ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF

PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS

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Outline

- Introduction: international trade liberalisation
- Types of PTAs
- Why PTAs?
- Towards deep integration
- PTAs and WTO
- Economic effects of PTAs
 - Need to look inside the agreements!
- Key issues and discussion

Literature

- Dür, A., Baccini, L. and Elsig, M. (2014) The design of international trade agreements: Introducing a new dataset. The Review of International Organisations, vol. 9, p. 353-375
- Kohl,T., Brakman, S. and Garretsen, H. (2016) Do trade agreements stimulate international trade differently? Evidence from 296 trade agreements. The World Economy, vol. 39.1, p. 97-131

Introduction

- Large progress has been made regarding trade liberalisation
- GATT 1947
- The creation of the WTO solidified progress and fostered further movement
- However, since Doha (2001) progress has slowed down
 - Different types of countries, coalitions, explosion of topics
- At the same time, marked proliferation of PTAs
 - Variety of (groups of) countries, varying content
- Last couple of decades increased focus on these PTAs

Cumulative number Number per year 5 넝 ō ä Notifications of RTAs in force Cumulative Notifications of RTAs in force and inactive RTAs Cumulative Notifications of RTAs in force Notifications of Inactive RTAs Cumulative Number of Physical RTAs in force

Evolution of Regional Trade Agreements in the world, 1948-2017

Note: Notifications of RTAs: goods, services & accessions to an RTA are counted separately. Physical RTAs: goods, services & accessions to an RTA are counted together. The cumulative lines show the number of notifications/physical RTAs that were in force for a given year. Source: RTA Section, WTO Secretariat, 20 June 2017.


Source: WTO

- Literature mixes two related types of trade agreement
- Preferential trade arrangements = uniliteral trade preferences These include Generalized System of Preferences Schemes and other non-reciprocal schemes
- Regional trade agreements = reciprocal trade agreements between two or more partners
 - EU
 - Mercosur (Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay Venezuela)
 - Nafta (US, Canada, Mexico)
 - ASEAN (Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar, Cambodia)

The debate on PTAs focuses on the second type of agreement

WTO and PTAs


- WTO: principle of non-discrimination
- PTAs: discriminatory, participants benefit from preferred access to markets
- GATT article XXIV: Countries may enter into preferential trade agreements by fully liberalising "substantially" all trade between them while not raising trade barriers for outsiders
- In reality, only a limited degree of worldwide international trade is of the preferential type
- Traditionally, in WTO context PTAs seen as mechanism to fasten trade liberalisation




Map B.1: Membership in PTAs in force, 2010, notified and non-notified PTAs, by country


World Trade Report 2011 "The WTO and preferential trade agreements: From co-existence to coherence"

Relative importance largest PTAs






Asia: noodle bowl PTAs



US rejects TPP



What is the TPP?

The **Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)** writes the rules for global trade—rules that will help increase Made-in-America exports, grow the American economy, support well-paying American jobs, and strengthen the American middle class.

Made in America

TPP will make it easier for American entrepreneurs, farmers, and small business owners to sell Made-In-America products abroad by eliminating **more than 18,000 taxes** & other trade barriers on American products across the 11 other countries in the TPP—barriers that put American products at an unfair disadvantage today.

Global Leadership

The rules of the road are up for grabs in Asia. If we don't pass this agreement and write **those rules**, competitors will set weak rules of the road, threatening American jobs and workers while undermining U.S. leadership in Asia.

:..

TPP signed March 8

- Ministerial Statement: Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership
- We, the Ministers and Senior Officials representing Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore and Vietnam, are pleased to announce that today we are signing the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (hereinafter referred to as "the Agreement").
- Ministers shared the view that, by achieving a high standard and well-balanced outcome, the Agreement will strengthen the mutually-beneficial linkages among our economies, boost trade, investment and economic growth in the Asia-Pacific region, and create new opportunities for businesses, consumers, families, farmers and workers. The Agreement demonstrates our collective commitment to an effective, rules-based and transparent trading system which is open to all economies willing to accept these principles.
- The signing of the Agreement enables us to move to the next phase. Ministers expressed their determination to complete their domestic processes to bring the Agreement into force expeditiously.
- Ministers welcome the interest shown by a number of other economies wishing to accede to the Agreement. This interest affirms our shared objective, through the Agreement, of creating a platform that promotes high standards for broader economic integration in the future.




