

developed Germany established a more extensive and invasive presence but it, too, often failed to have much effect upon the 'hearts and minds' of its ordinary citizens. Local Nazi leaders could compel their fellow townspeople 'to attend meetings and pretend enthusiasm, but that was largely a mutually agreed charade' (Allen, 1984: 104). Later, when the country was facing the prospect of military defeat, some elderly workers provided an ordinary citizen's view of such dramatic political changes as the onset of Nazi rule. They commented 'that they had little concern for the future: that they had had to work hard under the [monarchical] Kaiser, in the [democratic] Weimar Republic, and in the [Nazi] Third Reich, and had probably no more and no less to expect from [communist] Bolshevism than hard work and low wages' (Kershaw, 1983: 314).

On the other hand, many of their fellow citizens had more reason to fear the coming of communist dictatorship. Peasant farmers and small-businessmen, as well as wealthy landowners and industrialists, were likely to lose their land or businesses through communist collectivisation of agriculture and expropriation of the private sector. More importantly, the small Jewish minority of their fellow citizens had already suffered greatly from the Nazi dictatorship, with many having lost their lives as well as their livelihood. And this intent of some dictatorships to take away or reshape human life is perhaps the most important reason for studying the emergence of modern non-democratic regimes and the possibility of their resurgence in the next century.

1

Theories of Non-Democratic Government

Although there are no widely recognised general theories of non-democratic government, there are many theories of such particular forms of non-democratic government as totalitarianism, authoritarianism, communism and fascism. Being concerned with forms of government, these theories are less interested in the traditional regime-defining question of 'who rules?' than in the wider question of 'how do they rule?', which involves such issues as the regime's methods and degree of control over society, its ideological or other claims to legitimacy, its political and administrative structure, and the goals that it seeks to attain.

Therefore, although such terms as 'totalitarian', 'authoritarian', 'communist' and 'fascist' are used to describe regimes as well as forms of government, these labels say much more about a regime than whether it is a military or a party dictatorship (and in fact the term 'authoritarian' can be applied to both types of dictatorship). In contrast, to label a dictatorship as a 'military' or 'party' regime is to describe only the type of regime, in the sense of military or party rule, not the form of government – which in the case of party rule could be either totalitarian or authoritarian, communist or fascist.

Only theories of totalitarian and authoritarian forms of government will be examined in this chapter. The notions of 'totalitarianism' and 'authoritarianism' are general enough to have been applied (not necessarily very successfully) to a relatively

wide range of regimes, including those labelled communist and fascist. Moreover, the distinctive features of communist and fascist forms of government will be described in later chapters, especially those on legitimacy and control (Chapter 5) and on policy and performance (Chapter 6).

Totalitarianism

The theories of totalitarianism are the most distinctive and imaginative of those developed by theorists of non-democratic government (see Table 1.1). The term 'totalitarianism' emerged in the 1920s–30s as part of the ideology of Fascist Italy: the Fascist 'totalitarian' state was pithily described by Mussolini as 'everything in the State, nothing outside of the State, nothing against the State'. But in the 1950s totalitarianism reemerged as a prominent concept in Western political science and was used to describe communist as well as fascist regimes. The classic works of Arendt and of Friedrich and Brzezinski provided descriptive *theories* of totalitarianism (in the sense of offering a much broader as well as a deeper understanding of the concept) which claimed that it was a quite new and 'total' form of dictatorship. In fact theories or concepts of totalitarianism were for years the leading or most dynamic approach to the study of non-democratic regimes; but from as early as the 1960s onwards there was a growing body of opinion that the notion of totalitarianism had outlived its usefulness. And, despite the work of such second-generation theorists as Schapiro, the notion of totalitarianism has never recovered the prominence that it enjoyed in the 1950s–60s.

