's president declined a personal invitation from Obama to participate in the meeting and sent the prime minister instead. Indeed, Grybauskaite was the only invitee who refused to meet with Obama (Tracevskis 2010).

The avalanche of criticisms unleashed by such a presidential decision blaming her for the gross political misstep and shortsightedness was unprecedented. Even the international media thought that such behavior '[c]oming from a country roughly one-hundredth America's size, [...] showed a startling self-confidence, even by Lithuanian standards' (*Economist*, April 9, 2010). Actually, it was not a country, but rather Grybauskaite who was showing personal high self-confidence and resoluteness in her own judgment of evaluating the situation at hand. As a person who is achievement- and task-oriented, she saw no tangible outcomes that such a meeting would produce, and, therefore, estimated it to be pointless.

Once criticism subsided many local political analysts seemed to concur that Grybauskaite's move signaled that Lithuania's 'loyalty to the US [is] being substituted with loyalty to Brussels'

(Baciulis 2010b; Veidas, April 17, 2010). International media also agreed with such evaluations. 'The days of instinctive Atlanticism in the region are over, as Ms. Grybauskaite's haughty stance—which would once have been inconceivable—demonstrates' (*Economist*, April 9, 2010). At the end of 2010, Grybauskaite was also 'honored' by *The Economist* with 'The Foot In Mouth' award for exercising superciliousness in foreign affairs.

By 2011, it seemed that tense relations would go from bad to worse as Grybauskaite showed no signs of toning down her harsh rhetoric toward the Obama administration and NATO. She insisted that a NATO defense plan for Poland must include the three Baltic States (*ELTA* 2010). Grybauskaite argued that the absence of such defense plans for new NATO members implied that Art. 5 could not be implemented in reality and that newly acceded states only had formal rather than full-fledged membership in the alliance. 'Yes, you have to be a strict and loud partner if you want to be heard in the conversation,' Grybauskaite told the Associated Press in a 2011 interview. 'Lithuania is not used to a straightforward, terse, forceful way of making statements. I admit using *this style* in pushing NATO defense plans for the Baltic States' (emphasis added).

Her insistence that the alliance moves beyond 'discussion club organization' and reforms itself into 'an organization that can provide its member states with real security guarantees in military, political, and economic spheres' was successful. This occurrence was also revealing Grybauskaite's espoused pragmatism as she was allegedly defending the country's national interests and '[coping] with unfavorable processes related to the [American-Russian] "reset"' (Afanasyeva 2011). US cables released by WikiLeaks showed that NATO decided to provide defense plans for the Baltic States. Grybauskaite personally credited herself for this achievement. 'I am afraid that if I had chosen a *different tone*, Lithuania and its neighbors would be still waiting another six years for these [plans]' (emphasis added, Myhre 2012).

In 2011, when President Obama invited the same 11 post-communist states' leaders for a dinner in Poland, Grybauskaite accepted the invitation, and, for at least a few months, tried to refrain from new critical statements toward the US, showing 'a more conciliatory and diplomatic style' (Myhre 2012). But her assertive leadership style and stern rhetoric toward the Obama administration reemerged in 2012 and 2013. When participating in the 2012 NATO summit in Chicago, Grybauskaite again tensed relations with the US by claiming that President Obama changed his position regarding the NATO anti-missile defense system and even America's relations with Russia thanks to her influence. 'The result of *my* efforts was that the United States and President Obama *personally* are very clearly formulating and very clearly supporting our [Lithuania's] opinion on anti-missile defense, air policing, and energy security,' Grybauskaite announced (emphasis added; quoted in Dapkus 2012).

Not only did such Grybauskaite's high self-confidence anger the White House, but it also suggested that Lithuania's president overestimated the extent to which she could influence great power politics (*ELTA* 2013). In 2013, she self-confidently claimed that the US was paying more attention to a new geopolitical orientation, namely the Nordic and Baltic countries; her assertion was immediately disputed by local political analysts as unsubstantiated and not reflecting global realities (*ELTA* 2013).

Given the pattern that has been established during 2009–2013 period, it was doubtful that Grybauskaite would change her leadership style, rhetoric, views, or personal preferences about the US and NATO or that US–Lithuania relationship would become cordial any time soon. She was firm in her belief that she had 'liberated' Lithuania from a 'hostage' status of the US and that under her leadership bilateral relationship was at last grounded on tangible benefits (Cyvas 2010; Damosiute 2012).

However, when crisis erupted in Ukraine, suddenly altering geopolitical realities in Europe, Grybauskaitė was forced to reevaluate and *readjust* her policy priorities and her ‘anti-American’ predisposition (Leka 2014a; Samoskaitė 2015). She came to realize that without US support or its visible military presence in the region, Lithuania would not be able to withstand Russia’s economic or military threat (ELTA 2014). In fact, not only did Grybauskaitė change her position ‘360 degrees’ on defense spending, pressuring ‘the cabinet of ministers into boosting defense spending by 130 million litas’ and ‘[threatening] that she would not confirm two ministers, if the ruling coalition did not keep the promise to spend more money on defense’, but she also supported the reintroduction of a military draft; she also turned into a staunch critic of Russia and President Putin (Lapėniene 2014). Thus, changes in international context made Grybauskaitė change the perception of her role within a global political environment, which, in turn, altered her policies toward the US and made them closer to those that were pursued by her predecessor.

### **Eastward-oriented foreign policy: elevating the importance of Belarus and Russia, but ...**

Although Lithuania’s policies toward the East and the Black Sea region were not altered immediately, it was clear that development of pragmatic relations and achievement of tangible results with Russia was of the utmost importance for Grybauskaitė. She was determined to change the tone of her country’s foreign policy toward former Soviet republics, particularly by relinquishing, as she put it, the ‘hysterical anti-Russian rhetoric’ and possibly ‘Schroederizing’ it (Girnius 2009; Lucas 2009; Kahkinen 2009). The general public seemed to have a positive evaluation of Grybauskaitė’s intentions to normalize the country’s relations with its largest neighbor Russia given international and domestic economic realities at the time (Veidas, January 24, 2011). The president also insisted on policy changes toward neighboring Belarus, arguing that a long-lasting isolation of that state was not productive and that Lithuania was missing out on important economic opportunities because of a previous policy of non-engagement.

