WORKING PAPER | April 2015 | 1
WORKING PAPER
PUTTING A PRICE ON CARBON:
A HANDBOOK FOR U.S. POLICYMAKERS
KEVIN KENNEDY, MICHAEL OBEITER, AND NOAH KAUFMAN
CONTENTS
Executive Summary.......................................................1
1. Introduction...............................................................6
2. Basics of Pricing Carbon...........................................7
3. A Brief History of Carbon Pricing............................12
4. Key Design Features.................................................17
5. Commonly Proposed Uses of
Carbon Pricing Revenues.........................................24
6. Economic Effects of a Carbon Price.........................34
7. Conclusion..............................................................40
Appendix......................................................................42
Bibliography.................................................................45
Endnotes......................................................................48
Working Papers contain preliminary research, analysis,
findings, and recommendations. They are circulated to
stimulate timely discussion and critical feedback and
to influence ongoing debate on emerging issues. Most
working papers are eventually published in another form
and their content may be revised.
Suggested Citation: Kennedy, K., M. Obeiter, and N.
Kaufman. 2015. “Putting a Price on Carbon: A Handbook for U.S.
Policymakers.” Working Paper. Washington, DC: World Resources
Institute. Available online at http://wri.org/carbonpricing.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Putting a Price on Carbon: A Handbook for U.S.
Policymakers is the first in a series of papers that the
World Resources Institute will produce with the aim of
providing a clear and comprehensive understanding of
the key issues that will need to be addressed if the United
States ultimately imposes a national price on carbon. The
Handbook lays out what is already known about the design
and effects of different approaches to pricing carbon, with a
focus on carbon taxes and cap-and-trade programs.
We believe that pricing carbon should be a core element
of the United States’ long-term strategy for achieving
significant reductions in greenhouse gas emissions in the
coming decades. However, in writing the Handbook, we
recognize that many who are, or could become, interested
in carbon pricing might be motivated by the potential
for benefits that are unrelated to climate change. Carbon
price programs can be designed with an eye toward other
possible policy goals, such as reforming the tax code to be
more efficient. Even when carbon pricing is approached
with non-climate priorities in mind, the emission reduction
potential provides an insurance policy against the risk
of significant climate impacts.
The Handbook provides an overview of carbon pricing—
the types of decisions that need to be made in designing a
program (including the political decisions about the use of
revenue) and the expected economic impacts of alternative
approaches. We conducted a thorough review of the
literature, selecting a broad array of well-regarded and
highly cited studies that represent a range of viewpoints.
We expect this Handbook to be useful in the public
debate in the United States on whether, how, and when to
implement a national carbon price.
2 |
The Basics of Pricing Carbon
Greenhouse gas emissions impose costs on the global
community via climate change. A carbon price shifts the
burden of these costs from society as a whole to the entities
responsible for the emissions, providing an incentive
to decrease carbon emissions.
Pricing carbon increases the prices of goods across the
economy in proportion to their carbon content, and thus
in proportion to their effect on climate change. By raising
the relative price of carbon-intensive goods (for example,
fossil fuels), a carbon price encourages individuals and
businesses to purchase less carbon-intensive alternatives.
A carbon price would lead to reductions in U.S. greenhouse
gas emissions and create leverage to encourage
other countries to reduce their emissions, both of which
are necessary to prevent the more severe effects of climate
change. In addition, reduced fossil fuel usage will provide
“co-benefits” in the form of reduced emissions of other
harmful air pollutants.
While pricing carbon implies higher prices for certain
goods, the additional costs to individuals and businesses
become an additional source of revenue that can either
be returned to households or spent in other productive
ways. Among other possibilities, carbon-pricing revenues
can be used to promote economic growth, advance lowcarbon
technologies and other activities that help respond
to climate change, and reduce adverse economic effects of
the carbon price.
The following are some of the specific potential uses of
carbon pricing revenues:
▪▪ TAX CUTS. The revenues from carbon pricing could be
used to fund cuts in other tax rates. Taxes on labor
and capital can reduce the income of individuals
and businesses and decrease incentives to engage in
productive activities such as work and investment.
Such taxes differ from a carbon tax, which corrects
for a market failure and reduces the incentive to emit
harmful greenhouse gases.
▪▪ RETURNING MONEY TO HOUSEHOLDS OR ELECTRICITY
CONSUMERS. Revenue from carbon pricing could be
returned to households by sending them “lump sum”
payments, which could be divided equally or by some
alternative metric. This “tax-and-dividend” approach
has gained popularity largely because of its perceived
fairness and simplicity. Households could be provided
with tax refunds or sent quarterly or annual checks.
In California, some money from the cap-and-trade
allowance auctions is returned to electricity customers
in the form of rebates on their bills. These types of
approaches could also ensure that low-income households
receive at least as much in income as they spend
on the tax.
▪▪ DEFICIT REDUCTION. Large national deficits can reduce
economic growth rates by increasing interest rates,
inhibiting (or “crowding out”) private sector investments,
and increasing future tax burdens to pay off
the principal or interest on the debt. Carbon pricing
revenues could be used to reduce annual deficits and
thereby help to avoid such adverse economic effects.
▪▪ INVESTING IN COMBATING CLIMATE CHANGE. In addition
to its potential to stimulate innovation in low-carbon
technologies (for example, renewable energy), a
carbon price can provide revenue to help promote the
development and deployment of breakthrough technologies.
In addition, carbon-pricing revenues can be
used to invest in infrastructure that helps communities
adapt to the effects of climate change that are now
unavoidable (extreme weather, sea level rise, etc.).
▪▪ TRANSITIONAL ASSISTANCE. A portion of the revenues
can be used to assist those likely to be most adversely
affected by a carbon price. Job training can be provided
to workers in industries with anticipated job losses
(for example, coal mining). In addition, revenues can
be disproportionately allocated to households and
business in regions of the country that are most heavily
dependent on the production or consumption of
fossil fuels in order to smooth the transition to a lower
carbon economy. Revenues can also be used to provide
assistance to industries that might face increased
competition from foreign competitors.
Many other ways are available to make use of carbonpricing
revenue. While many advocates strongly favor
one or another particular approach to the use of revenue,
existing or proposed carbon-pricing policies often include
a mixture of approaches in accordance with the compromises
and trade-offs required to pass such far-reaching
legislation.
Carbon Taxes versus Cap-and-Trade
This Handbook focuses on the two main approaches to
pricing carbon: carbon taxes and cap-and-trade programs.
A carbon tax is a fee added to the price of goods in proportion
to their carbon content. A cap-and-trade program
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Putting a Price on Carbon: A Handbook for U.S. Policymakers
entails setting a maximum level of carbon emissions, with
emissions allowances issued by regulators up to this cap
that can be bought or sold. Under a cap-and-trade program,
the carbon price is equal to the market price of the
emissions allowances.
If properly designed and implemented, both carbon taxes
and cap-and-trade programs provide incentives to undertake
the lowest cost abatement opportunities (those less
expensive than paying the carbon price). In addition, carbon
taxes and cap-and-trade programs require a number
of similar decisions to be made in the design process.
While the effects of comparably stringent carbon taxes and
cap-and-trade programs are virtually identical in theory,
a number of practical differences exist between the two
policy instruments. A carbon tax is in some ways simpler
than a cap-and-trade program. A tax does not require the
government to allocate or conduct auctions for emissions
allowances, or monitor the trading of allowances, and
regulated entities do not need to participate in auctions or
secondary markets for allowance trading.
The major advantage of a cap-and-trade program is that
the policy sets a firm limit on the quantity of emissions
that will be allowed. Therefore, when climate change goals
are stated in terms of emissions levels, the emissions cap
can ensure the goal will be achieved. A carbon tax cannot
guarantee a certain emissions path, but it will lead to
a certain price pathway. Regulated entities might prefer
that approach to the less stable prices of a cap-and-trade
program, which can make business planning more difficult.
To that end, cap-and-trade programs may include
“ceilings” and/or “floors” on allowances prices to reduce
price volatility.
Carbon-Pricing Policies and Proposals
While the concept of carbon pricing dates back to economic
theory from the early 20th
century, in practice,
carbon-pricing programs were first developed in the early
1990s when four Scandinavian countries implemented
taxes on carbon dioxide (CO2
) emissions. In the United
States, the Clinton administration proposed a tax on the
energy content of fuels that would have been similar to a
carbon tax, but the proposal was controversial and withdrawn
in 1993.1
Also in the 1990s, the United States implemented the
Acid Rain Program, which put in place a cap-and-trade
program for sulfur dioxide emissions in the United States.2
While not focused on carbon emissions, the Acid Rain
Program provided proof of concept for cap and trade,
which has since been used for pricing carbon.
The European Union established its Emissions Trading
Scheme in 2005, which is the world’s largest CO2
cap-andtrade
program.3
The EU-ETS went through a rocky initial
phase, which saw prices collapse due, in part, to the overallocation
of allowances. However, the program has since
achieved a stable market for allowances and meaningful
emissions reductions, and has provided useful lessons for
other cap-and-trade programs developed elsewhere.
Back in the United States, starting with the Climate
Stewardship Act of 2003, Congress has seen numerous
carbon pricing proposals, many with bipartisan sponsorship
and support. The 111th Congress (2009 and 2010)
was the high-water mark for these proposals, when the
American Clean Energy and Security Act (ACES) capand-trade
program (also known as “Waxman-Markey”
after its two principal co-sponsors) was approved by the
House of Representatives. While several companion bills
were introduced in the Senate during that Congress, none
moved to a floor vote. Additional carbon-pricing bills have
been introduced in Congress since 2010, but none has
been given serious consideration.
With little prospect of comprehensive federal action on
climate change in the mid-2000s, many U.S. states began
to plan their own state or regional cap-and-trade programs.
The first was the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative
(RGGI), a cap-and-trade program for CO2
emissions
from power plants, launched in 2009 by ten northeastern
states (New Jersey has since withdrawn). Various western
U.S. states and Canadian provinces created the Western
Climate Initiative (WCI) in 2007 and jointly agreed on
design principles for a regional cap-and-trade program.
While the WCI was never able to implement the regional
program, California and Quebec currently operate a linked
cap-and-trade program that covers 85 percent of the emissions
in each jurisdiction. Ontario recently announced its
intent to establish a cap-and-trade program and link it
with California and Quebec as part of the WCI.4
In addition,
WCI member British Columbia established a carbon
tax in 2008 that is currently C$30 per ton of CO2
across
sectors representing 70 percent of total emissions.
Nearly 40 countries and over 26 sub-national jurisdictions
have implemented either a carbon tax or a greenhousegas
cap-and-trade program; these include seven pilot
programs in China. Together, these programs cover
approximately 12 percent of global greenhouse gas (GHG)
4 |
emissions. In contrast to the situation a decade ago, if the
United States were to establish a national carbon price it
would no longer be a lone actor; instead, it would be joining
a growing community of nations committed to reducing
global greenhouse gas emissions with cost-effective
climate-change policies.
Carbon Pricing Design Features
Establishing a carbon pricing program requires many
decisions on policy structure and design. Some of the main
design elements of a carbon-pricing policy are highlighted
below. Each element is relevant to both a carbon tax and a
cap-and-trade program.
▪▪ SCOPE. Scope refers to the portion of overall greenhouse
gas emissions covered by the program. Determining
a program’s scope requires policymakers to
decide: (1) whether the program covers only CO2
or
other greenhouse gases as well; (2) which economic
sectors are covered by the program; and (3) whether
all emitters or only those above a certain threshold of
emissions are regulated. The broader the scope, the
greater the emissions reductions that will be expected
from a given carbon price. A broader scope also implies
that a given quantity of emissions reductions will
be achieved at a lower cost.
▪▪ POINT OF REGULATION. Carbon pricing can be applied at
different points in the economy. Under an “upstream”
approach, the carbon price is applied where the materials
that will result in the emissions first enter the
economy (for example, at the coal mine, the oil or gas
drilling site, or the entry point of fuel imports). Such
an approach enables a large fraction of energy CO2
emissions to be covered while regulating relatively few
entities. A “downstream” approach applies the carbon
price at the point where the emissions actually occur.
This is straightforward to implement for power plants
and manufacturing facilities, but far more difficult for
individual buildings, cars, and trucks. A program may
also include a mixture of upstream and downstream
approaches, or “midstream” approaches (for example,
oil refineries and natural gas processing plants).
▪▪ REPORTING AND VERIFICATION. A key prerequisite for a
successful carbon pricing policy is a robust emissions
reporting and verification system. Reliable reporting
systems are often already in place for other purposes.
Because the addition of a carbon price creates direct
economic consequences for both the covered entity—
which wants to minimize its tax burden—and the
government, verification of the emissions reports is
essential. Different approaches to that verification are
possible—from independent third party verification to
self-certification with strong penalties.
▪▪ SETTING THE PRICE OR CAP. Carbon tax and cap-andtrade
programs require setting pathways of prices
or emissions caps. Setting the level of the tax or cap
will likely require balancing a variety of political,
economic, and environmental considerations. From a
climate perspective, one can start from either consideration
of emission targets or from estimates of the
damages caused by GHG emissions. For non-climate
policy priorities (for example, tax reform), setting
the price might have more to do with the amount of
revenue needed to serve those priorities. It is common
to increase the stringency of a program gradually over
time to allow businesses and consumers to adjust, and
to maintain some flexibility to adjust the price or cap
in the event that conditions change.
Various additional factors must also be considered. For
example, allowing “offsets” (emissions reductions from
entities that are not directly covered by the policy, for
example, enhanced carbon sinks achieved by tree planting)
can reduce the costs of a policy, but can also make the
emissions reductions more difficult to verify.
Policymakers should also consider the broader policy context
in which carbon pricing is introduced, including any
complementary policies that might be needed to further
reduce emissions or costs.
Economics of Carbon Pricing
The body of literature on the economic effects of carbon
pricing programs is wide and deep. Economists have conducted
both benefit-cost and economic-impact analyses to
assess the effects of carbon taxes on society as a whole and
on individual sectors, regions, and income levels. While
there are serious limitations to economic models (see
Section 6 for detail), economic theory and empirical
results can nonetheless offer important lessons to policymakers
as they design carbon-pricing programs.
Benefit-Cost Analysis
The most important finding of economic theory related
to carbon pricing is also the most basic: when an activity
such as emitting greenhouse gases causes harm that is not
reflected in the prices of goods and services (what economists
call a “negative externality”), pricing that activity
leads to reductions in the activity and to overall gains
WORKING PAPER | April 2015 | 5
Putting a Price on Carbon: A Handbook for U.S. Policymakers
in welfare. The price corrects for the market failure (the
harm caused is internalized in the costs of the goods and
services). Indeed, economic studies show that the optimal
carbon price is potentially very large.5
Climate change is a challenging economic problem, in part
because benefits are global in nature while policy costs
are local. This dilemma has caused some to question the
benefits achievable from a carbon price established by
any single country. On the other hand, many nations and
sub-national jurisdictions have already put a carbon price
in place. The United States is responsible for a significant
portion of global greenhouse-gas emissions, and U.S.
adoption of a carbon price could help spur broader multinational
action to combat climate change.
Comparisons of the benefits and costs of carbon pricing
should take account of benefits unrelated to climate
change. For example, reduced fossil fuel usage provides
substantial “co-benefits” in the form of reduced emissions
of other harmful air pollutants. In addition, the carbon
pricing revenues can be used in a variety of ways to benefit
the economy and boost economic growth.
For all these reasons, economists overwhelmingly support
a well-designed national carbon tax. In 2012, a University
of Chicago survey asked 40 prominent economists from
across the political spectrum whether they would prefer
the government to raise revenue through traditional
income taxes or via a national carbon tax. Not one chose
the income tax approach.6
Economic Impacts
While economists largely agree that many uses of carbonpricing
revenues can promote long-term prosperity,
determining whether a carbon price will be beneficial to
the U.S. economy in the short run is a more difficult question.
A significant portion of the welfare gains will accrue
outside the economy (if these gains are measured traditionally,
using metrics such as national GDP) and will not
be realized until far into the future. Nevertheless, because
of the various non-climate policy objectives that can be
achieved with the revenue from a carbon price, economists
have found that at least some of the potential adverse
economic consequences for specific sectors, regions,
or groups can be offset. In fact, some economists have
found that a properly designed carbon price can achieve
net economic benefits, even before consideration of the
climate benefits, which economists refer to as a “double
dividend.”7
The economic impacts of a carbon price (in terms of
economic growth, employment, etc.) are highly contingent
on how the revenue is spent. Economists have found that
maximizing economic growth requires using the revenue
to remove pre-existing “distortions” in the economy that
serve to hinder growth.8
For example, economic studies
have shown that lower income tax rates (corporate
and personal) would cause individuals to work more and
corporations to create more jobs. Revenue can also be
used to achieve many other objectives, such as investing in
technologies that spur low carbon innovation and climate
change adaptation, or providing transitional assistance to
sectors, regions, and individuals that are most vulnerable
to the higher prices and lower demand for carbonintensive
goods.
Recent studies have shown that neither the distributional
consequences,9
the regional disparities,10
nor the effects
on the competitiveness of U.S. industry11
are as large as
some have feared. Still, using a portion of the revenues to
address either the actual or perceived “losers” from a carbon
price may increase the fairness and political viability
of the policy.
Next Steps
While we can’t predict what the future may hold, conversations
with policymakers, stakeholders, and others
highlight several factors that could combine to increase
the appeal of carbon pricing policies across the political
spectrum in coming years. While views differ sharply on
some of these, factors that might interest people of different
political views include:
▪▪ Bipartisan support for tax reform;
▪▪ Successful carbon-pricing programs at the state and
regional levels, including the potential for more programs
spurred by compliance with the new EPA power
plant standards;
▪▪ Increased awareness of the current and impending
impacts of climate change;
▪▪ Stated goals for deeper greenhouse-gas emissions
cuts; and
▪▪ Desire by some for an alternative approach to
regulating carbon.
Cap-and-trade programs are already in place in the northeastern
United States and California. However, following
the failure of the U.S. Senate to pass climate legislation in
6 |
2010, talk in Washington D.C. about pricing carbon has
shifted from cap-and-trade to carbon taxes. These discussions
have involved a wide range of players, but have
remained quiet and behind the scenes. A key question in
coming years will be whether, and when, these discussions
will again be considered part of mainstream political
discussion.
We believe that pricing carbon should be a core element of
the United States’ response to climate change because of
the massive environmental and economic benefits it can
offer. Any such policy will result in winners and losers;
it is therefore critical that any program be designed to
recognize and address the potential for uneven distribution
of benefits and costs. This paper highlights the major
tools available for dealing with these concerns. These tools
also provide the opportunity to satisfy a variety of political
goals beyond emissions reductions. We hope that this
working paper—and future issue briefs that will dive more
deeply into many of the topics discussed here—will play a
helpful role in the coming national conversation on these
issues.
1. INTRODUCTION
Putting a Price on Carbon: A Handbook for U.S.
Policymakers is offered in the expectation of continued
debate in the United States over how to address climate
change. While current policy actions focus on regulatory
approaches, we believe that putting a price on carbon
needs to be a core element of the United States climate
policy in the long term. The Handbook is the first in a
series of papers that the World Resources Institute will
produce in coming years with the aim of providing a clear
and comprehensive understanding of the key issues that
will need to be addressed if the United States ultimately
chooses to impose a national price on carbon. The Handbook
sets out what is already known about the design and
effects of different approaches to pricing carbon, with the
main focus being on carbon fees or taxes and cap-andtrade
programs.
The starting point for most discussions of a carbon price
is its role in addressing greenhouse gas emissions and
reducing the future effects of climate change. However,
in writing the Handbook, we recognize that not all those
who are or might become interested in carbon pricing
are motivated by climate science and the need to reduce
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in order to avoid the
worst impacts of climate change. Carbon-pricing programs
can be designed with an eye toward other policy
goals, such as reforming the tax code to be more efficient.
Viewed in this way, the potential for emissions reduction
can be seen simply as a side benefit or an insurance
policy against uncertain but potentially significant climate
change impacts.