Arendt's Classic Theory

Arendt's 1951 pioneering work, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, depicted totalitarianism as a new and extreme form of dictatorship. In her view there had been only two examples of totalitarian dictatorship – Hitler's Nazi regime and Stalin's communist regime. More precisely, totalitarianism had existed in the 1938–45 years of Hitler's Nazi dictatorship in Germany, in the post-1929 years of the communist dictatorship in the Soviet Union, and in post-Second World War Eastern Europe,

whose newly established communist regimes were viewed by Arendt as only extensions of the Soviet-based communist movement (1962 [1951]: 419, 308 n. 10).

She downplayed the ideological/policy differences between the rightist Nazis and leftist communists, declaring that in practice it made little difference whether totalitarians organised the masses in the name of race or of class (*ibid.*: 313). In contrast, only a year later Talmon emphasised the distinction between Left and Right totalitarianism in his famous work on what he termed the 'totalitarian democracy' associated with the French Revolution (1952: 1–2, 6–7). He argued that only totalitarianism of the Left was a form of totalitarian democracy, for the Right totalitarians were concerned with such collective/historic entities as state, nation or race and viewed force as permanently required for maintaining order and social training. The significance of the differences between left-wing (communist) and right-wing (fascist) variants of totalitarianism has remained an awkward issue for theorists and users of the concept of totalitarianism.

Although Arendt did not view totalitarian regimes' ideological differences (or even ideological content) as very significant, she noted that ideology plays an important role in such regimes (1962: 325, 458, 363). Totalitarian ideology's desire to transform human nature provides the regime with a reason as well as a road map for the all-pervading totalitarian organisation of human life, as only under a totalitarian system can all aspects of life be organised in accordance with an ideology. Furthermore, ideology in turn provides a means of internally, psychologically dominating human beings and therefore plays an important role not only in the totalitarian organisation of all aspects of human life, but also in attaining the ultimate totalitarian goal of total domination.

One of the features of Arendt's theory of totalitarianism is the extreme and total goal that she ascribed to this form of dictatorship. For totalitarianism seeks 'the permanent domination of each single individual in each and every sphere of life' and 'the total domination of the total population of the earth' (*ibid.*: 326, 392). A totalitarian movement's seizure of power in a particular country therefore only secures a base for the movement's further global expansion. But taking control of a country also offers the opportunity to experiment with organising and

dominating human beings more intensively as well as extensively, and thereby subjecting society to 'total terror' (*ibid.*: 392, 421–2, 430–5, 440). After the secret police have liquidated all open or hidden resistance, they begin to liquidate ideologically defined 'objective enemies', such as Jews or supposed class enemies. This uniquely totalitarian level of terror is in turn replaced by a third, fully totalitarian stage. Now everyone seems to be a police informer and the secret police not only seek to remove all trace of their victims, as if these people had never existed, but also randomly select their victims. However, the ultimate 'laboratories' for experimenting with total domination are the regime's concentration, extermination or labour camps, where terror and torture are used to liquidate spontaneity and reduce human beings to only animal-like reactions and functions (*ibid.*: 436–8, 441, 451–6).

Unlike most later theorists of totalitarianism, Arendt was willing to take on the difficult task of explaining the origins of totalitarian regimes (though her explanations have never found favour with historians). She argued that these regimes arise from totalitarian movements' organisation of 'masses', in the sense of people who are experiencing social atomisation and extreme individualisation – the main characteristic of 'mass man' is social isolation created by the lack of normal social relationships (*ibid.*: 308–17). Such people are more easily attracted by totalitarian movements than are the sociable, less individualistic people who support normal political parties. If socially atomised masses also constitute (or are joined by) masses in the sense of sheer numbers, they can produce such a powerful totalitarian movement that a totalitarian regime can be established.

