72 2.2.5. Territorial scope 73 Overview of the institutional framework Art 5, revised TEU, and 2.5 below. Schengen integration, see 2.2.2.3 above. For the text ofthe Prum Convention, see Council 10900,'0') 7 July 2005. On its integration into the EU legal framework, see 12.6.2, 12.6.3, and the general issues regarding the integration ofthe Schengen acquisinto the EU legal order, above. Distinctions in the territorial scope of JHA measures have to some extent been created outside the EU legal framework, most prominently as regards the development of the Schengen acquis from 1985 onward, and also as regards the negotiation of a later treaty largely concerning police cooperation, the 'Prum Convention', among a group of Member States in 2005. 437 Since the Treaty of Lisbon abolished the third pillar and applied normal EU rules on decision-making, legal instruments, and judicial control to all JHA matters, the question of the territorial scope ofJHA measures remains the only issue that dearly differentiates JHA issues from most of the rest of EU law. The complexity ofthis issue results from the reluctance ofseveral 'old' Member States to participate fully in EU integration in this area for various reasons, the unwill- i llgness of all 'old' Member States to apply the full Schengen acquis immediately to new Member States, and the interest among several non-Member States in adopting the relevant EU measures.438 The following overview addresses in turn issues specific to: the UK and Ireland; Denmark; the Member States which .joined the EU in 2004 and 2007; and finally Norway, Iceland, Switzerland, and J..,iechtenstein. Finally, it examines the general rules in the Treaties concerning 'enhanced cooperation', which in principle allow for the adoption of measures across most areas ofEU law, indudingJHA law, without the full participation of l]'y1ember States. These latter rules also apply whenever the UK or Ireland (and ssibly in future Denmark) wish to opt in to a JHA measure that they initially ted out of. It should also be recalled that the discretion to opt in (or out) of the Court JJ.lStice's jurisdiction over preliminary rulings as regards third pillar measures, lJ.ich still applies for a five-year transitional period as regards third pillar acts before the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force, results in a different terscope of that jurisdiction (as distinct from a different territorial scope of criminal law, and policing law), since the possibility offull harmonization in areas of shared competence still applies to those parts of Title V as well. Finally, it should be noted that the exercise of the EU's JHA competences is subject to the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, which are discussed further elsewhere in this chapter. 436 When the Treaties confer on the Union a com et h a specific area the Union and th M b S pence s ared with the Member States · ' e em er tates may I . I d mg acts in that area The M b S h egls ate an adopt legally . em er tates s all e . heithat the U' h . . xercise t err competence to the . mon as not exercised Its competence Th M b . ctse their competence to the extent that th U·' h em. er States shall agam competence. e mon as decided to cease exercising It follows from the second sentence that in areas of shared corn eten could In principle 'occupy the field' b f 11 h . . . p ce, theHow A' Y u Y armornzmg the Issue concerned. ever, rticle 2(6) TFEU also points out that the precise 'scope' ofth tence concerned IS set out in th .f T ein Title V ofth TFEU .. e speci lC reaty provisions related to each area, . . 11 e . , It IS expressly stated that EU rules relating to substantive crrmina aw and dom sti .. 1 o r Furth . e IC CrImIna procedure set 'minimum' standards ermore, competence related to certain aspects of .rul d 431 d h . economIC migration e out, an arrnonization of national law I'S ruled t d. . ,. ou as regar s m(~aSUf(~S ~~nc~rn:gIntegr~tion ofthird-country nationals and crime p;evention 432 th: a~:. onzonta reserves of national competence in the general pr'oy"isilorls th J TItle and In the ;rEU, discussed in detail above.P" On the other e EU has the power to frame a common polic on as 1 external border control' 434 hi h . .. y ,y urn, immigration . . ' W IC In principle suggests that the Union more ambitious as regards harmonization ofsuch areas without .. to harmoni th 1 . h ' requmngze e aw In t ese areas fully 435 But th fin thes .fi . e re erence to a common · e speCI lC areas does not mean a contrario that full harmonization IS excluded III other areas (In particular, civil law, mutual recognition measures :~: Art 4(2)0) TFEU. m Art 2(2) TFEU. - On the question of t Ibelow. ' ex erna competence, see Art 3(2) TFEU and the discussion 43J Art 79(5) TFEU. See also Art 77(4) d 430 Arts 82(2), 83(1), borders. " as regar s Member States' competence to 43' A 7- rt 9(3) and 84 TFEU. The EU instead is limi , . . . supportmg Member States' action . th ted to providing mcentrves, promoting; I . s m ese areas See Art 2(5) TFEU OddI h are not istcd in Art 6 TFEU which a .' . " . y, t ese areas EU can only 'support coordin t ppe;rs pnl~a facie to be an exhaustive list 433 Arts 72 and 73 T' a e or supp ement Member States' action. FEU and Art 4(2) revised TEU di d '434 Art 67(2) TFEU , . , iscusse m 2.2.3.2 above. 435 Alth h h T' See further Arts 77(2)(a), 78(1), and (2)(a)-(d), and 79(1) TFEU · oug t e reaty states that the Union 'sh 11' d , . , , . m these areas, this must be reconciled ith h a a opt umform and common' competence of the EU and th M b W s I t e express allocation ofJHA matters to e ern. er tates. Institutional Framework those disgruntled Member States that d ho not ave an opt-out or bl use an 'emergency brake' i th . . were not a e ton e area In question It should be noted that the Tr t f L' b . . general horizontal rules concerni:ag~~ . IS on has Introduced into the Treaties 'sh d competence. JHA matters are described as a s are competence' between the EU d i M b d fi an ItS em er State 427 Th e me this concept as follows.F" s. e 72 2.2.5. Territorial scope 73 Overview of the institutional framework Art 5, revised TEU, and 2.5 below. Schengen integration, see 2.2.2.3 above. For the text ofthe Prum Convention, see Council 10900,'0') 7 July 2005. On its integration into the EU legal framework, see 12.6.2, 12.6.3, and the general issues regarding the integration ofthe Schengen acquisinto the EU legal order, above. Distinctions in the territorial scope of JHA measures have to some extent been created outside the EU legal framework, most prominently as regards the development of the Schengen acquis from 1985 onward, and also as regards the negotiation of a later treaty largely concerning police cooperation, the 'Prum Convention', among a group of Member States in 2005. 437 Since the Treaty of Lisbon abolished the third pillar and applied normal EU rules on decision-making, legal instruments, and judicial control to all JHA matters, the question of the territorial scope ofJHA measures remains the only issue that dearly differentiates JHA issues from most of the rest of EU law. The complexity ofthis issue results from the reluctance ofseveral 'old' Member States to participate fully in EU integration in this area for various reasons, the unwill- i llgness of all 'old' Member States to apply the full Schengen acquis immediately to new Member States, and the interest among several non-Member States in adopting the relevant EU measures.438 The following overview addresses in turn issues specific to: the UK and Ireland; Denmark; the Member States which .joined the EU in 2004 and 2007; and finally Norway, Iceland, Switzerland, and J..,iechtenstein. Finally, it examines the general rules in the Treaties concerning 'enhanced cooperation', which in principle allow for the adoption of measures across most areas ofEU law, indudingJHA law, without the full participation of l]'y1ember States. These latter rules also apply whenever the UK or Ireland (and ssibly in future Denmark) wish to opt in to a JHA measure that they initially ted out of. It should also be recalled that the discretion to opt in (or out) of the Court JJ.lStice's jurisdiction over preliminary rulings as regards third pillar measures, lJ.ich still applies for a five-year transitional period as regards third pillar acts before the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force, results in a different terscope of that jurisdiction (as distinct from a different territorial scope of criminal law, and policing law), since the possibility offull harmonization in areas of shared competence still applies to those parts of Title V as well. Finally, it should be noted that the exercise of the EU's JHA competences is subject to the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, which are discussed further elsewhere in this chapter. 436 When the Treaties confer on the Union a com et h a specific area the Union and th M b S pence s ared with the Member States · ' e em er tates may I . I d mg acts in that area The M b S h egls ate an adopt legally . em er tates s all e . heithat the U' h . . xercise t err competence to the . mon as not exercised Its competence Th M b . ctse their competence to the extent that th U·' h em. er States shall agam competence. e mon as decided to cease exercising It follows from the second sentence that in areas of shared corn eten could In principle 'occupy the field' b f 11 h . . . p ce, theHow A' Y u Y armornzmg the Issue concerned. ever, rticle 2(6) TFEU also points out that the precise 'scope' ofth tence concerned IS set out in th .f T ein Title V ofth TFEU .. e speci lC reaty provisions related to each area, . . 11 e . , It IS expressly stated that EU rules relating to substantive crrmina aw and dom sti .. 