Monday, Monday: Eastern Protest Movements and German Party Politics since 1989

David F. Patton

Monday, Monday: Eastern Protest Movements and German Party Politics since 1989

DAVID F. PATTON

Since 1989–90, sporadic but intense protest movements, centred in the east, have transformed German political parties, even those with West German origins. This article examines four major eastern protest movements: (a) the peaceful demonstrations of autumn 1989; (b) the anti-Hartz IV protests of summer 2004; (c) the burgeoning neo-Nazi free fellowships (freie Kameradschaften) of the mid-to-late 1990s and early 2000s; and (d) Pegida rallies in 2014–16. It addresses the following questions. First, in what ways did eastern protest shape German parties and party systems? Second, why did the protest movements have such a varying impact on party politics?

German unification has served as a catalyst for political change in different ways, with its effects direct and indirect, short term and long term, and conditioned by internal as well as external forces. Unification directly introduced into the Federal Republic a new political party, the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS), which had succeeded East Germany's ruling Socialist Unity Party (SED). Despite widespread expectations to the contrary, the PDS had a lasting impact on German party politics; in 2007, it merged with the western-based Electoral Alternative for Jobs and Social Justice (WASG) to form the Left Party (*die Linke*) that established itself nationwide and in so doing transformed the German party system.

Unification also recast German party politics by broadening the Federal Republic's electorate to include millions of eastern voters who were, on the whole, more supportive of an activist state, less satisfied with the country's democratic institutions, more likely to regard themselves as second-class citizens and more likely to hold ideological views to the left of western Germans.[1] Although less likely to be members of voluntary associations, they took part in legal demonstrations at a significantly higher rate than those in the west between 1990 and 2008.[2] A product of the distinct history, political culture and interests of the region, this propensity among easterners to demonstrate has been an agent of party political change in the Federal Republic. Unlike their East-Central European neighbours, East Germans in 1990 had the benefits of a 'ready-made state' that was transferred eastward during unification.[3] As Christiane Lemke has demonstrated in a comparative study, East Germany's anomalous, western-led transformation did not dampen the will of easterners to protest; in fact, a massive protest wave soon followed unification.[4] Through their activism, citizens in the east exercised, and continue to exercise, agency by shaping political institutions that originated in the west.

Since 1989–90, sporadic but intense protest movements based in the east have transformed German political parties, even those with West German roots. They have tested a party system long known for its centrism, its two major catch-all parties (CDU/CSU and SPD) and its weak parties on the ideological extremes.[5] This article highlights four major cases of eastern protest: (a) the peaceful demonstrations of autumn 1989; (b) the anti-Hartz IV protests of summer 2004; (c) the racist skinhead and free fellowship (*freie Kameradschaften*) movement of the 1990s and early 2000s; and (d) the Patriotic Europeans against the Islamisation of the Occident (Pegida) rallies of 2014–16. The first, the Peaceful Revolution of 1989, paved the way for German unification and provided a template for future non-violent protests in the east. Thereafter, unification indirectly influenced eastern social movements. Its cultural and economic legacies made favourable conditions for protests shaped by such external factors as the eurozone crisis, EU budgetary constraints, populist movements in Europe and refugee flows.

In what ways did these four protest movements influence German parties and party systems after unification? In order to answer this question, this article draws on Dieter Rucht's fourfold typology of movement parties. In applying this framework, it identifies diverging movement–party relationships both within and across the four cases. There was no one model that predominated, although some were more prevalent than others. This study examines why the movements had such varying impacts. Rather than the size of the protest wave, the short-term timing appears more consequential; if a movement arose at a time when an existing party stood at a strategic crossroad, it had greater influence.

In the 1980s, the West German Greens kindled scholarly interest in the interaction between social movements and political parties. The social movements of the 1970s had proved formative for the Greens whose success led political scientists to theorise about a specific party type: the movement party, which was characterised by close personnel, organisational and programmatic ties between party and social movement.[6] Rucht identified four different types of relationships: (a) the stages model, in which the movement serves as the precursor (*Vorstufe*) to party formation but then declines; (b) the model of the movement as a creative source (*Schöpfquelle*) for the party that continues to provide it with dynamic impulses, recruits and loyal voters; (c) the model of the avant-garde party that leads the movement; and (d) the model of the party as a mouthpiece (*Sprachrohr*) for the movement by which the party articulates and presents the demands of the latter.[7] Lothar Probst identified elements of three of the four models during the Greens' formation. Although the new social movements that helped to establish the Greens (model of the movement as a precursor) did subsequently weaken, they did not disappear.[8] Moreover, they provided the Greens with dynamic impulses (movement as a creative source), as the trade unions had long done for left-wing parties.[9] And, at least initially, the Greens regarded themselves as the mouthpiece for social movement demands.[10]

THE PEACEFUL REVOLUTION OF AUTUMN 1989

In autumn 1989, protests swept across East Germany that hastened the end of communism. Monday demonstrations (*Montagsdemonstrationen*) in Leipzig attracted ever

more protesters, from 20,000 on 2 October, to 70,000 on 9 October, to an estimated 300,000 on 23 October.[11] As demonstrations spread throughout the country, protesters demanded freedom of travel, democracy and the legal recognition of New Forum. Founded in September, New Forum called for a national dialogue on reform. It was joined by other civic groups, such as Democracy Now, the Initiative for Peace and Human Rights (IFM) and Democratic Awakening, which articulated East German dissatisfaction with the communist regime while offering a framework for peaceful reform.[12] While all but the IFM had formed in 1989, these civic groups did not appear out of the blue but rather came out of a nascent independent East German civil society that resembled, notwithstanding its distinctive features, grassroots developments elsewhere in East-Central Europe.[13] Civic groups and demonstrators propelled the autumn 1989 revolution.[14]

By December, leading civic groups were participants in the GDR's Central Round Table they had helped to establish, which met until March 1990 in an effort to broker the country's democratic transition;[15] they joined Prime Minister Hans Modrow's cabinet in February. Prior to the 18 March Volkskammer elections, New Forum, Democracy Now and IFM forged the electoral grouping Alliance '90. The heroes of autumn 1989, however, won only 2.9 per cent of the vote. Their poor result stemmed, in part, from the fact that the civic groups envisioned national unification along lines that differed greatly from what most East Germans wanted, including those who still took to the streets, namely quick accession to the Federal Republic. Alliance '90, however, did perform better, especially in the north, in those counties (*Kreise*) that had protested more during autumn and winter 1989–90.[16]

In the December 1990 federal election, Alliance '90 teamed up with the eastern Greens and cleared the 5 per cent barrier in eastern Germany, thereby ensuring their presence, albeit a small one, in the Bundestag. The same could not be said for the western Greens, who dropped out of the national parliament in 1990. Alliance '90, which now carried the Green banner in the Bundestag, became a party in 1991. In 1993, the western Greens and Alliance '90 had settled on a merger that was designed to create a new national party, Alliance '90/The Greens, which incorporated features from, and reflected the distinct experiences of, the western Greens and eastern civic groups. Former civic group activists, however, soon lost their relevance in the unified party despite its new name and its short-term quota provisions intended to amplify their voice. Werner Schulz, the only prominent veteran of the civic groups to have a lengthy, successful career in the new party, later conceded that 'Today the hyphenated name [Alliance '90-Greens] links a milieu party in the west with a splinter party in the east'.[17] While Alliance '90 did provide the Greens with organisation and electoral support in the east, this was not enough to prevent the unified party from steadily losing ground in the region during the 1990s. The impact of the autumn 1989 protests on the Greens proved quite limited.

