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Terrorism and Political Violence

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Terrorism as a Strategy of Insurgency

ARIEL MERARI

This essay describes terrorism as a mode of warfare and examines its unique characteristics, by comparing this method of struggle to other forms of violent conflict. It further emphasizes the role of terrorism as a strategy of insurgency and delineates the main strategic ideas by which terrorists have hoped to achieve their political objectives. The study evaluates terrorists' success in obtaining political goals and the conditions which affect their ability to materialize their objectives.

The author concludes that the mode of struggle adopted by insurgents is dictated by circumstances rather than by choice, and that whenever possible, insurgents use concurrently a variety of strategies of struggle. Terrorism, which is the easiest form of insurgency, is practically always one of these modes.

This article is about the nature of terrorism as a form of warfare, and its unique place in the universe of political violence. Before getting to these subjects, however, I have to clarify what I mean by 'political terrorism'. This term has been used by governments, the media and even by academics to denote phenomena that have very little in common. Thus, for some terrorism means violent acts of groups against states, for others – state oppression of its own citizens, and for still others – warlike acts of states against other states.

A major hindrance in the way of achieving a widely accepted definition of political terrorism is the negative emotional connotation of the term. Terrorism has become merely another derogatory word, rather than a descriptor of a specific type of activity. Usually, people use the term as a disapproving label for a whole variety of phenomena which they do not like, without bothering to define precisely what constitutes terroristic behavior. This article regards terrorism as a mode of struggle rather than a social or political aberration. It approaches this phenomenon technically rather than moralistically.

To make this approach clear, I must begin by delineating what I mean by the term terrorism, hence – what is the subject of this treatise. The article then proceeds to locate terrorism in the spectrum of forms of political violence, identify its peculiar features in comparison with other modes of struggle, and consider the characteristics of terrorism as a

strategy. The final section examines the question to what extent has terrorism been successful as a mode of struggle.

A Working Definition of Terrorism

As mentioned above, 'terrorism' has different meanings for different people. Terminology is always a matter of agreement for the purpose of common understanding. There is no point in searching for logic-based definitions of terms which belong to the realm of political or social science, especially when the term in question carries a negative emotional connotation. There is no way on earth by which the United States can *logically* prove that the Libyan-sponsored attack on the Rome and Vienna airports in 1985 was an act of terrorism, if some of the basic assumptions and semantics necessary for the definition of terrorism are not universally accepted. The United States assertion is certainly consistent with its own definition of terrorism, but Colonel Muammar al-Gaddafi may still maintain that the term 'terrorism' should be reserved for acts such as the US punitive raid on Libya (April 1986), and that the Rome and Vienna attacks are more properly described as actions of revolutionary violence, armed struggle, or fighting for freedom.

Still, for students of political violence, classification of the phenomena that fall under this general category is an essential first step of research. Achieving a consensus on the meaning of the term 'terrorism' is not an important end in itself, except, perhaps, for linguists. It is necessary, on the other hand, to differentiate between various conditions of violence and to distinguish between diverse modes of conflict, whatever we name them, if we want to gain a better understanding of their origins, the factors which affect them, and how to cope with them. The purposes, circumstances and methods involved in state violence against its own citizens are entirely different from those that characterize violence exercised by states against other states or by insurgent groups against governments. The application of the term 'terrorism' to all three situations is obfuscating and disrupts academic research as well as addressing these problems in political action. As long as the term 'terrorism' simply denotes a violent behavior which is deplorable in the eyes of the user of the term, its utility is in propaganda rather than in research.

An interesting approach to the problem of defining terrorism was taken by two Dutch researchers from the University of Leiden, Alex Schmid and Albert Jongman.¹ They collected 109 academic and official definitions of terrorism and analyzed them in search for their main components. They found that the element of violence was included in

83.5 per cent of the definitions, political goals in 65 per cent, and 51 per cent emphasized the element of inflicting fear and terror. Only 21 per cent of the definitions mentioned arbitrariness and indiscriminability in targeting and only 17.5 per cent included the victimization of civilians, noncombatants, neutrals or outsiders.²

A closer look at the assortment of definitions quoted by Schmid and Jongman shows that official definitions of terrorism are fairly similar. Thus, the US Vice-President's Task Force (1986) defined terrorism as '... the unlawful use or threat of violence against persons or property to further political or social objectives. It is generally intended to intimidate or coerce a government, individuals or groups to modify their behavior or policies.'³ The Office for the Protection of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany definition is: 'Terrorism is the enduringly conducted struggle for political goals, which ... [is] intended to be achieved by means of assaults on the life and property of other persons, especially by means of severe crimes as detailed in art. 129a, sec. 1 of the penal law book (above all: murder, homicide, extortionist kidnapping, arson, setting off a blast by explosives) or by means of other acts of violence, which serve as preparation of such criminal acts.'⁴ A British legal definition contains the same ingredients in a more succinct form: 'For the purposes of the legislation, terrorism is "the use of violence for political ends, and includes any use of violence for the purpose of putting the public or any section of the public in fear."⁵ There are three common elements in the definitions quoted above: (1) the use of violence; (2) political objectives and, (3) the intention of sowing fear in a target population.

Compared to official definitions of terrorism, those offered by academics are, unsurprisingly, more diverse, although most of them contain the three cornerstones of government definitions. Before we become overly euphoric about the evolving consensus about terrorism, let us remember that the sample of definitions brought by Schmid and Jongman reflects, by and large, the perceptions and attitude of Western academics and officials. Not only Syrian, Libyan and Iranian opinions of what constitutes terrorism are quite different, but, most likely, those of the many other Third World countries. The evolving Western consensus about the essence of terrorism is probably not shared by the majority of people on earth.

Moreover, the three basic commonly-agreed characteristics of terrorism delineated above do not suffice to make a useful definition. As working definitions, the official ones quoted above are too broad to be useful. The main problem is that they do not provide the ground to distinguish between terrorism and other forms of violent conflict, such

as guerrilla or even conventional war. Clearly, both conventional war and guerrilla warfare constitute the use of violence for political ends. Systematic large-scale bombing of civilian populations in modern wars were explicitly intended to spread fear among the targeted populations. For example, a leaflet which was dropped over Japanese cities by American bombers in August 1945 stated:

These leaflets are being dropped to notify you that your city has been listed for destruction by our powerful air force. The bombing will begin in 72 hours.

. . .

We give the military clique this notification because we know there is nothing they can do to stop our overwhelming power and our iron determination. We want you to see how powerless the military is to protect you.

Systematic destruction of city after city will continue as long as you blindly follow your military leaders . . .⁶

The dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki which ended World War II can also be viewed as a case which fits the definitions of terrorism, albeit on a huge scale. Clearly, these were acts of violence, committed in the service of political ends, with the intent of spreading fear among the entire Japanese population.

The history of guerrilla warfare also offers ample evidence of systematic victimization of civilians in an attempt to control the population. During its struggle for the independence of Algeria, the Front Liberation Nationale (FLN) murdered about 16,000 Muslim citizens and kidnapped 50,000 others, who have never been seen again; in addition to these figures, an estimated number of 12,000 FLN members were killed in internal 'purges'.⁷ A Vietcong directive of 1965 was quite explicit about the types of people who must be 'repressed', namely, punished or killed: 'The targets for repression are counterrevolutionary elements who seek to impede the revolution and work actively for the enemy and for the destruction of the revolution.' These included, among others, 'Elements who actively fight against the revolution in reactionary parties such as the Vietnamese Nationalist Party (Quoc Dan Dang), Party for a Greater Viet Nam (Dai-Viet), and Personality and Labor Party (Can-Lao Nhan-Vi), and key reactionaries in organizations and associations founded by the reactionary parties and the US imperialists and the puppet government.' To be 'repressed' were also 'Reactionary and recalcitrant elements who take advantage of various religions, such as Catholicism, Buddhism, Caodaism and Protestantism, actively to oppose and destroy the revolution, and key

elements in organizations and associations founded by these persons.⁸ (p.37). A more recent example is the Peruvian *Sendero Luminoso* practice of killing and maiming villagers for such offenses as voting in national elections.

If the definition of terrorism is equally applicable to nuclear war, conventional war and guerrilla, the term loses any useful meaning. It simply becomes a synonym for violent intimidation in a political context and is thus reduced to an unflattering term, describing an ugly aspect of violent conflicts of all sizes and shapes, conducted throughout human history by all kinds of regimes. If both the bombing in mid-air of a commercial airliner by a small insurgent group in peacetime and strategic bombing of enemy population by a superpower in a world war are 'terrorism', social scientists, policymakers and legislators can do nothing but sigh. If we wish to use the term 'terrorism,' in a political science analysis, we ought to limit it to a more specific type of phenomena, distinguishable from other forms of political violence. Despite the ambiguities and disagreements discussed above, the concept of terrorism in modern usage is most commonly associated with a certain kind of violent actions carried out by individuals and groups rather than by states, and with events which take place in peacetime rather than as part of a conventional war. Although the original usage of the term in a political context referred to state violence and repression (the 'Reign of Terror' period in the French Revolution)⁹, from a practical point of view the recent definition of the term by the United States Department of State is a better anchor. According to this definition "terrorism" is premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine state agents, usually intended to influence an audience.¹⁰ Practicality is the only reason why, in the remainder of this article, 'terrorism' will be used to connote insurgent rather than state violence. In the following sections I shall identify terrorism more precisely among the other forms of insurgent violence.

The Universe of Political Violence

Theoretically, there is an infinite number of ways to classify politically-motivated violence. Nevertheless, with the criteria of utility and parsimony in mind, a basic classification that relates to the initiator of the violence and to its target, distinguishing between states and citizens, is presented in Table 1.

Table 1 is a useful way to circumscribe this article's focus of interest. It encompasses, in a gross manner, all forms of political violence carried

TABLE 1
A BASIC CLASSIFICATION OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE

		TARGET	
		STATE	CITIZENS
INITIATOR	STATE	Full-scale war; belligerent activity in peacetime, e.g. cloak-and-dagger operations and punitive strikes	Law enforcement; legal and illegal oppression
	CITIZENS	Guerrilla; insurgent terrorism; coup d'etat; Leninist revolution	Vigilante terrorism; ethnic terrorism

out by humans against other humans, while differentiating between their main types. Each one of the four cells includes a distinct category of truculent behavior. These will be described briefly in the following paragraphs.

States against States

Violence initiated by states can be conceptually divided into two main types: (1) state violence directed against other states, and (2) violence that states inflict on their own citizens.