1 o r Furth . e IC CrImIna procedure set 'minimum' standards ermore, competence related to certain aspects of .rul d 431 d h . economIC migration e out, an arrnonization of national law I'S ruled t d. . ,. ou as regar s m(~aSUf(~S ~~nc~rn:gIntegr~tion ofthird-country nationals and crime p;evention 432 th: a~:. onzonta reserves of national competence in the general pr'oy"isilorls th J TItle and In the ;rEU, discussed in detail above.P" On the other e EU has the power to frame a common polic on as 1 external border control' 434 hi h . .. y ,y urn, immigration . . ' W IC In principle suggests that the Union more ambitious as regards harmonization ofsuch areas without .. to harmoni th 1 . h ' requmngze e aw In t ese areas fully 435 But th fin thes .fi . e re erence to a common · e speCI lC areas does not mean a contrario that full harmonization IS excluded III other areas (In particular, civil law, mutual recognition measures :~: Art 4(2)0) TFEU. m Art 2(2) TFEU. - On the question of t Ibelow. ' ex erna competence, see Art 3(2) TFEU and the discussion 43J Art 79(5) TFEU. See also Art 77(4) d 430 Arts 82(2), 83(1), borders. " as regar s Member States' competence to 43' A 7- rt 9(3) and 84 TFEU. The EU instead is limi , . . . supportmg Member States' action . th ted to providing mcentrves, promoting; I . s m ese areas See Art 2(5) TFEU OddI h are not istcd in Art 6 TFEU which a .' . " . y, t ese areas EU can only 'support coordin t ppe;rs pnl~a facie to be an exhaustive list 433 Arts 72 and 73 T' a e or supp ement Member States' action. FEU and Art 4(2) revised TEU di d '434 Art 67(2) TFEU , . , iscusse m 2.2.3.2 above. 435 Alth h h T' See further Arts 77(2)(a), 78(1), and (2)(a)-(d), and 79(1) TFEU · oug t e reaty states that the Union 'sh 11' d , . , , . m these areas, this must be reconciled ith h a a opt umform and common' competence of the EU and th M b W s I t e express allocation ofJHA matters to e ern. er tates. Institutional Framework those disgruntled Member States that d ho not ave an opt-out or bl use an 'emergency brake' i th . . were not a e ton e area In question It should be noted that the Tr t f L' b . . general horizontal rules concerni:ag~~ . IS on has Introduced into the Treaties 'sh d competence. JHA matters are described as a s are competence' between the EU d i M b d fi an ItS em er State 427 Th e me this concept as follows.F" s. e 75Overview of the institutional framework The Treaty ofLisbon amended this article to update the cross-reference to the general cooperation rules" On the substance ofthose rules, see 2.2.5.5 below. further detail, see s 2.5 of chs 3-12. opting out ofmeasures which amend acts which the UK and Ireland are already pound by (see discussion below). It has become evident from the case law of the Court ofJustice that this Protocol does not apply to measures which build upon the Schengen acquis, which are governed by different rules on participation by the UK and Ireland.v" Ireland (but not the UK) also has an option to denounce the Protocol altogether, which it has not invoked.v" An Irish Declaration to the Final Act of the ':treaty ofLisbon referred to its 'firm intention to exercise its right ... to take part in the adoption of [JHA] measures ... to the maximum extent it deems possible', stated that 'Ireland will, in particular, participate to the maximum possible extent '11measures in the field of police cooperation', and in the context ofthe possibility.of relinquishing the opt-out, announced that Ireland 'intends to review the peration of these arrangements within three years of the entry into force of the reaty ofLisbon' (so by 1 December 2012).445 While the default position pursuant to the Title V Protocol is that the UK d Ireland opt-out of each individualJHA proposal.r" the UK and Ireland can stead choose to 'opt-in' to each measure. To do this, they must tell the Council ithin a period of three months of receiving an initial proposal for a JHA act t they wish to take part in it. If one or both ofthese Member States opts in to roposal, the Council then tries to agree the proposal with their participation. the Protocol provides that ifit is not possible to obtain the agreement the participation of the UK and Ireland after 'a reasonable period of time', ,--~)UJ"lLJll may go ahead and adopt the measure without them."? The UK and may then join in later under the general conditions applying to enhanced I)pt~ration in the Treaties.l'" alternatively, if they decide to opt out in the first they can opt in after the proposal is adopted, by the same method. practice."? the UK and Irish governments have opted into: almost all civil )ol)eration measures; most or all of the first-phase measures establishing the 'ommon European Asylum System, but only a few of the second-phase measnumber ofmeasures on irregular migration; but again only a few measures border controls, or legal migration. In the first few months after the C-77/05 UK v Council [2007] ECR 1-11459 and C-137/05 UK v Council [2007] ECR See 2.2.5.1.3 below. 8 (not amended by the Treaty ofLisbon). Declaration 56 in the Final Act of the Treaty ofLisbon. 1 and 2. The Treaty ofLisbon amended these articles only to update the cross-reference voting rules which apply in the event of an opt-out (now Art 238(3) TFEU). 3. The Treaty of Lisbon amended this article to (again) update the cross-reference to the voting rules which apply in the event of an opt-out (see ibid) and to provide for a special relating to ]HA evaluations for the UK and Ireland (Art 70 TFEU, discussed in 2.2.3.2 Institutional Framework74 2.2.5.1. United Kingdom and Ireland The UK and Ireland are both covered by a specific protocol on border controls, a specific protocol on the possibility ofopting in to any Title IV measure, specific rules as regards the Schengen acquis. Since the Treaty of Lisbon, alone also has an option to opt out ofall third pillar measures adopted before entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, with effect from the end of a trve-vear transitional period in 2014. These various opt-outs will be considered in 439 See 2.2.3.3 above. 440 See 3.2.5 below. 441 The Treaty of Lisbon gave this Protocol a new name: the 'Protocol on the United Kingdom and Ireland in respect ofthe area offreedom, security and justice'. to it more simply as the 'Title V Protocol' throughout. All references in this subsection Protocol, unless otherwise indicated. 442 Art 9, as inserted by the Treaty ofLisbon. The UK made a unilateral declaration to of Lisbon asserting that it 'intends to exercise its right' to opt in to such measures (Declaratioi in the Final Act). The UK and Ireland were granted an opt-out from all of the JHA issues ferred to Title IV of the EC Treaty (immigration, asylum, and civil another Protocol attached to the EC Treaty by the Treaty of Amsterdam, Protocol was extended in scope by the Treaty ofLisbon to cover allJHA within the scope of Title V TFEU,441 so now including policing and law, except that Ireland has no opt-out as regards anti-terrorist sanctions, Treaty of Lisbon also made changes to the Protocol as regards the procedure third pillar acts).439 Also, it should be recalled that even though an opt-out that the representatives of the UK, Ireland, or Denmark respectively do participate in the Council as regards the relevant measure, the MEPs from states nevertheless vote on the relevant measures during the EP's proceedings; the Commissioners and Court ofJustice judges from those Member States play their normal role. 2.2.5.1.2. Title V TFEU 2.2.5.1.1 Border controls A Protocol attached to the Treaties by the Treaty ofAmsterdam entitles the and Ireland to maintain the 'Common Travel Area' in force between to check individuals coming from other Member States, no matter what Member States do and no matter what interpretation the Court give to Article 14 EC (now Article 26 TFEU) or to anything else. This also specifically exempts the UK and Ireland from any EC (now EU) legislatic# requiring the abolition of border controls, thus overlapping with their exemption from Title IV of the EC Treaty (now Title V TFEU). The Lisbon made no substantive amendments to this Protocol; the interpretation the Protocol is discussed further in Chapter 3.440 75Overview of the institutional framework The Treaty ofLisbon amended this article to update the cross-reference to the general cooperation rules" On the substance ofthose rules, see 2.2.5.5 below. further detail, see s 2.5 of chs 3-12. opting out ofmeasures which amend acts which the UK and Ireland are already pound by (see discussion below). It has become evident from the case law of the Court ofJustice that this Protocol does not apply to measures which build upon the Schengen acquis, which are governed by different rules on participation by the UK and Ireland.v" Ireland (but not the UK) also has an option to denounce the Protocol altogether, which it has not invoked.v" An Irish Declaration to the Final Act of the ':treaty ofLisbon referred to its 'firm intention to exercise its right ... to take part in the adoption of [JHA] measures ... to the maximum extent it deems possible', stated that 'Ireland will, in particular, participate to the maximum possible extent '11measures in the field of police cooperation', and in the context ofthe possibility.of relinquishing the opt-out, announced that Ireland 'intends to review the peration of these arrangements within three years of the entry into force of the reaty ofLisbon' (so by 1 December 2012).445 While the default position pursuant to the Title V Protocol is that the UK d Ireland opt-out of each individualJHA proposal.r" the UK and Ireland can stead choose to 'opt-in' to each measure. To do this, they must tell the Council ithin a period of three months of receiving an initial proposal for a JHA act t they wish to take part in it. If one or both ofthese Member States opts in to roposal, the Council then tries to agree the proposal with their participation. the Protocol provides that ifit is not possible to obtain the agreement the participation of the UK and Ireland after 'a reasonable period of time', ,--~)UJ"lLJll may go ahead and adopt the measure without them."? The UK and may then join in later under the general conditions applying to enhanced I)pt~ration in the Treaties.l'" alternatively, if they decide to opt out in the first they can opt in after the proposal is adopted, by the same method. practice."? the UK and Irish governments have opted into: almost all civil )ol)eration measures; most or all of the first-phase measures establishing the 'ommon European Asylum System, but only a few of the second-phase measnumber ofmeasures on irregular migration; but again only a few measures border controls, or legal migration. In the first few months after the C-77/05 UK v Council [2007] ECR 1-11459 and C-137/05 UK v Council [2007] ECR See 2.2.5.1.3 below. 