The Alliance's New Strategic
Concept
agreed by the Heads of State and Government participating in the
Meeting of the North Atlantic Council
At their meeting in London in July 1990, NATO's Heads of State and Government agreed on the
need to transform the Atlantic Alliance to reﬂect the new, more promising, era in Europe. While
reaﬃrming the basic principles on which the Alliance has rested since its inception, they
recognised that the developments taking place in Europe would have a far-reaching impact on
the way in which its aims would be met in future. In particular, they set in hand a fundamental
strategic review. The resulting new Strategic Concept is set out below.
Part I - the Strategic Context
The new strategic environment
1. Since 1989, profound political changes have taken place in Central and Eastern Europe
which have radically improved the security environment in which the North Atlantic Alliance
seeks to achieve its objectives. The USSR's former satellites have fully recovered their
sovereignty. The Soviet Union and its Republics are undergoing radical change. The three
Baltic Republics have regained their independence. Soviet forces have left Hungary and
Czechoslovakia and are due to complete their withdrawal from Poland and Germany by
1994. All the countries that were formerly adversaries of NATO have dismantled the
Warsaw Pact and rejected ideological hostility to the West. They have, in varying degrees,
embraced and begun to implement policies aimed at achieving pluralistic democracy, the
rule of law, respect for human rights and a market economy. The political division of
Europe that was the source of the military confrontation of the Cold War period has thus
been overcome.
2. In the West, there have also been signiﬁcant changes. Germany has been united and
remains a full member of the Alliance and of European institutions. The fact that the
07 Nov. 1991 - 08 Nov. 1991 | Last updated: 26 Aug. 2010 10:17
countries of the European Community are working towards the goal of political union,
including the development of a European security identity, and the enhancement of the
role of the WEU are important factors for European security. The strengthening of the
security dimension in the process of European integration, and the enhancement of the
role and responsibilities of European members of the Alliance are positive and mutually
reinforcing. The development of a European security identity and defence role, reﬂected in
the strengthening of the European pillar within the Alliance, will not only serve the interests
of the European states but also reinforce the integrity and eﬀectiveness of the Alliance as a
whole.
3. Substantial progress in arms control has already enhanced stability and security by
lowering arms levels and increasing military transparency and mutual conﬁdence (including
through the Stockholm CDE agreement of 1986, the INF Treaty of 1987 and the CSCE
agreements and conﬁdence and security-building measures of 1990). Implementation of
the 1991 START Treaty will lead to increased stability through substantial and balanced
reductions in the ﬁeld of strategic nuclear arms. Further far- reaching changes and
reductions in the nuclear forces of the United States and the Soviet Union will be pursued
following President Bush's September 1991 initiative. Also of great importance is the Treaty
on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), signed at the 1990 Paris Summit; its
implementation will remove the Alliance's numerical inferiority in key conventional weapon
systems and provide for eﬀective veriﬁcation procedures. All these developments will also
result in an unprecedented degree of military transparency in Europe, thus increasing
predictability and mutual conﬁdence. Such transparency would be further enhanced by the
achievement of an Open Skies regime. There are welcome prospects for further advances
in arms control in conventional and nuclear forces, and for the achievement of a global ban
on chemical weapons, as well as restricting de-stabilising arms exports and the
proliferation of certain weapons technologies.
4. The CSCE process, which began in Helsinki in 1975, has already contributed signiﬁcantly to
overcoming the division of Europe. As a result of the Paris Summit, it now includes new
institutional arrangements and provides a contractual frame- work for consultation and
cooperation that can play a constructive role, complementary to that of NATO and the
process of European integration, in preserving peace.
5. The historic changes that have occurred in Europe, which have led to the fulﬁlment of a
number of objectives set out in the Harmel Report, have signiﬁcantly improved the overall
security of the Allies. The monolithic, massive and potentially immediate threat which was
the principal concern of the Alliance in its ﬁrst forty years has disappeared. On the other
hand, a great deal of uncertainty about the future and risks to the security of the Alliance
remain.
