DOI: 10.1080/1461669032000127642 353
European Societies
5(4) 2003: 353–375
© 2003
Taylor & Francis Ltd
ISSN
1461-6696 print
1469-8307 online
VARIETIES OF FAMILIALISM
The caring function of the family in comparative
perspective
Sigrid Leitner
Department of Social Policy, University of Goettingen
1 Introduction: a two-fold starting point
This article ties up to two fields of comparative social policy research: the
area of family policy and the tradition of comparing welfare states in terms
of typologies. In 1978, Sheila B. Kamerman and Alfred J. Kahn published
their seminal work on family policy in fourteen countries. Since then,
comparative literature on family policy has developed rapidly, especially
within the last decade.1 Overall, the heterogeneity of research designs in
the field is striking. Such a ‘pluralism’ owes much to diverging definitions
of family policy. This article focuses on one specific function family policy
might be aiming at: the caring function of the family, and it will mainly
deal with policies which are directed towards supporting the family in its
caring function.
ABSTRACT: This article focuses on the caring function of the family in child
care and elderly care and follows a comparative as well as a gender
perspective. It aims at developing a gender-sensitive theoretical concept of
familialism which allows to identify real world variations of familialism. Four
ideal types of familialism are distinguished and care policies in the EU
member states are classified according to them. It can be shown that
countries cluster differently for different care policies. In addition, structural
gender effects of the four ideal types of familialism are reflected upon. The
empirical analysis of paid parental leave in nine EU member states gives an
example of gendered and de-gendered variants of familialism.
Key words: family policy; child care; elderly care; gender; welfare state
typology
1. For an overview of comparative research on family policies in Europe see Kaufmann
(2002: 439–44).
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Choosing the caring function of the family as subject connects the field
of family policy with the paper’s second research context: welfare state
typologies. In 1999, Gøsta Esping-Andersen published a revision of his
influential welfare state typology that distinguished ‘three worlds of
welfare capitalism’ (Esping-Andersen 1990). One of the main innovations
in the new book was the conceptualization of the social policy function of
the family. Esping-Andersen identifies familialistic and de-familializing
welfare regimes with regard to the extent to which families are held
responsible for their members’ welfare. The article draws from this
distinction but argues that familialism should be defined in more detail. I
suggest to use public policies which explicitly support the family in its
caring function as an indicator for familialism and to emphasize the
gender perspective of family policy. The overall aim is to develop a
gender-sensitive theoretical concept of familialism which allows to
identify real world variations of familialism. Thus, the article can be
understood as a critical statement to Esping-Andersen’s typology of
welfare regimes.
Section 2 will show that the caring function of the family has recently
become prominent in social policy. While the need for care is rising, the
availability of formal care provision as well as the reliability of family care
is increasingly questioned. This leaves social policy with the problem of
unmet care needs. Especially in times with tight social budgets, it seems
to be a reasonable strategy for welfare states to strengthen the family in
its basic caring role. The extent to which the caring function of the family
is promoted determines whether a welfare regime is conceptualized as a
familialistic or a de-familializing system. Section 3 of the paper identifies
four types of policies according to the provision of care for the young, the
disabled and the elderly: a de-familializing type, an implicitly familialistic,
an explicitly familialistic, and an optionally familialistic type. It, secondly,
focuses on an empirical analysis of two different fields of care policy: child
care and elderly care. The EU member states’ policies are compared and
classified according to the four types of familialism. It will be shown that
countries cluster differently for different care policies. Thereafter, in
Section 4, it will be elaborated how familialisms differ according to their
dimension of gender (in)equality. A gendered model of familialism which
is connected to the male breadwinner/female homemaker ideology and a
de-gendered model of familialism which enables gender equality in the
field of family care can be distinguished. Taking paid parental leave in nine
European countries as an example, gender-sensitive criteria will be developed
to engender familialism. The paper concludes with some reflections
on the perspectives which the varieties of familialism offer for further
research.
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2 The caring function of the family
With the development of the male breadwinner model and its structural
embodiment in most welfare states after the Second World War,2 a family
care regime was institutionalized that enabled (and at the same time
envisioned) women to care for children, the aged and the handicapped at
home (cf. Knijn/Kremer 1997: 329). With the increasing labour market
attachment of women, the family’s caring responsibility has come under
pressure, especially in the field of child care. The employment rates of
mothers with a child under 6 are rising rapidly:
While the employment rate of mothers is much lower than that for fathers
(54%, on average for the countries shown, as compared with well over 90%
for fathers), the gap has been closing quite rapidly, at around one percentage
point per year over the past decade.
(OECD 2001: 133)
Combining employment and child care is difficult given nuclear family
structures with both parents employed (at least part time) and inflexible
working conditions. The mismatch between both ‘worlds’, family and
employment, generates a need for support with regard to child care.
Consequently, parents can be supported by institutional child care provision
and/or by work-related policies that ‘enable them to care for their
young children without losing complete contact with the labour market’
(OECD 1995: 171). As a matter of fact, the old male breadwinner model
which guaranteed the availability of the female family carer is no longer
fitting the employment pattern of women nor the preferences of families
for dual earner models (cf. OECD 2001: 135).