Grybauskaitė produced the first major political earthquake in the first months of her presidency, when she initiated a ‘thaw’ by inviting and hosting Belorussian President Lukashenka in Vilnius in September of 2009. She explained her efforts for relaxing bilateral relations as part of the EU’s campaign to promote democratization of Belarus with an open dialog. According to her, only intensive cooperation, rather than isolation and sanctions, would ‘[...] build a true democratic security community without dividing lines’ (Grybauskaitė 2010). She described Lukashenka’s visit to Vilnius as a new beginning in the bilateral EU/Lithuania–Belarus relations and assured that Lithuania was eager to represent Belorussian interests in the EU *to the extent that Belarus allowed* (POPR, October 20, 2010). This covert, yet nuanced, message sent to Belarus signaled that leadership in Minsk was free to choose which path—eastern or western—it wanted to follow. By replacing value-based foreign policy—accept democracy or suffer isolation and sanctions—and by suggesting that she would represent Belorussian interests in the EU to the extent that Belarus wanted Lithuania to do so, Grybauskaitė positioned herself in a win–win situation and with self-confidence took control over the initiative. On the one hand, if Belarus were to democratize, she could take full credit for the ‘thaw’ that she initiated. On the other hand, if Belarus was not to pursue democratization, Grybauskaitė could justify such a ‘failure’ with a ‘Belarus-did-not-allow-it-to-happen’ rationalization. Thus, the president was introducing a new foreign policy position

that Lithuania was taking toward Belarus and was also assuming that, in case circumstances demanded, she would have enough space for political maneuvering.

A year later after Lukashenka's visit in Lithuania, Grybauskaite paid an official visit to Belarus. The timing of her trip was significant—it was less than a month before the October 2010 presidential election was held in Belarus. But it was one of Grybauskaite's observations communicated to EU diplomats that resulted in another political scandal. Apparently, she voiced an opinion that 'a victory by Mr. Lukashenka would safeguard [Belarus] stability and limit Russian influence' (*Economist*, December 2, 2010). In essence, this evaluation alluded that Lukashenka was not only a guarantor of country's economic and political stability, but also of the country's independence. Not surprisingly, once such an assessment became public, it was interpreted as the Lithuanian President's indirect meddling into the internal affairs of the country. Furthermore, since Grybauskaite traveled to Belarus in the capacity of a EU representative, her pronouncement produced a certain ambiguity potentially stipulating that the EU was supporting Lukashenka's regime. When Belorussian opposition expressed outrage, Grybauskaite retracted her comments by saying that only Byelorussians know which leader would serve their country best and, that no matter who got elected, the international community would respect Byelorussians' choice (*BNS*, November 22, 2010).

Unfortunately for Grybauskaite, her new initiatives toward Belarus did not bring the expected benefits. When brutal force was unleashed against the opposition after the 2010 presidential elections, she was quick to note that if elections were fair and legitimate, there would be no need to use force. Lithuanian president and diplomats appealed to the EU to refrain from imposing sanctions on Belarus and only target high-level Belorussian officials (POPR, January 10, 2011). The EU eventually agreed to sanction only Belorussian government officials rather than target all citizens. Nonetheless, the unfortunate aftermath of Byelorussian presidential elections produced the political stalemate between the two states that continues to the present, while Grybauskaite's personal ambition to achieve change in the country's foreign policy toward Belarus came to naught.

Lithuanian–Russian relations also experienced sudden changes after Grybauskaite assumed presidency. On 18 August 2009, she unexpectedly called the then President Medvedev to discuss the difficulties Lithuanian carriers and dairy export companies were encountering in Russia. By observing that 'misunderstandings between institutions is detrimental for both Lithuania and Russia [...] that there is enough potential between our countries for development of economic relations', (sic) Grybauskaite suggested to address 'all problems [...] by way of an open dialogue' (*BNS*, August 18, 2009a). Both presidents apparently agreed that economic relations should not be politicized and impeded, and that Lithuanian businesses in Russia should operate on the same terms as domestic businesses. More significantly, however, is that her personal initiative broke an eight-year long impasse between the two states (*BNS*, August 18, 2009b).

Grybauskaite's determination to reshape Lithuania–Russia relations could be explained using leadership style and personality traits profiling. Given her preference for concrete results and task orientation, she saw the need for Lithuania and Russia to support mutually beneficial economic relations, especially in light of the unfolding global economic crisis at the time. The president was willing and eager to take advantage of an opportunity to achieve *pragmatic* results. Furthermore, the area of concern between the two states was economic, which is in the sphere of Grybauskaite's expertise. Additionally, because of her hands-on

leadership style, Grybauskaite took a personal initiative to call the Russian president rather than rely on the country's diplomatic corps to initiate a breakthrough (Denisenko 2009).

The president's power motivation and concern with her prestige and image, both internationally, but especially domestically, elicited criticism. Some diplomats, under condition of anonymity, claimed that:

sometimes we find that the president uses foreign policy as an opportunity to gather bonus points by publicly appearing with some important foreign dignitary and then forgets about everything else until a new occasion arises. For instance, when it became clear that [Grybauskaite] would not be able to meet with [former president] Dmitry Medvedev, country's relations with Russia were suddenly "forgotten," even if Grybauskaite assigned entire credit exclusively to herself for initiating a thaw in bilateral relations in 2010. (quoted in Baciulis 2011b)

While at the beginning of her first term Grybauskaite sought rapprochement to resolve long-standing disagreements without pressuring Moscow to democratize, the Euro-Maidan crisis, Russia's takeover of the Crimea, and its ongoing meddling in eastern Ukraine had fundamentally altered her position toward Moscow. Within months, Grybauskaite took a much harder stand on Russia, describing Moscow's actions as reminiscent of cold war mongering and urged tougher sanctions by the EU. She also decided to terminate efforts for a constructive dialog with Moscow's leadership, choosing to adopt the 'new cold warrior' image and role instead. The Lithuanian president not only announced that Russia had characteristics of a 'terrorist state' given the tactics it utilized to fight covert war in Ukraine, but she also resorted to a provocative language by comparing Russian President Putin to Stalin and Hitler (Sabet-Parry 2014; Martyn-Hemphill 2015).

Subsequently, Russia's intimidation of its neighbors—regular violation of their airspace, maritime borders, and/or informational defamation campaigns—forced Grybauskaite to resort to even harsher criticism of Russia. At the end of 2014, she remarked that Russia's regular violations of Lithuania's airspace would not be viewed as the Kremlin's showing-off of power, but rather an example of Russia's 'foolish,' 'irresponsible behavior' (quoted in *BNS*, December 2, 2014). She even suggested that Europe maybe on the verge of a new cold war and, potentially, facing a civilizational clash (*BNS*, September 24, 2014; Cerniauskas 2014).

Due to her 'insolent and cynic' public pronouncements not only Grybauskaite became one of Putin's 'solitary foe's' (Martyn-Hemphill 2015), but she also enraged the Communist Party fraction in the Russian Duma, which suggested discussing the possibility of sanctions against, and even termination of diplomatic relations with, Lithuania (*Delfi*, November 21, 2014). Thus, the two states are finding themselves in the same stalemate situation when Grybauskaite assumed presidency in 2009 and the president pursuing her predecessor's anti-Russian policy.