Because carbon pricing can aim at a variety of policy
objectives, support for some form of pricing carbon comes
from divergent points on the political spectrum. Though
they disagree on the details, supporters include former
Secretary of State George Schultz,12
former Treasury
Secretary Henry Paulson,13
and former Republican Congressman
Bob Inglis;14
conservative economists such as
Gregory Mankiw15
and Art Laffer;16
scholars at the American
Enterprise Institute,17
Resources for the Future,18
and
the Brookings Institution;19
and organizations such as
the Center for American Progress,20
the Citizens’ Climate
Lobby,21
and the Niskanen Institute.22
The Handbook provides an overview of carbon pricing—
the types of decisions that need to be made in designing
a program (including the political decisions about the
use of revenue) and the expected economic impacts. This
overview provides basic information aimed at improving
understanding of important trade-offs inherent in pricing
carbon (for example, between ease of implementation and
comprehensiveness of coverage), though it is beyond the
scope of the paper to attempt to resolve them. For those
new to thinking about pricing carbon, the Handbook can
serve as a basic primer. For those who have been deeply
involved in prior legislative debates on climate legislation
or in research and discussions of cap-and-trade programs
or carbon fees and taxes, this Handbook provides a broad
refresher and reference work. We expect that this type of
reference work will be useful when public debate in the
United States turns toward whether, how, and when to
implement a national carbon price.
In writing this paper, the authors conducted a thorough
literature review, selecting a broad array of wellregarded
and highly cited studies that represent a range
of viewpoints. Our exploration of carbon pricing was
also informed by a number of conversations—many off
the record—with carbon-pricing proponents from across
the political spectrum. Future research by the World
Resources Institute will explore in more detail some of
the economic opportunities presented by carbon pricing,
such as encouraging innovation, and how to evaluate and
address some of the potential downsides, for example,
WORKING PAPER | April 2015 | 7
Putting a Price on Carbon: A Handbook for U.S. Policymakers
Box 1 | What is a “Carbon Price?”
In this Handbook, the term “carbon price” is being applied
both broadly–to include all greenhouse gases—and narrowly—
limited to two mechanisms that explicitly result in a price on
carbon emissions.
A “carbon price” is sometimes understood to apply to carbon
dioxide (CO2
) emissions only. In the context of this paper, we
will refer generically to greenhouse gases as “carbon” so a carbon
price can apply beyond CO2
. See section 3 for a discussion
of policy design issues related to including greenhouse gases
other than CO2
in a carbon pricing system.
This Handbook focuses specifically on carbon taxes (or fees)
and cap-and-trade programs. Both focus on greenhouse gas
emissions, and result either directly or indirectly in an explicit
price on carbon emissions. A carbon tax or fee would directly
establish a price on carbon emissions in dollars per ton of
emissions. While this price could be applied at the point
of emissions, many proposals focus on applying the price
“upstream”—at “chokepoints” where fossil fuels enter the
broader economy—and are based on the carbon content of the
fuels. A cap-and-trade program establishes the price indirectly
by placing a limit on the total quantity of emissions that will
be allowed. This limit is enforced based on tradable emission
permits, typically called “allowances,” that any emissions
source must use to cover its emissions. Like a carbon tax, the
cap could be applied downstream at the point of emissions,
upstream where fuels enter the economy, or at points in the
distribution system in between. The market for these allowances
creates the carbon price in a cap-and-trade program.
Other types of programs can be used to place a price on
carbon, including programs that are based on emission
intensity (rather than actual emissions) such as the Specified
Gas Emitters Regulation (SGER) program in Alberta, Canada.a
In addition, a program such as a clean energy standard that
includes trading provisions based on carbon intensity could
also result in an effective price on carbon. Some discussions
of carbon pricing also include consideration of fossil fuel and
other energy subsidies, which can have an important effect on
the relative cost of different fuels.
Note:
a. World Bank, State and Trends of Carbon Pricing 2014.
the potential for regional or income disparities that could
arise from a carbon price.
This work is intended to seed an ongoing productive
discussion and debate on the pros and cons of different
approaches to pricing carbon. While the World Resources
Institute sees reducing greenhouse gas emissions to
reduce the impacts of climate change as a critical priority,
the views and input of those interested in exploring a
carbon price based on other priorities are welcome and
needed to move the debate forward. We look forward to
a wide-ranging and productive set of discussions in the
coming years.
This paper explores how various design decisions and
possible uses of carbon revenues can address other policy
priorities in addition to climate change. The paper begins
with an overview of carbon pricing (Section 2), followed by
a brief history of experience with carbon pricing programs
in the United States and elsewhere (Section 3). Section
4 then walks through the main decisions that must be
made to design and implement a carbon-pricing program.
Section 5 explores the various uses of revenue that have
been tried or considered as part of different carbon pricing
programs and proposals, and Section 6 provides a summary
of the literature on the main economic impacts from
carbon pricing. Conclusions are presented in Section 7. By
providing clear analysis of what can be achieved through
different approaches to pricing carbon, this paper hopes
to guide thinking on how to design a proposal for pricing
carbon to achieve multiple objectives.
2. THE BASICS OF PRICING CARBON
2.1. Why Price Carbon?
Pricing carbon can provide an economically efficient
means of reducing greenhouse gas emissions and minimizing
the disruptive risks of climate change. A carbon
price provides a relatively simple and direct way to ensure
that more of the costs of climate change are brought into
the economic calculus behind investments and consumption,
including resource and fuel use. It sends a price
signal that could influence widely dispersed economic
decisions, help guide future economic growth toward a
lower carbon economy, and reduce the impacts of climate
change over time.
Support for carbon pricing also comes from parties who
might be motivated by policy priorities other than the
need for action on GHG emissions, but who see the value
of an insurance policy against climate risks. Policy priorities
that can be addressed through some form of carbon
pricing include:
▪▪ REDUCING GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS. A carbon price
can help reduce GHG emissions by internalizing
the costs of climate change in economic decisions
throughout the economy.
8 |
▪▪ SPURRING INNOVATION IN CLEAN ENERGY. By reflecting
the cost of carbon in the prices for fuels and goods, a
carbon price can send an economic signal that helps
spur investment and innovation in energy sources and
new technologies that are less carbon intensive.
▪▪ REDUCING OTHER TAXES. Revenue from pricing carbon
can be used to reduce other taxes. This can be done
in a revenue-neutral way that moves from taxing
things we want more of (for example, employment or
income) to taxing those we want less of (for example,
GHG emissions). Options include reductions in payroll,
personal income, or corporate income taxes in aid
of broader tax reform.
▪▪ RAISING REVENUE FOR OTHER PRIORITIES. Carbon revenues
can also help to address other policy priorities.
For example, revenues could be directed to supporting
research and development, adapting to climate change
impacts, investing in infrastructure maintenance and
improvements, or providing job training or other
targeted support for industries or regions that are
disproportionately affected by the carbon price.
In addition to these priorities, reducing GHG emissions
can improve energy security, reduce direct energy costs,
and help reduce other forms of pollution.23
While various
tools are available to address other forms of pollution
directly, the reductions that result from a carbon
price have the potential to provide meaningful local and
regional public health and environmental benefits.24
2.2. Uses of Revenue
While pricing carbon implies higher prices for certain
goods, the additional costs to individuals and businesses
become an additional source of revenue that can either be
returned to households or spent in other productive ways.
Among other possibilities, carbon-pricing revenues can
be used to promote economic growth or employment, to
advance low-carbon technologies and other activities that
help combat and prepare for climate change, or to reduce
any potential adverse effects of the carbon price on specific
groups.
The following summarizes some of the specific potential
uses of carbon-pricing revenues:
▪▪ TAX CUTS. The revenues from carbon pricing can be
used to fund cuts in income taxes, which increase
incentives to work and invest, and therefore boost economic
growth as a result. Taxes on labor and capital
not only take money away from individuals and business,
but also decrease incentives to engage in productive
activities such as work and investment. Such taxes
differ from a carbon price, which reduces the incentive
to emit harmful greenhouse gases. The decision
on which taxes to cut (for example, payroll, personal
income, or corporate income taxes) may involve tradeoffs
between cost-effectiveness and distributional
concerns.
▪▪ RETURNING MONEY TO HOUSEHOLDS OR ELECTRICITY
CONSUMERS. Revenue from carbon pricing could be
returned to households by sending them “lump sum”
payments, which could be divided equally or by some
alternative metric. This “fee-and-dividend” approach
has gained popularity largely because of its perceived
fairness and simplicity. Households could be provided
with tax refunds or sent quarterly or annual checks.
This approach could also ensure that low-income
households receive as much in income as they spend
on the tax. However, such payments are unlikely to
boost economic growth as much as cutting tax rates,
because they do not enhance incentives to work or
invest.
▪▪ DEFICIT REDUCTION. Large national deficits can slow
economic growth by increasing interest rates, reducing
(or “crowding out”) private sector investments,
and increasing future tax burdens because of the
need to pay off the principal or interest on the debt.
Carbon-pricing revenues could be used to pay down
the debt and therefore avoid such adverse economic
effects. Just as reducing current tax rates can increase
incentives to work and invest, reducing future tax
rates through deficit reduction could have similar progrowth
effects.
▪▪ ENCOURAGING INNOVATION IN LOW-CARBON TECHNOLOGIES.
While a carbon price can help stimulate innovation
in low-carbon technologies (for example, energy
efficiency or renewable fuels), additional support for
innovation might be needed to mitigate the effects
of climate change. Moreover, to the extent that the
private sector “underinvests” in research and development
because it cannot capture the public benefits of
R&D, further government support might be required
to promote the development of breakthrough technologies.
Carbon-pricing revenues could be a source of
such funding.
WORKING PAPER | April 2015 | 9
Putting a Price on Carbon: A Handbook for U.S. Policymakers
Box 2 | How a Carbon Price Works
The impacts of climate change resulting
from greenhouse gas emissions impose
costs on society as a whole. Pricing
carbon shifts these costs away from the
broader society to those responsible for the
emissions, while providing an incentive to
reduce emissions.
Putting a price on carbon across the
economy will increase the prices of goods
and services in proportion to their carbon
content, and so in proportion to their effect
on climate change. The higher prices for
carbon-intensive goods and services will
encourage businesses and consumers to
look for alternatives that meet their needs
but have lower carbon-emission footprints.
As a simplified illustration of this type of
shift, Figure 1 shows the impact of a carbon
tax of $25 per ton of CO2
on the levelized
cost of electricity (LCOE). LCOE is a
standard measure for comparing the lifetime
costs of building and operating different
electricity generation options, though it
does not reflect the dynamics of wholesale
electricity markets that drive electricity rates.
The carbon tax reflects the relative impact
of each fuel on CO2
emissions, so the tax
has a larger effect on carbon-intensive coal
(the fuel that creates the highest carbon
emissions per unit of energy when burned)
than on less carbon-intensive natural gas,
and no effect on non-carbon nuclear and
renewable sources. The increased fuel
prices—which now reflect the adverse
effects of climate change—would then be
passed on in full or in part in any products
for which the fuels are an input.
These shifts increase the competitiveness of
less carbon-intensive sources (see Figure
1). In addition, less efficient generation
methods (such as the natural gas turbine)
see a greater price increase than more
efficient options (such as natural gas
combined cycle).
FIGURE 1 | EFFECT OF CARBON TAX ON AVERAGE COST OF NEW U.S. ELECTRICITY GENERATION
FOR PLANTS ENTERING SERVICE IN 2019 (2012 $/MWH)
Sources: “Levelized Cost and Levelized Avoided Cost of New Generation Resources in the Annual Energy Outlook 2014,” U.S. Energy Information Administration, April
17, 2014, http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/electricity_generation.cfm. The tax increment is based on heat rates from EIA (“Table 8.2. Average Tested Heat Rates by Prime
Mover and Energy Source, 2007-2013,” U.S. Energy Information Administration, accessed April 13, 2015, http://www.eia.gov/electricity/annual/html/epa_08_02.html)
and the emissions per Btu from EIA (“How Much Carbon Dioxide is Produced When Different Fuels Are Burned?,” U.S. Energy Information Administration, accessed April
13, 2015, http://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.cfm?id=73&t=11).
Note: Levelized cost of electricity data in the figure are based on U.S. average levelized costs for plants entering service in 2019 from the 2014 Annual Energy Outlook.
Conventional
Coal
Conventional
Natural Gas
Combined Cycle
Conventional
Natural Gas
Turbine
Advanced
Nuclear
Wind Solar
Photovoltaic
tax ($/MWh)
$0
$150
$120
$90
$60
$30
LCOE w/o tax ($/MWh)
10 |
▪▪ CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION. While carbon pricing
can help to mitigate the adverse effects of climate
change, some impacts—according to the IPCC—are
now unavoidable. For that reason, some proponents
of carbon pricing support the use of revenues to invest
in infrastructure that helps communities adapt to the
impacts of climate change. Such investments could include
increasing the resiliency of water, transport, and
energy systems, as well as other infrastructure that is
vulnerable to extreme weather, sea-level rise, and the
other effects of a changing climate.
▪▪ TRANSITIONAL ASSISTANCE FOR AFFECTED SECTORS,
INDIVIDUALS, AND REGIONS. By inducing changes in
behavior and purchasing patterns, pricing carbon is
likely to benefit certain industries and regions more
than others. A portion of the revenues is often used to
assist those who are likely to be adversely affected by a
carbon price. Job training can be provided to workers
in industries that experience job losses (for example,
coal mining), and revenues can be disproportionately
allocated to households and business in regions of the
country that are most dependent on the production or
consumption of fossil fuels. Revenues can also be used
to provide assistance to industries that face increased
competition from competitors in foreign countries
without (or with lower) carbon prices.
CARBON TAX CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAM
What is the scope? Both involve similar decisions regarding the choice of gases to regulate, which sectors to regulate, whether to allow
relatively small emitters to remain unregulated, and where the regulation occurs (upstream, downstream, etc.).
Such decisions often involve trade-offs between emissions reductions and feasibility and administrative burdens
How is a carbon price
established?
The price is the tax level The price is the market price of emissions allowances (which
can be estimated via modeling)
What emissions reductions
can be achieved?
Depends on the response to the change in
prices (which can be estimated via modeling)
Maximum emissions established by setting the trajectory of
emissions caps
Table 1 | Important Design Features of a Carbon Tax Versus a Cap-and-Trade Program
Many other options are available. While many of those
who support pricing carbon are champions of particular
uses of carbon-pricing revenues, many carbon-pricing
policies and proposals reflect a mix of approaches.
2.3. The Basics of Cap-and-Trade and
Carbon-Tax Programs
Carbon taxes and cap-and-trade programs require a number
of similar decisions to be made in the design process.
These decisions often involve trade-offs: increasing the
scope of a program beyond a certain level usually implies
increasing the burden of administering it; programs with
more stringent emissions targets will cause larger impacts
on the economy; implementing mechanisms to “smooth”
these economic impacts will generally increase either
compliance costs or emissions.
A carbon tax is in some ways simpler than a cap-and-trade
program, especially for the companies that would have to
operate under the system. An emissions cap can ensure
that emissions targets are met, while a carbon tax can
ensure a stable trajectory of prices. Table 1 provides an
overview of the main similarities and differences between
the two systems,25
while Section 4 provides a short primer
on designing a carbon-price system.
WORKING PAPER | April 2015 | 11
Putting a Price on Carbon: A Handbook for U.S. Policymakers
CARBON TAX CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAM
How do regulated entities
comply?
Must report emissions (or a proxy for emissions
such as fuel quantities) and pay the tax
based on those emissions
▪▪ Must report emissions (or a proxy) and surrender allowances
based on those emissions
▪▪ Obtain allowances by direct allocation, through purchase at
auction, or in the secondary market
▪▪ Participate in secondary market as buyer and/or seller of
allowances
▪▪ Bank allowances for future use or borrow for current use (if
permitted under the regulation)
How much will it cost
regulated entities to
comply?
Future compliance costs based on emissions
and established tax rates
▪▪ Future compliance costs based on emissions and estimated
allowances prices
▪▪ Costs also depend on the degree to which allowances are
allocated at no charge, versus bought at auction or on the
secondary market
Can offsets lower
compliance costs?
In theory, either policy could allow regulated entities to purchase emissions offsets (that is, verified emissions
reductions from non-covered sources) in lieu of direct compliance, which will lower compliance costs. Offsets are
more commonly seen as part of cap-and-trade programs
Where will regulated
entities reduce their
emissions?
Where the cost of emissions reductions is
less than the cost of paying the tax, taking into
account the trajectory of future taxes
Where the cost of emissions reductions is less than the cost
of buying (or the opportunity cost of not selling) allowances,
taking into account the trajectory of expected future allowance
prices
What is the role of
markets, and which market
protections are needed?
A carbon tax would not create a market that
needs to be regulated
▪▪ A mechanism for auctioning allowances (unless all are
distributed at no charge)
▪▪ A secondary market with proper oversight and regulation (a
liquid secondary market that sends a transparent price signal
to regulated entities is needed for an efficient program)
What happens to the
revenue?
Both a carbon tax and a cap-and-trade program (assuming some degree of auctioning of permits) will generate
revenue, and the government can stipulate how the revenue is to be spent (for example, reduced taxes, deficit
reduction, spending on other programs). While the same alternatives will be available under either policy type,
revenue amounts are likely to be more predictable under a carbon tax
How does the
system interact with
complementary policies
(for example, a Renewable
Portfolio Standard)?
▪▪ Complementary policies can achieve emissions
reductions beyond those achieved by
a carbon tax, for example, if a renewable
portfolio standard requires more renewable
power than would be deployed with the
carbon tax alone
▪▪ Complementary policies may be desirable,
even within covered sectors, for example, to
encourage innovation or deployment of new
technologies in certain sectors
▪▪ Complementary policies shift the location of emissions in the
economy, but the cap establishes the maximum overall level of
emissions for covered sectors
▪▪ Complementary policies may be desirable even within covered
sectors, for example to encourage innovation or deployment of
new technologies in certain sectors
Table 1 | Important Design Features of a Carbon Tax Versus a Cap-and-Trade Program (continued)
12 |
3. A BRIEF HISTORY OF
CARBON PRICING
“Taxing carbon dioxide emissions may be an idea whose
time is at hand in the United States, now that reducing
greenhouse gas emissions has become an international
imperative.” These hopeful—but premature—words
opened Gus Speth’s foreword to The Right Climate for
Carbon Taxes,26
published by the World Resources
Institute in August 1992, in the wake of the climate treaty
signed by more than 150 nations in Rio de Janeiro that
April. While the Clinton administration, as part of its first
budget, proposed a tax on the energy content of fuels that
would have had similarities to a carbon tax on energy,27
Figure 2 |  Timeline of Carbon Pricing Programs from Around the World
Cap-and-TradeProgramsCarbonTaxes
2009
RGGI
(NE U.S.)
U.S. sub-national programs
1990
Finland
1992
Denmark
Norway British
Columbia
New
Zealand
Switzerland
1991
Sweden
2005
European
Union
Switzerland
2008
WORKING PAPER | April 2015 | 13
Putting a Price on Carbon: A Handbook for U.S. Policymakers
that proposal was highly controversial and withdrawn by
the end of 1993.28
No serious proposals for a carbon tax or
greenhouse gas cap-and-trade program were put before
Congress for another ten years, though the 1990s did see
the successful implementation of the acid rain cap-andtrade
program (see Box 3). In the years since the Rio
Earth Summit, however, many countries and sub-national
jurisdictions have instituted carbon taxes or cap-and-trade
programs. Figure 2 lists the carbon-tax and greenhouse
gas cap-and-trade programs that since have been instituted
around the world.
Figure 2 | Timeline of Carbon Pricing Programs from Around the World (continued)
2010
Ireland
(extended to solid
fuels in 2013)
2012
Japan
2016
South Africa
(planned)
2018
Chile
(planned)
2014
France
Iceland Mexico
Chongqing
Hubei
Australia
2012;
repealed
2014
2015
South Korea
Kazakhstan
California
Quebec
Tianjin
Beijing
Shanghai
Guangdong
Shenzhen
2013
United
Kingdom
U.S. sub-national program
Canada sub-national program
China sub-national pilots
China
sub-national
pilots
Australia
Initiated July
2012;
repealed in
2014
14 |
Box 3 | Acid Rain Program: The Origin of Cap and Trade
A cap-and-trade program, limiting total
emissions and enabling regulated entities to
buy and sell emissions permits, is among the
most prominent tools used to price carbon.
The first major cap-and-trade system was the
Acid Rain Program, passed by Congress in
1990 to reduce acid rain by regulating sulfur
dioxide (SO2
) emissions from power plants.
The majority of previous environmental
regulations were “command-and-control,”
in that they designated emissions rates or
equipment standards for regulated entities. In
fact, many environmentalists were hostile to
the concept of allowing polluters to pay for
the right to pollute.
The cap-and-trade system at the heart of the
Acid Rain Program arose from collaboration
between the Environmental Defense Fund
(EDF) and the Administration of George H.W.
Bush.a
Regulated power plants were allocated
a fixed number of tradable allowances and
had to surrender one allowance per ton of
SO2
emitted (and were heavily penalized if
they did not). Power plants could buy allowances,
sell allowances, or “bank” allowances
for use in future years, but could not borrow
allowances from future years’ allocations.