6. The new Strategic Concept looks forward to a security environment in which the positive
changes referred to above have come to fruition. In particular, it assumes both the
completion of the planned withdrawal of Soviet military forces from Central and Eastern
Europe and the full implementation by all parties of the 1990 CFE Treaty. The
implementation of the Strategic Concept will thus be kept under review in the light of the
evolving security environment and in particular progress in fulﬁlling these assumptions.
Further adaptation will be made to the extent necessary.
Security challenges and risks
7. The security challenges and risks which NATO faces are diﬀerent in nature from what they
were in the past. The threat of a simultaneous, full-scale attack on all of NATO's European
fronts has eﬀectively been removed and thus no longer provides the focus for Allied
strategy. Particularly in Central Europe, the risk of a surprise attack has been substantially
reduced, and minimum Allied warning time has increased accordingly.
8. In contrast with the predominant threat of the past, the risks to Allied security that remain
are multi-faceted in nature and multi-directional, which makes them hard to predict and
assess. NATO must be capable of responding to such risks if stability in Europe and the
security of Alliance members are to be preserved. These risks can arise in various ways.
9. Risks to Allied security are less likely to result from calculated aggression against the
territory of the Allies, but rather from the adverse consequences of instabilities that may
arise from the serious economic, social and political diﬃculties, including ethnic rivalries
and territorial disputes, which are faced by many countries in central and eastern Europe.
The tensions which may result, as long as they remain limited, should not directly threaten
the security and territorial integrity of members of the Alliance. They could, however, lead
to crises inimical to European stability and even to armed conﬂicts, which could involve
outside powers or spill over into NATO countries, having a direct eﬀect on the security of
the Alliance.
0. In the particular case of the Soviet Union, the risks and uncertainties that accompany the
process of change cannot be seen in isolation from the fact that its conventional forces are
signiﬁcantly larger than those of any other European State and its large nuclear arsenal
comparable only with that of the United States. These capabilities have to be taken into
account if stability and security in Europe are to be preserved.
1. The Allies also wish to maintain peaceful and non- adversarial relations with the countries
in the Southern Mediterranean and Middle East. The stability and peace of the countries on
the southern periphery of Europe are important for the security of the Alliance, as the 1991
Gulf war has shown. This is all the more so because of the build-up of military power and
the proliferation of weapons technologies in the area, including weapons of mass
destruction and ballistic missiles capable of reaching the territory of some member states
of the Alliance.
2. Any armed attack on the territory of the Allies, from whatever direction, would be covered
by Articles 5 and 6 of the Washington Treaty. However, Alliance security must also take
account of the global context. Alliance security interests can be aﬀected by other risks of a
wider nature, including proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, disruption of the ﬂow
of vital resources and actions of terrorism and sabotage. Arrangements exist within the
Alliance for consultation among the Allies under Article 4 of the Washington Treaty and,
where appropriate, coordination of their eﬀorts including their responses to such risks.
3. From the point of view of Alliance strategy, these diﬀerent risks have to be seen in diﬀerent
ways. Even in a non-adversarial and cooperative relationship, Soviet military capability and
build-up potential, including its nuclear dimension, still con- stitute the most signiﬁcant
factor of which the Alliance has to take account in maintaining the strategic balance in
Europe. The end of East-West confrontation has, however, greatly reduced the risk of major
conﬂict in Europe. On the other hand, there is a greater risk of diﬀerent crises arising,
which could develop quickly and would require a rapid response, but they are likely to be of
a lesser magnitude.
4. Two conclusions can be drawn from this analysis of the strategic context. The ﬁrst is that
the new environment does not change the purpose or the security functions of the
Alliance, but rather underlines their enduring validity. The second, on the other hand, is
that the changed environment oﬀers new opportunities for the Alliance to frame its
strategy within a broad approach to security.
Part II - Alliance Objectives And Security Functions
The purpose of the Alliance
5. NATO's essential purpose, set out in the Washington Treaty and reiterated in the London
Declaration, is to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and
military means in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. Based on
common values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law, the Alliance has worked
since its inception for the establishment of a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe. This
Alliance objective remains unchanged.