### **... (temporarily?) distancing from the Black Sea region states**

Since 2009, one of Grybauskaite's foreign policy priorities in the eastern direction was improvement of the country's relations with Russia, and it could be expected that Lithuania's support for Ukraine and Georgia would be altered for several reasons. There are obvious geopolitical constraints. First, Russia objects to the inclusion of the Black Sea states into Western organizations, especially NATO. Second, the EU is not prioritizing the Black Sea states' inclusion into the EU, if this will lead to the deterioration of its relations with Russia. Given Grybauskaite's prioritization of the EU in the country's foreign policy, the degree of support



shown toward Ukraine and Georgia had to decrease to reflect the general position of the EU that Lithuania sought to emulate under her leadership. She also tried to avoid any unilateral initiatives that would not be coordinated or in line with the interests of EU 'heavyweights' (Kojala and Ivanauskas 2014).

There are also leader's personality characteristics at play. Even if it was undiplomatic of Grybauskaite to refer to the Black Sea states as 'beggars', her public pronouncements were a reflection of the president's personal foreign policy priorities. She perceived the then existing relationships between Lithuania and Georgia and Ukraine as irrational, idealistic, and unrealistic (Volovoj 2009; Afanasyeva 2011). Her adherence to pragmatism and task orientation dictated that it was too idealistic to expect that Lithuania could successfully lead the Black Sea states toward membership in the EU and NATO; unquestionably, Vilnius had neither financial and human resources, nor political weight to achieve such resource intensive and ambitious foreign policy goals. Therefore, the country's foreign policy in the eastward direction had, in Grybauskaite's view, to be adjusted in order to reflect realistic and practically achievable objectives, rather than be built on personal ties and presidential 'shows' (Afanasyeva 2011). Grybauskaite signaled that she personally did not perceive the Black Sea region to be a priority for Lithuania's foreign policy and was unwilling to spend her political capital because of little expected payoff.

When Lithuania assumed the OSCE chairmanship in 2011, Grybauskaite began implementing her pragmatism-based foreign policy toward the Eastern Partnership (EP) countries. While on a visit to the South Caucasus region, she urged states to start a dialog on unresolved conflicts and to discuss opportunities for mutual economic cooperation and business. It was clear that such encouragements signaled the beginning of Lithuania's withdrawal from the active role it used to play in the region. Grybauskaite knew well that conflict resolution proved impossible to achieve for nearly 20 years, and that her encouragements would not lead to a sudden breakthrough. Additionally, she reiterated that the Black Sea countries needed to reform not only for the sake of membership in the EU and NATO, but also for their own benefit. These presidential pronouncements suggested that Lithuania would no longer actively promote the need for democratization and reforms, but rather lead an advisor-at-a-distance role, essentially delegating entire responsibility for the achieved progress (or lack thereof) on the countries themselves. For instance, Georgia was not offered any new political enticements, but was merely encouraged to use Lithuania's expertise in EU integration (Afanasyeva 2011).

Meanwhile, beyond officially expressed formal support for Ukraine's democratization, Grybauskaite showed little interest in developing new bilateral projects beyond those launched by her predecessor or in establishing personal relationships with Ukrainian leaders. Realizing that she cannot control events nor achieve concrete results with Ukraine (or Georgia)—after all, the democratization process takes a long time and is not a tangible goal *per se*—and being aware that other high-ranking policy-makers<sup>11</sup> were already engaged in Ukraine's democratization, Grybauskaite trusted her own judgment that personal investment was not worthwhile. That is why during her meetings with the former Ukrainian President, she repeated that only Ukraine could decide its own future and how determined it was to become a member of the EU (POPR, June 2, 2013).

Although the Lithuanian president had different foreign policy preferences toward the Black Sea states since 2009, a major shift occurred in 2013, when Lithuania assumed the Presidency of the Council of the EU and declared EP one of presidency's key priorities. If

Association Agreements (AA) with the EP countries were to be achieved, the Lithuanian president and country's diplomats had to show greater activism and involvement in the region. But since these states were not ranking high on Grybauskaite's foreign policy agenda, and for four years she exercised a rather 'modest' involvement with the 'beggars', the chances of achieving this particular goal were small (Baciulis 2011a).

Grybauskaite's role in, and impact on, Lithuania's EU Council presidency received controversial evaluations. On the one hand, local analysts praised the successful carrying out of the country's first EU Presidency, suggesting that Ukraine's unwillingness to sign AA in Vilnius was not due to Lithuania's fault, but rather due to the former Ukrainian president's suspension of preparations to sign the agreement as a result of pressure he experienced from Russia (BNS, November 29, 2013; Jurkynas and Dauksaite 2014). On the other hand, some EU parliament members and Russian political analysts provided different evaluations, blaming Grybauskaite personally, her leadership style, and her personal agenda for an unsuccessful outcome (Ponomareva and Shishelina 2014). The Lithuanian president was accused of using the EU Presidency for personal gain and prestige, specifically for 'her presidential PR campaign', 'as a chance to return to Brussels [to become a] new Head of the European Commission, as well an opportunity to strengthen own electoral and inner-elites position inside of her country', and for intimidating her Ukrainian counterpart by publicly presenting him 'an ultimatum [...]: either association and free trade area with EU, or accession to Customs Union of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan' (Ponomareva and Shishelina 2014, 6, 31, 34).

Second, Russia's escalating aggression in Ukraine not only changed the security environment in Eastern Europe, but also, according to Grybauskaite, 'have become a real threat on the continent of Europe', that is why 'the words freedom, independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and peace have taken on a new value' (Grybauskaite 2014). In light of new geopolitical realities, Grybauskaite not only abandoned the EU–Russia dialog, but also EP issues.

Looking retrospectively, consensus has yet to emerge in evaluating Grybauskaite's foreign policy in the East and toward the Black Sea states. Some analysts argue that from the beginning of her first term there was little noticeable change under Grybauskaite—or rather that change was more rhetorical and declarative in nature rather than actual (Baciulis 2011a); others claim that change was noticeable, and Grybauskaite's personal impact is significant when events in 2013 forced her to return to her predecessor's value-based foreign policy (Kojala and Ivanauskas 2014). As for her own evaluation, Grybauskaite remained true to her 2009 worldview: according to her 'the old conception [referring to EP states and the Black Sea region] is outdated and eastern neighbors are nothing but a millstone, which stops Lithuania's progress towards the Nordic countries' (quoted in Bruveris 2014).

## **Conclusion: Grybauskaite's personal impact on the country's foreign policy**

The global financial crisis, which was the unusual circumstance, and a fluid domestic environment opened unique 'windows of opportunity' for Grybauskaite to leave a personal impact on the country's foreign policy. Lithuania's first female president was willing and capable to exploit these opportunities to her advantage because she had determination, the 'right' personality traits, and leadership style: she is a person driven by ambition to achieve tangible and pragmatic results; she exercises a hands-on leadership style that builds on straightforwardness and decisiveness; she is resolute, ambitious, has high self-confidence and belief in

ability to control events; and she is a leader, who is establishing and tweaking her own rules of the game, if opportunities present themselves (Leka 2009b; Peceliuniene 2009b; Vidunaite 2009; Krupavicius 2010b). This article argued that it would be shortsighted to deny the president's impact on the country's foreign affairs or to claim that anybody else in this position would have given preference to, and decided in, the similar manner as Grybauskaite did.