If we look at the care provided for the elderly throughout Europe, the
family is usually the primary care provider (cf. Helmer 1993: 442). But the
need for elderly care is rising due to population ageing. Especially the 80+
population with its high disability rate is growing considerably (OECD
1996: 15). Today, a great deal of family care is provided by elderly wives
and husbands, but there is a growth in the proportion of elderly people
living alone, among whom are many of the very oldest. Alternatively,
family care is provided by female relatives in the 45–64 age group. Unfortunately,
‘the ratio of women in middle age to more elderly people has
shrunk considerably and will continue to do so’ (OECD 1996: 19).
Whether future care needs can be met by family care thus depends on the
availability of family carers in younger age groups. Those potential
informal care givers will be confronted with the problem of combining
work and care giving, especially if the rising labour market participation
2. For variations of the breadwinner model in Europe see Lewis and Ostner (1995).
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of women is considered. With rising levels of need for elderly-care and
shrinking state budgets, paying for family care can be a suitable solution
for the welfare state:
Provided that the level of financial support given is not high and does not
approximate to market rates for paid care labour, then informal care represents
a cheaper solution to long term care needs than any other.
(McLaughlin and Glendinning 1994: 53)
Moreover, payments for informal care givers are important not only in
terms of resources but also with regard to ‘the willingness and ability of
family members to assume responsibility for relatives’ (Hantrais and
Letablier 1996: 165). Apart from payments for care, informal care givers
can be supported by complementary home help services and work related
policies like care leave regulations or working time reductions (cf. Dumon
1990: 185–199; 1991: 94–96).
During the last 15–20 years, European welfare states increasingly have
taken the value of unpaid care work into consideration, at least partially.
With regard to the care of young children, most European countries have
installed or extended parental leave regulations, many in connection with
cash benefits for the carer. A trend towards low level, conditional
payments has emerged. In addition, the quality of social rights granted to
the care provider has been improved, e.g., protective labour market legislation
for carers and pension recognition of care periods. As far as caring
for elderly, ill and disabled people is concerned, European welfare states
increasingly subsidise private informal care arrangements (cf. Daly 1997:
138–142). Notwithstanding these general trends, welfare states have
treated the family quite differently according to its social policy function
of care provision. Within the ‘welfare triangle’ of state, market and private
households, caring responsibilities can be distributed in various ways.
Some welfare states explicitly attempted to strengthen social responsibility
among family members, others strongly supported the extension of
public care services, several states hoped for the market to provide suitable
services, and others did not intervene at all or tried a mixed strategy.
With reference to Gøsta Esping-Andersen (1999: 51) familialistic and
de-familializing welfare states can be distinguished:
A familialistic system, [. . .], is one in which public policy assumes – indeed
insists – that households must carry the principal responsibility for their
members’ welfare. A de-familializing regime is one which seeks to unburden
the household and diminish individuals’ welfare dependence on kinship.
In order to determine the degree of de-familialization, Esping-Andersen
distinguishes between de-familialization through public social services
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and de-familialization through market driven service provision. Whereas
the Scandinavian welfare regimes are characterized by the first, the liberal
welfare regimes rely on the latter. In this respect, only the conservative
welfare regimes resemble familialistic systems since they lack both service
provision by the state and the market. Two critical remarks should be
made at this point: Firstly, market driven care provision makes de-familialization
a class biased issue since either only the better-off can afford to be
de-familialized or the quality of de-familialization varies considerably by
income. Secondly, even in Scandinavian welfare regimes the family is the
most important agent of care provision.
Undoubtedly, it is not sufficient to define familialistic welfare regimes
by the absence of public and market provision of services. Therefore, a
second kind of analytical differentiation is needed. Esping-Andersen
determines the familialistic character of a welfare regime by indicators
that measure the intensity of familial welfare responsibilities: the
percentage of elderly living with children, the percentage of the unemployed
youth living with parents, and the number of women’s weekly
unpaid hours spent on domestic obligations. Here, the Southern
European countries (and Japan) stand out for their familialism and the
Nordic welfare regimes partly confirm their de-familialized status. All in
all, the indicators used seem to be inadequate for identifying variations of
familialism since they measure the outcome of familialistic structures but
do not say anything about these structures nor about the relations between
structures and outcome. These outcome-indicators of familialism should,
thus, be replaced by a more predicative instrument of measurement. If
familialism means that public policy wants private households to secure
the welfare of their members, the ways and means used to enforce this
goal should be at the centre of analysis. Thus, service provision would be
one part of the story, policies which support the caring function of the
family would be the other.
So, we can distinguish between welfare regimes that rely on and actively
support the family as the main source of care provision and welfare regimes
that attempt to relieve the family from caring responsibilities. Whereas
the first type of policy puts the family at the centre of care provision, the
second one either socializes or ‘marketizes’ the caring function of the
family through public social services or market-driven care provision.
Since welfare states do not resemble unambiguously the categories of
familialistic or de-familializing systems, I will distinguish in the following
between single measures of family policy rather than between welfare
states as such.
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3 Familialization versus de-familialization
Familialistic policies not only oblige (and at the same time: enable) the
family to meet the care needs of its members, they also enforce the
dependence of people in need of care on their family. In this perspective,
de-familialization means not only taking away care responsibilities from
the family. De-familialization also reduces the extent to which the satisfaction
of individual care needs is dependent on the individual’s relation
to the family (cf. McLaughlin and Glendinning 1994: 65). However, this
paper focuses on the perspective of the care givers rather than on those in
need of care. In the following subsections, the dimensions of familialization
and de-familialization will be developed in more detail to distinguish
ideal typical (3.1) as well as empirical (3.2) variations of familialism.
