National Security Decision-Making in Israel:
Processes, Pathologies, and Strengths
CharlesD.Freilich
MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL ✭ VOLUME 60, NO. 4, AUTUMN 2006
This article presents a first of its kind typology of Israeli national security decisionmaking
processes, focusing on five primary pathologies and a number of strengths.
It will demonstrate that these pathologies are the product of an extraordinarily
compelling external environment and domestic structural factors: chiefly, the
extreme politicization of the decision-making process stemming from the
proportional representation electoral system, the consequent need to govern
through coalition cabinets, and the absence of effective cabinet-level decisionmaking
support capabilities.
Ever since Israel’s establishment in 1948, it has confronted an external environment
whose primary characteristic has been perceived as one of nearly unremitting and
overwhelming hostility. Repeated wars, perpetual hostilities at lower levels, the failed
peace processes with the Palestinians and Syria, and even the “cold” peace with
Egypt and Jordan have reinforced this image. As a result, national security has been at
the forefront of Israeli political life for six decades.
Israel has responded to these circumstances on two levels: by building up a
disproportionate defense capability to forestall the threats to its security and by developing
a “hunkering down” national security decision-making style geared to a “garrison
democracy.”1
Indeed, by the 1970s and 80s, Israel’s national security establishment
(armed forces, intelligence services, defense and foreign ministries, defense
industries) had not only earned a reputation for quality, but had even become one of
the world’s largest in absolute numbers. In the period since, the defense establishment
has developed further, both in size and organizational complexity.
The literature on government and politics in Israel is extensive, though skewed
in its emphasis. Almost all studies by journalists, practitioners, and even scholars have
taken a clearly historical and case-study-oriented approach, with virtually every event,
incident, and major development in Israeli history extensively chronicled.A fair amount
of attention also has been given to the formal structures and institutions of Israeli
governance and politics. Little attention has been devoted, however, to the processes
Charles (Chuck) D. Freilich was Israel’s Deputy National Security Adviser until 2005. Currently a Senior
Fellow at the Belfer Center at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, Freilich is working on a book
on national security decision-making in Israel.
1. Term used by J.C. Hurewitz, Middle East Politics: The Military Dimension (Boulder: Westview,
1982).
© Middle East Institute. This article is for personal research only and may not be copied
or distributed in any form without the permission of The Middle East Journal.
636 ✭ MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL
of Israeli national security decision-making and to an attempt to develop an overall
typology thereof.2
This article seeks to close the gap and to present a typology of Israeli decisionmaking,
focusing on five primary pathologies. It will seek to demonstrate that these
pathologies are largely the product of two primary factors and the interplay between
them: an extraordinarily compelling external environment and domestic structural factors,
chief among them the extreme politicization of the decision-making process
(DMP) stemming from the proportional representation (PR) electoral system and consequent
need to govern through coalition cabinets.
ENVIRONMENTAL SOURCES OF ISRAELI NATIONAL SECURITY
DECISION-MAKING
DECISIONS ARE CRITICAL AND FATEFUL
For nearly 60 years, and in the pre-state days as well, Israeli national security
policy has been predicated on a broad national consensus, which holds that Israel
faces a realistic threat of genocide, or at a minimum, of politicide. Indeed, the dangers
and degree of external threat posed by the hostile security environment over the years
are so extreme that they bear little substantive comparison to other countries.3
In recent years, the threat of all-out conventional warfare has receded greatly
(despite the 2006 war in Lebanon), and the war in Iraq eliminated the feared Iraqi
WMD threat to Israel. Nonetheless, Iran’s nuclear program continues to be perceived
as an imminent existential threat, and additional threats, severe if not existential, also
persist, including Syrian WMD capabilities, Hizbullah’s massive rocket arsenal (as
amply demonstrated in the recent fighting), and ongoing terrorism. The second Intifada,
though not a major military threat in the conventional sense, was perceived by many
in Israel as a challenge to the very fabric of its society. Experience has demonstrated
further that national security decisions contain the potential for transforming the nation’s
future course and fundamental character, as was the case following the 1967 Six Day
2. Lewis Brownstein’s interesting, though unfortunately brief article is an early exception to this rule.
“Decision Making in Israeli Foreign Policy:An Unplanned Process,” Political Science Quarterly,Vol.
92, No. 2 (1977), pp. 259 – 279.Yehuda Ben Meir’s work on national security decision-making in Israel
was a major step forward and set out many of the issues of importance, National Security Decisionmaking:
The Israeli Case (Boulder: Westview, 1986). The first major breakthrough in this area came with the
publication of Yehezkel Dror’s Memorandum to the Prime Minister: Book Two [Tazkir Lerosh
HaMemshala] (Jerusalem: Academon, 1989) and his Grand Strategy for Israel [Istrategia Rabati
Leyisrael] (Jerusalem: Academon, 1989). More recent works of note in this regard, though of more
limited perspective, are Ben Meir’s Civil-Military-Relations in Israel (NY: Columbia University Press,
1995); Yoram Peri’s recent Generals in the Cabinet Room (Washington, DC: US Institute for Peace
Press, 2006); and Zeev Maoz, Defending the Holy Land (Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan, 2006). See
also, Michael Brecher’s works Decisions in Israel’s Foreign Policy (New Haven: Yale, 1972) and
Decisions in Crisis (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1980).
3.Yehezkel Dror, Improving Policymaking and Administration in Israel (TelAviv: Sifriat Haminhal,
1978), p. 158.
NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION-MAKING IN ISRAEL ✭ 637
War and 1993 Oslo Accords.
THE ENVIRONMENT IS NOT MALLEABLE
A second perception, which had an overwhelming impact on Israeli policy until
the late 1970s and to a lesser, though still significant, extent to this day, is the view of
Arab hostility as being so pervasive and extreme as to preclude any ability to materially
alter the nation’s circumstances through either military or diplomatic means. Following
the Sadat peace initiative, Israel’s strategic environment came to be perceived as
considerably more complex and nuanced, providing greater opportunities and room
for maneuver than was thought previously, while the national consensus regarding the
nature of the threats Israel faced unraveled. Nonetheless, the fundamental perception
of Arab hostility has persisted, and a large segment of the political spectrum continues
to perceive a very limited range of military or diplomatic options.4
A COMPLEX ENVIRONMENT WORTHY OF A MAJOR POWER
Although a very small nation, Israel faces numerous and complex national security
“environments” — diplomatic, political, economic, technological, and military.
Though true to varying extents of all states, Israel is affected by changes in a far
broader external environment than most and to a far greater extent. Indeed, by the
1990s, Israel’s national security environment had come to extend far beyond its borders
and “natural” interests in the Middle East, and began to encompass “the world.”
Ties with traditional partners became increasingly complex as well. The following
are a few examples to illustrate:
· The strategic WMD threats posed by Iran, Iraq, and Libya in the so-called
second- and third-tier confrontation states came to be viewed as the primary
danger to Israel’s security, presenting unprecedented challenges.
· Ties with the United States grew even deeper, requiring new areas of expertise
and ways of thinking. From a comparatively simple dependency relationship,
Israel-US ties now included cooperation in state-of-the-art arms development
and Israel sought to become a “strategic partner.” Joint counter-terror and
counter-proliferation efforts raised bilateral cooperation to new levels. Moreover,
the continually deepening role of the US in the Middle East meant a new set
of considerations for Israel, as did US concerns regarding its newly expanding
ties with nations such as China and India.
4. Dan Horowitz and Moshe Lissak, “Democracy and National Security in a Protracted Conflict,”
Jerusalem Quarterly, Vol. 51 (Summer 1984), p. 5; and Dror, Improving Policy Making, pp. 159, 162-
163.
638 ✭ MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL
· Long-standing, often problematic, relations with Europe became increasingly
complex, as the EU’s role in the region grew, and Israeli-European relations
took on a whole new range of issues with which Israel had limited experience
(including the political, economic, and social ramifications of a major upgrading
of the relationship, or establishment of ties with NATO). Relations with
individual European states also expanded, including strategic dialogue.
· The collapse of the Soviet Union led to the establishment of relations with
Russia, the arrival of one million Russian immigrants to Israel, and a fundamental
change in Russia’s role in the region. Israel faced a new necessity to take
Russia’s interests into account.
· The Far East became an area of considerable Israeli interest, due to North
Korean nuclear and missile proliferation, the establishment of relations with China
— with whom economic ties expanded rapidly, but whose proliferation policies
and problematic relationship with the US were sources of friction — and expanding
ties with Japan.
· The Subcontinent also became a focus of interest, due to Indian and Pakistani
proliferation and the rapidly expanding strategic relationship with India. Terror
in South America and Africa brought these regions into greater focus as well.
· For both economic and military reasons, Israel found it necessary to compete
at the forefront of military technology, becoming one of the few countries in the
world capable of producing combat aircraft and satellites, as well as the Arrow
anti-missile system, and generally a world leader in hi-tech.As Israel’s economy
advanced, its interest in global economic trends and international economic fora,
such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) and Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD), also grew.