8 (not amended by the Treaty ofLisbon). Declaration 56 in the Final Act of the Treaty ofLisbon. 1 and 2. The Treaty ofLisbon amended these articles only to update the cross-reference voting rules which apply in the event of an opt-out (now Art 238(3) TFEU). 3. The Treaty of Lisbon amended this article to (again) update the cross-reference to the voting rules which apply in the event of an opt-out (see ibid) and to provide for a special relating to ]HA evaluations for the UK and Ireland (Art 70 TFEU, discussed in 2.2.3.2 Institutional Framework74 2.2.5.1. United Kingdom and Ireland The UK and Ireland are both covered by a specific protocol on border controls, a specific protocol on the possibility ofopting in to any Title IV measure, specific rules as regards the Schengen acquis. Since the Treaty of Lisbon, alone also has an option to opt out ofall third pillar measures adopted before entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, with effect from the end of a trve-vear transitional period in 2014. These various opt-outs will be considered in 439 See 2.2.3.3 above. 440 See 3.2.5 below. 441 The Treaty of Lisbon gave this Protocol a new name: the 'Protocol on the United Kingdom and Ireland in respect ofthe area offreedom, security and justice'. to it more simply as the 'Title V Protocol' throughout. All references in this subsection Protocol, unless otherwise indicated. 442 Art 9, as inserted by the Treaty ofLisbon. The UK made a unilateral declaration to of Lisbon asserting that it 'intends to exercise its right' to opt in to such measures (Declaratioi in the Final Act). The UK and Ireland were granted an opt-out from all of the JHA issues ferred to Title IV of the EC Treaty (immigration, asylum, and civil another Protocol attached to the EC Treaty by the Treaty of Amsterdam, Protocol was extended in scope by the Treaty ofLisbon to cover allJHA within the scope of Title V TFEU,441 so now including policing and law, except that Ireland has no opt-out as regards anti-terrorist sanctions, Treaty of Lisbon also made changes to the Protocol as regards the procedure third pillar acts).439 Also, it should be recalled that even though an opt-out that the representatives of the UK, Ireland, or Denmark respectively do participate in the Council as regards the relevant measure, the MEPs from states nevertheless vote on the relevant measures during the EP's proceedings; the Commissioners and Court ofJustice judges from those Member States play their normal role. 2.2.5.1.2. Title V TFEU 2.2.5.1.1 Border controls A Protocol attached to the Treaties by the Treaty ofAmsterdam entitles the and Ireland to maintain the 'Common Travel Area' in force between to check individuals coming from other Member States, no matter what Member States do and no matter what interpretation the Court give to Article 14 EC (now Article 26 TFEU) or to anything else. This also specifically exempts the UK and Ireland from any EC (now EU) legislatic# requiring the abolition of border controls, thus overlapping with their exemption from Title IV of the EC Treaty (now Title V TFEU). The Lisbon made no substantive amendments to this Protocol; the interpretation the Protocol is discussed further in Chapter 3.440 77Overview of the institutional framework See 2.2.2.1 and 2.2.3.1 above. this issue, see further the report ofthe EU Select Committee ofthe House ofLords on the II' proposal (8th Report, 2003-04), paras 80-81. See the example of the European protection order proposal, discussed above. Art 4a, as inserted by the Treaty ofLisbon. However, in cases where the Council, acting on a proposal from the Commission, determines that the non-participation of the United Kingdom or Ireland in the amended of an existing measure makes the application ofthat measure inoperable for other Member States or the Union, it may urge them to make a notification under Article 3 For the purposes of Article 3, a further period of two months starts to run as from of such determination by the Council. at the expiry of that period of two months from the Council's determination the Kingdom or Ireland has not made a notification under Article 3 or Article 4, the measure shall no longer be binding upon or applicable to it, unless the Member concerned has made a notification under Article 4 before the entry into force of the Ill.c:nc11ll.g measure. This shall take effect from the date ofentry into force ofthe amending or of expiry of the period of two months, whichever is the later. the purpose ofthis paragraph, the Council shall, after a full discussion ofthe matter, a qualified majority of its members representing the Member States participating provisions of this Protocol apply for the United Kingdom and Ireland also to measures proposed or adopted pursuant to Title V of Part Three of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union amending an existing measure by which they are satisfied particular concerns which the UK had about the proposal, and particiactively (albeit informally) in the negotiations to that end. On those two occasions, this tactic (which is not as such provided for expressly in the Title V Protocot) was successful. With the application ofQMV to most areas ofJHA,455 it is clear that, in the ofany contrary provisions in the Title V Protocol, a British or Irish opt-in a proposal will entail the possibility that those Member States could be outvoted therefore required to apply a proposal which they disagree with.t'" If one or Member States form part of a blocking minority in the Council, either the '-J'JUULU could offer sufficient concessions to the other dissenting Member States then adopt the legislation with British and/or Irish participation, or it could the legislation without one or both of those Member States if, after a 'reaperiod oftime', their opposition is partly or wholly blocking the adoption proposal."? This may have resulted already in a greater reluctance by these to opt in to JHA proposals, with further reluctance in future following the extension of QMV to more areas ofJHA law pursuant to the Treaty ofLisbon. A significant new provision in the Title V Protocol introduced by the Treaty concerns the position of the UK and Ireland when a proposal is made amend a measure which they are already bound by.458 This rule provides as Institutional Framework76 Treaty of Lisbon, they opted in to most initial proposals for legislation concerning criminal law and policing and criminal law treaties. The approach ofthe governments has been largely, but not entirely, consistent. There have been cases where the Council went ahead and adopted JHA measures without Member State's participation even though they had opted in to discussions, but June 2010, the Spanish Council Presidency threatened that it would exclude UK from participation in the proposed Directive establishing a European tion order (despite the UK's opt-in to discussions), because the UK was opposing the proposal, and terminating the UK's participation in negotiations would that there were no longer enough votes against the proposal to form a blocking minority in the Council.v" This raises the question as to how much time has pass before the UK's or Ireland's participation in discussions on a proposal can terminated on the grounds that a 'reasonable period of time' has passed which one or both Member States have blocked the proposal, or participated a blocking minority. Furthermore, there were three cases where the UK attempted to opt in proposal, but was rebuffed; each of these decisions was challenged by the before the Court ofJustice. While the UK lost the first two of those UldUc;U:~c;~ on the grounds that the measures concerned fell instead within the scope rules in the Schengen Protocol, at the time ofwriting the third challenge is pending.": There have been three occasions when Ireland initially did not participate in a proposal, but then opted in after its adoption.t'" and two other occasions when the UK did the same,453 in each case pursuant to the enhanced cooperation rules which applied before the entry into force of the Treaty should be noted that in the latter two cases, the UK opted out of the proposaf but nevertheless indicated an intention to opt in if the final text ofthe legislation 450 See the press release of the JHA Council, 3-4 June 2010. The UK and the other dissenting Member States were objecting to this proposal due to (well-founded) concerns about its see 9.2.4 below. On the substance of the proposal, see 9.7.6 below; for the text, see [2010] 69/5. 451 Cases C-77/05 and C-137/05 UK v Council (n 443 above) and C-482/08 UK v Council, ing. An Advocate-General's opinion of 24 June 2010 recommends dismissing the UK's in the latter case. 452 Dir 2001/55 on temporary protection ([2001] OJ L 212/12), Reg 1030/2002 ([2002] 157/1), and the Decision establishing a Migration Network ([2008] OJ L 131/7). The Commissio approved Irish participation by means of Decisions, respectively: [2003] OJ L 251/23; C(2007)4589/F of 11 Oct 2007 (not published in the OJ); and [2009] OJ L 138/53. See Commission opinions on Irish participation in: SEC (2003) 907, 6 Aug 2003; COM 7 Sep 2007; and [2009] OJ Cl/I. 45; Regs 593/2008 on conflict of law in contract (Rome I Reg) and 4/2009 on maintenanc (respectively [2008] OJ L 177/6 and [2009] OJ L 7/1). The Commission approved UK participatio by means ofDecisions ([2009] OJ L 10/22 and [2009] OJ L 149/73). See also the Commission opir ions on UK participation in COM (2008) 730, 7 Nov 2008 and COM (2009) 181, 21 454 Art l l a EC, which has been replaced by Art 331(1) TFEU; see further 2.2.5.5 below. 