3.1 Care provision by the family or by the state/market
Policies which actively aim at strengthening the family in its caring
function can be found in the field of child care as well as in the field of
care for the elderly and handicapped. We can distinguish (1) time rights
(such as parental leave and care leave), (2) direct and indirect transfers for
caring (such as cash benefits and tax reductions) and (3) social rights
attached to care giving like individual pension rights or the (partial)
inclusion in other social security schemes or derived rights for nonemployed
wives (husbands). These familialistic policies can be contrasted
with de-familializing policies which aim at unburdening the family in its
caring function, like the public provision of child care and/or social
services or the (public subsidy of) care provision through the market. If
we suppose variation, i.e., strong and weak expressions within both kinds
of family policies and if welfare states may contain combinations of
familialistic and de-familializing family policies, the following matrix can
be drawn (see Table 1).
Four ideal types of familialism emerge from this matrix. The explicit
familialism not only strengthens the family in caring for children, the
handicapped and the elderly through familialistic policies. It also lacks the
provision of any alternative to family care. This lack in public and market
TABLE 1. Combinations of strong/weak familialization and strong/weak de-familialization
Familialization De-familialization
Strong Weak
Strong Optional familialism Explicit familialism
Weak De-familialism Implicit familialism
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driven care provision together with strong familialization explicitly
enforces the caring function of the family.
Within the optional familialism services as well as supportive care policies
are provided. Thus, the caring family is strengthened but is also given the
option to be (partly) unburdened from caring responsibilities. In both the
explicit and the optional familialism ‘the right to time to care’ (Knijn and
Kremer 1997) is honoured by familialistic policies which enable the family
to care. Yet, only in the optional familialism is the family’s right to care
not equated with the family’s obligation to care.
The implicit familialism neither offers de-familialization nor actively
supports the caring function of the family through any kind of familialistic
policy. Nevertheless, the family will be the primary caretaker in these
welfare regimes since there are no alternatives at hand. This type, therefore,
relies implicitly upon the family when it comes to care issues.
Finally, de-familialism would be characterized by strong de-familialization
due to the state or market provision of care services and weak
familialization. Thus, family carers are (partly) unburdened but the
family’s right to care is not honoured.
The different types of familialism are analytically useful on three
different levels: They could help to classify (1) the intentions of care
policies, articulated for example by political parties or the government, as
well as (2) the empirical effects of care policies on care arrangements.
However, the focus of my analysis will be (3) on the structural implications
of care policies. In the following subsection 3.2, the 15 EU member states
will be grouped according to the above matrix. The aim is to demonstrate
that welfare states resemble different family policy profiles (and therefore
cluster differently) for different care policies. Since detailed and comprehensive
comparative data on care policies is only selectively available, I
will focus on central policies for child care and for elderly care. Firstly,
cash benefits for child care in terms of parental leave regulations are
contrasted with institutional child care provision to determine country
clusters in the field of child care. Secondly, direct transfers for the care of
frail elderly people in terms of payments for care are contrasted with the
provision of home help services in order to determine country clusters in
the field of elderly care.
3.2 Varieties of familialism in child care and elderly care in Europe
In order to look at the empirical evidence of the above developed types of
familialism in the field of child care, indicators for the dimensions of familialization
and de-familialization have to be chosen. One of the main policies to
support the caring function of the family with respect to child care is the
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provision of cash benefits during parental leave. Paid parental leave enables
parents to suspend their labour market participation in order to care for their
young children or simply provides a financial compensation for the carer.
Thus, the existence (respectively: the absence) of regulations for paid
parental leave will be taken as an indicator for the dimension of strong
(respectively: weak) familialization. This is a structural indicator since
parental leave regulations provide (or deny) structural options for parents
and their care decisions. Therefore, the indicator holds no information about
the use of these structures or their importance for family care decisions.
Consequently, the indicator for strong (respectively: weak) de-familialization
has to correspond with the group of the cared for persons which
are very young children. Thus, formal child care for those children will
be focused on. More specifically, the percentage of children under 3 years
of age who are in formal child care will indicate the dimension of strong
and weak de-familialization. Though these data are about the usage of
formal child care, they can be used as an indicator for the structure of child
care services since the offer provided is completely used, i.e., the demand
exceeds the offer.
The empirical comparison demonstrates that the EU member states
differ considerably with respect to our two basic dimensions of familialization
and de-familialization (see Table 2). On the one hand, only five
countries (Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom) do not
provide cash benefits for child care in terms of paid parental leave. The
other ten EU members support the family’s child care provision through
paid parental leave.3 On the other hand, only two nations (Denmark and
Sweden) provide a high degree of formal child care for children under
three years of age (64 and 48%). Four nations range between 29 and 38%
(France, Belgium, Ireland, United Kingdom), which suggests that there is
a choice between family care and formal care for at least approximately
one-third of the parents. Finland’s score (22%) is a little lower but still
differs significantly from the remaining eight EU member states who
show a very poor coverage of formal child care (3–12%).