During 2009–2013, she re-ranked Lithuania's foreign policy goals to reflect new principles based on her perceptions of the world: first and foremost, defense of *national* interests in western institutions (the EU and, especially NATO) and only then promote democracy in the post-Soviet space. Characteristic of a strong-willed personality and in her aspiration to live up to a Baltic 'Iron Lady' name, Grybauskaite saw it as a mandatory task to change idealistic, value-based foreign policy and inject pragmatism in it.

In the westward foreign policy orientation, she prioritized relations with the EU and Nordic states, while downplaying the country's relations with the US, especially until the 2014 Ukrainian crisis, which altered her preferences. Grybauskaite's professional background and work in European administrative structures had unquestionably influenced her views and preferences. She ranked signing of strategic partnership treaties with the influential EU member states as one of the highest foreign policy priorities for Lithuania. Another instance that evidences her re-ranking of Lithuania's foreign policy priorities is the president's unwillingness to continue a close bilateral cooperation and friendship with Poland, giving preference to Scandinavian states. 'Lithuania [...] is a modern Northern state' she pronounced to the country's ambassadors (quoted in Bruveris 2014) and reiterated that under her leadership Lithuania's foreign policy 'has been *always* oriented toward the West *and* North. Therefore, the trend should continue. We see common interests with the major European countries, such as Germany or France. [...] We do not have such intensive contacts as with the Nordic countries with any other region' (emphasis added; quoted in Petrauskaite 2014).

Grybauskaite's personal imprint is visible in the country's relations with the US and NATO. She used stern rhetoric and even an aggressive leadership style to achieve NATO's defense plans for Lithuania, while straining relations with the Obama administration. These foreign policy priorities that she advocated for corresponded to and mirrored her perceptions of the world and her expertise in a technical rather than a diplomatic sphere. She was not only determined to defend her country's national interests in NATO, but she was equally resolute in renouncing as quickly as possible the advocate–lobbyist role Lithuania played on behalf of the US in promoting democracy to the East. Her high self-confidence and task orientation keeps Grybauskaite firm in her resolve that she is representing not a small state, but an equal partner state in Lithuania's relations with the US or NATO. Arguably, her personality traits and leadership style has allowed Grybauskaite to overcome the small country stigma, as she proved by declining President Obama's invitation to meet in Prague in 2010 and in response to a 'reset' in US–Russian relations (Samoskaite 2010b).

Grybauskaite's personal impact on foreign policy is equally noticeable in the eastward orientation. At the beginning of her first term, she intended to discard her predecessor's perception that Lithuania's foreign policy had to be based on core values of freedom, democracy, and solidarity, and that these values had to be promoted in democratizing countries to bring stability in the East. According to Grybauskaite, foreign policy had to reflect realistic goals and what Lithuania could rather than what it thought or imagined to achieve in foreign affairs. Hence, she initiated her own 'reset' of Lithuania's foreign policy priorities toward the East (Veidas, February 11, 2014). During 2009–2013 period, rather than focusing exclusively

on the Black Sea region as her predecessor did, she prioritized improvement and tightening of relations with Russia and Belarus, assuming that these actions would bring more tangible benefits to Lithuania, especially in economics and the energy sector.

Unfortunately, her policies toward Russia and, particularly, Belarus, when she became viewed as a pro-Belarusian and pro-Lukashenko supporter in the EU, did not produce any concrete changes in bilateral relationships, even if Grybauskaitė claimed to have pursued what is best for the country's national interests (Labanauskas 2014a). On the contrary, Grybauskaitė's foreign policy missteps with Belarus created a reputation of Lithuania being an 'unpredictable country' with erratic behavior (*BNS*, January 16, 2011).

The changing security environment in Europe, specifically the crisis in Ukraine, forced Grybauskaitė to take a critical stand toward Moscow and, once again, adjust the country's foreign policy priorities. She decided to adopt a 'new warrior' image, using language reminiscent of the Cold War years toward Russia (a 'terrorist state'), its leadership (Putin is like Stalin or Hitler) and Russia's relations with the West (the world may be facing a 'clash of civilizations') in public and diplomatic venues. Her 'no-nonsense' and 'resoluteness' traits also dictated the need for practical steps and tangible outcomes (Leka 2009b); hence, she firmly supported the reinstatement of a military draft in Lithuania and insisted that the government increased defense spending.

Although she is not showing much personal interest nor had launched any significant initiatives to have Lithuania more involved in helping Ukraine, Georgia, or Moldova in their pursuit of the EU membership during the 2009–2013 period, her efforts, albeit unclear whether for personal gain and prestige or not, during Lithuania's EU Council Presidency were intense as she sought to have AA signed between the EU and EP states (*BNS*, November 29, 2013). However, this goal was not achieved.

Overall, although her personal impact is unquestionable as evidenced by re-prioritization and re-ranking of Lithuania's foreign policy goals announced in 2009, it seems that Grybauskaitė continues to struggle with the question—*quo vadis*, Lithuania? (Baciulis 2009; Zibas 2010; Veidas, June 29, 2011; Labanauskas 2014b). Finding an answer to this question may become an important personal goal for Grybauskaitė during her second term in office. She has shown that she is a daring, independent president, who treasures and seeks to maintain her active, tough personal image and reacts to a constantly changing geopolitical situation, adjusting her foreign policy priorities.

The changes she has made thus far receive poor evaluations from political analysts, who claim that the country's foreign policy during Grybauskaitė's first term is characterized by inconsistency, rhetorical, and declarative statements, and that her ambitions are 'pushing Lithuania into margins of international politics' (Baciulis 2011a; Leka 2011; Dapkus 2012). Some political analysts also suggested that she was not a visionary as there were no grand, new ideas presented in foreign policy (Girnius 2013a). Hence, Grybauskaitė may be the best president Lithuania has had so far, but whether she will succeed in becoming a 'path breaking' president under whose leadership Lithuania identifies its new foreign policy mission remains to be seen.

## Notes

1. There is limited biographical information available about Grybauskaitė beyond basic life events that were officially released in 2009. 'I will not talk about my personal life' is a standard reply

Grybauskaite gives to the media inquiring about her past (quoted in Sotvariene 2009). There is no autobiography published as of 2015.