Socially atomised masses were created in a very different fashion in the Soviet Union than in Germany (*ibid.*: 313–24, 378–80). The Nazi movement came to power by winning the support of socially atomised masses that were created by the economic, social and political crises afflicting democratic Germany in the early 1930s. But in the Soviet Union the socially atomised masses were created *after* the communist movement had established a one-party dictatorship. Under its new leader, Stalin, the communist dictatorship created such masses by the destruction of the semi-capitalist class structure and by extensive political purges. Paradoxically, the victims sought relief from their social atomisation by offering total loyalty to the Communist Party, even

though it was dominated by the perpetrators of the purges – Stalin and the political police.

The prominent role played by the political/secret police (as elite formations and super-party) is a unique structural feature of totalitarian regimes, but the key and most distinctive structural feature is the functionally indispensable leader figure – the Stalin or Hitler (*ibid.*: 380, 413, 420, 374–5, 387). A totalitarian regime and movement is so closely identified with the leader and his infallibility (as interpreter of the infallible ideology) that any move to restrain or replace him would prove disastrous for the regime and movement. His subordinates are not only aware of his indispensability, but have also been trained for the sole purpose of communicating and implementing his commands. Therefore the leader can count on their loyalty to the death, monopolise the right to explain ideology and policy, and behave as if he were above the movement.

Friedrich and Brzezinski's Classic Theory

Friedrich and Brzezinski's 1956 *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy* provided a more detailed and widely applicable descriptive theory than Arendt's (see Table 1.1). The newer theory's examples included post-1936 Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy and communist Soviet Union plus the newly established communist regimes in Eastern Europe and China (though it was acknowledged that Fascist Italy was a borderline case). But the most distinctive and important aspect of the theory was its claim that the 'character' of totalitarian dictatorship was to be found in a *syndrome* of six interrelated and mutually supporting features or traits (1961 [1956]: 9):

1. an ideology;
2. a single party, typically (that is, not always) led by one person;
3. a terroristic police;
4. a communications monopoly;
5. a weapons monopoly; and
6. a centrally-directed economy.

However, it was acknowledged that the *six-point syndrome* had shown 'many significant variations', such as the striking variation in economic structure arising from the fascist regimes' retention

TABLE 1.1
Theories of totalitarianism

<i>Theories</i>	<i>Examples</i>	<i>Origins</i>	<i>Goals</i>	<i>Structure</i>	<i>Evolution</i>
Arendt (1951)	Only Nazi Germany and Stalin's Communist Soviet Union (plus subsidiary East European communist regimes)	Political exploitation of the masses (of socially 'atomised' isolated individuals) created by preceding democracy's economic/social crisis or by preceding one-party dictatorship's political purges and destruction of social classes	Ideology-directed goal of dominating every individual in every sphere of life (use of terror)	1. Leader (functionally indispensable) 2. Secret police 3. Party/movement	
Friedrich and Brzezinski (1956)	Nazi Germany, Communist Soviet Union and Eastern Europe plus Fascist Italy and Communist China	Era of mass democracy and modern technology	Ideology-directed political, social, cultural and economic revolution with 'violent passion for unanimity' (use of terror and propaganda)	Party typically led by an individual leader 1. leader (absolutist) 2. party (of leader's followers) 3. terroristic police 4. politicisation of military by totalitarian movement	Long-term, 1. decline in need for terror and 2. possibility of post-leader collective leadership (small group) by party bureaucrats
Schapiro (1972)	Nazi Germany, Communist Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, China and Cuba – also Fascist Italy and Nkrumah's Ghana as weak cases		Ideology-accompanied domination of state, society and individual – mobilisation for 1. outward mass enthusiasm/support and 2. either preparation for war or building Communism	1. Party leader (personalised rule) 2. Party 3. State's administrative machinery 4. Police and army	Long-term possible post-leader transitional era with some pluralism of institutions; e.g. incipient pressure-group activity by military or industrial managers

of a form of private-ownership economy instead of shifting to a state-owned/collectivised economy as the communists had done in the Soviet Union (*ibid.*: 10).