The emissions cap declined over time toward
a long-term national goal of 7.6 million tons
of SO2
emissions, which was achieved three
years ahead of schedule in 2007.
The great advantage of a cap-and-trade
system is that it facilitates cost-effective
emissions reductions. In theory, the plants
with relatively low-cost opportunities to
reduce emissions will do so and sell their
unneeded permits (for a profit) to plants with
higher cost opportunities, which will then
avoid expensive emissions reductions. The
Acid Rain Program was the first major test
of this theory, and it was highly successful.
The best estimates of actual program costs
($1.17 to $2 billion annually) were less than
the projected costs of command and-control
alternatives ($3.4 billion to $11.5 billion) and
also less than EPA’s initial projection for the
Acid Rain Program ($1.9 to $5.5 billion).b
Still, some people have argued that costs
could have been even lower, were it not for
informational barriers and other state and
federal regulations that constrained power
plants’ abilities to select the low-cost abatement
opportunities.c
Overall, the Acid Rain Program is widely
seen as a success at many levels. Not only
did it provide large environmental benefits
at a relatively low cost,d
it also paved the
way for future cap-and-trade systems that
have focused on carbon emissions. In 2005,
the European Union’s Emissions Trading
Scheme became the first major cap-and-trade
program for greenhouse gas emissions, and
greenhouse gas cap-and-trade systems have
since been established in the northeastern
United States (the RGGI program) and in
California.
3.1. Carbon Pricing in the United States
and Canada
Starting with the Climate Stewardship Act, introduced by
Senators John McCain and Joseph Lieberman in 2003,
Congress has seen numerous proposals to cap or tax
carbon emissions, many of them with bipartisan sponsorship
and support.29
The 111th Congress (2009 and 2010)
was the high-water mark for these proposals, with the
passage in the House of Representatives of the American
Clean Energy and Security Act (ACES), often referred to as
“Waxman-Markey” for the names of its chief sponsors—
then Representatives Henry Waxman and Ed Markey.
This bill benefited from the many precursors in earlier
Congresses. While several companion bills were introduced
in the Senate during that Congress, none moved to
a floor vote.
The debate and compromises that led to the passage
of ACES in the House provide a useful set of lessons to
consider in the context of future proposals to price carbon
at the national level in the United States. Putting in place
a significant carbon price will result in both winners and
losers even if the policy provides net benefits overall. For
the policy to succeed politically and work economically, it
is critical that the program be designed to recognize and
address, to the extent needed, the uneven distribution
of benefits and costs that it could impose. Much of the
Notes:
a. Conniff, R. August 2009. “The Political History of Cap and Trade.” Smithsonian Magazine.[1-3] See: http://www.smithsonianmag.com/air/the-political-history-of-cap-and-
trade-34711212/?page=2
b. Siikamäki J., D. Burtraw, J. Maher, and C. Munnings. March, 2012. “The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s Acid Rain Program.” Washington, D.C.: Resources for the
Future. Working Paper.
c. Schmalensee R. and R. Stavins. August, 2012. “The SO2 Allowance Trading System: The Ironic History of a Grand Policy Experiment.” Cambridge, MA: MIT Center for Energy
and Environmental Policy Research.
d. Cost-benefit analyses have shown that the Acid Rain Program contributed benefits roughly 40 times the costs of the program. Interestingly, nearly 95 percent of the estimated
benefits were related to the health impacts of sulfate particulates, which were not well understood until after the implementation of the program (Schmalensee and Stavins, 2012).
WORKING PAPER | April 2015 | 15
Putting a Price on Carbon: A Handbook for U.S. Policymakers
Box 4 | Carbon Pricing and the Clean Power Plan
In June 2014, EPA proposed the Clean Power
Plan (CPP) to satisfy its obligation to regulate
greenhouse gas emissions from existing
power plants.a
EPA proposed emissions rate
standards, but provided states with significant
flexibility to design their own implementation
plans. After the CPP is finalized by EPA
in the summer of 2015, states can propose
implementation plans to EPA by 2016, with
extensions available to 2017 (for single state
plans) or 2018 (for multi-state plans).b
EPA will
also issue a final federal plan in 2016 for areas
that do not submit a state plan. Within one year
of a state plan being proposed, EPA will either
approve the plan or institute its own plan before
the compliance period begins in 2020.
States are likely to adopt a variety of approaches
to implementing the CPP, including
pricing carbon. In its proposal, EPA describes
both “rate-based” and “mass-based” (that
is, cap-and-trade) performance standards as
alternative compliance mechanisms. Under
either approach, a system of tradable emissions
allowances could reduce the total costs
of compliance by incentivizing those with
high-cost abatement opportunities to purchase
allowances from those with low-cost abatement
opportunities. States and regions with
pre-existing cap-and-trade programs are likely
to continue these programs to comply with
the standard (namely, California, and RGGI in
nine northeastern states), and additional states
may take an interest in carbon pricing as an
implementation option. c
While not explicitly mentioned by EPA, various
commentators have called for the use of
carbon taxes as an additional CPP compliance
alternative.d
By increasing the relative price
of carbon-intensive electricity generation, a
carbon tax would lead to an increase in lowcarbon
generation or investments in energy
efficiency, and thus a reduction in overall emissions
rates. Using economic modeling (just
as it would for other compliance strategies),
a state could show that its planned carbon tax
would likely achieve the required emissions
rate standard. Carbon taxes are relatively easy
to administer because they do not require
states to allocate emissions allowances,
conduct auctions, or monitor allowance trading.
Carbon taxes also provide predictable and
stable price signals to regulated entities, and a
large source of government revenue that could
be used to counteract the cost of the tax to
constituents. Perhaps most importantly, carbon
taxes (as well as cap-and-trade programs) are
more cost-effective than emissions rate standards
(even with multi-state trading programs),
so enabling states to utilize carbon taxes could
significantly lower the compliance costs of the
CPP.e
Notes:
a. “Clean Power Plan Proposed Rule,” U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, accessed April 13, 2015, http://www2.epa.gov/carbon-pollution-standards/clean-power-plan-
proposed-rule.
b. “Fact Sheet: Clean Power Plan & Carbon Pollution Standards Key Dates,” U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, accessed April 13, 2015, http://www2.epa.gov/carbon-
pollution-standards/fact-sheet-clean-power-plan-carbon-pollution-standards-key-dates.
c. See “Power Plan Hub,” E&E Publishing, accessed April 13, 2015, http://www.eenews.net/interactive/clean_power_plan.
d. Wara, M, A. Morris, and M. Darby. October, 2014. “How the EPA Should Modify Its Proposed 111(d) Regulations to Allow States to Comply By Taxing Pollution.” Washington,
D.C.: Brookings Institution.
e. Fischer, C. 2001. “Rebating Environmental Policy Revenues: Output-Based Allocations and Tradable Performance Standards,” Washington, D.C.: Resources for the Future.
Discussion Paper 01-22.
negotiation and compromise that went into the House
passage of ACES related to finding ways of addressing real
or perceived costs of the program or finding benefits that
could bring additional people into the coalition supporting
the bill. This type of major policy initiative can only be
put in place in the U.S. political system by finding ways to
satisfy a wide variety of interests.
While additional bills have been introduced in Congress
since then—including the American Opportunity Carbon
Fee Act, by Senators Whitehouse and Schatz in November
2014,30
and the Healthy Climate and Family Security Act
of 2015 by Representative Van Hollen in February 201531
—
as of this writing, none have been given serious consideration
or a committee hearing.
With little prospect of comprehensive federal action on
climate change in the mid-2000s, many states began
working together, including several regional efforts to
create multi-state cap-and-trade programs. The first of
these was the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI),
a multi-state cap-and-trade program for CO2
emissions
from power plants. The discussions that led to RGGI were
initiated in 2003, and the program was launched in 2009
by ten northeastern states (New Jersey withdrew in 2012,
but New York, Delaware, Maryland, and the New England
states remain in RGGI). RGGI covers approximately 20
percent of total GHG emissions in the participating states.
In February 2013, the RGGI states completed a program
review that lowered the 2014 emissions cap by 45 percent
and made additional changes to the cap through 2020.
16 |
The revisions recommended through the program review
are intended to strengthen the program in the years
ahead.32
In 2006, California passed the Global Warming Solutions
Act (AB 32), which required it to reduce emissions to
1990 levels by 2020. The following year, western states
(including California) and Canadian provinces created the
Western Climate Initiative (WCI) and began a regional
discussion on the design and implementation of a multisector
cap-and-trade program. WCI grew to include seven
states and four Canadian provinces, who jointly agreed on
design principles for a regional cap-and-trade program.33
However, California and Quebec are the only jurisdictions
that have implemented the program to date. They
now operate a linked cap-and-trade program that covers
85 percent of the emissions in each jurisdiction. Ontario
recently announced its intent to establish a cap-and-trade
program and link it with California and Quebec as part of
the WCI.34
British Columbia (BC) remains a member of
WCI but does not have a firm plan for joining the linked
cap-and-trade program. BC did establish its own economy-wide
carbon tax in 2008 that is currently set at C$30
per ton of CO2
across sectors representing 70 percent of
total GHG emissions in the province.
Similar discussions among states and provinces in the
Midwest to form a regional cap-and-trade program were
initiated in 2007, but did not progress far and were suspended
in 2010. (See Box 4 for discussion of the potential
for carbon pricing as a state implementation measure
under EPA’s Clean Power Plan, which is establishing
carbon dioxide standards for existing power plants.)
Since the failure of the Senate to pass climate legislation
in 2010, talk in Washington about pricing carbon has
shifted from cap-and-trade—now considered a political
non-starter–to carbon taxes. These discussions have
involved a wide range of players, but have remained quiet
and behind the scenes. A key question in coming years
will be whether, and when, these discussions will again be
considered part of mainstream political discussion.
3.2. Carbon Pricing Systems Around the World
While no national carbon price has been established in the
United States, almost 40 other countries and over 26 subnational
jurisdictions have implemented carbon-pricing
programs. Total GHG emissions in the jurisdictions with
these programs represent more than 22 percent of global
GHG emissions, with the programs themselves covering
approximately 12 percent of global emissions.35
The longest-running programs are the carbon taxes established
by Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden in the
early 1990s. National carbon taxes have also been established
in recent years in France, Iceland, India, Ireland,
Japan, Mexico, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom,
while South Africa and Chile have approved carbon taxes
that have not yet taken effect. In addition, British Columbia
has enacted a carbon tax at the sub-national level.
The largest greenhouse gas cap-and-trade program is the
European Union’s Emissions Trading System (or EU ETS),
initially established in 2005. Other national programs
are operating in New Zealand, Switzerland, and Kazakhstan,
and one began operation in the Republic of Korea
in 2015. Sub-national cap-and-trade programs are also
operating, with an electric sector program in nine states
in the northeastern United States, linked multi-sector
programs in California and Quebec, and seven municipal
and provincial pilot programs under way in China. China
has begun planning36
a national-level emissions-trading
system that is expected to be phased in starting in 2016.37
While significant work remains to be completed, once fully
operational the Chinese program could be the largest GHG
trading program in the world.
Figure 3 shows the current and planned carbon tax and
cap-and-trade programs from around the world, and
Appendix A provides summary information about those
programs. Not included in this summary are systems
based on carbon intensity, such as the program in Alberta,
Canada, or offset programs such as the Clean Development
Mechanism (CDM).
In addition to these government programs, many businesses
in the private sector are already accounting for substantial
future carbon prices in their planning decisions.
As shown in a recent report by CDP (formerly known
as the Carbon Disclosure Project), a growing number of
multi-national corporations representing a diverse set of
industries and interest have disclosed using an internal
carbon price, including BP, Duke Energy, Google, Royal
Dutch Shell, Wal-Mart, Walt Disney, and Wells Fargo,
among many others.38
WORKING PAPER | April 2015 | 17
Putting a Price on Carbon: A Handbook for U.S. Policymakers
4. KEY DESIGN FEATURES
Establishing a carbon-pricing program requires many
design decisions, including which gases and sectors are
covered, which entities within the relevant sectors are
required to comply, and the overall stringency of the
program. While these elements are described separately
below, design decisions require consideration of the interactions
among these elements.
The policymakers involved with these decisions will also
need to balance various criteria that can sometimes conflict.
These range from comprehensive coverage of emissions,
administrative ease in implementation, minimizing
the economic costs and maximizing benefits, addressing
differing impacts across population groups and regions,
and achieving other goals, possibly unrelated to climate.
This section highlights some of the main choices facing
policymakers who are considering either a carbon tax
or a cap-and-trade program. Two of the most critical
choices are the scope of the program and setting the price
or cap levels. This section also discusses the importance
of reporting and verification, and concludes with an
examination of the possible interaction between a carbonpricing
program and complementary policies.
4.1. Scope
Scope refers to the share of total greenhouse gas emissions
covered by the program. One element of scope involves
the greenhouse gases to be included—just CO2
, or other
gases such as methane and hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) as
well? The second element is which sectors of the economy
are covered. Several existing programs only cover one sector,
such as the RGGI program in the northeastern United
States that only includes electricity generation, while others
are multi-sector, such as California and the EU ETS.
The third element is the point of regulation—where and
how emissions from different sectors are covered. This
might be “upstream,” using fuels as a proxy for the emisCARBON
TAX implemented or scheduled for implementation
CAP & TRADE implemented or scheduled for implementation
BOTH
Chile
Mexico
California
British
Columbia
Quebec
South Africa
Japan
South Korea
Kazakhstan
Iceland
Finland
Norway
Sweden
Denmark
U.K.
Ireland
France
Switzerland
European Union
Chinese Subnational Pilots
New
Zealand
Northeast
United States
Tianjin
Beijing
Shanghai
Guangdong
Shenzhen
Chongqing
Hubei
Figure 3 | Carbon Pricing Programs Around the World
18 |
sions that result from fuel combustion, “downstream” at
point sources of emissions, or somewhere in between. The
final element is whether and how to address imports and
exports in the program.
For any carbon-pricing program, the broader the scope,
the greater the emission reductions that will be expected
from a given carbon price, since more emissions will be
covered. A broader scope for a cap-and-trade program
also means that a greater variety of sources will fall under
the cap, leading to lower overall compliance costs because
there will be more low-cost emission reduction opportunities
covered by the program.
4.1.1. Which Gases to Include
Decisions over which greenhouse gases to include in a
carbon pricing program involve trade-offs between the
comprehensiveness of the program (that is, the fraction of
total GHGs covered) and the ease of implementation (the
ability to quantify the emissions being taxed or capped
through direct measurement or accurate estimation). For
each gas, two key factors to consider are (1) the contribution
of the gas to total greenhouse gas emissions; and (2)
how difficult it would be to measure and regulate the gas.
CO2
is the most important greenhouse gas (GHG), representing
over 70 percent of total GHG emissions globally
and over 80 percent in the United States.39
Other key
greenhouse gases include methane, nitrous oxide, hydrofluorocarbons,
perfluorocarbons, sulfur hexafluoride, and
nitrogen trifluoride. Because CO2
is the primary GHG,
some carbon-pricing systems focus only on this gas.
Many of the most important sources of CO2
, especially
those based on fossil fuel combustion, are also generally
easy to measure or estimate, making them well suited for
inclusion in a carbon pricing system. As seen in Figure 4,
a program that included only energy-related CO2
would
have covered 77 percent of total U.S. emissions in 2012.
Other gases can be included in the system, allowing
coverage of a larger portion of an economy’s GHG emissions.
Including these gases requires careful consideration
of their relative contributions to climate change. These
contributions are typically based on the “global warming
potential” (GWP), which compares gases in terms of CO2
equivalent
(CO2
e) units.40
These estimates can be made
based on considerations of the heat-trapping properties of
the gases and the time the gas remains in the atmosphere.
GWPs have been regularly updated in recent decades,
which can complicate the design of a pricing program.
The ease of implementing the program is in large part
contingent upon the extent to which the emissions can
be readily quantified or accurately estimated. In some
cases, proxy measures, such as the carbon content of fossil
fuels, provide a solid basis for quantifying the ultimate
CO2
emissions. On the other hand, methane and N2
O are
second and third in terms of greenhouse gases emissions
in the United States, but quantifying or accurately estimating
methane and N2
O emissions from agricultural sources
is difficult, so those sources are less likely to be included in
a carbon-pricing program.
Carbon Dioxide (C02
) – Energy 78%
Carbon Dioxide (C02
) – Non-Energy 5%
Methane (CH4
) 9%
Nitrous Oxide (N2
0) 6%
Fluorinated Gases (HFCs, PFCs, SF6) 3%
Figure 4 | Greenhouse Gas Emissions by Gas in the
United States, 2012
Source: Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks: 1990–2012.
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, April 2014. Accessible at:
http://epa.gov/climatechange/ghgemissions/usinventoryreport.html
Figure 5 | Greenhouse Gas Emissions by Sector in the
United States, 2012
Source: Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks: 1990–2012.
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, April 2014. Accessible at:
http://epa.gov/climatechange/ghgemissions/usinventoryreport.html
Transportation 28%
Industry 20%
Commercial & Residential 10%
Agriculture 10%
Electricity 32%
WORKING PAPER | April 2015 | 19
Putting a Price on Carbon: A Handbook for U.S. Policymakers
For each gas, policymakers must determine whether the
benefits of the incremental emissions reductions are worth
the difficulties associated with including the gas in the
program.
4.1.2. Choice of Sectors
A key determinant of the portion of an economy’s greenhouse
gases that is covered by a carbon-pricing system is
the choice of economic sectors to be included. One tradeoff
is between the ability to quantify emissions—whether
directly or through proxy measures such as the carbon
content of fossil fuels—and comprehensiveness. For
example, the electricity-generating sector already reports
its GHG emissions.41
As shown in Figure 5, the electric sector
in the United States is responsible for about one third
of total GHG emissions.42
Limiting a system to this sector
would miss a significant portion of overall emissions. An
alternative approach, included in many proposals, is to
limit the program’s scope to energy-related CO2
emissions,
which can readily be covered through assigning responsibility
for emissions to the point in the supply chain where
the fuels that will result in the emissions first enter the
economy.
There will be different advantages and disadvantages to
inclusion of other sectors in a carbon-pricing system, and
political considerations will also come into play in deciding
which sectors to include. A carbon-pricing program
could also begin with a limited scope and expand to
include a more comprehensive set of sectors or gases after
the program is initially established. Table 2 summarizes
the key aspects of different sectors that affect their inclusion
in a carbon-pricing system.
Table 2 | Characteristics Relevant for Decisions on Inclusion in a Carbon Price System
SECTOR
Energy CO2 ▪▪ Readily addressed based on carbon content of fuels and applying the program upstream, where fuels enter the economy
▪▪ Would not require direct emissions reporting from individual sources in different sectors
▪▪ Would cover 78 percent of total emissions in the United States
Electricity
Generation
▪▪ Easily identified emission sources that are already subject to environmental regulations and GHG reporting
Industry ▪▪ Many emission sources are large facilities that already report GHG combustion and process emissions
▪▪ Numerous smaller industrial sources may be difficult to track and monitor, so might be better addressed through more
upstream approaches
Transportation ▪▪ Significant emissions from many small and difficult-to-measure sources so program might be better directed upstream
where transportation fuels are produced or distributed
Residential/
commercial
▪▪ Significant emissions from many small and difficult-to-measure sources so program might be better directed upstream
where relevant fuels are produced or distributed (or through complementary policies)
Forestry/
agriculture
▪▪ Significant source of emissions and potential source of sequestration
▪▪ Many emission sources and carbon sinks are dispersed and difficult to monitor, so proxy measures might be needed to
estimate net emissions
Non-CO2
gases ▪▪ Some non-CO2
GHGs are significant source of emissions in some industries
▪▪ Many emissions result from a large number of sources that may be difficult to monitor, so might be better directed upstream
(that is, where the gas first enters the economy)
20 |
4.1.3. Point of Regulation
Different approaches can be taken to allocating responsibility
for paying the tax or surrendering allowances.
At one end of the spectrum is an upstream approach in
which responsibility for the emissions is applied when the
materials that will result in the emissions first enter the
economy. In the case of energy-related CO2
emissions, this
means that responsibility is applied to energy producers:
the entities that mine coal, produce gas and oil, or import
fuels. CO2
emissions from each ton of coal, barrel of oil, or
cubic foot of natural gas can be readily estimated because
one molecule of CO2
results from every atom of carbon in
the fuel (generally speaking). The cost added to the fossil
fuel will generally be passed along to the end users of
the energy and, for manufacturers, will be incorporated
into production costs. This approach allows a very large
fraction of energy-related CO2
emissions to be covered in
a system that requires relatively few responsible parties to
play a direct role.