2. Numerous FPA case studies have established that a high-ranking political leader (i.e. president, prime minister, and foreign minister) impacts the state's foreign policy or introduces changes primarily in an unstable environment such as during the time of major international or domestic crises, political regime change, or when precarious political uncertainty and ambiguity prevails. Refer to Hermann (1976, 1978, 1984, 2014), Barber (1985), Glad (1989), Neack, Hey, and Haney (1995), Elcock (2001), Post (2004), Breuning (2007), Dyson (2009), Yang (2010) and Doeser (2013).
3. The list of leader's characteristics varies depending on the depth and complexity of the analysis undertaken. For instance, Hermann's (1993, 1978, 1976) examination of world leaders relied on seven characteristics—the need for power, the need for affiliation, the level of cognitive complexity, the degree of trust in others, nationalism, the belief of how much one can control events, and task orientation—that can influence the state's foreign policy behaviors if domestic and international contexts permit. Her most recent study (Hermann 2014) suggests that five personal characteristics (individual's beliefs about politics and worldviews; leadership style; motivation for seeking political positions; reactions to stress; and significant background factors) are the most important to know about a leader in order to understand why she/he acts in a particular way or why she/he makes certain policy choices.
4. We thank one of the reviewers for this pertinent observation.
5. Referring to the extent a patriarchal value system dominates in a country and society.
6. Meaning acceptance of women in leadership positions.
7. Note that the president in Lithuania is in charge of foreign policy rather than the country's economic performance, which is the domain of the prime minister.
8. Initial pronouncements Grybauskaite made that she might 'rule' by decrees gave enough reason to some local political analysts to claim that Lithuania's new president had authoritarian inclinations and that, if she wanted, she could insist on increasing presidential office powers given the nearly 90% public approval rating she enjoyed at the beginning of her first term (Kvedaras 2009; Laucius 2009).
9. Referring to Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova.
10. During a visit to France, Grybauskaite announced that bilateral cooperation in 'energy, defense, business, and cultural spheres' is 'intense', but failed to provide concrete examples to support her claims (POPR, July 2, 2013).
11. Namely, former Swedish Prime Minister Bildt and former Polish Foreign Minister Sikorski.

## Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

## References

- Afanasyeva, G. 2011. "Dalia Grybauskaite: Drive by the Rules...." *AmberBridge International Magazine*, No. 2. Accessed June 3, 2015. <http://www.amberbridge.org/article?id=104&lang=eng>
- Baciulis, A. 2009. "D. Grybauskaites zadetas perversmas uzsienio politikoje neivyko." *Veidas*, December 28.
- Baciulis, A. 2010a. "Lietuva adamkine užsienio politiką keičia į landsberginę." *Veidas*, March 22. Accessed June 18, 2012. <http://www.veidas.lt/lietuva-adamkine-uzsienio-politika-keicia-i-landsbergine>
- Baciulis, A. 2010b. "Vaziuoti i Praha D.Grybauskaitei 'zemas lygis'?" *Veidas*, April 6. Accessed June 18, 2012. <http://www.veidas.lt/vaziuoti-i-praha-d-grybauskaitei-zemas-lygis>
- Baciulis, A. 2011a. "Lietuva netapo abejinga 'ubagams'." *Veidas*, February 28.
- Baciulis, A. 2011b. "Uzsienio politika prezidentei mazai rupi." *Veidas*, June 27.
- Bagdonas, A. 2010. "Lietuvos užsienio politika—nuo proamerikietiškos iki...." Accessed February 10, 2010. <http://www.delfi.lt/news/ringas/lit/abagdonas-lietuvos-uzsienio-politika-nuo-proamerikietiskos-iki.d?id=28814185>





- Denisenko, V. 2009. "Lietuva ir *real politique*." Accessed June 24, 2011. <http://www.geopolitika.lt/?artc=3615>
- Doeser, F. 2013. "Leader-Driven Foreign Policy Change: Denmark and the Persian Gulf War." *International Political Science Review* 34 (5): 582–597.
- Dvorak, J. 2012. "Prezidentė." *Journal of Baltic Studies* 43 (2): 305–308.
- Dyson, S. B. 2009. "Cognitive Style and Foreign Policy: Margaret Thatcher's Black-and-White Thinking." *International Political Science Review* 30 (1): 33–48.
- The Economist*, April 9, 2010. Accessed June 1, 2014. <http://www.economist.com/node/15879417>
- The Economist*, December 2, 2010. Accessed February 2, 2011. [www.economist.com/node/17632929?story\\_id=17632929](http://www.economist.com/node/17632929?story_id=17632929)
- Elcock, H. 2001. *Political Leadership*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
- ELTA. 2010. "D. Grybauskaitė: uzsienio politika - vidaus politikos atspindys." June 10. Accessed June 23, 2010. <http://www.delfi.lt/archive/article.php?id=33495585>
- ELTA. 2013. "Politologai ir Lietuvos prezidentė skirtingai vertina JAV uzsienio politika." August 31. Accessed August 31, 2013. <http://www.delfi.lt/news/daily/lithuania/politologai-ir-lietuvos-prezidente-skirtingai-vertina-jav-uzsienio-politika.d?id=62207263>
- ELTA (Lithuanian News Agency). 2014. "D. Grybauskaitė ivertino susitikimą su B. Obama: paprasme ir gavome." June 3. Accessed June 16, 2014. <http://www.delfi.lt/news/daily/lithuania/d-grybauskaitė-ivertino-susitikimą-su-b-obama-paprasme-ir-gavome.d?id=64955759>
- Genovese, M. A. 1993. *Women as National Leaders: The Political Performance of Women as Heads of Government*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
- Genovese, M. A., and J. S. Steckenrider. 2013. *Women as Political Leaders: Studies in Gender and Governing*. New York: Routledge.
- Girnius, K. 2009. "100 Grybauskaitės dienų: yra kuo džiaugtis." Accessed July 17, 2015. <http://www.alfa.lt/straipsnis/10295328/100-grybauskaitės-dienų-yra-kuo-džiaugtis>
- Girnius, K. 2013a. "Opinion: Four Years of Presidency." Accessed July 17, 2013. <http://en.delfi.lt/45103/opinion-four-years-of-presidency-201345103/>
- Girnius, K. 2013b. "Opinion: Who Determines Foreign Policy?" Accessed April 7, 2013. <http://en.delfi.lt/33494/opinion-who-determines-foreign-policy-201333494/>
- Glad, B. 1989. "Personality, Political and Group Process Variables in Foreign Policy Decision-Making: Jimmy Carter's Handling of the Iranian Hostage Crisis." *International Political Science Review* 10 (1): 35–61.
- Greenstein, F. I. 1969. *Personality and Politics: Problems of Evidence, Inference, and Conceptualization*. Chicago, IL: Markham.
- Greenstein, F. I. 1986. "Personality and Politics." In *Political Leadership: A Source Book*, edited by B. Kellerman, 36–48. Pittsburg, CA: University of Pittsburg Press.
- Grybauskaitė, D. 2009. "Inaugural Address at the Seimas on July 12." Accessed June 9, 2013. [www.prezidentas.lt/lt/prezidento\\_veikla/kalbos/lietuvos\\_respublikos\\_prezidentes\\_dalios\\_grybauskaites\\_inauguracijos\\_kalba\\_pasakyta\\_iskilmingame\\_seimo\\_posedyje.html](http://www.prezidentas.lt/lt/prezidento_veikla/kalbos/lietuvos_respublikos_prezidentes_dalios_grybauskaites_inauguracijos_kalba_pasakyta_iskilmingame_seimo_posedyje.html)
- Grybauskaitė, D. 2010. "Remarks at OSCE Summit in Astana on December 2." Accessed June 27, 2013. [www.president.lt/lt/prezidento\\_veikla/kalbos/lietuvos\\_respublikos\\_prezidentes\\_dalios\\_grybauskaites\\_kalba\\_europos\\_saugumo\\_ir\\_bendradarbiavimo\\_organizacijos\\_esbo\\_virsuniu\\_susitikime\\_astanoje.html?backlink=%252Ft%252Fpaieska%252Fresults%252Fp0.html](http://www.president.lt/lt/prezidento_veikla/kalbos/lietuvos_respublikos_prezidentes_dalios_grybauskaites_kalba_europos_saugumo_ir_bendradarbiavimo_organizacijos_esbo_virsuniu_susitikime_astanoje.html?backlink=%252Ft%252Fpaieska%252Fresults%252Fp0.html)
- Grybauskaitė, D. 2011. "Priorities." Accessed April 4, 2011. [www.president.lt/lt/prezidento\\_institucija\\_prezidente\\_dalia\\_grybauskaitė/prioritetai.html](http://www.president.lt/lt/prezidento_institucija_prezidente_dalia_grybauskaitė/prioritetai.html)
- Grybauskaitė, D. 2014. *State of the Nation Address*. Accessed July 17, 2014. <https://www.lrp.lt/en/speeches/state-of-the-nation-address/-2014/20827>
- Gudavicius, S. 2010. "A. Azubalis: Prezidentė daugiau demesio skiria Europai, o ne JAV." Accessed May 8, 2011. [www.diena.lt/naujienos/lietuva/a-azubalis-prezidente-daugiau-demesio-skiria-europai-o-ne-jav-interviu-301437](http://www.diena.lt/naujienos/lietuva/a-azubalis-prezidente-daugiau-demesio-skiria-europai-o-ne-jav-interviu-301437)
- Hermann, M. G. 1976. "When Leader Personality Will Affect Foreign Policy: Some Propositions." In *In Search of Global Patterns*, edited by J. N. Rosenau, 326–333. New York: Free Press.
- Hermann, M. G. 1978. "Effects of Personal Characteristics of Political Leaders on Foreign Policy." In *Why Nations Act: Theoretical Perspectives of Comparative Foreign Policy Studies*, edited by M. A. East, S. A. Salmore, and C. F. Hermann, 49–68. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.