Aggressive actions of states against other states have often taken the form of conventional war: a clash of sizable regular armies; this has, undoubtedly, been the most consequential form of violence in history. Various aspects of conventional wars, such as military strategy and the laws of war have been studied extensively and have become recognized academic disciplines or sub-disciplines. Obviously, states have also used a plethora of lower levels of violence in their contests with other states, such as limited air force strikes, commando raids or the assassination of enemy agents. Yet, in all cases these acts can be characterized as organized and planned, and they reflect the capability of a large bureaucracy.

States against Citizens

The use of force by states against their own citizens includes two main subcategories. One is the ordinary, overt legal process by which states enforce their laws. The other is the clandestine use of illegal violence by a government, designed to intimidate and terrorize their citizens with the intention of preventing them from opposing the regime. Sometimes illegal state violence is exercised, in the context of an internal strife, in the name of efficiency: cutting corners of due legal processes which constrain the struggle against the insurgents. Examples are abundant:

The most extreme instances have involved the enormous totalitarian regimes of Nazi Germany and Stalinist Soviet Union. 'Death squads', usually manned by members of the security forces in several Latin American countries provide a less efficient, albeit quite repugnant example of a different brand.

Citizens against Citizens

The most mundane form of citizens' violence against other citizens is, of course, common crime. Unlike the types of violence which appear in Table 1, common crime is usually motivated by reasons that have nothing to do with political objectives. Much of it is committed for personal economic gain and another significant part is stimulated by personal animosities. Thus, the great mass of citizens' violence against other citizens is unrelated to the subject of this article, namely, political violence. There are, however, also phenomena of citizens' violence committed for political or social motivations. Some of these are related to racial or ethnic rivalries or strives; others are associated with right-wing or left-wing social ideologies, and still others have to do with a variety of idiosyncratic issues, such as abortion, environment conservation or animal rights.

A special case of citizens' violence, vigilantism, merits special mention.¹¹ Vigilante violence has, sometimes, been associated with an unauthorized attempt to control crime, but sometimes – as the origin of the term meant – with violent activity against ethnic or political minorities.

Citizens against the State

Citizens' violence against states may be organized or spontaneous. Sometimes it is an impulsive expression of discontent, having neither clear political goals nor organized leadership or plan. In its organized form citizens' violence falls under the category of insurgency, aimed at overthrowing the government. The main forms of insurgency are distinct strategies of uprising that differ from each other in several important characteristics. Before turning to examine them in greater detail, however, it is necessary to cope with the definition of terrorism and to distinguish between this mode of violence and other forms of conflict.

Forms of Insurgent Violence

Insurgent violence may take various forms. These include revolution, *coup d'état*, guerrilla, terrorism and riots. In recent years the term

TABLE 2
COMPARISON OF FORMS OF INSURGENCY

Form of insurgency	Insurgency level	Number involved	Struggle duration	Violence	Threat to regime	Spontaneity
Coup d'etat	high	few	short	varies	great	no
Leninist Revolution	low	many	short ²	great	great	no?
Guerrilla	low	medium	long	great	varies	no
Riot	low	medium	short	little	small	yes
Terrorism	low	few	long	little ³	small	no
Nonviolent resistance	low	many	long	no	varies	no

intifada gained publicity, referring to the Palestinian uprising in the Israeli-administered territories. With the exception of riots, these forms of political violence can be also viewed as strategies of insurgency. Table 2 lists these forms in a framework that distinguishes between them according to several characteristics. The table's purpose is to help in the characterization of terrorism as a mode of struggle, emphasizing the differences between this and other forms of insurgent violence.

Before I turn to focus on the characteristics of terrorism as an insurgent strategy, let us describe briefly the other forms of insurgency, emphasizing their unique attributes.

Coup d'état

Coup d'état is 'a sudden, forceful stroke in politics; especially, the sudden, forcible overthrow of a government'.¹² It is the seizure of power by an individual or a small group of persons who control important positions in the state's machinery. Edward Luttwak, who wrote a highly informative and amusing book on *coup d'état*, characterized this strategy as 'the infiltration of a small but critical segment of the state apparatus, which is then used to displace the government from its control of the remainder.'¹³ Usually but not always, a coup grows from the ranks of the military. In any event, for a successful completion of a coup, the rebels must insure the cooperation of at least part of the armed forces. The success of a coup depends upon surprise, in order to catch the government off guard. It is, therefore, imperative that preparations for the coup are done in utmost secrecy. Compared to other strategies of insurgency, a coup usually involves little violence and, sometimes, it is achieved without bloodshed. A coup is always planned to be a swift event and is ordinarily a brief episode, regardless

of its success, although failed coups have, occasionally, developed into prolonged civil wars. In sum, *coup d'état* can be characterized as a planned insurgency at a high level of the state's ranks, by a few people, involving relatively little violence during a very brief period of time.

Leninist Revolution

Revolution is usually meant in the sense of a radical social, political or economic change. Unlike *coup d'état*, revolution is a change of the system rather than a strategy. In some cases the revolutionary change of the system has been achieved with little or no violence (e.g., the recent transformation of the form of government in Czechoslovakia, East Germany and Poland or, using a very different example, the industrial revolution of the eighteenth century in England).¹⁴ In other instances revolutions involved enormous bloodshed, as in the Chinese Communist Revolution. Some revolutionary changes have involved protracted convulsions and others were relatively quick. In short, as Brinton started his classic treatise, 'Revolution is one of the looser words.'¹⁵

In the context of this article, however, the term revolution is used in a much more limited sense, connoting a strategy rather than a social or political outcome. Although revolutions in history have sometimes been spontaneous, unplanned events and have utilized a variety of forms of struggle, since this article's interest is primarily in the nature and implications of the *strategy of insurgency*, I shall focus on the Leninist concept of bringing about a revolution. The way by which the Social Democratic Party under Lenin's leadership, and especially its Bolshevik branch, sought to realize the Marxist revolution was through a thorough process of clandestine preparations.¹⁶ According to this strategy the period of violence was meant to be brief. The actual seizure of power was conceived as a cataclysmic episode which might involve immense violence.¹⁷ Before this final decisive confrontation, however, there ought to be a long, arduous period of groundwork designed to prepare the revolutionary organization. The three most important elements in this preparatory period were recruiting, educating and organizing the revolutionary cadres. Upon the opportune moment, the prepared mechanism would be put to action. This moment, according to the Marxist theory, would come when the inherent economic characteristics of the capitalistic regime would bring its collapse.¹⁸ Of course, not all of the activity of the revolutionary party was clandestine. There were front organizations and other tools of propaganda which carried out the important task of preparing the hearts and minds of the people. But the most important part for making a revolution was the tightly-knit clandestine party apparatus.

The Leninist model of revolutionary strategy can, therefore, be characterized as an insurgency from below, involving numerous people. The period of preparation is very long, but the direct violent confrontation is expected to be brief.

Guerrilla

Guerrilla means 'small war'. This form of warfare is, perhaps, as old as mankind, certainly older than conventional war. Guerrilla is a diffuse type of war, fought in relatively small formations, against a stronger enemy. In numerous instances guerrilla warfare has merely served as an auxiliary form of fighting, especially behind enemy lines, whereas the main military effort took the form of conventional war. In many insurrections, however, guerrilla warfare was, at least for a while, the main form of struggle. As a strategy guerrilla avoids direct, decisive battles, opting for a protracted struggle, which consists of many small clashes instead. In some guerrilla doctrines, final victory is expected to result from wearing out the enemy.¹⁹ Other doctrines, however, insist that guerrilla is only an interim phase of the struggle, intended to enable the insurgents to build a regular army which will, eventually, win through conventional warfare.²⁰

Guerrillas try to compensate for their inferiority in manpower, arms and equipment by a very flexible style of warfare, based on hit-and-run operations. For this, the guerrillas utilize the terrain to their advantage, immerse in the population or, sometimes, launch their attacks from neighboring countries. The principle is always to prevent the government forces from employing its full might in the contest. Tactically, however, guerrillas conduct warfare in a manner similar to conventional armies. When guerrillas stage an ambush or attack a village, they do it in the same way that a regular infantry unit would.

Riot

Riot is mob violence. Riots are usually unorganized, in the sense that the rioters are not totally controlled by a leader nor are they organized in units or other hierarchical structure.²¹ However, riots have, sometimes, been intentionally incited by organized political activists, and at least partly directed. Unlike the other forms of violence discussed in this paper, riots cannot be characterized as a strategy of insurgency or a form of warfare. Although a major insurrection has, sometimes started by riots, such as in the cases of the French Revolution of 1789 and the Russian Revolution of February 1917, the spontaneous street violence was not part of a carefully planned scheme to topple the regime. In difference from guerrilla and terrorist struggles, riots are brief,

unplanned episodes. They may recur over weeks or months, but they still constitute a spasmodic eruption rather than a planned, organized, protracted campaign.

Nonviolent Resistance

By definition, nonviolent resistance is beyond the scope of an article on political violence. It encompasses methods such as demonstrations, labor strikes, hunger strikes, merchandise boycott, refusal to pay taxes, and other variations of challenging the authorities without spilling blood. This form of uprising was included in Table 2 for the purpose of comparison with violent strategies. Because of the moral and practical importance attached to nonviolent resistance as an alternative to violent modes of uprising²², however, a comment on this form of struggle seems in place.

Famous examples of nonviolent struggles which succeeded in inducing a major political change include Gandhi's movement in India, Martin Luther King's civil rights campaign and, of course, the 1989 protest movements in Eastern Europe. In view of these stunning successes, one should wonder why have they been so rare in history. A possible explanation may suggest that nonviolent resistance was only discovered after World War II. This is certainly not true. Gene Sharp mentions several cases in history which prove the contrary.²³ A more plausible explanation is that nonviolent resistance is of practical value only when the challenged government refrains from using its power to break the resistance by force. In this sense, the change of political standards after World War II which has been expressed in a global recognition of the right of self-determination and in a general trend toward further liberalization in democracies, gave nonviolent resistance a better chance than ever before.

Nevertheless, even in the second half of the twentieth century, there has not been a single case of a successful nonviolent challenge to a totalitarian regime or external power which was determined to face it by force. This lesson was learned, at a dear cost, by the Hungarians in 1956, the Czechs in 1968, and the Chinese students in 1989.

At a first glance, the success of the nonviolent movements in East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria to change the regimes in these countries in 1989 seems to contradict this generalization. It should be remembered, however, that these movements were prompted by the liberalization in the Soviet Union, and they succeeded only because the USSR changed its previous policy of intervention and even refused to render the communist regimes of its former satellites minimal political backing in their effort to retain power. The difference between

the successful Czech uprising in 1989 and the failure of 1968, or between the success in East Germany and the failure in China, cannot be attributed to the greater determination or capability of the insurgents in the successful cases, but to a lesser determination of the governments. The Iranian Islamic Revolution of 1979 and the failure of the August 1991 coup in Moscow are other seeming demonstrations of the effectiveness of nonviolent resistance. Yet in these examples too, the success of the unarmed civilians was a result of the rulers' indecisiveness and ineptitude. In all likelihood, greater determination from the Shah in Iran or the coup junta in the USSR, would have resulted in a bloody crushing of the resistance. In short, nonviolent resistance is a practical mode of strife only when the government allows it to take place. It is absolutely useless in repressive regimes determined to remain in power.

