The Process of Israeli Decision Making: Mechanisms, Forces and
Influences
By Karim El-Gendy
First published in 2010 by:
Al-Zaytouna Centre for Studies and Consultations
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Al-ZaytounaCentreforStudies&Consultations,Beirut,Lebanon
THE PROCESS OF ISRAELI
DECISION MAKING
M E C H A N I S M S, F O R C E S, A N D I N F L U E N C E S
By
Karim El-Gendy
Al-ZaytounaCentreforStudies&Consultations,Beirut,Lebanon
The Process of Israeli Decision Making __________________________________________________ 3
Table of Contents
Table of Contents ………………………………………………………… 3
I. Introduction ……………………………………………………… 6
II. The "Constitutional" Mechanism ……………………………… 13
1. The Knesset: …………………………………………………… 14
1.1. The Knesset’s composition ……………………………………. 14
1.2. The Knesset’s powers and functions …………………………... 16
2. The Cabinet: ………………………………………………….. 17
2.1. The Cabinet’s composition …………………………………... 17
2.2. The Cabinet’s powers and functions ………………………….. 18
3. The relationship between the Cabinet and the Knesset ………... 20
4. The Foreign Ministry Staff …………………………………….. 22
III. Forces and Processes within the Political System …………… 25
1. Coalition politics: …………………………………………… 26
1.1. Proportional representation, coalition politics, and the Cabinet 26
1.2. Coalition Politics and decision making ……………………….. 30
2. Parties, ideologies, and programmes: ……………………….… 32
2.1. Background on social structures and ideologies …………….. 32
2.2. Political ideologies ……………………………………………… 34
2.3. Internal party politics …………………………………………. 45
2.4. Political programs ……………………………………………… 46
3. The role of the Prime Minister and top leadership and the
personification of power: ………………………………………… 47
3.1. The role of the Prime Minister ………………………………… 47
3.2. Limitations to the power of the Prime Minister ……………… 48
3.3. Personification of top leadership ……………………………… 49
3.4. Cabinet politicization, improvisation, and decision making … 51
IV. External Influencing Factors …………………………………… 60
1. The influence of the military and security establishment on decision
making: …………………………………………………………… 61
1.1. The security concern and the military doctrine: …………….… 61
1.1.1. Operational principles of military doctrine …….………. 62
1.1.2. Psychological principles of military doctrine ………….… 63
1.1.3. Changes to military doctrine …………………………… 65
1.1.4. Changes to the military service ………………………… 66
1.1.5. The security concern and decision-making …………….. 68
Al-ZaytounaCentreforStudies&Consultations,Beirut,Lebanon
4 _____________________________________________________________________ Table of Contents
1.2. The status of the military and security establishment within the mm
society …………………………………………………………………. 69
1.3. The chain of command and the structure of the military and security
establishments: ……………………………………………………….. 70
1.3.1 The military forces ………………………………………. 70
1.3.2 The security forces ………………………………………. 72
1.4. The size of the military and its impact on economy and the society 78
1.5. The development of the Military-Industrial complex ………….. 81
1.6 The Military-Industrial complex’s relation to the political
establishment and decision making …………………………………. 84
2. The role of consultants and think tanks and its influence on decision
making: …………………………………………………………… 93
2.1. Official consultants ……………………………………………… 93
2.2. Independent consultants and advisors: ……………………….. 94
2.2.1. Advisors and aides ……………………………………… 95
2.2.2. Consultants and think tanks …………………………….. 96
3. The Influence of interest groups on decision making: ….……… 104
3.1. The Influence of the Haredim: …………………………………. 106
3.1.1. Background on the Israeli religious spectrum ………….. 106
3.1.2. Background on the Haredim ……………………………. 108
3.1.3. Power structures of the Haredim ………………………. 110
3.1.4. Influence of the Haredim ………………………………. 113
3.2. The influence of the Religious National Movement and Gush nnnnnn
Emunim: ……………………………………………………………… 118
3.2.1. Background on the Datim Le’umim, the National Religious mm
Party (Mafdal), Gush Emunim, and the Yesha Council ………. 118
3.2.2. The Dati Le’umi Messianic Ideology …………………… 122
3.2.3. The significance and structure of the Yesha Council …... 126
3.2.4. The influence of the Yesha Council and Gush Emunim: … 128
3.2.4.1 Political influence ………………………………. 131