The nature of the Alliance
6. NATO embodies the transatlantic link by which the security of North America is
permanently tied to the security of Europe. It is the practical expression of eﬀective
collective eﬀort among its members in support of their common interests.
7. The fundamental operating principle of the Alliance is that of common commitment and
mutual co-operation among sovereign states in support of the indivisibility of security for
all of its members. Solidarity within the Alliance, given substance and eﬀect by NATO's daily
work in both the political and military spheres, ensures that no single Ally is forced to rely
upon its own national eﬀorts alone in dealing with basic security challenges. Without
depriving member states of their right and duty to assume their sovereign responsibilities
in the ﬁeld of defence, the Alliance enables them through collective eﬀort to enhance their
ability to realise their essential national security objectives.
8. The resulting sense of equal security amongst the members of the Alliance, regardless of
diﬀerences in their circumstances or in their national military capabilities relative to each
other, contributes to overall stability within Europe and thus to the creation of conditions
conducive to increased co-operation both among Alliance members and with others. It is
on this basis that members of the Alliance, together with other nations, are able to pursue
the development of co-operative structures of security for a Europe whole and free.
The fundamental tasks of the Alliance
9. The means by which the Alliance pursues its security policy to preserve the peace will
continue to include the maintenance of a military capability suﬃcient to prevent war and to
provide for eﬀective defence; an overall capability to manage successfully crises aﬀecting
the security of its members; and the pursuit of political eﬀorts favouring dialogue with
other nations and the active search for a co-operative approach to European security,
including in the ﬁeld of arms control and disarmament.
0. To achieve its essential purpose, the Alliance performs the following fundamental security
tasks:
I. To provide one of the indispensable foundations for a stable security environment in
Europe, based on the growth of democratic institutions and commitment to the
peaceful resolution of disputes, in which no country would be able to intimidate or
coerce any European nation or to impose hegemony through the threat or use of
force.
II. To serve, as provided for in Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, as a transatlantic
forum for Allied consultations on any issues that aﬀect their vital interests, including
possible developments posing risks for members' security, and for appropriate coordination
of their eﬀorts in ﬁelds of common concern.
III. To deter and defend against any threat of aggression against the territory of any
NATO member state.
IV. To preserve the strategic balance within Europe.
1. Other European institutions such as the EC, WEU and CSCE also have roles to play, in
accordance with their respective responsibilities and purposes, in these ﬁelds. The creation
of a European identity in security and defence will underline the preparedness of the
Europeans to take a greater share of responsibility for their security and will help to
reinforce transatlantic solidarity. However the extent of its membership and of its
capabilities gives NATO a particular position in that it can perform all four core security
functions. NATO is the essential forum for consultation among the Allies and the forum for
agreement on policies bearing on the security and defence commitments of its members
under the Washington Treaty.
2. In deﬁning the core functions of the Alliance in the terms set out above, member states
conﬁrm that the scope of the Alliance as well as their rights and obligations as provided for
in the Washington Treaty remain unchanged.
Part III - A Broad Approach To Security
Protecting peace in a new Europe
3. The Alliance has always sought to achieve its objectives of safeguarding the security and
territorial integrity of its members, and establishing a just and lasting peaceful order in
Europe, through both political and military means. This comprehensive approach remains
the basis of the Alliance's security policy.
4. But what is new is that, with the radical changes in the security situation, the opportunities
for achieving Alliance objectives through political means are greater than ever before. It is
now possible to draw all the consequences from the fact that security and stability have
political, economic, social, and environmental elements as well as the indispensable
defence dimension. Managing the diversity of challenges facing the Alliance requires a
broad approach to security. This is reﬂected in three mutually reinforcing elements of Allied
security policy; dialogue, co-operation, and the maintenance of a collective defence
capability.
5. The Alliance's active pursuit of dialogue and co-operation, underpinned by its commitment
to an eﬀective collective defence capability, seeks to reduce the risks of conﬂict arising out
of misunderstanding or design; to build increased mutual understanding and conﬁdence
among all European states; to help manage crises aﬀecting the security of the Allies; and to
expand the opportunities for a genuine partnership among all European countries in
dealing with common security problems.