77Overview of the institutional framework See 2.2.2.1 and 2.2.3.1 above. this issue, see further the report ofthe EU Select Committee ofthe House ofLords on the II' proposal (8th Report, 2003-04), paras 80-81. See the example of the European protection order proposal, discussed above. Art 4a, as inserted by the Treaty ofLisbon. However, in cases where the Council, acting on a proposal from the Commission, determines that the non-participation of the United Kingdom or Ireland in the amended of an existing measure makes the application ofthat measure inoperable for other Member States or the Union, it may urge them to make a notification under Article 3 For the purposes of Article 3, a further period of two months starts to run as from of such determination by the Council. at the expiry of that period of two months from the Council's determination the Kingdom or Ireland has not made a notification under Article 3 or Article 4, the measure shall no longer be binding upon or applicable to it, unless the Member concerned has made a notification under Article 4 before the entry into force of the Ill.c:nc11ll.g measure. This shall take effect from the date ofentry into force ofthe amending or of expiry of the period of two months, whichever is the later. the purpose ofthis paragraph, the Council shall, after a full discussion ofthe matter, a qualified majority of its members representing the Member States participating provisions of this Protocol apply for the United Kingdom and Ireland also to measures proposed or adopted pursuant to Title V of Part Three of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union amending an existing measure by which they are satisfied particular concerns which the UK had about the proposal, and particiactively (albeit informally) in the negotiations to that end. On those two occasions, this tactic (which is not as such provided for expressly in the Title V Protocot) was successful. With the application ofQMV to most areas ofJHA,455 it is clear that, in the ofany contrary provisions in the Title V Protocol, a British or Irish opt-in a proposal will entail the possibility that those Member States could be outvoted therefore required to apply a proposal which they disagree with.t'" If one or Member States form part of a blocking minority in the Council, either the '-J'JUULU could offer sufficient concessions to the other dissenting Member States then adopt the legislation with British and/or Irish participation, or it could the legislation without one or both of those Member States if, after a 'reaperiod oftime', their opposition is partly or wholly blocking the adoption proposal."? This may have resulted already in a greater reluctance by these to opt in to JHA proposals, with further reluctance in future following the extension of QMV to more areas ofJHA law pursuant to the Treaty ofLisbon. A significant new provision in the Title V Protocol introduced by the Treaty concerns the position of the UK and Ireland when a proposal is made amend a measure which they are already bound by.458 This rule provides as Institutional Framework76 Treaty of Lisbon, they opted in to most initial proposals for legislation concerning criminal law and policing and criminal law treaties. The approach ofthe governments has been largely, but not entirely, consistent. There have been cases where the Council went ahead and adopted JHA measures without Member State's participation even though they had opted in to discussions, but June 2010, the Spanish Council Presidency threatened that it would exclude UK from participation in the proposed Directive establishing a European tion order (despite the UK's opt-in to discussions), because the UK was opposing the proposal, and terminating the UK's participation in negotiations would that there were no longer enough votes against the proposal to form a blocking minority in the Council.v" This raises the question as to how much time has pass before the UK's or Ireland's participation in discussions on a proposal can terminated on the grounds that a 'reasonable period of time' has passed which one or both Member States have blocked the proposal, or participated a blocking minority. Furthermore, there were three cases where the UK attempted to opt in proposal, but was rebuffed; each of these decisions was challenged by the before the Court ofJustice. While the UK lost the first two of those UldUc;U:~c;~ on the grounds that the measures concerned fell instead within the scope rules in the Schengen Protocol, at the time ofwriting the third challenge is pending.": There have been three occasions when Ireland initially did not participate in a proposal, but then opted in after its adoption.t'" and two other occasions when the UK did the same,453 in each case pursuant to the enhanced cooperation rules which applied before the entry into force of the Treaty should be noted that in the latter two cases, the UK opted out of the proposaf but nevertheless indicated an intention to opt in if the final text ofthe legislation 450 See the press release of the JHA Council, 3-4 June 2010. The UK and the other dissenting Member States were objecting to this proposal due to (well-founded) concerns about its see 9.2.4 below. On the substance of the proposal, see 9.7.6 below; for the text, see [2010] 69/5. 451 Cases C-77/05 and C-137/05 UK v Council (n 443 above) and C-482/08 UK v Council, ing. An Advocate-General's opinion of 24 June 2010 recommends dismissing the UK's in the latter case. 452 Dir 2001/55 on temporary protection ([2001] OJ L 212/12), Reg 1030/2002 ([2002] 157/1), and the Decision establishing a Migration Network ([2008] OJ L 131/7). The Commissio approved Irish participation by means of Decisions, respectively: [2003] OJ L 251/23; C(2007)4589/F of 11 Oct 2007 (not published in the OJ); and [2009] OJ L 138/53. See Commission opinions on Irish participation in: SEC (2003) 907, 6 Aug 2003; COM 7 Sep 2007; and [2009] OJ Cl/I. 45; Regs 593/2008 on conflict of law in contract (Rome I Reg) and 4/2009 on maintenanc (respectively [2008] OJ L 177/6 and [2009] OJ L 7/1). The Commission approved UK participatio by means ofDecisions ([2009] OJ L 10/22 and [2009] OJ L 149/73). See also the Commission opir ions on UK participation in COM (2008) 730, 7 Nov 2008 and COM (2009) 181, 21 454 Art l l a EC, which has been replaced by Art 331(1) TFEU; see further 2.2.5.5 below. 79Overview of the institutional framework See 2.2.5.1.5. 5, Title V Protocol. The Treaty of Lisbon amended this Art to provide that the Council decide, acting with the unanimity of all Member States, to charge these costs to the UK or nonetheless. Obviously the latter Member States are unlikely to agree to this. 6a, Title V Protocol, inserted by the Treaty of Lisbon. See more generally 12.2.4 and below. For example, the Council of Europe Convention on extradition and its Protocols would between those States if the Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant were disapplied between them. For example, the Schengen Convention provisions on extradition would arguably apply ifthe Framework Decision were disapplied, and the Dublin Convention would arguably apply if "W'V'UOllIl II Reg were disapplied. Art 4, Schengen Protocol. This provision has not been amended by the Treaty ofLisbon. Decisions 2000/365/EC ([2000] OJ L 131/43) and 2002/192/EC ([2002] OJ L 64120). 1.3. Schengen Protocol Protocol on the Schengen acquis (the 'Schengen Protocol') gave the UK and ?lreland the possibility of applying to participate in only part of the Schengen subject to a decision in favour by the Council, acting with the unanimous approval of the Schengen States."! The Council accepted the UK's application participation in Schengen in 2000, and the parallel Irish application 472 although the partial participation of these Member States in the lchen~;en rules only took effect (for the UK) or will take effect (for Ireland) entrrelv objective test, applying not only if the UK or Ireland are reluctant to be excluded from the relevant pre-existing measure but also if those Member States enthusiastic about the prospect ofreleasing themselves from their pre-existing obligations. The separate question ofwhether the UK and Ireland remain bound a measure which they originally participated in, but which is repealed by a later measure which they did not participate in, is considered further below.i'" The Protocol also specifies that non-participation in JHA measures exempts UK and Ireland from the costs related to those specific measures.i'" and nrrn,i,r1p< that the UK and Ireland are not bound by the general rules on data protection that may be adopted pursuant to Article 16 TFEU to the extent that are not bound by the underlying policing or criminal law measure to which general rules relate.t'" forced termination ofparticipation in prior EU measures will presumably the impact (as regards criminal law in particular) that any Council ofEurope Conventions which had been disapplied in relations between Member States by EU measures would then re-apply in relations between the UK and/or W:"'UlU, on the one hand, and the other Member States, on the other, since the basis for disapplying those measures as between those States would no longer in force.t"" It is even possible that earlier EU measures which had been repealed disapplied as between those States by the prior EU act which no longer applied also come back into application.f" Institutional Framework78 459 Art 4a(1). The following analysis ofthese new rules draws upon S Peers, 'In a World Own? Justice and Home Affairs Opt-outs and the Treaty ofLisbon' (2008-09) 10 CYELS 460 The Council acts only with the votes of the participating Member States: Art sub-paragraph. For the applicable voting rules, see Art 238(3) TFEU. There is no role for 461 Art 4a(2), first sub-paragraph. 462 Art 4a(2), second sub-paragraph. 463 Art 4a(3). Note that in this case, the UK and Ireland will participate in the vote. Again is no role for the EP. 464 Art 4a(4). Read literally, the UK or Ireland could opt in to either the original act or amending it, but this would undercut the purpose of Art 4a(2) and so is presumably ruled by analogy Cases C-77/05 and C-137/05, n 443 above). 465 For details ofthe measures concerned, see 5.2.5 below. or having participated in the adoption ofthe amending measure. A qualified majority the Council shall be defined in accordance with Article 238(3)(a) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 3. The Council, acting by a qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission, may determine that the United Kingdom or Ireland shall bear the direct financial sequences, if any, necessarily and unavoidably incurred as a result of the cessation participation in the existing measure. 