3.2.4.2 Military influence ……………………………… 132
3.2.4.3 Ideological influence …………………………… 134
3.2.5. Challenges for Gush Emunim …………………………… 135
3.3. The Histadrut labour union ………….…………………………. 137
4. The relationship with the Unites States and its impact on decision
making: …………………………………………………………… 138
4.1. Background ……………………………………………………… 138
4.2. Impact on decision making ……………………………………… 144
5. Relationship with Jewish communities outside of Israel and its impact
on decision making: ……………………………………………… 150
5.1. The Jewish community’s structure and the Israel lobby ……. 150
5.2. Jewish communities and Israel: The formal mechanism ……. 153
5.3. Jewish communities and Israel: A one way or two way bbbbbbbbbb
relationship?: ………………………………………………………… 155
5.3.1. Alternative interpretations: ………………………….. 155
5.3.2. Historical survey of relationship ……………………….. 156
5.3.3. Challenges to Israeli- Diaspora relations ……………… 157
Al-ZaytounaCentreforStudies&Consultations,Beirut,Lebanon
The Process of Israeli Decision Making __________________________________________________ 5
5.3.4. Israeli positions regarding the Diaspora and its influence on
decision making ……………………………………………… 159
V. Decision Making in the Cabinet: A Case Study ……………… 175
VI. Conclusion and the Decision Making Characteristics ……… 180
1. Pragmatism vs. ideology ……………………………………… 181
2. Strengths and Weaknesses: …………………………………… 183
2.1. The mechanism’s weaknesses ……………………………….. 183
2.1.1 The domination of a short-term perspective ..………… 183
2.1.2 The politicization of the decision making mechanism ..… 184
2.1.3 The deterioration of governmental capabilities ……….. 184
2.1.4 The lack of an institutional decision making mechanism .. 185
2.1.5 The dominance of the military-industrial complex ……. 185
2.1.6 The static nature of the political elite …………………. 185
2.1.7 Reliance on past experiences in times of crises: ……….. 186
2.1.8 The limited approach to problems …………………….. 186
2.2 The mechanism’s strengths …………………………………… 186
2.2.1 Common values …………………………………………… 186
2.2.2 Small tightly knit establishment ..……………………... 187
2.2.3 Ease of communication ………………………….……. 187
2.2.4 Rapidity and flexibility ………………………………… 187
2.2.5 Dynamic and pragmatic decision making on national security nn
issues ………………………………………………………… 187
2.2.6 The strong political-military relations ………………… 187
2.2.7 Transparency …………………………………………… 187
2.2.8 Responding to a complex environment under stress …… 188
2.2.9 Consultation ……………………………………………. 188
2.2.10 Democracy ……………………………………………. 188
2.2.11 Operational professional excellence ………………….. 188
2.2.12 Motivation and quality people ………………………… 188
VII. Bibliography …………………………………………………… 190
InCitations,PleaseUse:
El-Gendy,Karim,TheProcessofIsraeliDecision-Making:Mechanisms,
ForcesandInfluences(Beirut:Al-ZaytounaCentreforStudiesand
Consultations,2010)
I. Introduction
Al-ZaytounaCentreforStudies&Consultations,Beirut,Lebanon
The Process of Israeli Decision Making _________________________________________________ 7
I. Introduction
Israel has no foreign policy, only domestic policy - Henry Kessinger.1
According to its own declaration of independence, Israel is a Jewish and democratic
state, and according to the Israeli Law, it is a parliamentary democracy where its decisions
are theoretically made based on regulations that maintain the separation of powers of the
various institutions involved in decision making. But in reality, however, the decision making
mechanism in Israel is a complicated, highly personified, highly politicized, fluid, and
informal process, with no clear overall authority. It is influenced by the motives of the
different power centers within the political establishment and by factors and processes
relating to the nature of the establishment itself. It is also influenced by the powerful
institutions and individuals outside of the formal decision making political establishment, but
who directly or indirectly influence it. Israeli decision making is also influenced by Israel’s
complicated external environment. The balance between these different domestic and
external actors is what eventually determines the policy chosen, and it varies depending on
the nature, context, and scope of the issue at hand as well as on the timing of the decision.