6. In this regard, the Alliance's arms control and disarmament policy contributes both to
dialogue and to co-operation with other nations, and thus will continue to play a major role
in the achievement of the Alliance's security objectives. The Allies seek, through arms
control and disarmament, to enhance security and stability at the lowest possible level of
forces consistent with the requirements of defence. Thus, the Alliance will continue to
ensure that defence and arms control and disarmament objectives remain in harmony.
7. In fulﬁlling its fundamental objectives and core security functions, the Alliance will continue
to respect the legitimate security interests of others, and seek the peaceful resolution of
disputes as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations. The Alliance will promote
peaceful and friendly international relations and support democratic institutions. In this
respect, it recognizes the valuable contribution being made by other organizations such as
the European Community and the CSCE, and that the roles of these institutions and of the
Alliance are complementary.
Dialogue
8. The new situation in Europe has multiplied the opportunities for dialogue on the part of
the Alliance with the Soviet Union and the other countries of Central and Eastern Europe.
The Alliance has established regular diplomatic liaison and military contacts with the
countries of Central and Eastern Europe as provided for in the London Declaration. The
Alliance will further promote dialogue through regular diplomatic liaison, including an
intensiﬁed exchange of views and information on security policy issues. Through such
means the Allies, individually and collectively, will seek to make full use of the
unprecedented opportunities aﬀorded by the growth of freedom and democracy
throughout Europe and encourage greater mutual understanding of respective security
concerns, to increase transparency and predictability in security aﬀairs, and thus to
reinforce stability. The military can help to overcome the divisions of the past, not least
through intensiﬁed military contacts and greater military transparency. The Alliance's
pursuit of dialogue will provide a foundation for greater co-operation throughout Europe
and the ability to resolve diﬀerences and conﬂicts by peaceful means.
Co-operation
9. The Allies are also committed to pursue co-operation with all states in Europe on the basis
of the principles set out in the Charter of Paris for a New Europe. They will seek to develop
broader and productive patterns of bilateral and multilateral co-operation in all relevant
ﬁelds of European security, with the aim, inter alia, of preventing crises or, should they
arise, ensuring their eﬀective management. Such partnership between the members of the
Alliance and other nations in dealing with speciﬁc problems will be an essential factor in
moving beyond past divisions towards one Europe whole and free. This policy of cooperation
is the expression of the inseparability of security among European states. It is
built upon a common recognition among Alliance members that the persistence of new
political, economic or social divisions across the continent could lead to future instability,
and such divisions must thus be diminished.
Collective Defence
0. The political approach to security will thus become increasingly important. Nonetheless,
the military dimension remains essential. The maintenance of an adequate military
capability and clear preparedness to act collectively in the common defence remain central
to the Alliance's security objectives. Such a capability, together with political solidarity, is
required in order to prevent any attempt at coercion or intimidation, and to guarantee that
military aggression directed against the Alliance can never be perceived as an option with
any prospect of success. It is equally indispensable so that dialogue and co-operation can
be undertaken with conﬁdence and achieve their desired results.
Management of crisis and conﬂict prevention
1. In the new political and strategic environment in Europe, the success of the Alliance's policy
of preserving peace and preventing war depends even more than in the past on the
eﬀectiveness of preventive diplomacy and successful management of crises aﬀecting the
security of its members. Any major aggression in Europe is much more unlikely and would
be preceded by signiﬁcant warning time. Though on a much smaller scale, the range and
variety of other potential risks facing the Alliance are less predictable than before.
2. In these new circumstances there are increased opportunities for the successful resolution
of crises at an early stage. The success of Alliance policy will require a coherent approach
determined by the Alliance's political authorities choosing and co-ordinating appropriate
crisis management measures as required from a range of political and other measures,
including those in the military ﬁeld. Close control by the political authorities of the Alliance
will be applied from the outset and at all stages. Appropriate consultation and decision
making procedures are essential to this end.