Figure B.4: Type of PTAs in force, 2010, notified and non-notified PTAs

Note: As explained in the introduction, the term "preferential trade agreement" (PTA) is used in this report to denote reciprocal preferential agreements in general. For the purposes of this figure, we follow the classification in Acharya et al. (2011): A "free trade agreement" (FTA) denotes an agreement between two or more parties in which tariffs and other trade barriers are eliminated on most or all trade and each party maintains its own tariff structure vis-a-vis third parties. A "customs union" (CU) is an agreement between two or more parties in which tariffs and other trade barriers are eliminated on most or all trade and, in addition, the parties adopt a common commercial policy towards third parties which includes the establishment of a common external tariff. The term "partial scope agreement" (PSA) is employed to describe an agreement between two or more parties in which the parties offer each other concessions on a selected number of products or sectors. Economic integration agreements (EIA) refer to agreements on trade in services through which two or more parties offer preferential market access to each other.

Source: WTO Secretariat.

Different types

- System of preferential tariffs: lower trade restrictions between participants
- Free trade association: no trade restrictions between members, individual policies towards non members
- **Customs union**: FTA + common policy towards non-members
- Common market: CU + free movement capital and labour
- Economic union: CM + common economic policies
- Economic and monetary union: EU + common currency
- Political union 😕
- Traditionally, assumption has been that once started, there would be an inherent movement towards stronger integration
 - How do you solve problems that occur in a trade agreement?
 - Move to the next phase!
- More recent: preferential tariffs and free trade associations with deep integration elements

Reasons for proliferation PTAs (1)

- PTAs have been around for a long time
- Progress in WTO has slowed down
 - Victim of its own success?

Similar for EU

- Monetary Union selective participation
- EU of two speeds?

PTAs good alternative for multilateral negotiations

- Flexibility and speed
- Fewer negotiating partners

Reasons for proliferation PTAs (2)

Trade liberalisation has changed

- Not much more to gain from tariff reduction
- Non tariff barriers more tricky
 - e.g. Services, finance, technology
- Substantial gains still to be made, but more detailed in terms of countries, sectors, etc.
 - e.g. car industry: import US cars with automatic gears

Economic stagnation of world economy


- Recovery from latest financial crisis goes slow
- Countries can not wait for WTO-effects to foster growth
- Countries don't want to miss the boat; every country is doing it

Multinational enterprises

- General trade liberalisation no longer required
- Specific deals can still create benefits
- · Global value chains also important for this

PTAs and deep integration

- Traditionally, agreements characterised by shallow integration
 - Directly linked to border measures
- Last couple of decades: growing importance of deep integration
 - Measures that are linked to domestic policies "behind the border"
- Deep integration usually linked to the build up of different trade agreements
 - FTA \rightarrow CU \rightarrow CM \rightarrow EU \rightarrow EMU
- Now more and more "lighter" trade agreements contain elements of deep integration
 - Institutions sufficiently strong in PTAs?



BertelsmannStiftung

Deep integration

- **Protection** of multinational enterprises
- Liberalisation of behind the border barriers to trade
- Harmonisation of domestic trade rules to enhance efficiency of international production

Non-tariff barriers

Limiting Market Access

- Import quotas, export restraints
- Administrative and regulatory burdens discriminating against foreign firms (e.g. procurement)

Costs associated with operating in different markets

- Approval conditions and procedures
- Different standards regarding environment, health, consumer protection
- Industry standards
- Packaging and information requirements

How to assess need for NTBs

- Some of these are there for good reasons!
- Mixture of backgrounds (labour rights, environmental protection)

Example: topics negotiated on for TPP

- Market access for goods
 - Trade remedies
 - Dispute settlement

Cross-border services

- Financial services
- Telecommunications

Cooperation & capacity building

- Customs
- E-commerce
- Environment
- Labour

Competition policy

- Government procurement
- Intellectual property
- Investment
- Technical barriers to trade
- Rules of origin
- Textiles / apparel