Following the 1967 and 1973 war a number of academic studies and books have been
written on the decision making process in Israel at the times of crisis. These books examined
the details of how decisions have been made in some or all of the crises that faced Israeli
decision makers in 1948, 1967, and 1973. The prime concern in these studies was the
examination of the rationality of the decision making process in making choices in each crisis
that take gains and consequences into consideration seems. These studies also focused on
how the dynamics of political positions influenced the decision making process in an attempt
to learn from past mistakes and to improve the decision making mechanism especially at the
times of crises and under stress.
Another body of literature that emerged on Israeli policy around the same time has
been aimed at explaining the nature of all or parts of the Israel’s complex political and social
system, often focusing on breaking down the different Israeli institutions or societal groups.
However, while this body of literature was mostly concerned with explaining the complexity
of the ever changing societal and political mosaic of the Israeli society, it occasionally
discussed the implications of domestic influences on foreign policy but rarely engaged the
decision making process.
Al-ZaytounaCentreforStudies&Consultations,Beirut,Lebanon
8 ______________________________________________________________________ I. Introduction
In the last few years, interest in Israeli decision making was again renewed especially
following the 2006 war against Lebanon. This interest stemmed from the argument that
failures within the Israeli decision making process lead to the war failures. The new academic
interest was mostly focused on the failures of the decision making process, identifying
imbalances and suggesting remedial measures. Like the initial body of work, this one also
focuses on decision making during crises.
It could be argued here that this continuous interest by scholars and researchers in
Israeli decision making process, albeit often expressed following major events or crises, is a
result of a more chronic concern over the effectiveness of the often-faulty process. This
chronic concern has been expressed by many Israelis over the years. Criticism of the decision
making process has been sounded by scholars such as Yehuda Ben Meir, who states that at
that the summit of Israel’s decision making “it has, in effect, no organized and systematic
decision making process at all.”
In addition, many Israelis involved in decision making , including both military and
civilian personnel, have expressed similar concerns. For example, Abba Eban, who for many
years was Israel’s Foreign Minister and in the chairman of the Knesset’s Foreign Affairs and
Defense Committee, characterised Israel’s approach to decision making as “Amateurish,
based on improvisation, and lacking institutionalisation.”
Similarly, Shlomo Gazit, A former director of military intelligence, a former
coordinator of activities in the occupied territories, also described most of the decisions
which result from the Israeli decision making process as “irresponsible, haphazard, not
thought out and not based on any examination and evaluation of alternatives.” He also adds
that “it was only by chance” that good or correct decisions were arrived at. He also states
categorically that he cannot think of any single decision that was the result of coherent
thinking and evaluation arrived at after thorough study and analysis of all options,
possibilities, advantages, disadvantages, and the recommended course of action.
Aharon Yariv, also a former director of Military intelligence and a former cabinet
minister, has also described the Israeli decision making process as lacking some high level
echelon that “can look at the issues and at the recommendations with an overall
comprehensive view.” He wrote of Israel’s process of development of an overall strategy as
the “most conspicuous weakness in the Israeli government system.”
Meir Amit, a former director of the Mossad and the Military Intelligence has also
stated that “In Israel there is no systematic decision making process in any area;… from
Al-ZaytounaCentreforStudies&Consultations,Beirut,Lebanon
The Process of Israeli Decision Making _________________________________________________ 9
economic and social issues to national security there is no orderly process, everything is
pulled from a hat… we are in a country that runs itself, instead of being run.”
