BSS 187/487
America’s Changing Global Role
Professor Schuyler Foerster
Visiting Professor
Department of Political Science
Masaryk University
Spring 2018
Tuesday, 3 April – Friday, 13 April 2018

Course Objectives
üEvolution of America’s global role  -- 19th, 20th, & 21st centuries
üHow America’s global role has been shaped by (1) the changing structure of the international
system, (2) the changing nature of state power, and (3) the transformed dynamics of international
relations as a result of globalization.
üCritical analysis of U.S. past and current global and regional policies through case studies that
demonstrate these changes.
üAn inquiry into competing theories on how adaptive American and multinational institutions can be
in addressing these changes.
üImplications of these developments for the U.S. and the world.
ü

Course Assessment
üWritten essays (60%) – 2 x 30 points ~ 500 words
üCase study presentation (25%) – team presentation
üSeminar – Prepare – Engage – Participate (15%)
ü14-15 points
ü10-13 points
ü7-9 points
ü4-6 points
ü0-3 points
üYOU judge!
ü
A – 90-100%
B – 80-89%
C – 70-79%
D – 60-69%
E – 50-59%
F – 0-49%

Essays
üTwo analytic essays … 500 words … 30 points each
üToo short to ramble on aimlessly
üToo long simply to express an opinion
üThesis – roadmap – argument – conclusion
üYour work ... document sources … plagiarism unacceptable
üLate essay submissions will be penalized
üEssay #1 – due at beginning of class … Friday, 6 April
üEssay #2 – due at beginning of class if NOT presenting
üWednesday, April 11 or Thursday, April 12

Case Study Presentations
üWednesday & Thursday, 11-12 April
üTeams of 2 or 3 students each – 25 points
ü30 minutes + Q&A … PowerPoint (email to me w/team roles)
üTeams & topics by Friday, 6 April – propose early!
üDescribe issue … analyze U.S. historical/current role … assess
üSuggested topics:
ü
•Nuclear proliferation
•Climate change
•Trade
•Energy
•Cyberconflict
•Economic development
•Managing regional conflict
•Role of multilateral institutions
•Terrorism
•Migration

Course Readings
üAll required readings distributed electronically through IS.
üHints:
üRead to understand main ideas & argument
üCompare arguments … critically assess assumptions
üYou are not expected to memorize or regurgitate on test
üYou are expected to analyze arguments and apply ideas to specific cases
üSynthesize … connect dots … think critically

Course Overview – Week 1
[* indicates double session – check syllabus for times, room]
ü*4.4: A Changing World: What? Why? How?
ü*5.4: Evolution of U.S. Foreign Policy: What? Why? How?
ü6.4: Globalization & U.S. Leadership: How Much Success?
üEssay #1 due at beginning of class
üWe can think about America’s leadership role in 3 broad historical phases—(1) from the end of
World War II through the Cold War, (2) in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, and (3) in the
21st century especially after 9.11.
üHow would you assess America’s leadership during each of those periods?
üDid America’s leadership role fit the needs of the times?
üHow well did it adapt to changing needs and times?

Course Overview – Week 2
[* indicates double session – check syllabus for times, room]
ü9.4: Whither American Global Leadership?
ü10.4: The U.S. & Europe: What Kind of Future?
ü*11.4 & *12.4: Student Case Study Presentations
üEssay #2 due at beginning of class if not presenting
üDrawing on your case study research as well as the course material, what do you think is the
appropriate role for the United States, both generally and with respect to the issue of your case
study research?  Should the U.S. “lead,” and what does that leadership look like?  Are there other
states or institutions that should play a leadership role, either instead of the U.S. or in
partnership with the U.S.?  Why?
ü13.4: Implications for the Rest of Us [YOU]
ü

Look-Ahead
Wednesday, 4 April
üA Changing World: What? How? Why?
üDouble session (0800-0930 & 0945-1115)
üRoom U42
üFocus on global trends
üAtlantic Council, Global Risks 2035: The Search for a New Normal (2016)
üNational Intelligence Council, Global Trends: Paradox of Progress (2017)
üWorld Economic Forum, Global Risks Report 2018 (13th Edition, 2018)
üExecutive summaries vs. details – be prepared to discuss
üEmail me with proposed case study & team composition

