9 9.1. Introduction Criminal law: Mutual Recognition and Criminal Procedure to ensure that substantive criminal law achieves its intended objectives, obviouslv necessary both to investigate alleged crimes and to prosecute the offenders, and then to carry out any sentence imposed. But in democratic committed to human rights, ensuring effective prosecutions cannot be sole objective. Since it is unacceptable to punish the innocent with the force criminal sanctions such as imprisonment, the process of determining guilt or ocence needs to be fair. So the right to a fair trial carries a prominent place any general international human rights treaty or national constitutional bill rights, along with associated principles like the legality and non-retroactivity criminal law. Yet putting in practice the right to a fair trial, balancing defendants' rights ith the need to ensure effective prosecutions, is a complex and often conversial process, both as regards the general rules of criminal procedure and eir application to specific cases. The process is complicated when there are ss-border elements, such as the presence of a suspect, witness, or other evillce in another country. To address such issues, there is a considerable body of rnational treaties, mostly emanating from the Council of Europe. But since (operation of these treaties is often considered to be ineffective in light of a rceived increase in cross-border crime, the EU has been active in adopting easures in this area and planning further measures. In particular, since 1999, ~ ,EU has been implementing a principle of mutual recognition in criminal atters, according to which the decisions of the judicial authorities of one ember State should as far as possible take effect automatically in all other ember States. There are objections to the detailed measures adopted to apply this prinple, most notably from national parliaments and courts, in light of doubts particular about the fairness of foreign criminal procedures due to the iversity of systems of criminal procedure between Member States and fears at criminal suspects facing trial in a foreign system will face de facto disimination. These doubts could be addressed by EU-wide harmonization of Civil Cooperation654 who argue for greater similarity in national civil procedural laws, but shied away from any significant steps in that direction. That reticence under question eventually, particularly if the Common Frame of L"'.1~leTe,!lC( contract law is further developed. . As for human rights, while the EU's civil cooperation measures have nse to the same concerns over civil liberties and human rights protection Issues discussed in this book, all such matters fall within the scope of ECHR. The case law ofthe Court ofJustice has largely (but not entirelv) the right balance between developing efficient rules on civil jurisdiction mutual recognition ofjudgment, on the one hand, and the protection rights on the other. Furthermore, effective civil cooperation measures desirable result of assisting the Member States to fulfil their Article 6 to guarantee a trial within a reasonable time and to ensure the execuno, judgments. 9.2.1 Cooperation before the Treaty of Amsterdam 657Institutional framework and overview below. 2 See 9.6.1.1 below. 3 See 9.7 below. 4 See ibid. and 9.7.4 below. ratification details of all of the Conventions and Protocols, see Appendix 1. EPC process, see 2.2.1.1 above. 8 See 9.5.1,9.6.1.1, and 9.7 below. ratification details of all of the Conventions and Protocols, see Appendix 1. 48-53 of the Convention (Chapter 2 ofTitle lll), [2000] OJ L 239. See 9.6.1 below. 59-66 ofthe Convention (Chapter 4 of Title lll). See 9.5.1 below. 67-69 ofthe Convention (Chapter 5 of Title lll). See 9.7.1.2 below. respectively 9.6.1 and 9.7.1.1 below. particularly Arts 95, 98, and 100 ofthe Convention. On the SIS, see 12.6.1.1 below. 9.5.1 below. hich addressed in turn: extradition;' mutual assistance in transferring evidence." .e international validity of criminal judgments (or transfer of sentences);" the nsfer of sentenced persons, with a subsequent protocol);" and measures conrning the proceeds ofcrime.5 Most ofthese Conventions have been universally tified by Member States, but the Convention on the international validity of iminal judgments attracted much less interest." At first, the EU Member States focused on agreeing European Political Qoperation (EPe) Conventions that would enhance the application of the ouncil of Europe Conventions among themselves, and encourage cooperation tween Member States in the areas where the Council of Europe Conventions d attracted little enthusiasm.' To this end, they agreed on Conventions conrning the application of a Council of Europe terrorism Convention (which ntains further extradition and mutual assistance rules), the faxing of extradin requests, the international validity ofcriminaljudgments, and the transfer of tenced persons." However, none ofthese EPC Conventions entered into force, they failed to attract much enthusiasm among Member States." Outside the framework of cooperation between the (then) EEC Member tes, the 1990 Schengen Convention contained a number of detailed provison cross-border cooperation, addressing mutual assistance," extradition,'! the transfer ofsentenced persons." The Schengen Executive Committee also ted two relevant Decisions, concerning mutual assistance as regards drug icking and a separate agreement concerning cooperation regarding road trafoffences.D Furthermore, the Schengen Information System (SIS) contains data use to prosecutions and judicial investigations, in particular as regards extradirI, wanted persons, and objects which could be used as evidence." With the entry into force of the Treaty of Maastricht, the EU had a forLintergovernmental framework to address criminal procedural issues. The in development during the 'Maastricht era' was the signature of two extradiConventions in 1995 and 1996, concerning in turn consented and disputed clition." These Conventions sought to reduce or eliminate a number ofthe bars to extradition under the Council ofEurope Conventions. During this there were also lengthy attempts, starting in 1995, to agree a Convention Criminal Law: Mutual Recognition and Criminal Procedure656 9.2. Institutional framework and nVPI"\/IP1~A' domestic criminal procedural law, but there have been objections in such measures due to the limited legal powers of the EU as regards criminal procedure, qualms about harmonization of national law in sensitive and distinctive field, and doubts about the necessity of such in light of the fair trial provisions of the European Convention of Rights (ECHR) and the possibility of enforcing those rights in the Europe Court of Human Rights. But in the absence ofharmonized procedural the 'free movement of prosecutions and sentences' could arguably violation of the right to a fair trial. To address these concerns, the Lisbon provides for a specific legal base for the adoption of measures re ing domestic criminal procedure, and the EU has committed itself legislation in this area. This chapter surveys these issues in detail, starting with the of the institutional framework, an overview of measures adopted, petence, territorial scope, human rights, and overlaps with other In"n·~1 t EU law. It then examines the EU's mutual recognition measures, with extradition and the 'flagship' European Arrest Warrant, moving lyse pre-trial measures addressing issues such as the movement of and freezing orders, and then post-trial measures such as the recogrntio) sentences and confiscation orders and the transfer of prisoners. It ines EU harmonization of domestic criminal procedure, in the SPI~C1t1C referred to in the Treaty of Lisbon (evidence law, suspects' rights, tirns' rights). Finally, it concludes by examining the issues of acrrumstr: cooperation and EU funding and external relations, as they apply to procedure. Issues related to jurisdiction (including cross-border double JeopaDClY; prosecution, notably the development of Eurojust and the nrosnecr ing a European Public Prosecutor, are addressed separately in '--"w!:,'.u connected issue of substantive criminal law is addressed in Chapter closely related issue ofpolicing is examined in Chapter 12. As noted chapter, this book observes the English distinction between the prosecuno trial process before the courts (addressed in this chapter) and the inv'csti,iZal crime by the police or similar authorities (addressed in Chapter 12), in continental countries, investigations are more closely linked to process. Before the entry into force ofthe Treaty ofAmsterdam in 1999, the uu"u 0",.., the law on international criminal procedure was Council U'~~~ national courts.i'" The adoption offurther measures in this area was also enc aged by the Hague Programme of2004, and its related Action Plan." As for approximation oflegislation, there was no real development as regard law ofevidence or suspects and defendants' rights. 32 However, victims' and Criminal Law in the European Union: Has the Council Got it Wrong?', (2004) 41 at 7-10. 27 Direct enforcement means application of the foreign decision without cedure in the executing Member State. Indirect enforcement means that SOme (usually quite limited) by the executing State's authorities is necessary before the executed there. 2B See 29 See the Communication on this issue (COM (2007) 693, 13 Nov 2(07). 30 See further 9.5.2 below. 31 [2005] OJ C 53/1 and [2005] OJ C 198/1. See also the Commission communication recognition and harmonization of criminal law (COM (2005) 195, 19 May 2005; SEC 20 May 2005). n See 661Institutional framework and overview )See 9.8.3 below. 34 See 12.6.1.1 below. ~5J2008] OJ L 350/60. See 12.6.4 below. 36 See generally ch 10 below. 37 Cases: C-l05/03 Pupino[2005] ECR 1-5285; C-467/05 Dell'Orto [2007] ECR 1-5557; C-404/07 tz [2008] ECR 1-7607; C-205/09 Eredics, pending (opinion ofl July 2010); and C-483/09 Gueye, dingo On the substance of these cases, see 9.8.3 below. 38 Case C-303/05 Advocaten voor de Wereld [2007] ECR 1-3633. On the substance see 9.5.2 below. "Cases: C-66/08 Koslowski [2008] ECR 1-6041; C-296/08 PPU Santesteban Goicoechea [2008] R 1-6307; C-388/08 PPU Leymann and Pustovarov [2008] ECR 1-8993; C-123/08 Wolzenburg 009] ECR 1-9621; C-261/09Mantello, pending (opinion of7 Sep 2010); and C-306/09 lB, pending pinion of 6 July 2010). On the substance, see ibid. 40 The Court ofJustice has not yet been asked whether an identical clause must be interpreted the illeway in different mutual recognition instruments, although see the opinion in Mantello (ibid). .2.2.3. Basic principles of mutual recognition in criminal law lthough the various EU measures setting out the details of the principle of utual recognition in criminal law differ in the detail, they have certain common tures which it is useful to summarize at the outset." These features remain evant following the entry into force of the Treaty ofLisbon, as the pre-Lisbon easures will remain in force until replaced or amended, and since post-Lisbon easures appear set to follow the template established by previously adopted easures. A frequent feature of the mutual recognition measures is that they replace or plement the Council of Europe measures referred to above, whether those ad.dressed in particular by both a third pillar measure on their position in criminal rocedure and by an EC law (as it then was) measure on cornpensatiou." Other relevant measures have included the development of the Schengen formation System (S1S), in particular as regards the inclusion of further data levant to prosecutions, access to the S1Sby judicial authorities, and the creation second-generation SIS (S1S II), which will in particular include information nEAWs.34 Also, the Framework Decision on personal data protection, adopted ir12008, also applies to the judicial sector." There is also a link between measures on substantive criminal law and abolition of the dual criminality principle (the requirement that an (alleged) act must mount to a criminal offence in both States concerned) in the EU's mutual recognition measures, because the harmonization of substantive criminal law reduces the differences between national rules which underlie the principle of al