Likewise, Mordechai Gazit, who served as a director general both of the Prime
Minister’s Office and of the Foreign Ministry, has stated that “there is no institutionalisation
of the decision making process and it differs from case to case and from individual to
individual.” He also stressed that there has never been a clear and formal division of
responsibility and authority among the various functionaries in the Prime Minister’s Office,
and it was not clear who does what. Eliyahu Ben Elissar, who served as director general of
the Prime Minister’s Office during Manachem Begin’s first government, also states flatly
that in Israel “there is no such thing as policy planning- not long rage, nor short range, nor
medium range” 2
In light of the above statements and the existing literature on the subject, this study
represents an attempt to understand the current Israeli decision making process and to bridge
the literature gap by relating domestic factors with decision making and foreign policy. It
attempts to explain how elements and forces within the labyrinth of the Israeli society exert
influence on the decision making mechanism and on how foreign policy and national security
decisions are made. It will focus on political framework backgrounds, domestic and external
factors, as well as the main players through which policy is made.
This study would also attempt to avoid focusing its attention solely on decision
making in crisis situations as in the case of most earlier studies on the decision making
process in Israel. By doing so, it is hoped that a clearer picture of the decision making process
can be drawn, and a better identification of elements unique to the Israeli case together with
strengths and weaknesses can be made.
But while this study attempts to take holistic approach to the decision making process,
major events feature prominently in it simply because crises are often associated with
complex decision making mechanisms and high level officials which are the focus of this
study.3
This study aims to discuss the Israeli decision making process from three different
view points. The decision makers and the formal relationship between them, the structural
forces and influences inherent in the decision making mechanism, and the external factors
that influence the decision making process.
After this introduction, the second chapter of this study examines the first issue. It
addresses the theoretical mechanism and framework of the political establishment focusing
Al-ZaytounaCentreforStudies&Consultations,Beirut,Lebanon
10 ______________________________________________________________________ I. Introduction
on the two main players in Israeli decision making, the Cabinet and the Knesset, and the
interactions between them as stipulated by Israeli law and in practice. After explaining their
structures and the powers given to each of the two by Israeli Basic Laws, it argues that the
relationship between the Knesset and the Cabinet is a dynamic relationship whose center of
gravity has been recently moving towards the Cabinet.
In the third chapter, this study will discuss the internal forces and processes which
alter the formal relationships and balances between the major players and influences the way
they operate. These forces include the impact of the use of proportional representation in
Israeli general elections, the mechanisms, constraints, and development of coalition politics
and how they influence decision making. They also include the different ideologies and
programs of political parties. Finally they include the expanding role of the Prime Minister
and the impact of the personification of power of Israeli leadership.This study argues that
these three structural relationships within the decision making elite have led to a weakened
Knesset, and to the failure of the cabinet as a decision making forum . These two factors have
led to a culture of improvisation, and to the emergence of alternative forums led by the Prime
Minister.
In chapter four, this study expands on a number of external forces, or forces external
to the decision making process that are powerful enough to influence it. It discusses the
influence of five forces; the military, the advisors, two religious groups, the relationship with
the United States, and the relationship with the Jewish Diaspora.
The discussion of the Military influence starts with the security concern and the
origins of the military doctrine. After describing the size and structure of the military it then
attempts to explain how it managed to become such a major player in Israeli politics. This
section argues that in light of the weak civilian leadership and a weak decision making, the
military has used many of the tools it has in its disposal to fill the leadership vacuum.
Considerable attention was given in this section to the civil military relations in Israel and
how the military industrial complex has played a part in that.
The second section of this chapter discusses the role of consultants, advisors, and
think tanks as an external player in the decision making process. The role of different Israeli
think tanks is discussed including military consultants, civilian consultants and advisors, and
independent think tanks. This section also provides a short description of all Israeli think
tanks. It argues that advisors play a major role to decision makers not just in making policy
but also for domestic political purposes.