At the other end of the spectrum, a downstream approach
would apply responsibility at the point where the emissions
actually occur. Large point sources like power
plants and steel manufacturing plants are major emitters
of CO2
because they burn large quantities of fossil
fuels. Tapping them as the point of regulation captures
the major emitters who are responsible for a very large
fraction of energy-related CO2
emissions. This approach
may provide a useful point of regulation for a program
like RGGI, which is limited to the electricity-generating
sector. However, following this path is more difficult for
distributed sources such as residential and commercial
building heating systems or cars and trucks. In these
cases, an intermediate point may be more appropriate.
For example, emissions from combustion of natural gas in
household and small-scale commercial use can be captured
by making gas utilities responsible for the emissions
embedded in their product. A system can include a mix of
these approaches. For example, California’s cap-and-trade
program initially covered large industrial sources directly
(downstream), but has since expanded to include distributed
use of natural gas by homes and smaller businesses
through the utility distribution companies (midstream).
In a downstream program, it might be simpler to establish
an emissions threshold below which sources are not
included. Policymakers must decide whether the expected
emissions reductions from sources with emissions below
the threshold are sufficient to make the costs associated
with regulating these smaller sources worthwhile.
The decisions of whether and how to set thresholds are
generally based on what proportion of total emissions
are associated with “large” emitters, and these decisions
will differ by sector. In many sectors, such as electricity
generation or cement manufacturing, the most significant
emitters will also be responsible for the great majority of
emissions and will already be reporting emissions. In this
case, including all facilities in a carbon-pricing program
would greatly increase the number of facilities covered—
including many that are below emission thresholds for
reporting requirements—without significantly increasing
the amount of emissions included in the program. Other
industries, like food processing or pulp and paper, have
more small- and medium-sized facilities and companies,
indicating that lower emissions thresholds for inclusion
(or no thresholds) might be appropriate.
Regulating fuels as they enter the economy is one way to
address emissions from smaller sources without attempting
to regulate them directly. However, even an upstream
system will require consideration of whether and how to
apply thresholds.
4.1.4. Imports and Exports
A pricing program might also attempt to address emissions
associated with imports from countries that do not
have a carbon price in place (or have a lower carbon price)
to avoid putting U.S. producers and manufacturers at an
unfair disadvantage. The benefits and controversy surrounding
such “border tax adjustments” are discussed in
more detail in Section 6.2.3.
For energy imports in an upstream carbon price system,
applying a border tax adjustment is relatively straightforward,
because the carbon price can be applied at the point
of import and a credit can be applied at the point of export
of domestically produced energy.
Addressing emissions associated with imported goods
outside the energy sector is more complicated. “Embedded
emissions,” that is, the emissions generated during
manufacture and transport, are a significant concern for
energy-intensive, trade-exposed industries. The industries
that might potentially be affected are an important part
of the U.S. manufacturing base, but represent a relatively
small portion of the U.S. economy.43
See Section 6.2.3 for
a discussion of the impact of carbon pricing on industrial
competitiveness.
WORKING PAPER | April 2015 | 21
Putting a Price on Carbon: A Handbook for U.S. Policymakers
As more carbon-pricing programs are established around
the world, this issue may recede in importance, but for
now it remains one of the potential political concerns that
must be understood when designing any carbon-pricing
program in the United States.
4.2. Setting the Price or Cap
Different approaches can be taken to setting the level of a
carbon tax or emissions cap. From a climate perspective,
one can start from either consideration of emission targets
or estimates of the damages caused by GHG emissions.
For those whose primary interests lie in non-climate
policy priorities, such as tax reform, setting the price
might have more to do with the amount of revenue needed
to serve those priorities. In designing a pricing program,
it is also important to recognize that the price or cap is
normally not going to be a single number but rather a
trajectory—an increasing tax rate or declining cap over a
period of years or decades. In any case, setting the level
of the tax or cap will likely require balancing a variety of
political and economic considerations, such as attempting
to ease the economic transition by starting at a relatively
low price but allowing the price to increase over time to
ensure significant emission reductions.
The United States has put forward emissions targets for
2020 (17 percent reduction from 2005 levels) and 2025
(26 to 28 percent reductions from 2005). These goals
could provide the basis for the trajectory of emissions
caps, and modeling could be used to estimate the resulting
carbon price or to suggest an appropriate carbon tax
trajectory. Longer-term targets, for example for 2030 or
2050, could be used as well. However, translating between
carbon prices and emissions levels over the long term—
whether determining the emissions effects over time of
a given carbon-tax system or the prices that would result
from a given carbon cap—is complicated by the uncertainties
involved in modeling long-term developments in
economic and energy systems. (See text box “The Limits of
Economic Modeling” in Section 6.)
In theory, setting a carbon price based on damages caused
by climate change aims to ensure that the full costs of
climate change are incorporated into the prices of carbonintensive
goods and services. The United States and other
countries have estimated the “social cost of carbon” (SCC)
to gain insight into a key economic question–what damage
does an incremental ton of emissions create?44
The
SCC attempts to identify and quantify the major impacts
of climate change from around the globe and for centuries
into the future. These impacts, which affect public health,
the environment, and infrastructure, must be translated
into monetary terms and discounted to present values
in order to determine the “cost” of the incremental ton
of emissions in today’s dollars. In the United States, the
Office of Management and Budget has directed agencies
to use a range of SCC estimates in quantifying the benefits
of reducing carbon emissions as part of their regulatory
impact analyses. However, the resulting SCC estimates are
highly imprecise, due to the major uncertainties surrounding
the impact estimates, and also incomplete, because
sufficient information to translate certain damages into
monetary values is lacking.45
For policymakers who are not motivated primarily by the
need to address climate change, the amount of revenue
needed for particular policy purposes, such as paying for
reductions in payroll or corporate tax rates or providing
funding for infrastructure, provides an alternative
approach for determining the level of the carbon price.
Getting the level of the price and its trajectory over time
right would still require modeling; while the price could be
set with certainty for a carbon tax, the effect of the price
on future emissions, and thus on future revenues, would
need to be modeled. In addition, if the emissions levels
were to fall more quickly than the price were to rise over
time, the result would be declining revenues. Net government
revenue would also be affected in either type of
program by the extent to which tax payments or allowance
purchases were deductible business expenses.
4.2.1. Changes in the Carbon Price over Time
Typically, the program will include an increasing price or
declining cap that changes over time. With a price that
starts at a relatively low level and increases in a predictable
way over time, the immediate economic effects of the
policy on existing activities are muted, because industries
and consumers can adjust gradually to the carbon price.
The signal sent throughout the economy—continued
emissions will be increasingly costly in future years—is
clear and can shift investment and other economic activity
that need to take into account future costs and revenue
streams. For example, when British Columbia introduced
its carbon tax, it established the tax at C$10 per ton CO2
e
for the first year (2008), increasing at C$5 per year until
it reached C$30 in 2012.46
A decreasing cap works in the
same way, though with uncertainty over the future prices
that companies and consumers will face.
22 |
In establishing a carbon-price trajectory, policymakers
will need to balance the competing objectives of maximizing
emissions reductions (accomplished with a faster rise
in prices) and tempering the near-term economic effects
of the program (accomplished with a more gradually
increasing price).
In addition, emission reductions may prove either more
or less expensive than anticipated, with the result that
the economic and environmental outcomes differ from
predictions. For example, in the case of both the EU ETS
(after its initial phase) and RGGI, shifting levels of economic
activity and (in the case of RGGI) reduced natural
gas prices meant that the emission levels have been below
the caps. The EU ETS and RGGI have since moved either
to lower their caps in future phases or delay the auctioning
of allowances to address the unanticipated low level of
emissions.47
Conversely, if emission reductions are more
expensive or otherwise more difficult to achieve, a tax
might result in fewer emission reductions than expected or
a cap-and-trade program might experience higher allowance
prices. Unanticipated circumstances can also lead to
very high prices in a cap-and-trade program or minimal
emission reductions resulting from a carbon tax.48
Anticipating such circumstances argues for including an
adjustment mechanism in the original program design to
minimize the potential for disruptive, unplanned changes
or a cost-containment mechanism (see below). In terms
of an adjustment mechanism, for example, the program
rules might call for monitoring progress and determining
whether the price/cap trajectory needs to be adjusted at
established points along the way.
4.2.2. Cost-Containment Mechanisms
Price stability provides an important measure of confidence
for those investing in emission reductions and
clean technology. In the case of a carbon tax, this is an
inherent aspect of the program—the design establishes the
price of carbon emissions over time. Cost-containment
mechanisms can address concerns regarding severe price
fluctuations in a cap-and-trade program. If prices rise too
high or too quickly, they could result in significant economic
harm; if they drop too low, they will not provide the
desired price signal for low-carbon investment. As with
most program design choices, the decisions as to whether
to include cost containment mechanisms typically involve
trade-offs, which are discussed below for offsets and price
ceilings/floor.
OFFSETS
Offsets are documented emissions reductions that occur
outside the regulated sectors, and can be used by regulated
entities in lieu of reducing emissions covered by the
system. Offsets can reduce program costs (because a regulated
entity will utilize offsets when they are less expensive
than covered emissions reductions) while achieving the
same level of emissions reductions.
Offsets can also provide a way to bring into the program
sources that are difficult to address directly. For example,
overall emissions from agricultural are often difficult to
quantify, but it might be easier to quantify (and verify)
the emissions reductions from specific actions, such
as improved manure management. Offsets have been
included in most cap-and-trade programs, but they
have often been controversial because of concerns about
whether the offsets really represent emissions reductions
that would not have happened anyway.49
Accurately
measuring, reporting, and ensuring the quality of offsets
is essential. They must result from actions that would not
have been taken without the ability to sell the offset credits,
and the emissions reductions must be real, permanent,
quantifiable, and verified.50
The decision as to whether
to include offsets typically involves weighing the tradeoff
between lower compliance costs and the certainty of
achieving the environmental objectives. Including offsets
undermines certainty when there are concerns over the
validity of the associated emissions reductions.
Offsets are more often associated with cap-and-trade
programs than with carbon taxes, but they can be incorporated
into either type of program. Under cap-and-trade,
the offset credits can be used to cover emissions in the
same way as allowances. Under a carbon tax, regulated
entities can be allowed to use offsets to reduce the quantity
of emissions (or amount of fuel or other proxy for
emissions) on which the tax is assessed. In either case, the
system would need to include rules for establishing definitions
of valid offsets and limits, if any, on their use.
PRICE CEILINGS AND FLOORS
A price ceiling limits how high (or how fast) allowance
prices can rise, and a price floor limits how low they can
fall. Used together, they form a price collar. These mechanisms
are relevant only for cap-and-trade programs, and
make those programs more like a carbon tax by increasing
certainty about future prices. For example, the California
cap-and-trade program includes a price floor that is
WORKING PAPER | April 2015 | 23
Putting a Price on Carbon: A Handbook for U.S. Policymakers
implemented as a minimum price on the auction of its
allowances. The floor was initially set at $10 per ton of
CO2
e, increasing annually at the rate of inflation plus five
percent.
A program might include a ceiling, a floor, or both. The
purpose of the ceiling is to prevent economic disruption
from very high carbon prices or from prices that rise too
quickly. In general, a price ceiling will result in higher
emissions over time, since the primary response to hitting
the ceiling is likely to be an increase in the supply of allowances.
A price floor can be used to prevent the collapse of
the carbon price, ensuring that clean energy investments
will at least be supported by a known minimum carbon
price.
The drawback of price ceilings and floors is that they create
inefficiencies in the markets for emissions allowances.
Buyers and sellers might both wish to trade at a price
higher than the ceiling or lower than the floor, but they are
prohibited from doing so. Policymakers must determine
whether the benefits noted above are worth the costs of
these market inefficiencies.
4.3. Reporting and Verification
A key prerequisite for a successful system is a robust
reporting and verification system. Such a system needs to
be appropriate to the point of implementation; it is critical
to have accurate and verified reporting of the emissions
tied to the entity in the system that is responsible for
them. An upstream approach involves reporting the production
and imports of fossil fuels (often already done for
other purposes) and translating the fuel report data into
equivalent emissions. Similarly, downstream or intermediate
approaches mean that reporting must accurately tie
the emissions to the responsible entity.
Because the addition of a carbon price creates direct
economic consequences, verification of entities’ emission
reports is essential. Different approaches to verification
are possible, from independent third party verification to
self-certification with strong penalties. To provide confidence
that those covered by the program are providing
consistent and accurate information, the reporting must
be complete, accurate, consistent, transparent, and without
material misstatement.51
Piggy-backing on existing
reporting systems to the fullest extent possible simplifies
implementation for both business and the government.
In designing a carbon-pricing program, policymakers
must determine how to develop a system for reporting
and verification that is accurate and reliable while also
minimizing administrative and regulatory burdens to the
extent possible.
4.4. Complementary Policies
A price on carbon can be a key element of a broader
climate policy because it provides significant signals
throughout the economy that encourage a shift to lower
carbon energy and products. However, additional programs
and policies will likely be needed to help provide
a cost-effective path to deep greenhouse gas emissions
reduction in the coming decades.
4.4.1. Addressing Emissions and Sources
Outside the Program Scope
A carbon-pricing program is unlikely to address all
sources of greenhouse gas emissions, because some
emissions are too dispersed or hard to measure to be
included in a program without overburdening administration.
To reduce greenhouse gas emissions throughout the
economy, additional approaches can encourage or require
emission reductions from sources not covered by the carbon
price. Such approaches might include offset programs
allowing crediting of emission reduction activities, direct
regulation, investments in R&D, or incentive programs.
4.4.2. Energy Efficiency
Energy efficiency has many well documented market barriers,
such as split incentives between building owners and
tenants, up-front costs, and lack of information, which
hamper the achievement of the full range of cost-effective
opportunities.52
Applying a carbon price will strengthen
the market signals and provide incentives for additional
energy efficiency, but will not eliminate market barriers.
For this reason, many programs that currently provide
incentives to efficiency might still be needed, even with a
carbon-pricing system in place. Carbon revenues, however,
could provide significant additional funding to help
support or expand such programs over time; this has been
the case with the RGGI program. The Analysis Group has
shown that, in the first three years of RGGI’s operation,
RGGI added $1.6 billion in net present value to the economies
of the participating states, in large measure thanks to
spending auction revenues on energy efficiency programs.53
4.4.3. Regulations and Standards
Market mechanisms such as a carbon tax or cap-andtrade
program are often considered more cost effective
in achieving emission reductions than more traditional
24 |
regulations and standards, assuming that relevant markets
(especially for energy efficiency and innovation) are
functioning close to the competitive ideal.54
For policymakers
who view a carbon price as a means to other policy
goals, avoiding these types of regulations and standards
might be seen as a goal of implementing a carbon price.
However, in certain circumstances, a carbon price might
be less effective at reducing greenhouse gas emissions
than alternative policies; markets are not perfect, and
in some cases prices will not be effective. For example,
even a low carbon price applied uniformly across the U.S.
economy would likely achieve significant power sector
reductions, where significant low-cost opportunities are
available, but a higher carbon price would be required to
have meaningful effects in the transportation sector. The
relatively low rate of fleet turnover slows the rate at which
changes in vehicle technology lead to emission reductions,
and shifting from gasoline and diesel to lower carbon
fuels will require both vehicle and fueling infrastructure
changes. Given that vehicle technology, fueling infrastructure
and purchase patterns have little near-term response
to a carbon price, pairing a carbon price with continued
strong vehicle and alternative fuel standards is likely
to prove a more effective approach to achieving deeper
medium-term emission reductions, with the added benefit
of reducing reliance on oil imports.
Similarly, a major near-term response to a carbon price
in the electricity sector in the United States would likely
be the increased use of natural gas. This could provide
significant emission reductions for the next decade, but if
deeper reductions are desired in the medium to long term,
a continued shift to use of zero- and near-zero emissions
sources, for example, renewables, nuclear power, and
coal plus carbon capture and sequestration, is likely to be
needed. Continued support through standards and other
policies for these technologies might be a means to achieving
such medium- to long-term emission reductions.
4.4.4. Investing in Enabling Technologies
Many emission reduction opportunities depend on other
technologies that are not likely to be stimulated by a carbon
price because of the same market barriers that hamper
energy efficiency investments. For example, technical
upgrades to the national grid would enable an increased
contribution of power from distributed electricity generating
sources, including renewables. A carbon price by itself
is unlikely to provide sufficient incentive for investment in
the grid, because any benefit from increased distributed
power generation does not tend to accrue to parties investing
in the grid. Public investment in infrastructure and
enabling technologies might be able to unlock significant
emission reduction opportunities across the economy.
4.4.5. Research and Development
Achieving the deep emission reductions needed by midcentury
will require significant technological innovation
and advancement. Increased support for research and
development is likely to speed the development and
deployment of new and improved technologies that may
significantly reduce the cost of achieving the long-term
emission goals. See Section 5.3.2, below, for further
discussion on using revenues from a carbon-pricing
program to support innovation in emissions-reduction
technologies.
5. COMMONLY PROPOSED USES OF
CARBON PRICING REVENUES
According to the Environmental Protection Agency, U.S.
greenhouse gas emissions in 2012 were more than 6.5 billion
metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalents.55
A carbon
tax, or a cap-and-trade program with allowance auctions,
therefore has the potential to raise well over $100 billion
per year at a moderate price of about $15 per ton, depending
on its initial level and scope (for reference, in 2013 the
corporate income tax brought in roughly $273 billion of
revenue).56
In an economy with a gross domestic product
of nearly $17 trillion, this is a relatively small but far from
negligible sum.57
For a Congress looking for new sources
of revenue to finance tax reform or avoid cutting politically
popular tax expenditures, a carbon price could receive
some unlikely support—potentially even from those who
are not focused on reducing GHG emissions, but who see
a carbon tax as more palatable than other taxes or as a
potential substitute for regulations.
How any revenue gets spent will, of course, be decided by
the legislative process. Yet, because it is one of the most
critical and politically contentious elements of carbonpricing
policy design, with implications for individuals,
companies, and the economy, this paper examines some of
the most commonly proposed uses of revenue.
Policymakers have no shortage of competing priorities
from which to choose, and each presents a wide range of
WORKING PAPER | April 2015 | 25
Putting a Price on Carbon: A Handbook for U.S. Policymakers
advantages and disadvantages. Many revenue uses could
potentially provide a “double dividend” of reduced greenhouse
gas emissions and improved economic efficiency.
Indeed, previous analysis by WRI and others indicates
that well-designed policies to combat climate change can
enhance economic growth.58
While the prospect of significant new revenue can bring
many people to the table for a conversation, disagreements
over how to slice the pie can make the resulting
discussions difficult. For example, some proponents59
of
a carbon tax insist on a revenue-neutral offsetting of the
carbon tax with an attendant reduction in other taxes,
while others60
advocate for returning revenues to households,
reducing the deficit, or spending the money on
other priorities.
Different stakeholders have differing views of revenue
neutrality. Many conservatives would consider a carbon
tax to be revenue neutral only if all revenues were used to
reduce other taxes, with the federal government seeing no
net increase in tax revenues, and no new spending.61
Proponents
of a fee-and-dividend policy, on the other hand,
view their approach as revenue neutral as well, in that all
carbon-tax revenues are returned to households rather
than used by the government for other purposes.62
In this section, we’ll review many of the most commonly
suggested uses of revenues from a carbon tax or allowance
auctions under cap-and-trade, including:
▪▪ Reducing “distortionary” taxes such as payroll,
corporate and personal income taxes;
▪▪ Reducing government deficits;
▪▪ Investing in job training;
▪▪ Returning the revenue to households or electricity
consumers;
▪▪ Addressing regional disparities;
▪▪ Investing in economic competitiveness;
▪▪ Investing in technologies that enable communities to
adapt to climate change; and
▪▪ Investing in clean technology innovation.
For each alternative, we provide an overview of the
economic and political strengths and weaknesses, and
real world examples, where available. We have grouped
these revenue uses by their primary intended effect but, as
illustrated in Table 3 below, spending revenue can have a
wide array of economic impacts.
5.1. Encourage Economic Growth
5.1.1. Reduce Distortionary Taxes
Economists typically single out several categories of taxes
—such as those on labor, investment, and capital—as being
“distortionary;” that is, they serve to discourage things like
work and investment, which are encouraged elsewhere
in the tax code and by other policies. Using some or all of
the revenue from a carbon tax to reduce these distortionary
taxes, including payroll and corporate and personal
income taxes, can result in increased economic growth
and output.