Growing environmental complexity led not just to new areas of interest, but to
far more complicated decisions themselves. Thus, by way of illustration, the comparatively
simple Uzi submachine gun development program of the 1950s was succeeded
by the development of the Lavi fighter in the 80s and the Arrow system in the
90s. Similarly, Israeli responses to cases of Arab belligerence evolved from the simple
retaliatory raids of the 1950s, to the complex web of regional and global considerations
involved in the 1991 and 2003 Gulf Wars, when an Israeli response could have
had global repercussions. The comparatively simple attempts to thwart Egyptian missile
development efforts in the 1950s were succeeded by the intricate and conflicting
array of US, Russian, and European interests involved in the Iranian missile and
nuclear programs in the 1990s and early part of this decade.
NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION-MAKING IN ISRAEL ✭ 639
EXTREME UNCERTAINTY: CHANGE IS RAPID AND SHARP
Israel’s national security environment is extraordinarily volatile, extreme both
in the sweeping breadth of change in threats and opportunities, as well as in their
frequency, and is characterized by an extremely high degree of uncertainty. Indeed, it
has been claimed, with only some hyperbole, that crises are the expected situation in
Israel.5
By way of example, the decade between 1995-2005 included the peace processes
with the Palestinians (Oslo II Accords, Camp David Summit, Gaza Disengagement
Plan) and Syrians (the overtures under Israeli Prime Ministers Yitzhak Rabin,
Shimon Peres, Binyamin Netanyahu, and Ehud Barak, culminating in the failed
Shepherdstown and Geneva summits), the second Intifada and unprecedented domestic
terror attacks, the evolution of the Iranian and Iraqi WMD threats and war in
Iraq, and withdrawal from Lebanon and the development of a massive rocket threat
from Hizbullah, which was used extensively in the recent fighting. A variety of domestic
developments with major implications for national security policy also took
place, including the Rabin assassination in 1995, rapid cabinet turnover (seven governments
in ten years), the growing size and strength of the settler movement, and
rapid economic development, particularly of the hi-tech sector.
STRUCTURAL SOURCES OF NATIONAL SECURITY
DECISION-MAKING
COALITION-CABINET GOVERNANCE
The single most important structural determinant of Israel’s national security
decision-making process is the PR electoral system and the consequent need to govern
through coalition-cabinets. An historical outgrowth of the Zionist movement’s
highly ideological nature, the PR system was first adopted as a means of incorporating
as many groups as possible under its organizational umbrella and later continued
after independence. By giving all a voice, it was hoped that maximal unity could be
achieved. In reality, the PR system not only reflects the existing diversity of views,
but further amplifies it considerably, especially given the extremely low electoral threshold
(only 1% until the 1990s and currently 2%). The system thus ensures that the Knesset
is split between a plethora of parties, each of which represents the ideological beliefs
and interests of narrow constituencies.
The party split in the Knesset also is expressed in the cabinet, as no party has
ever been able to form a government on its own. Governance is thus, a priori, a nearly
all-consuming exercise in coalition management, including ongoing maneuvering and
ideological compromise, in an attempt to keep the coalition together. In recent de-
5. Dror, Grand Strategy, p. 69.
640 ✭ MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL
cades, cabinet coalitions have become increasingly fractious and unstable.6
Ministers are appointed primarily on the basis of their party’s and their own
personal political clout, rather than their professional expertise, managerial abilities,
or personal inclinations. These are generally taken into account, if at all, only after
the ministries have been divvied up in the coalition negotiations. Until the recent
appointment of Amir Peretz, the position of Minister of Defense was an exception to
this rule, whereas the Foreign and Finance Ministers, and even Minister of Justice,
have long been victims of the “spoils system.”
As political figures in their own right, ministers do not serve at “the Prime
Minister’s pleasure” and are not necessarily beholden to him. Ostensibly just first
among equals, the prime minister has few prerogatives of office and formal sources
of influence over ministers. While de facto political clout is a decisive factor in all
systems of government, the formal authority of the Israeli prime minister is particularly
circumscribed. Prime ministers such as Menachem Begin, who were in firm
control of their party and who led relatively cohesive coalitions, were very powerful
executives, capable of promoting even highly controversial policies. Others have been
far weaker and at the mercy of the contending forces within the coalition and without.
Peres, Netanyahu, and Barak saw their political support bleed away and lead to the
collapse of their governments. Ariel Sharon had to ride a political roller coaster to
force through the Gaza Disengagement Plan, demonstrating both the strengths and
weaknesses of his office.
Over the years, the size of the cabinet has increased, with the creation of new
ministries and the appointment of “Ministers Without Portfolio” as a means of increasing
the number of cabinet-level positions available for coalition formation. Since
the 1980s, the number of ministers has fluctuated, reaching an unmanageable number
in the low to upper twenties. Given the cabinet’s size, a sub-cabinet defense committee
(known today as the Ministerial Committee on Defense or MCOD), has been
convened throughout most of Israeli history as a means of conducting more discrete,
effective, and expedited deliberations.
THE KNESSET IS A VIRTUAL LEGISLATIVE BRANCH
Under Israel’s coalition-cabinet system, the cabinet, by definition, almost always
enjoys an automatic parliamentary majority, in effect negating the principle of
6. Until the Labor Party’s fall from office in 1977, following 29 years of uninterrupted rule, Israel’s
coalitions were all centered around a loose alliance between Labor and the then-moderate National
Religious Party (NRP). Since that time, the degree of ideological congruence within governing coalitions
has decreased markedly: Begin’s first Likud–led coalition included the dovish Democratic Party
for Change, while the 1980s were witness to six years of Labor-Likud “National Unity Governments.”
The first Shamir coalition included Likud and the right-wing fringe party Moledet, the Netanyahu
coalition included Likud, NRP, Shas (a Sephardic religious party), and Israel Bealiyah (a Russian
immigrant party). The Rabin coalition included Labor and both the dovish left wing Meretz party and
Shas. Barak’s coalition included Labor, Meretz and, initially, Shas, NRP, and Israel Bealiyah. The three
Sharon coalitions have ranged from narrow Likud-Labor cabinets, to a Likud, Shinui (a centrist party),
NRP, and radical right-wing Ichud Leumi combo.
NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION-MAKING IN ISRAEL ✭ 641
separation of powers and denying the Knesset a significant oversight role. Thus, with
the rare exception of issues of supreme importance and fundamental partisan discord,
such as votes on the Camp David Accords or the Gaza Disengagement Plan, the
Knesset’s actual impact on national security policy is negligible.
Meetings of the Foreign and DefenseAffairs Committee (FADAC), which, along
with Finance, is considered one of the Knesset’s two most important and prestigious
committees, tend to feature raucous debates along party lines, like those of the Knesset
as a whole, rather than serious deliberation. Committee members are almost entirely
preoccupied with their political activities — which, unlike parliamentary achievements,
are the primary basis of their future Knesset membership and possible promotion to
ministerial positions — and thus have little time, and even less incentive, to take on the
politically unpopular task of challenging the national security establishment. Moreover,
the committee lacks any staff of its own, making it almost entirely dependent on
the national security establishment for information and thereby further limiting its
oversight capabilities. Officials appear before the committee only with the approval of
their respective agency heads, and information presented is cleared in advance, typically
in a manner designed to obfuscate, at least as much as to clarify, and to make the
committee’s ability to delve into sensitive issues that much more difficult.
Nonetheless, in recent years, more information has been presented to the FADAC
than was the case in the past, primarily to its subcommittees (e.g., Intelligence, Procurement,
etc.), in which secrecy is generally observed and some substantive debate
does take place. Some attempts also have been made in recent decades to conduct
more substantive work, primarily by Chairmen of the FADAC such as Dan Meridor
andYuval Steinmetz, but these have been sporadic and have either not been brought to
fruition or have failed to have an actual policy impact. The committee thus remains,
on the whole, of little influence.
WEAK POLICY FORMULATION AND COORDINATION CAPABILITIES
Neither the prime minister nor the cabinet have significant policy-making machinery
at their disposal. Prior to the establishment of the National Security Council
(NSC) in 1999, the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) traditionally consisted of just a
handful of advisers (a Chief of Bureau, Foreign Affairs Adviser, and Military Secretary)
who usually served more as aides, responsible primarily for the prime minister’s
day-to-day needs and certainly lacking the capacity to conduct systematic policy formulation
and coordination. The Cabinet Secretariat, the sole support mechanism serving
the cabinet, is a purely administrative unit, responsible for the technical flow of
issues and documents.
To date, the NSC has had little impact on the work of the PMO or cabinet, as the
prime ministers in office since its establishment (Barak, Sharon, and now Ehud Olmert),
have chosen to continue working through the traditional advisers and processes. The
NSC has only a small staff and embryonic policy formulation capabilities; with the
exception of a few issues, it has been relegated to a largely inconsequential position.