In addition, only rarely has nonviolent resistance existed as the only mode of struggle. Alongside Gandhi's nonviolent struggle against British rule, there were numerous terrorism and rioting incidents.²⁴ Black dissatisfaction in the United States in the 1960s was not only expressed in peaceful marches and sit-ins but in violent riots as well. A broad uprising is usually expressed in several concurrent forms, and it is hard to evaluate the effects of the various aspects of the comprehensive struggle singly.

Terrorism

How does terrorism fit into the spectrum of political violence? As was suggested above, the customary modern usage of the term refers, at least in the West, to actions such as the bombing in mid-air of Pan Am Flight 103 in December 1988, the attacks on passengers in the Rome and Vienna airports in December 1985, and the seizure of the Saudi Embassy at Khartoum in March 1973. These actions represent a form of political violence which is different from guerrilla, conventional war and riots. Actions of this kind, when they are carried out systematically, constitute a distinct strategy of insurgency. This strategy should have a name, be it 'terrorism' or another, and retaining 'terrorism' has the advantage of familiarity. In fact, practitioners and advocates of this form of struggle have themselves often used the term to describe their method.²⁵ Yet, the definitions of the term leave several questions to be answered. I shall now turn to examine some of the areas of confusion.

Terrorism and Guerrilla

The terms 'terrorism' and 'guerrilla' are often used interchangeably. Apart from some carelessness in the use of technical terminology by the

media, politicians and even academics, this faulty synonymity reflects confusion concerning the definition of terrorism and, often, a wish to avoid the negative connotation that this term has acquired. 'Guerrilla' does not carry a defamatory overtone and its usage, therefore, seems to many writers to carry an air of objectivity. As Walter Laqueur pointed out, the widespread use of the misnomer 'urban guerrilla' had probably contributed to the confusion. This term has been used by revolutionaries to describe a strategy of terrorism, as an extension of, or substitute for guerrilla warfare.²⁶

As strategies of insurgency, however, terrorism and guerrilla are quite distinct. The most important difference is that unlike terrorism, guerrilla tries to establish physical control of a territory. This control is often partial. In some cases the guerrillas ruled the area during the night and government forces had control in daytime. In other examples government forces were able to secure the main routes of transportation but guerrilla territory started as little as a few hundred yards to the right and left. In many instances guerrillas managed to maintain complete control of a sizable portion of land for long periods of time. The need to dominate a territory is a key element in insurgent guerrilla strategy. The territory under the guerrillas control provides the human reservoir for recruitment, a logistical base and – most important – the ground and infrastructure for establishing a regular army.²⁷

Terrorist strategy does not vie for a tangible control of territory. Notwithstanding the fact that terrorists try to impose their will on the general population and channel its behavior by sowing fear, this influence has no geographical demarcation lines. Terrorism as a strategy does not rely on 'liberated zones' as staging areas for consolidating the struggle and carrying it further. As a strategy, terrorism remains in the domain of psychological influence and lacks the material elements of guerrilla.

Other practical differences between the two forms of warfare further accentuate the basic distinction of the two strategies. These differences belong to the tactical domain, but they are actually an extension of the essentially divergent strategic concepts. They relate to unit size, arms, and types of operations of guerrilla and terrorism. Guerrillas usually wage war in platoon or company size units and, sometimes even in battalions and brigades. There are well-known historical examples in which guerrillas even used division-size formations in battle.²⁸ Terrorists operate in very small units, usually ranging from the lone assassin or a single person who makes and plants an improvised explosive device, to a five members' hostage-taking team. The largest teams in terrorist operations numbered 40–50 persons.²⁹ These, however, have been very

rare. Thus, in terms of operational units' size, the upper limits of terrorists are the lower limits of guerrillas.

Differences in weapons used in these two types of warfare are also easily noticeable. Whereas guerrillas mostly use ordinary military-type arms, such as rifles, machine-guns, mortars and even artillery, typical terrorist weapons include home-made bombs, car bombs and sophisticated barometric pressure-operated devices, designed to explode on board airliners in mid-air. These differences in unit size and arms are merely corollaries of the fact noted above, that tactically, guerrilla actions are similar to regular army's mode of operation. Because terrorists, unlike guerrillas, have no territorial base, they must immerse among the general civilian population if they do not wish to become sitting ducks for their hunters. This is why ordinarily terrorists cannot allow themselves to wear uniforms, while guerrillas ordinarily do. In a somewhat simplified comparison, therefore, one may say that whereas guerrilla and conventional war are two modes of warfare which are different in strategy but similar in tactics, terrorism is a unique form of struggle in both strategy and tactics.

Table 3 summarizes the differences between terrorism, guerrilla and conventional war as modes of violent struggle.

Method and Cause: Terrorists and Freedom Fighters

Terrorist groups normally describe themselves as national liberation movements, fighters against social, economic, religious, or imperialist oppression, or any combination of these. On the other side of the barricade, in an understandable attempt to degrade terrorism, politicians have presented the terms 'terrorists' and 'freedom fighters' as contradictory. Thus, Vice-President George Bush wrote: 'The difference between terrorists and freedom fighters is sometimes clouded. Some would say one man's freedom fighter is another man's terrorist. I reject this notion. The philosophical differences are stark and fundamental.'³⁰

Without passing judgement on the self-description of any particular group, trying to present the terms 'terrorists' and 'freedom fighters' as mutually exclusive *in general* is a logical fallacy. 'Terrorism' and 'freedom fighting' are terms which describe two different aspects of human behavior. The first characterizes a method of struggle and the second – a cause. The causes of groups which adopted terrorism as a mode of struggle are as diverse as the interests and aspirations of mankind. Among the professed causes of terrorist groups are social changes in the spirit of right wing and left wing ideologies, aspirations associated with religious beliefs, ethnic grievances, environmental

TABLE 3

CHARACTERISTICS OF TERRORISM, GUERRILLA AND CONVENTIONAL WAR AS MODES OF VIOLENT STRUGGLE

	CONVENTIONAL WAR	GUERRILLA	TERRORISM
UNIT SIZE IN BATTLE	Large (armies, corps, divisions)	Medium (platoons, companies, battalions)	Small (usually less than ten persons)
WEAPONS	Full range of military hardware (air force, armor, artillery, etc.)	Mostly infantry-type light weapons but sometimes artillery pieces as well	Hand guns, hand grenades, assault rifles and specialized weapons, e.g., car bombs, remote-control bombs, barometric pressure bombs
TACTICS	Usually joint operations involving several military branches	Commando-type tactics	Specialized tactics: kidnapping, assassinations, car-bombing, hijacking, barricade-hostage, etc.
TARGETS	Mostly military units, industrial and transportation infrastructure	Mostly military, police and administration staff, as well as political opponents	State symbols, political opponents and the public at large
INTENDED IMPACT	Physical destruction	Mainly physical attrition of the enemy	Psychological coercion
CONTROL OF TERRITORY	Yes	Yes	No
UNIFORM	Wear uniform	Often wear uniform	Do not wear uniform
RECOGNITION OF WAR ZONES	War limited to recognized geographical zones	War limited to the country in strife	No recognized war zones. Operations carried out world-wide
INTERNATIONAL LEGALITY	Yes, if conducted by rules	Yes, if conducted by rules	No
DOMESTIC LEGALITY	Yes	No	No

issues, animal rights and specific issues such as abortion. Some terrorist groups undoubtedly fight for self-determination or national liberation. On the other hand, not all national liberation movements resort to terrorism to advance their cause. In other words, some insurgent groups are both terrorist and freedom fighters, some are either and some are neither.

Terrorism and Morality

The hero of the moralistic approach to terrorism is a Russian named Ivan Kaliayev. Kaliayev was a member of the 'combat organization' of the underground Social-Revolutionary Party which adopted assassina-

tions of government officials as its main strategy in the struggle against the Tsarist regime. Kaliayev was chosen by the organization to assassinate the Grand Prince Sergei. On 2 February 1905 Kaliayev waited, a bomb under his coat, for the arrival of the Grand Prince. When the Prince's carriage approached, however, Kaliayev noticed that the intended victim was accompanied by his two young children. In a spur-of-the-moment decision Kaliayev refrained from throwing the bomb, so as not to hurt the Prince's innocent brood. Two days later Kaliayev completed the mission, was caught, tried and executed.³¹ Kaliayev's insistence on a very strict definition of permitted targets of revolutionary violence gained him the status of a saint in the gospel of moralistic analysts of terrorism and something like a litmus paper for a quick identification of right and wrong in revolutionary violence.³²

The most concentrated treatment of the question of the morality of terrorism has probably been offered by Walzer.³³ His basic position can be summarized by the following quotation:

In its modern manifestations, terror is the totalitarian form of war and politics. It shatters the war convention and the political code. It breaks across moral limits beyond which no further limitation seems possible, for within the categories of civilian and citizen, there isn't any smaller group for which immunity might be claimed . . . Terrorists anyway make no such claim; they kill anybody.³⁴

Walzer's morality litmus is the responsibility of the victims for acts that are the subject of the assailants' grievances. In line with this criterion he offers what one might call a crude scale of assassinability: government officials who are part of the presumed oppressive apparatus are assassinable. A case in point is Kaliayev's victim. Other persons in government service, who are not related to the oppressive aspects of the regime (e.g., teachers, medical service personnel, etc.), make a questionable category. Walzer's somewhat ambiguous verdict is that because 'the variety of activities sponsored and paid for by the modern state is extraordinary . . . it seems intemperate and extravagant to make all such activities into occasions for assassination.'³⁵ The third category, that of private persons, is definitely not assassinable according to Walzer. These cannot spare their lives by changing their behavior. killing them is, therefore, unequivocally immoral.

