Menachem Begin: A Past Master at Negotiation
Author(s): William B. Quandt
Source: The Brookings Review, Vol. 2, No. 2 (Winter, 1983), pp. 12-15
Published by: Brookings Institution Press
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Menachem Begin:
A Past Master
at Negotiation
William B. Quandt
William B. Quandt is a senior fellow in the
Foreign Policy Studies program at Smok
ings. He was a Middle East specialist on the
National Security Council staff from 1972 to
1974 and from 1977 to 1979. His books in
clude Saudi Arabia in the 1980s and Dec
ade of Decisions: American Policy
Toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1967
1976. He is currently engaged in a study of
the Camp David agreements.
12 The Brookings Review Winter 1983
NOTHING SO SHARPLY CONTRASTED withMenachemBe
gin's political career as his manner of leaving it. The reclusive, tired,
reportedly despondent figure of recent months bears little resem
blance to the fiery, determined, and often rigid person who presided over
Israeli political life for the crucial six-year period following his selection as
prime minister in mid-1977. Begin came to power after a lifetime of political
struggle?after years spent in prison, in the underground, and in opposi
tion, often relegated to the fringes of power. He had only a brief chance to
translate into reality his compelling ideological and historical vision of Eretz
Israel, powerful and independent, able to offer refuge to Jews of the world,
with borders stretching from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea.
It is too early to know what history's judgment of the Begin era will be,
but his legacy is clearly a controversial one that will long be debated in Israel
and elsewhere. He can take credit for reaching peace with Israel's largest
Arab neighbor, Egypt, but as Begin fades from the scene, so also does the
promise of a real, lasting peace between Israel and the Arabs. Even the
relationship with Cairo can be described only as a "cold peace," and many
Israelis wonder how long it can last. On the domestic front, Begin's retire
ment coincided with a severe economic crisis that revealed the tenuousness
of the prosperity that Begin's economic policies had generated. That shaky
prosperity was enough to get Begin reelected in 1981, but it was built on
massive debt that entailed great dependency on the United States?and
thus susceptibility to a whole range of pressures. And Begin's dream of a
revival of Jewish migration to Israel has not been realized. Instead, many
Israelis leave their country each year, some never to return.
If, as many reported, Begin was in a state of depression at the time of his
retirement, the most likely reason was the unending tragedy of Lebanon,
where Israel fought what was, in the eyes of its own citizens, its least
justifiable war. Whatever grand design may have convinced Begin to launch
"Operation Peace for Galilee" in June, 1982, little of it could be seen in the
murky Lebanese realities of late 1983.
Over 500 Israelis, and many thousands of Lebanese and Palestinians,
died in a war that left the Middle East as far from peace as ever. True, the
Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) was driven from Beirut, but Pal
estinians have not ended their struggle for control over at least a portion of
what they consider to be their homeland. Syria, Israel's most vocal enemy,
managed to emerge from the military setback in Lebanon to claim a surpris
ingly strong position a year later. The Soviets, who stood by while Israeli
bombs rained down on Beirut, rushed to resupply the Syrians in late 1982
with advanced weapons and to strengthen Moscow's position in the
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region. And Israel's Christian allies in Lebanon have
not lived up to Begin's high hopes. The laboriously
negotiated Lebanese-Israeli accord of May 17,1983, re
mains a dead letter. All in all, Begin and his supporters
have little to show from the war in Lebanon.
If there is anything that Menachem Begin can take
quiet satisfaction from at the end of his tenure, it must
be the knowledge that Israel's presence in the West
Bank, Gaza, and Jerusalem is all but permanent. When
he entered office as prime minister, the official policy of
the government of Israel was that portions of the West
Bank and Gaza would be returned to Arab control in
the context of a peace settlement. Begin abruptly
changed Israel's policy, declaring that even in exchange
for peace and recognition, Israel would not return these
territories?which he considered to be a "liberated"
part of Eretz Israel. After six years and massive invest
ments in settlements, roads, and infrastructure, Israel's
hold on these areas seems assured, and American and
Arab efforts to keep open the possibility of trading "ter
ritory for peace" have failed.