crirninahtv.r" Finally, the Court ofJustice had begun to play a significant role as regards terpretation of measures in this area even before the Treaty of Lisbon entered to force, receiving five references for interpretation ofthe Framework Decision crime victims' rights;" a reference on the validity ofthe Framework Decision the European Arrest Warrarit;" and six references on the interpretation of the me Framework Decision;" Criminal Law: Mutual Recognition and Criminal Procedure660 included a list oftwenty-four measures, ranked by priority, but without concluding the programme as a whole or agreeing individual measures. According to its introduction, the mutual recognition programme was subject to a number of 'parameters': whether each measure should be in scope or limited to specific crimes; whether the concept of double ity (requiring the act in question to be a crime in both the requesting requested State) should be dropped; 'mechanisms for safeguarding the third parties, victims and suspects'; the need to define 'common minimum ards' necessary to facilitate mutual recognition (for example, the cornpeter of courts); whether enforcement is direct or indirect;" the grounds for recognition (such as public policy and double jeopardy, and exclusion fiscal, or political offences); and the existence of 'liability arrangements event of acquittal'. Before the entry into force ofthe Treaty ofLisbon, this programme was mented by Framework Decisions on: a European Arrest Warrant (EAW), w replaces extradition between Member States; freezing orders; the mutual recti nition offinancial penalties; execution ofconfiscation orders (and related dom tic law on confiscation); a European Evidence Warrant (following an earlier Convention and Protocol on mutual assistance in criminal matters); the tran of sentenced persons; probation and parole orders; pre-trial supervision ord' recognition ofconvictions; the exchange ofcriminal records; and in absentiain (trials held without the attendance of the accused)." However, the Commiss decided against proposing EU legislation on witness protection.i" The development ofEU policy in this area was clearly accelerated by thet rorist attacks of 11 September 2001, which were followed almost instantlvbv proposal to establish the EAWand the agreement on the text. This Framew Decision became the 'flagship' of the EU's mutual recognition policy-bu was subsequently attacked on human rights grounds in the Court ofJustice>~ national courts.i'" The adoption offurther measures in this area was also enc aged by the Hague Programme of2004, and its related Action Plan." As for approximation oflegislation, there was no real development as regard law ofevidence or suspects and defendants' rights. 32 However, victims' and Criminal Law in the European Union: Has the Council Got it Wrong?', (2004) 41 at 7-10. 27 Direct enforcement means application of the foreign decision without cedure in the executing Member State. Indirect enforcement means that SOme (usually quite limited) by the executing State's authorities is necessary before the executed there. 2B See 29 See the Communication on this issue (COM (2007) 693, 13 Nov 2(07). 30 See further 9.5.2 below. 31 [2005] OJ C 53/1 and [2005] OJ C 198/1. See also the Commission communication recognition and harmonization of criminal law (COM (2005) 195, 19 May 2005; SEC 20 May 2005). n See 663Institutional framework and overview ofmutual recognition, the decision ofthe issuing State (comparable to the 'home State' in free movement law) takes effect as such within the legal system of the executing State (comparable to the 'host State' in free movement law), subject to the remaining grounds for refusal to execute that decision. Therefore, the effect of a mutual recognition system is that the executing State has in principle lost some ofits sovereign power over the full control of the enforcement of criminal decisions on its territory. With some mutual recognition measures, there have been issues of material scope (ie defining the concept ofcriminal proceedings) as well as, to some extent, personal scope (ie limitations based on nationality and/or residence). The traditional ground of refusal as regards criminal cooperation, dual criminality, has been abolished in most cases for a standard list of thirty-two crimes, as defined by the issuing State, subject to a three-year threshold of possible punishment (ie the actual sentence which was imposed, or which is subsequently imposed in the event ofa conviction, is not relevant for this purpose)." Other traditional grounds pf refusal (political offences, military offences) have also been abolished, and the traditional 'fiscal offence' ground for refusal is now limited by the standard ualification that it cannot be applied merely because the two States in question different taxes or duties. As for human rights, there are standard clauses in the main text and the preto the mutual recognition legislation," but almost all of these measures the fundamental question as to whether Member States mayor must refuse recogrnze other Member States' judgments or decisions on human rights grounds-v-an issue discussed further below." Other remaining grounds for refusal forms ofrestriction applying to most or all Framework Decisions (somesubject to further exceptions or special procedural obligations) include: territoriality (ie the possibility of refusing execution because the act concerned place partly or wholly on the territory of the executing State);"? de minimis (ie the amount ofa financial penalty, the length ofthe sentence which was or be imposed, or the amount ofthe time ofcustodial sentence or supervision still left to serve); double jeopardy or ne bis in idem, which raises questions whether the general EU double jeopardy rules, including the provisions of EU Charter of Rights, take precedence over the specific rules in the mutual 'recognition legislation;" the age of criminal responsibility; lapse of time (also as statute-barring, ie the expiry of a time limit to begin and/or conclude prosecution); lis pendens (ie proceedings for the same offence underway in the this list ofcrimes, see Art 2(2) ofthe Framework Decision establishing the European Arrest ([2002] OJ L 190/1). 45 See 9.5-9.7 below, in particular the discussion in 9.5.2. 9.3.5 and 9.5.2. 47 On criminal jurisdiction generally, see 11.5 below. On the general double jeopardy rules, and the case for giving priority to those rules over mutual recognition measures, see 11.8 below. Criminal Law: Mutual Recognition and Criminal Procedure662 measures have the full support of Member States or only limited support, should be recalled that even those Council of Europe measures with wide su port by Member States have restrictions on their scope and significant possibilit for reservations, or provide only a general framework for cross-border crimin law cooperation. So there is a clear perceived 'added value' to the EU's involve ment, which principle provides for a far more intensive degree of cooperatio In most cases, the EU mutual recognition measures 'replace' the 'correspondin provisions of the relevant Council of Europe Conventions and prior EU meas ures as between Member States, without specifying exactly which provisionsjo the relevant Conventions are replaced. Most ofthe EU measures give a powert Member States to retain existing bilateral or multilateral treaties, or to conch'! new bilateral or multilateral treaties, which expand or enlarge on the EU mutu recognition measures or simplify and facilitate the procedures for mutual reeo nition, subject to an obligation to inform the Council and/or Commission abo such measures. This begs the question as to when such criteria are met." A furth underlying question is whether pursuant to such provisions, Member Statesc reduce protections regarding human rights in order to facilitate the movem ofjudgments and decisions between Member States." During the Amsterdam era, mutual recognition measures always took thefo ofFramework Decisions, while so far, all ofthe post-Lisbon proposals and agr measures have taken the form ofDirectives. Their application by Member Sta: has been reviewed by the Commission several years after the implementati date. In a few cases, there have been time-limited derogations for a small nu of Member States. Usually the mutual recognition measures apply regardle when the underlying (alleged) criminal offence was committed, but in Member States must or may limit the effect of the measures in time. As for the substance, each ofthe mutual recognition measures sets out gation to recognize another Member State's judgment or decision, with grounds for a refusal to recognize such decisions. The measures refer to ing' State and the 'executing' State, rather than the 'requesting' and ·~~~.. ~n. State pursuant to Council ofEurope measures-demonstrating the degree of obligation as compared to the latter measures, and the more difference between the principle of mutual recognition in criminal traditional judicial cooperation rules. Although, in the sphere eration, the discretion of the requested State over whetherto assist the State has been limited by successive treaties, a fundamental degree of over whether to assist the requesting State remains." Conversely, in 41 See further 9.10 below. 42 See 9.3.5 and 9.5.2 below. 43 See A Weyembergh, 'La reconnaissance mutuelle des decisions judiciaires en entre les Etats Membres de l'Union europeenne: mise en perspective' in G de Kerchove A Weyembergh, eds, La reconnaissance mutuelle des decisionsjudiciaires penales dans (Institut d'Etudes Europeennes, 2001), 25-63. 663Institutional framework and overview ofmutual recognition, the decision ofthe issuing State (comparable to the 'home State' in free movement law) takes effect as such within the legal system of the executing State (comparable to the 'host State' in free movement law), subject to the remaining grounds for refusal to execute that decision. Therefore, the effect of a mutual recognition system is that the executing State has in principle lost some ofits sovereign power over the full control of the enforcement of criminal decisions on its territory. With some mutual recognition measures, there have been issues of material scope (ie defining the concept ofcriminal proceedings) as well as, to some extent, personal scope (ie limitations based on nationality and/or residence). The traditional ground of refusal as regards criminal cooperation, dual criminality, has been abolished in most cases for a standard list of thirty-two crimes, as defined by the issuing State, subject to a three-year threshold of possible punishment (ie the actual sentence which was imposed, or which is subsequently imposed in the event ofa conviction, is not relevant for this purpose)." Other traditional grounds pf refusal (political offences, military offences) have also been abolished, and the traditional 'fiscal offence' ground for refusal is now limited by the standard ualification that it cannot be applied merely because the two States in question different taxes or duties. As for human rights, there are standard clauses in the main text and the preto the mutual recognition legislation," but almost all of these measures the fundamental question as to whether Member States mayor must refuse recogrnze other Member States' judgments or decisions on human rights grounds-v-an issue discussed further below." Other remaining grounds for refusal forms ofrestriction applying to most or all Framework Decisions (somesubject to further exceptions or special procedural obligations) include: territoriality (ie the possibility of refusing execution because the act concerned place partly or wholly on the territory of the executing State);"? de minimis (ie the amount ofa financial penalty, the length ofthe sentence which was or be imposed, or the amount ofthe time ofcustodial sentence or supervision still left to serve); double jeopardy or ne bis in idem, which raises questions whether the general EU double jeopardy rules, including the provisions of EU Charter of Rights, take precedence over the specific rules in the mutual 'recognition legislation;" the age of criminal responsibility; lapse of time (also as statute-barring, ie the expiry of a time limit to begin and/or conclude prosecution); lis pendens (ie proceedings for the same offence underway in the this list ofcrimes, see Art 2(2) ofthe Framework Decision establishing the European Arrest ([2002] OJ L 190/1). 