Walzer's analysis leaves several principal problems with no satisfactory answer. The most important one has to do with the essence of moral judgement. The fundamental question is whether moral norms in general and war norms in particular are absolute, unchanging over time and identical in all societies, or are they a changing reflection of the

human condition and, therefore, varying across societies and perennially modified to fit new situations. An absolute nature of moral norms may presumably stem from two sources: a godly edict or a universal psychological trait, common to men and women in all societies in history. In the first case, there is no point in arguing: Divine rules are not negotiable, they are a matter of belief. For those who believe in their divine source, they are fixed regulations of human conduct which do not change over time. Walzer admits that his treatise rests on the Western religious tradition,³⁶ but it is not clear whether this attribution is a statement of cultural identification or an announcement of personal religious conviction. Cultural norms are certainly a powerful source of influence on attitudes, opinions and behavior, and can be portrayed as the cast in which personal values are molded. But for claiming the status of an absolute value of the human race, it is necessary to show that the value under consideration is shared by all cultures. Given the tremendous diversity of cultures, the assertion that a certain value is universal must rest on the assumption that this value stems from a set of attitudes and emotions which prevail in all societies.

With regard to the specific issue under consideration, namely, moral values related to political violence, the universality assumption is untenable. This is proven by the very fact that divergence from the moral code of war, presented by Walzer as the absolute dictum, is so common. Flagrant breaches of Walzer's rules in modern history cannot be explained merely by the personal craziness or immorality of some individuals, who happened to head totalitarian regimes which enabled them to act in contradiction to the will of most of their inhabitants. In many cases, the violations of morality have been supported by the majority of the population in the nation which committed them. Large scale departures from the laws of war have been practiced even by democracies, a form of regime where government action is limited by public will. Thus, the massive bombing of Japanese civilian population, with the intent of damaging the population's morale, and the total destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by atomic bombs in World War II were, undoubtedly, supported by most of the American people.

It is obvious that in actual application, the moral code in general, including the rules of war, is a product of people's needs, perceptions and convenience, and is subject to cultural and circumstantial influences. Cultural differences concerning the status of noncombatants have been expressed, for instance, in the utilization of hostages. Whereas most Westerners regarded the usage by Iraq in 1990 of civilian hostages – men, women and children – as a human shield against the possible bombing of strategic targets as a repugnant, immoral act, for

many in the Arab world this was a legitimate, morally justified feat. It seems, however, that situational factors have a much greater role than cultural diversity in determining conduct in war. The form of government is, perhaps, the single most important factor. The most severe violations of human rights in modern history have been committed by totalitarian Western regimes. Perceived necessity plays a major role as well. In fact, all states have repeatedly broken the rules of war. In almost all modern wars civilian populations have been victimized intentionally, and the magnitude of the transgression has been determined by capability and need as much as by moral principles.

Terrorism is not different from other forms of warfare in the targeting of noncombatants. Yet terrorism, more than any other form of warfare, systematically breaches the internationally accepted rules of war. In guerrilla warfare and conventional war, the laws of engagement are often ignored, but terrorism discards these laws altogether in refusing to distinguish between combatants and noncombatants and, with regard to international terrorism, in rejecting the limitations of war zones as well. Unlike conventional and guerrilla wars, terrorism has no legal standing in international law (from the viewpoint of domestic law all insurrections are treated as crimes). For this reason, terrorism as a strategy and terrorists as a warring party have no hope of gaining a legal status. Hence, terrorism may be correctly described as an illegal form of warfare, but characterizing it as an immoral one is meaningless. Terrorists wage war by their own standards, not by the standards of their enemies. Both sides' rules of conduct stem from capabilities and necessities and undergo changes for reasons that are basically pragmatic. Of course, people and states pass moral judgement on the justification of wars and on particular acts in war. Their judgement, however, reflects nothing but their own existing cultural norms at best and – too often – a partisan view, influenced by direct interests. Yet morality, although it cannot be coherently treated as an absolute value is, at a given time, society and context, a *psychological* and, therefore, a political fact. Publics do pass moral judgements on persons, organizations and actions. They react by moral standards, no matter how emotional and irrational these may be. In fact, it is the emotional rather than the logical component that makes morally-based attitudes so powerful.

Morality is a code of behavior which prevails in a certain society at a certain time. As such, morality closely corresponds to the existing law, but the latter has the advantages of clarity, precision and formality. As a reflection of current norms, terrorism is an immoral form of warfare in twentieth century Western societies. The power of this characterization,

however, is weakened by the fact that in virtually all modern wars the moral code of behavior (and, indeed, the laws of war) has been breached by all parties on a massive scale, at least with regard to the targeting of civilians. In this respect, the difference between terrorism and other forms of warfare is a matter of comprehensiveness. Whereas terrorists usually dismiss the law altogether, without even pretending to abide by it, states pay tribute to law and norms and breach them only under extreme circumstances.

It should be noted that the relativity of morality has been also expressed in the changing rules of combating terrorism. If laws reflect the prevailing moral standards in a given society, one may find interest in the fact that all states, when faced with the threat of insurgency, have enacted special laws or emergency regulations permitting the security forces to act in manners that would normally be considered immoral. Indeed, under such circumstances states have even tended to sanction security forces' breaching of these laws or, at best, to punish such 'excesses' rather leniently.

Terrorism as a Strategy of Insurgence

In practice, the terrorist operational inventory is rather limited. They place explosive charges in public places, assassinate political opponents or carry out assaults by small arms on the public at large, take hostages by kidnapping, hijacking, or barricading themselves in buildings. In most cases, their capability is rather slim. Consider, for example, a notorious group such as the German Red Army Faction (widely known as the Baader-Meinhof gang). At any given period throughout its existence, the number of its active members has been less than 30. They have been able to assassinate several public officials and businessmen, to kidnap two, and to stage one barricade-hostage incident. How have they expected to achieve their far-reaching political goal of overpowering the German government and instituting a Marxist regime? The same puzzlement applies also to much larger organizations, such as the Irish Republican Army (IRA), which has had an estimated active membership of 200–400 men and women and a much broader body of supporters. How can they win the battle against Great Britain? In this section of the article I examine the main elements and variations of terrorism as a strategy, trying to explain how terrorists think they may bridge the gap between their meager means and extreme objectives.

The Psychological Element

Essentially, terrorism is a strategy based on psychological impact. Many authors have noted the importance of the psychological element of

terrorism.³⁷ Actually, this constituent has also gained recognition in official definitions of the term. The reference to terrorism's intention 'to influence an audience' in the US Department of State definition³⁸ or to its purpose of 'putting the public or any section of the public in fear' in the British legal definition of 1974³⁹ relate to the psychological effects of this mode of warfare.

Actually, all forms of warfare have a significant psychological ingredient, both in trying to hamper the enemy's morale by sowing fear in its ranks and in strengthening its own forces' self-confidence and will to fight. In his famous treatise *Strategy: The Indirect Approach*, Sir Basil Liddell Hart, one of the most eminent theoreticians of strategy this century, went as far as stating that in almost all great battles in history, 'the victor had his opponent at a psychological disadvantage before the clash took place.'⁴⁰ In fact, a similar idea was expressed about 2500 years ago, in a very concise form, by the ancient Chinese strategist Sun Tzu.⁴¹

Nevertheless, conventional wars are first and foremost massive collisions of material forces, and they are usually won by the physical elimination of the enemy's ability to resist, by destroying its fighting forces, economic infrastructure, or both. Even if Liddell Hart's contention is correct, the psychological impact of the crucial maneuvers of indirect approach stems from the enemy's belief that resistance is useless for material reasons. Although in many cases this conclusion is a product of the military leadership's surprise and confusion and does not reflect the true balance of power, it still rests on material assessments, wrong as they may be. Hence, the psychological feat described by Liddell Hart may be characterized as a swift deceptive move, which succeeds in getting the enemy off-balance in a single surprising jujitsu type maneuver. The psychological basis of the strategy of terrorism is entirely different in nature. Like guerrilla war, terrorism is a strategy of protracted struggle. Guerrilla warfare, however, notwithstanding its psychological component, is primarily a strategy based on a physical encounter. Although this century's guerrilla theoreticians have emphasized the propaganda value of guerrilla operations in spreading the word of the revolution, attracting supporters, awakening dormant opponents of the regime and providing them with a recipe of resistance, the importance of these psychological elements remains secondary. All insurgent guerrilla doctrines insist that the battleground against government forces is the countryside. The very concept of staging the struggle in rural areas, far from the eyes of the media, weakens the significance of the psychological factor.

Indeed, psychological impact is the most essential element in terror-

ism as a strategy. The validity of this generalization rests on the basic conditions of the terrorist struggle. Terrorist groups are small. Their membership ranges from a few persons to several thousands, and the majority number tens to a few hundreds. Even the weakest of governments has a fighting force immensely larger than the terrorist insurgents'. Under such circumstances, the insurgents cannot expect to win the struggle in any physical way. Describing the strategy of terrorism as a form of psychological warfare does not specifically explain how terrorists hope to win by it. Although terrorists have been rarely clear enough as to lay down a complete, coherent strategic plan, it is possible to discern several strategic ideas that terrorists have held as the cardinal practical concept of their struggle. These are described below as distinct notions, although they are not necessarily mutually exclusive, and terrorists have often espoused them concurrently.

Propaganda by the Deed

The essentials of the psychological basis of a terrorist struggle have changed little since last century, when anarchist writings first formulated the principles of this strategy. The basic idea was phrased as 'propaganda by the deed'.⁴² This maxim meant that the terrorist act was the best herald of the need to overthrow the regime and the torch which would show the way to do it.⁴³ The revolutionary terrorists hoped that their attacks would thus turn them from a small conspiratorial club into a massive revolutionary movement. In a way, the original concept of propaganda by the deed, as explained and exercised by nineteenth century revolutionaries, was more refined than its modern usage in the post-World War II era. Whereas the earlier users of this idea were careful to choose symbolic targets, such as heads of state and infamous oppressive governors and ministers, in order to draw attention to the justification of their cause, the more recent brand has turned to multi-casualty indiscriminate attacks. In doing so, they have exchanged the propaganda value of justification for a greater shock value, ensuring massive media coverage. This change seems to reflect the adaptation of the strategy to the age of television. Anyway, this basic concept of the nature of the terrorist struggle does not constitute a complete strategy. Like some other conceptions of terrorism, in the idea of propaganda by the deed terrorism is only meant to be the first stage of the struggle. It is a mechanism of hoisting a flag and recruiting, a prelude which would enable the insurgents to develop other modes of struggle. In itself, it is not expected to bring the government down.