The PMO and cabinet thus lack the organizational capabilities necessary to conduct
642 ✭ MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL
systematic policy assessment and formulation, inter-ministerial coordination, and to
follow-up on implementation, and remain almost entirely dependent on the various
ministers and bureaucracies. In some ways the dysfunctional nature of the PMO has
even worsened in recent years, as lines of authority have blurred and competing appointments
were made.7
To further exacerbate matters, the policy planning and formulation capabilities
in the civilian national security bureaucracies remain weak. The Foreign Ministry
lacks the personnel and organizational processes needed for systematic policy formulation
and focuses on the day to day management of Israel’s foreign relations. Its
Policy Planning Division remains an organizational backwater, whose outputs are almost
totally dependent on the individuals composing it, with few permanent and structured
procedures to ensure relatively constant and uniform performance. The Ministry
of Defense (MoD) is also almost totally devoid of policy formulating capabilities.
Only the IDF has a highly effective policy formulating mechanism, in the form of its
Planning Branch. Established after the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the Planning Branch
deals not only in military planning for the General Staff, but in strategic politicomilitary
planning, geared largely to the needs of the PM, Minister of Defense, and
cabinet. Though somewhat constrained by its nature as a military unit, the Planning
Branch has fulfilled many of the functions of an NSC, both prior to the latter’s establishment
and in practice ever since.
The MoD, in recognition of the weakness of its policy planning capabilities and
consequent dependence on the IDF Planning Branch, decided in 2003 to rectify this
anomaly by taking over the latter’s politico-military planning functions. As of this
writing, this important reform has been only partially implemented and so far has
succeeded primarily in downgrading the capabilities of the Planning Branch, without a
commensurate improvement in the MoD’s.
GROWTH IN SIZE AND SOPHISTICATION OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY MACHINERY
Notwithstanding the weaknesses in policy formation and coordination, the national
security bureaucracy and related organizations have grown tremendously in
recent decades, in size, organizational complexity, and processual sophistication. New
organizational structures have been added, existing ones greatly expanded, and staff
work within agencies has improved markedly, along with intensive usage of information
technology (IT) capabilities and increasing levels of professionalism. To cite just
7. Barak appointed the head of a Politico-Military Staff and special advisers. Under Sharon, the
Chief of Bureau, Dov Weisglass, became the primary player and de facto National Security Adviser,
even after he ostensibly resigned (but in practice remained fully engaged), leaving the ForeignAffairs
Adviser, Military Secretary, and National SecurityAdviser to compete for influence in secondary areas.
At one point in 2005, a fifth player joined the fray in the PMO, with the appointment of a Head of the
Prime Minister’s StrategicAffairs Department. Netanyahu, Barak, and Sharon all relied on their private
lawyers, who were long-term acquaintances, for sensitive tasks, in some cases appointing them to senior
staff positions.
NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION-MAKING IN ISRAEL ✭ 643
a few examples, the IDF Planning Branch became a primary player in the IDF and at
the cabinet level; the intelligence community as a whole grew greatly in size and
capabilities and the Mossad, Shin Bet (and Foreign Ministry) each established new
research divisions; and the NSC and MoD politico-military policy planning branch
were established.
THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS:
HOW THE SYSTEM ACTUALLY WORKS
The previous section presented Israel’s unusually volatile, complex, and dangerfraught
external environment, as well as some of the structural dimensions affecting
Israeli national security decision-making, including the PR system and developments
in the national security machinery. The following section presents the effects of these
variables on the DMP and the resulting pathologies.
PATHOLOGY 1: A SHORT-TERM PERSPECTIVE PREDOMINATES
The persistent threat of imminent or actual hostilities has led to a nearly total
preoccupation in Israel with the “thundering present”8
and to the development of a
national security decision-making process geared toward ad hoc solutions to immediate
problems. Many of the issues Israel faces present only a narrow range of options,
require clear and immediate decisions in a highly charged and uncertain atmosphere,
and do not lend themselves to incremental decision-making.
The resulting short term perspective is manifested by a pronounced tendency
toward:
Reactive Decision-Making
Since the environment is perceived as being almost completely unmalleable, yet
extremely dangerous, Israeli decision makers largely have come to accept their inability
to foresee and shape Israel’s external relations and have adopted a reactive “sit
back and wait to see how things develop” approach. Indeed, some observers believe
that the most conspicuous element in Israeli decision-making is its essentially reactive
character.9
Nevertheless, some radical departures in Israeli policy have taken place
over the years, suggesting a more complex picture and a proactive ability to take bold
8. Dean Acheson’s term, quoted in Henry M. Jackson, ed., The National Security Council (NY:
Praeger, 1965).
9. Avi Shlaim and Avner Yaniv, “Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy in Israel,” International
Affairs, Vol. 56 (1980), p. 242; and R. Bilski, ed., Can Planning Replace Politics (Hague: Martinus
Nijoff, 1980), p. 115.
644 ✭ MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL
initiatives, at least under certain circumstances.10
Crisis Management and Iltur (Improvisation) are the Rule
Iltur prevails rather than forethought, planning, and prevention. To a large degree,
crisis management and improvisation were an unavoidable outgrowth of Israel’s
national security environment, particularly in the early decades after independence,
when resources were extremely scarce and institutional capabilities and standardized
procedures far more limited. A necessary evil at the time, they succeeded above and
beyond any reasonable expectation and have remained a primary characteristic of
much of Israeli decision-making to this day, indeed becoming a national hallmark,
sphere of excellence, and virtual faith. In too many areas, however, trial-and-error
decision-making and “fire-fighting” are the norm, and policies are tried and abandoned
as events develop, without forethought, systematic analysis, and a basic strategic
framework, the recent war in Lebanon being a case in point.11
Though not unique
to Israel, the degree to which these trends are manifested is certainly unusual.
In a politically polarized society, iltur has the great virtues of enabling action
without requiring the clear articulation of objectives and prior choice between policy
options, and of facilitating flexibility in times of change and crisis. In recent years,
however, Israel’s ability to improvise has decreased, as issues have become far more
complex, requiring lengthy, systematic planning and implementation, and as the cost
of error has grown and often become unacceptable.12
Moreover, the end of a revolutionary
period and development of the differentiated bureaucratic organs of statehood
inherently reduce the latitude for improvisation.
Even in the best of circumstances, Israel’s highly compelling and volatile external
environment would lead to decision-making with relatively short-term perspectives.
This fundamental constraint is further exacerbated by rapid coalition turnover,
which compels ministers to focus on the immediate electoral ramifications of their
actions, rather than on effective governance, by the weakness of policy formulating
bodies, and by factors further elaborated later, such as decision makers’ basic lack of
faith in policy planning. The bottom line is that for reasons inherent to both its governmental
structure and environment, the DMP in Israel is focused almost entirely on the
short term and thus on the operational agencies, rather than on those involved in
policy formulation. Little attention is accorded to basic and long-term issues, and a
short-term perspective predominates, which in turn further limits the ability to shape
the environment.
10. Rabin’s acceptance of Oslo and willingness to withdraw from the Golan, Barak’s withdrawal
from Lebanon and dramatic proposals at Camp David in 2000, Sharon’s Gaza Disengagement Plan, and
Olmert’s West Bank “consolidation,” are but a few examples thereof.
11. Dror, Improving Policymaking, pp. 175-176; and Dror, Memorandum to the Prime Minister,
p. 56.
12. See, for example, the above comparisons of the Uzi and Arrow programs, and of the ramifications
of retaliatory policy in the 1950s and 1990s.
NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION-MAKING IN ISRAEL ✭ 645
PATHOLOGY 2: EXTREME POLITICIZATION OF THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS
Due both to the nature of the PR system, as well as to the need to achieve
consensus within the governing coalitions and their component parties, the DMP in
Israel is extremely politicized. To this, one must add the unique circumstances of
Israel’s establishment, including the Holocaust, repeated wars and the ongoing security
situation ever since, and the fact that Israel remains divided to this day over
fundamental issues of its national existence, such as the status and future of the West
Bank. As a result, Israel also remains exceptional among democracies in the degree of
ideological fervor that continues to pervade its political life, even if Zionism’s ideological
intensity has decreased significantly since its early years. Issues of national security
are thus commonly argued in highly ideological and partisan terms that exceed
their objective weight and arguments are even made in terms of national survival,
despite the many cases where this was not truly at stake.
Politics are of course a major and legitimate consideration for leaders everywhere;
it is the degree of politicization in Israel that makes its DMP unusual.
Political Considerations Reign Supreme
On many issues of national security, the influence of political and ideological
considerations is overwhelming, regardless of their objective merits, as they become
the subject of partisan squabbling. This has the practical effect of foreclosing certain
options, or of channeling them in given directions, not only on inherently charged
ideological issues, such as the various peace processes or future of the settlements,
but even on ostensibly technical and financial decisions, such as the development of
major weapons systems.13
Indeed, political and ideological considerations permeate
the entire DMP at the national level, often superceding all calculations of strategic
interest.