This had much to do with the protests and their timing. On the one hand, the autumn 1989 protests had centred on issues like democratic reform and popular empowerment that did not speak directly to the western Greens' core principles of ecology and social justice. On the other hand, the protests of autumn 1989 had long receded by the time Alliance '90 formed as a political party. By the early 1990s, eastern Germans were taking to the streets in large numbers to protest at the wrenching

dislocations of unification, which more closely matched the policy demands of the PDS than those of Alliance '90.[18] Former civic group activists derived legitimacy from the Peaceful Revolution, but this proved insufficient to shape the national Green party in their image, whose electoral, organisational and personnel bases lay in the west.[19]

The autumn 1989 protest movement did not create the Alliance '90 party, which formed two years later and therefore diverged from the movement as a party precursor (*Vorstufe*) model. In late 1989 the civic groups briefly assumed the role of mouthpiece (*Sprachrohr*) of the pro-democracy movement, although they did not yet comprise a political party.[20]

ANTI-HARTZ IV DEMONSTRATIONS IN EASTERN GERMANY IN 2004

Fifteen years after the 1989 demonstrations, anti-austerity protesters deliberately repurposed the Peaceful Revolution's language and imagery. They reconvened *Montagsdemonstrationen* in Leipzig (the so-called 'city of heroes', given its key role in 1989) and elsewhere. They proclaimed 'we are the people!', as protesters had done earlier, but now called upon Chancellor Gerhard Schröder's Red–Green government (SPD–Greens) to reverse its cuts in unemployment benefits for the long-term jobless – the so-called Hartz IV reforms.[21] Intended to reinvigorate the struggling post-unification German economy by reducing labour market rigidity, the reforms disproportionately affected the east where unemployment was high. In 2004, the national joblessness rate lay at 10.5 per cent, yet in the east it was 20.1 per cent.[22] Protests spread across Germany in summer 2004, but were concentrated in the depressed ex-GDR.

Galvanised by Hartz IV, demonstrators took to the streets in late July, August and September 2004 in protests backed by trade unions, anti-globalisation activists, self-help groups and left-wing political parties.[23] Protesters were disproportionately male, in their early 50s, unemployed or economically insecure, and politically left-wing in orientation.[24] By August, the weekly rallies were drawing demonstrators in over 200 German cities and towns; thousands marched in the eastern cities of Magdeburg, Leipzig, Halle, Dessau, Aschersleben, Halberstadt, Gera, Rostock and Berlin, inter alia. In Leipzig, crowds ranged from an estimated 10,000 in early August, to 20,000–30,000 by 30 August 2004. Far fewer marched in western Germany, where the economy was stronger.[25] German media covered the protests extensively given their size and that they occurred before important regional elections in Saxony, Thuringia and Saarland in September 2004. These elections were viewed as a barometer of support for the Red–Green government in the wake of its controversial economic programme.[26]

Although they dwindled during autumn 2004, the anti-Hartz IV protests nonetheless left a mark on German party politics. They drew attention to issues surrounding poverty and economic marginalisation, which not only proved costly to Schröder's SPD but played into the hands of the PDS whose programme focused on social justice. To understand the marches' impact on the PDS, one must look at its difficult situation. It had stumbled badly in the 2002 Bundestag election, winning only two direct mandates and failing to clear the critical 5 per cent threshold. Thereafter, a power struggle ensued within the party leadership. Eastern grievances, such as over the controversial decision to curb supplemental pension benefits for former GDR

elites, that had helped fuel the PDS's resurgence had begun to lose salience and the party's prospects of rejoining the Bundestag in 2006 were in doubt. In May 2003, a leading PDS strategist had floated a 'PDS-plus model' as a way out of the crisis: the party would forge durable ties to social movements through the formation of inclusive party structures.[27] As if on cue, the anti-Hartz IV protests commenced in summer 2004, opening up new strategic options for the party.

On the eve of the protests in late July 2004, an Allensbach poll saw the PDS at 6.0 per cent of the national vote; support for the party had climbed from the 4.8 per cent mark of late 2003. By mid-September, Allensbach polled the PDS at 7.5 per cent.[28] Although the PDS did not organise the anti-Hartz IV protests, it actively championed them. Its members were regulars at the weekly gatherings, holding up party flags and posters with the hard-hitting attack line: '"Hartz IV" – That is Poverty per Law – Away with it!'[29] Surveys conducted among eastern demonstrators revealed that while 44 per cent claimed to have voted for the PDS in 2002, 49 per cent were supporting the party by September 2004. Among western demonstrators, its support surged from 22 per cent in 2002 to 33 per cent as of September 2004.[30] Rink and Philipps noted: 'As a result, the PDS succeeded, most notably in the west as well, at establishing a connection to the existing protest potential there. The protests therefore laid the groundwork politically for the PDS's western expansion.'[31] Against the backdrop of the Monday demonstrations, the party performed strongly in the September 2004 regional elections in Brandenburg and Saxony.

Centred in western Germany, a new political organisation was formed in summer 2004 in opposition to the Hartz IV reforms. Known as the Electoral Alternative for Jobs and Social Justice, it became a bona fide political party in early 2005. Its founders included disappointed trade union officials and left-wing Social Democrats who had broken with the SPD over its welfare state reforms. Like the PDS, the WASG also backed and benefited from the protest wave. The demonstrations forged commonalities between the PDS and WASG in terms of programme (anti-Hartz IV), identity (agent of protest) and voters. This set the stage for the two parties' cooperation in the 2005 Bundestag election and their 2007 merger.[32] The protests fit closely with the core agenda and identity of both the PDS and WASG. Among the architects of the WASG–PDS alliance, Oskar Lafontaine (WASG) and Gregor Gysi (PDS) had spoken at Monday demonstrations. The summer 2004 demonstrations arose during a time of uncertainty in German politics. The PDS was open to a new strategic approach after its 2002 election defeat. For its part, the WASG was searching for a place in a party system that already featured several left-wing parties (SPD, PDS and Greens) and a 5 per cent barrier for parliamentary entry. The Hartz IV protests contributed to the PDS's resurgence, the WASG's emergence and the eventual union of these two parties. As a national left-wing force, the Left Party transformed German politics by further eroding the SPD's electoral position in the west while contributing to a five-party system at the federal level.

In summary, the anti-Hartz IV protests facilitated but did not create the Left Party and therefore diverged from Rucht's prototype of the movement as party precursor. Die Linke formed out of two pre-existing parties, the PDS and WASG. The 2004 demonstrations did, however, provide the PDS and WASG with a dynamic impulse.

The anti-Hartz IV protests also influenced the strategic orientation of the far-right National Democratic Party (NPD), discussed in greater detail in the next section. Although it tried, it did not generally succeed in infiltrating Monday demonstrations in large cities. The NPD did on occasion manage to join smaller protests where it presented itself as a resolute Hartz IV critic.[33] As a proponent of a chauvinistic national socialism, the NPD sharpened its anti-capitalist profile by backing the movement, employing a strategy of co-opting traditionally left-wing issues in an effort to craft new alliances and to reach new voters, especially in the east.[34] The NPD made Hartz IV a central plank in its regional election campaign in Saxony in summer 2004, underscoring a strategic shift toward a national socialist orientation that would continue even after the protests had ebbed.[35] According to Rink and Philipps: 'The anti-Hartz IV protest handed the NPD a rousing populist issue that could be exploited and a political stage to establish itself in Saxony as a protest party.'[36] The party, whose campaign posters thundered 'Payback for Hartz IV! NPD Now', achieved an electoral sensation on 19 September by winning 9.2 per cent of the vote in Saxony (an increase of 7.8 percentage points from 1999). It entered a regional parliament for the first time since 1968. Sixty per cent of those who voted for the NPD did so because of its opposition to Hartz IV.[37]