Many of Begin's admirers, and most of his critics, feel
that the war in Lebanon was really fought to strengthen
Israel's grip on the West Bank and Gaza. If that was in
fact his motivation, then Begin may feel that the war
served some purpose. But one must still ask whether
future generations of Israelis will thank Begin, or blame
him, for making Israel responsible not only for the terri
tory of the West Bank and Gaza, but also for the more
than one million Palestinian Arabs who live there. If
Israel keeps the territory and wishes to remain true to
democratic principles, it will become pluralistic and
binational, and the main raison d'etre of the Zionist
experiment?creation of a Jewish state?will have been
forfeited. Or Israel can remain a Jewish state, but one
that rules in colonial fashion over 35 to 40 percent of its
population?a restive and articulate Palestinian minor
ity that is deprived of political rights.
Tactician or Strategist?
Menachem Begin is a hard man to assess fairly. His
strong personality, his old-world demeanor, his ideo
logical bent, and his rhetorical flair arouse strong feel
ings among his supporters?who chanted during his
election campaign, "Begin, King of Israel"?and his de
tractors. His courtly manners, even his sense of humor,
could be disarming, while his rigidity and verbal ex
cesses often provoked antagonism.
What most people never saw was Begin the politi
cian, the man who shrewdly weighed the pros and
cons of issues, measured public opinion while seeking
to mold it, judiciously leaked stories to the press when
it could help his cause, knew the value of compromise,
and appreciated the realities of power. This was Begin
the tactician, maneuvering, seeking to seize the initia
tive from others, possessing a fine sense of timing, and
using to good effect his reputation for intransigence.
Begin the politician was a master tactician, made
more formidable by his absolute certainty about the
justice of the goals he was pursuing. These were not
personal goals of wealth or prestige. Begin lived mod
estly and, while a very proud man, did not suffer from
Lise Gladstone
excessive egotism. His drive for power seemed deeply
rooted in the trauma of his own people. He was deter
mined to make Israel a strong Jewish state in as much of
its ancestral homeland as possible. His world was one
in which anti-Semitism was an ever-present danger,
and opposition to Israeli policies, even by Jews, was
seen as tantamount to being anti-Jewish.
Begin was an educated man, yet very parochial. His
knowledge was primarily of Europe and European Jew
ry. Although he was obsessed by the threat to his coun
try posed by Arab nations, he knew little about these
neighbors. Unlike Abba Eban or Moshe Day an, he nev
er learned Arabic. He rarely met with any Arabs, even
when he was trying to promote the virtues of his pro
posals on Palestinian autonomy to the Arabs living un
der Israeli occupation. In fact, he spent almost no time
at all in the areas of Judea and Samaria, to which he was
so deeply committed.
The Brookings Review Winter 1983 13
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// there is anything that
Menachem Begin can take quiet
satisfaction from at the end
of his tenure, it must be the
knowledge that Israel's presence
in the West Bank, Gaza, and
Jerusalem is all but permanent.
No doubt Begin had a moral blindspot concerning
the Palestinian question. This seems to have made it
easier for him to characterize the Palestinians and their
leaders as irrevocably hostile to Israel. To have accepted
the possibility of compromise and mutual recognition,
as he did with Egypt, would have obliged him to con
sider the return of the West Bank to Arab control. This,
on ideological and historical grounds, he would not
consider. It was on the Palestinian question?and espe
cially on the issue of territorial compromise over what
Begin always called Judea and Samaria?that he was
unyielding.
Once one understands that Menachem Begin's
touchstone was the integrity of Eretz Israel, then much
else follows in understandable ways. Begin made peace
with Egypt, on terms that included the return of all
Sinai, as a step toward incorporating the West Bank.
Begin ordered the army into Lebanon in the summer of
1982 to destroy the PLO, but not?as many of his Le
banese allies, and probably General Ariel Sharon,
would have wished?to drive out the Syrians. Begin
proposed an autonomy plan for the West Bank as a
means of deflecting U.S. pressure, but on a day-to-day
basis focused on building a strong, irreversible Israeli
presence in the territories, not on encouraging Palestin
ians to assume more responsibility for their own lives.
It was Begin's fundamental strategic judgment that
Israel could be secure only if it could defeat its enemies
in battle and if it could control all of the territory west of
the Jordan River. So intent was he in the pursuit of
these goals that he neglected many domestic issues,
both economic and social. He may also have missed
opportunities to reach tacit or explicit accommodations
with King Hussein of Jordan and with Palestinians in
the occupied territories. He certainly damaged Israel's
standing in American public opinion. And he saddled
Israel with the burden of having to decide what to do
with more than one million Palestinians of the West
Bank and Gaza.