These differences between the EU member states leave us with four
country clusters which represent four types of familialism in the field of
child care: (1) the optional familialism with widespread formal child care
and payments for child care within the family, (2) the explicit familialism
with poor rates of formal child care but payments for child care within the
family, (3) the implicit familialism with poor rates of formal child care as
well as a lack of cash support for child care within the family, and (4) defamilialism
with widespread formal child care but a lack of payments for
child care (see Table 3).
3. The Netherlands does not have statutory regulations on cash benefits for child care
but collectively bargained benefits are widespread.
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TABLE 2. Paid parental leave and formal child care for children under 3 years of age in the EU
member states
Paid parental leave % of children under 3 in
formal child care
Denmark Flat-rate payment for 10 weeksb, thereafter
reduced flat-rate for 1 year per parenta
64
Sweden 75% of former wage for 1 yeare, thereafter
flat-rate for 3 months
48
Belgium Flat-rate payment for 1 yeara 30
France Flat-rate payment for 3 yearsd 29
Finland 66% of former wage for 6,5 months,
thereafter flat-rate paymentc for 2 years
and 2 months
22
Germany Flat-rate payment for 2 yearsf 10
Italy 30% of former wage for 6 months 6
The Netherlands Varying payment (collectively bargained)
for 6 months
6
Austria Flat-rate payment for 3 years 4
Luxembourg Universal flat-rate payment for 2 years 2
Portugal None 12
Spain None 5
Greece None 3
Ireland None 38
UK None 34
a The Belgian ‘career break’ is not directly comparable with parental leave regulations in other countries as
it does not particularly refer to child care but might be used for a child care break. Similarily, the extended
leave period in Denmark is part of a leave scheme that allows employees to take paid leave for training,
child care or other reasons, such as a sabbatical break from work.
b Mostly increased up to 100% of former wage through collective bargaining.
c Payable only if the child does not use public child care.
d Not available for the first child.
e The benefit has a maximum ceiling.
f The benefit is income tested.
Sources: Data on formal child care comprises publicly and privately funded care arrangements and is from
OECD (2001: 144), supplemented with Lohkamp-Himmighofen (1993: 343) for Luxembourg. Data on
parental leave is from Bundesministerium für Familie, Senioren, Frauen und Jugend (1998) and OECD
(1995: 175–8).
TABLE 3. Classification of countries in the field of child care
Formal child care
Widespread Poor
Payment for child care (1) Belgium, Denmark,
(Finland)*, France, Sweden
(2) Austria, Germany, Italy,
Luxembourg, Netherlands
No payment for child care (4) Ireland, United Kingdom (3) Greece, Portugal, Spain
(1) Optional familialism, (2) explicit familialism, (3) implicit familialism, (4) de-familialism.
* Finland is kind of a borderline case between optional and explicit familialism.
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The resulting country clusters differ from the ‘three worlds approach’
of Esping-Andersen. His de-familializing Scandinavian cluster is firstly
classified as familialistic system (optional familialism) and secondly
complemented by Belgium and France. The latter two countries were
given a special status within the conservative welfare regime by EspingAndersen
himself because of their strong tradition of formal child care
services. In my analysis this tradition makes them share one country
cluster with the Scandinavian welfare states in the field of child care
policies. Esping-Andersen’s conservative cluster is further split into
explicitly and implicitly familialistic systems with the Southern welfare
states (except Italy) in the implicit familialism type. This is compatible
with the special status of the Southern nations within his measurement of
the family’s responsibility for its members. Last not least, Ireland and the
United Kingdom which are in the liberal cluster of Esping-Andersen, are
found within the de-familialism type.
Using a modified analytical framework enabled us to identify varieties
of familialism and led to country clusters in the field of child care that
seem to catch similarities and differences between the EU member
states more adequately than before. But child care policies for very
young children are only one of the various policies that aim at
supporting the family in its caring function. Because of the heterogeneity
of care policies it is very likely that countries will cluster differently
for separate policies.
Moving on to the field of family care for frail elderly people, strong
(respectively: weak) familialization will be indicated by the availability
(respectively: the lack) of direct transfers for elderly care through cash
payments to the family. The strength or weakness of de-familialization
could be assessed by the percentage of elderly people in need of care who
live in institutional care arrangements. Unfortunately, the total numbers
of elderly people in need of care are widely unknown. If we estimate that
the percentage of elderly people who need care in relation to the total
number of elderly people is within the same range in all European countries,
we could also use the percentage of elderly people who live in
institutional care arrangements as a whole. Unfortunately, this indicator
shows hardly any variation between the EU member states,4 although the
extent of formal care provision for the elderly differs considerably within
Europe. But the general trend in care policy leads towards mobile care
services to enable elderly people to stay in their familiar surroundings as
long as possible. At the same time, home help services unburden the
family from its caring responsibilities. Thus, the percentage of people
aged over 65 who receive home help services seems to be a useful indicator
4. The percentages are very small anyway (Helmer 1993: 445) since usually only the
frailest are cared for in institutional settings.
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for de-familialization.5 Again, both indicators are structural: benefits for
elderly care provide structural options for (potential) family carers but
cannot tell us anything about the use of these structures or their importance
for family care decisions. Data on the usage of home help services
are also data about the supply of these services since the supply provided
is completely used.