THE NEO-NAZI MOVEMENT IN EASTERN GERMANY

Unlike the social movements behind the autumn 1989 Peaceful Revolution and the 2004 demonstrations, the far-right skinhead movement arose more gradually and persisted longer. Although it had appeared in both German states prior to national unification, it acquired many new adherents in the 1990s and early 2000s, especially among eastern youth. Militant skinhead activity was not an eastern phenomenon per se. It was present throughout the country, but economic crisis, limited experience with foreigners and a relatively weak civil society proved fertile ground for far-right activism in the former GDR. According to the Federal Interior Ministry in 1992, there were approximately 6,500 skinheads in Germany, of whom 4,500 were right-wing extremists. Three thousand resided in the east, a region with less than one-fifth of the national population. By 2003, there were about 10,000 skinheads in the Federal Republic.[38] The burgeoning movement led to violence against minorities, the political left and Jews. The Federal Office of Constitutional Protection put the number of 'violence prone rightists' at 8,200 in 1998 – nearly a 33 per cent increase since 1995.[39] The number of violent acts shot up from 178 in 1990 to 1,485 in 1992, to 1,322 in 1993 before declining to lower levels (600s and 700s) by the mid-to-late 1990s.[40] Although right-wing extremist crimes took place throughout Germany, with vicious assaults in the western cities of Solingen and Mölln, they were occurring in the east at rates three times higher per capita in the mid-to-late 1990s. In 1999, over half occurred in the east.[41]

In the early and mid-1990s, the German government banned numerous neo-Nazi associations, among them the Free German Workers Party (FAP). In response, militants from FAP and other outlawed associations formed small, less structured groups, the so-called 'free fellowships' (*freie Kameradschaften*), the decentralised 'independent forces' (*freie Kräfte*) and the 'autonomous nationalists' (*autonome Nationalisten*), the latter borrowed heavily from far-left youth in terms of their

organisation and clothing style.[42] Although neo-Nazi cells popped up across Germany, militants were disproportionately found in the east: 'The statistics are clear: a fifth of the population lives in the new federal Länder, of which however are half of all violence-prone right-wing extremists in Germany.'[43]

The burgeoning free fellowship movement in eastern Germany created new opportunities for the NPD. This party was neither new nor eastern in origin. It had formed in West Germany in 1964, entered several Länder parliaments, and narrowly failed to clear the 5 per cent mark in the 1969 Bundestag election. In the 1970s and 1980s, the far-right NDP languished as a small and ageing party with a national-conservative profile. This began to change in the early 1990s when Günter Deckert became the new party chair. Deckert relaxed the barrier to extremists, agitated aggressively against foreigners and extended support to Holocaust deniers.[44] Yet the party remained marginal, with few members and voters.

In 1996, Udo Voigt edged out Deckert, who had landed in jail for Holocaust revisionism, in a vote for party chair. Voigt transformed the NPD into a social-revolutionary force that extended its focus beyond contesting elections; it also courted young militants and broadened its programme. As a result, NPD membership doubled from 3,500 in 1996 to 7,000 in 2004.[45] Compared to the Bundestag parties, the NPD featured the second largest share of eastern members in 2007 (37.5 per cent), as well as the youngest membership, with an average age of 40. It came to resemble an eastern regional party.[46] The east's flourishing free fellowship movement had set the stage for the NPD's startling reinvention as a movement party.

By the late 1990s, the NPD was reaching out to the neo-Nazi youth movement. It followed a three-pillar strategy (reminiscent of that of Hitler's Nazi Party 70 years earlier) that encompassed 'the battle for the street', 'the battle for the minds' and 'the battle for the parliaments'.[47] Voigt declared: 'Only after we have conclusively won the battle for the street can the battle for parliament be fought under the prospect not to channel protest votes that quickly vanish, but to establish a durable national force.'[48] To this end, the NPD energetically mounted demonstrations, reporting 260 marches between 1997 and 2004.[49] In September 2005, the party leadership announced:

> The NPD commits itself to the entire movement of national resistance! With our declaration we would like to make a contribution, of which all multipliers of the national opposition are essential, to become a national movement – a *Volksfront* of all of those who still feel German.[50]

The party opened its ranks and cooperated with militants throughout Germany.[51] The partnership proved most consequential in the former GDR, where neo-Nazi groups were very active locally. The small, financially strapped NPD had prioritised the region, relocating its leaders, its party press and the headquarters of its youth organisation, the Young National Democrats (JN), to the new Länder. The NPD and the JN reached out to the *freie Kameradschaften* and the *freie Kräfte*. The party accepted those willing 'to think and act like political soldiers'.[52] In summer 2004, three prominent neo-Nazis joined; one, Thorsten Heise, was soon elected onto the party's executive committee, where he headed the free fellowships unit. Three former leaders of the banned Skinheads of Saxon Switzerland (SSS), each with a history of neo-Nazi

violence, assumed posts in the local NPD or its youth organisation.[53] Neo-Nazis also abounded in the NPD's Mecklenburg-West Pomerania branch, representing the party in the regional parliament and holding party offices.[54]

Without a large membership and ample financial resources, the NPD relied on 'comrades' to bolster its presence on the ground and during election campaigns. According to the Federal Office of Constitutional Protection: 'In some places the NPD can compensate for the lack of party structures with the help of sympathetic forces. In election campaigns it is massively supported by neo-Nazis, who in return must be granted spots on the party lists.'[55] This approach bore fruit in the 2004 local and regional elections in Saxony as well as in the 2006 Mecklenburg-West Pomerania regional election.[56] In Reinhardtsdorf-Schöna, the NPD received 23.1 per cent of the vote in the 2004 Saxon regional election. The party there had established a grassroots presence by engaging far-right youth, including former SSS members.[57] Although the relationship between party and free fellowships proved mutually beneficial ('boots on the ground' in exchange for jobs), it was strained, unstable and incomplete. Some militants opposed a parliamentary path to national socialism, while the NPD leadership was reluctant to associate too openly with neo-Nazi thugs.[58] That said, rightist militancy opened the door for the NPD to chart a more aggressive path, which it did with some success in eastern Germany. The party aspired to lead a national-resistance movement – equivalent to the party as an avant-garde model – that included notorious *Kameradschaften*.

THE PEGIDA MOVEMENT OF 2014–16

In October 2014, the owner of a small advertising firm near Dresden, Lutz Bachmann, founded a group called Patriotic Europeans against the Islamisation of the Occident (Pegida), which sponsored Monday demonstrations, or 'strolls', in Dresden against the alleged spread of Islamism.[59] These protests ostensibly sprang up out of nowhere in a region with a low share of immigrants and an even lower share of Muslims. However, they did reflect the pervasive anti-immigrant populism in Europe. The Pegida rallies began attracting very large crowds. In early November, the police estimated turnout at 1,000; by early December, protests had swelled to around 7,500 participants, rising to about 18,000 on 5 January, before peaking at some 25,000 participants on 12 January following the Charlie Hebdo attack in Paris.[60] By February, the crowds in Dresden had fallen off dramatically, continuing at lower levels throughout 2015, although numbers did rise again following the refugee crisis of late summer and autumn.[61] Copycat marches spread to other German cities and to other countries. With the exception of the 'Legida' protests in Leipzig, drawing as many as 15,000 protesters on 21 January 2015, the 'little Pegidas' with local names (like 'Kögida' in Cologne, 'Magida' in Magdeburg and 'Bogida' in Bonn) attracted far fewer marchers. In western Germany, they often numbered only in the hundreds, and often faced much larger counter-demonstrations.