In fact Friedrich and Brzezinski, unlike Arendt, went on to address the awkward issue of whether the differences between communist and fascist regimes outweigh the totalitarian similarities (*ibid.*: 7–8, 10–11, 68, 57, 77). They argued that communist and fascist totalitarian regimes are basically alike but by no means wholly alike, and they pointed to differences in origins, political institutions and proclaimed goals. In a later discussion of totalitarian ideology's link to international revolutionary appeals (and to the leader's ambitions for world rule), they again pointed to the difference between communism's supposedly global, class-based appeal and fascism's appeal to a particular people. Yet despite these significant differences, Friedrich and Brzezinski maintained that communist and fascist regimes were sufficiently similar to be classed together as totalitarian dictatorships and to be distinguished from older types of autocracy, none of which had displayed the totalitarian six-feature syndrome.

Like Arendt, these two later theorists viewed totalitarianism as an extreme, ideologically driven and terror-ridden form of dictatorship (Friedrich and Brzezinski, 1961: 130–2, 150, 137). The regime's ideology is the ultimate source of the goals that the totalitarians seek to attain through a political, social, cultural and economic revolution. Totalitarianism is in fact an actual system of revolution, requiring a state of 'permanent revolution' that will extend for generations and applies to even such prosaic matters as fulfilling economic Five-Year Plans.

The use of terror is stimulated not only by the ideology's extensive revolutionary goals, but also by its supposed infallibility. The totalitarians' commitment to their ideology's infallibility produces a 'violent passion for unanimity'; after the destruction of the regime's obvious enemies, the terroristic police turn their attention to the rest of society and even to the totalitarian party itself – 'searching everywhere for actual or potential deviants from the totalitarian unity' (*ibid.*: 132, 137, 150).

But Friedrich and Brzezinski took a less extreme view than Arendt of totalitarian terror. They pointed to 'islands of separateness', such as the churches and universities, where a person could remain aloof from the terror-accompanied 'total demand for total identification' (*ibid.*: 231, 239). And they argued that

the level of police-inflicted terror may eventually decline as terror is internalised into a habitual conformity and new generations of society are raised as fully indoctrinated supporters of the regime (*ibid.*: 138).

In fact the regime relies on its 'highly effective' propaganda/indoctrination system as well as terror to instill a totalitarian atmosphere in society (*ibid.*: 107, 116–17). The propaganda/indoctrination system uses not only mass communications, notably radio and newspapers, but also face-to-face communication by thousands of speakers and agitators deployed by the party and such mass-member organisations as the regime's youth and labour movements.

Like most other post-Arendt theorists of totalitarianism, Friedrich and Brzezinski did not examine the origins of totalitarian regimes. However, they identified mass democracy as among the 'antecedent and concomitant conditions' for totalitarianism, argued that totalitarian movements and ideologies are 'perverted descendants' of democratic parties and their party platforms, and emphasised the significance of modern technology for totalitarianism – pointing out that four of the syndrome's six traits have a technological dimension (*ibid.*: 6–7, 11, 13).

Their description of the structure of totalitarian regimes was wide-ranging and showed some obvious similarities with Arendt's analysis. In particular, Friedrich and Brzezinski considered the totalitarian absolutist leader to be a unique feature of the regime's structure

1. possessing 'more nearly absolute power than any previous type of political leader';
2. embodying a unique form of leadership that involves a pseudo-religious or 'pseudo-charismatic' emotionalism and a mythical/mystical identification of leader and led;
3. subordinating the regime's political party to a wholly dependent status so that it is more the leader's following than an organisation in its own right (*ibid.*: 25–6, 29).