- Hermann, M. G. 1984. "Personality and Foreign Policy Decision-Making: A Study of 53 Heads of Government." In *Foreign Policy Decision Making*, edited by D. A. Sylvan and S. Chan, 53–80. New York: Praeger.
- Hermann, M. G. 1993. "Leaders and Foreign Policy Decision Making." In *Diplomacy, Force, and Leadership: Essays in Honor of Alexander George*, edited by D. Caldwell and T. McKeown, 77–94. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Hermann, M. G. 2003. "Assessing Leadership Style: Trait Analysis." In *The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders*, edited by J. M. Post, 178–212. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Hermann, M. G. 2014. "Political Psychology." In *The Oxford Handbook of Political Leadership*, edited by R. A. W. Rhodes and Paul 't Hart, 117–131. Oxford: OUP.
- Hermann, M. G., and J. D. Hagan. 1998. "International Decision-Making: Leadership Matters." *Foreign Policy* 110: 124–137.
- Hey, J. A. K., ed. 2003. *Small States in World Politic*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
- Hoogensen, G., and B. O. Solheim. 2006. *Women in Power: World Leaders since 1960*. Westport, CT: Praeger.
- Hudson, Valerie M. 2013. *Foreign Policy Analysis: Classic and Contemporary Theory*. Latham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
- Jakilaitis, E. 2009. "D.Grybauskaitė ispejo: visi privales keistis." *Lietuvos rytas*, May 19.
- Jurkynas, M. 2010. "Has Lithuanian Foreign Policy Become Personalised?" *Diplomaatia*, 80, April. Accessed October 8, 2014. <http://www.diplomaatia.ee/en/article/has-lithuanian-foreign-policy-become-personalised/>
- Jurkynas, M., and J. Dauksaitė. 2014. "A Feather in its Cap? The Lithuanian Presidency of the Council of the EU in 2013." *Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review* 31: 11–36.
- Kaarbo, J. 2001. "Linking Leadership Style to Policy: How Prime Ministers Influence the Decision-Making Process." In *Profiling Political Leaders: Cross-Cultural Studies in Personality and Behavior*, edited by O. Feldman and L. O. Valenty, 81–96. Westport, CT: Praeger.
- Kahkinen, V. 2009. "Ponia likimas ir jos skestanti karalyste." Accessed May 12, 2011. [www.president.lt/lt/prezidento\\_veikla/prezidente\\_ziniasklaidoje/interviu\\_385/2009\\_m.\\_spalio\\_8\\_d.\\_prezidentes\\_d.\\_grybauskaites\\_interviu\\_suomijos\\_dienrasciui\\_helsingin\\_sanomat.html](http://www.president.lt/lt/prezidento_veikla/prezidente_ziniasklaidoje/interviu_385/2009_m._spalio_8_d._prezidentes_d._grybauskaites_interviu_suomijos_dienrasciui_helsingin_sanomat.html)
- Kojala, L., and V. Ivanauskas. 2014. "Lithuanian Eastern Policy 2004–2014: The Role Theory Approach." *Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review* 32: 49–72.
- Krupavicius, A. 2010a. "Lithuania." *European Journal of Political Research* 49: 1058–1075.
- Krupavicius, A. 2010b. "Pirmieji prezidentavimo metai - ilgas medaus mėnuo." *Lietuvos rytas*, July 10. Accessed July 10, 2010. <http://www.lrytas.lt/-12787761001276906174-politologas-a-krupavicius-pirmieji-prezidentavimo-metai-ilgas-medaus-menau.htm>
- Kvedaras, V. 2009. "Prezidentė su įvaizdžio pančiais." *Lietuvos rytas*, May 25. Accessed July 10, 2015. <http://www.lrytas.lt/-12432012241241183453-prezidentė-su-įvaizdžio-pančiais.htm>
- Labanauskas, E. 2014a. "Antrosios kadencijos užsienio politika." *Veidas*, July 11. Accessed July 10, 2015. <http://www.veidas.lt/antrosios-kadencijos-uzsienio-politika>
- Labanauskas, E. 2014b. "Lietuvos kryptys." *Veidas*, July 11. Accessed July 10, 2015. <http://www.veidas.lt/lietuvos-kryptys>
- Lapėnienė, J. 2014. "K. Girnius: dėl gynybos finansavimo prezidentės pozicija pakito 360 procentu." Accessed March 30, 2014. <http://www.delfi.lt/news/daily/lithuania/k-girnius-del-gynybos-finansavimo-prezidentes-pozicija-visiskai-apsiverte.d?id=64404456>
- Laucius, V. 2009. "D.Grybauskaitė gali padidinti prezidento galias." Accessed July 10, 2015. <http://www.delfi.lt/news/ringas/lit/vlaucius-dgrybauskaitė-gali-padidinti-prezidento-galias.d?id=24896691>
- Laurinavicius, M. 2010. "Ambicijų karas tesiasi: D.Grybauskaitė palaidojo 'V.Usacką'." Accessed June 16, 2010. <http://www.lrytas.lt/-12766753441275895881-m-laurinaviciaus-blogas-ambiciju-karas-tesiasi-d-grybauskaitė-palaidojo-v-usacką.htm>
- Leka, A. 2009a. "Prezidento rinkimai Lietuvoje: dar vienas laidotuviu requiem partinei systemai." *Veidas*, May 11.
- Leka, A. 2009b. "Belaukiant stebuklo—Dalia Grybauskaitė." *Veidas*, July 6.
- Leka, A. 2009c. "Valstybė—D.Grybauskaitės kumštyje." *Veidas*, August 10.
- Leka, A. 2009d. "Simtas Dalios Grybauskaitės dienu: kuo mitas skiriasi nuo tikroves." *Veidas*, October 12.
- Leka, A. 2011. "Meile prezidentams—akla." *Veidas*, July 11.