In December 2014, Pegida issued a 19-point platform that recognised political asylum as a basic principle, yet called for a constitutional requirement that foreigners be integrated.[62] It demanded immigration reform, more police, the introduction of Swiss-style referenda, while opposing 'preachers of hate', the imposition of gender-

neutral language, 'parallel societies', such as Sharia courts, and radicalism of any sort. Point 13 stated: 'Pegida is for the preservation and protection of our Judeo-Christian-based occidental culture.'[63] Although the group claimed to distance itself from the extreme right, it nonetheless shared its emphasis on Islam, asylum-seekers, 'political correctness' and the loss of national identity.

On the basis of 397 interviews with Pegida demonstrators in December 2014 and January 2015, a research team led by Hans Vorländer established that the 'typical' participant was a male, in his late 40s, and stemming from Dresden or Saxony. The average protester was middle class, employed, well educated, with an income slightly above average, who was neither a church member nor a party member. When asked why they were attending the demonstration, most indicated 'dissatisfaction with politics' (54 per cent). Others cited their criticism of the media and public information (20 per cent), or expressed deep concerns about immigrants and asylum-seekers (15 per cent). Of those stressing fear of foreigners as a primary motivation, 42 per cent voiced specific reservations about Muslims or Islam.[64] A January 2015 survey revealed that among Pegida protesters more than 80 per cent supported the statement: 'We should finally again have the courage to have strong national feelings.'[65]

In spring 2015, Pegida presented its own Dresden mayoral candidate, Tatjana Festerling, an outspoken critic of asylum-seekers who was a regular Pegida speaker. She received nearly 10 per cent in the first round, far more than had been forecast.[66] In September 2015, Bachmann announced that Pegida would become a political party and contest elections.[67] In February 2016, he spoke at a Monday evening demonstration about reconstituting Pegida in order to negotiate a joint electoral list with the Alternative for Germany (AfD).[68] Had either approach been followed, then it would have corresponded to the movement as a party precursor model.

At the time of writing, Pegida has not become a party, but it has shaped the AfD. Led by the economics professor Bernd Lucke, the AfD was formed in 2013 and contested the Bundestag election based on its opposition to the eurozone bailouts, earning it the label of a single-issue party. It won a surprising 4.7 per cent of the national vote, drawing somewhat more strongly in the east (5.9 per cent) than in the west (4.5 per cent), despite its predominantly western roots and leadership. In the European Parliament election of May 2014, the AfD received 7.1 per cent of the national vote. It performed well in eastern regional elections in late summer 2014, winning 9.7 per cent in Saxony, 12.2 per cent in Brandenburg and 10.6 per cent in Thuringia. In 2015, it joined Landtage in Hamburg and Bremen. Still, the AfD struggled to establish a coherent leadership and party programme. Intense internal disagreements over the leadership of co-chair and founder Lucke wracked the party. Two main camps clashed: a centre-right, economic liberal grouping that emphasised themes such as eurozone bailouts and excessive public debt. Lucke and co-deputy chair Hans-Olaf Henkel, a former industry group leader, belonged to this western-based faction, which courted former FDP and CDU supporters, while seeking to keep far-right activists at arm's length. A national conservative wing, by contrast, stressed such topics as political asylum, immigration, political Islam, multiculturalism and 'political correctness'. Prominent proponents included co-chair Frauke Petry, co-deputy chair Alexander Gauland, Ándre Poggenburg, who led the Saxony-Anhalt chapter, and Björn Höcke, the outspoken front man in Thuringia.[69]

Pegida arose at a critical juncture for the AfD, as infighting intensified after the party's strong showing in 2014 eastern regional elections. These successful campaigns had turned on immigration and asylum policy to a far greater extent than had the party's previous campaigns; this bolstered the national conservative wing, several of whose proponents, such as Petry (Saxony), Gauland (Brandenburg), Poggenburg and Höcke, headed eastern party chapters or Landtag caucuses.

Whereas the established parties condemned the swelling anti-Islam protests in 2014–15, the AfD lacked a clear, consistent line vis-à-vis Pegida.[70] Bernd Lucke indicated in a December 2014 Facebook post that he was encouraged that citizens were expressing their concerns in peaceful demonstrations. He cautioned, however, that Islamism should not be equated with Islam and that western values included freedom of religion and tolerance. Hans-Olaf Henkel warned that racism and xenophobia might accompany the protests.[71] In contrast, Alexander Gauland, who attended a rally, indicated that his party had much in common with Pegida.[72] The right-wing 'Patriotic Platform', an independent association of national-conservative AfD members, openly praised Pegida, as did local AfD party chapters in Saxony.[73] In January 2015, co-chair Frauke Petry and the party's Landtag caucus in Saxony met with Pegida's leadership and reported common ground on immigration, direct democracy and in defence of Pegida against media accusations that it had right-wing extremist tendencies.[74]

The Dresden protests exposed and deepened an ideological rift within the AfD. Economic liberals wanted the party to keep its distance from the movement and remain focused on economic policy. As Henkel cautioned: 'Exuberant over successful election results, some on the navigation bridge are no longer guided by the light of the stars, in other words our election platform, but instead by the lights of other passing ships – by Pegida, for example.'[75] National conservatives, well aware of the many AfD members and voters at the rallies, viewed the issues raised by Pegida as important for the party to stress. They favoured a populism that did not just draw upon economic protest, but grassroots cultural protest as well. In March 2015, Höcke and Poggenburg were the first to sign the 'Erfurt Resolution', which criticised the AfD, under Bernd Lucke, among other things, for distancing itself from 'civic protest movements'.[76] Soon thereafter, the Saxon AfD Landtag caucus, which Petry chaired, lauded the Pegida rallies as 'important and essential for urgently needed political changes in our home region of Saxony and in all of Germany'.[77]

The intraparty debate over Pegida came to a head at the AfD's party congress in Essen in July 2015. Marcus Pretzell, chair of the North Rhine-Westphalia party organisation, declared that the Alternative for Germany was both a 'Euro-party' and a 'Pegida party'. Lucke's response that this was not party policy was met with derision by the delegates.[78] In the election for party chair, Petry soundly defeated Lucke, who, along with Henkel and others from the party's economic liberal wing, subsequently quit the party he had founded. According to Hans Vorländer, Hans Herold and Steven Schäller, the Dresden anti-Islam protests significantly shaped the young party's internal development:

> In hindsight, one can start from the premise that precisely the question of the
> right way to interact with Pegida very early on, namely since December 2014,

allowed a deep rift to open up between the liberal-conservatives and the national-conservatives that was instrumental in bringing about the schism at the Essen party conference in July 2015.[79]

In 2015, the Thuringia AfD began organising its own demonstrations in Erfurt that mobilised opposition to Chancellor Angela Merkel's refugee policies and that matched those of Pegida in terms of composition.[80] In spring 2016, a prominent Pegida leader, Siegfried Däbritz, addressed an AfD rally in Erfurt, while, for the first time, an AfD Landtag deputy, Saxony-Anhalt's Hans-Thomas Tillschneider, spoke at a Pegida rally in Dresden; he credited the movement for setting the stage for the AfD's anti-Islam orientation and recommended Pegida front man Lutz Bachmann for the Federal Republic's Order of Merit. Bachmann had recently been convicted for incitement (*Volksverhetzung*).[81] To the political scientist Werner Patzelt, rather than just a provincial happening, Pegida 'is in fact the dispersion of right-wing populism in Germany'.[82] He called it the 'street arm' (*Straßenarm*) of the AfD.[83] Data showed that 'the biggest winner of the Pegida protests is the AfD'.[84] Whereas nearly a third of Pegida participants had reported voting for the AfD in the 2013 Bundestag election, about 80 per cent now indicated that they would vote for the party.[85]

