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Terrorism and Political
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Terrorism as a strategy of
insurgency
Ariel Merari
a
a
Director of The Political Violence Research
Unit, Tel Aviv University, Israel
Version of record first published: 21 Dec 2007.
To cite this article: Ariel Merari (1993): Terrorism as a strategy of insurgency,
Terrorism and Political Violence, 5:4, 213-251
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Terrorism as a Strategy of Insurgency
ARIEL MERARI
This essay describes terrorism as a mode of warfare and examines its unique
characteristics, by comparing this method of struggle to other forms of violent
conflict. It further emphasizes the role of terrorism as a strategy of insurgence
and delineates the main strategic ideas by which terrorists have hoped to achieve
their political objectives. The study evaluates terrorists' success in obtaining
political goals and the conditions which affect their ability to materialize their
objectives.
The author concludes that the mode of struggle adopted by insurgents is
dictated by circumstances rather than by choice, and that whenever possible,
insurgents use concurrently a variety of strategies of struggle. Terrorism, which
is the easiest form of insurgency, is practically always one of these modes.
This article is about the nature of terrorism as a form of warfare, and its
unique place in the universe of political violence. Before getting to these
subjects, however, I have to clarify what I mean by 'political terrorism'.
This term has been used by governments, the media and even by
academics to denote phenomena that have very little in common. Thus,
for some terrorism means violent acts of groups against states, for others
- state oppression of its own citizens, and for still others - warlike acts of
states against other states.
A major hindrance in the way of achieving a widely accepted
definition of political terrorism is the negative emotional connotation of
the term. Terrorism has become merely another derogatory word,
rather than a descriptor of a specific type of activity. Usually, people use
the term as a disapproving label for a whole variety of phenomena which
they do not like, without bothering to define precisely what constitutes
terroristic behavior. This article regards terrorism as a mode of struggle
rather than a social or political aberration. It approaches this phenomenon
technically rather than moralistically.
To make this approach clear, I must begin by delineating what I mean
by the term terrorism, hence - what is the subject of this treatise. The
article then proceeds to locate terrorism in the spectrum of forms of
political violence, identify its peculiar features in comparison with other
modes of struggle, and consider the characteristics of terrorism as a
Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol.5, No. 4 (Winter 1993), pp.213-251
PUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS, LONDON
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214 TERRORISM AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE
strategy. The final section examines the question to what extent has
terrorism been successful as a mode of struggle.
A Working Definition of Terrorism
As mentioned above, 'terrorism' has different meanings for different
people. Terminology is always a matter of agreement for the purpose of
common understanding. There is no point in searching for logic-based
definitions of terms which belong to the realm of political or social
science, especially when the term in question carries a negative
emotional connotation. There is no way on earth by which the United
States can logically prove that the Libyan-sponsored attack on the
Rome and Vienna airports in 1985was an act of terrorism, if some of the
basic assumptions and semantics necessary for the definition of terrorism
are not universally accepted. The United States assertion is certainly
consistent with its own definition of terrorism, but Colonel Muammar
al-Gaddafi may still maintain that the term 'terrorism' should be
reserved for acts such as the US punitive raid on Libya (April 1986), and
that the Rome and Vienna attacks are more properly described as
actions of revolutionary violence, armed struggle, or fighting for
freedom.
Still, for students of political violence, classification of the phenomena
that fall under this general category is an essential first step of research.
Achieving a consensus on the meaning of the term 'terrorism' is not an
important end in itself, except, perhaps, for linguists. It is necessary, on
the other hand, to differentiate between various conditions of violence
and to distinguish between diverse modes of conflict, whatever we name
them, if we want to gain a better understanding of their origins, the
factors which affect them, and how to cope with them. The purposes,
circumstances and methods involved in state violence against its own
citizens are entirely different from those that characterize violence
exercised by states against other states or by insurgent groups against
governments. The application of the term 'terrorism' to all three
situations is obfuscating and disrupts academic research as well as
addressing these problems in political action. As long as the term
'terrorism' simply denotes a violent behavior which is deplorable in the
eyes of the user of the term, its utility is in propaganda rather than in
research.
An interesting approach to the problem of defining terrorism was
taken by two Dutch researchers from the University of Leiden, Alex
Schmid and Albert Jongman.1
They collected 109 academic and official
definitions of terrorism and analyzed them in search for their main
components. They found that the element of violence was included in
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TERRORISM AS A STRATEGY OF INSURGENCY 215
83.5 per cent of the definitions, political goals in 65 per cent, and 51 per
cent emphasized the element of inflicting fear and terror. Only 21 per
cent of the definitions mentioned arbitrariness and indiscrimination in
targeting and only 17.5 per cent included the victimization of civilians,
noncombatants, neutrals or outsiders.2
A closer look at the assortment of definitions quoted by Schmid and
Jongman shows that official definitions of terrorism are fairly similar.
Thus, the US Vice-President's Task Force (1986) defined terrorism as
'. . . the unlawful use or threat of violence against persons or property
to further political or social objectives. It is generally intended to
intimidate or coerce a government, individuals or groups to modify their
behavior or policies.'3
The Office for the Protection of the Constitution
of the Federal Republic of Germany definition is: 'Terrorism is the
enduringly conducted struggle for political goals, which . . . [is]
intended to be achieved by means of assaults on the life and property of
other persons, especially by means of severe crimes as detailed in art.
129a, sec. 1 of the penal law book (above all: murder, homicide,
extortionist kidnapping, arson, setting off a blast by explosives) or by
means of other acts of violence, which serve as preparation of such
criminal acts.'4
A British legal definition contains the same ingredients
in a more succinct form: 'For the purposes of the legislation, terrorism is
"the use of violence for political ends, and includes any use of violence
for the purpose of putting the public or any section of the public in
fear."'5
There are three common elements in the definitions quoted
above: (1) the use of violence; (2) political objectives and, (3) the
intention of sowing fear in a target population.
Compared to official definitions of terrorism, those offered by
academics are, unsurprisingly, more diverse, although most of them
contain the three cornerstones of government definitions. Before we
become overly euphoric about the evolving consensus about terrorism,
let us remember that the sample of definitions brought by Schmid and
Jongman reflects, by and large, the perceptions and attitude of Western
academics and officials. Not only Syrian, Libyan and Iranian opinions of
what constitutes terrorism are quite different, but, most likely, those of
the many other Third World countries. The evolving Western consensus
about the essence of terrorism is probably not shared by the majority of
people on earth.
Moreover, the three basic commonly-agreed characteristics of terrorism
delineated above do not suffice to make a useful definition. As
working definitions, the official ones quoted above are too broad to be
useful. The main problem is that they do not provide the ground to
distinguish between terrorism and other forms of violent conflict, such
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216 TERRORISM AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE
as guerrilla or even conventional war. Clearly, both conventional war
and guerrilla warfare constitute the use of violence for political ends.
Systematic large-scale bombing of civilian populations in modern wars
were explicitly intended to spread fear among the targeted populations.
For example, a leaflet which was dropped over Japanese cities by
American bombers in August 1945 stated:
These leaflets are being dropped to notify you that your city has
been listed for destruction by our powerful air force. The bombing
will begin in 72 hours.
We give the military clique this notification because we know
there is nothing they can do to stop our overwhelming power and
our iron determination. We want you to see how powerless the
military is to protect you.
Systematic destruction of city after city will continue as long as
you blindly follow your military leaders . . .6
The dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki which ended
World War II can also be viewed as a case which fits the definitions of
terrorism, albeit on a huge scale. Clearly, these were acts of violence,
committed in the service of political ends, with the intent of spreading
fear among the entire Japanese population.
The history of guerrilla warfare also offers ample evidence of
systematic victimization of civilians in an attempt to control the
population. During its struggle for the independence of Algeria, the
Front Liberation Nationale (FLN) murdered about 16,000 Muslim
citizens and kidnapped 50,000 others, who have never been seen again;
in addition to these figures, an estimated number of 12,000 FLN
members were killed in internal 'purges'.7
A Vietcong directive of 1965
was quite explicit about the types of people who must be 'repressed',
namely, punished or killed: 'The targets for repression are counterrevolutionary
elements who seek to impede the revolution and work actively
for the enemy and for the destruction of the revolution.' These
included, among others, 'Elements who actively fight against the
revolution in reactionary parties such as the Vietnamese Nationalist
Party (Quoc Dan Dang), Party for a Greater Viet Nam (Dai-Viet), and
Personality and Labor Party (Can-Lao Nhan-Vi), and key reactionaries
in organizations and associations founded by the reactionary parties and
the US imperialists and the puppet government.' To be 'repressed' were
also 'Reactionary and recalcitrant elements who take advantage of
various religions, such as Catholicism, Buddhism, Caodaism and Protestantism,
actively to oppose and destroy the revolution, and key
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TERRORISM AS A STRATEGY OF INSURGENCY 217
elements in organizations and associations founded by these persons.'8
(p.37). A more recent example is the Peruvian Sendero Luminoso
practice of killing and maiming villagers for such offenses as voting in
national elections.
If the definition of terrorism is equally applicable to nuclear war,
conventional war and guerrilla, the term loses any useful meaning. It
simply becomes a synonym for violent intimidation in a political context
and is thus reduced to an unflattering term, describing an ugly aspect of
violent conflicts of all sizes and shapes, conducted throughout human
history by all kinds of regimes. If both the bombing in mid-air of a
commercial airliner by a small insurgent group in peacetime and
strategic bombing of enemy population by a superpower in a world war
are 'terrorism', social scientists, policymakers and legislators can do
nothing but sigh. If we wish to use the term 'terrorism,' in a political
science analysis, we ought to limit it to a more specific type of
phenomena, distinguishable from other forms of political violence.
Despite the ambiguities and disagreements discussed above, the concept
of terrorism in modern usage is most commonly associated with a
certain kind of violent actions carried out by individuals and groups
rather than by states, and with events which take place in peacetime
rather than as part of a conventional war. Although the original usage of
the term in a political context referred to state violence and repression
(the 'Reign of Terror' period in the French Revolution)9
, from a
practical point of view the recent definition of the term by the United
States Department of State is a better anchor. According to this
definition ' "terrorism" is premeditated, politically motivated violence
perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or
clandestine state agents, usually intended to influence an audience.10
Practicality is the only reason why, in the remainder of this article,
'terrorism' will be used to connote insurgent rather than state violence.
In the following sections I shall identify terrorism more precisely among
the other forms of insurgent violence.
The Universe of Political Violence
Theoretically, there is an infinite number of ways to classify politicallymotivated
violence. Nevertheless, with the criteria of utility and
parsimony in mind, a basic classification that relates to the initiator of
the violence and to its target, distinguishing between states and citizens,
is presented in Table 1.
Table 1 is a useful way to circumscribe this article's focus of interest.
It encompasses, in a gross manner, all forms of political violence carried
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218 TERRORISM AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE
TABLE 1
A BASIC CLASSIFICATION OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE
INITIATOR
STATE
crnzENS
TARGET
STATE
Full-scale war; belligerent
activity in peacetime, e.g.
cloak-and-dagger operations
and punitive strikes
Guerrilla; insurgent terrorism;
coup d'etat; Leninist
revolution
CITIZENS
Law enforcement;
legal and illegal oppression
Vigilante terrorism; ethnic
terrorism
out by humans against other humans, while differentiating between
their main types. Each one of the four cells includes a distinct category
of truculent behavior. These will be described briefly in the following
paragraphs.