- Leka, A. 2014a. "Prezidentė: "Turiu atsižvelgti ir į geopolitinę situaciją." *Veidas*, December 30. Accessed June 16, 2015. <http://www.veidas.lt/prezidente-„turiu-atsizvelgti-ir-i-geopolitine-situacija>"
- Leka, A. 2014b. "Kokio prezidento siandien esame verti." *Veidas*, May 20.
- Lucas, E. 2009. "The Fall and Rise and Fall Again of the Baltic States." *Foreign Policy*, June 21. Accessed July 21, 2009. <http://foreignpolicy.com/2009/06/21/the-fall-and-rise-and-fall-again-of-the-baltic-states/>
- Martyn-Hemphill, R. 2015. "The Baltic 'Iron Lady': Putin's Solitary Foe." Accessed on July 14, 2015. <http://www.politico.eu/article/the-baltic-iron-lady-putins-solitary-foe-dalia-grybauskaite/>
- Myhre, A. 2012. "The Complicated Obama-Grybauskaite Relationship." Accessed June 25, 2013. <http://vilnews.com/2012-11-the-complicated-obama-grybauskaite-relationship-2>
- Neack, L., J. A. K. Hey, and P. J. Haney, eds. 1995. *Foreign Policy Analysis: Continuity and Change in Its Second Generation*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
- Park, A. 2010. "The End of the Lithuanian Political "Patriarch's" Era." *Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization* 18 (2): 160–181.
- Park, A. 2015. "Post-Communist Leadership: A Case Study of Lithuania's 'White House' (1993–2014)." *Demokratizatsiya* 23 (2): 151–180.
- Park, A., and T. C. Salmon. 1999. "Evolving Lithuanian Security Options in the Context of NATO, WEU and EU Responses." *European Security* 8 (2): 103–129.
- Peceliuniene, L. 2009a. "Dekretais valdyti valstybės D.Grybauskaitei nepavyks." Accessed May 26, 2009. <http://www.delfi.lt/news/daily/lithuania/dekretais-valdyti-valstybes-dgrybauskaitei-nepavyks.d?id=22349823>
- Peceliuniene, L. 2009b. "Prezidentei koja kisa arogancija." *Valstiečių laikraštis*, August 12. Accessed June 29, 2015. <http://www.delfi.lt/archive/article.php?id=23533757>
- Petrauskaite, Z. 2014. "D. Grybauskaitė: Lietuva turi kuo didžiulis." *Kauno diena*, March 10. Accessed July 22, 2015. <http://kauno.diena.lt/naujienos/lietuva/politika/d-grybauskaite-lietuva-turi-kuo-didziulis-619370>
- Ponomareva, Y., and L. Shishelina. 2014. *Latvia's EU Presidency in 2015: Eastern Partnership—Instead or With Russia*. Moscow: Russian Political Science Association.
- POPR, September 6, 2010. Accessed May 2, 2013. [www.president.lt/lt/spaudos\\_centras\\_392/pranesimai\\_spaudai/lietuva\\_ir\\_vokietija\\_vienija\\_efektyvi\\_partneryste\\_es\\_ir\\_bendri\\_interesai\\_regione.html](http://www.president.lt/lt/spaudos_centras_392/pranesimai_spaudai/lietuva_ir_vokietija_vienija_efektyvi_partneryste_es_ir_bendri_interesai_regione.html)
- POPR, October 12, 2010. Accessed April 7, 2011. [www.president.lt/lt/spaudos\\_centras\\_392/pranesimai\\_spaudai/valstybes\\_gynimo\\_taryba\\_patvirtino\\_lietuvos\\_pozicijas\\_del\\_naujos\\_nato\\_koncepcijos.html](http://www.president.lt/lt/spaudos_centras_392/pranesimai_spaudai/valstybes_gynimo_taryba_patvirtino_lietuvos_pozicijas_del_naujos_nato_koncepcijos.html)
- POPR, October 20, 2010. Accessed February 2, 2011. [www.president.lt/lt/spaudos\\_centras\\_392/pranesimai\\_spaudai/lietuvos\\_ir\\_baltarusijos\\_zmonems\\_atsiveria\\_naujos\\_galimybes.html](http://www.president.lt/lt/spaudos_centras_392/pranesimai_spaudai/lietuvos_ir_baltarusijos_zmonems_atsiveria_naujos_galimybes.html)
- POPR, November 20, 2010. Accessed April 7, 2011. [www.president.lt/lt/spaudos\\_centras\\_392/pranesimai\\_spaudai/prezidente\\_nato\\_bendradarbiavimas\\_su\\_rusija\\_bus\\_naudingas\\_ir\\_lietuvai.html](http://www.president.lt/lt/spaudos_centras_392/pranesimai_spaudai/prezidente_nato_bendradarbiavimas_su_rusija_bus_naudingas_ir_lietuvai.html)
- POPR, January 10, 2011. Accessed February 2, 2011. [www.president.lt/lt/spaudos\\_centras\\_392/pranesimai\\_spaudai/palengvintas\\_vizu\\_rezimas\\_baltarusijos\\_pilieciams\\_paskatins\\_demokratinis\\_procesus\\_sioje\\_salyje.html](http://www.president.lt/lt/spaudos_centras_392/pranesimai_spaudai/palengvintas_vizu_rezimas_baltarusijos_pilieciams_paskatins_demokratinis_procesus_sioje_salyje.html)
- POPR, May 17, 2011. Accessed May 20, 2011. [www.president.lt/lt/spaudoscentras\\_392/pranesimai\\_spaudai/vokietijos\\_vaidmuo\\_yra\\_itin\\_svarbus\\_pletojant\\_es\\_energetika.html](http://www.president.lt/lt/spaudoscentras_392/pranesimai_spaudai/vokietijos_vaidmuo_yra_itin_svarbus_pletojant_es_energetika.html)
- POPR, Presidential Office press release, June 2, 2013. Accessed June 17, 2013. [www.president.lt/lt/spaudos\\_centras\\_392/pranesimai\\_spaudai/europine\\_ateitis\\_pacios\\_ukrainos\\_rankose.html?backlink=%252Flt%252Fpaieska%252Fresults%252Fp0.html](http://www.president.lt/lt/spaudos_centras_392/pranesimai_spaudai/europine_ateitis_pacios_ukrainos_rankose.html?backlink=%252Flt%252Fpaieska%252Fresults%252Fp0.html)
- POPR, July 2, 2013. Accessed July 3, 2013. [www.president.lt/lt/spaudos\\_centras\\_392/pranesimai\\_spaudai/prancuzija\\_strategine\\_lietuvos\\_partnere.html](http://www.president.lt/lt/spaudos_centras_392/pranesimai_spaudai/prancuzija_strategine_lietuvos_partnere.html)
- Post, J. M. 2004. *Leaders and Their Followers in a Dangerous World*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Post, J. M. 2005. "Assessing Leaders at a Distance: The Political Personality Profile." In *The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders*, edited by J. M. Post, 69–104. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Sabet-Parry, R. 2014. "Lithuania President Calls Russia 'terrorist state'." *The Baltic Times*, November 20. Accessed July 20, 2015. <http://www.baltictimes.com/news/articles/35799/>