In April 2016, Höcke thanked Pegida for its indispensable role in his party's success and characterised it as the AfD's 'extra-parliamentary partner organisation (*Vorfeldorganisation*) in Dresden'. He envisioned the AfD as 'a fundamentally oppositional movement party'.[86] Höcke's conception of the Pegida–AfD relationship approximates Rucht's model of the movement as a source of dynamic impulse (*Schöpfquelle*) for the party. However, it was far from being a majority position within the AfD leadership. In an effort to counter perceptions of a 'closing of ranks' (*Schulterschluss*) between the AfD and the anti-Islam protests, the AfD's executive committee resolved in May 2016 that party members should not speak or display party symbols at Pegida rallies. A party arbitration tribunal later invalidated this directive.[87]

At its national party congress in late April, the AfD passed a new party programme with pronounced anti-immigration and anti-Muslim planks. It declared that 'Islam is not part of Germany' and called for a ban on minarets, on the call to prayer and on full-body veiling in Germany, as well as opposition to multi-culturalism and large-scale immigration.[88] In short, the AfD had adopted a set of demands that mirrored those of Pegida and of right-wing populist parties elsewhere in Europe.

CONCLUSION

These four cases illustrate how German unification has been a catalyst for political change both directly and indirectly, in the short, medium and long term, and through the interplay of external and internal factors. Whereas a new political party, the PDS, made its debut as a direct consequence of unification, the lengthy process of integrating new and old Länder contributed to indirect effects, such as rising debt, mass unemployment and uncertain identities, which contributed to the Hartz IV protests, the free fellowship movement and the Pegida rallies in eastern Länder. In the short term, the autumn 1989 demonstrations brought to the fore civic groups,

which later combined as an electoral alliance in 1990 and as the Alliance '90 party in 1991. In comparison, the eastern neo-Nazi movement and the Hartz IV demonstrations arose as a medium-term legacy of unification, while the longer term effects of unification shaped the Pegida demonstrations, materialising a quarter-century after the Peaceful Revolution.

External pressures contributed to all four eastern-based protest movements. In the 1980s, the erosion of the communist bloc and the emergence of dissident protest movements in East-Central Europe set the stage for East Germany's non-violent revolution. Eurozone budgetary requirements and concerns about Germany's post-unification industrial competitiveness provided the backdrop to the Red–Green government's welfare state retrenchment policies, which in turn sparked the 2004 anti-Hartz IV protests. The influx of asylum-seekers to Germany in the early 1990s and in 2014–15, respectively, played a part in the growing skinhead movement of the 1990s and in the rise of Pegida. Foreign terrorist attacks and right-wing populism in Europe shaped the Dresden protests and the AfD. Internal pressures were nonetheless central in each instance. Amidst economic stagnation and political oppression, a rudimentary East German civil society challenged the SED dictatorship in 1989. The communist legacy and the aftermath of unification produced a structurally weak eastern economy that disproportionately felt the effects of the Hartz IV reforms. Likewise, the communist experience, as well as post-unification economic hardship, created fertile ground for the neo-Nazi free fellowships and the Pegida rallies. Generally, the impact of unification was of an indirect nature; it created the economic, political and cultural conditions conducive to popular protest, both left-wing and right-wing.

The four protest waves affected German parties and party systems in various ways. In the first case, the autumn 1989 demonstrations did not fundamentally change the German Greens. Although they helped to build Alliance '90's reputation and to shape its identity, they were not able to lift the civic groups to electoral success in the March 1990 East German elections, or deliver strong support for Alliance '90/The Greens in the east after the 1993 merger.

In other cases, the protest waves clearly influenced political party development. The anti-Hartz IV demonstrations forged bonds – based on programme, personnel and identity – between the mostly eastern PDS and the mostly western WASG, facilitating a new party formation. The racist free fellowship movement helped to transform the far-right NPD from a stagnant 'party of old men' (*Altherrenpartei*) into a youthful movement party. Given a green light by the NPD, militant neo-Nazis in the east embarked on a 'march through the institutions' that transformed a former West German party, still led by westerners, into a de facto eastern one. Pegida and its offshoots had a significant impact on another party with predominantly western German roots, the AfD. Pegida helped to drive a wedge between the party's neo-liberal and anti-immigration wings, which ended in the latter's ascendancy by summer 2015.

Protests, on the whole, affected the German party system less than they did individual parties. They played a part in fragmenting the old FRG party system that had begun with the Greens' ascent in the early 1980s, continued with the Left Party's formation in the mid-2000s, and extended to the AfD's national establishment. A corresponding development, aided by protest waves, has been the weakening of the two main catch-all parties, especially the SPD, and the rise of *die Linke* and the AfD on the ideological wings.

Yet these protest movements per se did not fundamentally transform the German party system. The *Kameradschaften* may have given the NPD a short-lived shot in the arm – witness its success in Saxony in 2004 and in Mecklenburg-West Pomerania in 2006 – but this gamble did little to alter the structure of partisan competition. The party remained irrelevant at the national level and shut out of most regional parliaments. Alliance '90 helped the Greens survive after the western Greens had failed to enter the Bundestag in 1990, but it was the Greens' societal anchoring in the west that ensured their comeback. Of the four cases, the 2004 protests arguably proved most consequential, having expedited the formation of an all-German left-wing party – *die Linke*. It remains to be seen whether Pegida or the AfD will establish in Germany what many of its neighbours have: namely, a successful right-wing populist party.

Returning to Dieter Rucht's typology of movement parties, which offers a useful rubric for conceptualising and comparing movement parties, one finds that certain patterns occurred with greater frequency. The model of the movement as a direct precursor (*Vorstufe*) to party formation, followed by the decline of the movement, did not fit any of the cases. Although the autumn 1989 demonstrations accorded civic groups political influence, they did not 'birth' Alliance '90. By the time it formed as a party in 1991, the protest wave had long passed. The anti-Hartz IV rallies paved the way for the WASG–PDS partnership, which three years later yielded *die Linke*, rather than forming the new party's institutions or leadership. The neo-Nazi movement of the 1990s was not a precursor to the NPD, which had existed since 1964. Although Bachmann has proposed that his movement either recast itself as a political party or combine with the AfD to form a unified party list, neither has yet transpired.

A prevalent pattern was that of movement as a source of party dynamism. The anti-Hartz IV protests increased support for the PDS and helped the party expand westward. The NPD tapped into the energy of the neo-Nazi free fellowships in its 'battle for the street'. Likewise, Pegida mobilised protesters who backed the AfD and raised the profile of anti-Islam demands, which the AfD later adopted. There were instances of a party (or its predecessors) serving as a mouthpiece (*Sprachrohr*) of the movement. East German civic groups, which later combined as Alliance '90, initially represented the peaceful demonstrators during the 1989–90 round table sessions but lost this function once the protesters began demanding rapid unification. Leading PDS and WASG officials regularly invoked the anti-Hartz IV protests, amplifying the demonstrators' demands to rescind the cuts. Finally, the hierarchical vanguard party model did not apply. Whereas the NPD had hopes that militants would act as disciplined 'political soldiers', they were erratic and unreliable. The party did not become the avant-garde of the free fellowship movement.