Intimidation

Another salient psychological element in the strategy of terrorism has been, as the term implies, the intention to spread fear among the enemy's ranks. The notion is simple and does not need elaboration. For the regime and its key functionaries, whose very existence is challenged by the insurgents, the struggle is a matter of life or death and they are generally unlikely to give up because of the terrorists' threat. Nevertheless, terrorists have sometimes succeeded, through a systematic campaign of assassination, maiming or kidnapping, to intimidate select categories of people, such as judges, jurors or journalists. An extension of this idea of coercive terrorism applies to the general population. Not only government officials and employees are punished by the terrorists, but also all those who cooperate with the authorities and refuse to assist the insurgents. Examples of a large-scale use of this strategy have been the murders of actual or presumed collaborators with the authorities by the Vietminh and the Vietcong in Vietnam, the FLN in Algeria, and the Palestinian 'Shock Committees' in the Israeli Occupied Territories. An even more extensive use of this type of intimidation is designed to force the population to take a stand. Actually, it is mostly intended to affect the neutrals which, in many cases, constitute the great majority of the public, more than to intimidate the real opponents. Horne notes that in the first two-and-a-half years of the FLN's war against the French in Algeria, the FLN murdered at least 6,352 Muslims, as compared with 1,035 Europeans.⁴⁴ The killings were often carried out in a particularly gruesome manner, in order to maximize the terrorizing effect.⁴⁵

Insurgent organizations have sometimes imposed pointless demands on the population, with the sole purpose of exercising and demonstrating their control. In the 1936–1939 Arab Rebellion in Palestine, the insurgents demanded the urban Arab population to refrain from wearing a tarboosh – the head cover popular among townspeople, and to wear the kaffiya instead. Those that ignored the edict were punished severely.⁴⁶ In a similar vein, in 1955 the FLN demanded the Muslim population in Algeria to refrain from smoking. They punished those that broke the ban by cutting their lips with pruning shears.⁴⁷ Again, it is hard to find any logic behind this edict, other than the demonstration of power to control the population.

Provocation

An important constituent in terrorist strategy is the idea of provocation. Like the theme of propaganda by the deed, this notion appeared in the writings of nineteenth-century revolutionaries.⁴⁸ It has, however, gained special prominence in Carlos Marighella's *Minimanual of the*

Urban Guerrilla, first published in 1969. Marighella, author of one of the most influential terrorist guidebooks (albeit an unsuccessful terrorist practitioner himself), wrote that as a result of terrorist attacks,

The government has no alternative except to intensify repression. The police networks, house searches, arrests of innocent people and of suspects, closing off streets, make life in the city unbearable. The Military dictatorship embarks on massive political persecution. Political assassinations and police terror become routine . . . The people refuse to collaborate with the authorities, and the general sentiment is that the government is unjust, incapable of solving problems, and resorts purely and simply to the physical liquidation of its opponents.⁴⁹

The idea is, in general, simple and true not only in the political environment of a Latin American dictatorship but in many liberal democracies. Terrorist attacks tend to draw repressive responses by any regime, which necessarily affect also parts of the population which are not associated with the insurgents. These measures, in turn, make the government unpopular, thus increasing public support of the terrorists and their cause. When government counter-terrorist actions are not only draconic but ineffective as well, anti-government sentiment is bound to be even more prevalent.

A special kind of the provocation doctrine is relevant to a conflict which has an international dimension. When the insurgents represent a radical nationalist faction of a larger political entity, or are supported by a state, they may hope that their acts of terrorism will spark a war between their target country and their state-sponsor. This was the initial strategic conception of Fateh. Khaled al-Hassan, a leading ideologue of Fateh, explained it as follows:

The armed struggle technique was ostensibly simple. We called this tactic 'actions and reactions', because we intended to carry out actions, the Israelis would react and the Arab states, according to our plan, would support us and wage war on Israel. If the Arab governments would not go to war, the Arab peoples would support us and would force the Arab governments to support us. We wanted to create a climate of fighting spirit in the nation, so that they will arise and fight.⁵⁰

Strategy of Chaos

Government ineptitude is the basis for another psychological lever in the strategy of some terrorist groups. The idea can be termed 'a strategy of chaos' and is typical of right wing insurgents. It refers to the terrorist

attempt to create an atmosphere of chaos so as to demonstrate the government's inability to impose law and order.⁵¹ The insurgents hope that the public will, under such circumstances, demand that the 'weak' liberal government be replaced by a strong regime. In order to create an atmosphere of disorder and insecurity, the terrorists resorted to random bombings of public places. Thus, the Italian neo-fascist *Ordine Nero* (Black Order) group placed a bomb on a train on 5 August 1974, arbitrarily killing 12 passengers and wounding 48. Another ultra-right Italian group, the Armed Revolutionary Nuclei, was charged with the bombing of the Bologna railway station in August 1980, which caused the death of 84 and the wounding of 200.⁵² The same idea presumably motivated German extreme right-wing terrorists, who detonated a bomb in the midst of a joyous crowd celebrating the Oktoberfest beer festival in Munich on 26 September 1980. Thirteen persons were killed and 215 were wounded in the explosion.⁵³ A similar tactic was employed by a Belgian ultrarightist terrorist group which, during 1982–85 murdered almost 30 people in random shooting of bystanders during supermarket robberies. There was no apparent reason for the killings other than to create panic in the population.⁵⁴ Like the other strategic concepts of terrorism described above, the 'strategy of chaos' is not a comprehensive plan for seizing power. It is merely a way to create public mood which, as the insurgents hope, will give them a better chance to continue their struggle in an unspecified way.

Strategy of Attrition

Some insurgent groups have viewed terrorism as a strategy of protracted struggle, designed to wear out the adversary. In fact, this is the only conception of terrorism which viewed this mode of struggle as a complete way of achieving victory, rather than as a supplement or prelude to another strategy. The insurgents were fully aware of their inferiority as a fighting force compared to the strength of the government and, unlike the concepts of struggle delineated above, they did not expect that they would ever be strong enough to defeat the government by a physical confrontation. Nevertheless, they assumed that they had a greater stamina than the government and that, if they persisted, the government would eventually yield. Because this strategy assumes that the insurgents can prevail by greater perseverance rather than by building a stronger force, it is patently suitable for conflicts where the issue at stake is not of vital importance for the government.

If the government considers the struggle as a matter of life or death, it will not succumb to terrorist harassment, however protracted and unpleasant it may be. Moreover, when the government fights for its life

or for the existence of the state, it is likely to take off its gloves and employ all means necessary to quell the insurrection, ignoring restraints and controls normally imposed on security forces' action or instituting emergency laws and regulations that suspend such restraints. In a bare-handed showdown an insurgent group using terrorism as its main strategy has a very slim chance of winning, as long as the security forces are loyal to the regime. If, however, the government's interests in the dispute concern matters of utility rather than the defense of its very existence, its approach to the problem is one of cost-benefit analysis. The government weighs the political, economic or strategic losses that it is likely to bear if it yields to the insurgents' demands, versus the price it is likely to pay if the struggle continues.

This process of cost-benefit analysis is rarely, if ever, a clear-headed, methodical evaluation of the situation and the prospects. Usually, it is a matter of trial-and-error, paved with fluctuations as a result of political pressures and public, analysts and decisionmakers' disagreements and debates. Nevertheless, what eventually determines the outcome is the relative importance of the struggle for the government and for the insurgents, and the terrorists' nuisance value and durability.

Expressive Terrorism

So far terrorism has been treated as a strategy, implying an organized plan to achieve a political end, usually to seize power. Nevertheless, in several cases terrorism has been an emotional response with no clear strategic aim, although the acts of violence have been perpetrated by a group, in a tactically organized manner. Admittedly, this assertion carries us to the obscure territory of the rationality of terrorists and terrorism. Retrospectively, judging by its meager success to achieve the declared political goals, terrorism is not an effective strategy and terrorists may, therefore, be considered in general to be irrational, at least as much as their political behavior is concerned. Nevertheless, in some cases the terrorist struggle seems hopeless to the extent that its irrationality is particularly striking.

A case in point is the Moluccan terrorism in the Netherlands in the 1970s. The Moluccan community in the Netherlands is a remnant of the Dutch colonial era. After the Dutch evacuation of their colonies in South East Asia, a South Moluccan republic was established in 1950 but was soon conquered by Indonesia. About 15,000 South Moluccans, most of them associated with the old Dutch administration, found refuge in the Netherlands. Political and social frustrations bred, within this small community, a terrorist group (Free South Moluccan Youth Movement), which carried out several spectacular terrorist attacks in

the Netherlands. The most notorious of these were the concurrent takeover of the Embassy of Indonesia and a passenger train in 1975 and the concurrent takeover of a school and another train in 1977. In return for the release of their hostages the terrorists demanded that the government of the Netherlands would recognize their nonexistent state and release comrades who had been arrested in previous operations.⁵⁵

A similar example is Armenian terrorism in the 1970s and 1980s. The two main Armenian terrorist groups, the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) and the Justice Commando for the Armenian Genocide (JCAG), carried out numerous terrorist attacks in 1975–85, most of them against Turkish diplomats. The motivation behind these acts was revenge for the massacre of Armenians by the Turks in 1915, in which an estimated number of 1.5 million Armenians perished. The terrorist groups demanded official Turkish admission of responsibility for the massacre, which the Government of Turkey consistently refused to grant. In addition to this explicitly emotional demand, ASALA also demanded the reinstatement of an independent Armenian state, which would include the old Armenian provinces in Turkey.⁵⁶ At present, only about 50,000 Armenians live in Turkey, very few of them in the historic Armenian region. About four-fifths of the Armenians live in the former Soviet Union, most of them in the former Armenian Republic of the USSR.⁵⁷ Yet, Armenian terrorist activity has been primarily directed against Turkey.

Both Moluccan and Armenian terrorism are manifest examples of *expressive terrorism*. The dominant motivation which has driven the young men and women who carried out the acts of violence belonged to the emotional realm rather than to the domain of rational political planning. Terrorism, in these instances, expressed an emotional state, rather than served as an instrumental tool in the framework of a strategy of insurgency. Undoubtedly, the emotional element is also part of the driving force behind the activity of other terrorist groups. In most cases, however, the hopelessness of the political case is not as clear as in the Armenian and Moluccan examples, rendering an outside judgement about the weight of the emotional factor impossible.

How Successful is Terrorism?

The evaluation of terrorism's success as a strategy depends on how success is defined. Most terrorist groups strive to depose the current government and to seize power. By this criterion of success, taking into

account only insurgents which have used terrorism as their main strategy, only some anti-colonial groups have fully accomplished their goal. The struggles of the *Ethniki Organosis Kypriahou Agoniston* (EOKA) in Cyprus and the Mau Mau in Kenya against British rule and the FLN in Algeria against the French, are well-known examples. The overwhelming majority of the many hundreds of terrorist groups which have existed in the second half of this century have failed miserably to attain their declared goal.⁵⁸ The fact that terrorist success has been limited to the category of anti-colonial struggles is not incidental. The main reason for this phenomenon is that only in this category the issue at stake is far more important for the insurgents than for the government. Where the terrorist organization's struggle is aimed at changing the social-political nature of the regime, such as in the case of right-wing or left wing insurgents, the incumbent government fights for its life and is ready to take all means necessary to quell the insurgency. For the governments of France, Germany or Italy, the struggle against the *Action Directe*, the Red Army Faction and the Red Brigades was an all or nothing matter. There was no room for compromise and the terrorists' success meant the demise of the government.