Party Politics, Not Governance
For most ministers, party politics demand a disproportionate share of their time,
and indeed, are a primary focus of activity. Typically political figures in their own
right, rather than professional or even political appointees, ministers must continually
jockey to shore up their positions and ensure their political futures. With an extraordinarily
frenetic 24/7 news cycle, volatile party politics, and short terms between elections,
many ministers’ time must be devoted to intra-party politics no less than to the
affairs of their ministry and of state. Indeed, ministers’ future political careers usually
13. The final decision to kill the multi-billion dollar development program for the Lavi fighter was
made on a purely partisan basis, without regard for the financial, technological and operational considerations
presented. See Charles D. Freilich, Messianism and Realism: National Security Decision
Making in Israel (NY: Columbia University dissertation, 1992).
646 ✭ MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL
have far less to do with how effectively they run their ministries than with how well
they pander to their party’s constituency. Though the Defense Minister, and to a
lesser extent, the Foreign Minister, are expected to remain at least partially above the
political fray and are held somewhat more accountable for how they conduct ministerial
duties, they too must devote an inordinate amount of time and attention to party
politics.
The Coalition Above All
Maintaining the coalition often becomes an end in itself, and is, in any event, a
full-time preoccupation.14
Coalition politics lead to a marked propensity for the cabinet
to act as a forum for ironing out the differences dividing its coalition components
(or for obfuscating them and reaching livable compromises), rather than as an executive
body. The need for compromise and consensus greatly limits the “search” for
options and leads to a marked decrease in attention to long-range and fundamental
issues. A strategy of procrastination, incrementalism, partial solutions, and paralysis
often results, even on issues of grand strategy; there is a tendency to wait for issues
to degenerate into “no choice” situations that force action and require sudden improvisation.
The breakdown in the “national consensus” since 1967, on even the most
fundamental issues (e.g., the future of the Territories), has further exacerbated the
problem and become one of the major impediments to the government’s ability to
adopt decisive and more far-reaching policies.15
Life in a Political Fish Bowl
The politicized nature of the DMP, reinforced by short-term perspectives, dictates
the political wisdom of avoiding clearly defined policy objectives and of maintaining
constructive ambiguity. The resulting tendencies are:
· “Tacticalization of Strategy” and “Dynamic Incrementalism.” These tendencies
result in the consideration of each issue separately, in an “atomistic”
fashion. Major policy achievements are typically the cumulative, incremental —
often unintended — outcome of a series of ad hoc solutions to immediate needs,
rather than of a consciously and deliberately chosen course of action. Decision-
14. Former Defense Minister Moshe Arens (interview by author, June 21, 2006), former Acting
National SecurityAdviser Gideon Sheffer (interview by author, January 21, 2006) and former Director
General of the Ministry of Defense, National Security Adviser, and Air Force Commander David Ivry
(interview by author, June 4, 2006) all share this view. See also Shlaim andYaniv, Domestic Politics, p.
250; Dror, Improving Policymaking, pp. 32, 34, 84; Dror, Memorandum to the Prime Minister, p. 57.
15. Shlaim andYaniv, Domestic Politics, p. 250; Dror, Improving Policymaking, pp. 32,34,84; Dror,
Memorandum to the Prime Minister, p. 57.
NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION-MAKING IN ISRAEL ✭ 647
making is thus characterized by the tactical, rather than the strategic, and by a
form of “dynamic incrementalism.”16
By way of example, fundamental aspects
of the Gaza Disengagement Plan remained unresolved immediately prior to its
implementation, raising questions regarding the basic decision to adopt the policy.17
· Avoidance of Staff Work. To illustrate, Sharon decided on the Gaza Disengagement
Plan without consulting the national security bureaucracy on the options
open to him, turning to it only after the fact, for its input on the best ways
to implement the course he already had settled upon. He also quashed a major
new policy formulation process initiated by the NSC — an annual net assessment
of Israel’s strategic posture — apparently over concern that its findings
and recommendations might impose constraints on his freedom of maneuver,
especially after some of the first report’s findings were published in the press.
Similarly, Begin went to Camp David (1978) without the benefit of any preparatory
staff work and quashed the one major study conducted by the IDF prior to
the summit. Extensive staff work was conducted at the bureaucratic level prior
to the 1982 War in Lebanon, but was kept from the cabinet by Begin and Sharon.
Barak made momentous decisions on the Palestinian, Syrian, and Lebanese fronts
on the basis of his own assessments and preferences. Preparatory staff work
prior to Barak and Sharon’s meetings with foreign leaders was similarly lim-
ited.18
Prior to the establishment of the NSC in 1999, the lack of systematic staff
work could have been attributed at least partially to the absence of a PM/cabinetlevel
policy staff, but even then means could have been found to ameliorate the
problem, had the desire so existed. Furthermore, the NSC has had virtually no
16. Y. Ben Meir, National Security Decisionmaking, p.71; and Dror, Memorandum, to the Prime
Minister, pp. 57, 126, 178.
17. For example, the future of the “Philadelphi Axis” (the Israeli security corridor along the old
Gaza-Egypt border) and as a result the entire future security regime which, indeed, subsequently
collapsed; the future of the border passages between Gaza and Israel, and thus the future commercial
regime between the two, which also failed; the status of the remaining Israeli “assets” in Gaza,
following the withdrawal, including private homes and the especially sensitive issue of synagogues.
The vital issue of the “day after,” i.e., the future of the negotiations with the Palestinians, also remained
unknown, except, possibly, to the Prime Minister.
18. Preparation of Barak and Sharon’s meetings with foreign leaders typically consisted of one, or
occasionally two, meetings of the PM’s staff with representatives of the various agencies. Background
papers and talking points, prepared on the basis of a brief, terse request from the PM’s office, were
generated on a “production line” basis, in the absence of a true understanding of the PM’s goals and
areas of flexibility. Moreover, numerous overlapping documents were typically submitted by the
different agencies which, having received only limited advance notice, were usually forced to prepare
them at the last minute. As a result, the PM’s Foreign Affairs Adviser was left with little time to sift
through the various documents and integrate the differing approaches; and thus, little use was made of all
the work done. Cognizant of this situation, the agencies adjusted their efforts, while the expectations of
the PM’s staff were presumably scaled back as well.
648 ✭ MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL
impact on the operation of the PMO, not least of all due to its marginalization by
the prime ministers in office since its establishment. Prime ministers have even
manifested a systematic preference to refrain from availing themselves of the
staff work conducted within the national security bureaucracies themselves.
The problem then is not one of organizational capability, but of a fundamental
and conscious decision on the part of nearly all prime ministers to refrain from
systematic staff work. The fear of leaks, of the politicization of the issue and of
a consequent loss of freedom of maneuver, apparently has outweighed their
calculus of the potential benefits attendant to systematic policy formulation pro-
cesses.19
PATHOLOGY 3: DETERIORATING GOVERNMENTAL CAPABILITIES:
IS ANYONE AT THE HELM?
The Prime Minister is in Charge — Sometimes
With highly circumscribed formal sources of authority, the prime minister’s
ability to lead is primarily a function of his intra- and inter-party political skills and his
ability to use the prestige of office to generate support for preferred policies. While
some prime ministers have managed to dominate the political system and lead major
changes, their formal sources of authority are simply too limited and leave them overly
beholden to considerations of party politics. Indeed, on more than one occasion,
prime ministers have had to rely on other coalition parties, or opposition parties, to
pass historic legislation for which they were unable to garner their own party’s sup-
port.20
An inherent characteristic of the coalition system, the weakness of the prime
minister’s office has become a growing problem in recent times, as party coherence
has diminished and the overall politicization of the DMP has increased. This has led
not just to repeated cabinet crises and attenuated terms of office, but to increasingly
detrimental consequences for the prime minister’s ability to govern even on a day-today
basis, let alone to chart a new course for the nation in the long run. The prime
minister’s ability to lead and effectively govern is further limited by the failure, time
19. Many of those interviewed by the author addressed prime ministers’ tendency to avoid
systematic staff work, with various nuances, including former Minister and Chief of Staff Amnon
Lipkin-Shahak (June 15, 2006), former Defense Minister MosheArens (June 21, 2006), former Director
General of the Ministry of Defense and National SecurityAdviser David Ivry (June 4, 2006), former
National Security Adviser and Deputy Chieff of Staff Uzi Dayan (generally concurs, but is less emphatic)
(May 23, 2006), former PoliticalAdviser to Prime Minister Peres, Nimrod Novik (January 26,
2006) and a senior defense establishment official (personal communication, June 4, 2006).According to
a former senior cabinet minister and expert on strategic affairs, the impact of the fear of leaks is true in all
areas, but especially in national security matters (personal communication, interview, May 30, 2006).