3. The potential of dialogue and co-operation within all of Europe must be fully developed in
order to help to defuse crises and to prevent conﬂicts since the Allies' security is
inseparably linked to that of all other states in Europe. To this end, the Allies will support
the role of the CSCE process and its institutions. Other bodies including the European
Community, Western European Union and United Nations may also have an important role
to play.
Part IV - Guidelines For Defence
Principles of Alliance strategy
4. The diversity of challenges now facing the Alliance thus requires a broad approach to
security. The transformed political and strategic environment enables the Alliance to
change a number of important features of its military strategy and to set out new
guidelines, while reaﬃrming proven fundamental principles. At the London Summit, it was
therefore agreed to prepare a new military strategy and a revised force posture responding
to the changed circumstances.
5. Alliance strategy will continue to reﬂect a number of fundamental principles. The Alliance is
purely defensive in purpose: none of its weapons will ever be used except in self-defence,
and it does not consider itself to be anyone's adversary. The Allies will maintain military
strength adequate to convince any potential aggressor that the use of force against the
territory of one of the Allies would meet collective and eﬀective action by all of them and
that the risks involved in initiating conﬂict would outweigh any foreseeable gains. The
forces of the Allies must therefore be able to defend Alliance frontiers, to stop an
aggressor's advance as far forward as possible, to maintain or restore the territorial
integrity of Allied nations and to terminate war rapidly by making an aggressor reconsider
his decision, cease his attack and withdraw. The role of the Alliance's military forces is to
assure the territorial integrity and political independence of its member states, and thus
contribute to peace and stability in Europe.
6. The security of all Allies is indivisible: an attack on one is an attack on all. Alliance solidarity
and strategic unity are accordingly crucial prerequisites for collective security. The
achievement of the Alliance's objectives depends critically on the equitable sharing of roles,
risks and responsibilities, as well as the beneﬁts, of common defence. The presence of
North American conventional and US nuclear forces in Europe remains vital to the security
of Europe, which is inseparably linked to that of North America. As the process of
developing a European security identity and defence role progresses, and is reﬂected in the
strengthening of the European pillar within the Alliance, the European members of the
Alliance will assume a greater degree of the responsibility for the defence of Europe.
7. The collective nature of Alliance defence is embodied in practical arrangements that enable
the Allies to enjoy the crucial political, military and resource advantages of collective
defence, and prevent the renationalisation of defence policies, without depriving the Allies
of their sovereignty. These arrangements are based on an integrated military structure as
well as on co-operation and co-ordination agreements. Key features include collective force
planning; common operational planning; multinational formations; the stationing of forces
outside home territory, where appropriate on a mutual basis; crisis management and
reinforcement arrangements; procedures for consultation; common standards and
procedures for equipment, training and logistics; joint and combined exercises; and
infrastructure, armaments and logistics co-operation.
8. To protect peace and to prevent war or any kind of coercion, the Alliance will maintain for
the foreseeable future an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces based in
Europe and kept up to date where necessary, although at a signiﬁcantly reduced level. Both
elements are essential to Alliance security and cannot substitute one for the other.
Conventional forces contribute to war prevention by ensuring that no potential aggressor
could contemplate a quick or easy victory, or territorial gains, by conventional means.
Taking into account the diversity of risks with which the Alliance could be faced, it must
maintain the forces necessary to provide a wide range of conventional response options.
But the Alliance's conventional forces alone cannot ensure the prevention of war. Nuclear
weapons make a unique contribution in rendering the risks of any aggression incalculable
and unacceptable. Thus, they remain essential to preserve peace.
The Alliance's new force posture
9. At the London Summit, the Allies concerned agreed to move away, where appropriate,
from the concept of forward defence towards a reduced forward presence, and to modify
the principle of ﬂexible response to reﬂect a reduced reliance on nuclear weapons. The
changes stemming from the new strategic environment and the altered risks now facing
the Alliance enable signiﬁcant modiﬁcations to be made in the missions of the Allies'
military forces and in their posture.
The Missions of Alliance Military Forces
0. The primary role of Alliance military forces, to guarantee the security and territorial
integrity of member states, remains unchanged. But this role must take account of the new
strategic environment, in which a single massive and global threat has given way to diverse
and multi-directional risks. Alliance forces have diﬀerent functions to perform in peace,
crisis and war.