WTO and PTAs

Table D.2: WTO+ and WTO-X policy areas in PTAs

| WTO+ areas | WTO-X areas | | | | |
|-----------------------------|------------------------------|-------------------------|--|--|--|
| PTA industrial goods | Anti-corruption | Health | | | |
| PTA agricultural goods | Competition policy | Human rights | | | |
| Customs administration | Environmental laws | Illegal immigration | | | |
| Export taxes | IPR | Illicit drugs | | | |
| SPS measures | Investment measures | Industrial cooperation | | | |
| State trading enterprises | Labour market regulation | Information society | | | |
| Technical barriers to trade | Movement of capital | Mining | | | |
| Countervailing measures | Consumer protection | Money laundering | | | |
| Anti-dumping | Data protection | Nuclear safety | | | |
| State aid | Agriculture | Political dialogue | | | |
| Public procurement | Approximation of legislation | Public administration | | | |
| TRIMS measures | Audiovisual | Regional cooperation | | | |
| GATS | Civil protection | Research and technology | | | |
| TRIPS | Innovation policies | SMEs | | | |
| | Cultural cooperation | Social matters | | | |
| | Economic policy dialogue | Statistics | | | |
| | Education and training | Taxation | | | |
| | Energy | Terrorism | | | |
| | Financial assistance | Visa and asylum | | | |

Source: Horn et al. (2010).

Lecture 5 Trade Agreements and Effects



Effects of PTAs

Trade creation versus trade diversion

- Static analysis
- Theoretically, possibility of trade diversion
- In reality, no real evidence for this
- Several studies find evidence of trade creation
- Natural trading partners hypothesis
- Dynamic analysis emphasizes importance of scale economies, learning effects, spillovers, technology creation, etc.
 - More difficult to quantify
- WTO+ versus WTO-x

PTAs and trade

- Increasing number of studies look at whether PTA membership enhances international trade
- In line with studies that have examined trade effects of WTO membership
- One set of studies controls for yes/no membership
- Findings are mixed
- More recent
 - PTA membership and content of PTA

Dür et al. (2014)

- 733 PTAs signed between 1945-2009 examined
- 587 agreements with full text availability
 - 3318 initial members


10 broad items

 Market access, services, investments, IPR, competition, public procurement, standards, trade remedies, non-trade issues, dispute settlement

DESTA dataset

https://www.designoftradeagreements.org/

Types and regional composition



Varation in agreement design (1)

| Services Service liberalization mentioned GATS reference Movement of natural persons National treatment MFN treatment Negative list approach Positive list approach Investments | 85 90 20 22 80 79 |
|--|--|
| Protection aimed for Restrictions to transfers and payments Non-discrimination (operation) National treatment Non-discrimination (post-establishment) Non-discrimination (pre-establishment) Non-discrimination (mergers) Compensation in case of expropriation MFN treatment Beyond services Investor-Country DSM Based on BIT Only in services chapter IPRs | 18 93 88 86 86 86 86 86 86 76 76 76 |
| At least general reference MFN treatment Paris convention Bern convention Provisions related to enforcement Rome convention References to geographical indications WIPO copyright treaty WIPO phonograms treaty References to pharmaceuticals | 61 15 897 708 708 334 19 |

Variation in agreement design (2)


Competition

Not distort competition State aid Create joint committee Monopolies and cartels State trading enterprises Provision to exchange information Chapter on competition Coordinate among authorities Mergers and acquisitions Set up national authority Create common authority

Dispute settlement

Some type of dispute settlement Consultation provision Provision on sanctions Complainant chooses amount Arbitration provision Third party chooses amount Delegation to external body Provision on forum shopping Restriction to one forum Defendant chooses amount Mediation provision Sanctions within sector Sanctions cross-sector Creation of standing body Monetary sanctions

| ••••••• | 408 |
|----------------|-----|
| •····· | 329 |
| | 302 |
| •••••• | 284 |
| • | 252 |
| | 155 |
| • | 101 |
| | 67 |
| -• | 22 |
| • | 16 |
| •• | 13 |