States against States
Violence initiated by states can be conceptually divided into two main
types: (1) state violence directed against other states, and (2) violence
that states inflict on their own citizens.
Aggressive actions of states against other states have often taken the
form of conventional war: a clash of sizable regular armies; this has,
undoubtedly, been the most consequential form of violence in history.
Various aspects of conventional wars, such as military strategy and the
laws of war have been studied extensively and have become recognized
academic disciplines or sub-disciplines. Obviously, states have also used
a plethora of lower levels of violence in their contests with other states,
such as limited air force strikes, commando raids or the assassination of
enemy agents. Yet, in all cases these acts can be characterized as
organized and planned, and they reflect the capability of a large
bureaucracy.
States againstCitizens
The use of force by states against their own citizens includes two main
subcategories. One is the ordinary, overt legal process by which states
enforce their laws. The other is the clandestine use of illegal violence by
a government, designed to intimidate and terrorize their citizens with
the intention of preventing them from opposing the regime. Sometimes
illegal state violence is exercised, in the context of an internal strife, in
the name of efficiency: cutting corners of due legal processes which
constrain the struggle against the insurgents. Examples are abundant:
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TERRORISM AS A STRATEGY OF INSURGENCY 219
The most extreme instances have involved the enormous totalitarian
regimes of Nazi Germany and Stalinist Soviet Union. 'Death squads',
usually manned by members of the security forces in several Latin
American countries provide a less efficient, albeit quite repugnant
example of a different brand.
Citizens against Citizens
The most mundane form of citizens' violence against other citizens is, of
course, common crime. Unlike the types of violence which appear in
Table 1, common crime is usually motivated by reasons that have
nothing to do with political objectives. Much of it is committed for
personal economic gain and another significant part is stimulated by
personal animosities. Thus, the great mass of citizens' violence against
other citizens is unrelated to the subject of this article, namely, political
violence. There are, however, also phenomena of citizens' violence
committed for political or social motivations. Some of these are related
to racial or ethnic rivalries or strives; others are associated with rightwing
or left-wing social ideologies, and still others have to do with a
variety of idiosyncratic issues, such as abortion, environment conservation
or animal rights.
A special case of citizens' violence, vigilantism, merits special men-
tion.11
Vigilante violence has, sometimes, been associated with an
unauthorized attempt to control crime, but sometimes - as the origin of
the term meant - with violent activity against ethnic or political
minorities.
Citizens againsttheState
Citizens' violence against states may be organized or spontaneous.
Sometimes it is an impulsive expression of discontent, having neither
clear political goals nor organized leadership or plan. In its organized
form citizens' violence falls under the category of insurgency, aimed at
overthrowing the government. The main forms of insurgency are
distinct strategies of uprising that differ from each other in several
important characteristics. Before turning to examine them in greater
detail, however, it is necessary to cope with the definition of terrorism
and to distinguish between this mode of violence and other forms of
conflict.
Forms of Insurgent Violence
Insurgent violence may take various forms. These include revolution,
coup d'état, guerrilla, terrorism and riots. In recent years the term
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220 TERRORISM AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE
TABLE 2
COMPARISON OF FORMS OF INSURGENCY
Form of
insurgency
Coup d'etat
Leninist
Revolution
Guerrilla
Riot
Terronsm
Nonviolent
resistance
Insurgency
level
high
low
low
low
low
low
Number
involved
few
many
medium
medium
few
many
Struggle
duration
short
short2
long
short
long
long
Violence
varies
great
great
little
little3
no
Threat to
regime
great
great
varies
small
small
varies
Spontaneity
no
no?
no
yes
no
no
intifada gained publicity, referring to the Palestinian uprising in the
Israeli-administered territories. With the exception of riots, these forms
of political violence can be also viewed as strategies of insurgency. Table
2 lists these forms in a framework that distinguishes between them
according to several characteristics. The table's purpose is to help in the
characterization of terrorism as a mode of struggle, emphasizing the
differences between this and other forms of insurgent violence.
Before I turn to focus on the characteristics of terrorism as an
insurgent strategy, let us describe briefly the other forms of insurgency,
emphasizing their unique attributes.
Coup d'état
Coup d'état is 'a sudden, forceful stroke in politics; especially, the
sudden, forcible overthrow of a government'.12
It is the seizure of power
by an individual or a small group of persons who control important
positions in the state's machinery. Edward Luttwak, who wrote a highly
informative and amusing book on coup d'état, characterized this
strategy as 'the infiltration of a small but critical segment of the state
apparatus, which is then used to displace the government from its
control of the remainder.'13
Usually but not always, a coup grows from
the ranks of the military. In any event, for a successful completion of a
coup, the rebels must insure the cooperation of at least part of the
armed forces. The success of a coup depends upon surprise, in order to
catch the government off guard. It is, therefore, imperative that
preparations for the coup are done in utmost secrecy. Compared to
other strategies of insurgency, a coup usually involves little violence
and, sometimes, it is achieved without bloodshed. A coup is always
planned to be a swift event and is ordinarily a brief episode, regardless
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TERRORISM AS A STRATEGY OF INSURGENCY 221
of its success, although failed coups have, occasionally, developed into
prolonged civil wars. In sum, coup d'état can be characterized as a
planned insurgency at a high level of the state's ranks, by a few people,
involving relatively little violence during a very brief period of time.
Leninist Revolution
Revolution is usually meant in the sense of a radical social, political or
economic change. Unlike coup d'état, revolution is a change of the
system rather than a strategy. In some cases the revolutionary change of
the system has been achieved with little or no violence (e.g., the recent
transformation of the form of government in Czechoslovakia, East
Germany and Poland or, using a very different example, the industrial
revolution of the eighteenth century in England).14
In other instances
revolutions involved enormous bloodshed, as in the Chinese Communist
Revolution. Some revolutionary changes have involved protracted
convulsions and others were relatively quick. In short, as Brinton
started his classic treatise, 'Revolution is one of the looser words.'15
In the context of this article, however, the term revolution is used in a
much more limited sense, connoting a strategy rather than a social or
political outcome. Although revolutions in history have sometimes been
spontaneous, unplanned events and have utilized a variety of forms of
struggle, since this article's interest is primarily in the nature and
implications of the strategyof insurgency, I shall focus on the Leninist
concept of bringing about a revolution. The way by which the Social
Democratic Party under Lenin's leadership, and especially its Bolshevik
branch, sought to realize the Marxist revolution was through a thorough
process of clandestine preparations.16
According to this strategy the
period of violence was meant to be brief. The actual seizure of power
was conceived as a cataclysmic episode which might involve immense
violence.17
Before this final decisive confrontation, however, there
ought to be a long, arduous period of groundwork designed to prepare
the revolutionary organization. The three most important elements in
this preparatory period were recruiting, educating and organizing the
revolutionary cadres. Upon the opportune moment, the prepared
mechanism would be put to action. This moment, according to the
Marxist theory, would come when the inherent economic characteristics
of the capitalistic regime would bring its collapse.18
Of course, not all of
the activity of the revolutionary party was clandestine. There were front
organizations and other tools of propaganda which carried out the
important task of preparing the hearts and minds of the people. But the
most important part for making a revolution was the tightly-knit
clandestine party apparatus.
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222 TERRORISM AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE
The Leninist model of revolutionary strategy can, therefore, be
characterized as an insurgency from below, involving numerous people.
The period of preparation is very long, but the direct violent confrontation
is expected to be brief.
Guerrilla
Guerrilla means 'small war'. This form of warfare is, perhaps, as old as
mankind, certainly older than conventional war. Guerrilla is a diffuse
type of war, fought in relatively small formations, against a stronger
enemy. In numerous instances guerrilla warfare has merely served asan
auxiliary form of fighting, especially behind enemy lines, whereas the
main military effort took the form of conventional war. In many
insurrections, however, guerrilla warfare was, at least for a while, the
main form of struggle. As a strategy guerrilla avoids direct, decisive
battles, opting for a protracted struggle, which consists of many small
clashes instead. In some guerrilla doctrines, final victory is expected to
result from wearing out the enemy.19
Other doctrines, however, insist
that guerrilla is only an interim phase of the struggle, intended to enable
the insurgents to build a regular army which will, eventually, win
through conventional warfare.20
Guerrillas try to compensate for their inferiority in manpower, arms
and equipment by a very flexible style of warfare, based on hit-and-run
operations. For this, the guerrillas utilize the terrain to their advantage,
immerse in the population or, sometimes, launch their attacks from
neighboring countries. The principle is always to prevent the government
forces from employing its full might in the contest. Tactically,
however, guerrillas conduct warfare in a manner similar to conventional
armies. When guerrillas stage an ambush or attack a village, they do itin
the same way that a regular infantry unit would.
Riot
Riot is mob violence. Riots are usually unorganized, in the sense that
the rioters are not totally controlled by a leader nor are they organized
in units or other hierarchical structure.21
However, riots have, sometimes,
been intentionally incited by organized political activists, and at
least partly directed. Unlike the other forms of violence discussed in this
paper, riots cannot be characterized as a strategy of insurgency or a
form of warfare. Although a major insurrection has, sometimes started
by riots, such as in the cases of the French Revolution of 1789 and the
Russian Revolution of February 1917, the spontaneous street violence
was not part of a carefully planned scheme to topple the regime. In
difference from guerrilla and terrorist struggles, riots are brief,
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TERRORISM AS A STRATEGY OF INSURGENCY 223
unplanned episodes. They may recur over weeks or months, but they
still constitute a spasmatic eruption rather than a planned, organized,
protracted campaign.
NonviolentResistance
By definition, nonviolent resistance is beyond the scope of an article on
political violence. It encompasses methods such as demonstrations,
labor strikes, hunger strikes, merchandise boycott, refusal to pay taxes,
and other variations of challenging the authorities without spilling
blood. This form of uprising was included in Table 2 for the purpose of
comparison with violent strategies. Because of the moral and practical
importance attached to nonviolent resistance as an alternative to violent
modes of uprising22
, however, a comment on this form of struggle seems
in place.
Famous examples of nonviolent struggles which succeeded in inducing
a major political change include Gandhi's movement in India,
Martin Luther King's civil rights campaign and, of course, the 1989
protest movements in Eastern Europe. In view of these stunning
successes, one should wonder why have they been so rare in history. A
possible explanation may suggest that nonviolent resistance was only
discovered after World War II. This is certainly not true. Gene Sharp
mentions several cases in history which prove the contrary.23
A more
plausible explanation is that nonviolent resistance is of practical value
only when the challenged government refrains from using its power to
break the resistance by force. In this sense, the change of political
standards after World War II which has been expressed in a global
recognition of the right of self-determination and in a general trend
toward further liberalization in democracies, gave nonviolent resistance
a better chance than ever before.
Nevertheless, even in the second half of the twentieth century, there
has not been a single case of a successful nonviolent challenge to a
totalitarian regime or external power which was determined to face it by
force. This lesson was learned, at a dear cost, by the Hungarians in
1956, the Czechs in 1968, and the Chinese students in 1989.