20. Begin needed the support of the then-opposition Labor Party to attain Knesset approval for the
Camp DavidAccords, while Sharon needed Labor and opposition parties to obtain approval for the Gaza
Disengagement Plan.
NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION-MAKING IN ISRAEL ✭ 649
after time, to conduct any prime ministerial/cabinet-level policy planning of conse-
quence.
The Cabinet is Not in Charge Either
If the prime minister’s authority is circumscribed and the policy-making machinery
at his disposal limited, the cabinet has become an almost entirely dysfunctional
policy-making forum, for a variety of reasons:
·The cabinet’s size has become unmanageable, rendering it unable to hold
effective deliberations. Moreover, cabinet meetings tend to consist largely of
political grandstanding, rather than true policy deliberation, as nearly all ministerial
statements are made with an eye to their press coverage, and indeed are
designed to be leaked immediately.
·The ostensible solution to the problem of cabinet size and secrecy, the convening
of the Ministerial Committee on Defense, has been undermined by the
insistence of most coalition parties, and many ministers, that they be included
in this politically prestigious forum. A problem of size and discretion has thus
arisen regarding the MCOD itself, which at least partially negates its raison
d’être.
· Cabinet ministers are professional politicians, not experts in their spheres of
responsibility or in management, thereby raising questions of basic competence
to deal with the issues at hand. Generally highly experienced politically, and in
some cases professionally as well, the cabinet is dysfunctional if for no other
reason than that the input of the Ministers of Agriculture and Health, for example,
is not needed on national security issues.
· The cabinet has become a conglomerate of semi-autonomous ministerial
fiefdoms, with the principle of “collective responsibility” no more than a vague
memory. Given the minimal “political glue” holding the coalition together, ministries
“belong” to the minister and/or party they are headed by. Rather than serving
as members of an integrative deliberative body, ministers tend to be united
by a common fear that delving too deeply into the affairs of other ministers will
lead to a similar response being directed against them and possibly stymie their
attempts to promote preferred policies within their ministerial purview. A “live
and let live” spirit of accommodation thus prevails, with each minister free to
run his or her ministry with a high degree of autonomy — both from other
ministers and the prime minister.21
21. Dror, Improving Policymaking, p. 34.
650 ✭ MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL
· The cabinet devotes an inordinate amount of time to issues of dubious or
secondary importance, micro-managing details best handled by the professional
bureaucracy, and leaving insufficient time for serious consideration of major
issues.22
Furthermore, there is often only a loose connection between cabinet
decisions and the allocation of the resources needed to implement them, and
decisions often are made for purely symbolic reasons. Indeed, it is an open
secret that a substantial majority of cabinet decisions are never implemented and
that they were adopted from the outset with no intention of actually implementing
them.23
The limitations of the cabinet and MCOD as effective decision-making fora are,
as in the case of the prime minister himself, further exacerbated by the lack of an
effective cabinet-level policy staff. With little preparatory staff work and documentation,
even basic data is often unknown to ministers and cabinet meetings are devoted
largely to a presentation of the situation, rather than to policy deliberation. In the
absence of an “honest broker,” policy proposals are usually presented by the policy
advocate, typically the relevant minister, ministry official, or the prime minister, who
invariably presents just one favored option, which the cabinet can either accept or
reject. Unsurprisingly, alternative policy objectives and options are generally not presented,
or are done so in a perfunctory manner, without a serious and systematic
attempt to assess the differing courses of action and to integrate the different aspects
of the issue from a broad national perspective. When policy options are generated
within the bureaucracy, differences are often ironed out prior to the meeting of the
cabinet, which remains unaware of them, or indeed, of their very consideration. In
any event, in the absence of a policy staff, the cabinet has no independent capability of
assessing the data and options presented. Ministers thus have to rely on their general
knowledge and the information they are able to glean from the press and casual conversations,
often with interested parties. Intuition, hunches, and preconceptions replace
serious consideration.24
The annual deliberations on the defense budget — by far the largest component
in the national budget — are a recurring example of the cabinet’s inability to deal with
complex national security issues.25
Each year, the MoD and IDF mount a public
relations campaign, which at times borders on scare tactics, to generate public support
for their budget request. This is then followed up by cabinet meetings, in which
the Minister of Defense and IDF “brass” present indigestible mounds of data and
22. Government of Israel, Comptroller General, Report 53, 2002, p.17.
23. A commonly used figure in the Israeli bureaucracy is that 70% of cabinet decisions are not
implemented. This is a rough estimate used anecdotally.
24. Government of Israel, Comptroller General, Report 53, 2002, pp. 17-18, formerActing National
Security Adviser Gideon Sheffer (interview by author, June 21, 2006), a former senior minister (personal
communication, May 30, 2006).
25. Interviews by author with former Chiefs of Staff Amnon Lipkin-Shahak (June 15, 2006) and
Moshe Yaalon (July 20, 2006), former Defense Minister Moshe Arens (June 21, 2006).
NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION-MAKING IN ISRAEL ✭ 651
assessments, with the aid of the latest technological imagery, to scare, dazzle, and
cajole the assembled ministers. It is a “fixed” game and ministers simply lack the
ability to question the budget demands presented; given public opinion, they tend to
have little desire to do so in any event.
At the same time, to the ministers’ credit, it must be said that the reports reaching
them suffer from a number of major deficiencies. Government ministries and
agencies, including the intelligence community and defense and foreign ministries, are
often not fully apprised of Israel’s own intentions and capabilities. They thus generate
reports that are at least in partial ignorance thereof, or which are not tied directly to
the cabinet’s agenda and consequent need for certain kinds of information at given
times. Furthermore, a plethora of often overlapping assessments reaches the decision
makers, typically geared to immediate developments, rather than national-strategic
policy formulation. In addition, not all ministers are privy to all reports for security
reasons, and so do not share the same information base and consequent expectations,
or “evoked set.”26
Many ministers thus have no recourse but to rely on the oral presentations
made to the cabinet and on informal talks with “informed” sources, within the
government and without.
No Effective Policy-Making Forum Exists
The failings of both the cabinet and MCOD as decision-making bodies, have led
to a propensity on the part of prime ministers to formulate policy on their own, in
small ad hoc fora, with only a few trusted confidantes.27
Though this approach may
have the advantage of efficiency, it does not provide for effective policy formulation,
the political integration necessary in a coalition system, or the policy integration essential
in any government. With a weak prime minister and dysfunctional cabinet,
Israel simply does not have an effective statutory forum for national level decision-
making.28
26. Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1976).
27. Golda Meir had a “kitchen cabinet;” Rabin and Peres tended to work things out between
themselves; and during the National Unity Government, Shamir convened a “Premiers’ Forum” (composed
of Rabin, Peres, and himself); Sharon had a “ranch forum;” and Olmert a “Group of Seven”
(ministers).
28. A number of those interviewed by the author are critical of the cabinet as a decision-making
forum, inter alia, former minister and Chief of Staff Amnon Lipkin-Shahak (June 15, 2006), former
Defense Minister Moshe Arens (June 21, 2006), former Director General of the Ministry of Defense
and National SecurityAdviser David Ivry (June 4, 2006), former National SecurityAdviser and Deputy
Chief of Staff Uzi Dayan (May 23, 2006), former Political Adviser to Prime Minister Peres Nimrod
Novik (January 26, 2006), a former senior cabinet minister (personal communication, May 30, 2006),
former Chief of Staff MosheYaalon (July 20, 2006), and former Foreign and Finance Minister Silvan
Shalom (June 13, 2006).
652 ✭ MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL
There is No Policy
Given the limited authority of the prime minister, the dysfunctional nature of the
cabinet, and the generally rough and tumble exigencies of Israeli coalition politics,
policies are rarely formulated, even on issues of importance, let alone articulated
(publicly or internally). Policies, as noted, are also dynamic and incremental, evolving
over time and on a trial-and-error basis. Hard to accept as this may be, on most issues
there is quite simply no Israeli policy, and ministries and agencies, and often the entire
system, operate in virtual ignorance, relying on their own “guesstimates” of what they
believe policy to be. Typically reflecting the simple absence of a systematically formulated
policy beyond the prime minister’s private thoughts or partially articulated public
positions, as well as the fact that the prime minister and other ministers often express
conflicting policies, this also reflects a conscious decision on the part of prime ministers
to avoid articulating policy. Time and again, Israeli prime ministers have manifested
a clear preference for “keeping their cards close to their chest” and foregoing
the benefits of systematic policy formulation work over the loss of freedom of maneuver
and politicization attendant to it. The absence of an effective policy-making
machinery, such as a robust NSC, and consequently of policy statements such as
Presidential Policy Directives or White Papers, is a reflection of the problem and
further exacerbates it.