Economists from across the political spectrum are among
those most keen to use carbon tax revenue to offset distortionary
taxes elsewhere.63
Doing so, they argue, would
make the tax code more efficient, and would reduce disincentives
to work and invest. Among the taxes most cited as
ripe for reduction are payroll taxes and those on corporate
income. The former are more regressive than the tax code
as a whole—in 2014, only the first $117,000 of income was
subject to Social Security payroll taxes—and they increase
the cost of labor, discouraging employers from additional
hiring and reducing the incentive to work. Taxes on corporate
income are passed through to customers, employees,
or shareholders, and are an inefficient means of taxing any
of these groups. They can also discourage companies from
investing and establishing or keeping their operations
in the United States, which nominally has the highest marginal
corporate income tax rate in the developed world.64
However, the effective tax rate—what companies actually
pay—is typically far less than this statutory rate, for a
variety of reasons.65
Using carbon-tax revenue to reduce
either, or both, of these taxes can pay dividends throughout
the economy, including greater economic growth and
increases in overall employment.
Such a “revenue-neutral tax swap” is among the most
common policy proposals from advocates of carbon taxes.
Typically, in these proposals, most or all of the revenue
from the carbon tax goes toward reducing other taxes, so
there is no increase or decrease of revenue to the government.
Generally speaking, most studies on the topic have
found that, while reducing taxes on either labor or capital
can offset at least some of the negative effects on economic
output from a carbon tax, reducing the top tax rate on
26 |
capital would be most effective at reducing the inefficiency
caused by the tax system. For example, McKibbin et al.
(2012) found that implementing a tax on carbon and
reducing the marginal tax rates on capital would result
in greater economic growth in the coming decades than
would be the case in a business-as-usual scenario.66
But
the authors found that cutting marginal tax rates on labor
instead would result in a small net negative effect on total
economic output. And Carbone et al. (2012) found that
cutting taxes on capital was more beneficial than cutting
taxes on labor or consumption from an economic growth
standpoint (though with no provision for issues of distributional
equity), and this finding applied to both present
and future generations.67
While reducing capital tax rates might be the most efficient
use of revenue, studies have found that reducing tax
rates on labor can offset at least a significant portion, and
perhaps all, of the potential adverse economic impacts of
the carbon tax. For example, a 2011 OECD study found
that when “revenues [from allowance auctions of an
emissions-trading program] are used to reduce taxation
on labor, the pace of employment growth would accelerate…without
any loss of purchasing power for workers.”68
According to Lawrence Goulder, an economics professor
at Stanford University, the greater the inefficiency in the
current tax system, the more likely it is that using carbontax
revenues to cut labor taxes will lead to an increase in
overall employment and economic growth.69
See Section
6 for more details on the economic effects of reducing
distortionary taxes.
5.1.2. Reduce Deficits
Interest payments on the national debt can potentially
crowd out other investments, dampening economic
growth and output. Some economists argue that future
tax rates will need to increase in order to make interest
payments and pay down the debt, and that the expectation
of future tax increases will discourage work and reduce
savings.70
Some carbon-tax advocates therefore argue that
policymakers have good incentive to use revenues from
the tax to reduce annual deficits and pay down the debt,
leading to long-term economic growth.71
(For more discussion
of the economic impacts of using carbon-tax revenue
to reduce the national debt, see Section 6).
Much like reducing distortionary taxes, proponents of
using carbon-tax revenue to address the national debt
are trading one tax for another—in this case, offsetting a
potential future tax increase, or allowing for a potential
future tax reduction (government deficits can be rolled
over forever, so whether to raise taxes to pay down the
debt can be as much a policy question as an economic
one). Although the issue of the rising national debt has
faded somewhat after the deficit peaked in fiscal year 2011,
many policymakers are still weighing the available options
for long-term solutions to a potentially destabilizing fiscal
problem.72
Ireland implemented a carbon tax in 2010, covering most
of the carbon dioxide emissions from sectors not already
included in the European Emissions Trading Scheme.
Following the 2008 fiscal crisis, the decision was made to
institute a carbon tax in lieu of other austerity measures
and tax increases, and use much of the revenue to reduce
annual budget deficits. In the years since its implementation,
the carbon tax has contributed to a dramatic slowdown
in the growth rate of the Irish national debt and has
led to a reduction in emissions from covered sectors.73, 74
While the circumstances under which the carbon tax was
first implemented were extraordinary, this case nevertheless
illustrates the way in which a carbon tax can help
address national debt.
5.2. Ease Transition Costs for Individuals,
Sectors, and Regions
5.2.1. Invest in Job Training
By inducing changes in behavior and purchasing patterns,
a carbon price will, over time, benefit some industries
(renewable energy, energy efficiency, clean vehicles,
etc.) at the expense of others, especially coal and oil
production. While such structural shifts in the economy
may not significantly affect overall employment, and are a
regular part of growth and economic shifts, policymakers
may nonetheless decide to enact measures to ensure
those that are adversely affected by a carbon tax are able
to transition quickly and find new jobs. Federal support
for job training programs,75
spending on education, and
other uses of carbon tax revenues can limit the impact
of a carbon tax on employment in particular industries,
or accelerate a transition to clean energy jobs.76
In some
cases, new initiatives for displaced workers can build upon
existing federal programs.77
Some studies have found benefits to both short-term and
long-term job training programs. Low-cost, short-term
programs—those designed to get a person back to work as
quickly as possible—have been found to reduce the time
spent unemployed and increase job stability, and they are
cost effective in the near term. Participants in long-term
WORKING PAPER | April 2015 | 27
Putting a Price on Carbon: A Handbook for U.S. Policymakers
training programs, which are aimed at giving workers the
skills they need to succeed in a new field, benefit from
even more job stability and higher lifetime earnings.78
Onthe-job
training programs have also proven cost effective.
A study of 16 trades across the Canadian economy found
that employers received C$1.47 in benefits for every C$1
invested in apprenticeship programs.79
There are few examples of existing carbon-pricing policies
that re-invest revenues into job-training programs, but the
recently enacted carbon tax in Chile may prove instructive
as it is implemented. In September 2014, as part of
a broader tax reform, Chile enacted a $5-per-ton tax on
carbon emissions from power plants in order to reduce its
fossil fuel imports and encourage renewable energy development.
It has been proposed that, when it goes into effect
in 2018, most of the revenues from the carbon tax, and
other tax increases, will go toward education initiatives.
While this policy will not likely pay immediate economic
dividends, Chile views it as a long-term investment in the
economy and a way to reduce economic inequality. It will
be a case study to follow in the years to come.80
5.2.2. Return Money to Households or Electricity
Consumers
The notion of sending a quarterly or annual check to
households to offset the increase in commodity prices
resulting from a carbon tax—known as “fee-and-dividend”—has
grown in popularity in recent years, largely
because of its perceived fairness and simplicity. By dividing
carbon-tax revenues equally amongst all consumers,
programs ensure that lower income households receive
as much or more in revenue as they spend on the tax, and
a sizeable fraction of households would be net winners
on a monetary basis.81
Unlike proposals to reduce other
taxes, fee-and-dividend programs do not have to contend
with the problem of declining carbon-pricing revenues
that must still fund permanent tax cuts. Also, by giving
revenues to individuals or groups, policymakers can
potentially increase public support for continued carbon
pricing and make such a policy more “sticky,” because any
reduction in price or repeal of the policy would reduce or
eliminate those dividends.82
However, some commentators do not agree that implementation
would be so straightforward. Many also disagree
with the characterization of this as a revenue-neutral
option. Providing dividend checks would likely involve at
least a small amount of new spending and growth of government
to determine and distribute the dividends. FurBox
5 | British Columbia’s Carbon Tax—Proving
	 Emissions Reductions and Economic 	 	
	 Growth Can Co-Exist
The Canadian province of British Columbia provides a realworld
example of a carbon tax that reduces other taxes and is
intended to be revenue neutral. British Columbia implemented
a carbon tax of C$10 per metric ton of CO2
equivalent in July
2008, which increased by C$5 per year to C$30 per metric ton
in 2012; the tax will remain at C$30 per metric ton through
2017. The tax was designed to be revenue neutral, as the
province anticipated using the revenues from the carbon tax to
reduce a range of personal and business taxes. Those measures
include providing a tax credit for low-income households,
reducing the two lowest personal income tax bracket rates
by five percentage points, and cutting the general and small
business corporate income tax rates by two percentage points.a
In its first few years, however, the tax was actually revenue
negative, in part because the price on carbon reduced demand
more than anticipated, leading to carbon-tax revenues that
were lower than the province had projected. British Columbia
therefore took in less money from its carbon tax than it cut from
other taxes.
A 2013 analysis of British Columbia’s carbon tax found that
it has been successful in reducing greenhouse gas emissions
without adversely affecting economic growth. In the five years
following implementation, per capita greenhouse gas emissions
fell 18.8 percent relative to the rest of Canada, while
GDP growth kept pace with the rest of Canada. Moreover, the
province’s personal income tax rates are now the lowest in the
country, and its corporate tax rates are among the lowest in
North America.b
British Columbia therefore provides an example
of one way in which governments can reduce distortionary
taxes, address regressivity, and reduce emissions–all while
ensuring that no income group is made worse off. We should
note, however, that some observers question British Columbia’s
suitability as an example for a carbon tax in the United
States, especially given the differences in sources of electricity
generation between the two regions.c
Notes:
a. British Columbia Ministry of Finance. February, 2012. “Budget and
Fiscal Plan, 2012/13-2014/15.” Available at http://www.bcbudget.gov.
bc.ca/2012/bfp/2012_Budget_Fiscal_Plan.pdf
b. Elgie, S., and J. McClay. 2013. “BC’s Carbon Tax Shift After Five
Years: Results.” Sustainable Prosperity. July. Available at: http://www.
sustainableprosperity.ca/dl1026&display
c. See, for example, Marlo Lewis, “Why British Columbia’s Carbon Tax is
Not Applicable to America,” OnPOINT, September 16, 2014, https://cei.
org/sites/default/files/Marlo%20Lewis%20-%20Why%20British%20
Columbia’s%20Carbon%20Tax%20Is%20Not%20Applicable%20to%20
America_0.pdf.
28 |
thermore, a policy that provides equal dividends to every
individual could support the perception that a carbon tax
would affect some states and regions more than others,
though these regional disparities may be overstated (see
additional discussion in Sections 5.2.3 and 6.2.2).
Various methods can be used to administer rebate checks
in a fee-and-dividend program. Existing federal programs
that disburse money, such as Social Security or the
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families program, can
supplement households’ monthly checks with carbon-tax
revenues. For non-participants in those programs, the
government can send a monthly check, or give annual tax
refunds. All of these means of returning revenues carry
various administrative burdens and costs.
Several examples of redistributing revenues to households
may be instructive to policymakers. In 2008, Switzerland
implemented a carbon tax on hydrocarbon fuels, which
applies to all individuals and those companies that do
not participate in the national cap-and-trade program.
Revenues are redistributed to taxpayers in the form of
lower health insurance premiums for individuals, and
are returned to companies based on their total payroll.
While few studies have analyzed the economic impacts
of Switzerland’s carbon tax, since its implementation in
2008 Switzerland has kept pace with, or exceeded, other
developed countries in a variety of economic indicators.83
In the United States, there is precedent for recycling
revenues to households, though as part of very different
programs. The Alaska Permanent Fund returns a portion
of that state’s oil revenues to its citizens every year.
And California is recycling some of the revenue from its
allowance auctions back to households in the form of
semi-annual rebates on electricity bills, administered by
the investor-owned utilities (IOUs) in the state, as directed
by the California Public Utilities Commission. The revenue
for the rebates comes from a reverse auction of allowances
that were distributed to investor-owned utilities under the
cap-and-trade program rules.
5.2.3. Address Regional Disparities
Some regions in the United States are more heavily
dependent on the production or consumption of fossil
fuels than others, and so will be differently affected by the
implementation of a carbon price. A reduction in demand
for coal, for example, could have adverse impacts on the
coal-producing regions of Wyoming, West Virginia, and
Kentucky, among other states.84
Residents of states that
get most of their electricity from coal would likely see their
monthly electric bills increase in the near term. Many
households in the Northeast, heavily reliant on heating oil,
would see wintertime energy costs increase.85
However, recent analysis suggests that regional disparities
in the consumption of carbon-intensive goods are not
as great as once feared.86
Regions that are more heavily
dependent on one fossil fuel tend to be relatively less
dependent on others—for example, while the Northeastern
states burn more oil for home heating, their electricity mix
is relatively less dependent on coal (see Figures 6 and 7).87
Figure 6 | Primary Home Heating Fuel, by Census Division
0%
100%
2005 2013 2005 2013 2005 2013 2005 2013 2005 2013
Midwest South West
Other/none
Fuel Oil & Kerosene
LPG
Natural Gas
Electricity
United StatesNortheast
Source: “Everywhere but Northeast, Fewer Homes Choose Natural Gas as Heating Fuel,” U.S. Energy Information Administration, September 25, 2014,
http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=18131.
WORKING PAPER | April 2015 | 29
Putting a Price on Carbon: A Handbook for U.S. Policymakers
*Includes generation by agricultural waste, landfill gas recovery, municipal solid waste, wood, geothermal, nonwood waste, wind, and solar.
Source: “Different Regions of the Country Use Different Fuel Mixes to Generate Electricity,” Edison Electric Institute, August 2014,
http://www.eei.org/issuesandpolicy/generation/fueldiversity/Documents/map_fuel_diversity.pdf.
PACIFIC
CONTIGUOUS
38%
3%
7%
36%
14%
<1%
1%
MOUNTAIN
54%
22%
8%
8%
7%
<1%
<1%
WEST NORTH
CENTRAL
67%
12%
5%
14%
<1%
3%
<1%
WEST SOUTH
CENTRAL
35%
45%
10%
8%
1%
1%
1%
EAST NORTH
CENTRAL 60%
9%
25%
4%
1%<1%
<1%
EAST SOUTH
CENTRAL
46%
23%
22%
7%
<1%
2% <1%
SOUTH
ATLANTIC
36%
33%
26%
1%
2%
2% 1%
MIDDLE
ATLANTIC
23%
30%
37%
6%
<1%
3% 1%
NEW
ENGLAND
45%
32%
7%
7%
5%
3%1%
PACIFIC NON-
CONTIGUOUS
21%
12%
9%
7%
48%
3%
Coal Natural Gas Nuclear Hydro Other Renewables* Fuel Oil Other
Figure 7 | Electricity Generation Fuel Mix, by Region
30 |
As Tufts University Economics Professor Gilbert Metcalf
has found, returning carbon-pricing revenues to households
via payroll tax reductions and Social Security can all
but eliminate regional disparities while making all regions
better off.88
Nevertheless, such concerns were a major sticking point
in the debate surrounding how to apportion allowance
revenue under the American Clean Energy and Security
Act (ACES). To mitigate against increases in energy prices
that would affect some regions more than others, the bill’s
authors devoted some allowance revenue to electricity
and natural gas local distribution companies, as well as
state programs that support home heating. The notion
that some regions would be more adversely affected than
others will likely be a contentious issue in any political
debate surrounding a carbon price. This issue is discussed
in more detail in Section 6, below.
5.2.4. Invest in Economic Competitiveness
Many industries, especially manufacturing, rely heavily on
energy derived from fossil fuels as a primary input. There
is concern that, if a price on carbon results in the prices
of those fuels increasing to the point that it is cheaper for
companies to relocate their operations elsewhere, some
manufacturing jobs could be lost. While recent studies
suggest that this may be less of a problem than previously
thought (see Section 6.4), many advocates of a national
climate policy call for measures to ensure that American
industry remains competitive in the global marketplace. In
a cap-and-trade program, this can be achieved by distributing
free allowances to industries identified as vulnerable
to competitive pressures because of the carbon price
(often called energy-intensive trade-exposed industries).
Under a carbon tax, the most frequently discussed corresponding
policy tool is a border adjustment, whereby
imports from countries without equivalent policies are
assessed a tariff based on the carbon content of their
goods, and exports given a rebate of the tax paid in the
manufacture of the good. If the trading partner has a
climate policy in place that implicitly or explicitly prices
carbon emissions equivalently to the U.S. domestic carbon
tax, the border adjustment can be waived. If the trading
partner has a climate policy that is less stringent than
that of the United States, the border adjustment can be
reduced accordingly. This creates difficult questions for
regulators, such as how to quantify the effect of regulations
that reduce emissions and how to determine the
stringency of a suite of climate policies in other countries.
Further discussion on border adjustments can be found in
Section 6.2.3. We should also note that many of the United
States’ largest trading partners already have carbon-pricing
policies in place. See Appendix A for more details.89
Of course, some portion of carbon-tax revenues can be
returned to energy-intensive trade-exposed industries, as
a means of sustaining international competitiveness (and
if the corporate income tax rate is cut as part of a carbontax
swap, many of these companies will already receive
a tax break). As long as the revenue is not returned to
these industries on the basis of their emissions, the price
signal to encourage companies to reduce their emissions
will remain. However, returning revenues to energyintensive
trade-exposed industries does not provide a way
to address the fact that some other jurisdictions already
apply a carbon price.
Denmark instituted a carbon tax in 1992 and, since 1995,
has been returning a portion of revenues to various industries.
In order to advance the goal of changing industrial
behavior in order to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, the
Danish government also provides a 25 percent reduction
in a company’s tax burden if it signs an agreement to take
steps to reduce its energy use. The Danish carbon tax has
proven effective at reducing emissions, especially from
industry. Industrial emissions fell 23 percent in the decade
following the implementation of the carbon tax, and per
capita emissions in Denmark declined 15 percent between
1990 and 2005.90
Wind projects in Denmark also receive revenues from
the country’s carbon tax, which has helped the country
become a global leader in wind power. Denmark is home
to the wind turbine manufacturing operations of Vestas
and Siemens, which together have nearly 20 percent of
global market share,91
and nearly 40 percent of Danish
electricity consumption in 2014 came from wind power,
the highest figure in the world.92
5.3. Support Related Goals
5.3.1. Respond to Climate Change
Some proponents of carbon pricing believe that revenue
would be best spent on infrastructure that helps make
communities more resilient to the impacts of climate
change.93
Such investments can serve a variety of purposes,
including:
WORKING PAPER | April 2015 | 31
Putting a Price on Carbon: A Handbook for U.S. Policymakers
▪▪ Increasing the resiliency of water, transport, energy,
and other forms of infrastructure that are vulnerable
to extreme weather and other effects of a changing
climate
▪▪ Reducing emissions and improving the resiliency of
the electric grid by building out renewable energy and
distributed generation infrastructure, and expanding
smart grids
▪▪ Creating jobs through the spending of public money
on needed investments in adaptation and resilience
Spending some carbon-tax revenues on adaptation allows
for a carbon tax to address both the causes and effects of
greenhouse gas emissions simultaneously.94
The World
Bank estimates that global investments to adapt to a
changing climate will need to reach $70-100 billion per
year through 2050—and even more if warming exceeds
two degrees Celsius.95
Estimates of adaptation costs in the
United States vary widely, but could reach tens of billions
of dollars per year by the middle of the century.96
Governments can also choose to spend revenues from a
carbon tax on clean-energy initiatives designed to achieve
additional emissions reductions, and possibly reduce the
costs of complying with the carbon price. These initiatives
can take the form of investments in renewable energy,
demand-side or supply-side energy efficiency, building
retrofits, or other measures designed to reduce the carbon
intensity of energy use.
There are precedents for governments investing carbonpricing
revenues to help spur additional emissions
reductions, though on a smaller scale. Germany currently
devotes all revenues from its allowance auctions to domestic
and international climate initiatives. These include
“innovative projects” in Germany’s industrial sector, other
energy-saving domestic initiatives, and international
climate finance to help spur emissions reductions in other
countries.97
In the United States, RGGI states devoted
over 70 percent of allowance auction revenues to energy
efficiency and renewable energy projects between 2009
and 2012—measures that RGGI estimates will avoid eight
million tons of CO2
emissions and save consumers more
than $2 billion in energy savings.98
5.3.2. Encourage Investment in Clean
Technology Innovation
By changing the relative prices of goods, and creating
financial incentives to reduce emissions, a price on carbon
can stimulate innovation. Alone or in conjunction with
complementary policies (as discussed in Section 4.4),
a carbon price encourages companies to develop new,
cleaner, more cost-effective technologies and processes. As
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
has written:
“…environmentally related taxes can provide significant
incentives for innovation, as firms and consumers
seek new, cleaner solutions in response to the
price put on pollution. These incentives also make it
commercially attractive to invest in R&D activities to
develop technologies and consumer products with a
lighter environmental footprint, either by the polluter
or by a third-party innovator… Even for firms that do
not have the resources or inclination to undertake formalised
R&D activities, the presence of environmentally
related taxation provides increased incentives to
bring in the latest technologies that have already been
developed elsewhere.” 99
It is highly unlikely that a low to moderate carbon tax
would achieve the level of emissions reductions the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)
recommends in order to prevent the worst impacts of
climate change.100
Therefore, some supporters of a carbon
tax propose using some revenue to encourage innovation
in technologies or practices that could help reduce greenhouse
gas emissions.101
The federal government already
invests in research and development—the Department of
Energy supports renewable energy, fossil energy, nuclear
energy, and energy efficiency—and those programs have
paid dividends in the form of technological advancement
and lower costs to businesses and consumers.102
But, while
we can make significant emissions reductions with technology
available today, in order to achieve much deeper
emissions reductions by mid-century we will need either
innovative breakthroughs or continuous improvements in
the existing suite of technologies, or both.