At a first glance, the success of the nonviolent movements in East
Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria to change the regimes
in these countries in 1989 seems to contradict this generalization. It
should be remembered, however, that these movements were prompted
by the liberalization in the Soviet Union, and they succeeded only
because the USSR changed its previous policy of intervention and even
refused to render the communist regimes of its former satellites minimal
political backing in their effort to retain power. The difference between
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224 TERRORISM AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE
the successful Czech uprising in 1989 and the failure of 1968, or between
the success in East Germany and the failure in China, cannot be
attributed to the greater determination or capability of the insurgents in
the successful cases, but to a lesser determination of the governments.
The Iranian Islamic Revolution of 1979 and the failure of the August
1991coup in Moscow are other seeming demonstrations of the effectiveness
of nonviolent resistance. Yet in these examples too, the success of
the unarmed civilians was a result of the rulers' indecisiveness and
ineptitude. In all likelihood, greater determination from the Shah in
Iran or the coup junta in the USSR, would have resulted in a bloody
crushing of the resistance. In short, nonviolent resistance is a practical
mode of strife only when the government allows it to take place. It is
absolutely useless in repressive regimes determined to remain in power.
In addition, only rarely has nonviolent resistance existed as the only
mode of struggle. Alongside Gandhi's nonviolent struggle against
British rule, there were numerous terrorism and rioting incidents.24
Black dissatisfaction in the United States in the 1960s was not only
expressed in peaceful marches and sit-ins but in violent riots as well. A
broad uprising is usually expressed in several concurrent forms, and it is
hard to evaluate the effects of the various aspects of the comprehensive
struggle singly.
Terrorism
How does terrorism fit into the spectrum of political violence? As was
suggested above, the customary modern usage of the term refers, at
least in the West, to actions such as the bombing in mid-air of Pan Am
Flight 103in December 1988, the attacks on passengers in the Rome and
Vienna airports in December 1985, and the seizure of the Saudi
Embassy at Khartoum in March 1973.These actions represent a form of
political violence which is different from guerrilla, conventional war and
riots. Actions of this kind, when they are carried out systematically,
constitute a distinct strategy of insurgency. This strategy should have a
name, be it 'terrorism' or another, and retaining 'terrorism' has the
advantage of familiarity. In fact, practitioners and advocates of this
form of struggle have themselves often used the term to describe their
method.25
Yet, the definitions of the term leave several questions to
be answered. I shall now turn to examine some of the areas of
confusion.
Terrorism andGuerrilla
The terms 'terrorism' and 'guerrilla' are often used interchangeably.
Apart from some carelessness in the use of technical terminology by the
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TERRORISM AS A STRATEGY OF INSURGENCY 225
media, politicians and even academics, this faulty synonymity reflects
confusion concerning the definition of terrorism and, often, a wish to
avoid the negative connotation that this term has acquired. 'Guerrilla'
does not carry a defamatory overtone and its usage, therefore, seems to
many writers to carry an air of objectivity. As Walter Laqueur pointed
out, the widespread use of the misnomer 'urban guerrilla' had probably
contributed to the confusion. This term has been used by revolutionaries
to describe a strategy of terrorism, as an extension of, or substitute
for guerrilla warfare.26
As strategies of insurgency, however, terrorism and guerrilla are
quite distinct. The most important difference is that unlike terrorism,
guerrilla tries to establish physical control of a territory. This control is
often partial. In some cases the guerrillas ruled the area during the night
and government forces had control in daytime. In other examples
government forces were able to secure the main routes of transportation
but guerrilla territory started as little as a few hundred yards to the right
and left. In many instances guerrillas managed to maintain complete
control of a sizable portion of land for long periods of time. The need to
dominate a territory is a key element in insurgent guerrilla strategy. The
territory under the guerrillas control provides the human reservoir for
recruitment, a logistical base and - most important - the ground and
infrastructure for establishing a regular army.27
Terrorist strategy does not vie for a tangible control of territory.
Notwithstanding the fact that terrorists try to imposé their will on the
general population and channel its behavior by sowing fear, this
influence has no geographical demarcation lines. Terrorism as a strategy
does not rely on 'liberated zones' as staging areas for consolidating the
struggle and carrying it further. As a strategy, terrorism remains in the
domain of psychological influence and lacks the material elements of
guerrilla.
Other practical differences between the two forms of warfare further
accentuate the basic distinction of the two strategies. These differences
belong to the tactical domain, but they are actually an extension of the
essentially divergent strategic concepts. They relate to unit size, arms,
and types of operations of guerrilla and terrorism. Guerrillas usually
wage war in platoon or company size units and, sometimes even in
battalions and brigades. There are well-known historical examples in
which guerrillas even used division-size formations in battle.28
Terrorists
operate in very small units, usually ranging from the lone assassin or a
single person who makes and plants an improvised explosive device, to a
five members' hostage-taking team. The largest teams in terrorist
operations numbered 40-50 persons.29
These, however, have been very
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226 TERRORISM AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE
rare. Thus, in terms of operational units' size, the upper limits of
terrorists are the lower limits of guerrillas.
Differences in weapons used in these two types of warfare are also
easily noticeable. Whereas guerrillas mostly use ordinary military-type
arms, such as rifles, machine-guns, mortars and even artillery, typical
terrorist weapons include home-made bombs, car bombs and sophisticated
barometric pressure-operated devices, designed to explode on
board airliners in mid-air. These differences in unit size and arms are
merely corollaries of the fact noted above, that tactically, guerrilla
actions are similar to regular army's mode of operation. Because
terrorists, unlike guerrillas, have no territorial base, they must immerse
among the general civilian population if they do not wish to become
sitting ducks for their hunters. This is why ordinarily terrorists cannot
allow themselves to wear uniforms, while guerrillas ordinarily do. In a
somewhat simplified comparison, therefore, one may say that whereas
guerrilla and conventional war are two modes of warfare which are
different in strategy but similar in tactics, terrorism is a unique form of
struggle in both strategy and tactics.
Table 3 summarizes the differences between terrorism, guerrilla and
conventional war as modes of violent struggle.
Method and Cause: Terroristsand Freedom Fighters
Terrorist groups normally describe themselves as national liberation
movements, fighters against social, economic, religious, or imperialist
oppression, or any combination of these. On the other side of the
barricade, in an understandable attempt to degrade terrorism, politicians
have presented the terms 'terrorists' and 'freedom fighters' as
contradictory. Thus, Vice-President George Bush wrote: 'The difference
between terrorists and freedom fighters is sometimes clouded.
Some would say one man's freedom fighter is another man's terrorist. I
reject this notion. The philosophical differences are stark and funda-
mental.'30
Without passing judgement on the self-description of any particular
group, trying to present the terms 'terrorists' and 'freedom fighters' as
mutually exclusive in general is a logical fallacy. 'Terrorism' and
'freedom fighting' are terms which describe two different aspects of
human behavior. The first characterizes a method of struggle and the
second - a cause. The causes of groups which adopted terrorism as a
mode of struggle are as diverse as the interests and aspirations of
mankind. Among the professed causes of terrorist groups are social
changes in the spirit of right wing and left wing ideologies, aspirations
associated with religious beliefs, ethnic grievances, environmental
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TERRORISM AS A STRATEGY OF INSURGENCY 227
TABLE 3
CHARACTERISTICS OF TERRORISM, GUERRILLA AND CONVENTIONAL
WAR AS MODES OF VIOLENT STRUGGLE
UNIT SIZE IN
BATTLE
WEAPONS
TACTICS
TARGETS
INTENDED
IMPACT
CONTROL OF
TERRITORY
UNIFORM
RECOGNITION
OF WAR ZONES
INTERNATIONAL
LEGALITY
DOMESTIC
LEGALITY
CONVENTIONAL
WAR
Large (armies, corps,
divisions)
Full range of military
hardware (air force,
armor, artillery, etc.)
Usually joint operations
involving several
military branches
Mostly military units,
industrial and
transportation
infrastructure
Physical destruction
Yes
Wear uniform
War limited to
recognized geographical
zones
Yes, if conducted by
rules
Yes
GUERRILLA
Medium (platoons,
companies, battalions)
Mostly infantry-type
light weapons but
sometimes artillery
pieces as well
Commando-type tactics
Mostly military, police
and administration staff,
as well as political
opponents
Mainly physical attrition
of the enemy
Yes
Often wear uniform
War limited to the
country in strife
Yes, if conducted by
rules
No
TERRORISM
Small (usually less than
ten persons)
Hand guns, hand
grenades, assault rifles
and specialized weapons,
e.g., car bombs, remotecontrol
bombs, barometric
pressure bombs
Specialized
tactics:kidnapping,
assassinations, carbombing,
hijacking,
barricade-hostage, etc.
State symbols, political
opponents and the public
at large
Psychological coercion
No
Do not wear uniform
No recognized war zones.
Operations carried out
world-wide
No
No
issues, animal rights and specific issues such as abortion. Some terrorist
groups undoubtedly fight for self-determination or national liberation.
On the other hand, not all national liberation movements resort to
terrorism to advance their cause. In other words, some insurgent groups
are both terrorist and freedom fighters, some are either and some are
neither.
Terrorismand Morality
The hero of the moralistic approach to terrorism is a Russian named
Ivan Kaliayev. Kaliayev was a member of the 'combat organization' of
the underground Social-Revolutionary Party which adopted assassina-
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228 TERRORISM AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE
tions of government officials as its main strategy in the struggle against
the Tsarist regime. Kaliayev was chosen by the organization to assassinate
the Grand Prince Sergei. On 2 February 1905 Kaliayev waited, a
bomb under his coat, for the arrival of the Grand Prince. When the
Prince's carriage approached, however, Kaliayev noticed that the
intended victim was accompanied by his two young children. In a spurof-the-moment
decision Kaliayev refrained from throwing the bomb, so
as not to hurt the Prince's innocent brood. Two days later Kaliayev
completed the mission, was caught, tried and executed.31
Kaliayev's
insistence on a very strict definition of permitted targets of revolutionary
violence gained him the status of a saint in the gospel of moralistic
analysts of terrorism and something like a litmus paper for a quick
identification of right and wrong in revolutionary violence.32
The most concentrated treatment of the question of the morality of
terrorism has probably been offered by Walzer.33
His basic position can
be summarized by the following quotation:
In its modern manifestations, terror is the totalitarian form of war
and politics. It shatters the war convention and the political code.
It breaks across moral limits beyond which no further limitation
seems possible, for within the categories of civilian and citizen,
there isn't any smaller group for which immunity might be claimed
. . . Terrorists anyway make no such claim; they kill anybody.34
Walzer's morality litmus is the responsibility of the victims for acts that
are the subject of the assailants' grievances. In line with this criterion he
offers what one might call a crude scale of assassinability: government
officials who are part of the presumed oppressive apparatus are
assassinable. A case in point is Kaliayev's victim. Other persons in
government service, who are not related to the oppressive aspects of the
regime (e.g., teachers, medical service personnel, etc.), make a questionable
category. Walzer's somewhat ambiguous verdict is that because
'the variety of activities sponsored and paid for by the modern state is
extraordinary . . . it seems intemperate and extravagant to make all
such activities into occasions for assassination.'35
The third category,
that of private persons, is definitely not assassinable according to
Walzer. These cannot spare their lives by changing their behavior,
killing them is, therefore, unequivocally immoral.