4. This Article shall be without prejudice to Article 4. It can be seen that in principle the Protocol applies as usual to such cases. However, it is possible for the Council, acting by QMV on a proposal.v" to determine that the non-participation of the UK or Ireland in proposed amended measure makes the application ofthe existing measure erable' for other Member States or the EU, to urge the UK or Ireland to notify intention to opt in to the proposal while under discussion or after its adoption. Ifthe UK or Ireland fail to do so, the existing measure ceases to apply to them. The Council, acting by QMV, may also impose financial sanctions on the UK Ireland subject to certain conditions.i'" However, it is always open to the UK Ireland to opt in to the original act and its amending measure after the adopted."?" These provisions have not yet been applied in practice, although UK and Ireland have opted out of several measures which would amend legislation in which they already participate.r" The key question as regards these provisions is the definition ofwhen the participation of the UK or Ireland in a measure should be considered to that measure 'inoperable' as regards other Member States or the Union, for in that case could the UK or Ireland be excluded from the existing measure subjected to sanctions. Given that the EU has been able to tolerate prolonged periods when different versions ofthe same measure apply to most Member on the one hand, and to Denmark or associated States on the other hand, the interpretation ofthis rule is that it only applies where the non-participation UK or Ireland would make it genuinely and objectively impossible for the measure to apply in different forms in the UK or Ireland on the one hand and the Member States on the other hand. It is not sufficient that it is more difficult to the two different sets ofrules. Also, it should be noted that the high threshold.is 79Overview of the institutional framework See 2.2.5.1.5. 5, Title V Protocol. The Treaty of Lisbon amended this Art to provide that the Council decide, acting with the unanimity of all Member States, to charge these costs to the UK or nonetheless. Obviously the latter Member States are unlikely to agree to this. 6a, Title V Protocol, inserted by the Treaty of Lisbon. See more generally 12.2.4 and below. For example, the Council of Europe Convention on extradition and its Protocols would between those States if the Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant were disapplied between them. For example, the Schengen Convention provisions on extradition would arguably apply ifthe Framework Decision were disapplied, and the Dublin Convention would arguably apply if "W'V'UOllIl II Reg were disapplied. Art 4, Schengen Protocol. This provision has not been amended by the Treaty ofLisbon. Decisions 2000/365/EC ([2000] OJ L 131/43) and 2002/192/EC ([2002] OJ L 64120). 1.3. Schengen Protocol Protocol on the Schengen acquis (the 'Schengen Protocol') gave the UK and ?lreland the possibility of applying to participate in only part of the Schengen subject to a decision in favour by the Council, acting with the unanimous approval of the Schengen States."! The Council accepted the UK's application participation in Schengen in 2000, and the parallel Irish application 472 although the partial participation of these Member States in the lchen~;en rules only took effect (for the UK) or will take effect (for Ireland) entrrelv objective test, applying not only if the UK or Ireland are reluctant to be excluded from the relevant pre-existing measure but also if those Member States enthusiastic about the prospect ofreleasing themselves from their pre-existing obligations. The separate question ofwhether the UK and Ireland remain bound a measure which they originally participated in, but which is repealed by a later measure which they did not participate in, is considered further below.i'" The Protocol also specifies that non-participation in JHA measures exempts UK and Ireland from the costs related to those specific measures.i'" and nrrn,i,r1p< that the UK and Ireland are not bound by the general rules on data protection that may be adopted pursuant to Article 16 TFEU to the extent that are not bound by the underlying policing or criminal law measure to which general rules relate.t'" forced termination ofparticipation in prior EU measures will presumably the impact (as regards criminal law in particular) that any Council ofEurope Conventions which had been disapplied in relations between Member States by EU measures would then re-apply in relations between the UK and/or W:"'UlU, on the one hand, and the other Member States, on the other, since the basis for disapplying those measures as between those States would no longer in force.t"" It is even possible that earlier EU measures which had been repealed disapplied as between those States by the prior EU act which no longer applied also come back into application.f" Institutional Framework78 459 Art 4a(1). The following analysis ofthese new rules draws upon S Peers, 'In a World Own? Justice and Home Affairs Opt-outs and the Treaty ofLisbon' (2008-09) 10 CYELS 460 The Council acts only with the votes of the participating Member States: Art sub-paragraph. For the applicable voting rules, see Art 238(3) TFEU. There is no role for 461 Art 4a(2), first sub-paragraph. 462 Art 4a(2), second sub-paragraph. 463 Art 4a(3). Note that in this case, the UK and Ireland will participate in the vote. Again is no role for the EP. 464 Art 4a(4). Read literally, the UK or Ireland could opt in to either the original act or amending it, but this would undercut the purpose of Art 4a(2) and so is presumably ruled by analogy Cases C-77/05 and C-137/05, n 443 above). 465 For details ofthe measures concerned, see 5.2.5 below. or having participated in the adoption ofthe amending measure. A qualified majority the Council shall be defined in accordance with Article 238(3)(a) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 3. The Council, acting by a qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission, may determine that the United Kingdom or Ireland shall bear the direct financial sequences, if any, necessarily and unavoidably incurred as a result of the cessation participation in the existing measure. 4. This Article shall be without prejudice to Article 4. It can be seen that in principle the Protocol applies as usual to such cases. However, it is possible for the Council, acting by QMV on a proposal.v" to determine that the non-participation of the UK or Ireland in proposed amended measure makes the application ofthe existing measure erable' for other Member States or the EU, to urge the UK or Ireland to notify intention to opt in to the proposal while under discussion or after its adoption. Ifthe UK or Ireland fail to do so, the existing measure ceases to apply to them. The Council, acting by QMV, may also impose financial sanctions on the UK Ireland subject to certain conditions.i'" However, it is always open to the UK Ireland to opt in to the original act and its amending measure after the adopted."?" These provisions have not yet been applied in practice, although UK and Ireland have opted out of several measures which would amend legislation in which they already participate.r" The key question as regards these provisions is the definition ofwhen the participation of the UK or Ireland in a measure should be considered to that measure 'inoperable' as regards other Member States or the Union, for in that case could the UK or Ireland be excluded from the existing measure subjected to sanctions. Given that the EU has been able to tolerate prolonged periods when different versions ofthe same measure apply to most Member on the one hand, and to Denmark or associated States on the other hand, the interpretation ofthis rule is that it only applies where the non-participation UK or Ireland would make it genuinely and objectively impossible for the measure to apply in different forms in the UK or Ireland on the one hand and the Member States on the other hand. It is not sufficient that it is more difficult to the two different sets ofrules. Also, it should be noted that the high threshold.is 81Overview of the institutional framework borders agency.?" A further case is pending on the question of whether to the Visa Information System by UK law enforcement officials can be restricted."? C-77/05 UK v Council and C-137/05 UK v Council (n 443 above). C-482/08 UK v Council, pending (opinion of24 June 2010). of the approach ultimately adopted by the Court, see the second edition of this 58-59. Schengen Protocol. The previous Art 5(2) of the Protocol was repealed by the the Court's view, the Commission and Council were correct: in order to ....,..'·:••• _.~" decision by the representatives ofthe Member States fully applying the Schengen acquis at that time and the Member State(s) seeking to participate fully. The and Ireland participated in that decision to the extent that they had opted in the acquis. The Act of Accession further provides that the agreements associating Norway and Iceland with the Schengen rules, as referred to in the Schengen Protocol, were binding on the new Member States as from the date accession to the EU.5IB More precisely, the provisions ofthe Schengen acquis and the measures ing upon it which applied as from 1 May 2004 in the new Member States are rules on: external border controls (except for checks in the SIS); certain of visas (particularly the visa list and visa format); irregular migration; poucmg (other than hot pursuit and surveillance); criminal law cooperation (except references to the SIS); drugs; firearms; and data protection (to the extent that other Schengen rules apply). Conversely, the rules on abolition of internal border controls; other of the common visa policy; freedom to travel; cross-border hot pursuit and veillance by police officers; and the SIS did not apply in practice until the Council decision. As for Schengen-related measures adopted after agreement the Accession Treaty, and subsequently adopted after accession, each measure 514 For the text of the treaties, see [2006J OJ L 66/38 (asylum responsibility); [2005J OJ (jurisdiction rules); and [2005] OJ L 300/53 (service of documents). The asylum treaty into force on 1 Apr 2006 ([2006] OJ L 96/9), and the civil law treaties entered into force 2007. 515 Art 8, Schengen Protocol, renumbered Art 7 by the Treaty 516 [2003J OJ L 236/33 (Act ofAccession). 517 Art 3(2), Act ofAccession, ibid. 518 Art 3(3), Act of Accession. to the Treaty of Lisbon.514 Denmark may refuse to apply subsequent measures amending or implementing the EC acts, but in such cases, the relevant treaty will be terminated. 