45 See 9.5-9.7 below, in particular the discussion in 9.5.2. 9.3.5 and 9.5.2. 47 On criminal jurisdiction generally, see 11.5 below. On the general double jeopardy rules, and the case for giving priority to those rules over mutual recognition measures, see 11.8 below. Criminal Law: Mutual Recognition and Criminal Procedure662 measures have the full support of Member States or only limited support, should be recalled that even those Council of Europe measures with wide su port by Member States have restrictions on their scope and significant possibilit for reservations, or provide only a general framework for cross-border crimin law cooperation. So there is a clear perceived 'added value' to the EU's involve ment, which principle provides for a far more intensive degree of cooperatio In most cases, the EU mutual recognition measures 'replace' the 'correspondin provisions of the relevant Council of Europe Conventions and prior EU meas ures as between Member States, without specifying exactly which provisionsjo the relevant Conventions are replaced. Most ofthe EU measures give a powert Member States to retain existing bilateral or multilateral treaties, or to conch'! new bilateral or multilateral treaties, which expand or enlarge on the EU mutu recognition measures or simplify and facilitate the procedures for mutual reeo nition, subject to an obligation to inform the Council and/or Commission abo such measures. This begs the question as to when such criteria are met." A furth underlying question is whether pursuant to such provisions, Member Statesc reduce protections regarding human rights in order to facilitate the movem ofjudgments and decisions between Member States." During the Amsterdam era, mutual recognition measures always took thefo ofFramework Decisions, while so far, all ofthe post-Lisbon proposals and agr measures have taken the form ofDirectives. Their application by Member Sta: has been reviewed by the Commission several years after the implementati date. In a few cases, there have been time-limited derogations for a small nu of Member States. Usually the mutual recognition measures apply regardle when the underlying (alleged) criminal offence was committed, but in Member States must or may limit the effect of the measures in time. As for the substance, each ofthe mutual recognition measures sets out gation to recognize another Member State's judgment or decision, with grounds for a refusal to recognize such decisions. The measures refer to ing' State and the 'executing' State, rather than the 'requesting' and ·~~~.. ~n. State pursuant to Council ofEurope measures-demonstrating the degree of obligation as compared to the latter measures, and the more difference between the principle of mutual recognition in criminal traditional judicial cooperation rules. Although, in the sphere eration, the discretion of the requested State over whetherto assist the State has been limited by successive treaties, a fundamental degree of over whether to assist the requesting State remains." Conversely, in 41 See further 9.10 below. 42 See 9.3.5 and 9.5.2 below. 43 See A Weyembergh, 'La reconnaissance mutuelle des decisions judiciaires en entre les Etats Membres de l'Union europeenne: mise en perspective' in G de Kerchove A Weyembergh, eds, La reconnaissance mutuelle des decisionsjudiciaires penales dans (Institut d'Etudes Europeennes, 2001), 25-63. 9.2.3. Treaty of Lisbon 49 On the coordination of multiple prosecutions, see 11.6 below. so On the standard in absentia exception, see 9.3.5 and 9.5.2 below. 665Institutional framework and overview 83(3) TFEU; see 10.2.3 below. 52 See 2.2.3.4.1 above. 53 See 9.2.4 below. 11.6-11.8. On jurisdiction over offences as such, see 11.5. 11.9 and 11.10. On the question of competing legal bases which might result, see 9.2.4 accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, establish minimum rules. Such shall take into account the differences between the legal traditions and systems of Member States. They shall concern: (a) mutual admissibility of evidence between Member States; the rights ofindividuals in criminal procedure; the rights ofvictims ofcrime; any other specific aspects of criminal procedure which the Council has identified in advance by a decision; for the adoption ofsuch a decision, the Council shall act unanimously after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament. i).clop,tlClU of the minimum rules referred to in this paragraph shall not prevent Member from maintaining or introducing a higher level of protection for individuals. Treaty of Lisbon made a fundamental change to the decision-making in area, applying the 'ordinary legislative procedure' (qualified majority voting in Council and joint powers for the EP) in place ofthe prior rule ofunain Council with consultation ofthe EP. However, Article 82(3) TFEU sets a special 'emergency brake' rule, allowing a Member State to halt discussions a measure proposed pursuant to Article 82(2) (but not Article 82(1)) 'would fundamental aspects ofits criminal justice system'. This special procedure, also applies to the adoption ofsubstantive criminal law measures,51 is disin detail in Chapter 2.52 However, the application of this rule to Article but not to Article 82(1), makes it necessary to distinguish between these legal bases.P The power to adopt measures concerning the prevention and settlement of conflicts ofjurisdiction (Article 82(1)(b)) is discussed in Chapter 11.54 Criminal procedure issues might also result from measures adopted regarding Eurojust and the European Public Prosecutor (Articles 85 and 86 TFEU); such are also discussed in Chapter 11.55 to the previous Treaty provisions, Article 82 TFEU includes a eference to the principle of mutual recognition, which must include approxiof law. The Treaty retains a reference to facilitating (but not accelerating) cQoper:atlon between judicial or equivalent authorities (but not also ministries). However, the specific reference to facilitating extradition was dropped. There is reference to ensuring mutual recognition instead, along with a further reference to judicial training. The previous power regarding ensuring ofnational law was replaced by Article 82(2) TFEU Although the reference to the basic principle ofmutual recognition is new as compared previous Treaty rules, this principle had already been used as the basic princrple governing the adoption of criminal law legislation within the previous Criminal Law: Mutual Recognition and Criminal Procedure664 The relevant provision ofthe Treaties following the entry into force ofLisbon is Article 82 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European (TFEU): executing State);" immunity; amnesty or pardon-although sometimes question ofapplicable law; in absentia trials, although the rules on this issue relevant legislation have been harrnonized>'' and the rule ofspecialty (ie on prosecuting a person for an offence other than that which motivated the nal mutual recognition decision). The mutual recognition legislation also includes technical rules on proCeS5'111.~ applications, costs, and languages, as well as the use ofstandard forms. Decision or judgments are issued through judges or prosecutors, not ministries Council of Europe measures. There are generally strict time limits to with (or refuse) the issuing State's decisions, as well as rules on applicable cedural law issues (ie determining when the power to take further decisions transferred to the executing State, and when it is retained or transferred the issuing State). Finally, an obvious distinction between the Council of Europe legal work and the EU legal framework is the jurisdiction of the Court interpret the relevant EU measures, and thereby to ensure a greater uniform interpretation. 1. Judicial cooperation in criminal matters in the Union shall be based on the of mutual recognition ofjudgments and judicial decisions and shall include the mation of the laws and regulations ofthe Member States in the areas referred to graph 2 and in Article 83. The European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the legislative procedure, shall adopt measures to: (a) lay down rules and procedures for ensuring recognition throughout the all forms ofjudgments and judicial decisions; (b) prevent and settle conflicts ofjurisdiction between Member States; (c) support the training of the judiciary and judicial staff; (d) facilitate cooperation between judicial or equivalent authorities of States in relation to proceedings in criminal matters and the enforcement decisions. 2. To the extent necessary to facilitate mutual recognition of judgments and decisions and police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters having a cross-bore dimension, the European Parliament and the Council may, by means of directives 9.2.3. Treaty of Lisbon 49 On the coordination of multiple prosecutions, see 11.6 below. so On the standard in absentia exception, see 9.3.5 and 9.5.2 below. 665Institutional framework and overview 83(3) TFEU; see 10.2.3 below. 52 See 2.2.3.4.1 above. 53 See 9.2.4 below. 11.6-11.8. On jurisdiction over offences as such, see 11.5. 11.9 and 11.10. On the question of competing legal bases which might result, see 9.2.4 accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, establish minimum rules. Such shall take into account the differences between the legal traditions and systems of Member States. They shall concern: (a) mutual admissibility of evidence between Member States; the rights ofindividuals in criminal procedure; the rights ofvictims ofcrime; any other specific aspects of criminal procedure which the Council has identified in advance by a decision; for the adoption ofsuch a decision, the Council shall act unanimously after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament. i).clop,tlClU of the minimum rules referred to in this paragraph shall not prevent Member from maintaining or introducing a higher level of protection for individuals. Treaty of Lisbon made a fundamental change to the decision-making in area, applying the 'ordinary legislative procedure' (qualified majority voting in Council and joint powers for the EP) in place ofthe prior rule ofunain Council with consultation ofthe EP. However, Article 82(3) TFEU sets a special 'emergency brake' rule, allowing a Member State to halt discussions a measure proposed pursuant to Article 82(2) (but not Article 82(1)) 'would fundamental aspects ofits criminal justice system'. This special procedure, also applies to the adoption ofsubstantive criminal law measures,51 is disin detail in Chapter 2.52 However, the application of this rule to Article but not to Article 82(1), makes it necessary to distinguish between these legal bases.P The power to adopt measures concerning the prevention and settlement of conflicts ofjurisdiction (Article 82(1)(b)) is discussed in Chapter 11.54 Criminal procedure issues might also result from measures adopted regarding Eurojust and the European Public Prosecutor (Articles 85 and 86 TFEU); such are also discussed in Chapter 11.55 to the previous Treaty provisions, Article 82 TFEU includes a eference to the principle of mutual recognition, which must include approxiof law. The Treaty retains a reference to facilitating (but not accelerating) cQoper:atlon between judicial or equivalent authorities (but not also ministries). However, the specific reference to facilitating extradition was dropped. There is reference to ensuring mutual recognition instead, along with a further reference to judicial training. The previous power regarding ensuring ofnational law was replaced by Article 82(2) TFEU Although the reference to the basic principle ofmutual recognition is new as compared previous Treaty rules, this principle had already been used as the basic princrple governing the adoption of criminal law legislation within the previous Criminal Law: Mutual Recognition and Criminal Procedure664 The relevant provision ofthe Treaties following the entry into force ofLisbon is Article 82 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European (TFEU): executing State);" immunity; amnesty or pardon-although sometimes question ofapplicable law; in absentia trials, although the rules on this issue relevant legislation have been harrnonized>'' and the rule ofspecialty (ie on prosecuting a person for an offence other than that which motivated the nal mutual recognition decision). The mutual recognition legislation also includes technical rules on proCeS5'111.