By way of example, the Foreign Ministry was almost completely in the dark
regarding the intricacies and negotiating requirements of the Gaza Disengagement
Plan, and unable to play a significant role in its formulation, or even to effectively
present it abroad. The MoD and IDF also were brought in at a comparatively advanced
date. Foreign embassies and officials wishing to understand Israeli policy
have long been cognizant of this absence of coherent policy and consequently have
adopted a “polling” approach — i.e., canvassing opinion among a comparatively large
cross-section of agencies, officials, and ministers — in the hope of gaining an overall
impression of possible directions and who might be responsible for their implementa-
tion.
The System is Under Tremendous Pressure
A final reason for the growing crisis in governability is the tremendous time
pressure and stress the entire system is under, due to the discrepancy between the
vast number of demands placed on it, the pace of change, and the resources at its
disposal. Furthermore, despite the quantitative and qualitative growth in the national
security bureaucracies in recent decades, capabilities remain thin: in some areas they
are still lacking almost completely, although mostly the problem is too few people,
with insufficient expertise, facing too many demands.
PATHOLOGY 4: THE DMP REMAINS UNINSTITUTIONALIZED
While the true flow of power and decision-making varies by leader and issue in
NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION-MAKING IN ISRAEL ✭ 653
all governments, time, experience and tradition tend to produce accepted norms, practices,
and established standard operating procedures (SOPs). Though this is true, of
course, in Israel as well, a primary characteristic of Israel’s DMP is its comparatively
fluid, informal, and uninstitutionalized nature.29
Highly Idiosyncratic, Personalized Decision-Making
The personal policy preferences of the prime minister and senior ministers often
have an inordinate impact on the DMP in Israel. To illustrate, then-Defense Minister
Sharon decided on the 1982 invasion of Lebanon despite broad opposition from the
cabinet and national security bureaucracy, as did Barak in deciding on Israel’s unilateral
withdrawal from Lebanon 18 years later. Begin, Rabin, Barak, Sharon, and Olmert
adopted radically new positions on the peace process solely, or almost solely, on their
own cognizance. Earlier research already has demonstrated the disproportionate nature
of individual preferences even on such technological and financial decisions as
major arms development plans.30
Among the reasons for this idiosyncratic dimension:
· Expertise and Confidence. Israeli leaders usually have had long experience in
national security affairs, often having come up through the political and/or military
establishment and having served in more junior cabinet positions. As a result,
they typically have long-standing familiarity with the primary national security
issues, and often have strongly held positions. In recent decades, as the
issues Israel faces have become increasingly complex, going beyond the comparatively
familiar ones of the Arab-Israeli conflict, decision makers’ need for
expert advice undoubtedly has grown. On the core issues, however, they appear
to believe, in many cases with considerable justification, that their own knowledge
and experience exceeds that of the senior officials reporting to them. They
thus have tended to downplay the importance of consultation and preparatory
staff work, relying primarily on their personal judgment and relegating senior
officials and advisers to the level of “aides.” By contrast, an American president,
with global concerns, cannot possibly have a comprehensive grasp of all the
important issues he faces, no matter how great his experience, and must rely to a
far greater degree on his senior officials and advisers.
· Limited “Culture of Consultation.” Cultural differences further accentuate
the objective differences in the comparative need for consultation. Israeli history
celebrates the spirit of “can do” leaders, who press forward without regard for
constraints; indeed, Israel itself is portrayed as a victory produced by the deter-
29. Interviews with the author of former Minister and Chief of Staff Amnon Shahak (June 15,
2006) and former National Security Adviser and Deputy Chief of Staff Uzi Dayan (May 23, 2006).
See also Ben Meir, National Security Decisionmaking, p. 68.
30. Freilich, Messianism and Realism.
654 ✭ MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL
mined few over insurmountable odds.31
Moreover, many decision makers, having
had long careers in the defense establishment, or at least having spent years
in military service, have internalized its highly mission-oriented ethos. “Experts,”
who tend to see shades of gray and to focus on complexities and constraints,
rather than action, have thus long been held in some contempt, and a
“culture of consultation” at the senior levels is far less developed in Israel than in
other countries. It may not be a coincidence that it was Netanyahu — arguably
the least experienced prime minister to date, but who had grown up in the US —
who finally established the NSC, 50 years after it was first proposed.
· Limited “Checks and Balances.” As noted, the MoD and MFA’s policy formulating
capabilities remain limited, as do the NSC’s, while the IDF Planning
Branch is a clearly subordinate military unit. They thus lack the bureaucratic
stature that might enable them to serve as an even partial curb against excessive
individual preference, haste, or whim on the part of decision-makers. In any
event, whether this is their appropriate role is debatable.32
Given the lack of a
consultative culture, the only remaining “checks and balances” are the political
process, the need for cabinet and Knesset approval, and the judicial system. All
are often highly effective means of curbing excess, but commonly come to bear
only after the essential parts of a new policy already have been formulated and
even implemented.
Oral and Personal Communications
The DMP in Israel is based to an unusual degree on personal relationships and
oral communications, with comparatively little documentation. The senior bureaucracy
is relatively small and officials and ministers often have known each other for
years, thus creating a highly effective informal flow of communication, or an “old
boys network.” Phone calls between senior officials, or one-time meetings with minimal
preparation, are often all that is needed to formulate positions. Even in meetings
of the cabinet and ministerial committees, as well as closed consultations held by the
prime minister, presentations are typically made orally, with limited supporting documentation,
such as policy papers setting out objectives and options. In those cases
where documents are circulated, this is often done either at the time of, or immediately
prior to, the meeting, thereby (not unintentionally) precluding serious study of
the issues and the formulation of substantiated counter-proposals. Even more disturb-
31. The national ethos celebrates the famous statement by Theodore Herzl, the founder of modern
Zionism, “if you will it, it is not a fantasy,” while many are familiar with the story of Ben Gurion’s
decision in 1948 to declare independence, despite the fears of many of his advisers.
32. Many supporters of the establishment of the NSC in Israel viewed it as a means of curbing the
prime minister’s and senior ministers’ freedom of maneuver. The invasion of Lebanon in 1982 was
considered a primary case where an NSC might have served as a counterbalance to the prime minister
and defense minister’s decision to invade and thus could have prevented the war.
NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION-MAKING IN ISRAEL ✭ 655
ing is the finding that even those documents that are circulated in advance are often
not read by the ministers — thus necessitating recourse to oral reporting.33
The oral nature of cabinet communications has a number of detrimental effects,
including: the submission of numerous issues to the cabinet that could have been dealt
with by senior officials or cabinet committees, had they been elucidated fully prior to
the meeting; a lack of precision in the data and policy proposals presented; and further
extension of the already intolerable length of meetings, in which perseverance and
stamina are at least as important a source of policy influence as substance.34
Disconnect Between Policy Inputs and Policy Planning/Formulating Processes
A further aspect of the uninstitutionalized aspect of Israeli decision-making is,
as already noted, the absence of virtually any systematic policy planning and preparatory
staff work at the level of the prime minister and cabinet. Even where preparatory
staff work is conducted, there is a severe disconnect between the information generated
and the policy formulation process. For example:
· Israel’s information gathering capabilities in the areas of foreign and defense
affairs (Foreign Ministry, intelligence, and other agencies) are generally considered
to be highly developed. Yet little effort is made, particularly of a proactive
character, to turn this information into the systematic generation of policy
options. To the limited extent that policy options are generated, they tend to be
post facto — i.e., how to cope with an already evolving situation — rather than
to shape the course of events in advance. Though particularly pronounced at the
cabinet level, this tendency is prevalent throughout the bureaucracy, which is
geared to react to events, rather than to generate policy options in order to
preempt and shape them. The work of the IDF Planning Branch is a partial
exception to this general rule.
· The budgetary process is primarily a function of political considerations and
clout, rather than a substantive consideration of alternative uses of resources.
The defense budget, as described above, is a case in point. Based on the requirements
presented by the MoD/IDF, the Ministry of Finance typically makes
an arbitrary cut in the defense budget request, based on its assessment of what
it can get away with or “what will fly,” rather than what is truly needed. The
compromise typically worked out, which often requires the intervention of the
prime minister and additional ministers, is based on political compromise rather
33. Interview by the author with former Minister and Chief of Staff Amnon Shahak, (June 15,
2006); former Minister Gad Yaacobi, (March 24, 1991); Dror, Memorandum, to the Prime Minister,
pp. 177, 179; Avi Shlaim and Raymond Tanter, “Decision Process, Choice and Consequence,” World
Politics, Vol. 30, (1978), pp. 513-515.
34. The regular weekly meeting typically lasts some five hours, while meetings on more important
issues, or at times of crisis, can last double this time and even go through the night.