The same is also true for most cases of separatist struggle, where the insurgents' aspirations are perceived by the government as threatening the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state, such as in the Basque separatist struggle in Spain.⁵⁹ Differences in the degree of success of separatist terrorists stem primarily from the extent to which secession of the disputed part of the country seems, to most citizens of the state, as severing their own flesh and blood. For France, for instance, leaving the protectorates of Tunisia and Morocco or the colonies of Mali and Madagascar was much less painful than relinquishing its rule of Algeria, which was legally part of France and had more than one million Frenchmen among its mostly Muslim population; giving up Bretagne or Normandy is unthinkable. In this sense, the success of separatist terrorism in obtaining its goals is a yardstick for the degree to which the disputed territory is truly a separate entity.

It is also true, however, that a nationalist cause is generally much more powerful in motivating people than a social issue and, therefore, other things being equal, the intensity of violence which stems from nationalistic sentiments is usually greater than the magnitude of violence generated by social-economical grievances.

Whereas achievement of the insurgents' goals in full is rare, terrorists have more often succeeded in accomplishing partial objectives. Four types of partial terrorist success can be discerned: (1) recruitment of domestic support which enables the terrorists to move on to a higher

level of insurrection; (2) achieving international attention to their grievances; (3) acquiring international legitimacy; (4) gaining partial political concessions from their adversary. These are discussed below.

It has already been mentioned that the most basic notion of terrorism as a strategy is the idea of 'propaganda by the deed', which viewed this mode of struggle as a tool for spreading the word of the insurrection, expanding its popular base, and thus serving as a lever for and prelude to a more advanced form of insurrection. For the bulk of the terrorist groups, even this elementary doctrine has not worked. Although their acts of violence gained tremendous publicity, as terrorist attacks always do, they have failed to attract public sympathy and support and to generate the broad popular insurrection they hoped to propel. This has been, for example, the case with the radical left-wing and right-wing movements in Western Europe and in the United States in the 1970s and 1980s.

Nevertheless, there have been cases where terrorism apparently helped in sparking and arousing a broader movement. One example is the Russian Social Revolutionaries at the beginning of this century. Although they have failed in turning their own clandestine apparatus into a political instrument capable of seizing power, and notwithstanding the fact that the October 1917 Revolution was eventually executed by the broader-based, better-organized Bolsheviks, the terrorist acts of the Social Revolutionaries probably contributed much to keep the revolutionary torch aflame. Throughout the years that the Social Democrats (the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks) were building their clandestine infrastructure with no dramatic actions to ignite people's enthusiasm, the Social Revolutionaries, by their assassination of oppressive state ministers and other government functionaries, maintained the idea and spirit of struggle alive among potential revolutionaries. Ironically, it seems that Social Revolutionary terrorism, much criticized and ridiculed by the Social Democrats, thus enabled the latter to reach 1917 with the capability of seizing power.

The most common outcome of international terrorism is bringing the terrorists' grievances to international consciousness. In itself, this awareness is not enough to effect changes desired by the insurgents and sometimes results in repercussions that are deleterious to the terrorists' cause. Yet, under favorable conditions, it grants the insurgents a ladder by which they can climb further. In Western publics, the initial reaction to a terrorist campaign is, invariably, one of vehement condemnation. This response, however, is often followed by readiness to examine closely the terrorists' case with a tendency to view their grievances favorably. Paradoxically, the public may end up approving of causes

while denouncing the method by which they were brought to its attention.

The formation of the subsequent benevolent attitude to the terrorists' cause is most likely to occur in publics that suffer from the terrorist attacks, but have nothing to lose from the fulfillment of their demands. In this situation, the initial rage is soon replaced by the wish that the problem will disappear. When a positive political attitude to the terrorists' cause seems to be able to buy peace, governments often adapt their policy so as to gain the terrorists' good will. The situation is known in psychology as 'cognitive dissonance', and is not necessarily conscious. Essentially, it involves finding an acceptable excuse for a course of behavior that may produce conflict, because it contradicts some principles or beliefs. It is certainly much more palatable for a government or public to think that, on a closer examination, the terrorist have a point, than to admit caving in to terrorist pressure.

When other pressures and interests are added to the will to end the terrorist attacks, such as accommodating influential patrons of the terrorists, the likelihood of adopting a favorable attitude to the terrorist cause is greater. Western responses to international Palestinian terrorism is a salient example of this process. Palestinian terrorist attacks in Western Europe began in 1968 and reached a peak in 1973. They were condemned strongly by the European Community. In a few years, however, the PLO was allowed to open representations in practically all European countries, and in 1974, about a year after the imposition of oil embargo by the Organization of [Arab] Petroleum Exporting Countries and the increase in oil prices, PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat was invited to speak in front of the General Assembly of the UN, and the PLO was granted an observer status in that international forum.

Martha Crenshaw observed correctly that 'An initial problem in assessing the results of terrorism is that it is never the unique causal factor leading to identifiable outcomes. The intermingling of social and political effects with other events and trends makes terrorism difficult to isolate.'⁶⁰ Admittedly, it is impossible to isolate the net effect of terrorism and to assess accurately its relative contribution to the legitimation process of the PLO, alongside with other factors, such as economic and political pressures by Arab states. There can be little doubt, however, that in the last count, terrorism has had a beneficial rather than a deleterious effect on PLO's legitimacy.

The PLO's case is unique, in that other nationalist and separatist insurgent movements have not enjoyed the backing of powerful patrons. The Kurds, the Croats, the Kashmiris, the Sikhs, to name just a few examples of separatist movements which have been active in the

recent two decades, have not gained nearly as much international legitimacy and support, although their grievances are at least as convincing as those of the Palestinians. On the other hand, it is also true that these movements have not used nearly as much international terrorism as the Palestinians (which, in itself, can be explained by the lack of state-sponsorship).

Some terrorist groups that have been unable to materialize their political objectives, have nevertheless succeeded in driving their adversary to make significant concessions. A typical example is the Basque *Euzkadi ta Askatasuna* (ETA). Their long violent campaign for secession from Spain has not produced the independence they aspired for, but it has undoubtedly been a major factor in Spain's decision to grant the Basque provinces extensive autonomy. Another case in point is the IRA's struggle over Ulster. Although no actual steps have been taken yet towards changing the status of Ulster, there has been a growing readiness in Britain to get rid of the Irish problem by any solution that would end the violence. The British-Irish Accord of 1985 guaranteed that Ulster would become part of the Republic of Ireland if they decide so by popular vote. For the time being, Ireland was granted a say in the affairs of Ulster in the framework of an Anglo-Irish conference. Clearly, these changes in Britain's policy were prompted by the IRA's struggle.

The Mixed Forms of Uprising

Strategies of uprising are usually treated as separate entities or phenomena. In a theoretical analysis this separation is necessary, if we want to understand the essentials of a strategy and its characteristics. The real world, however, is always more complex than academic classifications. In reality, it is sometimes hard to distinguish between terrorism and guerrilla war even with the help of the criteria offered above. By these criteria the basic strategy used by the IRA, for example, belongs to the category of terrorism: the IRA does not try to seize territory in order to establish 'liberated zones,' and the tactics used by the organization are mostly well within the typical terrorist brand, namely, assassinations and placing explosive devices in public places. Yet, some of this group's operations, such as a mortar attack on a police station and blowing up bridges, have utilized tactics and weapons which are usually associated with guerrilla warfare. Another case in point are the Palestinian groups. These organizations *have* maintained territorial control in Lebanon (and during 1967-70 in Jordan), but the territory which they held has been

outside their main theater of operations. Although they used the area which they dominated for the classical guerrilla ends of recruiting, training and establishing a regular force, their draftees were recruited from the Palestinian diaspora in these countries, rather than from the populace in the Israeli-held territories. Moreover, with some exceptions, they have used terrorist rather than guerrilla tactics. Their operations inside Israel and the Occupied Territories have mostly involved explosive charges placed in supermarkets, residential buildings, bus stations and similar venues. Even their incursions into Israel have been usually done by small teams sent to stage barricade-hostage incidents or random killing attacks on civilian villages.

Aside from the fact that it is sometimes difficult to make a clear distinction between terrorist and guerrilla tactics, it is even more confusing that in many cases insurgent groups systematically use a mixture of both strategies. In Peru, the *Sendero Luminoso* have used a classical guerrilla strategy in the mountainous Ayacucho region, where they have occupied towns, carried out attacks on police stations and military convoys, and have established control over large areas. At the same time, however, they have conducted a typical terrorist campaign in the cities, in which they committed assassinations, bombings and kidnapping. A similar mixture has existed in the activities of many other Latin American groups, such as the Colombian *Ejército de Liberación Nacional*, M-19 and *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia*, the Salvadoran Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front and the Guatemalan Guerrilla Army of the Poor. A dual guerrilla-terrorist strategy has also characterized groups in other parts of the Third world. The Vietminh and, later, the Vietcong insurgencies were instances where regular warfare, guerrilla strategy and terrorism abounded side by side. Similar examples, albeit on a smaller scale, are abundant in Asia and Africa.

A closer examination reveals that the co-existence of guerrilla and terrorist strategies is not incidental. Apparently, all insurgent organizations which have adopted guerrilla as their main strategy have also used terrorism regularly. Some may claim that resistance movements which fought against occupying armies are a noticeable exception to this generality. This reservation, however, rests on dubious ground. Fighters against a foreign army in their homeland, such as the French Resistance and the Russian, Yugoslav and Greek partisans in World War II, only attacked the enemy's military and official apparatus, for the simple reason that civilian members of the enemy's nationality were not present on the scene of battle. Failure to target enemy noncombatants was not a matter of choice, but reflected availability. The underground

movements did attack civilians of their own nationality – actual and suspected collaborators with the occupiers. In addition, although in some places, such as the Soviet Union and in Yugoslavia, the strategy adopted by the partisans was, by and large, guerrilla warfare, employing large units which operated from liberated or semi-liberated areas, in West European countries, such as France, the strategy of the insurgents can at best be characterized as falling in the grey zone between guerrilla and terrorism. No territorial control was established by the French underground and its operations consisted of attacks on individual members of the occupying forces as well as of blowing up bridges, mining and similar tactics typical of guerrilla warfare. Presumably, many readers would feel insulted by the classification of the anti-Nazi warriors as terrorists, rather than as guerrillas. For them, I must reiterate that the terms ‘terrorism’ and ‘guerrilla’ are used here to denote different strategies of warfare which may be utilized in the service of a variety of just or unjust causes, and that they do not imply any moral judgement whatsoever.