A Changing World:
What?  How?  Why?
Wednesday, 4 April 2018

Three Global Trend Studies
üAtlantic Council (2016)
üGlobal Risks 2035: The Search for a New Normal
üNational Intelligence Council (2017)
üGlobal Trends: Paradox of Progress
üWorld Economic Forum (2018)
üGlobal Risks Report
ü
üWhat is the difference between “trends” & “predictions”?
üDoes the “authorship” matter?

Global Trends – The Good News
Economics
1.Globalization & the information age have enabled an explosion of global wealth and a reduction in
extreme poverty.
üSince the 1970s ... global population has risen about 50% (from 5 billion to 7.5 billion) ... But
the number of people in the world living in extreme poverty has been reduced by 50% (from almost 2
billion to under 1 billion).
üPrincipal “winners” have been:
üMiddle classes in emerging economies, especially China, India
üThe most affluent in the developed “post-industrial” world (including 10-15% of U.S. population,
5% in W Europe, Japan)
12

Global Trends – The Bad News
Economics
1.Expansion of global wealth has been accompanied by greater gaps between rich and poor, both in
actual wealth and opportunities to access wealth
üPrincipal “losers” in this global wealth expansion:
üThe very poor in sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, Asia, and the Middle East ... [The Bottom
Billion, Collier, 2007]
üCitizens of rich countries with stagnating incomes, much of the population of former communist
countries ... exacerbated by changing nature of work, less access to quality education &
retraining, dependence on debt during 2008 financial crisis
üBoth create a crisis of expectations, in both rich & poor societies
13

Global Trends – The Good News
Demographics
2.Overall global population growth rate is declining after almost 50% growth in last half-century
... 7.6 billion today ... 8.6 billion (2030) ...9.7 billion (2050) ... 11.2 billion (2100)
üDeclining fertility rates
üImproved maternal and post-natal health (after baby boom)
üIncreasing numbers of women seeking employment out of the home
üGrowing urbanization
üHigher life expectancy worldwide
ü
14

Global Trends – The Bad News
Demographics
2.Changing distribution of global demographics will add stress – in different ways – to all
countries.
üBulk of population growth in future decades confined to the poorest countries least able to cope
with that growth
üAfrica ... Over 50% of global growth by 2050 ... Nigeria 3rd most populous country after India &
China
ü“Youth bulges” persist in Africa, South Asia, Arab world
üIn wealthy countries – population aging, working-age populations decreasing ... Increased burdens
on support systems for aging
üPeople in distress will migrate to places where they perceive opportunities for a better life for
themselves and their children
ü
15

Global Trends – The Good News
Technology
3.Rapid technological growth has enabled:
üExplosive economic growth
üTransformations in manufacturing and energy
üDemocratized access to information
üNew frontiers in healthcare and the fight against disease
üPeople across boundaries and cultures to interact
üAn end to major conflict between major powers [so far]
16

Global Trends – The Bad News
Technology
3.Technology is a value neutral tool – for every benefit and advantage, there is also vulnerability
to its exploitation:
üSocioeconomic dislocation as a result of the changing nature of work and increased automation
üProliferation – and fragmentation – of information and media place new burdens on the consumer to
assess reliability, think critically
üAdvances in biotechnology raise difficult ethical & moral issues
üInterconnectedness heightens localism & populism as people believe their identities are being
threatened – institutions lose legitimacy
üNew weapons technologies [e.g. cyber, bio, etc] enable even weak countries – and groups – to pose
unacceptable risks
17

Global Trends – The Good News
Politics
4.End of the 20th century witnessed an unprecedented rise in democratic governance and pluralist
political institutions
üDefeat of Fascism and Soviet Communism as credible contending models of development and governance
üCollapse of empires – imperial structures that had been the principal model of international
relations for centuries
üEven among autocratic regimes, the “vocabulary” and “edifices” of democratic governance were
essential both at home and abroad
üProjections of the “End of History” (Fukuyama) plus growth of information technologies
foreshadowed converging interest globally and increased cooperation to tackle shared problems
18