Devoting some carbon-tax revenue to R&D can potentially
help to reduce the long-term costs of complying with the
tax and reducing emissions, in several ways. First, as
reaffirmed in a pair of 2014 reports, both the public and
private sectors often underinvest in innovation:103
“Financing for research and development in the power
sector does not match the scale of the challenge [of
reducing emissions]. Power company funds spent on
research and development were only $280 million in
2011, or approximately 0.05 percent of power sec-
32 |
Notes:
a. If payroll or other labor taxes are cut, there could be a small improvement in the overall progressivity of the tax code, which could address income inequality in a modest way. If carbon tax
revenues are used to reduce corporate income taxes, any such effect would be muted.
b. Depending on whether and how additional revenue is raised from alternative sources.
c. Proponents of a fee-and-dividend approach claim that it will foster economic growth, but the economic literature is divided on this. See Section 6 for more detail.
d. The revenue neutrality of returning all carbon-tax revenues to households in the form of dividends is in the eye of the beholder. Some proponents, such as Citizens Climate Lobby, believe
fee-and-dividend to be revenue neutral (see https://citizensclimatelobby.org/carbon-fee-and-dividend/). Others disagree, pointing to the need to devote some revenues to the administration of
the program, and the belief that dividends are a form of government spending and not tax reduction.
e. The evidence is mixed as to whether these revenue uses achieve the stated policy goals.
Table 3 | Revenue Options, and the Policy Goals they are Designed to Achieve
POLICY GOAL
Correct for
Regressivity
Foster
Economic
Growth
Cut Taxes
Preserve or
Create Jobs
Additional
Emissions
Reductions
Reduce Costs
of Compliance
Revenue
Neutrality
REVENUEOPTION
Reduce
Distortionary
Taxes
?a
Reduce
Deficits ?b
Invest in Job
Training
Return Money
to Households ?c
?e
?d
Address
Regional
Disparities
Invest in Economic
Competi-
tiveness
Respond to
Climate Change
Impacts
?e
Encourage
Investment in
Innovation
WORKING PAPER | April 2015 | 33
Putting a Price on Carbon: A Handbook for U.S. Policymakers
tor sales. By comparison, company funds spent on
research and development were 11 percent of sales
for pharmaceuticals, eight percent for computers and
electronics, five percent for professional services, and
three percent for general manufacturing.” 104
Government support of research, development, and demonstration
of measures to reduce emissions from energy,
transportation, agriculture, or other sectors can fill the
gap created by private sector underinvestment, and help
bring down the costs of breakthrough technologies. This,
in turn, could help to drive more cost-effective emissions
reductions and reduce the cost of complying with the carbon
tax.105
Polls suggest that public support for a carbon
tax grows when revenue is used for R&D (though many
polls do not ask respondents what level of tax they would
be comfortable with).106
5.4. Mixing and Matching
Of course, policymakers will likely choose several options
for using carbon-price revenues, and divide the money
between them. In this way, a carbon-pricing policy can
achieve (or contribute to achieving) a number of the goals
outlined in this section. For example, in its analysis of a
federal cap-and-trade program, the Center for Budget and
Policy Priorities found that only 14 percent of allowance
Figure 8 | Cumulative Distribution of Allowances Under ACES, 2012-2050
Source: “Distribution of Allowances Under the American Clean Energy and Security Act (Waxman-Markey),” Pew Center on Global Climate Change, August 2009, http://www.c2es.org/
docUploads/policy-memo-allowance-distribution-under-waxman-markey.pdf.
Consumers (Electricity, natural gas, home heating,
low-income, etc.) 58%
Technology (Renewables, Efficiency, CCS, Autos, etc.) 15%
Energy-Intensive, Trade-Vulnerable Industries 8%
Adaptation (Domestic & International) 7%
Prevention of Tropical Deforestation 4%
Merchant Coal Generators & Long-term Power 3%
Other (Early actors, worker transition, deficit reduction) 2%
Strategic Reserve 2%
Domestic Fuel Production 1%
auction revenue was needed to ensure that the bottom
quintile of the income distribution was not adversely
affected by higher energy prices.107
The 2009 ACES Act
followed this guidance and devoted about 15 percent
of allowance revenue to lower income households. To
achieve a variety of policy goals, the bill’s authors also
proposed giving free allowances (or devoting allowance
revenue) to electricity and natural gas distribution companies
to protect consumers from higher energy prices, to
energy-intensive and trade-exposed industries, to innovation
and R&D, and for adaptation investments (see Figure
8).108
California is currently putting many of those principles
into practice.109
In addition to the semi-annual rebates
on electricity bills mentioned above, the state is devoting
some of its allowance revenue to transportation infrastructure
(including high-speed rail and other mass transit),
affordable housing, energy- and water-efficiency projects,
support for low-income and minority communities, and
several other smaller programs.110
While distributing
revenues across a variety of end-uses can diminish the
effectiveness in achieving certain policy goals, it may allow
a federal carbon-pricing program to address multiple priorities.
See Table 3 for a summary of how various revenue
options can satisfy one or more policy goals.
34 |
6. ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF A
CARBON PRICE
Like other climate and tax policies, pricing carbon will
necessarily have economic impacts. The economic literature
on a carbon tax’s effects on economic growth and
output, jobs, income, regional disparities, and industrial
competitiveness is both deep and wide. These studies
can tell us much about how a carbon tax can change an
economy as it transitions from being highly dependent on
fossil fuels toward a lower carbon future.
The design choices discussed in Section 4 help to determine
the economic effects of a given carbon-pricing policy,
among the most consequential decisions for policymakers
in this regard is how to spend the revenues.
6.1. Macroeconomic Impacts
6.1.1. Effects of a Carbon Tax on Economic Growth
The effect of a carbon tax on economic growth depends
greatly on the details of how the tax is designed, and especially
on what is done with the resulting revenues. Studies
have found that while some uses of carbon tax revenues
would produce a net drag on economic growth, other uses
would provide a net stimulus to the economy. Of course,
as with all economic modeling, much depends on the
modelers’ assumptions (see Box 6 for further discussion
on the limits of economic modeling). Here, we review the
economic literature to see how the choices made by policymakers
regarding the structure of the tax and the use of
revenues will affect economic growth.
CARBON TAX POLICY PROPOSALS AND THEIR
EFFECTS ON ECONOMIC GROWTH
Economists have undertaken considerable modeling
and research on the economic impacts of various policy
proposals and uses of revenues; those most commonly
suggested are discussed in Section 5. Here, we’ll review
some of the economic literature to see how these revenue
uses will impact growth.
REDUCING DISTORTIONARY TAXES. Using carbon tax revenue
to “pay for” reductions in taxes on capital or labor can
partially or fully offset the adverse effects of a carbon tax
on economic growth, though there is disagreement among
economists as to which of these uses of carbon tax revenue
would lead to greater economic growth. Economists refer
to taxes on capital and labor as distortionary, because
they reduce the incentives to work and invest—generally,
things that policymakers want to encourage in a healthy
economy. By using carbon tax revenue to reduce existing
tax rates on corporate income, personal income, or payroll
taxes, policymakers can increase the incentives to work
and invest while reducing the incentive to over-consume
fossil fuels. For example, Parry et al. (2011) find that “if
revenues are used to substitute for distortionary income
taxes (either directly or indirectly through deficit reduction),
economy-wide carbon taxes…may have (slightly)
negative costs.”111
PROVIDING DIVIDENDS. Carbon-tax revenue can also be
recycled to households on a monthly, quarterly, or annual
basis, either via a new federal program or through any of
a number of existing programs; these programs include,
but are not limited to, Social Security, Supplemental
Nutritional Assistance Program (SNAP, also called food
stamps), or via annual tax returns (further discussion of
federal programs that could be used to return revenues
to households can be found in Section 5.2.2). Most
economists believe such a policy would reduce economic
efficiency, at least in the near- to medium-term. For
example, Lawrence Goulder and Marc Hafstead find that
a lump-sum rebate is worse for economic growth than
using revenues to reduce either personal or corporate
income tax rates.112
And, while a 2014 study by Regional
Economic Models, Inc. (REMI) found that a “fee-anddividend”
approach would yield small net positive impacts
on economic growth, this study was not peer-reviewed and
some experts have taken issue with its assumptions and
findings.113
FEDERAL DEFICIT REDUCTION. Large deficits are thought to
act as a drag on the economy, because they crowd out private
sector investment, and interest payments on the debt
reduce the amount of money that the federal government
can spend on more constructive purposes. And if interest
payments rise (or are expected to rise) in the future,
Congress may be forced to raise taxes to help defray those
costs, further limiting output. Economists have modeled
the potential economic effects of carbon taxes with
revenues used for federal deficit reduction by assuming,
for example, that tax increases to reduce the debt are
inevitable, and carbon taxes can reduce the need for some
of these future tax increases.
Carbone et al. (2013) find that a CO2
tax of $30 per ton,
with all revenue used as a “down payment” to bring
the debt down to a sustainable level, would lead to very
minor GDP reductions in the near term, and either minor
increases or decreases following 2030, depending on the
choice of debt reduction measures for which carbon taxes
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Putting a Price on Carbon: A Handbook for U.S. Policymakers
are substituted.114
Similarly, McKibbin et al. (2012) find
that, to achieve a given level of deficit reduction, a carbon
tax reduces GDP slightly less than an equivalent tax on
labor and slightly more than an equivalent tax on capital.
They conclude that a carbon tax “offers a way to help
reduce the deficit and improve the environment, and do so
with minimal disturbance to overall economic activity.”115
The potential advantages of reducing deficits are not present
only at the federal level. Eisenberg et al. (2014) see
similar benefits for states that use a carbon tax to comply
with federal carbon-pollution standards for power plants,
using that revenue to reduce state deficits and lower other
tax rates.116
6.1.2. Effects of a Carbon Price on Employment
From an environmental standpoint, the primary goal of
a carbon tax is to reduce greenhouse gas emissions; a
well-designed tax will entail some restructuring of the
economy as a result of reductions in the use of carbonintensive
fuels and the consumption of carbon-intensive
goods. There is no consensus among economists on the
effects of carbon pricing on overall employment levels in
the near term, although it is well recognized that there will
be “winners” and “losers” from different economic sectors,
and most economists agree that any economic impacts will
be limited in the long term. The non-partisan Congressional
Budget Office (CBO) found that “[w]orkers and
investors in fossil-fuel industries (such as coal mining and
oil extraction) and in energy-intensive industries (such
as chemicals, metals, and transportation) would tend to
experience comparatively large losses in income under
a carbon tax because demand for their products would
decline.”117
However, the same analysis found that job
losses would be offset over time by job gains in low-emitting
energy industries (such as wind, solar, and nuclear)
as well as the service sector and other industries that are
comparatively less emissions-intensive. Further discussion
on how a carbon tax affects employment in different
regions and sectors can be found in Section 6.2, below.
In the aggregate, because a carbon tax would affect prices
throughout the economy, there would likely be shifts in
employment levels within industries, though the impact
on overall employment levels depends on the size of the
tax and what is done with revenue, and is likely to be
small. In a 2010 review of the literature, CBO found that
a “gradually increasing tax on greenhouse gas emissions
or a cap-and-trade program … would probably have only
a small effect on total employment during the next few
decades.”118
In addition, CBO found that initially “job
Box 6 | Limits of Economic Modeling
Economists build models that aim to simulate the conditions,
operation, and behavior of real world economies. These models
can be powerful tools to help economists understand and
predict the behavior of economic actors, but they are necessarily
simplifications, and have different strengths and weaknesses.
They have some explanatory power, but they cannot predict the
future.
Some of the discrepancy between predicted and actual costs of
new rules is the result of changes made by affected entities to
mitigate costs once those rules are implemented. Like models
from other disciplines designed to mimic real-world conditions,
economic models are premised upon the theories, assumptions,
and policy design choices of their creators, and those theories
and assumptions may be flawed, incomplete, or unproven.
Moreover, given the wide range of views in the economics
profession, there is likely to be another economist—and another
model—with contrasting assumptions and vastly different
results. In this paper, we strive to present an unbiased view of
different modeling results, noting when those results are largely
in agreement with each other and when they are not.
According to previous analysis by WRI and others, economic
models also have a history of overstating the costs of environmental
measures while undervaluing the benefits of action to
address climate change.a
We encourage readers to keep in mind
that all the economic modeling results discussed in this section
are estimates, and that changes to policy design that depart from
what researchers have modeled, can have an impact on modeling
results.
Economic models are also limited in their ability to reflect
the benefits of preserving “natural capital,” which includes
resources such as forests, clean air, and clean water. When
economic impacts are measured in terms of gross domestic
product (that is, the total value of the goods and services in an
economy), any degradation of natural capital will generally be
unaccounted for. Economic models also typically fail to reflect
the benefits of preserving other valuable resources (for example,
minerals and fuels) or a stable climate. Thus the business-asusual
or reference scenarios may be more optimistic than reality,
once the impacts of climate change are reflected.
Notes:
a. On the tendency of industry and EPA models to overstate the costs of
environmental regulations, see http://pdf.wri.org/factsheets/factsheet_for_
epa_regulations_cost_predictions_are_overstated.pdf. On the tendency
for economic modeling to undervalue the benefits of acting on climate,
see http://static.newclimateeconomy.report/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/
NCE_Chapter5_EconomicsOfChange.pdf.
36 |
losses from the industries that shrink would lower overall
employment in the economy and raise the unemployment
rate,” but over time most of these displaced workers would
find jobs in less emissions-intensive industries and the
economy would eventually return to full employment.119
As discussed in Section 5, the OECD found that using
carbon-tax revenue to reduce labor taxes would lead to faster
growth in total employment than would be the case in the
absence of such a tax swap.120
In the long run, carbon taxes
are expected to improve economic growth significantly by
mitigating adverse effects of climate change, and overall
employment tends to grow with the economy as a whole.
Rausch and Reilly (2012) argue for using tax revenue
to offset either capital or labor taxes, to avoid spending
cuts on social welfare programs, to pay down the deficit,
or a combination thereof. They find that any of these
suggested uses would lead to improvements throughout
the economy, including greater private spending and
employment.121
There is some agreement in the economic literature that
a well-designed carbon tax will not have a significant,
adverse effect on employment, if revenues are directed in
ways that can partially or fully offset any job losses. Fossil
fuel extraction, heavy manufacturing, and other emissions-intensive
industries would be affected the most, and
the transition could be difficult for many communities.122
Job training programs and a steady and predictable rate of
increase in the carbon tax rate could help mitigate any job
losses, but those will likely take some time for their impact
to be felt. Further discussion on how to mitigate negative
impacts on heavy industry can be found in Section 6.2.3.
6.2. Distributional Impacts
6.2.1. Effects of a Carbon Tax on Income
A carbon tax increases the price of carbon-intensive fuels
and, in the absence of any offsetting use of revenue, lower
income households would bear a proportionally greater
burden than higher income households because they tend
to spend a higher proportion of their income on energy.123
For example, CBO has found that a carbon tax of $28 per
metric ton of CO2
emissions would increase after-tax costs
for the average household in the lowest quintile of the
income distribution by 2.5 percent; for households in the
top quintile, the carbon tax would increase after-tax costs
by only one percent.124
Marron and Toder (2013) found
similar regressivity from a $20 per ton carbon tax—a 1.8
percent burden on the pre-tax income of the lowest quintile,
but only a 0.7 percent burden on the top quintile.125
At
the extreme ends of the income distribution, the regressivity
of a carbon tax is even more pronounced—Mathur
and Morris (2012) found that an illustrative carbon tax of
$15 per ton would account for 3.5 percent of income for
households in the bottom decile, but only 0.6 percent in
the top decile.126
Several studies—including Mathur and Morris (2012),
Dower and Zimmerman (1992), and Hassett et al. (2007)
—find that a carbon tax is comparatively less regressive
when looking at impacts on consumption instead
of income. For example, when measuring the effect of a
carbon tax on consumption, Mathur and Morris estimate
that the same $15 per ton tax would reduce consumption
in the bottom decile by 2.1 percent, and in the top decile
by 1.3 percent.
Due to this greater proportional burden on the poor than
the rich, a carbon tax is considered a regressive tax, but
this regressivity can be addressed through a variety of
ways of returning revenues to lower income households.
Williams et al. (2014) find that, while using carbon-price
revenue to cut capital taxes improves economic efficiency,
it exacerbates the regressivity of a carbon tax.127
The
authors found that using the revenue to provide dividends
to households, however, would mean that the lower three
quintiles of the income distribution would see a net benefit
from the policy. Using revenues to reduce taxes on labor
falls in between these two options, doing more to help
lower income households than cutting capital taxes, but
doing less than providing lump-sum dividends.
Eisenberg et al. (2014) suggest that, to offset regressivity,
tax revenues could go toward safety net programs that
benefit the poor.128
While this study analyzed state-level
carbon taxes as a means for complying with carbon pollution
standards for power plants, the same approach could
be used at the federal level. Existing federal programs
that assist lower income families and individuals, and
could be vehicles for distributing tax revenues to various
constituencies, include Social Security, the Earned Income
Tax Credit, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families,
the Low Income Home Energy Assistance Program, and
the Supplemental Nutritional Assistance Program (also
called food stamps), among others. Other approaches
include targeted tax cuts, such as the “environmental
earned income tax credit” as proposed by Metcalf (2008),
or including Social Security recipients in any payroll tax
reduction (see Table 4) (Metcalf 2009).129
Metcalf pro-
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Putting a Price on Carbon: A Handbook for U.S. Policymakers
Table 4 | Income Effects of a Carbon Tax, and Various Proposals to Reduce Regressivity
Source: Metcalf, G. 2009. “Designing a Carbon Tax to Reduce U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions.” Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, Vol. 3, Iss. 1, Winter. Available at: http://reep.
oxfordjournals.org/content/3/1/63.full.pdf+html
Note: Illustrative example using a carbon tax of $15 per metric ton (in 2005 dollars). Positive numbers represent an increase in income, and negative numbers represent a decrease in income.
“Tax credit” refers to a proposal to use carbon tax revenues to reduce payroll taxes, up to the first $560 in taxes owed. “Earned income and Social Security” is a proposal whereby Social
Security recipients also receive a $560 rebate. And “Lump sum” is the effects of a proposal to return all revenues to households in the form of per capita lump-sum rebates of $274.
Change in Disposable Income ($) Change as a Percentage of Income
Income Group
(decile)
Carbon tax Tax credit Net Carbon tax Tax credit Net
1 (lowest) -276 208 -68 -3.4 2.7 -0.7
2 -404 284 -120 -3.1 2.1 -1
3 -485 428 -57 -2.4 2.2 -0.2
4 -551 557 6 -2 2.1 0.1
5 -642 668 26 -1.8 1.9 0.1
6 -691 805 115 -1.5 1.8 0.3
7 -781 915 135 -1.4 1.6 0.2
8 -883 982 99 -1.2 1.4 0.2
9 -965 1035 70 -1.1 1.1 0
10 (highest) -1224 1093 -130 -0.8 0.8 0
Earned Income Earned Income and Social Security Lump Sum
Income Group
(decile)
Net ($) Net (%) Net ($) Net (%) Net ($) Net (%)
1 (lowest) -68 -0.7 112 1.4 166 2.1
2 -120 -1 125 1 128 1
3 -57 -0.2 114 0.6 120 0.6
4 6 0.1 70 0.3 103 0.4
5 26 0.1 54 0.1 108 0.3
6 115 0.3 66 0.1 26 0.1
7 135 0.2 35 0.1 -32 -0.1
8 99 0.2 -61 -0.1 -52 -0.1
9 70 0 -95 -0.1 -171 -0.2
10 (highest) -130 0 -332 -0.2 -355 -0.2
38 |
poses reducing payroll taxes for individuals up to a certain
level of income, while ensuring that workers with low
income tax liability receive enough support to ensure they
are not adversely affected.
Estimates of how much revenue is needed to offset much
of this regressivity are more or less consistent across
studies. Morris and Mathur (2014) find that ensuring the
bottom 20 percent of households (those with incomes less
than 150 percent of the poverty line) are not made worse
off by a carbon tax would require about 15 percent of the
revenue from the tax.130
The analysis in Rosenbaum et al.