1. In peace, the role of Allied military forces is to guard against risks to the security of Alliance
members; to contribute towards the maintenance of stability and balance in Europe; and to
ensure that peace is preserved. They can contribute to dialogue and co-operation
throughout Europe by their participation in conﬁdence-building activities, including those
which enhance transparency and improve communication; as well as in veriﬁcation of arms
control agreements. Allies could, further, be called upon to contribute to global stability
and peace by providing forces for United Nations missions.
2. In the event of crises which might lead to a military threat to the security of Alliance
members, the Alliance's military forces can complement and reinforce political actions
within a broad approach to security, and thereby contribute to the management of such
crises and their peaceful resolution. This requires that these forces have a capability for
measured and timely responses in such circumstances; the capability to deter action
against any Ally and, in the event that aggression takes place, to respond to and repel it as
well as to reestablish the territorial integrity of member states.
3. While in the new security environment a general war in Europe has become highly unlikely,
it cannot ﬁnally be ruled out. The Alliance's military forces, which have as their fundamental
mission to protect peace, have to provide the essential insurance against potential risks at
the minimum level necessary to prevent war of any kind, and, should aggression occur, to
restore peace. Hence the need for the capabilities and the appropriate mix of forces
already described.
Guidelines for the Alliance's Force Posture
4. To implement its security objectives and strategic principles in the new environment, the
organization of the Allies' forces must be adapted to provide capabilities that can
contribute to protecting peace, managing crises that aﬀect the security of Alliance
members, and preventing war, while retaining at all times the means to defend, if
necessary, all Allied territory and to restore peace. The posture of Allies' forces will conform
to the guidelines developed in the following paragraphs.
5. The size, readiness, availability and deployment of the Alliance's military forces will
continue to reﬂect its strictly defensive nature and will be adapted accordingly to the new
strategic environment including arms control agreements. This means in particular:
a. that the overall size of the Allies' forces, and in many cases their readiness, will be
reduced;
b. that the maintenance of a comprehensive in-place linear defensive posture in the
central region will no longer be required. The peacetime geographical distribution of
forces will ensure a suﬃcient military presence throughout the territory of the
Alliance, including where necessary forward deployment of appropriate forces.
Regional considerations and, in particular, geostrategic diﬀerences within the Alliance
will have to be taken into account, including the shorter warning times to which the
northern and southern regions will be subject compared with the central region and,
in the southern region, the potential for instability and the military capabilities in the
adjacent areas.
6. To ensure that at this reduced level the Allies' forces can play an eﬀective role both in
managing crises and in countering aggression against any Ally, they will require enhanced
ﬂexibility and mobility and an assured capability for augmentation when necessary. For
these reasons:
a. Available forces will include, in a limited but militarily signiﬁcant proportion, ground,
air and sea immediate and rapid reaction elements able to respond to a wide range of
eventualities, many of which are unforeseeable. They will be of suﬃcient quality,
quantity and readiness to deter a limited attack and, if required, to defend the
territory of the Allies against attacks, particularly those launched without long
warning time.
b. The forces of the Allies will be structured so as to permit their military capability to be
built up when necessary. This ability to build up by reinforcement, by mobilising
reserves, or by reconstituting forces, must be in proportion to potential threats to
Alliance security, including the possibility - albeit unlikely, but one that prudence
dictates should not be ruled out - of a major conﬂict. Consequently, capabilities for
timely reinforcement and resupply both within Europe and from North America will
be of critical importance.
c. Appropriate force structures and procedures, including those that would provide an
ability to build up, deploy and draw down forces quickly and discriminately, will be
developed to permit measured, ﬂexible and timely responses in order to reduce and
defuse tensions. These arrangements must be exercised regularly in peacetime.
d. In the event of use of forces, including the deployment of reaction and other available
reinforcing forces as an instrument of crisis management, the Alliance's political
authorities will, as before, exercise close control over their employment at all stages.
Existing procedures will be reviewed in the light of the new missions and posture of
Alliance forces.