The empirical evidence across the EU member states (see Table 4)
shows variation on both dimensions of familialism. On the one hand, only
five nations (Greece, Italy,6 The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain) do not
provide any kind of payments for elderly care within the family. Within
the remaining ten welfare states payments for elderly care vary considerably:
some do have cash benefits paid to the carer, others pay the carer
only indirectly via the cared for person, the level of the benefit varies, and
so on. The heterogeneity of regulations is striking. Together with the lack
of coherent and comprehensive comparative data on this very young
policy, this makes it difficult to classify countries in more detail.7 On the
other hand, the percentage of elderly over 65 receiving home help services
is rather restricted in most cases8 (1–9%). Only Finland, Denmark (24 and
22%) and – with a small gap – also Sweden (16%) differ considerably.
However, the three Scandinavian countries show a considerable degree
of home help coverage as well as direct transfers for elderly care and thus
in the field of elderly care resemble the optional familialism (1). The
countries with poor home help coverage differ firstly according to the
existence or the absence of payments for elderly care. Five of them do not
(Greece, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain) or hardly (Italy) provide any
such payments. They therefore resemble the implicit familialism (3) of
elderly care. In the remaining countries the combination of direct transfers
for elderly care with a poor home help coverage points out the explicit
familialism (2) in the field of elderly care (see Table 5).
Comparing these results to Esping-Andersen’s clusters, the Scandinavian
countries are once again classified as familialistic systems (optional
familialism). The conservative cluster is again split into explicit and
implicit familialism with Austria, Belgium, France, Germany and Luxembourg
resembling the first and the Southern European nations together
with The Netherlands resembling the latter. (Note that Italy changed
5. As a matter of fact home help services not only relieve the family from caring duties
but also may help the family to maintain its caring function. So, to some unknown
extent this indicator represents also familialization, since home help services are not in
all cases simply a substitute for family care but are also an incentive for family care.
6. Italy has established pilot projects in four regions but there is no national programme
yet.
7. For a typology of payments for care see Ungerson (1997: 366–73).
8. For Luxembourg the data sources provide no account, but it can be assumed that
Luxembourg has a rather small rate (cf. Dienel 1993: 287).
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TABLE 4. Payment for elderly care and home help services for the elderly in the EU member states
Payment for the care of frail elderly
people
% of elderly over 65 receiving
home help services
Finland A home care allowance is paid to the
carer.
24
Denmark Caring relatives are paid by the
community.
22
Sweden Cash allowances are made to elderly
people to enable them to pay a family
carer.
16
UK A flat-rate allowance is paid to the carer. 9
France An income-tested dependency allowance
can be received by frail elderly people. It
is paid directly to the elderly person and
can be spent either for professional or
informal care, e.g. for compensating a
family member (but not the spouse).
7
Belgium A career break for caring can be taken
and is compensated by a flat-rate
payment.
6
Austria A care allowance is paid to elderly
persons requiring care, graduated
according to the degree of care needed.
The care allowance can be spent for
compensating a family member for
supplying help.
3
Ireland A means-tested allowance is paid to the
carer.
3
Germany A care allowance is paid to the person
receiving family care, graded according
to the degree of care needed. The
care giver is not paid directly but
(hopefully) by the cared for person.
2
Luxembourg Frail elderly being cared for at home
receive either professional care or a care
allowance to remunerate the carer.
no account
The Netherlands None 8
Spain None 2
Greece None 1
Italy Four regions adopted payment for care:
a means-tested subsidy to people opting
to keep a dependent elderly person at
home with them.
1
Portugal None 1
Sources: Data on home help services are from Esping-Andersen (1999: 71), supplemented by Anttonen
and Sipilä (1996: 92) for Greece. Data on payment for care are from European Commission (2000), Lewis
(1998) and OECD (1996).
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from explicit familialism in child care to implicit familialism in elderly care
and The Netherlands vice versa, whereas Belgium and France changed
from optional familialism in child care to explicit familialism in elderly
care.) Esping-Andersen’s liberal cluster is found on the weak side of defamilialization
and on the strong side of familialism this time. Thus,
Ireland and the United Kingdom changed from de-familialism in child
care to the explicit familialism in elderly care.
As this first approach to conceptualize empirical variants of familialism
demonstrates, countries cluster differently for different care policies.
Since there are still other care policies to consider, it will be difficult if not
impossible to subsume each welfare state under one exclusive category of
familialism. Countries will also cluster differently at different points in
time which would demand a historical approach to catch the dynamics of
national variants of familialism. Including the gender dimension into the
analysis makes things even more complicated.
4 Gendered versus de-gendered familialism
Since family care is usually provided by women (wives, daughters, daughters-in-law),
supporting the caring function of the family represents a
gendered subject per se. In order to complete the theoretical considerations
about the varieties of familialism, the question of gendered care
giving has to be conceptionalized.
4.1 Gender and the caring function of the family
Re-examining the four types of familialism identified in Section 3.1, questions
of gender equality may be raised. As a matter of fact, the implicit
familialism with its weak direct support for the family’s caring function and
TABLE 5. Classification of countries in the field of elderly care
Home help coverage
Widespread Poor
Payment for elderly care (1) Denmark, Finland,
Sweden
(2) Austria, Belgium, France,
Germany, Ireland,
Luxembourg, United Kingdom
No payment for elderly care (3) Greece, Italy, The
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain
(1) Optional familialism, (2) explicit familialism, (3) implicit familialism.