Walzer's analysis leaves several principal problems with no satisfactory
answer. The most important one has to do with the essence of
moral judgement. The fundamental question is whether moral norms in
general and war norms in particular are absolute, unchanging over time
and identical in all societies, or are they a changing reflection of the
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TERRORISM AS A STRATEGY OF INSURGENCY 229
human condition and, therefore, varying across societies and perennially
modified to fit new situations. An absolute nature of moral norms
may presumably stem from two sources: a godly edict or a universal
psychological trait, common to men and women in all societies in
history. In the first case, there is no point in arguing: Divine rules are
not negotiable, they are a matter of belief. For those who believe in
their divine source, they are fixed regulations of human conduct which
do not change over time. Walzer admits that his treatise rests on the
Western religious tradition,36
but it is not clear whether this attribution
is a statement of cultural identification or an announcement of personal
religious conviction. Cultural norms are certainly a powerful source of
influence on attitudes, opinions and behavior, and can be portrayed as
the cast in which personal values are molded. But for claiming the status
of an absolute value of the human race, it is necessary to show that the
value under consideration is shared by all cultures. Given the tremendous
diversity of cultures, the assertion that a certain value is universal
must rest on the assumption that this value stems from a set of attitudes
and emotions which prevail in all societies.
With regard to the specific issue under consideration, namely, moral
values related to political violence, the universality assumption is
untenable. This is proven by the very fact that divergence from the
moral code of war, presented by Walzer as the absolute dictum, is so
common. Flagrant breaches of Walzer's rules in modern history cannot
be explained merely by the personal craziness or immorality of some
individuals, who happened to head totalitarian regimes which enabled
them to act in contradiction to the will of most of their inhabitants. In
many cases, the violations of morality have been supported by the
majority of the population in the nation which committed them. Large
scale departures from the laws of war have been practiced even by
democracies, a form of regime where government action is limited by
public will. Thus, the massive bombing of Japanese civilian population,
with the intent of damaging the population's morale, and the total
destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by atomic bombs in World War
II were, undoubtedly, supported by most of the American people.
It is obvious that in actual application, the moral code in general,
including the rules of war, is a product of people's needs, perceptions
and convenience, and is subject to cultural and circumstantial
influences. Cultural differences concerning the status of noncombatants
have been expressed, for instance, in the utilization of hostages.
Whereas most Westerners regarded the usage by Iraq in 1990 of civilian
hostages - men, women and children - as a human shield against the
possible bombing of strategic targets as a repugnant, immoral act, for
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230 TERRORISM AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE
many in the Arab world this was a legitimate, morally justified feat. It
seems, however, that situational factors have a much greater role than
cultural diversity in determining conduct in war. The form of government
is, perhaps, the single most important factor. The most severe
violations of human rights in modern history have been committed by
totalitarian Western regimes. Perceived necessity plays a major role as
well. In fact, all states have repeatedly broken the rules of war. In
almost all modern wars civilian populations have been victimized
intentionally, and the magnitude of the transgression has been determined
by capability and need as much as by moral principles.
Terrorism is not different from other forms of warfare in the targeting
of noncombatants. Yet terrorism, more than any other form of warfare,
systematically breaches the internationally accepted rules of war. In
guerrilla warfare and conventional war, the laws of engagement are
often ignored, but terrorism discards these laws altogether in refusing to
distinguish between combatants and noncombatants and, with regard to
international terrorism, in rejecting the limitations of war zones as well.
Unlike conventional and guerrilla wars, terrorism has no legal standing
in international law (from the viewpoint of domestic law all insurrections
are treated as crimes). For this reason, terrorism as a strategy and
terrorists as a warring party have no hope of gaining a legal status.
Hence, terrorism may be correctly described as an illegal form of
warfare, but characterizing it as an immoral one is meaningless.
Terrorists wage war by their own standards, not by the standards of
their enemies. Both sides' rules of conduct stem from capabilities and
necessities and undergo changes for reasons that are basically pragmatic.
Of course, people and states pass moral judgement on the
justification of wars and on particular acts in war. Their judgement,
however, reflects nothing but their own existing cultural norms at best
and - too often - a partisan view, influenced by direct interests. Yet
morality, although it cannot be coherently treated as an absolute value
is, at a given time, society and context, apsychologicaland, therefore, a
political fact. Publics do pass moral judgements on persons, organizations
and actions. They react by moral standards, no matter how
emotional and irrational these may be. In fact, it is the emotional rather
than the logical component that makes morally-based attitudes so
powerful.
Morality is a code of behavior which prevails in a certain society at a
certain time. As such, morality closely corresponds to the existing law,
but the latter has the advantages of clarity, precision and formality. As a
reflection of current norms, terrorism is an immoral form of warfare in
twentieth century Western societies. The power of this characterization,
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TERRORISM AS A STRATEGY OF INSURGENCY 231
however, is weakened by the fact that in virtually all modern wars the
moral code of behavior (and, indeed, the laws of war) has been
breached by all parties on a massive scale, at least with regard to the
targeting of civilians. In this respect, the difference between terrorism
and other forms of warfare is a matter of comprehensiveness. Whereas
terrorists usually dismiss the law altogether, without even pretending to
abide by it, states pay tribute to law and norms and breach them only
under extreme circumstances.
It should be noted that the relativity of morality has been also
expressed in the changing rules of combating terrorism. If laws reflect
the prevailing moral standards in a given society, one may find interest
in the fact that all states, when faced with the threat of insurgency, have
enacted special laws or emergency regulations permitting the security
forces to act in manners that would normally be considered immoral.
Indeed, under such circumstances states have even tended to sanction
security forces' breaching of these laws or, at best, to punish such
'excesses' rather leniently.
Terrorism as a Strategy of Insurgence
In practice, the terrorist operational inventory is rather limited. They
place explosive charges in public places, assassinate political opponents
or carry out assaults by small arms on the public at large, take hostages
by kidnapping, hijacking, or barricading themselves in buildings. In
most cases, their capability is rather slim. Consider, for example, a
notorious group such as the German Red Army Faction (widely known
as the Baader-Meinhof gang). At any given period throughout its
existence, the number of its active members has been less than 30. They
have been able to assassinate several public officials and businessmen,
to kidnap two, and to stage one barricade-hostage incident. How have
they expected to achieve their far-reaching political goal of overpowering
the German government and instituting a Marxist regime? The same
puzzlement applies also to much larger organizations, such as the Irish
Republican Army (IRA), which has had an estimated active membership
of 200-400 men and women and a much broader body of
supporters. How can they win the battle against Great Britain? In this
section of the article I examine the main elements and variations of
terrorism as a strategy, trying to explain how terrorists think they may
bridge the gap between their meager means and extreme objectives.
The Psychological Element
Essentially, terrorism is a strategy based on psychological impact. Many
authors have noted the importance of the psychological element of
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232 TERRORISM AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE
terrorism.37
Actually, this constituent has also gained recognition in
official definitions of the term. The reference to terrorism's intention 'to
influence an audience' in the US Department of State definition38
or to
its purpose of 'putting the public or any section of the public in fear' in
the British legal definition of 197439
relate to the psychological effects of
this mode of warfare.
Actually, all forms of warfare have a significant psychological ingredient,
both in trying to hamper the enemy's morale by sowing fear in its
ranks and in strengthening its own forces' self-confidence and will to
fight. In his famous treatise Strategy: The Indirect Approach, Sir Basil
Liddell Hart, one of the most eminent theoreticians of strategy this
century, went as far as stating that in almost all great battles in history,
'the victor had his opponent at a psychological disadvantage before the
clash took place.'40
In fact, a similar idea was expressed about 2500
years ago, in a very concise form, by the ancient Chinese strategist Sun
Tzu.41
Nevertheless, conventional wars are first and foremost massive
collisions of material forces, and they are usually won by the physical
elimination of the enemy's ability to resist, by destroying its fighting
forces, economic infrastructure, or both. Even if Liddell Hart's contention
is correct, the psychological impact of the crucial maneuvers of
indirect approach stems from the enemy's belief that resistance is
useless for material reasons. Although in many cases this conclusion is a
product of the military leadership's surprise and confusion and does not
reflect the true balance of power, it still rests on material assessments,
wrong as they may be. Hence, the psychological feat described by
Liddell Hart may be characterized as a swift deceptive move, which
succeeds in getting the enemy off-balance in a single surprising jujitsu
type maneuver. The psychological basis of the strategy of terrorism is
entirely different in nature. Like guerrilla war, terrorism is a strategy of
protracted struggle. Guerrilla warfare, however, notwithstanding its
psychological component, is primarily a strategy based on a physical
encounter. Although this century's guerrilla theoreticians have emphasized
the propaganda value of guerrilla operations in spreading the word
of the revolution, attracting supporters, awakening dormant opponents
of the regime and providing them with a recipe of resistance, the
importance of these psychological elements remains secondary. All
insurgent guerrilla doctrines insist that the battleground against government
forces is the countryside. The very concept of staging the struggle
in rural areas, far from the eyes of the media, weakens the significance
of the psychological factor.
Indeed, psychological impact is the most essential element in terror-
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TERRORISM AS A STRATEGY OF INSURGENCY 233
ism as a strategy. The validity of this generalization rests on the basic
conditions of the terrorist struggle. Terrorist groups are small. Their
membership ranges from a few persons to several thousands, and the
majority number tens to a few hundreds. Even the weakest of governments
has a fighting force immensely larger than the terrorist insurgents'.
Under such circumstances, the insurgents cannot expect to win
the struggle in any physical way. Describing the strategy of terrorism as
a form of psychological warfare does not specifically explain how
terrorists hope to win by it. Although terrorists have been rarely clear
enough as to lay down a complete, coherent strategic plan, it is possible
to discern several strategic ideas that terrorists have held as the cardinal
practical concept of their struggle. These are described below as distinct
notions, although they are not necessarily mutually exclusive, and
terrorists have often espoused them concurrently.
Propagandaby theDeed
The essentials of the psychological basis of a terrorist struggle have
changed little since last century, when anarchist writings first formulated
the principles of this strategy. The basic idea was phrased as 'propaganda
by the deed'.42
This maxim meant that the terrorist act was the
best herald of the need to overthrow the regime and the torch which
would show the way to do it.43
The revolutionary terrorists hoped that
their attacks would thus turn them from a small conspiratorial club into
a massive revolutionary movement. In a way, the original concept of
propaganda by the deed, as explained and exercised by nineteenth
century revolutionaries, was more refined than its modern usage in the
post-World War II era. Whereas the earlier users of this idea were
careful to choose symbolic targets, such as heads of state and infamous
oppressive governors and ministers, in order to draw attention to the
justification of their cause, the more recent brand has turned to multicasualty
indiscriminate attacks. In doing so, they have exchanged the
propaganda value of justification for a greater shock value, ensuring
massive media coverage. This change seems to reflect the adaptation of
the strategy to the age of television. Anyway, this basic concept of the
nature of the terrorist struggle does not constitute a complete strategy.
Like some other conceptions of terrorism, in the idea of propaganda by
the deed terrorism is only meant to be the first stage of the struggle. It is
a mechanism of hoisting a flag and recruiting, a prelude which would
enable the insurgents to develop other modes of struggle. In itself, it is
not expected to bring the government down.