The absence of a genuine anti-Nazi guerrilla campaign in Western Europe during World War II draws attention to the fact that, there has not been even a single guerrilla organization in Western Europe among the many insurgent organizations which have operated in this region since the 1960s. This fact is particularly conspicuous against the backdrop of the abundance of such organizations in Third World countries. How can this fact be explained? Is it because Western insurgents have co-incidentally decided that they like terrorism better than guerrilla as their strategy of choice? The answer is, of course, different. In Western Europe, as well as in North America, there has *not* been a choice for insurgents. The only option, which could seem at least temporarily sane, has been terrorism. Imagine the IRA in Ulster or the Red Brigades in Italy trying to launch a guerrilla campaign: establishing liberated zones and carrying out company-size attacks on military installations. Had they tried this strategy, it would, undoubtedly, have been the shortest guerrilla war in history. For the incumbent government forces, elimination of the insurgency would, at most, be a matter of days.

There are several examples in history which show quite clearly what happens when a group of insurgents aims too high in its choice of strategy. The most dramatic in the second half of this century is, probably, Ernesto (Che) Guevara’s Bolivian venture. Guevara, a leader of the 1956–59 guerrilla campaign in Cuba, drew the wrong lessons from the rather peculiar circumstances which brought about the insurgents’ success. Guevara believed that the Cuban experience could be readily

applied in several other Latin American countries, which he considered ripe for a revolution. In autumn 1966 he led 15 men to Bolivia, to start a Cuban-style guerrilla campaign. The insurgency, however, never succeeded in taking off. Although the terrain was favorable for guerrilla warfare, Guevara failed to attract enough popular support. Despite the fact that government forces' efficiency was far below Western standards, their superiority in numbers was enough to encircle and wipe out the insurgency within a year.⁶¹

Terrorism, on the other hand, however it may seem hopeless for most people as a way of effecting a radical political change, is at least a mode of struggle that is not immediately suicidal even when the circumstances are not favorable for the insurgents, and can be sustained for a considerable time. In all likelihood, the West European insurgents would like to be able to wage a guerrilla war as their major strategy. One might say, that all terrorist groups wish to be guerrillas when they grow up.⁶² They are unable to do it because of practical reasons. Guerrilla warfare requires a terrain that would be advantageous for the small bands of insurgents and disadvantageous for mechanized and airborne government forces. In Western Europe this kind of terrain – thick jungles or extensive, rugged mountains inaccessible by motor transportation – cannot be found. Guerrillas can sometimes compromise for less than perfect terrain, providing that other conditions are met, in particular inefficient and poorly-equipped government forces on the one hand and massive popular support for the insurgents on the other hand. In twentieth century Western countries none of these conditions exists and terrorism is the only strategic option for insurgents who are determined to resort to violence to advance their cause.

It still has to be explained why those who *can* conduct a guerrilla campaign resort to terrorism at the same time. Again, the answer is in the difference between academic classifications and real life. In a way, the distinction between guerrilla warfare and terrorism is artificial. To be sure, it is a valid differentiation, but only as an external observation. Academics may sit in their armchairs and categorize strategies of insurgency. The point is that the insurgents themselves rarely do so when they come to select their actions. Although rebels have often delineated their strategic concepts, the arguments have almost always been of a practical nature. The key has been what could be realistically done to promote the political cause. That does not include an attempt to fit the actions into a rigid doctrinaire framework. The primary considerations are capability and utility. Because terrorism is the lowest, least demanding form of insurgency, it has always been used simultaneously with other strategies. The relative importance of terrorism in the overall

struggle depends on the circumstances, but it is always part of the strife. A case in point is the Palestinian struggle. Abu Iyad, one of the PLO's main leaders noted in his memoirs:

. . . I do not confuse revolutionary violence, which is a political act, with terrorism, which is not. I reject the individual act committed outside the context of an organization or strategic vision. I reject the act dictated by subjective motives which claims to take the place of mass struggle. Revolutionary violence, on the other hand, is part of a large, structured movement. It serves as a supplementary force and contributes, during a period of regrouping or defeat, to giving the movement a new impetus. It becomes superfluous when the grass-roots movement scores political successes on the local or international scene.⁶³

In fact, terrorism has been a perennial part of the Palestinian struggle since the early 1920s. Abu Iyad's quotation refers to the period 1971-73, when Fateh, the PLO's main organization, engaged in an intensive campaign of international terrorism under the guise of the Black September organization. Abu Iyad himself was, allegedly, one of the principal chieftains of the clandestine apparatus of international terrorism, which carried out a series of spectacular terrorist attacks, including the barricade-hostage incident in the Munich Olympic games of 1972. Fateh's decision to launch a spectacular campaign of international terrorism followed the PLO's expulsion from Jordan by King Hussein in September 1970 (an event after which the Black September organization was named). The wave of international terrorism was designed to boost PLO members' morale after the débâcle in Jordan, at a time when they lost Jordan as a base for operations.

A similar increase in international Palestinian terrorism took place in the wake of the 1982 war, in which the PLO lost most of its bases in Lebanon. Within Israel and the Territories, however, terrorism has always been considered by the Palestinian insurgents an integral part of the struggle. Changes in the number of terrorist attacks have, therefore, reflected capability rather than motivation. The question has never been whether terrorism should continue, but what else could be done. In the course of the 70 years of the Palestinian violent struggle, the insurgents have, at times, been able to wield guerrilla warfare in addition to terrorism, such as in the 1936-39 Arab rebellion, but most of the time terrorism remained the only mode of violence at their disposal. Riots have occasionally erupted throughout this period and have sometimes developed into large-scale popular uprisings, which included several forms of political violence concurrently.

The *Intifada* (literally: shaking) is the most recent of these uprisings, albeit not the most intense one. Like similar phenomena in Algeria, South Africa, Azerbaijan, Soviet Armenia, and in the Jewish struggle for independence in the 1930s and 1940s, the *Intifada* is not a pure form of insurgent violence. It has included violent as well as non-violent components. The violent elements of the *Intifada* have consisted of riots, petrol bomb and rock throwing at military and civilian vehicles, and ordinary terrorist-type attacks, such as explosive charges and assassinations. The non-violent elements have included labor and commerce strikes, road blocks, and an attempted boycott of Israeli goods and government services.⁶⁴ One might suppose that the embarkation on the more effective strategy of mass protest during the *Intifada* would result in a reduction in terrorist attacks, which represented a lower-grade, less effective form of struggle. The contrary is true: the frequency of terrorist incidents and the number of casualties have increased considerably.⁶⁵ Thus, the 'Intifada' has not been a distinct strategy but a mixture of several modes of struggle, including terrorism.

The 1989 bloodless change of regimes in several East European countries seems to refute the assertion that terrorism appears as an omni-present part of uprisings. By a strict criterion of examination this reservation is certainly true. It should be remembered, however, that the regimes of the East European Soviet satellites drew their strength from an external source – the USSR. Once this hoop was loosened, the barrel fell apart. In other words, the changes in East Europe were not a result of a true internal insurgency, but a consequence of surrender at the top. Had the governments of Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and East Germany been more determined to withstand the peaceful uprising, the struggle would have probably been deteriorated into a long campaign, including terrorism as a cardinal mode of insurgency. Actually, this is the process which has taken place in several republics within the Soviet Union.

In sum, in reality the form of insurgency – terrorism, guerrilla, mass-protest, or any combination of these – is mainly determined by objective conditions rather than by strategic conceptions of the insurgents. The most important factor is capability. Usually, the insurgents utilize every possible mode of struggle that can advance their cause. Because terrorism is the lowest form of violent struggle, it is always used in insurgencies. Often, because the insurgents are few, the terrain is not favorable for guerrilla warfare and government forces are efficient, terrorism is the only mode of insurgency available to the insurgents. Sometimes the rebels are able to conduct guerrilla warfare, although they continue to use terrorism concurrently. The actual form of contest

is forged in a continuous process of friction against hard reality, and terrorism is practically always part of it.

NOTES

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1. Alex P. Schmid and Albert J. Jongman, *Political Terrorism*. (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1988). See also the earlier edition of this study: Alex P. Schmid, *Political Terrorism* (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1983).
2. Schmid and Jongman (1988), pp.5-6.
3. *Ibid.*, p.33.
4. *Ibid.*, pp.33-4.
5. *Ibid.*, p.34.
6. W.E. Daugherty, 'Bomb Warnings to Friendly and Enemy Civilian Targets' in William E. Daugherty and Morris Janowitz, *A Psychological Warfare Casebook* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1958), pp.359-362.
7. Alistair Horne, *A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962* (New York: Penguin, 1987), pp.537-8.
8. 'Vietcong Directive on "Repression"' in J. Mallin (ed.), *Terror and Urban Guerrillas* (Coral Gables, FLA: Univ. of Miami Press, 1971), pp.31-43.
9. For a comprehensive summary of the origin of the term see: Walter Laqueur, *The Age of Terrorism* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1987), especially Ch.1.
10. US Dept. of State, *Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1988* (Washington, DC: Dept. of State Publication 9705, Office of the Secretary of State, Ambassador at Large for Counterterrorism, March 1989), p.v.
11. Webster's New World Dictionary defines 'vigilance committee' as '1. a group of persons organized without legal authorization professedly to keep order and punish crime when ordinary law enforcement agencies apparently fail to do so. 2. especially formerly in the South, such a group organized to terrorize and control Negroes and Abolitionists and, during the Civil War, to suppress support of the Union.' *Webster's New World Dictionary* (Cleveland, OH and NY: World Publishing Co. 1966).
12. *Webster's New Twentieth Century Dictionary Unabridged*, 2nd ed. (NY: William Collins Publishers Inc., 1980).
13. Edward Luttwak, *Coup d'Etat* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1979), p.27.
14. The characterization of some revolutions as nonviolent is controversial. Chalmers Johnson, for example, maintains that "'nonviolent revolution", so long as these words retain any precise meaning whatsoever, is a contradiction in terms. Nevertheless, it is quite true that many revolutions have been accomplished without any blood flowing in the gutters. What then, sociologically speaking, do we mean by violence? This question is also basic to the analysis of revolution.' (Chalmers Johnson, *Revolutionary Change* (Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 1982), p.7).
15. C. Brinton, *The Anatomy of Revolution* (NY: Vintage Books, 1965), p.3.
16. In 1903 the revolutionary Russian Social-Democratic Party was split into Bolsheviks (majority) and Mensheviks (minority). The division was over the issue of party membership. Whereas Lenin and his supporters envisaged a tight, centrally controlled conspiratorial organization which would include only dedicated activists, the Mensheviks preferred a more general, less demanding and less centralized organization. See, e.g., I. Deutscher, *The Prophet Armed: Trotsky, 1879-1921* (London: OUP, 1954).