89Overview of the institutional framework 519 Art 3(4), Act ofAccession. 520 Art 5(2), Act ofAccession. For details on these treaties, see 2.7.2 below. For ratification details, see Appendix I. 523 Art 34, Act ofAccession. Art 35, Act ofAccession. 525 Art 39, Act ofAccession. Protocol 3 to the Act ofAccession. See Art 20 of the Act ofAccession, which gives effect to Annex 11. [2007J OJL 323/34. indicated whether it applied immediately or after a delay to the new Member The Act ofAccession also provided that the new Member States had to accede JHA conventions or instruments 'which are inseparable from the attainment the objectives of' the EU Treaty.?" whether those measures were opened for signature by the old Member States or drawn up by the Council in accordance Title VI of the EU Treaty (ie the old third pillar); the new Member States had to take the administrative and other measures necessary to facilitate JHA Similarly, the new Member States had to accede to Conventions up on the basis ofArticle 293 EC (since repealed by the Treaty ofLisbon) those inseparable from the objectives of the EC Treaty.F" They also had to to treaties established on the basis of Article 38 EU (external third piltreatiesj.F' In practice, the new Member States quickly ratified a significant number of Conventions and Proto cols, although this ratification process is not complete.Y' the Act of Accession provided that until the end of 2006, there were transinonal funds to assist with the application of EU law including, inter alia, .;tSSlst;ln(;e to implement JHA obligarions.v" along with a specific facility to assist Member States with external land borders to apply their Schengen obligaby funding buildings, equipment, and training.F" specific JHA safeguard is set out in the Act, providing that for three years the date of accession (so up until 1 May 2007), the Commission could have 'appropriate measures' if there had been insufficient application of a measconcerning mutual recognition in civil law or criminal law by a new Member 525 In practice, this safeguard clause was not applied. Also, a Protocol relating UK's military base on the island ofCyprus contains specific rules on border ."""u.v,.526 Finally, Annex II to the Act of Accession contains a list of technical to existing measures made necessary by accession.v" Point 18 of lists amendments to JHA civil law measures; the Common Consular nstructions (concerning Schengen visa applications); the Border Manual (for use 101I."Cl.U'" border guards); and the EC's visa list Regulation. Iltirnatelv nine ofthe ten Member States to join the EU in 2004 participated full Schengen system as from December 2007, and from March 2008 as air borders.v" Only Cyprus was left out ofthe extension ofthe Schengen because of the practical difficulties controlling the borders as long as the Institutional Framework88 2.2.5.3. Accession States The Schengen Protocol specifies that all future Member States were to be by the entire Schengen acquisi" This was implemented first of all by the Accession Trcaty.?" which specifies that the ten new Member States the EU pursuant to that Treaty applied as from the date ofaccession (1 May the measures in the acquis as integrated into the EC and EU Treaties 'and building on it or otherwise related to it', as referred to in Article 3(1) of the of Accession and listed in Annex 1 to the Act, along with other such measures adopted between agreement of the Accession Treaty and the date of accession.. However, there was a delay in applying the remaining provisions ofthe Scheng;en acquis (or measures building upon it).517 Those measures were binding on the Member States as from 1 May 2004, but did not apply until a unanimous r >:••• _.~" decision by the representatives ofthe Member States fully applying the Schengen acquis at that time and the Member State(s) seeking to participate fully. The and Ireland participated in that decision to the extent that they had opted in the acquis. The Act of Accession further provides that the agreements associating Norway and Iceland with the Schengen rules, as referred to in the Schengen Protocol, were binding on the new Member States as from the date accession to the EU.5IB More precisely, the provisions ofthe Schengen acquis and the measures ing upon it which applied as from 1 May 2004 in the new Member States are rules on: external border controls (except for checks in the SIS); certain of visas (particularly the visa list and visa format); irregular migration; poucmg (other than hot pursuit and surveillance); criminal law cooperation (except references to the SIS); drugs; firearms; and data protection (to the extent that other Schengen rules apply). Conversely, the rules on abolition of internal border controls; other of the common visa policy; freedom to travel; cross-border hot pursuit and veillance by police officers; and the SIS did not apply in practice until the Council decision. As for Schengen-related measures adopted after agreement the Accession Treaty, and subsequently adopted after accession, each measure 514 For the text of the treaties, see [2006J OJ L 66/38 (asylum responsibility); [2005J OJ (jurisdiction rules); and [2005] OJ L 300/53 (service of documents). The asylum treaty into force on 1 Apr 2006 ([2006] OJ L 96/9), and the civil law treaties entered into force 2007. 515 Art 8, Schengen Protocol, renumbered Art 7 by the Treaty 516 [2003J OJ L 236/33 (Act ofAccession). 517 Art 3(2), Act ofAccession, ibid. 518 Art 3(3), Act of Accession. country is divided. However, Cyprus has expressed an intention of applying the provisions of the Schengen acquis relating to visas; the Council has not yet acted on this request.F? Specific issues relating to northern Cyprus have also arisen as regards the territorial scope of the EU's civil law legislation.F" The model set out in the 2003 Treaty ofAccession was largely copied in the 2005 Treaty of Accession with Romania and Bulgaria, in force from 1 January 2007, except that this time most JHA Conventions applied to the new Member States from a date decided by the Council, acting unanimously.531 Again the special JHA safeguard was not applied within its three-year period of applicability.532 91Overview of th.e institutional framework upon the acquis, the treaty is terminated regarding them, although the Mixed Committee may decide to retain it in force. 538 The parties must keep the judgments of the Court ofJustice, and of Norwegian and Icelandic courts, under review.F" If a 'substantial difference' develops in judicial interpretation national application of the agreement, and the Mixed Committee cannot a measure to ensure uniform interpretation or application of the treaty, if a dispute relating to the agreement otherwise develops, then the Mixed has a fixed period to settle the dispute, otherwise the agreement terminated.v'? It is striking that this treaty, in accordance with the Schengen Protocol, was negotiated by the Council, not the Commission, which normally negotiates treaon behalf of the EC. Moreover, although the treaty was concluded by the ,-,'JU"U', it is not clear whether the treaty also binds the EU as such, although the does state that it creates obligations for the Community and its Member 541 It is not clear whether the Court ofJustice has jurisdiction to interthe agreement as far as the Community, the Union, or both is concerned, in one judgment the Court's jurisdiction as regards the third pillar provisions of the treaty was assumed.v" practice, the treaty has entailed Norwegian and Icelandic acceptance ofmost IXJ.,ea~;U1:es concerning visas, border control, and irregular migration, and certain concerning policing and criminal law. 543 Also, Norway and Iceland a similar treaty on asylum responsibility, paralleling the EU Member Dublin Convention, which entered into force in March 2001 at the same that their Schengen association agreement was applied.r" Furthermore, States ultimately agreed to further treaties associating them with the EU's assistance Convention and Protocol.-" the surrender of fugitives (a verof the EU's European arrest warrant);546 the 'Prum Decision' relating to cooperation.>" the borders agency (Prontexj.>" the EU's borders funds Art 8 of the treaty. 539 Art 9 of the treaty. 540 Arts 10 and 11 of the treaty. 8(3) and 15(4) ofthe treaty. On the issue ofEU legal personality, see 2.7 below. C-436/04 Van Esbroek[2006] ECR 1-2333. See s 2.5 of chs 3-4,6-7, and 9-12 below. 544 [2001] OJ L 93/38. See 5.2.5 below. OJ L 26/1. The treaty has not yet entered into force. The Commission proposed its the entry into force of the Treaty ofLisbon (COM (2009) 704,17 Dec 2009). See 9.2.5 below. [2006] OJ L 292/1. The treaty has not yet entered into force. The Commission proposed its .conclusion after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon (COM (2009) 705,17 Dec 2009). See .turther '~.'2." below. OJ L 353/1. The treaty has been signed and applies provisionally, but has not yet entered (the EU concluded the treaty in July 2010, but the associated states have not ratified it 12.2.5 below. L 188/19. The treaty has not yet entered into force, but is being applied Institutional Framework90 2.2.5.4. Norway, Iceland, Switzerland, and Liechtenstein As noted above, Norway and Iceland are in a distinct position as non-EU whose participation in the Schengen rules was necessary if Sweden, Denmark, and Finland were to be able to participate in Schengen, because none of these States wished to relinquish the existing Nordic Passport Union. In fact, I"J()TVITOV and Iceland had already agreed to an association agreement with the Scnengen States before the Treaty of Amsterdam was signed.v" The Schengen Protocol therefore provided for conclusion of a replacement association agreement Norway and Iceland, as well as for a separate agreement with those States cerning UK and Irish participation in the Schengen rules.>" These treaties agreed in 1999,535 and the Schengen area was extended to Norway and Iceland March 2001, at the same time it was extended to Nordic EU Member States. The Schengen association treaty requires Norway and Iceland to the Schengen acquis, including EC measures related to the acquis, as it in spring 1999. A Mixed Committee established by the treaty is a for discussions about implementation of the acquis and concerning measures building upon it. 537 If Norway or Iceland do not accept a measure buudmg 529 See 4.2.5 below. 