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234 TERRORISM AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE
Intimidation
Another salient psychological element in the strategy of terrorism has
been, as the term implies, the intention to spread fear among the
enemy's ranks. The notion is simple and does not need elaboration. For
the regime and its key functionaries, whose very existence is challenged
by the insurgents, the struggle is a matter of life or death and they are
generally unlikely to give up because of the terrorists' threat. Nevertheless,
terrorists have sometimes succeeded, through a systematic
campaign of assassination, maiming or kidnapping, to intimidate select
categories of people, such as judges, jurors or journalists. An extension
of this idea of coercive terrorism applies to the general population. Not
only government officials and employees are punished by the terrorists,
but also all those who cooperate with the authorities and refuse to assist
the insurgents. Examples of a large-scale use of this strategy have been
the murders of actual or presumed collaborators with the authorities by
the Vietminh and the Vietcong in Vietnam, the FLN in Algeria, and the
Palestinian 'Shock Committees' in the Israeli Occupied Territories. An
even more extensive use of this type of intimidation is designed to force
the population to take a stand. Actually, it is mostly intended to affect
the neutrals which, in many cases, constitute the great majority of the
public, more than to intimidate the real opponents. Home notes that in
the first two-and-a-half years of the FLN's war against the French in
Algeria, the FLN murdered at least 6,352 Muslims, as compared with
1,035 Europeans.44
The killings were often carried out in a particularly
gruesome manner, in order to maximize the terrorizing effect.45
Insurgent organizations have sometimes imposed pointless demands
on the population, with the sole purpose of exercising and demonstrating
their control. In the 1936-1939 Arab Rebellion in Palestine, the
insurgents demanded the urban Arab population to refrain from
wearing a tarboosh - the head cover popular among townspeople, and
to wear the kaffiya instead. Those that ignored the edict were punished
severely.46
In a similar vein, in 1955 the FLN demanded the Muslim
population in Algeria to refrain from smoking. They punished those
that broke the ban by cutting their lips with pruning shears.47
Again, it is
hard to find any logic behind this edict, other than the demonstration of
power to control the population.
Provocation
An important constituent in terrorist strategy is the idea of provocation.
Like the theme of propaganda by the deed, this notion appeared in the
writings of nineteenth-century revolutionaries.48
It has, however,
gained special prominence in Carlos Marighella's Minimanual of the
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TERRORISM AS A STRATEGY OF INSURGENCY 235
Urban Guerrilla, first published in 1969. Marighella, author of one of
the most influential terrorist guidebooks (albeit an unsuccessful terrorist
practitioner himself), wrote that as a result of terrorist attacks,
The government has no alternative except to intensify repression.
The police networks, house searches, arrests of innocent people
and of suspects, closing off streets, make life in the city unbearable.
The Military dictatorship embarks on massive political
persecution. Political assassinations and police terror become
routine . . . The people refuse to collaborate with the authorities,
and the general sentiment is that the government is unjust,
incapable of solving problems, and resorts purely and simply to the
physical liquidation of its opponents.49
The idea is, in general, simple and true not only in the political
environment of a Latin American dictatorship but in many liberal
democracies. Terrorist attacks tend to draw repressive responses by any
regime, which necessarily affect also parts of the population which are
not associated with the insurgents. These measures, in turn, make the
government unpopular, thus increasing public support of the terrorists
and their cause. When government counter-terrorist actions are not
only draconic but ineffective as well, anti-government sentiment is
bound to be even more prevalent.
A special kind.of the provocation doctrine is relevant to a conflict
which has an international dimension. When the insurgents represent a
radical nationalist faction of a larger political entity, or are supported by
a state, they may hope that their acts of terrorism will spark a war
between their target country and their state-sponsor. This was the initial
strategic conception of Fateh. Khaled al-Hassan, a leading ideologue of
Fateh, explained it as follows:
The armed struggle technique was ostensibly simple. We called
this tactic 'actions and reactions', because we intended to carry out
actions, the Israelis would react and the Arab states, according to
our plan, would support us and wage war on Israel. If the Arab
governments would not go to war, the Arab peoples would
support us and would force the Arab governments to support us.
We wanted to create a climate of fighting spirit in the nation, so
that they will arise and fight.50
Strategy of Chaos
Government ineptitude is the basis for another psychological lever in
the strategy of some terrorist groups. The idea can be termed 'a strategy
of chaos' and is typical of right wing insurgents. It refers to the terrorist
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236 TERRORISM AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE
attempt to create an atmosphere of chaos so as to demonstrate the
government's inability to impose law and order.51
The insurgents hope
that the public will, under such circumstances, demand that the 'weak'
liberal government be replaced by a strong regime. In order to create an
atmosphere of disorder and insecurity, the terrorists resorted to random
bombings of public places. Thus, the Italian neo-fascist Ordine Nero
(Black Order) group placed a bomb on a train on 5 August 1974,
arbitrarily killing 12 passengers and wounding 48. Another ultra-right
Italian group, the Armed Revolutionary Nuclei, was charged with the
bombing of the Bologna railway station in August 1980, which caused
the death of 84 and the wounding of 200.52
The same idea presumably
motivated German extreme right-wing terrorists, who detonated a
bomb in the midst of a joyous crowd celebrating the Oktoberfest beer
festival in Munich on 26 September 1980. Thirteen persons were killed
and 215were wounded in the explosion.53
A similar tactic was employed
by a Belgian ultrarightist terrorist group which, during 1982-85 murdered
almost 30 people in random shooting of bystanders during
supermarket robberies. There was no apparent reason for the killings
other than to create panic in the population.54
Like the other strategic
concepts of terrorism described above, the 'strategy of chaos' is not a
comprehensive plan for seizing power. It is merely a way to create
public mood which, as the insurgents hope, will give them a better
chance to continue their struggle in an unspecified way.
Strategyof Attrition
Some insurgent groups have viewed terrorism as a strategy of protracted
struggle, designed to wear out the adversary. In fact, this is the only
conception of terrorism which viewed this mode of struggle as a
complete way of achieving victory, rather than as a supplement or
prelude to another strategy. The insurgents were fully aware of their
inferiority as a fighting force compared to the strength of the government
and, unlike the concepts of struggle delineated above, they did not
expect that they would ever be strong enough to defeat the government
by a physical confrontation. Nevertheless, they assumed that they had a
greater stamina than the government and that, if they persisted, the
government would eventually yield. Because this strategy assumes that
the insurgents can prevail by greater perseverance rather than by
building a stronger force, it is patently suitable for conflicts where the
issue at stake is not of vital importance for the government.
If the government considers the struggle as a matter of life or death, it
will not succumb to terrorist harassment, however protracted and
unpleasant it may be. Moreover, when the government fights for its life
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TERRORISM AS A STRATEGY OF INSURGENCY 237
or for the existence of the state, it is likely to take off its gloves and
employ all means necessary to quell the insurrection, ignoring restraints
and controls normally imposed on security forces' action or instituting
emergency laws and regulations that suspend such restraints. In a barehanded
showdown an insurgent group using terrorism as its main
strategy has a very slim chance of winning, as long as the security forces
are loyal to the regime. If, however, the government's interests in the
dispute concern matters of utility rather than the defense of its very
existence, its approach to the problem is one of cost-benefit analysis.
The government weighs the political, economic or strategic losses that it
is likely to bear if it yields to the insurgents' demands, versus the price it
is likely to pay if the struggle continues.
This process of cost-benefit analysis is rarely, if ever, a clear-headed,
methodical evaluation of the situation and the prospects. Usually, it is a
matter of trial-and-error, paved with fluctuations as a result of political
pressures and public, analysts and decisionmakers' disagreements and
debates. Nevertheless, what eventually determines the outcome is the
relative importance of the struggle for the government and for the
insurgents, and the terrorists' nuisance value and durability.
ExpressiveTerrorism
So far terrorism has been treated as a strategy, implying an organized
plan to achieve a political end, usually to seize power. Nevertheless, in
several cases terrorism has been an emotional response with no clear
strategic aim, although the acts of violence have been perpetrated by a
group, in a tactically organized manner. Admittedly, this assertion
carries us to the obscure territory of the rationality of terrorists and
terrorism. Retrospectively, judging by its meager success to achieve the
declared political goals, terrorism is not an effective strategy and
terrorists may, therefore, be considered in general to be irrational, at
least as much as their political behavior is concerned. Nevertheless, in
some cases the terrorist struggle seems hopeless to the extent that its
irrationality is particularly striking.
A case in point is the Moluccan terrorism in the Netherlands in the
1970s. The Moluccan community in the Netherlands is a remnant of the
Dutch colonial era. After the Dutch evacuation of their colonies in
South East Asia, a South Moluccan republic was established in 1950 but
was soon conquered by Indonesia. About 15,000 South Moluccans,
most of them associated with the old Dutch administration, found
refuge in the Netherlands. Political and social frustrations bred, within
this small community, a terrorist group (Free South Moluccan Youth
Movement), which carried out several spectacular terrorist attacks in
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238 TERRORISM AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE
the Netherlands. The most notorious of these were the concurrent
takeover of the Embassy of Indonesia and a passenger train in 1975 and
the concurrent takeover of a school and another train in 1977. In return
for the release of their hostages the terrorists demanded that the
government of the Netherlands would recognize their nonexistent state
and release comrades who had been arrested in previous operations.55
A similar example is Armenian terrorism in the 1970s and 1980s. The
two main Armenian terrorist groups, the Armenian Secret Army for the
Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) and the Justice Commando for the
Armenian Genocide (JCAG), carried out numerous terrorist attacks in
1975-85, most of them against Turkish diplomats. The motivation
behind these acts was revenge for the massacre of Armenians by the
Turks in 1915, in which an estimated number of 1.5 million Armenians
perished. The terrorist groups demanded official Turkish admission of
responsibility for the massacre, which the Government of Turkey
consistently refused to grant. In addition to this explicitly emotional
demand, ASALA also demanded the reinstitution of an independent
Armenian state, which would include the old Armenian provinces in
Turkey.56
At present, only about 50,000 Armenians live in Turkey, very
few of them in the historic Armenian region. About four-fifths of the
Armenians live in the former Soviet Union, most of them in the former
Armenian Republic of the USSR.57
Yet, Armenian terrorist activity has
been primarily directed against Turkey.
Both Moluccan and Armenian terrorism are manifest examples of
expressive terrorism. The dominant motivation which has driven the
young men and women who carried out the acts of violence belonged to
the emotional realm rather than to the domain of rational political
planning. Terrorism, in these instances, expressed an emotional state,
rather than served as an instrumental tool in the framework of a strategy
of insurgency. Undoubtedly, the emotional element is also part of the
driving force behind the activity of other terrorist groups. In most cases,
however, the hopelessness of the political case is not as clear as in the
Armenian and Moluccan examples, rendering an outside judgement
about the weight of the emotional factor impossible.
How Successful is Terrorism?
The evaluation of terrorism's success as a strategy depends on how
success is defined. Most terrorist groups strive to depose the current
government and to seize power. By this criterion of success, taking into
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TERRORISM AS A STRATEGY OF INSURGENCY 239
account only insurgents which have used terrorism as their main
strategy, only some anti-colonial groups have fully accomplished their
goal. The struggles of the Ethniki Organosis Kypriahou Agoniston
(EOKA) in Cyprus and the Mau Mau in Kenya against British rule and
the FLN in Algeria against the French, are well-known examples. The
overwhelming majority of the many hundreds of terrorist groups which
have existed in the second half of this century have failed miserably to
attain their declared goal.58
The fact that terrorist success has been
limited to the category of anti-colonial struggles is not incidental. The
main reason for this phenomenon is that only in this category the issue
at stake is far more important for the insurgents than for the government.