However, they also acknowledged that the extensive role allotted to the party in a communist regime was a significant structural difference between communist and fascist totalitarianism (*ibid.*: 273–4, 279–81, 32, 34–6). They described how the communist movements carried out a markedly more extensive

politicisation of the military than the fascist movements sought to do, and pointed to a similar contrast between fascist and communist parties' relationships with their regime's (civilian) state apparatus. In fascist regimes the party was allotted a relatively limited administrative role and was no more than equal in power to the state. In contrast, in communist regimes the party bureaucracy plays a vital role in the state-owned/controlled economic system, and in the post-Stalin Soviet Union it had become a super-bureaucracy, penetrating and controlling the state's administrative apparatus.

Friedrich and Brzezinski had more to say than Arendt on the issue of whether a totalitarian regime continues to evolve after it has established totalitarianism (*ibid.*: 6, 151, 50-7). (However, they had the benefit of observing the changes that had occurred in the Soviet Union after Stalin's death in 1953, too late for Arendt to consider in her book.) They contended that the communist Soviet Union had passed through phases of totalitarian development which had never had time to emerge in the short-lived Nazi and Fascist totalitarian regimes.

These later evolutionary phases or stages had seemed to produce a more moderate version of totalitarianism, with a decline in terror and an end to absolutist individual rule. As was mentioned earlier, Friedrich and Brzezinski argued that the level of police-inflicted terror might eventually decline (as it had in the Soviet Union after Stalin's death), and in their discussion of the post-leader succession problem they acknowledged that after Stalin's death the highest-ranking officials of the Communist Party had established a collective form of leadership. They argued that it was likely such collective leadership would eventually be replaced by a return to rule by an individual, personal leader. But, as the years passed without the rise of a new Stalin (and as the Stalinist terror became a distant memory), the next generation of theorists of totalitarianism had to take a more flexible approach to the issue of regime evolution and made some significant modifications to the classical conception of totalitarianism.

Second-Generation Theories of Totalitarianism

The differences between the two classic theories of totalitarianism were only a foretaste of the different interpretations and definitions that the term 'totalitarian' soon acquired. With nearly

a dozen theorists having coined their own definitions, with researchers having applied it to more than a dozen pre-twentieth century regimes, and with politicians employing it in anti-communist polemics, it is not surprising that some scholars believed that such a loosely used term should be avoided or abandoned (Barber, 1969; Rigby, 1972). However, others sought instead to build upon the contribution made by the two classic works of Arendt and Friedrich and Brzezinski. They offered second-generation theories of totalitarianism that could accommodate the criticisms and changing circumstances that were undermining the standing of the classic conception of totalitarianism.

Schapiro's (1972) book *Totalitarianism* is an accomplished example of such second-generation theorising (see Table 1.1). He espoused an Arendt-like view of totalitarianism as being a form of personalised rule by a leader, aided by a subordinate elite and ideology, who seeks to dominate – in fact to totally control – state, society and individual (1972: 102, 119). But Schapiro also adopted a similar approach to Friedrich and Brzezinski's six-point syndrome by identifying totalitarianism's five characteristic features or 'contours', and three distinctive instruments of rule or 'pillars' (see Table 1.2). Together, his two lists covered similar territory to the six-point syndrome but with the significant addition of mobilisation (see Exhibit 1.1) as a characteristic feature, and the significant omission of the terroristic police as a distinctive instrument of rule (*ibid.*: 20, 45, 119, 38).

Like other second-generation theorists of totalitarianism, Schapiro had to take into account the criticisms that had been directed at the concept. He tackled a key criticism head-on by presenting and responding to Curtis's argument that the concept of totalitarianism was no longer applicable to the Soviet Union, nor automatically applicable to the now diverse range of regimes to be found among the other communist countries (Schapiro, 1972: 107; Curtis, 1969). In fact political scientists dissatisfied with theories of totalitarianism had developed a host of new concepts or models of contemporary communist systems: the administered society, the command society, the organisational or mono-organisational society, the ideological system, the monist system, the mobilisation system, and, most fruitfully, the bureaucratic system; they had also begun to apply to