530 Case C-420/07 Apostolides[2009] ECR 1-3571; see further 8.2.5 below. 531 Art 3 and Annex I to Act of Accession ([2005] OJ L 157/203). In practice, the extended the application ofall relevant Conventions to Romania and Bulgaria by the end [2007] OJ L 200/47 (Europol); [2007] OJ L 307/20 (CIS); [2008] OJ L 9/23 (anti-fraud Convention); [2007] OJ L 304/34 (corruption); [2008] OJ L 9/21 (Naples Il); [2007] OJ L 307/18 (mutual ance); [2007] OJ L 307/22 (driving disqualification); and [2007] OJ L 347/1 (Rome Convention) 532 Art 38 ofthe Act ofAccession (ibid). There were regular reports from the Commission on application by Romania and Bulgaria of, inter alia, standards regarding judicial reform. The recent reports are in COM (2010) 112 and 113, 23 Mar 2010. 533 Council doe 11780/97, 28 Oct 1997. 534 Art 6, Schengen Protocol. The Treaty of Lisbon made a minor amendment to this delete a reference to the pre-Amsterdam association treaty with Norway and Iceland (ibid). 535 See respectively [1999] OJ L 176/35 and [2000] OJ LIS/I; both treaties entered into on 26 June 2000 ([2000] OJ L 149/36). See also a Decision on implementation of the first (Decision 1999/437/EC, [1999] OJ L 176/31). 536 Decision 2000/777 ([2000] OJ L 537 Arts 2-5 of the treaty; and see Decision 1/99 of the Mixed Committee, adopting its rules dure ([1999] OJ C 211/9). These rules were later amended by Decision 1/2004 ([2004] OJ C country is divided. However, Cyprus has expressed an intention of applying the provisions of the Schengen acquis relating to visas; the Council has not yet acted on this request.F? Specific issues relating to northern Cyprus have also arisen as regards the territorial scope of the EU's civil law legislation.F" The model set out in the 2003 Treaty ofAccession was largely copied in the 2005 Treaty of Accession with Romania and Bulgaria, in force from 1 January 2007, except that this time most JHA Conventions applied to the new Member States from a date decided by the Council, acting unanimously.531 Again the special JHA safeguard was not applied within its three-year period of applicability.532 91Overview of th.e institutional framework upon the acquis, the treaty is terminated regarding them, although the Mixed Committee may decide to retain it in force. 538 The parties must keep the judgments of the Court ofJustice, and of Norwegian and Icelandic courts, under review.F" If a 'substantial difference' develops in judicial interpretation national application of the agreement, and the Mixed Committee cannot a measure to ensure uniform interpretation or application of the treaty, if a dispute relating to the agreement otherwise develops, then the Mixed has a fixed period to settle the dispute, otherwise the agreement terminated.v'? It is striking that this treaty, in accordance with the Schengen Protocol, was negotiated by the Council, not the Commission, which normally negotiates treaon behalf of the EC. Moreover, although the treaty was concluded by the ,-,'JU"U', it is not clear whether the treaty also binds the EU as such, although the does state that it creates obligations for the Community and its Member 541 It is not clear whether the Court ofJustice has jurisdiction to interthe agreement as far as the Community, the Union, or both is concerned, in one judgment the Court's jurisdiction as regards the third pillar provisions of the treaty was assumed.v" practice, the treaty has entailed Norwegian and Icelandic acceptance ofmost IXJ.,ea~;U1:es concerning visas, border control, and irregular migration, and certain concerning policing and criminal law. 543 Also, Norway and Iceland a similar treaty on asylum responsibility, paralleling the EU Member Dublin Convention, which entered into force in March 2001 at the same that their Schengen association agreement was applied.r" Furthermore, States ultimately agreed to further treaties associating them with the EU's assistance Convention and Protocol.-" the surrender of fugitives (a verof the EU's European arrest warrant);546 the 'Prum Decision' relating to cooperation.>" the borders agency (Prontexj.>" the EU's borders funds Art 8 of the treaty. 539 Art 9 of the treaty. 540 Arts 10 and 11 of the treaty. 8(3) and 15(4) ofthe treaty. On the issue ofEU legal personality, see 2.7 below. C-436/04 Van Esbroek[2006] ECR 1-2333. See s 2.5 of chs 3-4,6-7, and 9-12 below. 544 [2001] OJ L 93/38. See 5.2.5 below. OJ L 26/1. The treaty has not yet entered into force. The Commission proposed its the entry into force of the Treaty ofLisbon (COM (2009) 704,17 Dec 2009). See 9.2.5 below. [2006] OJ L 292/1. The treaty has not yet entered into force. The Commission proposed its .conclusion after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon (COM (2009) 705,17 Dec 2009). See .turther '~.'2." below. OJ L 353/1. The treaty has been signed and applies provisionally, but has not yet entered (the EU concluded the treaty in July 2010, but the associated states have not ratified it 12.2.5 below. L 188/19. The treaty has not yet entered into force, but is being applied Institutional Framework90 2.2.5.4. Norway, Iceland, Switzerland, and Liechtenstein As noted above, Norway and Iceland are in a distinct position as non-EU whose participation in the Schengen rules was necessary if Sweden, Denmark, and Finland were to be able to participate in Schengen, because none of these States wished to relinquish the existing Nordic Passport Union. In fact, I"J()TVITOV and Iceland had already agreed to an association agreement with the Scnengen States before the Treaty of Amsterdam was signed.v" The Schengen Protocol therefore provided for conclusion of a replacement association agreement Norway and Iceland, as well as for a separate agreement with those States cerning UK and Irish participation in the Schengen rules.>" These treaties agreed in 1999,535 and the Schengen area was extended to Norway and Iceland March 2001, at the same time it was extended to Nordic EU Member States. The Schengen association treaty requires Norway and Iceland to the Schengen acquis, including EC measures related to the acquis, as it in spring 1999. A Mixed Committee established by the treaty is a for discussions about implementation of the acquis and concerning measures building upon it. 537 If Norway or Iceland do not accept a measure buudmg 529 See 4.2.5 below. 530 Case C-420/07 Apostolides[2009] ECR 1-3571; see further 8.2.5 below. 531 Art 3 and Annex I to Act of Accession ([2005] OJ L 157/203). In practice, the extended the application ofall relevant Conventions to Romania and Bulgaria by the end [2007] OJ L 200/47 (Europol); [2007] OJ L 307/20 (CIS); [2008] OJ L 9/23 (anti-fraud Convention); [2007] OJ L 304/34 (corruption); [2008] OJ L 9/21 (Naples Il); [2007] OJ L 307/18 (mutual ance); [2007] OJ L 307/22 (driving disqualification); and [2007] OJ L 347/1 (Rome Convention) 532 Art 38 ofthe Act ofAccession (ibid). There were regular reports from the Commission on application by Romania and Bulgaria of, inter alia, standards regarding judicial reform. The recent reports are in COM (2010) 112 and 113, 23 Mar 2010. 533 Council doe 11780/97, 28 Oct 1997. 534 Art 6, Schengen Protocol. The Treaty of Lisbon made a minor amendment to this delete a reference to the pre-Amsterdam association treaty with Norway and Iceland (ibid). 535 See respectively [1999] OJ L 176/35 and [2000] OJ LIS/I; both treaties entered into on 26 June 2000 ([2000] OJ L 149/36). See also a Decision on implementation of the first (Decision 1999/437/EC, [1999] OJ L 176/31). 536 Decision 2000/777 ([2000] OJ L 537 Arts 2-5 of the treaty; and see Decision 1/99 of the Mixed Committee, adopting its rules dure ([1999] OJ C 211/9). These rules were later amended by Decision 1/2004 ([2004] OJ C 93Overview of the institutional framework revised TEU, first sub-paragraph. AllJHA matters are shared competences, and so non-exclusive: see Art 4(2)U) TFEU and the discussion in 2.2.4 above. 20(2), revised TED. Art 20(1), revised TEU, second sub-paragraph, and Arts 326 and 327 TFEU. See Arts 11 and 11. EC and Arts 43-45, previous TEU. There were specific rules for the third in the prior Arts 40, 40a, and 40b TED. 559 See 2.2.5.1 above. See 2.2.3.4.1 above. 56! On the substance of the Rome III proposal, see S.6 below. 20, revised TEU and Arts 326-334 TFED. There remain some distinct rules for foreign enhanced cooperation, which are not considered further here (Arts 32S(2), 329(2), and 331(2) General rules on enhanced cooperation 'J'.U'-L'U provisions on 'enhanced cooperation', ie the process of some Member 'participating in EU measures without some other Member States, were first introduced in the Treaty of Amsterdam, and these provisions were amended by Treaty of Nice.558 These rules were never in fact used, except in the context UK and Ireland opting in to immigration, asylum, and civil law measures those measures had already been adopted.i" However, it is striking to note there were two attempts to use these provisions in the JHA area: as regards a proposal on criminal suspects' rights, where enhanced cooperation failed because were insufficient votes in the Council to support authorization ofenhanced cooperation when the issue was raised informallyr''" and as regards the 'Rome Ill' proposal for choice oflaw on divorce, because the Commission did not respond, the Treaty ofLisbon entered into force, to a group ofMember States which requested authorization for enhanced cooperation.t'" The Treaty of Lisbon subsequently amended the enhanced cooperation rules inter alia, in order to merge the separate rules governing the former first pillars.r'" The basic rule is that a group ofMember States may establish enhanced cooperation among themselves, within the context of the EU's non"""rlll"i",,, competences, by 'applying the relevant provisions of the Treaties'Y" In words, once enhanced cooperation has been approved, the normal rules on competence and decision-making (for example, unanimity as regards family law will apply. Enhanced cooperation is authorized by the Council 'as a resort, when it has established that the objectives of such cooperation cannot attained within a reasonable period by the Union as a whole', and at least nine States must participate.t'" Furthermore, enhanced cooperation must: to further the objectives of the Union, protect its interests and reinforce its rntegration process'; 'comply with the Treaties and Union law'; not 'undermine' rnternai market or 'distort' competition, etc; and 'respect the competences, and obligations ofthose Member States which do not participate in it'. But the non-participants 'shall not impede its implementation by the parncipating Member States'.565The Treaties are silent on the question of enhanced cooperation outsidethe EU legal framework, but of course there are prior examtaking place (the Schengen and Prum Conventions). It should follow Institutional Framework92 549 [2010] OJ L 169122. The treaty has been signed, but is not yet in force. 