Where the terrorist organization's struggle is aimed at changing
the social-political nature of the regime, such as in the case ofright-wing
or left wing insurgents, the incumbent government fights for its life and
is ready to take all means necessary to quell the insurgency. For the
governments of France, Germany or Italy, the struggle against the
Action Directe,the Red Army Faction and the Red Brigades was an all
or nothing matter. There was no room for compromise and the
terrorists' success meant the demise of the government.
The same is also true for most cases of separatist struggle, where the
insurgents' aspirations are perceived by the government as threatening
the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state, such as in the
Basque separatist struggle in Spain.59
Differences in the degree of
success of separatist terrorists stem primarily from the extent to which
secession of the disputed part of the country seems, to most citizens of
the state, as severing their own flesh and blood. For France, for
instance, leaving the protectorates of Tunisia and Morocco or the
colonies of Mali and Madagascar was much less painful than relinquishing
its rule of Algeria, which was legally part of France and had more
than one million Frenchmen among its mostly Muslim population;
giving up Bretagne or Normandy is unthinkable. In this sense, the
success of separatist terrorism in obtaining its goals is a yardstick for the
degree to which the disputed territory is truly a separate entity.
It is also true, however, that a nationalist cause is generally much
more powerful in motivating people than a social issue and, therefore,
other things being equal, the intensity of violence which stems from
nationalistic sentiments is usually greater than the magnitude of
violence generated by social-economical grievances.
Whereas achievement of the insurgents' goals in full is rare, terrorists
have more often succeeded in accomplishing partial objectives. Four
types of partial terrorist success can be discerned: (1) recruitment of
domestic support which enables the terrorists to move on to a higher
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level of insurrection; (2) achieving international attention to their
grievances; (3) acquiring international legitimacy; (4) gaining partial
political concessions from their adversary. These are discussed below.
It has already been mentioned that the most basic notion of terrorism
as a strategy is the idea of 'propaganda by the deed', which viewed this
mode of struggle as a tool for spreading the word of the insurrection,
expanding its popular base, and thus serving as a lever for and prelude
to a more advanced form of insurrection. For the bulk of the terrorist
groups, even this elementary doctrine has not worked. Although their
acts of violence gained tremendous publicity, as terrorist attacks always
do, they have failed to attract public sympathy and support and to
generate the broad popular insurrection they hoped to propel. This has
been, for example, the case with the radical left-wing and right-wing
movements in Western Europe and in the United States in the 1970s and
1980s.
Nevertheless, there have been cases where terrorism apparently
helped in sparking and arousing a broader movement. One example is
the Russian Social Revolutionaries at the beginning of this century.
Although they have failed in turning their own clandestine apparatus
into a political instrument capable of seizing power, and notwithstanding
the fact that the October 1917 Revolution was eventually executed
by the broader-based, better-organized Bolsheviks, the terrorist acts of
the Social Revolutionaries probably contributed much to keep the
revolutionary torch aflame. Throughout the years that the Social
Democrats (the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks) were building their
clandestine infrastructure with no dramatic actions to ignite people's
enthusiasm, the Social Revolutionaries, by their assassination of
oppressive state ministers and other government functionaries, maintained
the idea and spirit of struggle alive among potential revolutionaries.
Ironically, it seems that Social Revolutionary terrorism, much
criticized and ridiculed by the Social Democrats, thus enabled the latter
to reach 1917 with the capability of seizing power.
The most common outcome of international terrorism is bringing the
terrorists' grievances to international consciousness. In itself, this
awareness is not enough to effect changes desired by the insurgents and
sometimes results in repercussions that are deleterious to the terrorists'
cause. Yet, under favorable conditions, it grants the insurgents a ladder
by which they can climb further. In Western publics, the initial reaction
to a terrorist campaign is, invariably, one of vehement condemnation.
This response, however, is often followed by readiness to examine
closely the terrorists' case with a tendency to view their grievances
favorably. Paradoxically, the public may end up approving of causes
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while denouncing the method by which they were brought to its
attention.
The formation of the subsequent benevolent attitude to the terrorists'
cause is most likely to occur in publics that suffer from the terrorist
attacks, but have nothing to lose from the fulfillment of their demands.
In this situation, the initial rage is soon replaced by the wish that the
problem will disappear. When a positive political attitude to the
terrorists' cause seems to be able to buy peace, governments often adapt
their policy so as to gain the terrorists' good will. The situation is known
in psychology as 'cognitive dissonance', and is not necessarily conscious.
Essentially, it involves finding an acceptable excuse for a course of
behavior that may produce conflict, because it contradicts some principles
or beliefs. It is certainly much more palatable for a government or
public to think that, on a closer examination, the terrorist have a point,
than to admit caving in to terrorist pressure.
When other pressures and interests are added to the will to end the
terrorist attacks, such as accommodating influential patrons of the
terrorists, the likelihood of adopting a favorable attitude to the terrorist
cause is greater. Western responses to international Palestinian terrorism
is a salient example of this process. Palestinian terrorist attacks in
Western Europe began in 1968 and reached a peak in 1973. They were
condemned strongly by the European Community. In a few years,
however, the PLO was allowed to open representations in practically all
European countries, and in 1974, about a year after the imposition of oil
embargo by the Organization of [Arab] Petroleum Exporting Countries
and the increase in oil prices, PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat was invited
to speak in front of the General Assembly of the UN, and the PLO was
granted an observer status in that international forum.
Martha Crenshaw observed correctly that 'An initial problem in
assessing the results of terrorism is that it is never the unique causal
factor leading to identifiable outcomes. The intermingling of social and
political effects with other events and trends makes terrorism difficult to
isolate.'60
Admittedly, it is impossible to isolate the net effect of
terrorism and to assess accurately its relative contribution to the
legitimation process of the PLO, alongside with other factors, such as
economic and political pressures by Arab states. There can be little
doubt, however, that in the last count, terrorism has had a beneficial
rather than a deleterious effect on PLO's legitimacy.
The PLO's case is unique, in that other nationalist and separatist
insurgent movements have not enjoyed the backing of powerful
patrons. The Kurds, the Croats, the Kashmiris, the Sikhs, to name just a
few examples of separatist movements which have been active in the
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recent two decades, have not gained nearly as much international
legitimacy and support, although their grievances are at least as
convincing as those of the Palestinians. On the other hand, it is also true
that these movements have not used nearly as much international
terrorism as the Palestinians (which, in itself, can be explained by the
lack of state-sponsorship).
Some terrorist groups that have been unable to materialize their
political objectives, have nevertheless succeeded in driving their adversary
to make significant concessions. A typical example is the Basque
Euzkadi ta Askatasuna (ETA). Their long violent campaign for
secession from Spain has not produced the independence they aspired
for, but it has undoubtedly been a major factor in Spain's decision to
grant the Basque provinces extensive autonomy. Another case in point
is the IRA's struggle over Ulster. Although no actual steps have been
taken yet towards changing the status of Ulster, there has been a
growing readiness in Britain to get rid of the Irish problem by any
solution that would end the violence. The British-Irish Accord of 1985
guaranteed that Ulster would become part of the Republic of Ireland if
they decide so by popular vote. For the time being, Ireland was granted
a say in the affairs of Ulster in the framework of an Anglo-Irish
conference. Clearly, these changes in Britain's policy were prompted by
the IRA's struggle.
The Mixed Forms of Uprising
Strategies of uprising are usually treated as separate entities or phenomena.
In a theoretical analysis this separation is necessary, if we want to
understand the essentials of a strategy and its characteristics. The real
world, however, is always more complex than academic classifications.
In reality, it is sometimes hard to distinguish between terrorism and
guerrilla war even with the help of the criteria offered above. By these
criteria the basic strategy used by the IRA, for example, belongs to the
category of terrorism: the IRA does not try to seize territory in order to
establish 'liberated zones,' and the tactics used by the organization are
mostly well within the typical terrorist brand, namely, assassinations
and placing explosive devices in public places. Yet, some of this group's
operations, such as a mortar attack on a police station and blowing up
bridges, have utilized tactics and weapons which are usually associated
with guerrilla warfare. Another case in point are the Palestinian groups.
These organizations have maintained territorial control in Lebanon (and
during 1967-70 in Jordan), but the territory which they held has been
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outside their main theater of operations. Although they used the area
which they dominated for the classical guerrilla ends of recruiting,
training and establishing a regular force, their draftees were recruited
from the Palestinian diaspora in these countries, rather than from the
populace in the Israeli-held territories. Moreover, with some exceptions,
they have used terrorist rather than guerrilla tactics. Their
operations inside Israel and the Occupied Territories have mostly
involved explosive charges placed in supermarkets, residential buildings,
bus stations and similar venues. Even their incursions into Israel
have been usually done by small teams sent to stage barricade-hostage
incidents or random killing attacks on civilian villages.
Aside from the fact that it is sometimes difficult to make a clear
distinction between terrorist and guerrilla tactics, it is even more
confusing that in many cases insurgent groups systematically use a
mixture of both strategies. In Peru, the Sendero Luminqso have used a
classical guerrilla strategy in the mountainous Ayacucho region, where
they have occupied towns, carried out attacks on police stations and
military convoys, and have established control over large areas. At the
same time, however, they have conducted a typical terrorist campaign in
the cities, in which they committed assassinations, bombings and
kidnapping. A similar mixture has existed in the activities of many other
Latin American groups, such as the Colombian Ejército de Liberation
National, M-19 and Fuerzas Armadas Revolutionanas de Colombia, the
Salvadoran Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front and the Guatemalan
Guerrilla Army of the Poor. A dual guerrilla-terrorist strategy
has also characterized groups in other parts of the Third world. The
Vietminh and, later, the Vietcong insurgencies were instances where
regular warfare, guerrilla strategy and terrorism abounded side by side.
Similar examples, albeit on a smaller scale, are abundant in Asia and
Africa.
A closer examination reveals that the co-existence of guerrilla and
terrorist strategies is not incidental. Apparently, all insurgent organizations
which have adopted guerrilla as their main strategy have also used
terrorism regularly. Some may claim that resistance movements which
fought against occupying armies are a noticeable exception to this
generality. This reservation, however, rests on dubious ground. Fighters
against a foreign army in their homeland, such as the French Resistance
and the Russian, Yugoslav and Greek partisans in World War II, only
attacked the enemy's military and official apparatus, for the simple
reason that civilian members of the enemy's nationality were not
present on the scene of battle. Failure to target enemy noncombatants
was not a matter of choice, but reflected availability. The underground
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movements did attack civilians of their own nationality - actual and
suspected collaborators with the occupiers. In addition, although in
some places, such as the Soviet Union and in Yugoslavia, the strategy
adopted by the partisans was, by and large, guerrilla warfare, employing
large units which operated from liberated or semi-liberated areas, in
West European countries, such as France, the strategy of the insurgents
can at best be characterized as falling in the grey zone between guerrilla
and terrorism. No territorial control was established by the French
underground and its operations consisted of attacks on individual
members of the occupying forces as well as of blowing up bridges,
mining and similar tactics typical of guerrilla warfare. Presumably,
many readers would feel insulted by the classification of the anti-Nazi
warriors as terrorists, rather than as guerrillas. For them, I must
reiterate that the terms 'terrorism' and 'guerrilla' are used here to
denote different strategies of warfare which may be utilized in the
service of a variety of just or unjust causes, and that they do not imply
any moral judgement whatsoever.