Global Trends – The Bad News
Politics
4.Globalization brought winners & losers … the losers fought back!
üDemocratic governance is hard ... it takes generations to develop the “civic virtues” that make
pluralism work & can’t be imposed
üSocioeconomic dislocation reaped by globalization create fear, anxiety, and impatience with which
governments can’t cope
üMore actors mean more voices seeking to be heard – and frustrated by the result – but institutions
are weak and exploitable
üChallenges to good governance increase beyond the capacity of most systems to cope ... so
governments cultivate distractions
üResult – persistent rise of autocratic models of governance, notions of “illiberal democracy” as
populism increases
19

Implications – “Top Ten”?
1.Industrial & information revolutions created transformative opportunities ... heightened
expectations ... seeded dangers
2.The global economy – and the nature of work – are shifting (again)
3.Societies – both rich and poor – are unraveling at home
4.The rich are aging … the poor aren’t (but they ARE urbanizing)
5.Technology accelerates progress … but creates disruptive discontinuities
üCan you “feel” the paradox?
20

Implications – “Top Ten”?
6.Ideas and identities can create new communities … but they can also drive a wave of exclusion &
intolerance
7.Governing is getting more necessary … but harder
8.Conflict is more lethal – blurring civilian/military lines … also more likely … and less
manageable
9.Societies and institutions are more vulnerable to systemic risks – interdependence of complex
systems (environmental, financial, informational, etc)
10.20th century “liberal world order” – and the institutions that sustained it – is breaking down
11.
21

Choices … [not predictions]
üHow will “we” – individuals, groups, and governments – renegotiate expectations of one another to
create a legitimate political order? üTo what extent will “we” craft new or adapt existing
architectures of international cooperation & competition? üTo what extent will “we” prepare for
complex and multifaceted global issues like climate change and transformative technologies?
üHow will the U.S. respond?
üHow do these questions play into your case study?

Look-Ahead
Thursday, 5 April
üEvolution of U.S. Foreign Policy: What? How? Why?
üDouble session (1700-1830 & 1845-2015)
üRoom U43
üFocus on competing themes in U.S. foreign & security policy
üBetts, Conflict or Cooperation? Three Visions Revisited
üBacevich, Saving “America First”: What Responsible Nationalism Looks Like
üJones, Order from Chaos: The New Geopolitics, Brookings
üMead, The Jacksonian Revolt: American Populism and the Liberal Order
üU.S. National Security Strategy 2010 & 2017: skim, but compare
üEmail me with proposed case study & team composition

Evolution of U.S. Foreign Policy:
What?  How?  Why?
Thursday, 5 April 2018

Core & Enduring Debates
ü“Values” vs. “Interests”
ü“Enlightened self-interest” vs. “Pragmatism”
ü“American Primacy” – what & how
ü“Isolationism” vs. “Engagement”
ü“Regionalism” vs. “Globalism”

America’s Early Worldview
üConstitutional foundations – a maritime power:
ü“raise and support” an army (with state militias)
ü“provide and maintain” a navy
üWashington’s Farewell Address:
ü“It will be worthy of a free, enlightened, and, at no distant period, a great nation, to give to
mankind the magnanimous and too novel example of a people always guided by an exalted justice and
benevolence.”
üAmerican Exceptionalism? ~ geopolitical realities
ü

19th Century Priorities
üPreserve the Union
üDomestic focus … block foreign interference (UK)
üKeep foreign powers out of the Hemisphere
üMonroe Doctrine, 1823
üExpand and settle the continent – Manifest Destiny
üWar with Mexico, 1848
üMaintain freedom of the seas
üBarbary Pirates in Mediterranean
üOpen trade with Asia – inherit Spanish colonies by 1898