TABLE 1.2

Characteristic features of totalitarianism and authoritarianism		
<i>Totalitarianism:</i> <i>classic theorists, Friedrich</i> <i>and Brzezinski</i>	<i>Totalitarianism:</i> <i>second generation</i> <i>theorist, Schapiro</i>	<i>Authoritarianism:</i> <i>classic theorist,</i> <i>Linz</i>
Six-point syndrome	'Contours'	1. Limited political pluralism
1. Ideology	1. The Leader	2. Distinctive mentalities instead of elaborate and guiding ideology
2. Single party typically led by an individual	2. Subjugation of the legal order	3. Absence of intensive/extensive mobilisation
3. Terroristic police	3. Control over private morality	4. Leader or (occasionally) small group of leaders exercise power within predictable limits
4. Communications monopoly	4. Continuous mobilisation	
5. Weapons monopoly	5. Legitimacy based on mass support	
6. Centrally-directed economy		
	'Pillars'	
	1. Ideology	
	2. Party	
	3. Administrative machinery of the state	

communist systems the factional-conflict and interest-group approaches originally developed as models of Western or democratic politics (Hough and Fainsod, 1979: 523-4; Hough, 1977: 49-51).

In response, Schapiro argued that while there had been changes in the Soviet Union and other communist regimes, these developments did not mean that the concept of totalitarianism was outmoded. He acknowledged that the Soviet Union no longer suffered from a totalitarian leader and terror, and had seen a decline in ideological commitment, the emergence of dissenters, and some signs of pluralism in the form of such interests as the military establishment and the industrial managers emerging as 'incipient' pressure groups (1972: 109, 112-13, 115). But he contended that the essence of totalitarian rule still persisted, namely an ever-present total control over the individual (*ibid.*: p. 117).

As for the diversity to be seen among communist regimes, he argued that so long as these regimes shared certain fundamental and distinctive features they can be classed together as

Exhibit 1.1 Mobilising the Masses

Although no longer much used, the term (political) 'mobilisation' was quite commonly used by political scientists in the 1960s-70s and was included in some theories of totalitarianism and authoritarianism. The concept was originally a military term meaning the preparation of an army for war by calling up the reserves and moving forces to the front line. As later recast into a political term it would mean dictatorships' attempts 'to activate their peoples in support of official norms and goals', and it was used in this sense by fascist and communist regimes themselves long before the notion of mobilisation entered the theoretical vocabulary of political science (Unger, 1974: 5).

In the Soviet Union the emphasis was on economic attitudes and behaviour, especially the labour productivity and discipline needed to meet the production targets of the economic Five-Year Plans (*ibid.*: 266, 126). As will be seen in Chapter 7 mobilisation of the public in support of economic goals was taken even further by some other communist regimes, notably North Korea, and it was experimented with by a few African one-party states of the 1960s. In fact, the one-party states in Guinea, Mali and Ghana were included along with communist regimes as examples of 'mobilisation systems' in a leading 1960s work on the politics of modernisation, and the concept was briefly adopted by some analysts of communist politics (Apter, 1965; Rigby, 1972). Mobilising regimes also employed their official parties and mass-member organisations to mobilise the public in support of non-economic goals, such as community health and/or birth-control programmes, self-proclaimed cultural revolutions, or instilling the official ideology in the hearts and minds of the public.

The minimal and most common form of political mobilisation, though, is simply the activation of the public to express support for the regime itself. For example, the Cuban communist regime's ability to draw a crowd of over a million people to political gatherings in Revolution Square has been based on a highly organised mobilisation of the public at neighbourhood and workplace level by the local Committees for the Defence of the Revolution and by the official trade union movement (Aguirre, 1989: 389-90). To what extent this support-expressing behaviour reflects a positive attitude to the regime is always difficult to judge against the coercive/repressive background of a non-democratic regime (as research into the defunct Nazi case has confirmed) (Unger, 1974: 102-3; Allen, 1984, chs 17, 19). Such political 'participation' is very different from that 'mobilised' by parties and interest groups in a democratic system.

totalitarian despite their diversity in other respects (*ibid.*: 112). Moreover, in typical second-generation fashion he gave the concept more flexibility by suggesting that totalitarianism actually varies in intensity and totality, and that even when one or more characteristic features is weak or absent, the totalitarian nature of a regime is still clearly discernible (*ibid.*: 124).