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366
its lack in service provision does not directly intervene in gender relations.
It resembles a laissez-faire model of family policy where the state seeks to
exercise no influence on the family at all (cf. Harding 1996: 183–6). Nevertheless,
this type affects gender relations since it simply reproduces and
thus confirms the status quo of gendered care provision within the family.
Similarily, de-familializing care policies per se do not directly intervene
in gender relations.9 But, since they relieve the family from care provision,
they provide options for family carers. De-familializing care policies thus
weaken breadwinner models in which one person is employed and the
other person is available for family care and they represent an important
structural condition for gender equality in the labour market. The effect
will be most widespread in the field of child care where formal care
arrangements enable parents (mostly: mothers) to participate in the labour
market. In the field of elderly care the provision of formal care will have
a similar effect only for the younger age groups of carers for whom labour
market participation would still be an option. Both, de-familialism and the
optional familialism provide de-familializing care policies. Whereas defamilialism
provides family carers exactly with the option of labour market
participation, the optional familialism additionally supports family care
directly as an alternative to formal care arrangements. The optional
familialism, therefore, provides a better opportunity to choose between
family care and formal care than de-familialism which does not actively
enable family care.10
In contrast to de-familializing care policies, familialistic care policies
directly regulate gender relations. On the one hand, they seem to automatically
enforce traditional gender roles since they aim at maintaining and
strengthening the family’s caring function. As family care is in most cases
women’s work, these policies will not only support the family as such in its
caring function but will also strengthen the caring role of women and, thus,
reproduce the gendered division of family care. On the other hand, this does
not necessarily have to be the case. To avoid the dilemma11 of validating
9. They may have direct effects on gendered care provision within the sector of formal
care though. If formal care is mostly provided by female carers, the gender division
of care giving is enforced.
10. Similarily, Hochschild distinguishes between a ‘cold modern’ and a ‘warm modern’
ideal model of care. The first one is ‘represented by impersonal institutional care in
year-round ten-hour day care and old-age homes’ whereas in the second one ‘institutions
provide some care for young and elderly’ while the family provides care as
well (1995: 332).
11. This was called the contemporary variant of the Wollstonecraft dilemma: ‘We are
torn between wanting to validate and support, through some form of income maintenance
provision, the caring work for which women still take the responsibility in
the ‘private’ sphere and to liberate them from this responsibility so that they can
achieve economic and political autonomy in the public sphere.’ (Lister 1994 cited in
Knijn/Kremer 1997: 350)
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family care and strengthening the independence of family carers while at the
same time engendering family care, familialistic policies could also contain
incentives to ensure that care provision is shared on equal terms among male
and female family members. Therefore, the explicit as well as the optional
familialism hold both options: a gendered or a de-gendered variant. In the
following I will focus on these two types of familialism since they are the
interesting cases with regard to the political regulation of gender relations.
To assess the extent of gender (in)equality in familialistic care policies,
an analytical framework is needed which connects the different kinds of
gender discrimination to social policy. For this purpose I will draw from
earlier works (cf. Leitner 1999: 19–36; 2001) and distinguish three forms
of sex differentiation:
1) The distinction between man and woman due to biological
characteristics
This biological differentiation uses biologically determined differences to
legitimize different treatment of men and women. It is institutionalized
within social policy by implementing regulations that refer explicitly to
biological sex differences. The discriminating mechanism attached to
biological sex differentiation is characterized by the implicit connection
of biological sex differences with a gendered division of labour: if, for
example, benefits for child care or elderly care are available only for
women, all caring men are excluded from the provision of benefits. Thus,
familialistic policies discriminate if they explicitly assign family care to
women (or men) only.
2) The distinction between man and woman due to the gendered
division of labour
This differentiation due to the gendered division of labour results from the
distinction between a public sphere of paid employment (in which men
usually are) and a private sphere of unpaid work (for women). It is implemented
within social policy by separate schemes for employment on the one
hand and family work on the other. The differentiation is non-discriminatory
if both kinds of schemes provide equal protection with regard to benefit
levels and quality of social rights. Thus, familialistic policies discriminate
due to the gendered division of labour if family care is devalued in relation
to employment. Furthermore, the gendered division of labour per se
restricts the options of men and women to move between the public and
the private sphere. Thus, familialistic policies which differentiate along the
gendered division of labour will be even more discriminating if no choices
are provided to (re-)move from family care to employment.
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3) The distinction between ‘male’ and ‘female’ sexuality
The distinction between ‘male’ and ‘female’ sexual desire – men desire
women and women desire men as sexual partners – reflects the norm of
heterosexuality. Heterosexuality is implemented within social policy by
regulations that refer to (married) couples. Familialistic policies discriminate
against alternative family care arrangements if they do not provide
comparable benefits.
Ideal-typically, gendered familialism shows familialistic policies that
assign family care to women (or men) only, devalue family care in relation
to employment, do not provide choices to (re-)move from family care to
employment, and focus on (married) heterosexual couple families.
Contrarily, de-gendered familialism shows familialistic policies that do not
refer to biological sex differences, validate family care, enable financial
independence of the carer, provide choices to move between family care
and employment, and provide comparable benefits for different family
care arrangements.