World Wars I & II
üBy 20th century, US was by any measure a “great power”
üBut a “status quo” power intent on preserving principles of non-interference and freedom of the
seas
üWorld War I
üGerman submarine warfare against US shipping
üWilson: “make the world safe for democracy” … but 1917
üPostwar League of Nations & Versailles blocked by Senate
üWorld War II
üJapanese attack on Pearl Harbor … 1941, not 1939

Backdrop to “containment’
üWest sought to build postwar liberal world order
üDemocracy, free markets, human rights, trade, rule of law
ü1947-8 turning points ~ no reconciliation w/USSR
üTruman Doctrine & Marshall Plan
üFall of Prague … Berlin blockade
üVandenberg Resolution in US Senate (1948)
üPrinciple of “self-help and mutual aid”
üNATO Treaty (1949) – unprecedented U.S. commitment
ü

Kennan’s “X” Article (1947)
“Sources of Soviet Conduct,” Foreign Affairs
üConclusions about Soviet behavior:
üInnate antagonism between capitalism and socialism
üInfallibility of the Kremlin ~ Communist Party discipline
üNo ideological compulsion for urgency
üSoviet diplomacy both easier and more difficult to deal with
üIntransigent … and flexible
ü“[T]he main element of any U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union … must be that of long-term,
patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies.”

Paradox of Power
üLate 1940’s: U.S. 55% of global GDP … most powerful military … moral & political leadership within
“the West”
üYet, there are limits to that power:
ü“We are great and strong; but we are not great enough or strong enough to conquer or to change or
to hold in subjugation by ourselves all … hostile or irresponsible forces.  To attempt to do so
would mean to call upon our own people for sacrifices which would in themselves completely alter
our way of life and our political institutions, and would lose the real objectives of our policy in
trying to defend them.”  (Kennan,1948)
ü

The NSC 68 Critique
üPaul Nitze … January 1950 … after “changes” of 1949
üSoviet test of atomic bomb + PRC Revolution
ü“Containment not enough … “In a shrinking world, which now faces the threat of atomic warfare, it
is not an adequate objective merely to seek to check the Kremlin design.”
ü“Kremlin is able to select means ....  We have no such freedom of choice, least of all in the use
of force.  Resort to war is not only a last resort for a free society; it is also an act which
cannot definitively end the fundamental conflict in the realm of ideas.”
ü

The Cold War Legacy
üThe bad news – the Cold War was a frigid standoff
üKennan … “final militarization” of the line through Europe
üBerlin … Cuba … Budapest … Prague … Warsaw … etc
üCrises – escalatory threats and ultimatums – crushing freedom
üNATO doctrine ~ dilemmas of extended deterrence
üThe good news – Cold War stayed “cold” …  “thawed”
üNo major war between major powers
üReasonably good record of U.S.-Soviet crisis management
üFocus on rebuilding and healing “all” of Europe

Post-Cold War Priorities
üConsolidate U.S. domestic position
ü“It’s the economy, stupid” [which is why Bush lost in 1992]
ü27% global GDP …  5% population … only 10% through trade
üEnlargement of western liberal democratic “space”
üTony Lake (NSC): “The successor to a doctrine of containment must be a strategy of enlargement …of
the world’s free community of market democracies.” [1993]
üWork with “newly independent states” ~ privatization
üPartnership for Peace… then NATO [and EU] enlargement
ü

The 1990’s brought challenges…
üIraq ~ the residue from Desert Storm’s 43 day war
üIsrael-Palestine ~ extremism takes over
üSomalia ~ humanitarian missions gone bad
üHaiti ~ so near but yet so far
üRwanda ~ what genocide?
üBosnia ~ “we don’t have a dog in this fight”
üKosovo ~ “the indispensable nation”?
üStrategic Response … or disconnect?
üPromote democracy & free markets
üPromote stability & security

Betts: Three Visions Revisited
üFukuyama, The End of History & the Last Man (1992)
üIdeas matter
üHuntington, The Clash of Civilizations (1996)
üCulture matters
üMearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (2002)
üPower matters
ü“None of the three visions won out as the new conventional wisdom ….
ü“Yet all three ideas remain beacons … even practical policymakers who shun ivory-tower theories
still tend to think roughly in terms of one of them, and no other visions have yet been offered
that match their scope and depth. Each outlines a course toward peace and stability if statesmen
make the right choices—but none offers any confidence that the wrong choices will be avoided.”
ü