Measuring the depth of PTAs

| Table 1 Operationalization of depth (additive index) | | | | | |
|--|-------|--|--|--|--|
| Variable | Value | | | | |
| More than a partial scope agreement? | 0/1 | | | | |
| Substantive provision on services? | 0/1 | | | | |
| Substantive provision on investments? | 0/1 | | | | |
| Substantive provision on standards? | 0/1 | | | | |
| Substantive provision on public procurement? | 0/1 | | | | |
| Substantive provision on competition? | 0/1 | | | | |
| Substantive provision on intellectual property rights? | 0/1 | | | | |
| Total range | 0/7 | | | | |

Development over time





Fig. 5 Depth over time. The vertical bars show the standard errors of the means

Depth of PTAs across time



33

Empirical strategy

 $lnTrade_{ij,t} = \alpha + \beta_1 PT A_{ij,t-1} + \beta_2 Depth_{ij,t-1} + \beta_3 X_{ij,t-1} + \gamma_{ij} + \theta_t + \epsilon.$ (1)

Control variables

GATT/WTO Regime Conflict InGDP Distance Contiguity Common language Common language Common legal system Common currency

Estimated effects of PTA and depth

Table 2 Baseline models

| VARIABLES | (1) In(Trade) | (2) In(Trade) | (3) In(Trade) | (4) In(Trade) | (5) In(Trade) | (6) In(Trade) | |
|----------------------|------------------|------------------|---------------------|----------------------|------------------|---------------------|----------------|
| PTA | 0.265*** | 0.053*** (0.017) | 0.100*** | -0.007 (0.022) | 0.209*** | 0.205*** | |
| Depth(index) | (0.015) | 0.155*** (0.006) | (0.010) | (0.022) | 0.125*** (0.006) | (0.021) | |
| Depth (latent) | | (0.000) | 0.260*** (0.013) | | (0.000) | | |
| Shallow_anticipatory | | | (0.015) | -0.100*** (0.012) | | 0.040*** (0.014) | Model omits |
| hallow_short – term | | | | 0.087*** (0.021) | | -0.014 (0.022) | other |
| hallow_medium – term | | | | 0.175 | | 0.107*** | contro |
| hallow_long – term | | | | (0.022) 0.286*** | | (0.022) 0.122*** | |
| Deep_anticipatory | | | | (0.031) 0.269*** | | (0.030) 0.212*** | |
| Deep_short – term | | | | (0.015) 0.452*** | | (0.012) 0.236*** | |
| Deep_medium — term | | | | (0.020) 0.363*** | | (0.019) 0.384*** | |
| Deep_long – term | | | | (0.019) 0.207*** | | (0.020) 0.372*** | |
| | | | | (0.034) | | (0.031) | |

Long period effects

| | Before 1990 | After 1990 |
|----------|-----------------|------------------|
| | | |
| GATT/WTO | 0.19 (0.02)a | 0.02 (0.013) |
| PTA | 0.36 (0.02)a | 0.31 (0.03)a |
| | | |
| GATT/WTO | 0.20 (0.02)a | 0.01 (0.012) |
| PTA | 0.28 (0.03)a | 0.05 (0.03)c |
| Depth | 0.09 (0.01)a | 0.10 (0.001)a |
| | | |
| | | |

Effects PTAs and time

Table 3 The effect of PTAs on trade

| Main variables | Increase in trade (%) | C.I. |
|-------------------------------|--------------------------|-----------|
| Model 1 (PTA & GATT/WTO) & Mo | del 4 (design variables) | |
| Deep_anticipatory | 31 | [27, 35] |
| Deep_short – term | 57 | [51, 63] |
| Deep_middle – term | 44 | [39, 49] |
| Deep_long - term | 23 | [15, 32] |
| Shallow_anticipatory | -10 | [-12, -7] |
| Shallow_short – term | 9 | [5, 14] |
| Shallow_middle – term | 19 | [14, 24] |
| Shallow_long - term | 33 | [25, 41] |
| PTA | 31 | [27, 34] |
| GATT/WTO | 4 | [2, 7] |