As has been argued above, the explicit as well as the optional familialism
have the potential to aim either at a gendered or at a de-gendered model
of family care. In addition, it will be important to consider not only direct
but also indirect structures of gender discrimination. For example, the
gendered variant of the optional familialism will be less restrictive than
the gendered variant of the explicit familialism since the optional
familialism provides also de-familializing policies which hold the option
of alternatives to family care. Moreover, the overall character – gendered
or de-gendered – of a welfare regime has to be taken into consideration.
E.g. a ‘male breadwinner model’ (cf. Lewis 1992; Lewis and Ostner 1995)
indirectly supports the family’s caring function through derived social
rights (e.g., sickness insurance, survivor benefits) or tax benefits for nonworking
wives. It can, therefore, either strengthen a gendered form of
familialism or be a hindrance for a de-gendered model of familialism.
Contrarily, dual earner models with individualized social rights would
strengthen a de-gendered model of familialism.
In the following sub-section, I will focus on parental leave policies and
their attached cash benefits for child care. The aim is to provide an
example for a gender sensitive analysis of familialism and to classify the
different policies according to the gendered or de-gendered model of
gender relations. Only those nine countries are part of the analysis which
resemble either the optional or the explicit type of familialism in the field
of child care (see Section 3.2).12
12. The Netherlands will be skipped from the analysis because it has no statutory
provision of parental benefits.
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4.2 Gendered and de-gendered paid parental leave policies in
Europe
Following the above-presented dimensions of gender discrimination in
family care, the extent of gender (in)equality of the nine paid parental
leave policies will be assessed (see Table 6).
Discrimination due to biological sex differentiation
None of the policies discriminate by sex. All of the countries allow for
shared parenting since parental leave periods are transferable between the
parents. Thus, no country has explicit gender norms. But only four countries
‘punish’ the unequal engagement of parents. Belgium and Denmark
grant parental leave periods as individual rights for mothers and fathers.
If one parent does not make use of his/her right, it lapses and cannot be
passed on to the other parent. Similarily, Sweden reserves one month of
the whole leave period for each parent. The rest of the parental leave
period can – but does not have to – be shared among the parents. Austria
presents a special case in this respect: the maximum duration of the
parental benefit amounts to three years per child, but is cut to thirty
months if only one of the parents qualifies as primary caretaker, i.e., only
the other parent is entitled to the remaining six months of the benefit.
Discrimination due to the devaluation of family care
Parental benefits are generally low. Only Denmark and Sweden – and to
some extent also Finland – provide wage replacement rates that allow a
certain extent of financial independence. With the exemption of Italy
which has a very low wage replacement rate (30%), all the other countries
pay a flat-rate between €271 and €456. Therefore, six of the countries
provide benefits below the poverty line which devalues family care in
relation to employment and enforces the financial dependence of family
carers on a breadwinner (or on welfare programmes). Finland presents a
special case since it has a two-fold regulation: a rather short period of the
leave is paid rather well (66% of the former wage) whereas the longer
period of the leave has a low flat-rate payment attached.
Connected to the question of financial independence is the duration of
paid parental leave in relation to parental leave as a whole. In all countries
but Germany and Italy, parental benefits are paid at least throughout the
whole leave period. In Germany two out of three years and in Italy six
months out of three years are covered by parental benefits which decreases
the financial independence of parents who take the whole leave period.
Due to the lack of formal child care in both countries this concerns
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EUROPEAN SOCIETIES
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especially (single) parents who can not rely on a breadwinner. Thus, the
question of financial independence is also closely related to the question
of equal treatment of different family care arrangements. Insufficient
benefits discriminate against one parent families as well as low income
families.
Discrimination due to labour market disincentives for carers
In contrast, in Austria the duration of the parental benefit exceeds the
leave period which leads to the exlusion from protective labour market
legislation attached to parental leave if the carer does not return to his/
her job after two years. This is clearly a disincentive for the labour market
participation of carers. Similarily, Luxembourg provides a universal
parental benefit for two years, but the eligibility of parental leave is very
limited. Finally, Sweden provides a low flat-rate parental benefit during
three months after the end of the parental leave period.
The labour market attachment of family carers is further affected by the
general duration of parental leave. Like other times of absence from the
labour market, ‘long leave periods may create difficulties in returning to
the job if there have been significant changes in the technological and
organizational context of the firm in the meantime’ (OECD 1995: 188).
Only Belgium, Denmark and Sweden show relatively short leave periods.
Carers can take a maximum leave of one year in these countries. The other
six countries provide parental leave between two and three years and,
therefore, set labour market disincentives for carers.
The comparison shows that Denmark and Sweden have the most degendered
profiles in paid parental leave throughout the European Union:
short leave periods, wage replacement rates that allow for financial independence
– though on a rather low level – and incentives to share child
care among the parents characterize their policies. Belgium, too,
approaches the de-gendered model of familialism but fails with regard to
the insufficient level of the parental benefit.
On the contrary, France, Germany, Italy and Luxembourg clearly
resemble a gendered familialism: long leave periods together with
insufficient parental benefits and a lack of incentives for shared parenting
structurally enforce the caring role as well as the financial dependence of
mothers. Austria comes very close to this group of countries, but differs
with respect to its incentive for shared parenting. Finland, finally, shows
gendered elements due to a rather long leave period and the lack of
incentives for shared parenting. But, it provides a comparably high
parental benefit for the first (shorter) part of the leave.