Fukuyama (1992)
Ideas matter
üPost-Cold War “consensus” on democracy & capitalism
ü“Homogenization of all human societies”
üConvergence ~ technology & wealth [means]
üEnabling achievement of human dignity [end]
ü“Liberal democracy remains the only coherent political aspiration that spans different regions and
cultures across the globe.”
üRejected inevitability of war
üRecognized that conflicts remain … progress not linear
ü

Huntington (1996)
Culture matters
üModernization ≠ Westernization
üConflict … not convergence
üConflict may or may not mean war
ü“Forces of integration are real … generating counterforces of cultural assertion.”
ü“Western belief in the universality of Western culture suffers from three problems: it is false …
it is immoral … and it is dangerous.”
üWest vs. “the rise of the rest” [Fareed Zakaria??]
üFocused on China … but fed post-9.11 notions of West vs. Islam
ü
ü

Mearsheimer (2002)
Power matters
üEnd of the Cold War was not the end of great power politics … not the end of the “state”
üConflict … competition for power … the prospect of war – all remain an inevitable part of
international relations
üIncludes both military and economic power
üNuclear weapons changed the way the game is played but not “the game” itself.
ü“There are no status quo powers … save for the occasional hegemon that wants to maintain its
dominating position.” [e.g.., the U.S.]
üEmerging powers (China most of all) more than declining powers (e.g. Russia) ... Simply a matter
of time
ü

Back to Betts …
ü“The most significant similarity, and a dispiriting one, is that all three authors were out of
step with the attitudes that have dominated U.S. foreign policy and made it overreach after the
Cold War. …
ü“First, in different ways, all three saw beyond Davos-style liberalism and recognized that
noneconomic motives would remain powerful roiling forces. …
ü“Second, none supported crusading neoconservatism. …
ü“The problem is that Davos-style liberalism and militant neoconservatism have both been more
influential than the three more profound and sober visions of Fukuyama, Huntington, and
Mearsheimer.”

Humanitarian Interventionism
ü“In an increasingly interdependent world, Americans have a growing stake in how other countries
govern or misgovern themselves.”
ü (Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, Foreign Affairs, November 1996)
ü“We can then say to the people of the world, whether you live in Africa, or Central Europe, or any
other place, if somebody comes after innocent civilians and tries to kill them en masse because of
their race, their ethnic background, or their religion, and if it is within our power to stop it,
we will stop it.”
ü (President Clinton, speech in Macedonia, June 22, 1999)
ü
ü

Neoconservatism
ü“Today, America sits at the summit.  Our military strength is the envy of every nation on earth
….  It would be tragic indeed if we did not use this extraordinary historical moment to promote the
ideals at the heart of our national enterprise and, by so doing, take the steps that will ensure
stability and the steady growth of freedom throughout the world.”
ü William J. Bennett, in Kagan & Kristol [eds], Present Dangers, 2000
ü“Today, the United States enjoys a position of unparalleled military strength and great economic
and political influence.  … We seek ... to create a balance of power that favors human freedom:
conditions in which all nations and all societies can choose for themselves the rewards and
challenges of political and economic liberty.
üU.S. National Security Strategy, September 17, 2002
ü
ü
ü

Realism
ü“Some Americans, exulting in their country’s power, urge the explicit affirmation of a benevolent
American hegemony.  But such an aspiration would impose on the the U.S. a burden no society has
ever managed successfully for an indefinite period of time … would gradually unite the world
against the U.S. and force it into positions that would eventually leave it isolated and drained.”
ü (Henry Kissinger, Does America Need a Foreign Policy?, 2000)
ü
üStephen Walt (2014) … “Realists are the new doves.”
ü
ü
ü

Injected into this debate … 9.11
ü“September 11th did not so much change the world as show how the world had changed, while our
means of managing it had not.”
ü-- David Gompert, RAND Corporation, November 2001
ü
üNo more “illusion of invulnerability”
üInstinct for unilateral U.S. solutions ~ overreach?
üAfghanistan 2001 … Iraq 2003
üUN to legitimize U.S. actions??
üStrategic disconnect – military means / political ends?
üDemocracy/free markets … security/stability?