Why did some social movements have a greater party political impact than others? Generally, neither protest size nor party provenance proved decisive. Demonstrations in autumn 1989 drew hundreds of thousands, but this did not ensure significant eastern electoral support for Alliance '90, nor did it shift the long-term balance of power within Alliance '90/The Greens. Neither the 2004 anti-Hartz IV demonstrations, nor the 2014–16 Pegida marches, nor the free fellowship movement approached the magnitude of the autumn 1989 protests, but they were of considerable party political consequence. The 2004 protest wave lifted the western-based WASG. The racist free

fellowship movement of the late 1990s and 2000s was central to the NPD's transformation from a western-based party into an eastern-based movement party. The Dresden-based Pegida movement affected the inter-factional power struggle in the AfD, whose genesis lay in the west.

The timing of the protests mattered, with greater impact occurring when a pre-existing party stood at a strategic crossroad. Whereas former civic group activists in Alliance '90 embodied the people power, grassroots democratic ethos of the Peaceful Revolution, the dominant, pragmatic wing of the western Greens had professionalised party structures.[89] By contrast, the anti-Hartz IV demonstrations developed while the PDS was on the lookout for a new strategic course to ensure its own survival. They also influenced the nascent WASG, which lacked a clear path to electoral relevance. On the right, the free fellowship movement made possible Udo Voigt's three-pillar strategy, which offered the semi-dormant NPD an opportunity to master its crisis. Had Pegida arisen a year earlier, when the AfD's economic liberals (led by Bernd Lucke) held a dominant position and before eastern regional election victories had bolstered the national-conservative wing, then it would have been less consequential to the AfD.

In closing, eastern Germany retained after 1989–90 a vibrant culture of protest that drove, and still drives, party political change in the Federal Republic. In Saxony, especially its south-east corner, this could relate to pre-1989 experiences. Cut off from West German television broadcasts prior to unification, this region had been known as the 'valley of the clueless' (*Tal der Ahnungslosen*) because it had less contact with the west. Hans-Ulrich Winkler has attributed Pegida's success to this past isolation.[90] The Peaceful Revolution of 1989 still continues to frame eastern protests. It is no accident that the anti-Hartz protests and the Pegida strolls were held on Monday evenings; or that whether leftist or rightist the crowds chanted, 'we are the people'. The tradition of eastern protest reflects at once the East German legacy and that of the post-communist transformation when many easterners questioned the efficacy of united Germany's political institutions.

DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

David F. Patton, who is the Joanne Toor Cummings' 50 Professor of Government and International Relations at Connecticut College in New London, CT, teaches classes on comparative and European politics. Patton has published books and articles on German foreign policy, reunification and German party politics.

NOTES

1. David P. Conradt, 'The Civic Culture and Unified Germany: An Overview', *German Politics* 24/3 (2015), p.254; Robert Rohrschneider, 'Is There a Regional Cleavage in Germany's Party System? Unequal Representation and Ideological Congruence in Germany 1980–2013', *German Politics* 24/3 (2015), pp.361–2.

2. Marc Morjé Howard, *Weakness of Civil Society in Post-Communist Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). For rates of participation in legal demonstrations, see table on page 409 in Christian Lahusen and Lisa Bleckmann, 'Beyond the Ballot Box: Changing Patterns of Political Protest Participation in Germany (1974–2008)', *German Politics* 24/3 (Sept. 2015), pp.402–26.

3. Richard Rose and Christian Haerpfer, 'The Impact of a Ready-made State: East Germans in Comparative Perspective', *German Politics* 6/1 (1997), pp.100–121.

4. Christiane Lemke, 'Protestverhalten in Transformationsgesellschaften', *Politische Vierteljahresschrift* 38/1 (1997), pp.65–8.

5. See Gordon Smith, 'West Germany and the Politics of Centrality', *Government and Opposition* 11/4 (Oct. 1976), pp.387–407.

6. See Joachim Raschke, 'Die Grünen zwischen Bewegungs- und Parlamentspartei', *Gegenwärtskunde* 27/2 (1987), pp.171–84; Gudrun Heinrich, 'Die NPD als Bewegungspartei', *Forschungsjournal Neue Soziale Bewegungen* 21/4 (2008), pp.30–31.

7. Dieter Rucht, 'Zum Verhältnis von sozialen Bewegungen und Politischen Parteien', *Journal fur Sozialforschung* 27/3–4 (1987), esp. pp.300–304.

8. Lothar Probst, 'Übergänge von der Zivilgesellschaft zur politischen Institution: Der Parteiwerdungsprozess der Grünen', in Cornelia Fraune and Klaus Schubert (eds), *Grenzen der Zivilgesellschaft: Empirische Befunde und analytische Perspektiven* (Münster: Waxmann Verlag, 2012), pp.75–92, esp. pp.88–9.

9. Ibid., p.88.

10. Ibid.

11. Hermann Weber, *Die DDR 1945–1990*, 2nd ed. (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1993), pp.104–6.

12. Karsten Timmer, *Vom Aufbruch zum Umbruch: die Bürgerbewegung in der DDR* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 2000), p.150.

13. Christiane Olivo, *Creating a Democratic Civil Society in Eastern Germany: The Case of the Citizens Movements and Alliance 90* (New York: Palgrave, 2001), esp. pp.61–89. See also Joyce Mushaben, '*Die Lebensjahre sind vorbei!* Re-Forming Democratic Interest Groups in the East German Länder', *Democratization* 8/4 (Winter 2001), pp.95–133.

14. Timmer, *Vom Aufbruch zum Umbruch*, pp.172–4.

15. Weber, *Die DDR 1945–1990*, p.109; Olivo, *Creating a Democratic Civil Society in Eastern Germany*, pp.102–12.

16. Marko Grdešić, 'Spacial Patterns of Thermidor: Protest and Voting in East Germany's Revolution, 1989–1990', *German Politics and Society* 34/2 (Summer 2016), pp.28–32. The author analyses protest activity from 1 Sept. 1989 to 18 March 1990.

17. Werner Schulz, 'Ach Du Grüne 90!', in Werner Schultz (ed.), *Der Bündnis-Fall: Politische Perspektiven 10 Jahre nach Gründung des Bündnis 90* (Bremen: Edition Temmen, 2001), p.142; Jens König, 'Der Bündnis-Fall', *die tageszeitung*, 18 Jan. 2002, available from http://www.taz.de/1/archiv/?dig=2002/01/18/a0113 (accessed 6 July 2016).

18. Although political demands had been the most frequent category of demands among those protesting in 1989, economic demands were by far the most frequent from 1991 to 1994. Lemke, 'Protestverhalten in Transformationsgesellschaften', p.73.

19. David F. Patton, 'The Left Party at Six: The PDS–WASG Merger in Comparative Perspective', *German Politics* 22/3 (Sept. 2013), pp.219–34, esp. pp.227–9.

20. Olivo, *Creating a Democratic Civil Society in Eastern Germany*, p.101.

21. See Britta Baumgarten and Christian Lahusen, 'The Mobilization of the Unemployed in Germany (1998–2004)', in Didier Chabanet and Jean Faniel (eds), *The Mobilization of the Unemployed in Europe: From Acquiescence to Protest?* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), pp.57–88.

22. 'Die soziale Situation in Deutschland: Arbeitslose und Arbeitslosenquote', bpb: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, available from http://www.bpb.de/wissen/H9NU28,0,Arbeitslose_und_Arbeitslosenquote.html (accessed 6 July 2016).

23. Baumgarten and Lahusen, 'The Mobilization of the Unemployed', pp.62, 76.

24. Dieter Rucht and Mundo Yang, 'Wer demonstrierte gegen Hartz IV?', *Forschungsjournal Neue Soziale Bewegungen* 17/4 (Dec. 2004), pp.21–7.