Characteristics of Conventional Forces
7. It is essential that the Allies' military forces have a credible ability to fulﬁl their functions in
peace, crisis and war in a way appropriate to the new security environment. This will be
reﬂected in force and equipment levels; readiness and availability; training and exercises;
deployment and employment options; and force build-up capabilities, all of which will be
adjusted accordingly. The conventional forces of the Allies will include, in addition to
immediate and rapid reaction forces, main defence forces, which will provide the bulk of
forces needed to ensure the Alliance's territorial integrity and the unimpeded use of their
lines of communication; and augmentation forces, which will provide a means of
reinforcing existing forces in a particular region. Main defence and augmentation forces will
comprise both active and mobilisable elements.
8. Ground, maritime and air forces will have to co-operate closely and combine and assist
each other in operations aimed at achieving agreed objectives. These forces will consist of
the following:
a. Ground forces, which are essential to hold or regain territory. The majority will
normally be at lower states of readiness and, overall, there will be a greater reliance
on mobilization and reserves. All categories of ground forces will require
demonstrable combat eﬀectiveness together with an appropriately enhanced
capability for ﬂexible deployment.
b. Maritime forces, which because of their inherent mobility, ﬂexibility and endurance,
make an important contribution to the Alliance's crisisresponse options. Their
essential missions are to ensure sea control in order to safeguard the Allies' sea lines
of communication, to support land and amphibious operations, and to protect the
deployment of the Alliance's sea-based nuclear deterrent.
c. Air forces, whose ability to fulﬁl their fundamental roles in both independent air and
combined operations - counter-air, air interdiction and oﬀensive air support - as well
as to contribute to surveillance, reconnaissance and electronic warfare operations, is
essential to the overall eﬀectiveness of the Allies' military forces. Their role in
supporting operations, on land and at sea, will require appropriate long-distance
airlift and air refuelling capabilities. Air defence forces, including modern air
command and control systems, are required to ensure a secure air defence
environment.
9. In light of the potential risks it poses, the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of
mass destruction should be given special consideration. Solution of this problem will
require complementary approaches including, for example, export control and missile
defences.
0. Alliance strategy is not dependent on a chemical warfare capability. The Allies remain
committed to the earliest possible achievement of a global, comprehensive, and eﬀectively
veriﬁable ban on all chemical weapons. But, even after implementation of a global ban,
precautions of a purely defensive nature will need to be maintained.
1. In the new security environment and given the reduced overall force levels in future, the
ability to work closely together, which will facilitate the cost eﬀective use of Alliance
resources, will be particularly important for the achievement of the missions of the Allies'
forces. The Alliance's collective defence arrangements in which, for those concerned, the
integrated military structure, including multinational forces, plays the key role, will be
essential in this regard. Integrated and multinational European structures, as they are
further developed in the context of an emerging European Defence Identity, will also
increasingly have a similarly important role to play in enhancing the Allies' ability to work
together in the common defence. Allies' eﬀorts to achieve maximum co-operation will be
based on the common guidelines for defence deﬁned above. Practical arrangements will be
developed to ensure the necessary mutual transparency and complementarity between
the European security and defence identity and the Alliance.
2. In order to be able to respond ﬂexibly to a wide range of possible contingencies, the Allies
concerned will require eﬀective surveillance and intelligence, ﬂexible command and
control, mobility within and between regions, and appropriate logistics capabilities,
including transport capacities. Logistic stocks must be suﬃcient to sustain all types of
forces in order to permit eﬀective defence until resupply is available. The capability of the
Allies concerned to build-up larger, adequately equipped and trained forces, in a timely
manner and to a level appropriate to any risk to Alliance security, will also make an
essential contribution to crisis management and defence. This capability will include the
ability to reinforce any area at risk within the territory of the Allies and to establish a
multinational presence when and where this is needed. Elements of all three force
categories will be capable of being employed ﬂexibly as part of both intra-European and
transatlantic reinforcement. Proper use of these capabilities will require control of the
necessary lines of communication as well as appropriate support and exercise
arrangements. Civil resources will be of increasing relevance in this context.