(2009) of the Waxman-Markey cap-and-trade bill from
2009 found that the bill’s provision that 15 percent of auction
revenue be returned to low-income households would
ensure that households in the bottom income quintile
were made slightly better off, on average. A cap-and-trade
program that auctions off all allowances functions in many
ways like a carbon tax, so the findings are relevant to a
carbon tax as well. For reference, CBO’s analysis of the
Waxman-Markey bill found that, in 2020, the bill’s provisions
for returning revenue to consumers meant that the
average household in the bottom income quintile would
see a net benefit of $125 per year. The other four quintiles
would see a net annual cost, on average, as follows: second
quintile $150, third quintile $310, fourth quintile $375,
and top quintile $165.131
6.2.2. Regional Implications of a Carbon Tax
Gasoline, coal-fired electricity, and oil for home heating
will all get more expensive under a carbon tax. Differing
consumption patterns and fuel mixes in the electric grid
between states and regions mean that a carbon tax will
affect consumers differently depending on where they
live. For example, the average driver in Wyoming drives
nearly 22,000 miles per year—more than twice as far as
drivers in Alaska and the District of Columbia.132
In 2012,
92 percent of the electricity generated in Kentucky came
from coal, while in Idaho that figure was less than one
percent.133
And carbon-heavy heating oil is a significant
source of space heating in the Northeast, while much of
the rest of the country relies much more heavily on less
carbon-intensive fuels like natural gas, propane, or grid
electricity to heat homes in wintertime (however, in states
that are most heavily dependent on coal for electricity
production, heating oil can be a less emissions-intensive
method of home heating than grid electricity).134
Nevertheless,
as discussed below, some policy options for returning
revenues to households can make all regions better off.
The Congressional Budget Office states that “[p]eople in
regions of the country that rely on emission- intensive
industries for their livelihood or that use the most emission-intensive
fuels to produce power” are likely to bear
a larger burden from the imposition of a carbon tax than
others, and “[p]arts of the country that rely on fossil fuels
or energy-intensive production for income would experience
larger losses than other regions.”135
Policymakers
concerned with such effects have tools at their disposal to
offset any increases in energy prices. For example, ACES
devoted 23 percent of revenue in the early years to local
electricity and natural gas distribution companies, to
combat higher prices for those commodities.136
Yet it is important not to focus just on electricity use,
transportation costs, or any other single aspect of consumption,
but rather to look at regional energy use and
spending patterns more holistically. Morris and Mathur
(2014) find that “regional analyses show that the burdens
of a carbon tax as a share of income would not vary nearly
as much as many fear,” because different regions have
different consumption patterns for carbon-intensive goods
and fuels, but relatively similar consumption patterns for
non-energy goods and services.137
That said, they find that
Wisconsin, Illinois, Ohio, Indiana, and Michigan could
see a slightly higher burden from a carbon tax due to
their high gasoline consumption and greater total energy
consumption as a share of income.
Morris and Mathur are not alone in their conclusions,
though the details do vary between studies. Metcalf also
finds that a gradually increasing tax of $15 per ton CO2
equivalent “does not appear to disproportionately burden
one region of the country” after revenue is returned to
households (Metcalf 2009). In analyzing the regional distribution
effects of a carbon tax, Metcalf finds that, when
revenues are returned via a payroll tax credit, there is a
mere 0.6 percent difference in earned income between the
hardest hit region (Alabama, Kentucky, Mississippi, Tennessee)
and the regions least affected by the tax (the upper
Midwest and the Mountain West). And when revenues
are returned to households via a combination of payroll
tax reductions and Social Security rebates, this income
discrepancy drops to 0.4 percent, with all regions better
off (see Table 5).
Hassett et al. found less in the way of regional effects in a
2009 study analyzing the impacts of a tax of $15 per ton of
carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuels when measured
on a lifetime basis. The authors found that regional variation
in the burden from the carbon tax was modest even
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Putting a Price on Carbon: A Handbook for U.S. Policymakers
though their analysis did not look at uses of revenue, and
that “variation across regions is sufficiently small that one
could argue that a carbon tax is distributionally neutral
across regions.”138
Williams et al. (2014) found that, while a carbon tax would
have a regionally diverse impact on electricity prices due
to differing fuel mixes, those regional variations could be
minimized through revenue recycling.139
Using carbon-tax
revenues to reduce taxes on capital would reduce the burden
of the carbon tax, but do little to correct for regional
disparities. A lump-sum rebate would be more beneficial
for evening out the incidence of the carbon tax across
regions but would lower overall welfare compared to a
capital tax reduction. Reducing taxes on labor, however,
nearly eliminated regional disparities in the incidence of
the carbon tax, while providing much of the same economic
benefit as reducing taxes on capital.
Source: Metcalf (2009).
Notes: Illustrative example using a carbon tax of $15 per metric ton (in 2005 dollars). Positive numbers represent an increase in income, and negative numbers represent a decrease in
income. “Earned income and Social Security” is a proposal whereby Social Security recipients also receive a $560 rebate. And “Lump sum” is the effects of a proposal to return all revenues to
households in the form of per capita lump sum rebates of $274. Regions are defined as follows: New England (Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Vermont);
Middle Atlantic (New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania); East North Central (Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, Wisconsin); West North Central (Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska,
North Dakota, South Dakota); South Atlantic (Florida, Georgia, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, West Virginia); East South Central (Alabama, Kentucky, Mississippi,
Tennessee); West South Central (Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Texas); Mountain (Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, Wyoming); and Pacific (Alaska, California,
Hawaii, Oregon, Washington).
Table 5 | Regional Distribution Effects of a Carbon Tax, With Two Proposals for Revenue Use
Earned Income and Social Security Lump Sum
Region Net ($) Net (%) Net ($) Net (%)
New England -36 0.2 -65 -0.1
Middle Atlantic -13 0.2 -18 -0.2
East North Central -14 0.1 -37 -0.1
West North Central 52 0.5 -26 -0.2
South Atlantic 17 0.3 2 0.3
East South Central -6 0.3 -75 -0.2
West South Central -42 0.2 9 0.4
Mountain 46 0.5 34 0.4
Pacific -4 0.2 59 0.6
10 (highest) -332 -0.2 -355 -0.2
40 |
6.2.3. Impact of a Carbon Price on Industrial
Competitiveness
Some emissions-intensive industries could see a decline
in demand for their products under a carbon tax. Some
of those industries, such as electricity generation, don’t
face competition from U.S. trade partners, simply because
the vast majority of what is produced is not imported
or exported.140
Other emissions-intensive industries,
however, such as steel, chemicals, and other large energy
users, do face such competition, and higher prices on
inputs could raise concerns that the United States will be
a less attractive location for manufacturing and will lose
international competitiveness, at least in the near term.
However, these concerns may be unfounded, because
many of the United States’ largest trading partners already
have carbon-pricing policies in place (see Appendix A for
more information on those countries’ policies).
A 2009 interagency report assessing the impact of a
national cap-and-trade program on international competitiveness
found that, on average, energy expenditures
account for less than two percent of the value of U.S.
manufacturing output, and that the majority of industries
would not be noticeably adversely affected by a carbon
price.141
Meanwhile, only 44 of the 500 largest manufacturing
industries qualified as trade-exposed, accounting
for 12 percent of total manufacturing output and just six
percent of manufacturing employment, although they
were responsible for nearly half of all greenhouse gas
emissions from manufacturing.
Even a small increase in energy costs could make a big
difference in industries with tight profit margins, however,
so it is important for policymakers to take steps to address
the reduced competitiveness of some industries. Under a
cap-and-trade program, allowances can be freely allocated
to vulnerable industries to mitigate their trade exposure.
Under a carbon tax, however, the most direct way to correct
the disadvantage to these industries may be through
a border adjustment. In this way, imports from countries
without comparable carbon pricing policies would be subject
to a tariff according to the carbon content of the good,
and exports to such countries would have at least some
of their tax burden reduced. Implicit in such a measure is
an inducement to our trading partners to enact their own
carbon-pricing policies. Harmonized policies would have
the advantage of generating domestic tax revenues rather
than tariff payments to other countries, and the potential
for a more effective multi-country effort to reduce emissions.
Metcalf (2010) asserts that a border adjustment
under a carbon tax is more likely to be compliant with
World Trade Organization (WTO) rules than similar measures
under a cap-and-trade program.142
Border tax adjustments are not without risk and some
measure of controversy. First, compliance with WTO rules
is not a given, though the WTO has acknowledged that it is
possible to design a border tax for environmental reasons
without running afoul of its rules.143
The border adjustment
must be designed in such a way that it does not favor
domestically produced goods, or imports from certain
countries.144
If a provision were written in a way that takes
into account the carbon-pricing policies of our trading
partners, many (though not all) experts believe a U.S.
carbon tax could pass muster with the WTO, though it
could be challenged by other countries.145
Second, a border
adjustment has the potential to spark trade disputes if
some countries believe that they are being unfairly singled
out and retaliate with import tariffs of their own.146
Lastly,
border adjustments can be burdensome to implement,
because the carbon content of a vast array of imported
goods will be so difficult to determine.147
7. CONCLUSION
In this Handbook, we have laid out the fundamental
choices available to policymakers considering policies that
put an explicit price on carbon emissions. Most of these
decisions will be the results of political compromises, and
there are a number of precedents in the recent past for
cooperation on this issue. While we can’t predict what
the future might hold for carbon pricing and views differ
sharply on some issues, a number of factors are in play
that could increase the appeal of such a policy to different
parts of the political spectrum in the United States in the
coming years.
Bipartisan support for federal tax reform
The past five years have seen increasing calls for an
overhaul of the federal tax code. Observers on both sides
of the aisle, along with businesses and individual taxpayers,
find it to be overly onerous and complicated, yet full of
loopholes that allow individuals or companies to pay less
than their fair share of taxes. The top marginal corporate
tax rate is the highest in the developed world, yet a wide
array of deductions means that the effective corporate
tax rate is far lower, and closer to the average effective
tax rate of other developed countries.148
The tax code is
also full of conflicting incentives; for example, fossil-fuel
WORKING PAPER | April 2015 | 41
Putting a Price on Carbon: A Handbook for U.S. Policymakers
companies receive subsidies and targeted tax breaks,
even as renewable-energy companies receive tax credits
and subsidies for production and investment. All of these
complications and inconsistencies in the tax code have
led many in Congress to call for significant tax reform. In
recent years, Republican and Democratic members of the
Senate Finance Committee have discussed simplifying the
tax code by replacing most or all energy subsidies and tax
credits with a carbon tax or cap-and-dividend program.149
Stated goals for deeper reductions in
GHG emissions
Under President Obama, the United States now has a plan
in place to meet its near- and medium-term emissions
reduction targets, and to continue driving reductions in
emissions from the largest emitting sectors in the years
beyond. However, analysis by WRI has shown that administrative
actions alone are likely insufficient to meet our
long-term emissions target of roughly 83 percent below
2005 levels by 2050.150
In short, the United States will
need a comprehensive, economy-wide climate policy, such
as a carbon tax or cap-and-trade program, if the country
is to achieve the level of reductions that the IPCC says will
be necessary from developed nations to avoid the worst
impacts of climate change.
Desire for alternative climate policies
A price on carbon is both a fiscal and an environmental
policy. In addition to using revenues to “pay for” reductions
in other taxes, as discussed above, some proponents
advocate an economy-wide carbon price as an approach
that is preferable to imposing sectoral emission standards,
while others view such standards as important tools in
their own right or as potentially complementary climate
policies.
Bipartisan support for deficit reduction
While concerns about the national debt have subsided
to some extent in the past few years, reducing long-term
debt remains an issue with significant support from the
general public and lawmakers on both sides of the aisle. A
national carbon tax has the potential to raise hundreds of
billions of dollars per year that could be used to improve
the United States’ long-term fiscal situation.
Experience at the state level
In the absence of a national, economy-wide policy
to reduce GHG emissions, some states have moved
forward with their own carbon-pricing mechanisms.
As discussed above, nine northeastern states operate
a regional electricity sector cap-and-trade program,
and California in 2012 initiated its own economy-wide
cap-and-trade program. As of this writing, stakeholders
in Massachusetts, Oregon, Vermont, and Washington,
among others, are advocating for a carbon tax to raise
revenue for transportation infrastructure or other
purposes. And in response to the flexibility afforded them
under the Clean Power Plan, many states are actively
considering whether carbon pricing offers the least-cost
way of complying with GHG emissions standards for
power plants. Successful implementation of these policies
at the state level could lessen resistance at the federal level
for a similar carbon-pricing policy.
Increased awareness of
climate-related impacts
From sea-level rise in Florida and Virginia, to increases
in the frequency and severity of some types of extreme
weather events, to protracted droughts in Texas and California,
the United States is already seeing previews of what
a warming planet holds in store. As climate impacts hit
home, and their effects begin taking a toll on the economy,
we might see public opinion become increasingly vocal on
the need to act. A climate policy that puts a price on GHG
emissions throughout the economy offers policymakers a
proven, market-based solution to reduce the U.S. contribution
to climate change and to raise revenues that can be
invested in technologies that enable communities to better
adapt to the impacts of climate change.
While none of these factors alone will likely be enough
to move Congress to put a price on carbon in the coming
years, their confluence suggests a gradual mounting
of pressure that could turn the tide. The world and the
American people are increasingly serious about the need
to act to avoid the worst impacts of climate change.151
A
comprehensive carbon-pricing policy provides the opportunity
to satisfy a variety of political goals beyond emissions
reductions. We hope that this working paper—and
future briefing papers that will dive more deeply into
many of the issues raised here—can play a helpful role in
the coming national conversation on these issues.
42 |
COUNTRY
YEAR
IMPLEMENTED
PRICE PER TON CO2
E
PORTION OF GHGS
COVERED (%)
REVENUE USAGE152
Finland 1990 ▪▪ €35 ($48) for
heating fuels
▪▪ €60 ($83) for
liquid traffic fuels
15 ▪▪ Reduce income taxes
▪▪ Increase government revenue
Norway 1991 Nkr25 to 419 ($4-69)
in 2014; depending on
fuel type and usage
50 ▪▪ Increase government revenue
Sweden 1991 Skr1076 ($168) 25 ▪▪ Increase government revenue
▪▪ Offset labor taxes
Denmark 1992 Dkr167 ($31 in 2014) 45 ▪▪ 40 percent used as environmental subsidy
▪▪ 60 percent returned to industry
British
Columbia
2008 C$30 ($28) in
2013/14
70 ▪▪ Designed to be revenue neutral through income
tax reductions and tax credits
▪▪ Revenue negative in practice - tax cuts and credits
have exceeded carbon tax revenue
Switzerland 2008 SFr60 ($68) from
2014
30 ▪▪ Dividend redistributed proportionally to industry
and consumers
▪▪ Fund climate-friendly building renovations
Iceland 2010 Íkr1120 ($10) 50 ▪▪ Increase government revenue
Ireland 2010
(extended to solid
fuels in 2013)
€20 ($28) from May
2014
40 ▪▪ Increase government revenue
▪▪ Reduce the deficit
Japan 2012 ¥192 ($2) from April
2014, increasing to
¥289 ($3) in April
2016
70 ▪▪ Invest in clean energy and energy efficiency
Table A.1 | Carbon taxes around the world
APPENDIX – GLOBAL CARBON PRICING SYSTEMS
WORKING PAPER | April 2015 | 43
Putting a Price on Carbon: A Handbook for U.S. Policymakers
Table A.1 | Carbon taxes around the world (continued)
Source: State and Trends of Carbon Pricing 2014, World Bank, Washington D.C. 2014. Dollar values are based on exchange rates as of December 31, 2013.
Notes: a. Information from Reuters (“Chile becomes the first South American country to tax carbon,” Reuters, September 27, 2014) and Point Carbon (“Chile passes carbon tax,” Point
Carbon,October 30, 2014).
COUNTRY
YEAR
IMPLEMENTED
PRICE PER TON CO2
E
PORTION OF GHGS
COVERED (%)
REVENUE USAGE152
United
Kingdom
2013 ▪▪ EU ETS price floor
of £16 ($26.23)
in 2013
▪▪ Effective tax in
April 2014 of £9.55
($15.75)
25 ▪▪ Reduce other taxes
Mexico 2014 ▪▪ Mex$10-50
($1-4), depending
on fuel
Unclear – initial bill
included natural
gas and would have
covered 40 percent
▪▪ Increase government revenue
France April 1, 2014 ▪▪ €7 ($10)
increasing to €14.5
($20) in 2015 and
€22 ($30) in 2016
Initial coverage:
35 percent
▪▪ Fund energy transition plans
South
Africa
Implementation
planned in 2016
▪▪ R120 ($12) in
2016
▪▪ Increasing by 10
percent per year
through 2019, then
subject to review
▪▪ During 2016-19,
a basic tax-free
threshold will
be established,
making the
maximum effective
tax rate R48 ($5)
80 ▪▪ Likely to be a reduction in VAT or income taxes
Chilea
Goes into effect in
2018
▪▪ $5 per ton
▪▪ No detail on price
increases
no data
▪▪ Educational developments on climate change
▪▪ Education system
Australia Initiated July 2012;
repealed in 2014
▪▪ A$24.15 ($21.54)
from July 2013
60 ▪▪ Revenue neutral: Reduce income tax and provide
dividend to energy producers and consumers
▪▪ Funded industry assistance programs
44 |
Table A.2 | National and Sub-National Greenhouse Gas Cap-and-Trade Programs Around the World
JURISDICTION
YEAR
IMPLEMENTED
EMISSIONS
COVERED (%)
2013
PRICE PER
TON CO2
E
COVERED SECTORS
European Union 2005 45 $9 Industry, electricity, aviation
New Zealand 2008 50 $1 Industry, forestry, transport, waste
Switzerland 2008 10 Electricity, buildings
U.S. Sub-national Programs
▪▪ Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative
(RGGI) – NE United States
2009 20 $3 Electricity
▪▪ California
(linked with Quebec)
2013 85 $11 From 2013: Industry, electricity; added in
2015: transport, distributed use of fuels
Australia
2012;
repealed 2014
60 $21.54
(fixed
price)
All large emission sources, including industry,
large gas consumers, and landfills
Canada Sub-national Program
Quebec
(linked with California)
2013 85 $10 From 2013: Industry, electricity; added in
2015: transport, distributed use of fuels
Chinese Sub-national Pilots
Tianjin 2013 60 $4 Industry, electricity, buildings
Beijing 2013 50 $9 Industry, electricity, buildings
Shanghai 2013 50 $5 Industry, transport, electricity
Guangdong 2013 42 $10 Industry, electricity
Shenzhen 2013 38 $11 Industry, electricity, buildings
Chongqing 2014 38 Electricity
Hubei 2014 35 Industry, electricity
Kazakhstan 2013 50 Industry, transport, electricity, agriculture
South Korea 2015 (planned) 60 Industry, electricity
Source: World Bank, State and Trends of Carbon Pricing 2014, unless otherwise noted.
Notes:
This table does not include Alberta (Canada) or Tokyo, Saitama and Kyoto (Japan), which have initiated trading systems based on emissions intensity.
California’s program went into effect in 2012, but the first year for which covered entities had emissions obligations was 2013.
The portion of emissions covered in California and Quebec reflects the increase in scope at the start of 2015 to include transportation fuels and distributed use of natural gas and other fuels.
Australia’s system, which has now been repealed, was initiated with a fixed price and was therefore, in its initial stages, a carbon tax.
WORKING PAPER | April 2015 | 45
Putting a Price on Carbon: A Handbook for U.S. Policymakers
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ENDNOTES
1.	 Horvitz, P.F. June 9, 1993. “Clinton Retreats on Energy Tax in Fight
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2.	 Conniff, R. August 2009. “The Political History of Cap and Trade.”
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political-history-of-cap-and-trade-34711212/?page=2
3.	 World Bank. May 28, 2014. State and Trends of Carbon Pricing 2014.
Washington, D.C.: World Bank.
4.	 Ontario Office of the Premier, “Statement of Intent Between the
Government of Ontario and the Gouvernement Du Québec Concerning
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the-government-of-ontario-and-the-gouvernement-du-quebec-
concerning-coop.html
5.	 Interagency Working Group on Social Cost of Carbon, United States
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Social Cost of Carbon for Regulatory Impact Analysis Under Executive
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whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/inforeg/technical-update-
social-cost-of-carbon-for-regulator-impact-analysis.pdf
6.	 The University of Chicago Booth School of Business. December
4, 2012. Carbon Taxes II. Chicago: IGM Economic Experts Panel.