~ applications, costs, and languages, as well as the use ofstandard forms. Decision or judgments are issued through judges or prosecutors, not ministries Council of Europe measures. There are generally strict time limits to with (or refuse) the issuing State's decisions, as well as rules on applicable cedural law issues (ie determining when the power to take further decisions transferred to the executing State, and when it is retained or transferred the issuing State). Finally, an obvious distinction between the Council of Europe legal work and the EU legal framework is the jurisdiction of the Court interpret the relevant EU measures, and thereby to ensure a greater uniform interpretation. 1. Judicial cooperation in criminal matters in the Union shall be based on the of mutual recognition ofjudgments and judicial decisions and shall include the mation of the laws and regulations ofthe Member States in the areas referred to graph 2 and in Article 83. The European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the legislative procedure, shall adopt measures to: (a) lay down rules and procedures for ensuring recognition throughout the all forms ofjudgments and judicial decisions; (b) prevent and settle conflicts ofjurisdiction between Member States; (c) support the training of the judiciary and judicial staff; (d) facilitate cooperation between judicial or equivalent authorities of States in relation to proceedings in criminal matters and the enforcement decisions. 2. To the extent necessary to facilitate mutual recognition of judgments and decisions and police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters having a cross-bore dimension, the European Parliament and the Council may, by means of directives 667Institutional framework and overview Competence issues (2010] OJ C 115/1 and COM (2010) 171,20 Apr 2010; see also the 'roadmap' on suspects' rights 09] OJ C 295/1). See further the summaries offuture plans in 9.6-9.10 below. '.See similarly the discussion of competence in 10.2.4 below. °This interpretation is confirmed by the Opinions in Cases C-I05/03 Pupino (2005] ECR ;285 (paras 48-52) and C-303/05 Advocaten voor de Wereld (2007] ECR 1-3633 (note 21). See also eOpinion in Case C-467/05 Dell'Orto (2007] ECR 1-5557, paras 36-37. For a different view, see Mitsilegas, 'Trust-Building Measures in the EuropeanJudicial Area in Criminal Matters: Issues of ompetence, Legitimacy and Institutional Balance', in T Balzacq and S Carrera, eds, Security versus dam? A Challenge for Europe's Future (Ashgate, 2006), 282, who asserts that the previous TEU no competence to adopt measures on criminal procedure. discussion here on this point is adapted from S Peers, 'EU Criminal Law and the Treaty (2008) 33 ELRev (2008) 507 at 510-514. Furthermore, Art 82(2) requires the use ofDirectives, whereas Art 82(1) does not. case law on dual legal bases, see 3.2.4 above. treezmg and confiscation of assets), recognition of financial penalties, mutual admissibility of evidence, the rights of criminal suspects, and victims' rights." the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, there was a dispute as to w!JletJJ.er the EU could harmonize domestic criminal procedural law, in particular Article 31(1)(a)-(d) of the previous TEU referred essentially to crossmatters, with only Article 31(1)(c) referring to powers to 'ensur[e] cornpatin rules applicable in the Member States, as may be necessary to improve cooperation'. This issue remains relevant after the entry into force of the of Lisbon, as long as there are still pre-existing measures in force whose "01;...1;,." could still be called into question. On this point, the opening words of ~ previous Article 31(1) TEU provided that '[c]ommon action onjudicial cooption in criminal matters shall include'the following list ofmeasures, indicating arly that this list was non-exhaustive."? In any event, a broad interpretation of ticle 31(1)(c) could be envisaged, in particular since the harmonization oflaw procedural protection for suspects could in fact have facilitated national courts' illingness to cooperate with foreign courts." As for competence issues following the entry into force ofthe Treaty ofLisbon, ~.:basic issues arising are the extent of the competence conferred by Article 82 :ppU as such, including the distinction between Article 82(1) and (2),71 and the tinction between Article 82 and the rest of the JHA provisions. These issues be examined in turn. :pirst of all, it is necessary to distinguish Article 82(1) and (2) TFEU, on the that one paragraph is subject to the emergency brake and the other is It would certainly be necessary to draw this distinction if a duallegal basis paragraphs would be considered incompatible due to this difference in ecision-making." However, since the emergency brake is not applicable every Criminal Law: Mutual Recognition and Criminal Procedure third pillar legal framework." The specific requirement that judicial cooperatioi 'shall include' approximation of procedural and substantive law indicates that the EU cannot limit itself to adopting mutual recognition measures. In the first nine months after the entry into force of the Treaty of there were five proposals or initiatives in this area: two competing proposals concerning interpretation and translation rights for criminal suspects ofwhich has been agreed between the Council and EP);57a proposal to a European protection order.l" a proposal to establish a European Investigatio Order.i" and a proposal on the right to information for criminal suspects. substantive criminal law proposals (one ofthem agreed within the C()U1J.CI.l) include a dual legal base relating to procedural law." So far, the 'emergcncybr, has not been pulled. The Commission also suggested the conclusion ties in this field that had been signed, but not concluded, before the entry force of the Treaty ofLisbon.62 This area is subject to the enhanced jurisdiction of the Court measures adopted after the Treaty of Lisbon; this jurisdiction will also pre-existing measures after the end of a five-year transitional period (so 1 December 2014) and to any pre-existing measures which are amended this transitional period;" In the first few months after the entry into the Treaty of Lisbon, there were three references to the Court ofJustice area." The revised rules on opt-outs from JHA matters also apply to this do the general provisions ofTitle V ofPart Three ofthe TFEU, in particular provision that the Union JHA policy must have 'respect for tundamental and the different legal systems and traditions of the Member States'," power to adopt measures concerning cooperation between the administratic of Member States." For the future, the Stockholm programme and the action plan concerning implementation provide inter alia for measures on the proceeds ofcrime (acldl'es:~~ 56 See 9.2.2 above. 57 (2010] OJ C 69/1 and COM (2010) 82, 9 Mar 2010. See 9.8.2 below. 58 (2010] OJ C 69/5. See 9.7.6 below. 59 (2010] OJ C 165/22. See 9.6.1.3 below. 60 COM (2010) 392, 20 July 2010. See 9.8.2 below. 61 COM (2010) 94 and 95, 29 Mar 2010, concerning sexual offences against children ficking in persons. On the legal base issues, see 9.2.4 below. For the Council's agreement latter proposal, see Council doe 10845/10, 10 June 2010; the Council must still agree on this proposal. 62 See 63 On these transitional rules, see 2.2.3.3 above. The proposal for a European InvestigationC (n 59 above) would repeal one pre-existing measure and replace the corresponding several others. 64 Cases: C-l/I0 Salmeron Sanchez, pending, on the interpretation of the Framework on standing of victims; C-I05/10 PPU Gataev, withdrawn, concerning the interpretation Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant; and C-264/10 Kita, pending, on issue. 65 See 66 Art 67(1) TFED. 67 Art 74 TFED. On the general provisions, see 2.2.3.2 666 667Institutional framework and overview Competence issues (2010] OJ C 115/1 and COM (2010) 171,20 Apr 2010; see also the 'roadmap' on suspects' rights 09] OJ C 295/1). See further the summaries offuture plans in 9.6-9.10 below. '.See similarly the discussion of competence in 10.2.4 below. °This interpretation is confirmed by the Opinions in Cases C-I05/03 Pupino (2005] ECR ;285 (paras 48-52) and C-303/05 Advocaten voor de Wereld (2007] ECR 1-3633 (note 21). See also eOpinion in Case C-467/05 Dell'Orto (2007] ECR 1-5557, paras 36-37. For a different view, see Mitsilegas, 'Trust-Building Measures in the EuropeanJudicial Area in Criminal Matters: Issues of ompetence, Legitimacy and Institutional Balance', in T Balzacq and S Carrera, eds, Security versus dam? A Challenge for Europe's Future (Ashgate, 2006), 282, who asserts that the previous TEU no competence to adopt measures on criminal procedure. discussion here on this point is adapted from S Peers, 'EU Criminal Law and the Treaty (2008) 33 ELRev (2008) 507 at 510-514. Furthermore, Art 82(2) requires the use ofDirectives, whereas Art 82(1) does not. case law on dual legal bases, see 3.2.4 above. treezmg and confiscation of assets), recognition of financial penalties, mutual admissibility of evidence, the rights of criminal suspects, and victims' rights." the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, there was a dispute as to w!JletJJ.er the EU could harmonize domestic criminal procedural law, in particular Article 31(1)(a)-(d) of the previous TEU referred essentially to crossmatters, with only Article 31(1)(c) referring to powers to 'ensur[e] cornpatin rules applicable in the Member States, as may be necessary to improve cooperation'. This issue remains relevant after the entry into force of the of Lisbon, as long as there are still pre-existing measures in force whose "01;...1;,." could still be called into question. On this point, the opening words of ~ previous Article 31(1) TEU provided that '[c]ommon action onjudicial cooption in criminal matters shall include'the following list ofmeasures, indicating arly that this list was non-exhaustive."? In any event, a broad interpretation of ticle 31(1)(c) could be envisaged, in particular since the harmonization oflaw procedural protection for suspects could in fact have facilitated national courts' illingness to cooperate with foreign courts." As for competence issues following the entry into force ofthe Treaty ofLisbon, ~.:basic issues arising are the extent of the competence conferred by Article 82 :ppU as such, including the distinction between Article 82(1) and (2),71 and the tinction between Article 82 and the rest of the JHA provisions. These issues be examined in turn. :pirst of all, it is necessary to distinguish Article 82(1) and (2) TFEU, on the that one paragraph is subject to the emergency brake and the other is It would certainly be necessary to draw this distinction if a duallegal basis paragraphs would be considered incompatible due to this difference in ecision-making." However, since the emergency brake is not applicable every Criminal Law: Mutual Recognition and Criminal Procedure third pillar legal framework." The specific requirement that judicial cooperatioi 'shall include' approximation of procedural and substantive law indicates that the EU cannot limit itself to adopting mutual recognition measures. In the first nine months after the entry into force of the Treaty of there were five proposals or initiatives in this area: two competing proposals concerning interpretation and translation rights for criminal suspects ofwhich has been agreed between the Council and EP);57a proposal to a European protection order.l" a proposal to establish a European Investigatio Order.i" and a proposal on the right to information for criminal suspects. substantive criminal law proposals (one ofthem agreed within the C()U1J.CI.l) include a dual legal base relating to procedural law." So far, the 'emergcncybr, has not been pulled. The Commission also suggested the conclusion ties in this field that had been signed, but not concluded, before the entry force of the Treaty ofLisbon.62 This area is subject to the enhanced jurisdiction of the Court measures adopted after the Treaty of Lisbon; this jurisdiction will also pre-existing measures after the end of a five-year transitional period (so 1 December 2014) and to any pre-existing measures which are amended this transitional period;" In the first few months after the entry into the Treaty of Lisbon, there were three references to the Court ofJustice area." The revised rules on opt-outs from JHA matters also apply to this do the general provisions ofTitle V ofPart Three ofthe TFEU, in particular provision that the Union JHA policy must have 'respect for tundamental and the different legal systems and traditions of the Member States'," power to adopt measures concerning cooperation between the administratic of Member States." For the future, the Stockholm programme and the action plan concerning implementation provide inter alia for measures on the proceeds ofcrime (acldl'es:~~ 56 See 9.2.2 above. 