Obama … idealism + restraint
ü“America must always lead on the world stage.  If we don’t, no one else will.  The military ...
is, and always will be, the backbone of that leadership.
ü“But U.S. military action cannot be the only – or even primary – component of our leadership in
every instance.  Just because we have the best hammer does not mean that every problem is a nail.”
ü-- President Barack Obama, West Point commencement, 28 May 2014
ü
üFocus on allies, engagement, support for multilateralism
üBut still “the indispensable nation”?
üAfghanistan … Iraq … Libya … Ukraine … Syria
ü

Trump – “America First”
ü“The American people elected me to make America great again.  I promised that my Administration
would put the safety, interests, and well-being of our citizens first ... That we would revitalize
the American economy, rebuild our military, defend our borders, protect our sovereignty, and
advance our values. …
ü“My Administration’s National Security Strategy lays out a strategic vision for protecting the
American people and preserving our way of life, promoting our prosperity, preserving peace through
strength, and advancing American influence in the world.  We will pursue this beautiful vision—a
world of strong, sovereign, and independent nations, each with its own cultures and dreams,
thriving side-by-side in prosperity, freedom, and peace—throughout the upcoming year.”
ü-- President Donald Trump, U.S. National Security Strategy, December 2017
ü
ü

“Principled Realism”?
üDefining a world of zero-sum competition … elevating “sovereignty” to a formula for peace and
cooperation.
üRejecting the presumed premise of globalization – that inclusion and multilateralism promote
cooperation.
üBut presuming that others’ culturally unique “prosperity, freedom and peace” always align with
U.S. interests.
üEmphasizing hard power ... De-emphasizing diplomacy.
üRetreating from global commitments ...
üBut unwilling to pull back …

Critiques
üMead: The challenge for international politics in the days ahead is therefore less to complete the
task of liberal world order building along conventional lines than to find a way to stop the
liberal order’s erosion and reground the global system on a more sustainable basis. üBacevich: As
for the United States … preeminence does not imply hegemony.  Washington’s calling should be not to
impose a Pax Americana but to promote mutual coexistence. Compared with perpetual peace and
universal brotherhood, stability and the avoidance of cataclysmic war may seem like modest goals,
but achieve that much, and future generations will be grateful.

Look-Ahead
Friday, 6 April
üGlobalization & U.S. Leadership: How Much of a Success?
üSingle session (0945-1115)
üRoom U33
üFocus on the implications of globalization
üBlyth, Global Trumpism
üLi, The End of Globalism: Where China & the United States Go From Here
üThe Next War: The Growing Danger of Great-Power Conflict, Economist,
üRoberts, Strategic Stability under Obama and Trump, Survival
üWhite, What’s So Great About American World Leadership?  The Atlantic
üEssay #1 due at the beginning of class
üFinalize proposed case study & team composition

Globalization & U.S. Leadership
How Much of a Success?
Friday, 6 April 2018

Blyth – Global Trumpism
üEconomic thesis
üPopulism is both left and right … both sides of Atlantic
üRoots in response to 1930s depression …
üKeep people employed … inherently inflationary
üInflation encourages spending, wage growth, more inflation
üDisinflation … credit becomes cheap
üWages lag, but buying power appears stable
üDebt becomes unmanageable … loss of wealth

Li - The End of Globalism
üGlobalization vs “globalism” – reality vs. ideology
üWithin U.S. … hollowed out middle class, failing infrastructure, inadequate education …
ü“In the name of globalization … American elites had been building up an empire at the expense of
the nation.”
üDitto Europe … in the name of European integration
üAre there opportunities or pitfalls for China?
ü

The Economist – The Next War
üGrowing danger of great power conflict?
üBoth [Russia and China] have benefited from the international order that America did most to
establish and guarantee. But they see its pillars—universal human rights, democracy and the rule of
law—as an imposition that excuses foreign meddling and undermines their own legitimacy. They are
now revisionist states that want to challenge the status quo and look at their regions as spheres
of influence to be dominated.
üWhile no one wants war, conflict over regional influence & access.
üTraditional models of deterrence based on nuclear weapons may not contribute to stability … add to
uncertainty and miscalculation.