The absence of a genuine anti-Nazi guerrilla campaign in Western
Europe during World War II draws attention to the fact that, there has
not been even a single guerrilla organization in Western Europe among
the many insurgent organizations which have operated in this region
since the 1960s. This fact is particularly conspicuous against the
backdrop of the abundance of such organizations in Third World
countries. How can this fact be explained? Is it because Western
insurgents have co-incidentally decided that they like terrorism better
than guerrilla as their strategy of choice? The answer is, of course,
different. In Western Europe, as well as in North America, there has
not been a choice for insurgents. The only option, which could seem at
least temporarily sane, has been terrorism. Imagine the IRA in Ulster
or the Red Brigades in Italy trying to launch a guerrilla campaign:
establishing liberated zones and carrying out company-size attacks on
military installations. Had they tried this strategy, it would, undoubtedly,
have been the shortest guerrilla war in history. For the incumbent
government forces, elimination of the insurgency would, at most, be a
matter of days.
There are several examples in history which show quite clearly what
happens when a group of insurgents aims too high in its choice of
strategy. The most dramatic in the second half of this century is,
probably, Ernesto (Che) Guevara's Bolivian venture. Guevara, a leader
of the 1956-59 guerrilla campaign in Cuba, drew the wrong lessons from
the rather peculiar circumstances which brought about the insurgents'
success. Guevara believed that the Cuban experience could be readily
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applied in several other Latin American countries, which he considered
ripe for a revolution. In autumn 1966 he led 15 men to Bolivia, to start a
Cuban-style guerrilla campaign. The insurgency, however, never succeeded
in taking off. Although the terrain was favorable for guerrilla
warfare, Guevara failed to attract enough popular support. Despite the
fact that government forces' efficiency was far below Western standards,
their superiority in numbers was enough to encircle and wipe out the
insurgency within a year.61
Terrorism, on the other hand, however it may seem hopeless for most
people as a way of effecting a radical political change, is at least a mode
of struggle that is not immediately suicidal even when the circumstances
are not favorable for the insurgents, and can be sustained for a
considerable time. In all likelihood, the West European insurgents
would like to be able to wage a guerrilla war as their major strategy.
One might say, that all terrorist groups wish to be guerrillas when they
grow up.62
They are unable to do it because of practical reasons.
Guerrilla warfare requires a terrain that would be advantageous for the
small bands of insurgents and disadvantageous for mechanized and
airborne government forces. In Western Europe this kind of terrain thick
jungles or extensive, rugged mountains inaccessible by motor
transportation - cannot be found. Guerrillas can sometimes compromise
for less than perfect terrain, providing that other conditions are
met, in particular inefficient and poorly-equipped government forces on
the one hand and massive popular support for the insurgents on the
other hand. In twentieth century Western countries none of these
conditions exists and terrorism is the only strategic option for insurgents
who are determined to resort to violence to advance their cause.
It still has to be explained why those who can conduct a guerrilla
campaign resort to terrorism at the same time. Again, the answer is in
the difference between academic classifications and real life. In a way,
the distinction between guerrilla warfare and terrorism is artificial. To
be sure, it is a valid differentiation, but only as an external observation.
Academics may sit in their armchairs and categorize strategies of
insurgency. The point is that the insurgents themselves rarely do so
when they come to select their actions. Although rebels have often
delineated their strategic concepts, the arguments have almost always
been of a practical nature. The key has been what could be realistically
done to promote the political cause. That does not include an attempt to
fit the actions into a rigid doctrinaire framework. The primary considerations
are capability and utility. Because terrorism is the lowest, least
demanding form of insurgency, it has always been used simultaneously
with other strategies. The relative importance of terrorism in the overall
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struggle depends on the circumstances, but it is always part of the strife.
A case in point is the Palestinian struggle. Abu Iyad, one of the PLO's
main leaders noted in his memoirs:
. . . I do not confuse revolutionary violence, which is a political
act, with terrorism, which is not. I reject the individual act
committed outside the context of an organization or strategic
vision. I reject the act dictated by subjective motives which claims
to take the place of mass struggle. Revolutionary violence, on the
other hand, is part of a large, structured movement. It serves as a
supplementary force and contributes, during a period of regrouping
or defeat, to giving the movement a new impetus. It becomes
superfluous when the grass-roots movement scores political successes
on the local or international scene.63
In fact, terrorism has been a perennial part of the Palestinian struggle
since the early 1920s. Abu Iyad's quotation refers to the period 1971-73,
when Fateh, the PLO's main organization, engaged in an intensive
campaign of international terrorism under the guise of the Black
September organization. Abu Iyad himself was, allegedly, one of the
principal chieftains of the clandestine apparatus of international terrorism,
which carried out a series of spectacular terrorist attacks, including
the barricade-hostage incident in the Munich Olympic games of 1972.
Fateh's decision to launch a spectacular campaign of international
terrorism followed the PLO's expulsion from Jordan by King Hussein in
September 1970 (an event after which the Black September organization
was named). The wave of international terrorism was designed to
boost PLO members' morale after the débâcle in Jordan, at a time when
they lost Jordan as a base for operations.
A similar increase in international Palestinian terrorism took place in
the wake of the 1982 war, in which the PLO lost most of its bases in
Lebanon. Within Israel and the Territories, however, terrorism has
always been considered by the Palestinian insurgents an integral part of
the struggle. Changes in the number of terrorist attacks have, therefore,
reflected capability rather than motivation. The question has never been
whether terrorism should continue, but what else could be done. In the
course of the 70 years of the Palestinian violent struggle, the insurgents
have, at times, been able to wield guerrilla warfare in addition to
terrorism, such as in the 1936-39 Arab rebellion, but most of the time
terrorism remained the only mode of violence at their disposal. Riots
have occasionally erupted throughout this period and have sometimes
developed into large-scale popular uprisings, which included several
forms of political violence concurrently.
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The Intifada (literally: shaking) is the most recent of these uprisings,
albeit not the most intense one. Like similar phenomena in Algeria,
South Africa, Azerbaijan, Soviet Armenia, and in the Jewish struggle
for independence in the 1930s and 1940s, the Intifada is not a pure form
of insurgent violence. It has included violent as well as non-violent
components. The violent elements of the Intifada have consisted of
riots, petrol bomb and rock throwing at military and civilian vehicles,
and ordinary terrorist-type attacks, such as explosive charges and
assassinations. The non-violent elements have included labor and
commerce strikes, road blocks, and an attempted boycott of Israeli
goods and government services.64
One might suppose that the embarkation
on the more effective strategy of mass protest during the Intifada
would result in a reduction in terrorist attacks, which represented a
lower-grade, less effective form of struggle. The contrary is true: the
frequency of terrorist incidents and the number of casualties have
increased considerably.65
Thus, the 'Intifada' has not been a distinct
strategy but a mixture of several modes of struggle, including terrorism.
The 1989 bloodless change of regimes in several East European
countries seems to refute the assertion that terrorism appears as an
omni-present part of uprisings. By a strict criterion of examination this
reservation is certainly true. It should be remembered, however, that
the regimes of the East European Soviet satellites drew their strength
from an external source - the USSR. Once this hoop was loosened, the
barrel fell apart. In other words, the changes in East Europe were not a
result of a true internal insurgency, but a consequence of surrender at
the top. Had the governments of Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and East
Germany been more determined to withstand the peaceful uprising, the
struggle would have probably been deteriorated into a long campaign,
including terrorism as a cardinal mode of insurgency. Actually, this is
the process which has taken place in several republics within the Soviet
Union.
In sum, in reality the form of insurgency - terrorism, guerrilla, massprotest,
or any combination of these - is mainly determined by objective
conditions rather than by strategic conceptions of the insurgents. The
most important factor is capability. Usually, the insurgents utilize every
possible mode of struggle that can advance their cause. Because
terrorism is the lowest form of violent struggle, it is always used in
insurgencies. Often, because the insurgents are few, the terrain is not
favorable for guerrilla warfare and government forces are efficient,
terrorism is the only mode of insurgency available to the insurgents.
Sometimes the rebels are able to conduct guerrilla warfare, although
they continue to use terrorism concurrently. The actual form of contest
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is forged in a continuous process of friction against hard reality, and
terrorism is practically always part of it.
NOTES
The work on this essay was supported by a MacArthur Foundation's grant to the Center
for Criminal Justice at the Harvard Law School. The author is indebted to Professor Philip
Heymann and Dr. Daniel McGillis for their invaluable critique, ideas and advice.
1. Alex P. Schmid and Albert J. Jongman, Political Terrorism. (Amsterdam: NorthHolland
Publishing Company, 1988).See also the earlier edition of this study: Alex P.
Schmid, Political Terrorism (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company,
1983).
2. Schmid and Jongman (1988), pp.5-6.
3. Ibid., p.33.
4. Ibid., pp.33-4.
5. Ibid., p.34.
6. W.E. Daugherty, 'Bomb Warnings to Friendly and Enemy Civilian Targets' in
William E. Daugherty and Morris Janowitz, A Psychological Warfare Casebook
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1958), pp.359-362.
7. Alistair Horne, A Savage War of Peace:Algeria 1954-1962(New York: Penguin,
1987), pp.537-8.
8. 'Vietcong Directive on "Repression" ' in J. Mallin (ed.), Terror and Urban Guerrillas
(Coral Gables, FLA: Univ. of Miami Press, 1971), pp.31-43.
9. For a comprehensive summary of the origin of the term see: Walter Laqueur, TheAge
of Terrorism (Boston: Little, Brown, 1987), especially Ch.1.
10. US Dept. of State, Patternsof Global Terrorism:1988 (Washington, DC: Dept. of
State Publication 9705, Office of the Secretary of State, Ambassador at Large for
Counterterrorism, March 1989), p.v.
11. Webster's New World Dictionary defines 'vigilance committee' as '1. a group of
persons organized without legal authorization professedly to keep order and punish
crime when ordinary law enforcement agencies apparently fail to do so. 2. especially
formerly in the South, such a group organized to terrorize and control Negroes and
Abolitionists and, during the Civil War, to suppress support of the Union.'Webster's
New World Dictionary(Cleveland, OH and NY: World Publishing Co. 1966).
12. Webster's New Twentieth Century Dictionary Unabridged,2nd ed. (NY: William
Collins Publishers Inc., 1980).
13. Edward Luttwak, Coup d'Etat (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1979), p.27.
14. The characterization of some revolutions as nonviolent is controversial. Chalmers
Johnson, for example, maintains that '"nonviolent revolution", so long as these
words retain any precise meaning whatsoever, is a contradiction in terms. Nevertheless,
it is quite true that many revolutions have been accomplished without any blood
flowing in the gutters. What then, sociologically speaking, do we mean by violence?
This question is also basic to the analysis of revolution.' (Chalmers Johnson,
RevolutionaryChange(Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 1982), p.7).