17. In reality, however, the October revolution of 1917 was accomplished in a coup-like manner. There were very few casualties in the actual process of seizing power, although the civil war which followed resulted in great bloodshed and destruction.
18. In reality, the dominant factor in the collapse of the Tsarist regime in 1917 was the disintegration of the Army, as a result of a series of defeats in World War I. See Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions* (Cambridge: CUP, 1979).
19. See, for instance, the doctrine of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). John W. Amos, *Palestinian Resistance: Organization of a Nationalist Movement* (NY: Pergamon Press, 1980), pp.192-3.
20. This has been the doctrine advocated by Mao Tse Tung and his followers. See, for instance, Walter Laqueur, *Guerrilla: A Historical and Critical Study* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1976), Ch.6.
21. On the basis of empirical findings on riot participation in Newark, New Jersey, Paige defined riots as 'a form of disorganized political protest engaged in by those who have become highly distrustful of existing political institutions.' (p.819). J.M. Paige, 'Political Orientation and Riot Participation', *American Sociological Review*, Vol.36 (1971), pp.810-20.
22. Advocates of nonviolent resistance usually emphasize the moral superiority of this mode of struggle. However, Gene Sharp, although his point of departure is that nonviolent resistance is morally preferable, stresses the practical advantages of this form of uprising. See Gene Sharp, *The Politics of Nonviolent Action* (Boston: Porter Sargent Publishers, 1973).
23. Sharp, pp.75-90.
24. See Laqueur, *Age of Terrorism* (note 9), pp.21, 44-8.
25. Nineteenth century revolutionaries have often carried the term 'terrorism' with pride. See, e.g., N. Morozov, 'The Terrorist Struggle,' G. Tarnovski, 'Terrorism and Routine,' and J. Most, 'Advice for Terrorists' in Walter Laqueur and Yonah Alexander, *The Terrorism Reader* (NY: NAL Penguin, 1987), pp.72-84, 100-8. In the second half of the twentieth century, however, most insurgent organizations which adopted terrorism as a strategy have shunned the term in favor of a variety of euphemisms. Yet even a modern authority on terrorism doctrine, Carlos Marighella, wrote: 'Terrorism is an arm the revolutionary can never relinquish.' (Carlos Marighella, 'Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla,' in J. Mallin (ed.), *Terror and Urban Guerrilla* (Coral Gables, FLA: Univ. of Miami Press, 1971), p.103.
26. Laqueur, *Guerrilla* (note 20), pp.x xi.
27. See, e.g., Mao Tse Tung, 'Base Areas in the Anti-Japanese Guerrilla War' in W.J. Pomeroy, *Guerrilla Warfare and Marxism* (NY: Int'l Publishers, 1968), pp.183-93.
28. In the Battle of Dien Bien Phu (1954) the Vietminh employed four divisions against a French force of about 15,000 (R.E. Dupuy and T.N. Dupuy, *The Encyclopedia of Military History* (London: Jane's, 1986), p.1296. Inasmuch as the battle itself was conducted along the lines of a regular war, it was waged in the general framework of a guerrilla struggle. See, e.g., Laqueur, *Guerrilla* (note 20).
29. The largest terrorist teams have been employed in barricade-hostage incidents. E.g., 50 members of the 28th of February Popular League participated in the takeover of the Panamanian Embassy in San Salvador on 11 Jan. 1980; 41 members of the Colombian M-19 group took over the Palace of Justice in Bogota on 6 Nov. 1985 (Edward F. Mickolus, Todd Sandler and Jean M. Murdock, *International Terrorism in the 1980s: A Chronology of Events* (Ames, IA: Iowa State UP, 1989), Vol.I, pp.5-6, Vol.II, pp.298-300).
30. George Bush, introduction to *Terrorist Group Profiles* (Washington, DC: US GPO, 1988), page unnumbered. See also, Menachem Begin 'Freedom Fighters and Terrorists' in, Benjamin Netanyahu (ed.), *International Terrorism: Challenge and Response* (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1981), pp.39-46.
31. Zeev Ivianski, *Revolution and Terror* (Tel Aviv: Yair Publications, 1989), pp.274-8 (Hebrew).
32. Many authors who addressed the moral issue in terrorism have resorted to Kaliayev's

- example. A partial list includes: Frederick J. Hacker, *Crusaders, Criminals, Crazyes* (NY Norton, 1976), pp.294–5; Ze'ev Ivianski, 'The Moral Issue: Some Aspects of Individual Terror,' in David C. Rapoport and Yonah Alexander, *The Morality of Terrorism* (NY: Pergamon Press, 1982), p.230; Laqueur, *Age of Terrorism* (note 9) p.83; Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars* (NY: Basic Books, 1977), pp.198–9; J. Bowyer Bell, *Assassin!* (NY: St. Martin's Press, 1979), p.235.
33. Walzer (note 32), pp.197–206.
 34. *Ibid.*, p.203
 35. *Ibid.*, p.202
 36. *Ibid.*, p.xiv.
 37. E.g., Martha Crenshaw, 'Introduction: Reflections on the Effects of Terrorism' in *idem* (ed.), *Terrorism Legitimacy and Power: The Consequences of Political Violence* (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan UP, 1983), p.1; Paul Wilkinson, *Terrorism and the Liberal State* (London: Macmillan, 1977), p.110; Grant Wardlaw, *Political Terrorism: Theory, Tactics, and Counter-Measures* (Cambridge: CUP 1989), pp.34–42.
 38. *Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1988* (note 10).
 39. Schmid and Jongman (note 1), p.34.
 40. B.H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy: The Indirect Approach* (London: Faber, 1954), p.163.
 41. Sun Tzu, *The Art of War* (New York: Delta, 1988), Ch.3.
 42. Laqueur, *Age of Terrorism* (note 9) pp.48–51; Wardlaw (note 37), p.21.
 43. See, e.g., John Most, 'Advice for Terrorists,' in: Laqueur and Alexander *Terrorism Reader* (note 25), pp.105–6; Ze'ev Ivianski, *Revolution and Terror* (Tel Aviv: Yair Publication, 1989), pp.106–7. (Hebrew).
 44. Alistair Horne, *A Savage war of Peace* (Tel Aviv: Ma'arachot, 1989), p.139 (Hebrew trans.).
 45. *Ibid.* p.138.
 46. The kaffiya was the traditional head cover of villagers and some authors viewed its enforcement on the urban population as a symptom of social rebellion against the bourgeoisie, in addition to the nationalist element which was the main motivation of the rebellion. At that time, the insurgent gangs were mainly composed of villagers. Regardless of the true origin of the insurgents' demand, the kaffiya became a symbol of the rebellion and the insurgents imposed it on the population as a symbol of compliance. See Youval Arnon-Ohanna, *Kherev Mi'Bayit (The Internal Struggle within the Palestinian Movement, 1929–1939)* (Tel Aviv: Yariv-Hadar, 1981) pp.282–4 (Hebrew).
 47. Jacques Massu, *La Vraie Bataille d'Alger* (Tel Aviv: Ma'arachot, 1975) p.31 (Hebrew trans.)
 48. Walter Laqueur, for example, notes that Armenian revolutionaries of the 1880s and 1890s adopted a strategy based on provocation. They assumed that their attacks on the Turks would instigate brutal retaliation which would, in turn, result in radicalization of the Armenian population and, possibly, also lead to Western countries' intervention. Laqueur, *Age of Terrorism* (note 9), p.43.
 49. Marighella in Mallin (note 25), p.111.
 50. Guy Bechor, *Lexicon of the PLO* (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defense Publishing House, 1991), p.279 (Hebrew).
 51. The same basic idea was given the name 'strategy of tension'. See K.S. Rentner, 'Terrorism in Insurgent Strategies.' *Military Intelligence* (Jan.–March 1985), p.51; P. Jenkins, 'Strategy of Tension: The Belgian Terrorist Crisis 1982–1986', *Terrorism* 13/4–5 (1990), pp.299–309.
 52. Peter Janke, *Guerilla and Terrorist Organisations: A World Directory and Bibliography* (NY: Macmillan, 1983), pp.47–8.
 53. The bombing was apparently carried out by members of the neo-Nazi terrorist group *Wehrsportgruppe Hoffman* (Military Sports Group Hoffman), or the *Wehrsportgruppe Schlageter* (Military Sports Group Schlageter). See Mickolus, Sandler, and Murdock, *International Terrorism in the 1980s: A Chronology of Events, Volume I, 1980–1983*, p.87; Schmid and Jongman (note 1), p.558.

54. Jenkins (note 51).
55. Schmid and Jongman (note 1), p.623. See also, Janke (note 52), pp.57-8; C.H. Yaeger, 'Menia Muria: The South Moluccans Fight in Holland', *Terrorism* 13/3 (1990), pp.215-26.
56. Anat Kurz and Ariel Merari, *ASALA: Irrational Terror or Political Tool* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985). See also, Schmid and Jongman (note 1), pp.673, 675; Janke (note 52), p.276.
57. Kurz and Merari, pp.14-15.
58. The data base at Tel Aviv University's Political Violence Research Unit includes data on more than 800 distinct terrorist groups which have operated in the 1980s.
59. For a discussion of the influence of the issue at stake on readiness to yield to terrorism, see A. Merari and N. Friedland, 'Social Psychological Aspects of Political Terrorism' in Stuart Oskamp (ed.), *International Conflict and National Public Policy Issues (Applied Social Psychology Annual 6)* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1985), pp.185-206.
60. M. Crenshaw, 'Introduction: Reflections on the Effects of Terrorism', p.5.
61. See George C. Kohn, *Dictionary of Wars* (Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1987), p.60.
62. Even Carlos Marighella, the most popular modern advocate of terrorism, viewed terrorism ('urban guerrilla' in his terminology) as a stage necessary to enable the development of rural guerrilla: 'it is a technique that aims at the development of urban guerrilla warfare, whose function will be to wear out, demoralize and distract the enemy forces, permitting the emergence and survival of rural guerrilla warfare which is destined to play the decisive role in the revolutionary war.' Marighella, in Mallin (note 25), p.83.
63. Abu Iyad, *My Home, My Land: A Narrative of the Palestinian Struggle* (NY: Times Books, 1978), p.98.
64. A. Merari, T. Prat and D. Tal, 'The Palestinian Intifada: An Analysis of a Popular Uprising after Seven Months.' *Terrorism and Political Violence* 1/2 (1989), pp.177-201.
65. A. Kurz, 'Palestinian Terrorism in 1988' in Shlomo Gazit (ed.), *The Middle East Military Balance 1988-1989* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1989), pp.84-97.