Roberts – Strategic Stability?
üStrategic stability ~ nuclear balance of power
üMaintain clear deterrent
üReassure allies
üReduce risk of war by removing incentives for it to start
üPreserve communications to manage crisis, end conflict
üChanged strategic realities
üNo longer bipolar – multiple powers
üAsymmetric powers posing symmetrical threats  -- DPRK
üNo longer uni-dimensional … space, cyber, hybrid, etc
üNew technological challenges (precision strike, hypersonic)
ü

White – So What?
üChallenges to America’s “global vision”
üMiddle East
üAsia (China)
üCentral and Eastern Europe
üAmerica is not as overwhelmingly preponderant as most people thought it would be, but it remains
an exceptionally powerful country …”
üAmerica can do little without partners—real partners, not followers.
üAmerica … will have no choice but to share power, which will mean constant compromise and
accommodation of conflicting views and aims. The alternative to dealing with other major powers as
equals is to confront them as rivals.

Look-Ahead
Monday, 9 April
üWhither American Global Leadership?
üSingle session (0800-0930)
üRoom U43
üFocus on U.S. “global leadership” – foundations & future?
üA. Posen, Post-American World Economy: Globalization in the Trump Era,
üB. Posen, Rise of Illiberal Hegemony: Trump’s Surprising Grand Strategy
üSullivan, The World After Trump: How the System Can Endure
üSeminar format … come prepared to discuss!
üEmail me your personal assessment of your preparation, engagement, and participation in the
seminar (per syllabus)
ü

Whither American Global Leadership?
Monday, 9 April 2018


Essay #1 Comments
üRead the question! Then read it again (or write at top of paper)!
üCritical analysis – not unsubstantiated assertions!
üKey is “nuance” … not “either-or” … not “good” or “evil”
ü“Self-interest” vs. “self-less” – “enlightened self-interest”
üWatch out for words that carry “baggage”
ü“Dominant” vs. “Primacy”
üBe efficient in your language
üAvoid long intro paragraphs that do not add anything
üEssay #2 – 500-1,000 word range is OK

A. Posen – Post-American Economy
üU.S. contributions to the global economic order
üUmbrella of security guarantees
üFree navigation of seas and airspace
üImportance of rules … and data transparency (e.g. IMF)
üImplications of U.S. withdrawal/retrenchment from rules-based free trade and financial systems
üLoss of U.S political influence
üIncreasing U.S. vulnerability

B. Posen – Illiberal Hegemony
ü“Liberal hegemony”:
ü“Hegemonic”: U.S. aimed to be most powerful state
ü“Liberal”: create rules-based order ~ multilateral institutions
üPromote market-oriented democracies & free trade
ü“Illiberal hegemony” … Hegemony without multilateralism
üLess concern for rules-based multilateral institutions
üIncreased focus on military power … Asia, Europe, Middle East
üUndercut multilateral trade, security arrangements
ü
ü

Sullivan – World After Trump
üResilience in the international system
üMuch of the world remains invested in U.S. leadership
üPassing of U.S. dominance ≠ loss of U.S. leadership [??]
üInternational arrangements becoming more flexible
ü“Coalitions of the willing”
üInformal multilateral agreements (not treaties) – JPCOA
üRegional trade arrangements (TPP, TTIP)
üDomestic constraints on political power – U.S. and abroad

Look-Ahead
Tuesday, 10 April
üThe United States & Europe: What Kind of Future?
üSingle session (0800-0930)
üRoom U43
üFocus on the U.S. role in Europe … foundations and future?
üStelzenmüller, Normal is Over: The New Geopolitics/Europe, Brookings
üWright, A Post-American Europe & the Future of U.S. Strategy, Brookings
üWicket, Transatlantic Relations: Converging or Diverging? Chatham House read Executive Summary &
Introduction; skim remainder
üEssay #2 & Case Study Presentations Wednesday & Thursday
ü