15. C. Brinton, The Anatomy of Revolution (NY: Vintage Books, 1965), p.3.
16. In 1903 the revolutionary Russian Social-Democratic Party was split into Bolsheviks
(majority) and Mensheviks (minority). The division was over the issue of party
membership. Whereas Lenin and his supporters envisaged a tight, centrally controlled
conspiratorial organization which would include only dedicated activists, the Mensheviks
preferred a more general, less demanding and less centralized organization.
See, e.g., I. Deutscher, The Prophet Armed: Trotski, 1879-1921(London: OUP,
1954).
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TERRORISM AS A STRATEGY OF INSURGENCY 249
17. In reality, however, the October revolution of 1917 was accomplished in a coup-like
manner. There were very few casualties in the actual process of seizing power,
although the civil war which followed resulted in great bloodshed and destruction.
18. In reality, the dominant factor in the collapse of the Tsarist regime in 1917 was the
disintegration of the Army, as a result of a series of defeats in World War I. See Theda
Skocpol, Statesand Social Revolutions (Cambridge: CUP, 1979).
19. See, for instance, the doctrine of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
(PFLP). John W. Amos, Palestinian Resistance: Organization of a Nationalist
Movement (NY: Pergamon Press, 1980), pp.192-3.
20. This has been the doctrine advocated by Mao Tse Tung and his followers. See, for
instance, Walter Laqueur, Guerrilla: A Historical and Critical Study (Boston: Little,
Brown, 1976), Ch.6.
21. On the basis of empirical findings on riot participation in Newark, New Jersey, Paige
defined riots as 'a form of disorganized political protest engaged in by those who have
become highly distrustful of existing political institutions.' (p.819). J.M. Paige,
'Political Orientation and Riot Participation', American Sociological Review, Vol.36
(1971), pp.810-20.
22. Advocates of nonviolent resistance usually emphasize the moral superiority of this
mode of struggle. However, Gene Sharp, although his point of departure is that
nonviolent resistance is morally preferable, stresses the practical advantages of this
form of uprising. See Gene Sharp, The Politics of NonviolentAction (Boston: Porter
Sargent Publishers, 1973).
23. Sharp, pp.75-90.
24. See Laqueur, Age of Terrorism (note 9), pp.21, 44-8.
25. Nineteenth century revolutionaries have often carried the term 'terrorism' with pride.
See, e.g., N. Morozov, 'The Terrorist Struggle,' G. Tarnovski, 'Terrorism and
Routine,' and J. Most, 'Advice for Terrorists' in Walter Laqueur and Yonah
Alexander, The Terrorism Reader(NY: NAL Penguin, 1987), pp.72-84, 100-8. In the
second half of the twentieth century, however, most insurgent organizations which
adopted terrorism as a strategy have shunned the term in favor of a variety of
euphemisms. Yet even a modern authority on terrorism doctrine, Carlos Marighella,
wrote: 'Terrorism is an arm the revolutionary can never relinquish.' (Carlos
Marighella, 'Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla,' in J. Maliin (ed.), Terror and Urban
Guerrilla (Coral Gables, FLA: Univ. of Miami Press, 1971), p.103.
26. Laqueur, Guerrilla (note 20), pp.x xi.
27. See, e.g., Mao Tse Tung, 'Base Areas in the Anti-Japanese Guerrilla War' in W.J.
Pomeroy, Guerrilla Warfareand Marxism (NY: Int'l Publishers, 1968), pp.183-93.
28. In the Battle of Dien Bien Phu (1954) the Vietminh employed four divisions against a
French force of about 15,000 (R.E. Dupuy and T.N. Dupuy, The Encyclopedia of
Military History (London: Jane's, 1986), p.1296. Inasmuch as the battle itself was
conducted along the lines of a regular war, it was waged in the general framework of a
guerrilla struggle. See, e.g., Laqueur, Guerrilla(note 20).
29. The largest terrorist teams have been employed in barricade-hostage incidents. E.g.,
50 members of the 28th of February Popular League participated in the takeover of
the Panamanian Embassy in San Salvador on 11 Jan. 1980; 41 members of the
Colombian M-19 group took over the Palace of Justice in Bogota on 6 Nov. 1985
(Edward F. Mickolus,Todd Sandier and Jean M. Murdock, International Terrorism in
the 1980s: A Chronologyof Events (Ames, IA: Iowa State UP, 1989), Vol.1, pp.5-6,
Vol.11, pp.298-300.
30. George Bush, introduction to Terrorist Group Profiles(Washington, DC: US GPO,
1988), page unnumbered. See also, Menachem Begin 'Freedom Fighters and
Terrorists' in, Benjamin Netanyahu (ed.), International Terrorism: Challenge and
Response (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1981), pp.39-46.
31. Zeev Ivianski, Revolution and Terror(Tel Aviv: Yair Publications, 1989), pp.274-8
(Hebrew).
32. Many authors who addressed the moral issue in terrorism have resorted to Kaliayev's
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250 TERRORISM AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE
example. A partial list includes: Frederick J. Hacker, Crusaders,Criminals, Crazies
(NY Norton, 1976), pp.294-5; Ze'ev Ivianski, 'The Moral Issue: Some Aspects of
Individual Terror,' in David C. Rapoport and Yonah Alexander, The Morality of
Terrorism(NY: Pergamon Press, 1982), p.230; Laqueur, Age of Terrorism(note 9)
p.83; Michael Walzer, Just and UnjustWars (NY: Basic Books, 1977), pp.198-9; J.
Bowyer Bell, Assassin! (NY: St. Martin's Press, 1979), p.235.
33. Walzer (note 32), pp.197-206.
34. Ibid., p.203
35. Ibid., p.202
36. Ibid., p.xiv.
37. E.g., Martha Crenshaw, 'Introduction: Reflections on the Effects of Terrorism' in
idem (ed.), Terrorism Legitimacyand Power: The Consequences of Political Violence
(Middletown, CT: Wesleyan UP, 1983), p.1; Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism and the
LiberalState(London: Macmillan, 1977), p.110; Grant Wardlaw, Political Terrorism:
Theory, Tactics,and Counter-Measures (Cambridge: CUP 1989), pp.34-42.
38. Patterns of Global Terrorism,1988(note 10).
39. Schmid and Jongman (note 1), p.34.
40. B.H. Liddell Hart, Strategy:The IndirectApproach (London: Faber, 1954), p.163.
41. Sun Tzu, The Art of War (New York: Delta, 1988), Ch.3.
42. Laqueur, Age of Terrorism(note 9) pp.48-51; Wardlaw (note 37), p.21.
43. See, e.g., John Most, 'Advice for Terrorists,' in: Laqueur and AlexanderTerrorism
Reader (note 25), pp.105-6; Ze'ev Ivianski, Revolution and Terror (Tel Aviv: Yair
Publication, 1989), pp.106-7. (Hebrew).
44. Alistair Horne, A Savagewarof Peace (Tel Aviv: Ma'arachot, 1989), p.139 (Hebrew
trans.).
45. Ibid. p.138.
46. The kaffiya was the traditional head cover of villagers and some authors viewed its
enforcement on the urban population as a symptom of social rebellion against the
bourgeoisie, in addition to the nationalist element which was the main motivation of
the rebellion. At that time, the insurgent gangs were mainly composed of villagers.
Regardless of the true origin of the insurgents' demand, the kaffiya became a symbol
of the rebellion and the insurgents imposed it on the population as a symbol of
compliance. See Youval Arnon-Ohanna, Kherev Mi'Bayit (The Internal Struggle
withinthe Palestinian Movement, 1929-1939 (Tel Aviv: Yariv-Hadar, 1981) pp.282-4
(Hebrew).
47. Jacques Massu, La VraieBattaille d'Alger (Tel Aviv: Ma'arachot, 1975) p.31 (Hebrew
trans.)
48. Walter Laqueur, for example, notes that Armenian revolutionaries of the 1880s and
1890s adopted a strategy based on provocation. They assumed that their attacks on
the Turks would instigate brutal retaliation which would, in turn, result in radicalization
of the Armenian population and, possibly, also lead to Western countries'
intervention. Laqueur, Age of Terrorism (note 9), p.43.
49. Marighella in Mallin (note 25), p.111.
50. Guy Bechor, Lexicon of the PLO (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defense Publishing House,
1991), p.279 (Hebrew).
51. The same basic idea was given the name 'strategy of tension'. See K.S. Rentner,
'Terrorism in Insurgent Strategies.' Military Intelligence(Jan.-March 1985), p.51;
P. Jenkins, 'Strategy of Tension: The Belgian Terrorist Crisis 1982-1986',Terrorism
13/4-5 (1990), pp.299-309.
52. Peter Janke, Guerrillaand TerroristOrganisations: A World Directoryand Bibliography
(NY: Macmillan, 1983), pp.47-8.
53. The bombing was apparently carried out by members of the neo-Nazi terrorist group
WehrsportgruppeHoffman (Military Sports Group Hoffman), or the Wehrsportgruppe
Schlageter(Military Sports Group Schlageter). See Mickolus, Sandier, and
Murdock, InternationalTerrorismin the 1980s: A Chronologyof Events, Volume I,
1980-1983, p.87; Schmid and Jongman (note 1), p.558.
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TERRORISM AS A STRATEGY OF INSURGENCY 251
54. Jenkins (note 51).
55. Schmid and Jongman (note 1), p.623. See also, Janke (note 52), pp.57-8; C.H.
Yaeger, 'Menia Muria: The South Moluccans Fight in Holland', Terrorism 13/3
(1990), pp.215-26.
56. Anat Kurz and Ariel Merari, ASALA: IrrationalTerror or PoliticalTool (Boulder,
CO: Westview Press, 1985). See also, Schmid and Jongman (note 1), pp.673, 675;
Janke (note 52), p.276.
57. Kurz and Merari, pp.14-15.
58. The data base at Tel Aviv University's Political Violence Research Unit includes data
on more than 800 distinct terrorist groups which have operated in the 1980s.
59. For a discussion of the influence of the issue at stake on readiness to yield to terrorism,
see A. Merari and N. Friedland, 'Social Psychological Aspects of Political Terrorism'
in Stuart Oskamp (ed.), International Conflict and National Public Policy Issues
(Applied SocialPsychologyAnnual 6) (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1985), pp.185-206.
60. M. Crenshaw, 'Introduction: Reflections on the Effects of Terrorism', p.5.
61. See George C. Kohn, Dictionaryof Wars (Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1987),
p.60.
62. Even Carlos Marighella, the most popular modern advocate of terrorism, viewed
terrorism ('urban guerrilla' in his terminology) as a stage necessary to enable the
development of rural guerrilla: 'it is a technique that aims at the development of urban
guerrilla warfare, whose function will be to wear out, demoralize and distract the
enemy forces, permitting the emergence and survival of rural guerrilla warfare which
is destined to play the decisive role in the revolutionary war.' Marighella, in Mallin
(note 25), p.83.
63. Abu Iyad, My Home, My Land:A Narrative of the Palestinian Struggle(NY: Times
Books, 1978), p.98.
64. A. Merari, T. Prat and D. Tal, 'The Palestinian Intifada: An Analysis of a Popular
Uprising after Seven Months.' Terrorismand PoliticalViolence 1/2 (1989), pp.177-
201.
65. A. Kurz, 'Palestinian Terrorism in 1988' in Shlomo Gazit (ed.), The Middle East
MilitaryBalance 1988-1989 (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1989), pp.84-97.
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