57 (2010] OJ C 69/1 and COM (2010) 82, 9 Mar 2010. See 9.8.2 below. 58 (2010] OJ C 69/5. See 9.7.6 below. 59 (2010] OJ C 165/22. See 9.6.1.3 below. 60 COM (2010) 392, 20 July 2010. See 9.8.2 below. 61 COM (2010) 94 and 95, 29 Mar 2010, concerning sexual offences against children ficking in persons. On the legal base issues, see 9.2.4 below. For the Council's agreement latter proposal, see Council doe 10845/10, 10 June 2010; the Council must still agree on this proposal. 62 See 63 On these transitional rules, see 2.2.3.3 above. The proposal for a European InvestigationC (n 59 above) would repeal one pre-existing measure and replace the corresponding several others. 64 Cases: C-l/I0 Salmeron Sanchez, pending, on the interpretation of the Framework on standing of victims; C-I05/10 PPU Gataev, withdrawn, concerning the interpretation Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant; and C-264/10 Kita, pending, on issue. 65 See 66 Art 67(1) TFED. 67 Art 74 TFED. On the general provisions, see 2.2.3.2 666 669Institutional framework and overview On these measures, see 9.2.2 above. The EAW Framework Decision also had a legal base ofArt 31(1)(b) TEU, while the Framework on recognition ofprobation and parole orders, and on recognition ofpre-trial orders also base ofArt 31(1)(c)TEU. Moreover, the Framework Decisions on the EEW, the recogniconvictions and criminal records were based generally on Art 31. See, for instance, Cases C-187/01 and 385/01 Gozutok and Brugge [2003] ECR 1-1345, para 33. latter appears to overlap with the former (since it also concerns 'facilitation' of, inter alia, 'judicial cooperation'). Otherwise the specific safeguards in Article 82(2) could be circumvented. Applying these principles, Article 82(1) would be a sufficient legal base for adopting measures such as the Framework Decisions on the EAW; freezing orders; the mutual recognition offinancial penalties and confiscation orders; the European Evidence Warrant (EEW); the transfer ofprisoners; the mutual recognition of criminal sentences; prior convictions and probation/parole and pre-trial orders; mutual assistance and the transfer of information relating to criminal records, as long as the relevant proceedings take place in ajudicial context. All of the legislation adopted on these issues before the entry into force ofthe Treaty of Lisbon was adopted on the basis ofthe previous Article 31(1)(a) TEU,78 which was interpreted to encompass mutual recognition as a form of cooperation between administrations, although several measures were additionally adopted on the basis of other provisions of Article 31(1) TEU79 Article 82 TFEU provides for two separate powers for mutual recognition on the one hand, and cooperation between judicial authorities on the other. In particular, it should be observed that the prior measures on the EEW and mutual assistance rules do not concern the admissibility ofevidence (an issue which falls within the scope ofArticle 82(2)(a) TFEU), but rather the transfer ofevidence between Member States, an issue within the scope ofArticle 82(1). Furthermore, a. measure amending the Schengen double jeopardy rules would not concern the rights of suspects as such (Article 82(2)(b)), but rather fall within the scope of rticle 82(1), since such a measure would concern mutual recognition (according othe Court ofJustice),80 and possibly also conflicts ofjurisdiction. As for Article 82(2) in particular, the adoption ofmeasures on domestic crimiprocedure has to be 'necessary' to 'facilitate mutual recognition and police and [criminal law] cooperation', which has to have a 'cross-border dimension'. Only 'minimum rules' can be adopted, and these rules have to 'take into account' national legal differences. In light ofArticle 82(2)(d), this list ofpowers (unlike the .• t of powers in the prior Article 31(1) TEU) must necessarily be exhaustive. First of all, the concept of 'minimum' rules is implicitly further defined in third sub-paragraph ofArticle 82(2), which provides that Member States are to introduce or maintain higher standards for individuals. This proviso must that Member States are free to provide for higher standards ofprotection for and victims than the EU measures provide for, but not lower standards. Criminal Law: Mutual Recognition and Criminal Procedure 74 The requirement to 'respect' different national legal systems (set out in Art to Art 82(1), but this is arguably a subtly different obligation than the requirement systems into account, as set out in Art 82(2). See the discussion ofthis point 75 Art 83 TFEU. See 10.2.3 and 10.2.4 below. 76 See, by analogy, the special rules regarding recognition ofUKjudgments maintenance proceedings ([2009] OJ L 7/1), discussed in 8.2.5 above. 77 time that Article 82(2) TFEU is used to adopt measures, but will only the exceptional cases where a Member State pulls the brake, then it possible to combine the two provisions. On the other hand, it is certainly sary to distinguish between the two legal bases on the grounds that Article is subject to a number of specific requirements ('necessary to facilitate', a cross-border dimension' and 'tak[ing] into account' different national traditions) which do not apply to Article 82(1).74 In the event of a dual being used, an emergency brake could only be pulled as regards those a proposal that fall within the scope ofArticle 82(2), and so 'fast-track' cooperation could only apply to part ofthe relevant proposal. The remaining'pn visions could still be adopted separately, and would therefore apply to all States. But it is possible that many Member States (and/or the EP) would to adopt a mutual recognition measure, for example, unless all the MemberSta which would be bound by that measure were also bound by a parallel harmonizing procedural law (or substantive criminal law, where the emerger brake also applies)." A reasonable compromise would be to provide in recognition measure for broader grounds for refusal to execute decisions authorities of the Member State(s) which were not participating in to lel measure." The same compromise could also be used to address the UK or Ireland opted into a mutual recognition measure, but out measure. It is surprising to see that Member States were willing to accept the of mutual recognition measures without a veto or at least an emergency given the national constitutional disputes concerning the adoption In light of those disputes, which reflected legitimate national concerns, have been preferable to allow for an emergency brake here as well. applying an emergency brake to both paragraphs would have avoided to distinguish between them. Having said that, how should Article 82(1) and (2) TFEU be distinguIsp First of all, Article 82(1) concerns (inter alia) mutual recognition whereas Article 82(2) concerns procedural harmonization in order (inter alia) mutual recognition. Similarly, Article 82(2) cannot concerning training, since Article 82(1) is a lex specialis for these power in Article 82(1)(d) to 'facilitate cooperation' as regards crimmal ings and enforcement ofdecisions, it cannot extend to the substance procedural laws which fall within the scope of Article 82(2), 668 669Institutional framework and overview On these measures, see 9.2.2 above. The EAW Framework Decision also had a legal base ofArt 31(1)(b) TEU, while the Framework on recognition ofprobation and parole orders, and on recognition ofpre-trial orders also base ofArt 31(1)(c)TEU. Moreover, the Framework Decisions on the EEW, the recogniconvictions and criminal records were based generally on Art 31. See, for instance, Cases C-187/01 and 385/01 Gozutok and Brugge [2003] ECR 1-1345, para 33. latter appears to overlap with the former (since it also concerns 'facilitation' of, inter alia, 'judicial cooperation'). Otherwise the specific safeguards in Article 82(2) could be circumvented. Applying these principles, Article 82(1) would be a sufficient legal base for adopting measures such as the Framework Decisions on the EAW; freezing orders; the mutual recognition offinancial penalties and confiscation orders; the European Evidence Warrant (EEW); the transfer ofprisoners; the mutual recognition of criminal sentences; prior convictions and probation/parole and pre-trial orders; mutual assistance and the transfer of information relating to criminal records, as long as the relevant proceedings take place in ajudicial context. All of the legislation adopted on these issues before the entry into force ofthe Treaty of Lisbon was adopted on the basis ofthe previous Article 31(1)(a) TEU,78 which was interpreted to encompass mutual recognition as a form of cooperation between administrations, although several measures were additionally adopted on the basis of other provisions of Article 31(1) TEU79 Article 82 TFEU provides for two separate powers for mutual recognition on the one hand, and cooperation between judicial authorities on the other. In particular, it should be observed that the prior measures on the EEW and mutual assistance rules do not concern the admissibility ofevidence (an issue which falls within the scope ofArticle 82(2)(a) TFEU), but rather the transfer ofevidence between Member States, an issue within the scope ofArticle 82(1). Furthermore, a. measure amending the Schengen double jeopardy rules would not concern the rights of suspects as such (Article 82(2)(b)), but rather fall within the scope of rticle 82(1), since such a measure would concern mutual recognition (according othe Court ofJustice),80 and possibly also conflicts ofjurisdiction. As for Article 82(2) in particular, the adoption ofmeasures on domestic crimiprocedure has to be 'necessary' to 'facilitate mutual recognition and police and [criminal law] cooperation', which has to have a 'cross-border dimension'. Only 'minimum rules' can be adopted, and these rules have to 'take into account' national legal differences. In light ofArticle 82(2)(d), this list ofpowers (unlike the .• t of powers in the prior Article 31(1) TEU) must necessarily be exhaustive. First of all, the concept of 'minimum' rules is implicitly further defined in third sub-paragraph ofArticle 82(2), which provides that Member States are to introduce or maintain higher standards for individuals. This proviso must that Member States are free to provide for higher standards ofprotection for and victims than the EU measures provide for, but not lower standards. Criminal Law: Mutual Recognition and Criminal Procedure 74 The requirement to 'respect' different national legal systems (set out in Art to Art 82(1), but this is arguably a subtly different obligation than the requirement systems into account, as set out in Art 82(2). See the discussion ofthis point 75 Art 83 TFEU. See 10.2.3 and 10.2.4 below. 76 See, by analogy, the special rules regarding recognition ofUKjudgments maintenance proceedings ([2009] OJ L 7/1), discussed in 8.2.5 above. 