14 The Brookings Review Winter 1983
Historians of a later era will have to judge the strate
gic vision pursued by Menachem Begin?and that vi
sion may prove to be so controversial that no consensus
on its merits will emerge. What will be agreed upon by
all those who saw Begin operate in his prime is his skill
as a politician. On the tactical level, he was doubtless
brilliant, outmaneuvering his fellow Israelis, the Arabs,
and two American presidents. Nowhere was his politi
cal acumen more clearly demonstrated than in the
Camp David negotiations.
Begin at Camp David and After
At Camp David, Begin was in top form?sure of him
self, skillful in his tactics, clear in his objectives, and
tenacious in negotiating with two formidable leaders,
Anwar Sadat of Egypt and President Jimmy Carter.
Begin left Camp David having achieved far more of his
objectives than Sadat and Carter achieved of theirs. Let
us look for a moment at how he did it.
Soon after becoming prime minister, Begin flew to
Washington to meet with Carter. It was immediately
clear that Israeli policy had changed. Begin distrusted
any substantive role for the United States in negotia
tions, fearing that Washington would tilt in favor of the
Arabs. He sought to restrict his discussions with Carter
to procedural issues and to a sweeping review of his
tory. In addition, he placed great emphasis on Israel's
strategic importance to the United States in the East
West confrontation.
When Carter managed to get him to focus on sub
stance in a private talk on July 19, 1977, Begin spelled
out clearly that he would agree to relinquish most of
Sinai in return for peace with Egypt, but that he would
never accept any "foreign sovereignty" over the West
Bank. In response to Carter's request that he promise
not to build more settlements in occupied territory,
Begin said that he could not make such a promise, but
that he would do his best to act with restraint. In return,
he asked Carter not to talk about the 1967 lines as the
eventual secure and recognized borders of Israel, and
he urged Carter not to repeat the phrase "Palestinian
homeland."
From this first encounter, it seemed clear to the
Americans present that Begin sought a separate peace
with Egypt and would not willingly make any conces
sions on the Palestinian issue. When looked at closely,
his position involved a major departure from that of his
predecessor in one respect. The Labor governments
from 1967 to 1977 had opposed the creation of a Pales
tinian state, but they had been prepared to apply the
"territory for peace" formula of U.N. Resolution 242 to
a future agreement with Jordan?prepared, in other
words, to return some, but not all, of the West Bank to
Jordanian authority in the context of peace. Begin, who
had quit the cabinet in 1970 when Israel formally ac
cepted 242 with this interpretation, staunchly main
tained that Israel was under no obligation to withdraw
from any of the West Bank, even in the context of
peace. In his view, Jordan had no valid claim to sover
eignty over any of this territory. In a novel twist, Begin
now said that he did accept 242, but that he interpreted
its withdrawal provision as applying only to Sinai.
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Throughout much of the next year, the United States
and Egypt tried to get Begin to agree to a freeze on
settlement activities in the occupied territories and to
an understanding that the withdrawal provision of
U.N. Resolution 242 did indeed apply to all fronts, in
cluding the West Bank. Begin was masterful at resisting
all pressures. The ability and single-mindedness of the
man were much in evidence in the months leading up
to Camp David.
On one level, Begin tried to go behind Carter's back
to see if a separate deal could be struck with Sadat.
Several secret contacts took place in late 1977, along
with the highly publicized and politically significant
bilateral meetings between Begin and Sadat in Jerusa
lem in November and Ismailia in December. Sadat soon
concluded that his position was too weak to deal with
Begin alone, so he asked Carter to rejoin the negotia
tions. However, Begin had already staked out his basic
position. In essence, he offered Sadat most of what he
wanted in strict Israeli-Egyptian terms, while refusing
to give Sadat anything significant on the Palestinian
question. Initially, Sadat refused the offer, and during
most of 1978 he tried to use Carter to pressure Begin to
be more forthcoming.