Table 7 shows that only two of the optional familialistic countries have
de-gendered paid parental leave policies and not all of the explicit
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TABLE 6. Parental leave and parental benefits in nine European countries
Parental leave Parental benefit
Duration Transferability Duration Monthly amount
Belgium 1 year per parent individual right throughout the
whole leave period
Flat-rate (€271)
Denmark 10 weeks Family right Throughout the
whole leave period
Flat-ratea for 10
weeks (minimum:
€1.513)
plus 1 year per
parent
Individual right Reduced flat-rate
thereafter (€909)
Sweden 1 year Family right and
individual rightd
1 year 75% of wage
plus 3 months Flat-rate
thereafter(€199)
Austria 2 years Family right and
individual righte
3 yearse Flat-rate (€436)
Finland 6.5 months
plus 2 years, 2
months
Family right Throughout the
whole leave period
66% of wageb for
6,5 months (min.:
€252)
Flat-ratec thereafter
(€252)
France 3 yearsf Family right Throughout the
whole leave period
Flat-rate (€456)
Italy 3 years Family right 6 months 30% of wage
Germany 3 years Family right 2 years Flat-rate (income
tested, maximum:
€307)
Luxembourg 2 yearsg Family right 2 years Flat-rate (€408)
a Mostly increased up to 100% of former wage through collective bargaining.
b Parents not gainfully employed receive a flat-rate benefit.
c The benefit is only paid if the child does not use public child care.
d One month is reserved for each parent.
e If the parental leave is not shared, the parental benefit is paid for 30 months only.
f Parental leave is not available for the first child.
g The availability of parental leave is very limited.
Sources: Bundesministerium für Familie, Senioren, Frauen und Jugend (1998) and OECD (1995: 175–8).
TABLE 7. Gendered and de-gendered variations of familialism
Gendered familialism Mixed cases De-gendered
familialism
Optional familialism France Finland, Belgium Denmark, Sweden
Explicit familialism Germany, Italy,
Luxembourg
Austria
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EUROPEAN SOCIETIES
372
familialistic countries rely on a completely gendered model of familialism.
Due to relatively widespread formal child care in France and Belgium,
family carers are provided with an alternative to gendered family care. But
if parents opt for family care, it will be gendered, in France probably more
than in Belgium. In Finland, the alternative to family care is more
restricted since the coverage with formal child care is not as well developed
as in the other optional familialistic countries (see Section 3.2).
Thus, parents have less choice between employment or gendered family
care. Finally, the incentive for shared parenting distinguishes Austria from
a gendered familialism. But, the de-gendering effects of this incentive
have to be questioned since the insufficient parental benefit is a structural
incentive for female child care at home. It is very likely that gendered and
de-gendered country profiles of familialism differ across care policies and
over time.
5 Summary and research perspectives
This article focuses on the caring function of the family and (re)defines
the concept of familialism by drawing from Esping-Andersen’s distinction
between familialistic and de-familializing welfare regimes and by introducing
a more predictable indicator for familialization: policies that
actively support the family in its caring function. Contrasting familialization
and de-familialization leads to four ideal types of familialism:
optional, explicit, and implicit familialism, and de-familialism. In a second
step, empirical indicators for familialization and de-familialization in the
fields of child care and elderly care are defined. The empirical analysis of
the fifteen EU member states leads to country clusters that differ considerably
– and for good reasons – from the ‘three worlds’ typology of
Esping-Andersen. Moreover, countries cluster differently for different
care policies. Both results call for a more differentiated approach in
comparative welfare state research.
The article further develops a concept to include the gender dimension
into the analysis of familialism. Applying gender sensitive criteria to paid
parental leave policies in nine European countries leads to an assessment
of the extent of structural gender (in)equality. The analysis shows gendered
and de-gendered variants of familialism among the countries. More
conceptual work will have to be done to analyse also other care policies
with regard to their extent of structural gender (in)equality. A more
comprehensive approach would also have to include other analytical levels
like the political intentions and the empirical outcomes of care policies.
Last but not least, a dynamic comparative perspective would be most
interesting to analyse the development of familialism over time. Further
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research would be especially beneficial in those countries which historically
move between different types of familialism.
Acknowledgements
I am grateful for comments and suggestions by the participants of the
fellows’ colloquium at the Centre for European and North American
Studies in Goettingen who discussed an early version of this paper. I also
thank Ilona Ostner, Klaus Stolz and two anonymous referees for their
constructive criticism.
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Sigrid Leitner is assistant professor at the Department of Social Policy, University of
Goettingen, Goettingen, Germany. She works on comparative social policy,
pension policies, family policies, and gender discrimination in social policy.
Recent publication (with Ilona Ostner and Margit Schratzenstaller (eds)):
‘Wohlfahrtsstaat und Geschlechterverhältnis im Umbruch. Was kommt nach dem
Ernährermodell?’ (Opladen: Leske+Budrich 2003).
Address for correspondence: Department of Social Policy, Georg-August-University,
Platz der Goettinger Sieben 3, D 37073 Goettingen, Germany. E-mail:
sleitne@uni-goettingen.de
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