25. See Dieter Rink and Axel Philipps, 'Mobilisierungsframes auf den Anti-Hartz-IV-Demonstrationen', *Forschungsjournal Neue Soziale Bewegungen* 20/1 (March 2007), pp.53–4; 'Hartz-IV-Protest: Montagsdemos auf Abwegen', *Stern*, 9 Aug. 2004, available from http://www.stern.de/politik/deutschland/hartz-iv-protest-montagsdemos-auf-abwegen-3074772.html (accessed 6 July 2016).

26. Baumgarten and Lahusen, 'The Mobilization of the Unemployed', p.78.

27. Michael Brie, Ist die PDS noch zu retten? Analyse und Perspektiven, *Standpunkte* 3/2003 (May 2003), esp. pp.39–40.

28. See Allensbach polling on 'Sonntagsfrage', 2004, available from http://www.wahlrecht.de/umfragen/allensbach/2005.htm (accessed 6 July 2016).

29. Rink and Philipps, 'Mobilisierungsframes auf den Anti-Hartz-IV-Demonstrationen', p.56.
30. Rucht and Yang, 'Wer demonstrierte gegen Hartz IV?', p.24.
31. Rink and Philipps, 'Mobilisierungsframes auf den Anti-Hartz-IV-Demonstrationen', p.56.
32. See Matthias Micus, 'Stärkung des Zentrums: Perspektiven, Risiken und Chancen des Fusionsprozesses von PDS und WASG', in Tim Spier, Felix Butzlaff, Matthias Micus and Franz Walter (eds), *Die Linkspartei: Zeitgemäße Idee oder Bündnis ohne Zukunft?* (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2007), pp.185–237, esp. p.225.
33. Rink and Philipps, 'Mobilisierungsframes auf den Anti-Hartz-IV-Demonstrationen', p.57.
34. *Die 'Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (NPD)' als Gravitationsfeld im Rechtsextremismus* (Cologne: Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, 2006), pp.8–9; Gerard Braunthal, *Right-Wing Extremism in Contemporary Germany* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), p.60.
35. Rink and Philipps, 'Mobilisierungsframes auf den Anti-Hartz-IV-Demonstrationen', p.58; Bernd Sommer, 'Anti-capitalism in the Name of Ethno-nationalism: Ideological Shifts on the German Extreme Right', *Patterns of Prejudice* 42/3 (2008), pp.308–9.
36. Rink and Philipps, 'Mobilisierungsframes auf den Anti-Hartz-IV-Demonstrationen', p.58.
37. Sommer, 'Anti-capitalism in the Name of Ethno-nationalism', p.309.
38. Braunthal, *Right-Wing Extremism in Contemporary Germany*, p.91.
39. Data in Meredith W. Watts, 'Aggressive Youth Cultures and Hate Crime: Skinheads and Xenophobic Youth in Germany', *American Behavioral Scientist* 45/4 (Dec. 2001), p.607.
40. Data in Watts, 'Aggressive Youth Cultures and Hate Crime', p.602.
41. Braunthal, *Right-Wing Extremism in Contemporary Germany*, p.97.
42. Andrea Röpke, 'Braune Kameradschaften', *bpb*, 13 Sept. 2006, available from http://www.bpb.de/politik/extremismus/rechtsextremismus/41901/braune-kameradschaften (accessed 6 July 2016).
43. Harald Bergsdorf, *Die neue NPD* (Munich: Olzog, 2007), p.47.
44. Marc Brandstetter, 'Die "neue" NPD: Zwischen Systemfeindschaft und bürgerlicher Fassade', *Parteienmonitor Aktuell*, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Berlin, Jan. 2012, p.5.
45. Ibid., p.9.
46. Ibid., pp.10–12.
47. Braunthal, *Right-Wing Extremism in Contemporary Germany*, pp.62–6.
48. Quoted in Heinrich, 'Die NPD als Bewegungspartei', p.32.
49. Johannes Radke, 'Der rechtsextreme "Kampf um die Strasse"', *bpd*, 14 May 2014, available from http://www.bpb.de/politik/extremismus/rechtsextremismus/184385/der-rechtsextreme-kampf-um-die-strasse (accessed 6 July 2016). See also Bergsdorf, *Die neue NPD*, p.72.
50. Quoted in Heinrich, 'Die NPD als Bewegungspartei', p.33.
51. Ibid. See also 'Andreas Speit zu den freien Kameraden: "Die NPD ist ihnen zu moderat"', *Süddeutsche*, 17 May 2010, available from http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/andreas-speit-zu-den-freien-kameradschaften-die-npd-ist-ihnen-zu-moderat-1.203552 (accessed 6 July 2016).
52. NPD Executive Committee, 'Das Strategische Konzept der NPD', 1999, quoted in Brandstetter, 'Die "neue" NPD', pp.7–8.
53. Jochen Brenner, 'Ex-Skinheads in der NPD: Vom Schläger zum Kader', 25 Nov. 2011, *Spiegel-Online*, available from http://www.spiegel.de/panorama/gesellschaft/ex-skinheads-in-der-npd-vom-schlaeger-zum-kader-a-799882.html (accessed 6 July 2016).
54. Heinrich, 'Die NPD als Bewegungspartei', p.33.
55. Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, 'Die "Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands," (NPD) als Gravitationsfeld im Rechtsextremismus', Cologne, Dec. 2006, p.5.
56. Christoph Ruf and Olaf Sundermeyer, *In der NPD: Reisen in die National Brefreite Zone* (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2009), pp.217–18.
57. The Saxon Switzerland region of southern Saxony borders the Czech Republic. Frank Nordhausen, 'Das läuft alles doch schief', *Berliner Zeitung*, 21 Sept. 2004, available from http://www.berliner-zeitung.de/archiv/in-einem-dorf-in-sachsen-erzielte-die-rechtsextreme-npd-ihr-bestes-wahlergebnis–aus-protest–sagen-viele–aber-es-gibt-auch-andere-gruende–das-laeuft-doch-alles-schief-,10810590,10214970.html (accessed 6 July 2016).
58. 'Andreas Speit zu den freien Kameraden'; Heinrich, 'Die NPD als Bewegungspartei', pp.33–4; 'Die "Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands"', p.5.
59. Lars Geiges, Stine Marg and Franz Walter, *Pegida: Die Schmutzige Seite der Zivilgesellschaft?* (Bielefeld: transcript Verlag, 2015), p.14.
60. See data available from http://www.polizei.sachsen.de/de/MI_2014_32600.htm (accessed 1 Sept. 2015), http://www.polizei.sachsen.de/de/MI_2014_33210.htm (accessed 1 Sept. 2015), http://www.polizei.sachsen.de/de/MI_2015_33745.htm (accessed 6 July 2016),https://web.archive.org/web/20150112224354/http://www.polizei.sachsen.de/de/MI_2015_33890.htm (accessed 6 July 2016).