77 time that Article 82(2) TFEU is used to adopt measures, but will only the exceptional cases where a Member State pulls the brake, then it possible to combine the two provisions. On the other hand, it is certainly sary to distinguish between the two legal bases on the grounds that Article is subject to a number of specific requirements ('necessary to facilitate', a cross-border dimension' and 'tak[ing] into account' different national traditions) which do not apply to Article 82(1).74 In the event of a dual being used, an emergency brake could only be pulled as regards those a proposal that fall within the scope ofArticle 82(2), and so 'fast-track' cooperation could only apply to part ofthe relevant proposal. The remaining'pn visions could still be adopted separately, and would therefore apply to all States. But it is possible that many Member States (and/or the EP) would to adopt a mutual recognition measure, for example, unless all the MemberSta which would be bound by that measure were also bound by a parallel harmonizing procedural law (or substantive criminal law, where the emerger brake also applies)." A reasonable compromise would be to provide in recognition measure for broader grounds for refusal to execute decisions authorities of the Member State(s) which were not participating in to lel measure." The same compromise could also be used to address the UK or Ireland opted into a mutual recognition measure, but out measure. It is surprising to see that Member States were willing to accept the of mutual recognition measures without a veto or at least an emergency given the national constitutional disputes concerning the adoption In light of those disputes, which reflected legitimate national concerns, have been preferable to allow for an emergency brake here as well. applying an emergency brake to both paragraphs would have avoided to distinguish between them. Having said that, how should Article 82(1) and (2) TFEU be distinguIsp First of all, Article 82(1) concerns (inter alia) mutual recognition whereas Article 82(2) concerns procedural harmonization in order (inter alia) mutual recognition. Similarly, Article 82(2) cannot concerning training, since Article 82(1) is a lex specialis for these power in Article 82(1)(d) to 'facilitate cooperation' as regards crimmal ings and enforcement ofdecisions, it cannot extend to the substance procedural laws which fall within the scope of Article 82(2), 668 671Institutional framework and overview For instance, the provisions on victims' rights in the proposed Directives harmonizing the 'substantive law relating to trafficking in persons and offences against children: CaM (2010) 95 and 29 Mar 2010. See particularly the tobacco advertising case law: Cases C-376/98 Germany v EP and Council ECR 1-8419 and C-380/03 Germany v EP and Council [2006] ECR 1-11573. See 9.3.5 and 9.5.2. Dir 2004/80 ([2004] OJ L 261/15), based on the prior Art 308 EC. On the substance of this see 9.8.3 below. Art 308 EC became Art 352 TFEU after the entry into force of the Treaty ofLisbon. Furthermore, Art 83(2) will in some cases require unanimous voting. See further 10.2.4 has set as regards the comparable general power to harmonize law for the purposes offacilitating the internal market." Ofcourse, it also assumes that Member States would otherwise have the power or even the obligation to refuse to recognize other Member States' criminal law decisions on human rights grounds, an issue examined further below." More generally, it must be kept in mind that measures adopted pursuant to Article 82(2) are expressly not limited to those necessary to facilitate mutual recognition, but can facilitate police and criminal law cooperation ore generally. Finally, there are questions regarding the scope ofthe individual provisions of 82(2). In the absence of any specific limit, the power to regulate suspects' conferred by Article 82(2)(b) applies to any aspect ofthe right to a fair trial than the double jeopardy rule, as noted above), provided that the general on the powers conferred by Article 82(2) are complied with. As for victims' Article 82(2)(c) does not apply to the harmonization of rules concerning compensation of crime victims, which was the subject of a Directive adopted pursl1arlt to the previous 'residual powers' clause of the EC Treaty," because 82 TFEU only applies to 'judicial cooperation'. In the absence of any specific legal base addressing this issue, it remains within the scope of the 'I'r~ot,,'< residual powers clause." next key issue is the distinction between Article 82 TFEU and otherJHA bases. As compared to other criminal law powers, Article 82(1) in particular be distinguished from the substantive criminal law powers set out in Article because the latter Article is subject to the emergency brake procedure.88 While concerning asserting jurisdiction can be regarded as ancillary to the definiof substantive offences, other procedural rules cannot, and the EU can only such powers as the Treaty has conferred upon it. For example, it should noted that the proposals for Directives on trafficking in persons and sexual exploitation of children include provisions on victim protection, which can be are) based on Article 82(2)(a) TFEU.89 Treaty powers relating to Eurojust (Article 85 TFEU) must be distinguished from Article 82(2) in particular, since there is no emergency brake applicable to Article 85. It should follow that any harmonization of national Criminal Law: Mutual Recognition and Criminal Procedure670 Next, the requirement to take account ofnational legal traditions and is nearly identical to the general requirement set in Article 67(1) TFEU EU must 'respect' such systems and traditions. However, it is arguable requirement to 'take into account' is more ofa positive obligation than tion to 'respect', perhaps entailing an obligation to reflect those ditterences adopted legislation, rather than merely to refrain from damaging national systems in that legislation. This brings us to the most important limitation: the requirement measure must be necessary to facilitate mutual recognition and policing criminal law cooperation with a cross-border dimension. It might be temptins first sight, to conclude that this power is be limited to matters which cific relationship with cross-border proceedings, like the EU's civil law But the wording ofthe criminal law power ('cross-border dimension') than the wording ofthe civil law power ('cross-border implications'). the phrase 'cross-border dimensions' also governs the scope of the tive criminal law powers.F and it is hard to believe that the Union's harmonize substantive criminal law was intended to be limited to alleged offence has factual links to more than one Member State. Furtller"Illl the EU's specific criminal procedure powers would be rendered meamngles they could only be applied in cross-border proceedings, given that already sets out a power to regulate criminal proceedings with a border nature. In particular, although rules on mutual admissibility of evidence sarily have a link to cross-border proceedings, it will be hard in practice their impact to cross-border cases, given that some degree of harmonizatie the laws of evidence is necessary in order to ensure mutual ad:missibility that such harmonization cannot easily be restricted to cases which cific cross-border element, given that the evidence might be collected it was clear that such an element was present. The point applies EU's powers as regards victims' and suspects' rights (which might evidence issues),83 a fortiori because the Treaty does not insist upon cross-border element in these matters as it requires as regards evidence better approach to the limit on the EU's criminal procedure is therefore on a degree ciflikelihood that the rules in question will have a particular cross-border proceedings. This will be the case in particular whenever (in effect) a 'free movement clause' in the legislation, which provides that Member States could not refuse to recognize judgments and other ofjudicial authorities on grounds falling within the scope of a measure pursuant to Article 82(2) TFEU. This would parallel the 8\ See 8.2.4 above. 82 See Art 83(1) TFEU, discussed in 10.2.4 below. 83 See 9.8.3 below (as regards victims' rights) and Art 6(3)d ECHR (as 671Institutional framework and overview For instance, the provisions on victims' rights in the proposed Directives harmonizing the 'substantive law relating to trafficking in persons and offences against children: CaM (2010) 95 and 29 Mar 2010. See particularly the tobacco advertising case law: Cases C-376/98 Germany v EP and Council ECR 1-8419 and C-380/03 Germany v EP and Council [2006] ECR 1-11573. See 9.3.5 and 9.5.2. Dir 2004/80 ([2004] OJ L 261/15), based on the prior Art 308 EC. On the substance of this see 9.8.3 below. Art 308 EC became Art 352 TFEU after the entry into force of the Treaty ofLisbon. Furthermore, Art 83(2) will in some cases require unanimous voting. See further 10.2.4 has set as regards the comparable general power to harmonize law for the purposes offacilitating the internal market." Ofcourse, it also assumes that Member States would otherwise have the power or even the obligation to refuse to recognize other Member States' criminal law decisions on human rights grounds, an issue examined further below." More generally, it must be kept in mind that measures adopted pursuant to Article 82(2) are expressly not limited to those necessary to facilitate mutual recognition, but can facilitate police and criminal law cooperation ore generally. Finally, there are questions regarding the scope ofthe individual provisions of 82(2). In the absence of any specific limit, the power to regulate suspects' conferred by Article 82(2)(b) applies to any aspect ofthe right to a fair trial than the double jeopardy rule, as noted above), provided that the general on the powers conferred by Article 82(2) are complied with. As for victims' Article 82(2)(c) does not apply to the harmonization of rules concerning compensation of crime victims, which was the subject of a Directive adopted pursl1arlt to the previous 'residual powers' clause of the EC Treaty," because 82 TFEU only applies to 'judicial cooperation'. In the absence of any specific legal base addressing this issue, it remains within the scope of the 'I'r~ot,,'< residual powers clause." next key issue is the distinction between Article 82 TFEU and otherJHA bases. As compared to other criminal law powers, Article 82(1) in particular be distinguished from the substantive criminal law powers set out in Article because the latter Article is subject to the emergency brake procedure.88 While concerning asserting jurisdiction can be regarded as ancillary to the definiof substantive offences, other procedural rules cannot, and the EU can only such powers as the Treaty has conferred upon it. For example, it should noted that the proposals for Directives on trafficking in persons and sexual exploitation of children include provisions on victim protection, which can be are) based on Article 82(2)(a) TFEU.89 Treaty powers relating to Eurojust (Article 85 TFEU) must be distinguished from Article 82(2) in particular, since there is no emergency brake applicable to Article 85. It should follow that any harmonization of national Criminal Law: Mutual Recognition and Criminal Procedure670 Next, the requirement to take account ofnational legal traditions and is nearly identical to the general requirement set in Article 67(1) TFEU EU must 'respect' such systems and traditions. However, it is arguable requirement to 'take into account' is more ofa positive obligation than tion to 'respect', perhaps entailing an obligation to reflect those ditterences adopted legislation, rather than merely to refrain from damaging national systems in that legislation. This brings us to the most important limitation: the requirement measure must be necessary to facilitate mutual recognition and policing criminal law cooperation with a cross-border dimension. It might be temptins first sight, to conclude that this power is be limited to matters which cific relationship with cross-border proceedings, like the EU's civil law But the wording ofthe criminal law power ('cross-border dimension') than the wording ofthe civil law power ('cross-border implications'). the phrase 'cross-border dimensions' also governs the scope of the tive criminal law powers.F and it is hard to believe that the Union's harmonize substantive criminal law was intended to be limited to alleged offence has factual links to more than one Member State. Furtller"Illl the EU's specific criminal procedure powers would be rendered meamngles they could only be applied in cross-border proceedings, given that already sets out a power to regulate criminal proceedings with a border nature. In particular, although rules on mutual admissibility of evidence sarily have a link to cross-border proceedings, it will be hard in practice their impact to cross-border cases, given that some degree of harmonizatie the laws of evidence is necessary in order to ensure mutual ad:missibility that such harmonization cannot easily be restricted to cases which cific cross-border element, given that the evidence might be collected it was clear that such an element was present. The point applies EU's powers as regards victims' and suspects' rights (which might evidence issues),83 a fortiori because the Treaty does not insist upon cross-border element in these matters as it requires as regards evidence better approach to the limit on the EU's criminal procedure is therefore on a degree ciflikelihood that the rules in question will have a particular cross-border proceedings. This will be the case in particular whenever (in effect) a 'free movement clause' in the legislation, which provides that Member States could not refuse to recognize judgments and other ofjudicial authorities on grounds falling within the scope of a measure pursuant to Article 82(2) TFEU. This would parallel the 8\ See 8.2.4 above. 