Kohl et al. (2016)

| Туре | Provision | (1) Number Covered | (2) Number Enforceable | (3) Sample Covered (%) | (4) Sample Enforceable (%) | (5) Column 2/Column 1 (%) |
|------------------|------------------------------|--------------------------|------------------------------|---------------------------------|-------------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| WTO ⁺ | Agriculture | 189 | 188 | 64 | 64 | 99 |
| | AD and CVM | 220 | 217 | 74 | 73 | 99 |
| | Customs administration | 216 | 214 | 73 | 72 | 99 |
| | Export restrictions | 256 | 256 | 86 | 86 | 100 |
| | Import restrictions | 292 | 292 | 99 | 99 | 100 |
| | Intellectual property rights | 191 | 180 | 65 | 61 | 94 |
| | Investment | 162 | 85 | 55 | 29 | 52 |
| | Public procurement | 172 | 103 | 58 | 35 | 60 |
| | Sanitary and phytosanitary | 182 | 163 | 61 | 55 | 90 |
| | Services | 168 | 86 | 57 | 29 | 51 |
| | State aid | 190 | 187 | 64 | 63 | 98 |
| | State trading enterprises | 162 | 149 | 55 | 50 | 92 |
| | Technical barriers to trade | 187 | 138 | 63 | 47 | 74 |
| WTOX | Capital mobility | 212 | 212 | 72 | 72 | 100 |
| | Competition | 209 | 181 | 71 | 61 | 87 |
| | Environment | 89 | 66 | 30 | 22 | 74 |
| | Labour | 48 | 43 | 16 | 15 | 90 |

TABLE 1 Descriptive Statistics of Provisions' Coverage and Legal Enforceability

Index of trade heterogeneity

For WTO⁺ provisions, agreement *A*'s total number of WTO⁺ provisions is divided by the maximum number of provisions that can be covered. The maximum number is 13. Hence, the index for WTO⁺ coverage is as follows:

$$IWTO_A^{+,z} = \sum WTO_A^{+,z}/13,\tag{1}$$

where superscript z (z = C, E) is C for provisions that are covered by agreement A regardless of their legal enforceability, and E for only those provisions that are legally enforceable. *IWTO*⁺ ranges between 0 (incomprehensive; no coverage of WTO⁺ provisions) and 1 (comprehensive; full coverage of WTO⁺ provisions).

Similarly, the index for WTO^X coverage is based on a maximum of four provisions and is as follows:

$$IWTO_A^{X,z} = \sum WTO_A^{X,z}/4.$$
 (2)

$$TAI_A^z = \frac{1}{2} \left(IWTO_A^{+,z} + IWTO_A^{X,z} \right)$$

$$TAI_A^{z*} = \frac{1}{17} \left(\sum WTO_A^{+,z} + \sum WTO_A^{X,z} \right)$$

Identifying effect on trade

 $\ln(M_{ijt}) = \alpha + \beta_1 \ln(GDP_{it}) + \beta_2 \ln(GDP_{jt}) + \beta_3 \ln(Distance_{ij}) + \beta_4 TA_{ijt} + F_{it} + F_{jt} + F_{ijt} + \varepsilon_{ijt}$

$$\ln(M_{ijt}) = \alpha + \beta_1 T A_{ijt} + F_{it} + F_{jt} + F_{ij} + \varepsilon_{ijt}$$

M = imports

221 countries 1948-2011

| | Main Results | | | | | | | |
|----------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|---------------------|------------------|--|
| Variable | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | |
| ТА | 0.443*** | | | | | | | |
| TAI ^C | (0.025) | 0.521*** | | | | | | |
| TAI ^E | | (0.033) | 0.511*** | | | | | |
| TAI ^C * | | | (0.033) | 0.593*** | | | | |
| TAI ^E * | | | | (0.037) | 0.606*** | | | |
| IWTO ^{+, C} | | | | | (0.037) | 0.166*** | | |
| IWTO ^{X, C} | | | | | | (0.083) 0.354*** | | |
| IWTO ^{+, E} | | | | | | (0.084) | 0.545*** | |
| IWTO ^{X, E} | | | | | | | (0.093) 0.062 | |
| R^2 | 0.928 | 0.928 | 0.928 | 0.928 | 0.928 | 0.928 | (0.091) 0.928 | |
| Adj. R^2 N | 0.922 601,986 | 0.922 601,986 | 0.922 601,986 | 0.922 601,986 | 0.922 601,986 | 0.922 601,986 | 0.922 601,986 | |

TABLE 5 Main Results

Notes:

(i) Dependent variable: $\ln(M)_{ijt}$. Model estimated with OLS, importer-year, exporter-year and importer-exporter fixed effects. Robust standard errors (clustered by dyad) are in parentheses.