550 COM (2009) 605 and 606, 30 Oct 2009. The Council has agreed to sign this treaty, but it not yet entered into force. 551 [200S] OJ L 53/13 and 52. On the date of entry into force, see [200S] OJ L 53/1S. 5S2 [200S] OJ L 327/15 (Decision on full extension ofSchengen acquis). For the rules ofprocedure of the Mixed Committee, see [2004] OJ C 30S/2. 553 As regards asylum responsibility, the EC (now EU) also had to be party to this parallel alongside Switzerland and Liechtenstein. This treaty is in force as between the EU and Switzerland ([2009] OJ L 191/6). 554 Arts 7(5) 13, 15, 16, and 18 ofthe Schengen treaty and Arts 11 and 14-16 ofthe asylum sibility treaty. On the specific legislation which Switzerland applies, see s 2.5 of chs 3-7 and 555 COM (2006) 752-754, 1 and 4 Dec 2006. The Protocols were signed in 200S L 83/3 and 5 as regards the Schengen Protocols; the signature relating to the Protocol on responsibility was not published). Following the entry into force of the Treaty of Protocol will be approved in the form of two revised Council decisions: see Council doc 26 Apr 2010. See also the amendment to the EU/Switzerland (Schengen) Mixed Committee of procedure ([200S] OJ L S3/37). 556 COM (2009) 255, 4June 2009. The treaty entered into force between the EU and Switzerland on 1 Aug 2010, but has not yet entered into force between the EU and Liechtenstein. 557 [2010] OJ L 169122 and COM (2009) 605 and 606 (nn 549 and 550 above). legislation.v'" and participation in comitology committees connected to the Schengen acquis.55o As for Switzerland, it agreed a treaty associating itself with the Schengen acquis in 2004, along with a parallel treaty on its application of the EU's asylum responsibility rules; these treaties entered into force on 1 March 200S,551 and were applied as from 12 December 200S (29 March 2009 as regards Schengen air bordersl.Y" These two agreements are essentially identical to the Schengen and asylum responsibility agreements with Norway and Iceland, except that: the Schengen treaty is expressly with the Community and Union (and creates obligations for the EC, the EU, and Member States); Liechtenstein may accede to either treaty; there is an obligation to negotiate parallel treaties with Denmark (as regards matters within the scope of the former Title IV of the EC Treaty),553 Norway, and Iceland; Switzerland is not obliged to apply a particular rule relating to mutual criminal assistance; and the Schengen and asylum responsibility treaties are linked (denunciation of one will terminate the application of the other one).554 A Protocol concerning accession of Liechtenstein to these treaties was agreed in 2006, but is not yet in force. 555Also, Switzerland and Liechtenstein have agreed a treaty with the EC concerning their relationship with Frontex (paralleling the agreement with Norway and Iceland on this subject),556 and are also parties to the treaties concerning association with the Borders Funds comitology committees.v" However, unlike Norway and Iceland, Switzerland and Liechtenstein have not agreed any further treaties relating to mutual assistance, the surrender procedure, or the Prum Decision on police cooperation with the ED. 93Overview of the institutional framework revised TEU, first sub-paragraph. AllJHA matters are shared competences, and so non-exclusive: see Art 4(2)U) TFEU and the discussion in 2.2.4 above. 20(2), revised TED. Art 20(1), revised TEU, second sub-paragraph, and Arts 326 and 327 TFEU. See Arts 11 and 11. EC and Arts 43-45, previous TEU. There were specific rules for the third in the prior Arts 40, 40a, and 40b TED. 559 See 2.2.5.1 above. See 2.2.3.4.1 above. 56! On the substance of the Rome III proposal, see S.6 below. 20, revised TEU and Arts 326-334 TFED. There remain some distinct rules for foreign enhanced cooperation, which are not considered further here (Arts 32S(2), 329(2), and 331(2) General rules on enhanced cooperation 'J'.U'-L'U provisions on 'enhanced cooperation', ie the process of some Member 'participating in EU measures without some other Member States, were first introduced in the Treaty of Amsterdam, and these provisions were amended by Treaty of Nice.558 These rules were never in fact used, except in the context UK and Ireland opting in to immigration, asylum, and civil law measures those measures had already been adopted.i" However, it is striking to note there were two attempts to use these provisions in the JHA area: as regards a proposal on criminal suspects' rights, where enhanced cooperation failed because were insufficient votes in the Council to support authorization ofenhanced cooperation when the issue was raised informallyr''" and as regards the 'Rome Ill' proposal for choice oflaw on divorce, because the Commission did not respond, the Treaty ofLisbon entered into force, to a group ofMember States which requested authorization for enhanced cooperation.t'" The Treaty of Lisbon subsequently amended the enhanced cooperation rules inter alia, in order to merge the separate rules governing the former first pillars.r'" The basic rule is that a group ofMember States may establish enhanced cooperation among themselves, within the context of the EU's non"""rlll"i",,, competences, by 'applying the relevant provisions of the Treaties'Y" In words, once enhanced cooperation has been approved, the normal rules on competence and decision-making (for example, unanimity as regards family law will apply. Enhanced cooperation is authorized by the Council 'as a resort, when it has established that the objectives of such cooperation cannot attained within a reasonable period by the Union as a whole', and at least nine States must participate.t'" Furthermore, enhanced cooperation must: to further the objectives of the Union, protect its interests and reinforce its rntegration process'; 'comply with the Treaties and Union law'; not 'undermine' rnternai market or 'distort' competition, etc; and 'respect the competences, and obligations ofthose Member States which do not participate in it'. But the non-participants 'shall not impede its implementation by the parncipating Member States'.565The Treaties are silent on the question of enhanced cooperation outsidethe EU legal framework, but of course there are prior examtaking place (the Schengen and Prum Conventions). It should follow Institutional Framework92 549 [2010] OJ L 169122. The treaty has been signed, but is not yet in force. 550 COM (2009) 605 and 606, 30 Oct 2009. The Council has agreed to sign this treaty, but it not yet entered into force. 551 [200S] OJ L 53/13 and 52. On the date of entry into force, see [200S] OJ L 53/1S. 5S2 [200S] OJ L 327/15 (Decision on full extension ofSchengen acquis). For the rules ofprocedure of the Mixed Committee, see [2004] OJ C 30S/2. 553 As regards asylum responsibility, the EC (now EU) also had to be party to this parallel alongside Switzerland and Liechtenstein. This treaty is in force as between the EU and Switzerland ([2009] OJ L 191/6). 554 Arts 7(5) 13, 15, 16, and 18 ofthe Schengen treaty and Arts 11 and 14-16 ofthe asylum sibility treaty. On the specific legislation which Switzerland applies, see s 2.5 of chs 3-7 and 555 COM (2006) 752-754, 1 and 4 Dec 2006. The Protocols were signed in 200S L 83/3 and 5 as regards the Schengen Protocols; the signature relating to the Protocol on responsibility was not published). Following the entry into force of the Treaty of Protocol will be approved in the form of two revised Council decisions: see Council doc 26 Apr 2010. See also the amendment to the EU/Switzerland (Schengen) Mixed Committee of procedure ([200S] OJ L S3/37). 556 COM (2009) 255, 4June 2009. The treaty entered into force between the EU and Switzerland on 1 Aug 2010, but has not yet entered into force between the EU and Liechtenstein. 557 [2010] OJ L 169122 and COM (2009) 605 and 606 (nn 549 and 550 above). legislation.v'" and participation in comitology committees connected to the Schengen acquis.55o As for Switzerland, it agreed a treaty associating itself with the Schengen acquis in 2004, along with a parallel treaty on its application of the EU's asylum responsibility rules; these treaties entered into force on 1 March 200S,551 and were applied as from 12 December 200S (29 March 2009 as regards Schengen air bordersl.Y" These two agreements are essentially identical to the Schengen and asylum responsibility agreements with Norway and Iceland, except that: the Schengen treaty is expressly with the Community and Union (and creates obligations for the EC, the EU, and Member States); Liechtenstein may accede to either treaty; there is an obligation to negotiate parallel treaties with Denmark (as regards matters within the scope of the former Title IV of the EC Treaty),553 Norway, and Iceland; Switzerland is not obliged to apply a particular rule relating to mutual criminal assistance; and the Schengen and asylum responsibility treaties are linked (denunciation of one will terminate the application of the other one).554 A Protocol concerning accession of Liechtenstein to these treaties was agreed in 2006, but is not yet in force. 555Also, Switzerland and Liechtenstein have agreed a treaty with the EC concerning their relationship with Frontex (paralleling the agreement with Norway and Iceland on this subject),556 and are also parties to the treaties concerning association with the Borders Funds comitology committees.v" However, unlike Norway and Iceland, Switzerland and Liechtenstein have not agreed any further treaties relating to mutual assistance, the surrender procedure, or the Prum Decision on police cooperation with the ED.