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7.	 See, for example: Bento, A. and M. Jacobsen. 2007. “Ricardian Rents,
Environmental Policy, and the “Double Dividend” Hypothesis.” Journal
of Environmental Economics and Management 53(1): 17–31.
8.	 Carbone, J.C., R.D. Morganstern, R.C. Williams III, and D. Burtraw.
August, 2013. “Deficit Reduction and Carbon Taxes: Budgetary,
Economic, and Distributional Impacts.” Washington, D.C.: Resources
for the Future. Available at: http://www.weathervane.rff.org/RFF/
Documents/RFF-Rpt-Carbone.etal.CarbonTaxes.pdf
9.	 Mathur, A. and A. Morris. 2012. “Distributional Effects of a Carbon
Tax in Broader U.S. Fiscal Reform.” Washington, D.C.: The Brookings
Institution. Available at: http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/
files/papers/2012/12/14%20carbon%20tax%20fiscal%20reform%20
morris/14%20carbon%20tax%20fiscal%20reform%20morris.pdf
10.	 See, for example, Morris, A. and A. Mathur. “A Carbon Tax in
Broader U.S. Fiscal Reform: Design and Distributional Issues.” 2014.
Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution. Available at: http://www.
brookings.edu/research/papers/2014/05/22-carbon-tax-in-broader-usfiscal-reform-morris
Additional studies are discussed in Section 5 of
this paper.
11.	 Environmental Protection Agency. December 2, 2009. “The Effects of
H.R. 2454 on International Competitiveness and Emission Leakage
in Energy-Intensive Trade-Exposed Industries.” Washington, DC:
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12.	 Shultz, George P. March 13, 2015. “A Reagan Approach to
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html
13.	 Paulson, Henry M. June 21, 2014. “The Coming Climate Crash:
Lessons for Climate Change in the 2008 Recession.” The New York
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reagan-model-on-climate-change/2015/03/13/4f4182e2-c6a8-11e4-
b2a1-bed1aaea2816_story.html
14.	 See http://republicen.org/
15.	 See, for example, Mankiw, N. Gregory. “Smart Taxes: An Open
Invitation to Join the Pigou Club.” Eastern Economic Journal 35, 14-23
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smart_taxes.pdf
16.	 See, for example, Wolf, Amy. February 20, 2012. “Economist Arthur
Laffer Proposes Taxing Pollution Instead of Income.” Vanderbilt News.
Also available at: http://news.vanderbilt.edu/2012/02/economist-
arthur-laffer-proposes-taxing-pollution/
17.	 See, for example, Green, Kenneth P., Hayward, Steven F., and Kevin
A. Hassett. “Climate Change: Caps vs. Taxes.” American Enterprise
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uploads/2011/10/20070601_EPOg.pdf
18.	 See “Considering a U.S. Carbon Tax,” Resources for the Future,
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climate_economics/Pages/Considering-a-US-Carbon-Tax.aspx
19.	 See, for example, Morris, Adele C. and Aparna Mathur. May 2014. “A
Carbon Tax in Broader U.S. Fiscal Reform: Design and Distributional
Issues.” Washington, DC: Center for Climate and Energy Solutions.
Available at: http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2014/05/22-
carbon-tax-in-broader-us-fiscal-reform-morris
20.	 See, for example, “Idea of the Day: We Should Have a Progressive
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WORKING PAPER | April 2015 | 49
Putting a Price on Carbon: A Handbook for U.S. Policymakers
24.	 For example, coal-fired power plants emit pollutants into the air and
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25.	 For a more complete discussion comparing carbon taxes to cap-andtrade
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90.	 Sumner, J., L. Bird, and H. Smith. December, 2009. “Carbon Taxes: A
Review of Experience and Policy Design Considerations.” Golden, CO:
National Renewable Energy Laboratory. Available at: http://www.nrel.
gov/docs/fy10osti/47312.pdf
91.	 “Global Market Share of the World’s Leading Wind Turbine
Manufacturers in 2013, Based on Sales in Gigawatts,” Statista,
accessed April 13, 2015, http://www.statista.com/statistics/272813/
market-share-of-the-leading-wind-turbine-manufacturers-worldwide/.
92.	 “Wind Turbines Reached Record Level in 2014,” Energinet.dk, January
20, 2015, http://energinet.dk/EN/El/Nyheder/Sider/Vindmoeller-slog-
rekord-i-2014.aspx.
93.	 Caperton, R. 2012. “A Progressive Carbon Tax Will Fight Climate
Change and Stimulate the Economy.” Center for American Progress,
December 6, 2012. Available at: http://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/12/CAPERTONCarbonTax.pdf.
52 |
94.	 For more information on the Green Climate Fund, see: http://unfccc.int/
cooperation_and_support/financial_mechanism/green_climate_fund/
items/5869.php and http://news.gcfund.org/
95.	 The World Bank. 2010. “Economics of Adaptation to Climate
Change, Synthesis Report.” January. Washington, D.C.: The World
Bank. Available at: http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/
en/2010/01/16436675/economics-adaptation-climate-change-
synthesis-report
96.	 Sussman, F., N. Krishnan, K. Maher, R. Miller, C. Mack, P. Stewart, K.
Shouse, and W. Perkins. “Climate Change Adaptation Cost in the U.S.:
What Do We Know?” Climate Policy, Vol. 14, No. 2: 242-282. Available
at: http://www.tandfonline.com/action/showCitFormats?doi=10.1080%
2F14693062.2013.777604&
97.	 http://www.bmub.bund.de/en/topics/climate-energy/climate-initiative/
general-information/
98.	 http://www.rggi.org/docs/Documents/2012-Investment-Report.pdf
99.	 OECD (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development).
2010. “Taxation, Innovation and the Environment.” Executive
Summary. Paris: OECD. Available at: http://www.oecd.org/env/tools-
evaluation/46177075.pdf.
100.	The IPCC estimates that, in order to keep warming to two degrees
Celsius, global emissions must be approximately 80-95 percent below
2000 levels by 2050, though reductions would likely need to be even
greater in developed countries. Global emissions of CO2
would need to
be net zero by 2070, and all greenhouse gases would need to be phased
out by 2100. For more information, see: https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/
assessment-report/ar5/wg3/ipcc_wg3_ar5_chapter6.pdf
101.	See, for example: Jesse Jenkins. July 28, 2014. “When Politics
Constrains Carbon Pricing, Part 3: Why Carbon Revenues Are Just
As Important As ‘Putting a Price on Carbon.’” The Energy Collective.
Available at: http://theenergycollective.com/jessejenkins/444186/when-
politics-constraints-carbon-pricing-part-3-why-carbon-revenues-are-
just-imp.
102.	For example, federal support for new drilling techniques helped pave
the way for the U.S. shale gas boom in recent years. See Box 1.1 of
Bianco, N. et al. 2014. “Seeing is Believing: Creating a New Climate
Economy in the United States.” Working Paper. Washington, D.C.:
World Resources Institute. Available at: http://www.wri.org/publication/
new-climate-economy.
103.	The Global Commission on the Economy and Climate, Better Growth,
Better Climate, Executive Summary. Available at: http://static.
newclimateeconomy.report/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/NCE_
ExecutiveSummary.pdf
104.	Bianco, N. et al. 2014. “Seeing is Believing: Creating a New Climate
Economy in the United States.” Working Paper. Washington, D.C.:
World Resources Institute. Available at: http://www.wri.org/publication/
new-climate-economy
105.	See: Acemoglu, D. et al. and Fischer, C. et al.
106.	Amdur, D., B. Rabe and C. Borlick. “Public Views on a Carbon Tax
Depend on the Proposed Use of Revenue.” CLOSUP (Center for Local,
State and Urban Policy), University of Michigan. July 2014. http://
closup.umich.edu/files/ieep-nsee-2014-spring-carbon-tax.pdf
107.	Center on Budget and Policy Priorities. May 12, 2008. “Climate
Change Policies Can Treat Low-Income Families Fairly and Be Fiscally
Responsible.” Available at: http://www.cbpp.org/files/climate-brochure.
pdf
108.	Pew Center on Global Climate Change. August, 2009. “Distribution
of Allowances Under the American Clean Energy and Security Act
(Waxman-Markey).” Pew Center, Washington, D.C. Available at: http://
www.c2es.org/docUploads/policy-memo-allowance-distribution-under-
waxman-markey.pdf
109.	Horowitz, C., M.R. Enion, S.B. Hecht and A. Carlson. “Spending
California’s Cap-and-Trade Auction Revenue: Understanding the
Sinclair Paint Risk Spectrum.” Emmitt Center on Climate Change
and the Environment, UCLA School of Law. March 2012. http://law.
ucla.edu/~/media/Files/UCLA/Law/Pages/Publications/CEN_EMM_
PUB%20Spending_CA_Cap_Trade_Revenue.ashx
110.	For more information, see: http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/
auctionproceeds/budgetappropriations.htm
111.	Parry, I., and R. Williams III. 2011. “Moving U.S. Climate Policy
Forward: Are Carbon Taxes the Only Good Alternative?” Washington,
D.C.: Resources for the Future. Available at: http://www.rff.org/RFF/
Documents/RFF-DP-11-02.pdf
112.	Goulder, L.H. and M.A. C. Hafstead. October 8, 2013. “Tax Reform and
Environmental Policy: Options for Recycling Revenue from a Tax on
Carbon Dioxide”. Washington, D.C.: Resources for the Future. Available
at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=233821
113.	Regional Economic Models, Inc. and Synapse Energy Economics,
Inc. 2014. “The Economic, Climate, Fiscal, Power, and Demographic
Impact of a National Fee-and-Dividend Carbon Tax.” Available at:
http://dv7gcmvxe5e8l.cloudfront.net/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/
The-Economic-Climate-Fiscal-Power-and-Demographic-Impact-of-a-
National-Fee-and-Dividend-Carbon-Tax-6.9.14.pdf
114.	Carbone, J.C., R.D. Morganstern, R.C. Williams III, and D. Burtraw.
August, 2013. “Deficit Reduction and Carbon Taxes: Budgetary,
Economic, and Distributional Impacts.” Washington, D.C.: Resources
for the Future. Available at: http://www.weathervane.rff.org/RFF/
Documents/RFF-Rpt-Carbone.etal.CarbonTaxes.pdf
115.	McKibbin, W.J., A. Morris, P.J. Wilcoxen, and Y. Cai. July 24, 2012.
“The Potential Role of a Carbon Tax in U.S. Fiscal Reform.” Climate
and Energy Economics Discussion Paper. Washington, D.C.: Brookings
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116.	Eisenberg, S., M. Wara, A. Morris, M. Darby, and J. Minor. 2014. “A
State Tax Approach to Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under the
Clean Air Act.” Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution. Available
at: http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2014/05/22-state-tax-
regulating-greenhouse-gas-clean-air-act-morris
WORKING PAPER | April 2015 | 53
Putting a Price on Carbon: A Handbook for U.S. Policymakers
117.	CBO (Congressional Budget Office). 2013.
118.	CBO (Congressional Budget Office). May, 2010. “How Policies to
Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions Could Affect Employment.”
Washington, D.C.: CBO, Available at: http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/
files/05-05-capandtrade_brief.pdf
119.	Ibid. According to CBO, “The length of time required for [the economy
to return to full employment] would depend on a number of factors.
One would be the ability of firms and workers to foresee and act quickly
on the changes in prices and to implement the changes that would be
required in their output, training, and other activities. Another factor
would be the extent to which shrinking industries are concentrated
in small communities in which other opportunities for employment
are limited, requiring laid-off workers to relocate in order to find
new employment. The U.S. economy has adjusted fairly quickly to
past changes in the economic environment, including the changes
brought about by the rapid development of computer and information
technologies, which destroyed many jobs but created many others, and
the increase in international trade, which shifted many manufacturing
jobs out of the country but probably contributed to the growth of
service jobs.”
120.	Chateau et al., 2011.
121.	Rausch, S., and J. Reilly. August, 2012. “Carbon Tax Revenue and the
Budget Deficit: A Win-Win-Win Solution?” MIT Joint Program on the
Science and Policy of Global Change. August 2012. Cambridge, MA:
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Available at: http://18.7.29.232/
bitstream/handle/1721.1/72548/MITJPSPGC_Rpt228.pdf?sequence=1
122.	For more information on the decline of coal-reliant communities in
recent decades, see: http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/
wp/2013/11/04/heres-why-central-appalachias-coal-industry-is-dying/
123.	See, for example: Dower, R. and M.B. Zimmerman. 1992. “The Right
Climate for Carbon Taxes: Creating Economic Incentives to Protect the
Atmosphere.” Washington, D.C.: World Resources Institute. Available at:
http://www.wri.org/sites/default/files/pdf/rightclimateforcarbontaxes_
bw.pdf. Dower and Zimmerman find that poorer households spend as
much as five times as much on energy as do richer households, when
measured as a percentage of income
124.	CBO (Congressional Budget Office). May 2013. “Effects of a Carbon
Tax on the Economy and the Environment.” Washington, D.C.: Available
at: http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/44223_Carbon_0.pdf
125.	Marron, D. and E. Toder. February, 2013. “Carbon Taxes and Corporate
Tax Reform.” Washington, D.C.: Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center.
Available at: http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/412744-
Carbon-Taxes-and-Corporate-Tax-Reform.pdf
126.	Mathur, A. and A. Morris. 2012. “Distributional Effects of a Carbon
Tax in Broader U.S. Fiscal Reform.” Washington, D.C.: The Brookings
Institution. Available at: http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/
files/papers/2012/12/14%20carbon%20tax%20fiscal%20reform%20
morris/14%20carbon%20tax%20fiscal%20reform%20morris.pdf
127.	Williams III, R., H. Gordon, D. Burtraw, J. Carbone, and R. Morgenstern.
August, 2014. “The Initial Incidence of a Carbon Tax Across Income
Groups.” Washington, D.C.: Resources for the Future. Available at:
http://www.rff.org/RFF/Documents/RFF-DP-14-24.pdf
128.	Eisenberg et al., 2014.
129.	Metcalf, G. 2009. “Designing a Carbon Tax to Reduce U.S. Greenhouse
Gas Emissions.” Review of Environmental Economics and Policy,
Vol. 3, Iss. 1, Winter. Available at: http://reep.oxfordjournals.org/
content/3/1/63.full.pdf+html
130.	Morris, A. and A. Mathur. 2014. “A Carbon Tax in Broader U.S. Fiscal
Reform: Design and Distributional Issues.” Washington, D.C.: The
Brookings Institution. Available at: http://www.brookings.edu/research/
papers/2014/05/22-carbon-tax-in-broader-us-fiscal-reform-morris
131.	Rosenbaum, D., S. Parrott, and C. Stone. October, 2009. “How LowIncome
Consumers Fare in the House Climate Bill.” Washington, D.C.:
Center on Budget and Policy Priorities. Available at: http://www.cbpp.
org/files/7-8-09climate.pdf
132.	U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration.
“State and Urbanized Area Statistics.” Available at: http://www.fhwa.dot.
gov/ohim/onh00/onh2p11.htm Accessed on December 11, 2014.
133.	U.S. Energy Information Administration. “Electricity: Detailed State
Data.” Available at: http://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/state/ Accessed
on December 11, 2014.
134.	U.S. Energy Information Administration. “Household heating fuels vary
across the country.” Available at: http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/
detail.cfm?id=3690. Accessed on December 11, 2014.
135.	CBO, 2013.
136.	Pew Center, 2009. Available at: http://www.c2es.org/docUploads/
policy-memo-allowance-distribution-under-waxman-markey.pdf
137.	Morris and Mathur, 2014.
138.	Hassett, K., A. Mathur, and G. Metcalf. 2009. “The Incidence of a U.S.
Carbon Tax: A Lifetime and Regional Analysis.” The Energy Journal.
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php?pdfid=346
139.	Williams III, R., H. Gordon, D. Burtraw, J. Carbone ,and R. Morganstern.
October, 2014. “The Initial Incidence of a Carbon Tax Across U.S.
States.” Washington, D.C.: Resources for the Future. Discussion Paper.
Available at: http://www.rff.org/RFF/Documents/RFF-DP-14-25.pdf
140.	For example, in 2012, the United States consumed 3.8 billion
megawatt-hours of electricity. Of that total, less than 60 million
megawatt-hours were imported from Canada or Mexico. See: http://
www.eia.gov/electricity/annual/html/epa_02_02.html and http://www.
eia.gov/electricity/annual/html/epa_02_13.html
141.	EPA (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency). December 2, 2009. “The
Effects of H.R. 2454 on International Competitiveness and Emission
Leakage in Energy-Intensive Trade-Exposed Industries.” Washington,
D.C.: EPA. Available at: http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/Downloads/
EPAactivities/InteragencyReport_Competitiveness-EmissionLeakage.pdf
142.	Metcalf, G.E. 2010. “Submission on the Use of Carbon Fees to
Achieve Fiscal Sustainability in the Federal Budget.” Submission
to Commission. Available at: http://works.bepress.com/gilbert_
metcalf/86
54 |
143.	See: “WTO Signals Backing for Border Taxes.” Financial Times, June
25, 2009. Available at: http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/1be7d034-61b6-
11de-9e03-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3Vaj4M5MQ
144.	For GATT rules, see: http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/
gatt47_e.pdf
145.	See, for example: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=2026879 and http://www.gmfus.org/wp-content/blogs.dir/1/
files_mf/1374767060Hillman_CarbonTaxes_Jun13_web.pdf For
an alternate viewpoint, see: http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/
events/2008/6/09%20climate%20trade/2008_bordoff.pdf. For a
summary of challenges to WTO compliance, see http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2163203
146.	See Holzer et al.
147.	For a discussion of the challenges surrounding how to determine the
carbon content of imported goods, see: http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2008/
cph_trade_climate_carbon.pdf
148.	Gravelle, J. January 6, 2014. “International Corporate Tax Rate
Comparisons and Policy Implications.” Washington, D.C.:
Congressional Research Service. Available at https://www.fas.org/sgp/
crs/misc/R41743.pdf
149.	See: http://www.finance.senate.gov/issue/?id=8b4a11ec-b93f-43bd-
8f72-fbc4f4768989
150.	Bianco, N. et al. 2013. For the United States’ commitment to reduce its
emissions by 83 percent below 2005 levels by 2050, see: “United States
Submission to the Copenhagen Accord, Appendix 1,” United States
Department of State, January 28, 2010, http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/
cop_15/copenhagen_accord/application/pdf/unitedstatescphaccord_
app.1.pdf
151.	See, for example: Coral Davenport and Marjorie Connelly. January 30,
2015. “Most Republicans Say They Back Climate Action, Poll Finds.”
The New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/31/us/politics/
most-americans-support-government-action-on-climate-change-poll-
finds.html?_r=0
152.	Source: Sumner et al., 2009.
WORKING PAPER | April 2015 | 55
Putting a Price on Carbon: A Handbook for U.S. Policymakers
ABOUT WRI
World Resources Institute is a global research organization that turns big
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ABOUT THE AUTHORS
Kevin Kennedy is deputy director of the U.S. Climate Initiative in the Global
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the California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, including development
of California’s cap-and-trade program and the range of other measures the
state is using to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
Contact: kkennedy@wri.org
Michael Obeiter is a Senior Associate in WRI’s Global Climate Program. As
a member of the U.S. Climate Initiative, he works to advance climate and clean
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Contact: mobeiter@wri.org
Noah Kaufman is an economist for the U.S. Climate Initiative in the Global
Climate Program. The focus of his work is on carbon pricing and other
market-based climate change solutions. Noah also works on projects related
to the economic impacts of climate change and assists WRI’s Economics
Team with its work across the organization. Prior to joining WRI, Noah worked
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The authors would like to thank the following individuals for their valuable
insights and critical reviews of this work: Bradley Abelow, Sam Adams, Juan
Carlos Altamirano, David Bailey, Christina DeConcini, Greg Dotson, Craig
Hanson, Karl Hausker, Dave Hawkins, Bob Inglis, David Jenkins, Nat Keohane,
Tom Kerr, Noah Kirsch, Ray Kopp, John Larsen, Eli Lehrer, Kelly Levin,
Larry Linden, Aparna Mathur, Michael McCormick, Eliot Metzger, Jennifer
Morgan, Helen Mountford, Derek Murrow, Alex Perera, Kevin Rennert, Danny
Richter, Roger Ullman, Laura Malaguzzi Valeri, and Gernot Wagner.
The authors would also like to thank Emily Matthews for copyediting and
proofreading. In addition, we thank Carni Klirs, Julie Moretti, and Hyacinth
Billings for publication layout and design. Funding for this project was provided
by the Linden Trust for Conservation. While our reviewers were very
generous with their time and advice, this working paper represents the views
of the authors alone.