- Samoskaite, E. 2009a. "Apklausa: Lietuva pasirengusi turėti prezidentę moterį." Accessed March 26, 2009. <http://www.delfi.lt/archive/article.php?id=21020735>
- Samoskaite, E. 2009b. "Politologai: D.Grybauskaitės komanda nebus stiprus jos užnugaris." Accessed July 5, 2009. <http://www.delfi.lt/news/daily/lithuania/politologai-dgrybauskaites-komanda-nebus-stiprus-jos-uznugaris.d?id=22941974>
- Samoskaite, E. 2010a. "Gyventojams patinka D.Grybauskaitės 'galvų kapojimo' metodika." Accessed July 14, 2010. <http://www.delfi.lt/news/daily/lithuania/gyventojams-patinka-dgrybauskaites-galvu-kapojimo-metodika.d?id=34472225>
- Samoskaite, E. 2010b. "D.Grybauskaitė: Vyriausybė per daug įsitikinusi savo teismumu." Accessed July 12, 2010. <http://www.delfi.lt/news/daily/lithuania/dgrybauskaite-vyriausybe-per-daug-isitikinusi-savo-teisumu-atnaujinta.d?id=34398625>
- Samoskaite, E. 2015. "Kodėl taip pasikeitė D.Grybauskaitė." Accessed January 6, 2015. <http://www.delfi.lt/news/daily/lithuania/kodel-taip-pasikeite-d-grybauskaite.d?id=66777372>
- Skard, T. 2014. *Women of Power: Half a Century of Female Presidents and Prime Ministers Worldwide*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Sotvariene, R. 2009. "Lietuva jau pasirinko: šali gelbės moteris." *Lietuvos rytas*, May 18.
- Steinberg, B. S. 2008. *Women in Power: The Personalities and Leadership Styles of Indira Gandhi, Golda Meir, and Margaret Thatcher*. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press.
- Tracevskis, R. M. 2010. "Grybauskaitė rejects Obama's invitation." *The Baltic Times*, April 7. Accessed July 11, 2013. [www.baltictimes.com/news/articles/25473/](http://www.baltictimes.com/news/articles/25473/)
- Veidas, April 17, 2010. "Istikimybė Vasingtonui keičia istikimybę Briuseliui." Accessed June 12, 2015. <http://www.veidas.lt/istikimybė-vasingtonui-keičia-istikimybę-briuseliui>
- Veidas, January 24, 2011. "Lietuvos užsienio politika vertinama vidutiniškai." Accessed June 18, 2012. <http://www.veidas.lt/lietuvos-uzsienio-politika-vertinama-vidutiniskai>
- Veidas, March 3, 2011. "Lietuva netapo abejinga 'ubagams'." Accessed June 12, 2015. <http://www.veidas.lt/lietuva-netapo-abejinga-ubagams>
- Veidas, June 29, 2011. "Užsienio politika prezidentei mazai rūpi." Accessed June 1, 2015. <http://www.veidas.lt/uzsienio-politika-prezidentei-mazai-rupi>
- Veidas, January 10, 2012. "Dalia Grybauskaitė, neperkandama politikos vienišę." Accessed June 18, 2012. <http://www.veidas.lt/dalia-grybauskaite-neperkandama-politikos-vienise>
- Veidas, February 11, 2014. "Sutarti su kaimynais—Lietuvai vis dar išsukis." Accessed June 18, 2015. <http://www.veidas.lt/sutarti-su-kaimynais---lietuvai-vis-dar-issukis>
- Vidunaite, M. 2009. "Prezidentei D.Grybauskaitėi reikės išmokti nuolankumo." Accessed July 30, 2009. <http://www.delfi.lt/news/ringas/lit/mvidunaite-prezidentei-dgrybauskaitei-reikes-ismokti-nuolankumo.d?id=23344961>
- Vilpisauskas, R. 2013. "Lithuanian Foreign Policy since EU Accession. Torn between History and Interdependence." In *The New Member States and the European Union: Foreign Policy and Europeanization*, edited by M. Baun and D. Marek, 127–141. New York, NY: Routledge.
- Volovoj, V. 2009. "D.Grybauskaitė ir naujoji Lietuvos užsienio politika." Accessed June 24, 2011. <http://www.geopolitika.lt/?artc=3230>
- Winter, D. G. 2003. "Personality and Political Behavior." In *The Oxford Handbook of Political Leadership*, edited by D. O. Sears, L. Huddy, and R. Jervis, 110–145. Oxford: OUP.
- Yang, Y. E. 2010. "Leaders' Conceptual Complexity and Foreign Policy Change: Comparing the Bill Clinton and George W. Bush Foreign Policies toward China." *The Chinese Journal of International Politics* 3 (4): 415–446.
- Zibas, A. 2010. "Sunki lyderystės nasta (apie tai, kaip V.Adamkaus niekinimu bandoma pateisinti keistus D.Grybauskaitės politinius viržus ir nusisnekėjimus)." *Lietuvos rytas*, October 6. January 16, 2011. <http://www.lrytas.lt/-12862810071284502444-sunki-lyderystės-našta-apie-tai-kaip-v-adamkaus-niekinimu-bandoma-pateisinti-keistus-d-grybauskaitės-politinius-viržus-ir-nusišnekėjimus.htm>