Outmoded or Unfashionable?

Despite the efforts of the second-generation theorists, the notion of totalitarianism never regained its earlier prominence. In the 1970s most analysts of their contemporary communist regimes continued to prefer one of the newer models or approaches, notably the bureaucratic politics model, or to develop new approaches focused on the policy-making issue, such as Hough's notion of institutional (or institutionalised) pluralism (Hough, 1977, ch. 2; Hough and Fainsod, 1979: 547-8). By the 1980s it was also becoming increasingly clear that even such classic examples of totalitarianism as Nazi Germany had in reality fallen well short of the totalitarian 'ideal'. Historical research into Hitler's Germany and Stalin's Soviet Union was revealing that (a) control over society and individual, especially over 'hearts and minds', had been far from total, and (b) the leader had exercised far from total political control over his subordinates and the regime's institutions/organisations (Allen, 1984; Kershaw, 1983; Brösdat, 1981; Getty, 1985). In fact, decades earlier some historical research had already suggested that there had been surprisingly weak 'totalitarian' control over behaviour, let alone attitudes, particularly in the rural areas of Hitler's Germany and Stalin's Soviet Union (Peterson, 1969; Fainsod, 1958). And this dawning awareness in the 1960s that even such horrific regimes as Hitler's and Stalin's had fallen short of the classic conception of totalitarianism may explain why there was so little enthusiasm for applying the concept to some of the new Third World dictatorships, particularly the rash of African one-party states that had emerged in the 1960s.

Schapiro did classify the short-lived African one-party state developed by Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana as a case of weak/failed totalitarianism (1972: 124). He argued that before its fall to military coup in 1966, Nkrumah's regime had been moving down the road to totalitarianism but that Nkrumah had failed

to establish party control over the state or to arouse a more than play-acting public enthusiasm for the official ideology and leader cult (*ibid.*: 122). By categorising Nkrumah's regime as a form of totalitarian dictatorship – however weak and short-lived – Schapiro was reaffirming that the concept was not outmoded and was also implicitly offering a solution to the problem of how to categorise those African one-party states, notably Touré's mass-mobilising regime in Guinea, which seemed to display characteristic features of totalitarianism (Rivière, 1977). Yet he did not develop this approach in any depth or with much enthusiasm. Nor would many other theorists, or many writers on Africa, show any interest in applying the concept of totalitarianism to African or other Third World, non-communist dictatorships.

Even political biases or expediency did not lead to the concept being extended to Third World regimes. In her controversial article calling for US foreign policy to take into account the distinction between traditional/authoritarian and revolutionary/totalitarian autocracies, Kirkpatrick (1979) did mention the (self-proclaimed Marxist-Leninist) regime in Angola and the revolutionary regime in Nicaragua among her examples of actual or potential revolutionary/totalitarian regimes. But her other examples were the typically communist cases of Cuba, China, North Korea and Vietnam, and the controversy aroused by the article revealed the lack of enthusiasm for applying the concept of totalitarianism to contemporary regimes. Furthermore, neither Qadhafi's regime in the 1980s nor Saddam Hussein's regime in the 1990s were denounced as 'totalitarian' by their Western critics, even though some US politicians and officials were prepared to go to extreme lengths to express their disapproval. Saddam Hussein may have been compared to Hitler, but his regime was not labelled as totalitarian despite its showing such characteristic features as an absolutist party leader and the extensive use of terror.

Authoritarianism

While theories of totalitarianism may seem to cover too rare a form of modern non-democratic government, theories of authoritarianism face quite the opposite problem. The term