The United States & Europe: What Kind of Future?
Tuesday, 10 April 2018


Case Studies
üWednesday
üMigration
üLiz Anderson
üJen Purser
ü
üNuclear Proliferation
üJan Běláč
üJulie Vinklová
üHelena Worthington
ü
üRegional Conflict
üPeter Köles
üTerézia Rekšáková
üKryštof Šír
üThursday
üClimate Change
üCamilla Kelényová
üVojtěch Kyselý
üAnna Mezhenskaya
üPavel Šaradín
üMultilateral Institutions
üVeronika Blablová
üLucie Řeháková
üNatálie Zelinková
üConflict in South China Sea
üTomáš Daněk
üLuboš Přikryl
üTerrorism
üMarek Bukovský
üElise Gustavsen
üViktória Neradná
•Cyber Conflict
üEmre Ar
üMelis Sabanci
ü
•Trade
üTomáš Lalkovič
üPavla Pitrunová
üMichal Sojka
ü

Chatham House – Transatlantic Relations: Converging or Diverging?
üSources of “divergence”:
üDifferent political and military capabilities
üPolitical polarization at home and within NATO/EU
üLeadership personalities
üEconomics – different vulnerabilities and resiliencies
üDemographics – aging populations; need immigration
üResources -- different food and energy dependencies
üPerceived decline in capacity of international institutions
ü
ü
ü

Stelzenmuller – Normal is Over
üFebruary 2018: “…the trans-Atlantic security community has also been breathing a sigh of relief,
because many of their worst expectations seem to have been averted: trade wars, an attack on North
Korea, the end of NATO.
üHedging options:
üCling to Atlanticist institutions
üEUR security & defense cooperation to “complement” NATO
üReject Atlanticism … speak of “post-NATO”
üCan Atlanticism survive a “zero-sum” worldview?
ü

Wright – Post-American Europe
ü“While [Europe] faces a wide array of problems … Washington is strikingly absent from efforts to
resolve them.”
üBush / Obama / Trump: expect Europeans to invest more
üLitany of Europe’s problems …
üCan Europe resolve them?
üDoes U.S. have a role or capability even if it wanted one?
üAdvocates return to U.S. “deep engagement” in Europe … but doubts it will happen under Trump (or
beyond?)
üEurope should hedge – build integrated autonomous capacity
üDoes this logic “work” as a strategy going forward?

Core Questions for US
[and not just U.S.]
üDoes U.S. have an “obligation” to lead?
üIs U.S. leadership valuable?
üIs it sustainable?
üWhat should it look like, if it is to endure?
üU.S.-dominated liberal order containing challengers?
üU.S. + Allies managing multipolar system?
üFocus on multilateral institutions to share costs, risks, benefits?
üHow do we achieve these ends?
üWhat obligations do others have?

Look-Ahead
Wednesday, 11 April, & Thursday, 12 April
üCase Study Presentations & Discussion
üWednesday, 11 April:
üDouble session (1700-1830 & 1845-2015) Room U41
üThursday, 12 April:
üDouble session (1515-1645 & 1700-1830) Room P22
üYour Presentation should …
1.Describe issue
2.Analyze U.S. historical/current role in dealing with this issue
3.Assess U.S. role … what IS vs. what SHOULD BE
üIf you are presenting … email slides & team contribution to me
üIf you are not presenting … Essay #2 due at beginning of class
üMore …
ü
ü

Look-Ahead
Friday, 13 April
üImplications for the Rest of Us (YOU)
üSingle session (1130-1300)
üRoom U42
üFocus on “lessons learned”
üBring to class at least THREE “lessons learned”:
üWhat did you learn from this course that was most valuable to you, either intellectually,
professionally, or personally?
üGive me (by email or on paper) your personal assessment of your preparation, engagement, and
participation in the seminar

Implications for the Rest of Us …
Friday, 13 April 2018