656 ✭ MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL
than any systematic attempt to maximize benefits by consideration of budgetary
alternatives for the defense establishment, or the government as a whole.35
Insufficient Coordination
Closely related to the absence of clearly articulated policy and of an effective
prime ministerial/cabinet-level policy staff is the problem of insufficient coordination,
in terms of policy formulation, follow up on implementation, and ongoing inter-agency
operations. As issues have grown in complexity over the years and the bureaucracy
has grown in both size and complexity, the need for more effective inter-agency
coordination has grown substantially, but the inter-agency machinery has not.36
Although
a common pathology of governments everywhere, the coordination problem
in Israel is exacerbated by:
· The aforementioned uninstitutionalized nature of decision-making.
· The fear of leaks and politicization, which leads prime ministers to refrain
from necessary consultation and coordination.
· The flexibility of SOPs in Israel. In recent years, there also has been an
increasing tendency on the part of prime ministers to adopt the time-honored
tradition of overlapping assignments and lines of authority, with ministers and
officials often charged with tasks outside their areas of expertise or responsibil-
ity.37
To this we must add the turf and budgetary battles typical of bureaucracies
everywhere, further fueled by a feeling on the part of some agencies (especially the
Foreign Ministry and parts of the intelligence community), that their areas of responsibility
have been encroached upon or that they have been marginalized. At the same
time, it must be noted that the severity of the threats Israel faces, as well as an
35. Former Defense Minister Moshe Arens, as well as former Minister and Chief of Staff Amnon
Shahak and former Chief of Staff MosheYaalon, were highly critical of the defense budget process in
the cabinet. Interviews by the author, respectively, June 21, 2006, June 15, 2006, and July 7, 2006.
36. It has been noted wryly in Israel that only the US ambassador, who usually has excellent ties
and sources of information in all branches of the Israeli government, actually knows what is going on
and is thus, at least ostensibly, capable of fulfilling the necessary coordinating function.
37. Recent examples include the role played by then-Minister of Justice (now Foreign Minister) Tzipi
Livni, during 2005 in overcoming the political obstacles to the Gaza Disengagement Plan; the special
role played by Shimon Peres, Deputy Premier in the Sharon government (2003-2006), in affairs having
to do with the peace process and the establishment of a special ministry for him, the Ministry of Regional
Cooperation, during the Barak cabinet (1999-2001); and the ongoing preeminent role played by Sharon’s
“former” Bureau Chief, Dov Weisglass, even after ostensibly resigning. Former Minister of Justice
Haim Ramon played an important role in promoting Olmert’s West Bank “consolidation” plan, both in
behind the scenes politicking and through substantive responsibility for policy development.
NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION-MAKING IN ISRAEL ✭ 657
ongoing shared commitment to a few fundamental principles, have forced a certain
degree of discipline on the system which may keep bureaucratic battles from reaching
the extremes often found in other countries.
Flexibility and Rapidity
A corollary of the lack of institutionalization — and an important advantage — is
the system’s remarkable ability to respond rapidly and flexibly to the continually changing
environment.
PATHOLOGY 5: PREDOMINANCE OF THE DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT
AND ITS CONSIDERATIONS
The defense establishment, and especially the IDF, remain the most influential
player in the national DMP, with by far the most developed policy assessment, formulation,
and implementation capabilities.38
As such, it is hard to speak of the defense
establishment’s capabilities in terms of pathology as it is a vital national asset. It is the
weakness of the civilian bureaucracies and imbalance in influence that are problematic.
In addition to the extreme character of the threats Israel has faced, which has led
to a subordination of foreign policy to security considerations, the following factors
account for this imbalance in capabilities and consequent influence over policy:
Professional Expertise
In many areas, extending far beyond commonly accepted spheres of military
competence, the IDF is either the sole entity capable of supplying information, analysis,
and policy advice to the prime minister and cabinet, or the primary one. No other
institution can compete with the Intelligence, Planning, and Operations Branches’
ability to generate rapid and sophisticated staff work around the clock. Moreover, the
Chief of Staff and other senior officers frequently appear before the cabinet and act as
senior advisers on defense and foreign policy matters.
The “Closed Circle”
The IDF has primary influence over all stages of the decision-making process:
situational assessment, policy planning, and actual implementation.
· Intelligence Assessment. Military Intelligence is responsible for the National
Intelligence Assessment and is the only intelligence service capable of generating
comprehensive politico-military assessments. None of the research divisions
38. Former Foreign and Finance Minister Silvan Shalom interview (June 13, 2006); a former senior
minister (personal communication, May 30, 2006).
658 ✭ MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL
of the other services or the Foreign Ministry rivals the primacy of Military
Intelligence.
· Strategic Planning. The Planning Branch, similarly, remains the primary strategic
planning entity and the only one with a comparatively full picture of the
capabilities and intentions of both Israel and its adversaries.
· Diplomacy in Uniform. Over the years, many of the diplomatic contacts
with Arab and other states have been conducted by the IDF, thus providing it
with a leading role in foreign policy as well. Beginning with theArmisticeAgreements
of 1949, the IDF played a major role in all of the peace talks, including the
Camp David Accords of 1978, as well as the talks with the Palestinians, Syrians,
and Jordanians since the 1990s. Military cooperation has also been an important
means of fostering relations with foreign countries.
· Military Government. The IDF’s responsibility for civil administration in the
territories occupied since 1967 has afforded it with primary influence over this
entire range of issues, many of a purely civilian and particularly sensitive char-
acter.
· IDF Doctrines and Operational Control. These create constraints for political
leaders, which include Israel’s first-strike preemptive doctrine.39
The generally
offensive approach colored Israel’s ability to show restraint during the 1991
and 2003 Gulf Wars, as it did during Israel’s responses in Lebanon from the late
70s through the 2006 War and the two Palestinian Intifadas. Even at relatively
low levels, military commanders are given broad discretion and room for maneuver.
Although this approach has proven itself effective in exploiting success
on the battlefield, it also has proven problematic. In the 1967 Six Day War, for
example, battlefield commanders raced for the Suez Canal, with fateful consequences
for Israel’s future, whereas then Defense Minister Moshe Dayan had
intended to stop the advance at the Sinai passes.40
· The IDF as a Pressure Group. The IDF’s institutionalized role in national
security decision-making, as well as the high accessibility and close links afforded
by the small size of the political and military elites and close connections
between them, make it a highly influential pressure group. Virtually all ministers
have served in the IDF, both as conscripts and reservists, and many are
former senior officers, making the “old boys network” nearly all-pervasive.
Furthermore, a disproportionate share of the national labor force is employed
by the military and military-related industries, thereby making the IDF, and the
39. Horowitz and Lissak, Democracy and National Security, p. 19.
40. Horowitz and Lissak, Democracy and National Security, p. 19.
NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION-MAKING IN ISRAEL ✭ 659
defense establishment as a whole, a major economic force.
· Unity of Command. The IDF General Staff, unlike the US Joint Chiefs, is a
unified military structure under the direct command of the Chief of Staff, who
has clear and final authority in all areas. The positions of the Chief of Staff thus
reflect, with few exceptions, the collective judgment of the senior military leadership,
which typically presents a united front that the cabinet finds difficult, if
not impossible, to reject. Though the various services do vie for budgets and
other resources, the degree of inter-service rivalry that has plagued other military
establishments would appear to be rare.
· Imbalance Between the IDF and MoD. The nature of the division of authority
between the IDF and the MoD is a further source of IDF influence. Instead
of the IDF being subordinate to the MoD, the division is in fact a complementary
one. The IDF has authority for all matters of military organization and force
structure, training, doctrine, intelligence, logistics and procurement plans, personnel,
strategic planning, and operations. The MoD is responsible for the defense
budget, arms procurement, and exports; its role has been limited, for the
most part, to the implementation of policies favored by the IDF. Furthermore,
the IDF is directly subordinate to the Minister of Defense, not the Ministry,
which was neither authorized to exert supervision over the IDF, nor structured
to do so in terms of organizational capabilities. Recognition of this imbalance
and of the MoD’s inability to fulfill a ministerial oversight role led to a series of
structural reforms in 2003. These included the aforementioned establishment of
a politico-military planning branch, as well as two additional branches designed
to strengthen its abilities to deal with defense-related economic and social issues.
As of this writing, these changes are still very much in the initial stages of
implementation.
SOMETHING MUST BE RIGHT: SUCCESS DESPITE THE SYSTEM?
The myriad pathologies described above notwithstanding, Israel has in many
ways been an historic success story. Its very survival, despite all odds, in itself borders
on the miraculous, but more substantively, Israel has been hailed as a “text book
case” of successful national development, in political, economic, and social areas.
This is certainly the case in national security affairs, in which Israel has developed
clearly disproportionate capabilities. Israel must, therefore, be doing something right.
Some believe its success to be in spite of the system (structure and processes),41
whereas this article will argue that this success is also due to the system’s ability to
cope with its own failings and turn them into short term, tactical advantages.
41. For example, former Acting National Security Adviser Gideon Sheffer (interview with author,
June 21, 2006).