Begin simply refused to budge. To ward off U.S. and
Egyptian initiatives, he came up with a plan of his own
in mid-December, 1977, that he called "home rule" for
the Palestinians. It was vintage Begin. A formal docu
ment was drawn up with excessive detail. Begin lob
bied hard for his plan in the United States, and in one
meeting listed for Carter all the prominent Americans
who supposedly supported it. When Carter expressed
a mildly positive opinion about the plan, Begin immedi
ately told the press that the president had termed it a
"fair basis for negotiations." Although he never won
full American support for the plan, he did insure that
his ideas became the focus of discussion. Eventually the
"home rule" proposal was modified and redefined. The
Camp David accords did provide for a five-year transi
tional regime for the West Bank and Gaza during which
Palestinians could exercise "self-government" or "ad
ministrative autonomy." This was an outgrowth of
Begin's original idea.
In addition to recognizing the importance of control
ling the agenda for negotiations, Begin also knew how
to turn to good advantage his reputation for intransi
gence. He would resist mightily making even the most
insignificant verbal concessions, so that when he
would finally decide to give an inch it would seem like a
yard. Sadat became thoroughly exasperated by this tac
tic, which meant that he paid little attention to words
and details. Begin was able to get most of what he
wanted in the final agreements. Carter also disliked the
tactic, but he could never find a way to counter it.
Instead, he and Secretary Vance often ended up negoti
ating the precise words of a text on Sadat's behalf.
Begin also had a great sense of timing. He would
push negotiations to the breaking point and then at the
last moment would give just enough to get what he
really wanted in return. For example, at Camp David
he was unwilling to agree, until the next to the last day
of discussions, to remove Israeli settlements from Sinai.
By then, Sadat had already threatened to walk out
once, Carter had nearly concluded that the talks would
end in failure, and a whole host of issues were still left
to be resolved. Finally, in one marathon session of ne
gotiating, Begin yielded on the question of settlements
in Sinai and in return won removal from the agreement
of several key points that would have held Israel to the
"peace for withdrawal" formula on the West Bank.
In March, 1979, in one of his most remarkable perfor
mances, Begin once again took negotiations to the brink
of failure before edging back just enough to ensure
success on his terms. President Carter decided to travel
to the Middle East in a last attempt to clinch an agree
ment between Sadat and Begin. By the time he arrived
in Jerusalem, only a few significant issues remained to
be solved. One involved a footnote to one article of the
treaty. The Egyptians wanted a phrase changed?from
"does not derogate from" to "does not contradict."
Begin maintained that this change would nullify the
entire sense of the treaty, an implication that none of
the native English speakers could see in the proposed
revision. Much of one day was spent in Jerusalem with
the American and Israeli delegations looking through
dictionaries and thesauruses to find substitute
language.
The spectacle of the president, the secretary of state,
the secretary of defense, the assistant to the president
for national security affairs, and half a dozen of their
top aides trying to find a word acceptable to Begin must
have given him a sense of power and importance. Fi
nally, Begin came into the room and announced that he
had found a solution. He proposed the phrase "does
not affect," which had exactly the opposite meaning
from that which was intended. Secretary Vance replied
that "does not contravene" seemed more appropriate.
Begin hesitated, gravely acknowledged that this was a
serious proposal, and said that he would have to dis
cuss it with his cabinet.
A few hours later the answer came back: Begin could
not accept "does not contravene," but he could accept
"is not to be construed as contravening." The Ameri
cans, who never quite understood the game that was
being played, saw no difference, shrugged, and felt
relieved to have gotten over one more hurdle. Of
course, the other important issues that could have been
discussed during those long hours were all still pend
ing, to be dealt with in haste on the morning of Carter's
departure from Israel. Begin had once again put his
reputation for rigidity and verbal precision to good use
for major political purposes.
In the end, it was this combination of single-minded
ness, tenacity, and toughness, coupled with a real un
derstanding of the uses of power and persuasion, that
made of Menachem Begin a larger than life-size figure.
Whether or not his vision of Israel is one that his own
countrymen will want to live with for long, he has left
them a powerful legacy. And Begin's name will be
linked with other great Israeli leaders?Ben Gurion and
Golda Meir, for example?who in their time held him in
contempt. So, as Menachem Begin eases his grip on
Israeli political life and passes the mantle to his chosen
successor, he must find some satisfaction in knowing
that history will treat him seriously, if not necessarily
kindly.
The Brookings Review Winter 1983 15
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