3. For the Allies concerned, collective defence arrangements will rely increasingly on
multinational forces, complementing national commitments to NATO. Multinational forces
demonstrate the Alliance's resolve to maintain a credible collective defence; enhance
Alliance cohesion; reinforce the transatlantic partnership and strengthen the European
pillar. Multinational forces, and in particular reaction forces, reinforce solidarity. They can
also provide a way of deploying more capable formations than might be available purely
nationally, thus helping to make more eﬃcient use of scarce defence resources. This may
include a highly integrated, multinational approach to speciﬁc tasks and functions.
Characteristics of Nuclear Forces
4. The fundamental purpose of the nuclear forces of the Allies is political: to preserve peace
and prevent coercion and any kind of war. They will continue to fulﬁl an essential role by
ensuring uncertainty in the mind of any aggressor about the nature of the Allies' response
to military aggression. They demonstrate that aggression of any kind is not a rational
option. The supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies is provided by the strategic
nuclear forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the United States; the independent
nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France, which have a deterrent role of their own,
contribute to the overall deterrence and security of the Allies.
5. A credible Alliance nuclear posture and the demonstration of Alliance solidarity and
common commitment to war prevention continue to require widespread participation by
European Allies involved in collective defence planning in nuclear roles, in peacetime
basing of nuclear forces on their territory and in command, control and consultation
arrangements. Nuclear forces based in Europe and committed to NATO provide an
essential political and military link between the European and the North American
members of the Alliance. The Alliance will therefore maintain adequate nuclear forces in
Europe. These forces need to have the necessary characteristics and appropriate ﬂexibility
and survivability, to be perceived as a credible and eﬀective element of the Allies' strategy
in preventing war. They will be maintained at the minimum level suﬃcient to preserve
peace and stability.
6. The Allies concerned consider that, with the radical changes in the security situation,
including conventional force levels in Europe maintained in relative balance and increased
reaction times, NATO's ability to defuse a crisis through diplomatic and other means or,
should it be necessary, to mount a successful conventional defence will signiﬁcantly
improve. The circumstances in which any use of nuclear weapons might have to be
contemplated by them are therefore even more remote. They can therefore signiﬁcantly
reduce their sub-strategic nuclear forces. They will maintain adequate sub-strategic forces
based in Europe which will provide an essential link with strategic nuclear forces,
reinforcing the trans-Atlantic link. These will consist solely of dual capable aircraft which
could, if necessary, be supplemented by oﬀshore systems. Sub-strategic nuclear weapons
will, however, not be deployed in normal circumstances on surface vessels and attack
submarines. There is no requirement for nuclear artillery or ground-launched short- range
nuclear missiles and they will be eliminated.
Part V - Conclusion
7. This Strategic Concept reaﬃrms the defensive nature of the Alliance and the resolve of its
members to safeguard their security, sovereignty and territorial integrity. The Alliance's
security policy is based on dialogue; co-operation; and eﬀective collective defence as
mutually reinforcing instruments for preserving the peace. Making full use of the new
opportunities available, the Alliance will maintain security at the lowest possible level of
forces consistent with the requirements of defence. In this way, the Alliance is making an
essential contribution to promoting a lasting peaceful order.
8. The Allies will continue to pursue vigorously further progress in arms control and
conﬁdence-building measures with the objective of enhancing security and stability. They
will also play an active part in promoting dialogue and co-operation between states on the
basis of the principles enunciated in the Paris Charter.
9. NATO's strategy will retain the ﬂexibility to reﬂect further developments in the politicomilitary
environment, including progress in the moves towards a European security
identity, and in any changes in the risks to Alliance security. For the Allies concerned, the
Strategic Concept will form the basis for the further development of the Alliance's defence
policy, its operational concepts, its conventional and nuclear force posture and its collective
defence planning arrangements.
1. In July 1997, NATO Heads of State and Government agreed that the Strategic Concept
should be re-examined to ensure that it remained fully consistent with Europe's new
security situation and challenges. The Council was requested to initiate the work with a
view to completing it in time for presentation at the next Summit Meeting in 1999.