660 ✭ MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL
SMALL, TIGHTLY KNIT ESTABLISHMENT, EASE OF COMMUNICATIONS
Israel’s national security establishment, at least at senior levels, is comparatively
small, and most officials come to know each other personally. The “old boys
network” facilitates development of a “common language” and understanding of the
issues and, further, creates a level of personal and professional intimacy. Perhaps
most important of all, it enables ease and speed of communications through informal,
personal ties that cut through various areas and levels of responsibility. Furthermore,
the comparatively small size of the establishment makes it easier to identify those who
are responsible and capable of dealing with an issue.42
RAPID AND FLEXIBLE RESPONSE IS THE SYSTEM’S GREATEST STRENGTH
The uninstitutionalized, informal, and improvisational nature of the Israeli DMP
is, as presented above, a primary pathology. At the same time, given that this is the
state of affairs, as well as the extraordinarily frenetic character of Israel’s environment,
the ability to improvise, change gears, and rapidly adapt to changing circumstances
is a vital necessity and has become a sphere of national excellence.
Time and again, Israel has had to face sweeping changes in its environment,
forcing it to regroup, rethink its basic strategy, and gear up for new capabilities. The
hardening of political positions following the 1973 War and the consequent huge military
build-up were soon followed by the need for a basic change in outlook, as peace
talks began with Egypt in 1977, culminating in the 1978 Camp David Accords and full
Israeli withdrawal from Sinai in 1982. In 1981, Israel was forced to cope with a new,
even existential, threat in the form of Iraq’s nuclear program and shortly thereafter, in
1982, found itself mired in a conventional war in Lebanon. In 1987, it had to gear up
for a new type of warfare with the outbreak of the first Palestinian Intifada.
The 1991 Gulf War posed unprecedented challenges, in terms of the threat and
possible responses, but also paved the way for the Madrid Conference and broader
peace process. The Oslo Agreement followed in 1993, with Israeli recognition of the
PLO and the Palestinian right to a state. Israel again prepared for peace with the
Palestinians at Camp David in 2000, and made dramatic concessions, only to see a
breakdown in talks and the onset of the second Intifada. The belief that there was no
hope for negotiations led to unilateral withdrawal from Gaza in 2005, which had been
previously anathema to Israeli strategic thinking, and to Olmert’s declared intention to
do so from most of the West Bank; a dramatic move which has been derailed by the
fighting in Lebanon that took place in the summer of 2006. Peace talks with Syria
during the 1990s forced Israel to come to terms with the ramifications of a virtually
complete withdrawal from the Golan, but also with the failed Geneva summit. The
1990s were also a period of intensive Israeli efforts to prepare for the Iraqi and
42. Former National SecurityAdviser and Deputy Chief of Staff Uzi Dayan (interview with author,
May 23, 2006); interview with a senior defense official (personal communication, June 4, 2006).
NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION-MAKING IN ISRAEL ✭ 661
Iranian WMD threats, requiring major changes in doctrine and procurement.
DYNAMIC, PRAGMATIC DECISION-MAKING
Though government policy is often highly charged ideologically or politically,
especially on such issues as the future of the West Bank or defense budget, the national
security establishment itself takes a distinctly pragmatic approach. While normative
or ideological considerations cannot always be divorced from professional
ones, the national security establishment, and certainly the IDF, tends to view issues
from an analytical problem-solving perspective. Thus, for the most part, the IDF has
focused on the purely military ramifications of various options for a peace settlement,
has taken a practical approach to administering the Territories, and has objected to
what it considered to be politically motivated considerations regarding the procurement
or development of weapons systems. Similarly, it has refused to become engaged
in such politically charged issues as the possible induction of Orthodox con-
scripts.
In fact, decision-making that is dynamic and pragmatic, rather than ideological
is a primary characteristic of much of the political leadership as well. Thus, numerous
Israeli leaders have demonstrated an ability to radically change existing policies, even
those based on long and deeply held ideological convictions or strategic outlooks
when either necessity or opportunity warranted. Thus, Begin withdrew from Sinai,
Rabin and Peres accepted the Olso Agreement, sought to embrace Arafat and, like
Barak and Netanyahu, explored possible full withdrawals from the Golan Heights.
Barak unilaterally withdrew from Lebanon and was willing to forego almost all previous
Israeli positions at Camp David in 2000, Sharon unilaterally withdrew from Gaza,
and Olmert announced his intention of unilaterally withdrawing from the West Bank.
HIGHLY POROUS POLITICAL/MILITARY RELATIONS
The Israeli national security establishment, much like all organizations, has its
own norms, axioms, and ways of thinking. It is, however, not a closed elite, removed
from political, social, and economic trends in broader society. Indeed, civil-military
borders are highly porous. A largely conscript and reservist army, the IDF’s regular
elements are in constant contact with recent, or soon-to-be-again, civilians. In the
virtual absence of closed military living communities, regular military personnel and
their families are fully integrated within civil society, shopping, recreating, sending
children to school and spouses to work, and sharing the feelings and tribulations of
the broader population. Officers are in frequent contact with civil and political leaders
and their turnover rate is high, with most officers retiring at relatively young ages,
thus facilitating the flow of new ideas and helping reduce the danger of long-established
mindsets.
662 ✭ MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL
EXTERNAL TRANSPARENCY
Israel’s courts intervene in IDF and other governmental security decisions,
unlike few, if any, other judiciaries in the world, thereby setting limits to what can and
cannot be done. Israel is analyzed and often skewered by both its domestic and the
international media as perhaps no other nation, and press coverage serves as a primary
means of gauging reaction to policy. Short-term difficulties aside, the Israeli
national security establishment is greatly affected, and in some ways strengthened, by
its exposure and relative transparency before this external system of normative, media,
and professional scrutiny.
The national security establishment as a whole is in continual contact with the
international community at all levels — politico/military, diplomatic, scientific, and
otherwise — exposing it to an ongoing exchange of ideas, feedback, and constraints.
Exchanges with friendly governments, or individual leaders and officials, can often
serve as an important input into the Israeli DMP and serve as a “reality check.” Indeed,
information and policy exchanges with the US are so extensive that, on many
issues, US policy-making capabilities almost become an extension of Israel’s. “What
the Americans think” is the single most important consideration in virtually all policy
deliberations, exposing the system to additional approaches and options and setting
limits regarding what should and should not be done. Finally, and possibly most importantly,
Israel enjoys the fundamental strengths of a healthy and vibrant democracy,
in which media, political, social, and public criticism may not prevent errors in the
short run, but “straighten the politicians out” in the long term.43
CENTERS OF EXCELLENCE
If the DMP at the cabinet level, as a whole, remains fundamentally dysfunctional,
and the national security bureaucracy suffers from structural lacunae, it nonetheless
has a number of spheres of excellence. Thus, the defense establishment, but
not the Foreign Ministry, does have an orderly, systematic DMP and a focused effort
is made to utilize the information available and to generate appropriate options, both
for its own use and as inputs into decision-making at the cabinet level. The problem
begins primarily once issues reach the cabinet. Within the defense establishment, the
intelligence community, the Air Force, and various other units are important spheres
of excellence. This, however, is operational excellence, not cabinet level policy-mak-
ing.44
43. A senior defense official, (personal communication, December 12, 2005 and June 4, 2006).
44. Former Minister and Chief of Staff Amnon Shahak, (interview by author, June 15, 2006).
NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION-MAKING IN ISRAEL ✭ 663
HIGH MOTIVATION AND QUALITY OF PEOPLE
If the DMP itself is faulty, this is at least partly overcome by the quality of the
people involved, their deep motivation based on a shared sense of extreme, even
existential threat, and belief in the fundamental righteousness of the cause and consequent
commitment to common goals. Human and bureaucratic infighting aside, at the
senior levels, long years of familiarity and expertise on the primary issues of national
security help overcome the lack of sufficient staff support and faulty DMP. 45
CONCLUSION
“The Lord is our shepherd” says the Book of Psalms, and fortunate this is, for
no one else in Israel has the overall authority and structural capabilities needed for
effective decision-making. Nearly 60 years after independence, the same basic national
security bureaucracy that so successfully gave rise to the nation in its formative
years is still largely intact. Though its size and sophistication have changed beyond
recognition, the structures and dynamics of decision-making at the prime ministerial
and cabinet level remain essentially unchanged. The demands placed on the system by
Israel’s ever volatile and increasingly complex external environment, however, have
grown unrecognizably, creating an untenable gap with the system’s ability to cope.
Though reform is thus recognized by many as essential, the dysfunctions of the PR
electoral system, which are largely the source of the system’s structural and processual
failings, are also those that have prevented this from happening.
45. Interviews by author with Acting National Security Adviser Gideon Sheffer, (June 21, 2006);
former National Security Adviser and Deputy Chief of Staff Uzi Dayan, (May 23, 2006); a senior
defense official (June 4, 2006); former Defense Minister Moshe Arens, (June 21, 2006); and a former
senior cabinet minister. (May 30, 2006).