61. 'Pegida-Demo in Dresden: Unmut wegen Flüchtlingsandrang', *Focus-Online*, 15 Sept. 2015, available
     from http://www.focus.de/politik/deutschland/pegida-demo-in-dresden-unmut-wegen-fluechtlingsand
     rang-5000-menschen-in-dresden-ausschreitungen-in-leipzig_id_4947727.html (accessed 6 July 2016).
62. '19-Punkte-Programm: Was Will Pegida wirklich', *Focus-Online*, 19 Dec. 2014, available from http://
     www.focus.de/politik/deutschland/woechentliche-demonstrationen-19-punkte-programm-was-will-
     pegida-wirklich_id_4359150.html (accessed 6 July 2016).
63. Ibid.
64. Data drawn from Hans Vorländer, Maik Harald and Steven Schäller, 'Wer geht zu Pegida und warum?
     Eine empirische Untersuchung von Pegida-Demonstranten in Dresden', *Schriften zur Verfassungs- und
     Demokratieforschung*, Zentrum für Verfassungs- und Demokratieforschung, 1/2005, Dresden, 2015,
     esp. pp.45–73.
65. Priska Daphi, Piotr Kocyba, Michael Neuber, Jochen Roose, Dieter Rucht, Franziska Scholl, Moritz
     Sommer, Wolfgang Stuppert and Sabriena Zajak, 'Protestforschung am Limit: Eine soziologische
     Annäherung an Pegida', *ipb working papers*, Berlin, Feb. 2015, pp.29–30.
66. 'Dresdner Oberbürgermeisterwahl: Fast zehn Prozent für Pegida-Kandidatin', *Frankfurter Allgemeine
     Zeitung*, 7 June 2015, available from http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/dresden-fast-zehn-
     prozent-fuer-pegida-kandidatin-13634674.html (accessed 6 July 2016).
67. 'Rechtsextremismus: "Pegida" will sich als Partei formieren', *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 15 Sept.
     2015, available from http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/rechtsextremismus/pegida-mitgruender-
     lutz-bachmann-will-partei-gruenden-13804236.html (accessed 6 July 2016).
68. 'Pegida-Führer will Schulterschluß mit AfD', *Deutsche Welle*, 29 Feb. 2016, available from http://
     www.dw.com/de/pegida-führer-will-schulterschluss-mit-afd/a-19083635 (accessed 6 July 2016).
69. In January 2017, Höcke gave a speech in which he described the Holocaust memorial in Berlin as a
     'monument of shame'.
70. Felix Korsch identifies five different phases of the AfD's relationship to Pegida from late 2014 to April
     2015. Felix Korsch, '"Natürliche Verbündete"? Die Pegida-Debatte in der AfD zwischen Anziehung
     und Ablehnung', in Alexander Häusler (ed.), *Die Alternative für Deutschland: Programmatik, Entwick-
     lung und politische Verortung* (Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 2016), pp.115–25. See also Felix Korsch,
     'Stichwortgeber im Nadelstreifen: Personelle und inhaltliche Konvergenzen zwischen AfD und
     Pegida', in Häusler (ed.), *Die Alternative für Deutschland*, pp.135–47. See also the chapter 'Alternative
     Annäherungen? Bemerkungen zum Verhältnis von AfD und Pegida', in Geiges et al., *Pegida.*
71. 'Anti-Islam-Bewegung: AfD-Chef findet Pegida "gut und richtig"', *Spiegel-Online*, 9 Dec. 2014, avail-
     able from http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/afd-chef-bernd-lucke-bezeichnet-pegida-als-gut-
     und-richtig-a-1007563.html (accessed 6 July 2016).
72. 'Gauland sieht Dresdner "Pegida" als Verbündete', *rbb-online*, 7 Jan. 2015, available from http://www.
     rbb-online.de/politik/beitrag/2015/01/gauland-veraendertes-einwanderungsgesetz-dresdner-pegida-
     verbuendete.html (accessed 6 July 2016).
73. Justus Bender and Stefan Locke, 'Die AfD und Pegida: Kein Geheimnis mehr', *Frankfurter Allgemeine
     Zeitung*, 10 Dec. 2015, available from http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/die-naehe-der-afd-
     zum-islamkritischen-pegida-buendnis-13314224.html (accessed 6 July 2016).
74. Günther Lachmann, 'AfD-Chefin Petry sieht "Schnittmengen" mit Pegida', *Die Welt*, 8 Jan. 2015,
     available from http://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article136170926/AfD-Chefin-Petry-sieht-
     Schnittmengen-mit-Pegida.html (accessed 6 July 2016).
75. 'AfD-Vize will Ausländerfeinde aus der Partei werfen', *Handelsblatt*, 30 Jan. 2015, available from
     http://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/deutschland/hans-olaf-henkel-afd-vize-will-auslaenderfeinde-aus-
     partei-werfen/11300024.html (accessed 6 July 2016).
76. Korsch, '"Natürliche Verbündete"?', p.124.
77. Ibid., p.125.
78. 'Die AfD stellt sich neu auf: "Wir sind die Pegida-Partei"', *Badische Zeitung*, 6 July 2015, available
     from http://www.badische-zeitung.de/deutschland-1/die-afd-stellt-sich-neu-auf-wir-sind-die-pegida-
     partei–107238994.html (accessed 6 July 2016).
79. Hans Vorländer, Hans Herold and Steven Schäller, *PEGIDA: Entwicklung, Zusammensetzung und
     Deutung einer Empörungsbewegung* (Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 2016), p.43.
80. Stefan Locke, 'Studie aus Dresden: "Pegida und AfD sind dasselbe"', *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*,
     25 Feb. 2016, available from http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/fluechtlingskrise/studie-aus-dresden-
     pegida-und-afd-sind-dasselbe-14090416.html (accessed 6 July 2016).
81. Matthias Meisner, 'Nach Kundgebung in Erfurt: AfD streitet um Schulterschluss mit Pegida', *Tages-
     spiegel*, 19 May 2016, available from http://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/nach-kundgebung-in-erfurt-
     afd-streitet-um-schulterschluss-mit-pegida/13613684.html (accessed 28 March 2017); 'Kundgebung
     in Dresden: AfD-Abgeordneter Tillschneider dankt Pegida', *Spiegel-Online*, 10 May 2016, available

from http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/pegida-in-dresden-afd-abgeordneter-hans-thomas-till schneider-bedankt-sich-a-1091522.html (accessed 30 March 2017).

82. Locke, 'Studie aus Dresden'.

83. 'Pegida-Führer will Schulterschluß mit AfD', *Deutsche Welle*, 29 Feb. 2016, available from http://www.dw.com/de/pegida-führer-will-schulterschluss-mit-afd/a-19083635 (accessed 6 July 2016).

84. 'PEGIDA: Aktuelle Forschungsergebnisse', Robert Mueller-Stahl, Göttinger Institut für Demokratieforschung blog, 31 Jan. 2016, available from http://www.demokratie-goettingen.de/blog/pegida-2016-studie/print/ (accessed 6 July 2016).

85. Ibid.

86. 'AfD: Höcke bedankt sich bei Pegida', *Zeit-Online*, 9 April 2016, available from http://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2016-04/afd-bjoern-hoecke-pegida-wegbereiter-wahlerfolg (accessed 6 |July 2016).

87. Matthias Meisner, 'AfD's Schiedsgericht erlaubt Auftritte bei Pegida', *Tagesspiegel*, 8 Aug. 2016, available from http://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/schlappe-fuer-frauke-petry-afd-schiedsgericht-erlaubt-auftritte-bei-pegida/13983452.html (accessed 26 March 2017).

88. Alternative for Germany, *Programm für Deutschland. Das Grundsatzprogramm der Alternative für Deutschland*, Passed at the federal party congress held in Stuttgart from 30 April to 1 May 2016, esp. pp.48–50, available from https://alternativefuer.de/wp-content/uploads/sites/7/2016/05/2016-06-27_afd-grundsatzprogramm_web-version.pdf (accessed 13 November 2017).

89. E. Gene Frankland, 'The Evolution of the Greens in Germany: From Amateurism to Professionalism', in E. Gene Frankland, Paul Lucardie and Benoît Rihoux (eds), *Green Parties in Transition: The End of Grass-roots Democracy* (Farnham and Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2008), pp.30–31.

90. 'Historiker Winkler: "Fehlendes Westfernsehen schuld an Pegida in Dresden"', *Wirtschaftswoche*, 17 Jan. 2015, available from http://www.wiwo.de/politik/deutschland/historiker-winkler-fehlendes-westfernsehen-schuld-an-pegida-in-dresden/11240638.html (accessed 6 July 2016).