82 See Art 83(1) TFEU, discussed in 10.2.4 below. 83 See 9.8.3 below (as regards victims' rights) and Art 6(3)d ECHR (as 673Institutional framework and overview Territorial scope See Council doc 6538/10, 17 Feb 2010. See also the analysis of the Commission legal service (Council doe 10005/10, 19 May 2010), points out inter alia that the EU cannot harmonize national law on crime prevention pursuto Art 84 TFEU. 97 See the Convention on mutual assistance, discussed in 9.6.1 below. See the Framework Decision on crime victims, discussed in 9.8.3 below. Note also the excluofdamages and restitution claims from the Framework Decision on financial penalties ([2005] 76/16, Art l(b) of the Framework Decision). See Cases C-7/98 Krombach [2000] ECR 1-1935 and 157/80 Rinkau [1981] ECR 1391. On the case, see further 9.3 and 11.2.4 below. On Art 74 generally, see 2.2.3.2 above. to the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, there were no opt-cuts Member States in this area, except for the delayed application of the relSchengen acquis to the UK and Ireland. The acquis applied to the UK from Finally, it is necessary to distinguish the whole of Article 82, and Article in particular, from Article 74 TFEU, which is a legal base for the adopofmeasures concerning cooperation between national administrations, and betwee-n national administrations and the Commission. Such measures are nonezislative acts, adopted by QMV in the Council with consultation ofthe EP. The distinction between Articles 74 and 82 TFEU is that the former concooperation between civilservants, whereas the latter concerns cooperation oetween iudoes.100 is understood that the Council legal service took the view that the prowas correctly based on Article 82 TFEU, since the prevention of crime fall within the scope of that Article." On this point, while it is true Article 67(3) TFEU refers to prevention of crime, more specific referto crime prevention are set out in Articles 84, 87(1), and 88(1) TFEU, in Article 82.96 The requirement to respect different legal systems, as out in Article 67(1) TFEU, instead points toward the need to respect the different approaches that Member States have towards addressing this issue. a measure based wholly on Article 82 can only address issues connected criminal law proceedings. It would be possible to adopt a measure based on Articles 81 and 82 TFEU-but it would have to be proposed by Commission. On the same issues, there are several criminal law measures that refer to issues arguably fall within the scope ofcivil law, such as restitution ofproperty," compensation ofvictims by offenders, and return ofproperty for crime victims." Converselv, EU civil law measures address issues such as civil claims related to criminal proceedings and representation in criminal trials for non-intentional offences." Criminal Law: Mutual Recognition and Criminal Procedure672 criminal procedure directly related to the functioning of Eurojust, in particulaf (but not only) concerning the specific functions of Eurojust mentioned in 85(l)(a), (b), and (c). Similarly, the Treaty powers relating to the European Prosecutor (Article 86 TFEU) must be distinguished from Article 82 int Article 86 requires unanimous voting. Again, any measure directly relating the operation of the European Public Prosecutor, whether it concerns nation procedural law or mutual recognition (ie national authorities' recognition oft Prosecutor's decisions and vice versa) must be based on Article 86.90 Next, there is also a need to distinguish between Article 82 and ArticleS TFEU, as regards policing powers, given that legislation on some aspects police cooperation is not subject to an emergency brake (Article 87(2)), whe measures on operational police cooperation are subject to unanimous vot (Article 87(3)).91 On this point, it should be emphasized that Article 820 extends to judicial proceedings, arguably as defined by Member States,9211 to cooperation between police or other non-judicial authorities. The polid legal bases would have to be used instead (or in addition) to adopt legislation such issues. Although by way of exception, Article 82(1)(d) extends to author ties which are equivalent to judicial authorities, this extension is clearly lim.it in scope by the ejusdemgeneris rule of interpretation, considering also that policing provisions of the Treaty are a lex specialis. Although Article 82(1)(d not expressly limited to judicial authorities, the whole ofArticle 82(1) islirni in scope to '[j]udicial cooperation' and Article 82(1)(d) is expressly limit scope to criminal proceedings. Any other interpretation could render redundant. In any case, it is hard to see how' police officers are judges. Applying this rule, it may be doubted whether some of the in the proposed Directive on the European investigation order fall scope ofArticle 82.93 It is also necessary to distinguish between Article 82 and the powers set out in Article 81 TFEU, given that civil law measures subject to an emergency brake, can only be proposed by the are subject to a stronger 'cross-border' requirement, and can potentiallyi in fact usually) take the form of Regulations. The issue of dlStUlgll1S1ll.J between these legal bases arose shortly after the entry into force of Lisbon, when the Commission queried the correct legal base posed Directive on a European protection order.?' since some Member address such issues by means of civil or administrative law, not criminal 90 For instance, rules on the 'admissibility of evidence' referred to in Art Arts 85 and 86, see 11.2.4 below. 91 For further details on these provisions, including the distinction between see 12.2.4 below. 92 This follows from the requirement of respect for national legal systems, as set out rn 1;\)[[ TFEU. 93 [2010] OJ C 165/22. On the substance, see 94 [2010] OJ C 69/5. On the substance, see 9.7.6 below. 673Institutional framework and overview Territorial scope See Council doc 6538/10, 17 Feb 2010. See also the analysis of the Commission legal service (Council doe 10005/10, 19 May 2010), points out inter alia that the EU cannot harmonize national law on crime prevention pursuto Art 84 TFEU. 97 See the Convention on mutual assistance, discussed in 9.6.1 below. See the Framework Decision on crime victims, discussed in 9.8.3 below. Note also the excluofdamages and restitution claims from the Framework Decision on financial penalties ([2005] 76/16, Art l(b) of the Framework Decision). See Cases C-7/98 Krombach [2000] ECR 1-1935 and 157/80 Rinkau [1981] ECR 1391. On the case, see further 9.3 and 11.2.4 below. On Art 74 generally, see 2.2.3.2 above. to the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, there were no opt-cuts Member States in this area, except for the delayed application of the relSchengen acquis to the UK and Ireland. The acquis applied to the UK from Finally, it is necessary to distinguish the whole of Article 82, and Article in particular, from Article 74 TFEU, which is a legal base for the adopofmeasures concerning cooperation between national administrations, and betwee-n national administrations and the Commission. Such measures are nonezislative acts, adopted by QMV in the Council with consultation ofthe EP. The distinction between Articles 74 and 82 TFEU is that the former concooperation between civilservants, whereas the latter concerns cooperation oetween iudoes.100 is understood that the Council legal service took the view that the prowas correctly based on Article 82 TFEU, since the prevention of crime fall within the scope of that Article." On this point, while it is true Article 67(3) TFEU refers to prevention of crime, more specific referto crime prevention are set out in Articles 84, 87(1), and 88(1) TFEU, in Article 82.96 The requirement to respect different legal systems, as out in Article 67(1) TFEU, instead points toward the need to respect the different approaches that Member States have towards addressing this issue. a measure based wholly on Article 82 can only address issues connected criminal law proceedings. It would be possible to adopt a measure based on Articles 81 and 82 TFEU-but it would have to be proposed by Commission. On the same issues, there are several criminal law measures that refer to issues arguably fall within the scope ofcivil law, such as restitution ofproperty," compensation ofvictims by offenders, and return ofproperty for crime victims." Converselv, EU civil law measures address issues such as civil claims related to criminal proceedings and representation in criminal trials for non-intentional offences." Criminal Law: Mutual Recognition and Criminal Procedure672 criminal procedure directly related to the functioning of Eurojust, in particulaf (but not only) concerning the specific functions of Eurojust mentioned in 85(l)(a), (b), and (c). Similarly, the Treaty powers relating to the European Prosecutor (Article 86 TFEU) must be distinguished from Article 82 int Article 86 requires unanimous voting. Again, any measure directly relating the operation of the European Public Prosecutor, whether it concerns nation procedural law or mutual recognition (ie national authorities' recognition oft Prosecutor's decisions and vice versa) must be based on Article 86.90 Next, there is also a need to distinguish between Article 82 and ArticleS TFEU, as regards policing powers, given that legislation on some aspects police cooperation is not subject to an emergency brake (Article 87(2)), whe measures on operational police cooperation are subject to unanimous vot (Article 87(3)).91 On this point, it should be emphasized that Article 820 extends to judicial proceedings, arguably as defined by Member States,9211 to cooperation between police or other non-judicial authorities. The polid legal bases would have to be used instead (or in addition) to adopt legislation such issues. Although by way of exception, Article 82(1)(d) extends to author ties which are equivalent to judicial authorities, this extension is clearly lim.it in scope by the ejusdemgeneris rule of interpretation, considering also that policing provisions of the Treaty are a lex specialis. Although Article 82(1)(d not expressly limited to judicial authorities, the whole ofArticle 82(1) islirni in scope to '[j]udicial cooperation' and Article 82(1)(d) is expressly limit scope to criminal proceedings. Any other interpretation could render redundant. In any case, it is hard to see how' police officers are judges. Applying this rule, it may be doubted whether some of the in the proposed Directive on the European investigation order fall scope ofArticle 82.93 It is also necessary to distinguish between Article 82 and the powers set out in Article 81 TFEU, given that civil law measures subject to an emergency brake, can only be proposed by the are subject to a stronger 'cross-border' requirement, and can potentiallyi in fact usually) take the form of Regulations. The issue of dlStUlgll1S1ll.J between these legal bases arose shortly after the entry into force of Lisbon, when the Commission queried the correct legal base posed Directive on a European protection order.?' since some Member address such issues by means of civil or administrative law, not criminal 90 For instance, rules on the 'admissibility of evidence' referred to in Art Arts 85 and 86, see 11.2.4 below. 