(ii) Coefficients marked ***/**/* are statistically significant at the 1/5/10% level. Other regressors are perfectly collinear with the fixed effects. Fixed effects not reported for brevity.

$$TAI_{A}^{z} = \frac{1}{2} \left(IWTO_{A}^{+,z} + IWTO_{A}^{X,z} \right) \qquad TAI_{A}^{z*} = \frac{1}{17} \left(\sum WTO_{A}^{+,z} + \sum WTO_{A}^{X,z} \right)$$

Interacting with WTO membership

TINTE (

| Interaction with W | | BLE 6 f Trade Agreement | ts' (TA) Participant | s |
|---------------------------------------|-----------------------------|--------------------------------|----------------------|---------------------|
| Variable | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| TAI ^C | -1.099*** | | | |
| TAI ^E | (0.348) | -1.169*** | | |
| TAI ^C * | | (0.385) | -1.014*** | |
| TAI ^E * | | | (0.316) | -1.123*** |
| Mixed membership | 0.732*** | 0.745*** | 0.814*** | (0.374) 0.798*** |
| All in WTO | (0.061) 0.157* | (0.060) -0.068 | (0.066) 0.299*** | (0.065) -0.017 |
| $TAI^{C} \times mixed$ membership | (0.091) 0.415 (0.260) | (0.080) | (0.101) | (0.091) |
| $TAI^{C} \times all in WTO$ | (0.360) 1.633** | | | |
| $TAI^{E} \times mixed$ membership | (0.367) | 0.402 | | |
| $TAI^E \times all in WTO$ | | (0.397) 2.143*** (0.402) | | |
| $TAI^{C*} \times mixed$ membership | | (0.402) | 0.208 | |
| $TAI^{C*} \times all in WTO$ | | | (0.329) 1.337*** | |
| $TAI^{E_{*}} \times mixed membership$ | | | (0.342) | 0.265 |
| $TAI^{E_{*}} \times all in WTO$ | | | | (0.387) 1.994*** |
| R^2 | 0.928 | 0.928 | 0.928 | (0.395) 0.928 |
| Adj. R ² N | 0.922 601,986 | 0.922 601,986 | 0.922 601,986 | 0.922 601,986 |

Notes:

(i) Dependent variable: $\ln(M)_{ijt}$. Model estimated with OLS, importer-year, exporter-year and importer-exporter fixed effects. Robust standard errors (clustered by dyad) are in parentheses.

(ii) Coefficients marked ***/**/* are statistically significant at the 1/5/10% level.

- (iii) Other regressors are perfectly collinear with the fixed effects.
- (iv) Fixed effects not reported for brevity.

Key issues (1)

- Strong increase in PTAs
- Not surprising?
 - Economic context: countries in search for growth
 - Multinational enterprises and global value chains
 - GATT/WTO has obtained initial gains from trade liberalisation
- Incentives not there for countries to pursue similar goals via WTO
 - But at some stage successful PTAs need to be more formalised / extended / increased integration
 - WTO can play key role here?
 - This can take some time!
 - Many sensitive topics are addressed in PTAs



Most PTAs don't reach the CU stage of integration

• But they cover a lot, much more than the traditional theories contained!

Deep integration is striking

- Protection, liberalization, harmonisation
- Trial and error, large heterogeneity
- Little attention is paid to the question whether PTAs are efficient in their structure / actions
- What is best practice?

Overall effects

- Little evidence of trade diversion, some evidence of trade creation
- Heterogeneity and wide range of contents makes it difficult to identify full welfare effects
- Empirical studies find that the content of PTAs is important for their positive impact on trade

Discussion points (1)

Future integration: WTO or PTAs?

Discussion points (2)

PTA integration: are the protesters right?