91 For further details on these provisions, including the distinction between see 12.2.4 below. 92 This follows from the requirement of respect for national legal systems, as set out rn 1;\)[[ TFEU. 93 [2010] OJ C 165/22. On the substance, see 94 [2010] OJ C 69/5. On the substance, see 9.7.6 below. 675Human rights 9.3. Human rights Right to a fair trial C-436/03 Van Esbroek[2006] ECR 1-2623. 112 [2004] OJ L 26/1. OJ L 292/1. See also the earlier Decision defining the Schengen extradition acquis as Norway and Iceland ([2003] OJ L 76/25). details of the EAW, see 9.5.2 below. the proposals to conclude the treaties: COM (2009) 704 and 705, 17 Dec 2009. Arts 25-38 oftreaty ([2009] OJ L 46/6). The treaty entered into force as regards most Member the EC, and Switzerland on 8 Apr 2009 (see [2009] OJ L 17717). (2009) 644, 23 Nov 2009. at the outset, the human rights principle ofgreatest relevance to crimiprocedure is the right to a fair trial. This right is set out in national constituArticle 6 ECHR, and Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil Political Rights (ICCPR). Article 6(2) ECHR expressly sets out a right to resumption of innocence in criminal cases, and Article 6(3) sets out minimum to be informed promptly ofan accusation (Article 6(3)(a)); to have time and for a defence (Article 6(3)(b)); to have access to a defence lawyer and free aid if 'the interests ofjustice' require (Article 6(3)(c)); to examine witnesses and call witnesses for the defence (Article 6(3)(d)); and to 'to have the free ofan interpreter ifhe [or she] cannot understand or speak the language in court' (Article 6(3)(e)). The Seventh Protocol to the ECHR, which has ratified by a large majority of Member States, also includes the right to an the Court ofJustice has implicitly assumed that it has jurisdiction to rule on Schengen association treaty with Norway and Iceland.'!' The EU, Norway, and Iceland have also signed a treaty committing themselves implement all of the provisions of the EU mutual assistance Convention and fJr,nt"rc,1 which do not fall within the scope ofthe Schengen acquis,!!2 as well as establishing a surrender procedure between the EU Member States and and Norway.'!" The latter agreement is very similar to the Framework Decision on the EAW, but contains variations, particularly allowing for the con.tinuation of a 'political offence' exception and the option to refuse to extradite own nationals, subject to some lirnitations.!" Neither of these treaties is in force.!" Switzerland and the EU (more precisely, the EC (asit was then) and the Member States) have concluded a treaty which concerns the particular issue ofprotection of the EU's financial interests. It contains a number of provisions Xelev;mtto mutual legal assistance.!" The Commission has proposed the signature conclusion of a parallel treaty with Liechtenstein.'!" Criminal Law: Mutual Recognition and Criminal Procedure674 HI! See the decision on UK participation in Schengen ([2000] OJ L 131/43) and application ofthat decision ([2004] OJ L 395170). For more detail on UK participation, above. 102 See the decision on Irish participation in Schengen ([2002] OJ L 64/20). For Irish participation, see 2.2.5.1.3 above. 103 For more detail on accession and the Schengen acquls, see 2.2.5.3 above. 104 On the substance of that acquis, see 9.2.1 above. 105 For the detail, see 2.2.5.1.2 and 2.2.5.1.3 above. 106 On the substance ofthese measures, see 9.8.2 and 9.7.6 below. However, there that the UK will nonetheless be excluded from participation in the latter measure: above. 107 See Council does 9262/10, 3 May 2010, and 7670/10, 7673/10, and 7676/10, 108 See 2.2.5.2 above. 109 See 2.2.5.4 above. 110 Art 7(5) ofthe Schengen association treaty with Switzerland ([2008] OJ L ofthe Protocol to that treaty concerning the association ofLiechtenstein (COM 2006). It should be noted that the proposed Directive establishing the European Investigation.t (see 9.6.1.3 below) would trigger these exceptions. 1January 2005,1°! and will also apply to Ireland at a date to be decided.l'" TheE rules and the Schengen acquis relating to criminal procedural law applied fullyt the new Member States from their dates ofaccession (1 May 2004 and 1Januar 2007),1Il3 and also applied fully to Denrnark.l'" The position changed with the entry into force ofthe Treaty ofLisbon, whic extended the British and Irish opt-outs to new measures in the area of policin and criminal law, and provided for special rules if the UK and Ireland opte out of a measure which amends a measure which already applies to them}05) practice, the UK and Ireland have both opted into the Member States' initiativ on suspects' rights to interpretation and translation, and the UK has opted in~ the proposals on the European protection order and the European investigati order.l'" both have opted into the treaties in this area with Norway, Icelandja japan."? Their opt-in decisions regarding the proposal on the right to infor tion are not yet known. On the other hand, Denmark is now excluded.fro measures in this area, unless those measures build upon the Schengen acquis.lO~ post-Lisbon measures are adopted which amend or repeal pre-Lisbon actsv,rh.i already apply to the UK, Ireland, or Denmark, and those Member States do participate in such measures, there is a possibility that their participation in relevant pre-Lisbon acts will be terminated. In that case, the relevant Counci] Europe treaties will then (re-)apply between those Member States and a1l9t Member States. As for non-Member States, pursuant to their association with the Schen acquis, the relevant rules and measures building upon them (including asp of the 2000 EU Convention on mutual assistance and its 2001 Protocol) apply to Norway, Iceland, Switzerland, and (in future) Liechtenstein.'?" Hqv,re Switzerland and Liechtenstein have an exemption as regards any future me as building on the acquis which eliminate the 'double criminality' rule as search and seizure for offences relating to direct taxation.110 It should 675Human rights 9.3. Human rights Right to a fair trial C-436/03 Van Esbroek[2006] ECR 1-2623. 112 [2004] OJ L 26/1. OJ L 292/1. See also the earlier Decision defining the Schengen extradition acquis as Norway and Iceland ([2003] OJ L 76/25). details of the EAW, see 9.5.2 below. the proposals to conclude the treaties: COM (2009) 704 and 705, 17 Dec 2009. Arts 25-38 oftreaty ([2009] OJ L 46/6). The treaty entered into force as regards most Member the EC, and Switzerland on 8 Apr 2009 (see [2009] OJ L 17717). (2009) 644, 23 Nov 2009. at the outset, the human rights principle ofgreatest relevance to crimiprocedure is the right to a fair trial. This right is set out in national constituArticle 6 ECHR, and Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil Political Rights (ICCPR). Article 6(2) ECHR expressly sets out a right to resumption of innocence in criminal cases, and Article 6(3) sets out minimum to be informed promptly ofan accusation (Article 6(3)(a)); to have time and for a defence (Article 6(3)(b)); to have access to a defence lawyer and free aid if 'the interests ofjustice' require (Article 6(3)(c)); to examine witnesses and call witnesses for the defence (Article 6(3)(d)); and to 'to have the free ofan interpreter ifhe [or she] cannot understand or speak the language in court' (Article 6(3)(e)). The Seventh Protocol to the ECHR, which has ratified by a large majority of Member States, also includes the right to an the Court ofJustice has implicitly assumed that it has jurisdiction to rule on Schengen association treaty with Norway and Iceland.'!' The EU, Norway, and Iceland have also signed a treaty committing themselves implement all of the provisions of the EU mutual assistance Convention and fJr,nt"rc,1 which do not fall within the scope ofthe Schengen acquis,!!2 as well as establishing a surrender procedure between the EU Member States and and Norway.'!" The latter agreement is very similar to the Framework Decision on the EAW, but contains variations, particularly allowing for the con.tinuation of a 'political offence' exception and the option to refuse to extradite own nationals, subject to some lirnitations.!" Neither of these treaties is in force.!" Switzerland and the EU (more precisely, the EC (asit was then) and the Member States) have concluded a treaty which concerns the particular issue ofprotection of the EU's financial interests. It contains a number of provisions Xelev;mtto mutual legal assistance.!" The Commission has proposed the signature conclusion of a parallel treaty with Liechtenstein.'!" Criminal Law: Mutual Recognition and Criminal Procedure674 HI! See the decision on UK participation in Schengen ([2000] OJ L 131/43) and application ofthat decision ([2004] OJ L 395170). For more detail on UK participation, above. 102 See the decision on Irish participation in Schengen ([2002] OJ L 64/20). For Irish participation, see 2.2.5.1.3 above. 103 For more detail on accession and the Schengen acquls, see 2.2.5.3 above. 104 On the substance of that acquis, see 9.2.1 above. 105 For the detail, see 2.2.5.1.2 and 2.2.5.1.3 above. 106 On the substance ofthese measures, see 9.8.2 and 9.7.6 below. However, there that the UK will nonetheless be excluded from participation in the latter measure: above. 107 See Council does 9262/10, 3 May 2010, and 7670/10, 7673/10, and 7676/10, 108 See 2.2.5.2 above. 109 See 2.2.5.4 above. 110 Art 7(5) ofthe Schengen association treaty with Switzerland ([2008] OJ L ofthe Protocol to that treaty concerning the association ofLiechtenstein (COM 2006). It should be noted that the proposed Directive establishing the European Investigation.t (see 9.6.1.3 below) would trigger these exceptions. 1January 2005,1°! and will also apply to Ireland at a date to be decided.l'" TheE rules and the Schengen acquis relating to criminal procedural law applied fullyt the new Member States from their dates ofaccession (1 May 2004 and 1Januar 2007),1Il3 and also applied fully to Denrnark.l'" The position changed with the entry into force ofthe Treaty ofLisbon, whic extended the British and Irish opt-outs to new measures in the area of policin and criminal law, and provided for special rules if the UK and Ireland opte out of a measure which amends a measure which already applies to them}05) practice, the UK and Ireland have both opted into the Member States' initiativ on suspects' rights to interpretation and translation, and the UK has opted in~ the proposals on the European protection order and the European investigati order.l'" both have opted into the treaties in this area with Norway, Icelandja japan."? Their opt-in decisions regarding the proposal on the right to infor tion are not yet known. On the other hand, Denmark is now excluded.fro measures in this area, unless those measures build upon the Schengen acquis.lO~ post-Lisbon measures are adopted which amend or repeal pre-Lisbon actsv,rh.i already apply to the UK, Ireland, or Denmark, and those Member States do participate in such measures, there is a possibility that their participation in relevant pre-Lisbon acts will be terminated. In that case, the relevant Counci] Europe treaties will then (re-)apply between those Member States and a1l9t Member States. As for non-Member States, pursuant to their association with the Schen acquis, the relevant rules and measures building upon them (including asp of the 2000 EU Convention on mutual assistance and its 2001 Protocol) apply to Norway, Iceland, Switzerland, and (in future) Liechtenstein.'?" Hqv,re Switzerland and Liechtenstein have an exemption as regards any future me as building on the acquis which eliminate the 'double criminality' rule as search and seizure for offences relating to direct taxation.110 It should