Al-ZaytounaCentreforStudies&Consultations,Beirut,Lebanon
The Process of Israeli Decision Making _________________________________________________ 11
The third section of this chapter focuses on the influence of political and interest
groups. It focuses primarily on the influence of the two main religious groups in Israel, the
Haredim (often referred to in English as the Ultra-orthodox) and the Datim Le’umim (known
in English as the religious Zionist). The purpose of this section is not just to demystify the
religious population in Israel or to explain the nature of the religious mosaic in Israel,although
these were intended -but to discuss the different roles played by each group and how
they shape Israeli policy politically and ideologically.
This chapter would then deal with the nature of Israel’s relationship with the United
States and how it influences Israeli decision making process. This section would first discuss
the formal relationship between the two countries, surveying the scholarly discourse over the
nature of the relationship. It argues that the client state model fails to explain Israeli
behaviour towards the United States, and presents an alternative interpretation of Israeli
decision making based on the different attitudes of Israeli leaders towards their main
benefactors and ally, the United States.
Finally this chapter would discuss the relationship between Israel and the Jewish
communities outside of Israel, explaining the differences between the Jewish Community and
the Israel Lobby in the United States, and explaining the nature and development of the
Israel-Diaspora relations as well as the formal mechanisms of the relationship between the
two. This section concludes with an analysis of the influence of this relationship on Israeli
decision making and how Israeli decision makers’ perception of the Diaspora influences their
decisions towards them.
The fifth chapter represents an attempt to integrate these three viewpoints into a real
decision making scenario by presenting a case study of a decision making process. The case
study chosen is the decision making process to launch a deep bombing campaign into Egypt
at the end of the war of attrition in 1970. The issues discussed in this case study would also
be compared to other decision making case studies.
Finally, and by way of conclusion, this study will summarize the main characteristics
of the decision making mechanism in the sixth chapter. This chapter attempts to summarize
the decision making characteristics in terms of their nature on the pragmatic-ideological
scale, and in terms of its main strengths and weaknesses. The strengths and weaknesses
identified are summed up in a list format.
Al-ZaytounaCentreforStudies&Consultations,Beirut,Lebanon
12 ______________________________________________________________________ I. Introduction
Endnotes
1
Joseph Heller, The Birth of Israel, 1945-1949: Ben-Gurion and His Critics (Gainesville, FL: University Press
of Florida, 2000), preface xi.
2
Yehuda Ben Meir, National security decision making: the Israeli case. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986),
67-69.
3
Ira Sharansky,. Policy making in Israel: Routines for Simple Problems and Coping with the Complex.
(Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1997).
InCitations,PleaseUse:
El-Gendy,Karim,TheProcessofIsraeliDecision-Making:Mechanisms,
ForcesandInfluences(Beirut:Al-ZaytounaCentreforStudiesand
Consultations,2010)
II. The "Constitutional"
Mechanism
Al-ZaytounaCentreforStudies&Consultations,Beirut,Lebanon
The Process of Israeli Decision Making _________________________________________________ 14
II. The "Constitutional" Mechanism
Theoretically, the Israeli political system is based on the principle of separation of
powers, generally following the British pattern, with checks and balances, in which the
executive branch (the government) is subject to the confidence of the legislative branch (the
Knesset). The independence of the judiciary (with both its secular and religious branches) and
its status as the protector of the democratic values and civil liberties, and the insurer of the
fairness of laws is also expressed and guaranteed by the Basic Laws.1
The Israeli Basic Laws, which are a key component of Israel’s uncodified
constitution2
, identify the roles and powers of the ruling establishment’s various institutions,
such as the Presidency, the Knesset, the Government (the Cabinet), the State Comptroller (the
Supreme Audit Institution), The Local Authorities, and the Judiciary.
Michael Brecher has defined foreign policy decision making as “the selection, among
perceived alternatives, of one option leading to a course of action in the international system.
A decision is made by an individual or individuals or a group authorized by the political
system to act within a prescribed sphere of external behaviour.”3
He also categorized the
different decisions into strategic decisions, tactical decision, and implementing decisions.4
According to this definition, Israeli Basic Laws: The Knesset (1958) and The Government
(2001) put the decision making powers to make all three types of decisions within the
executive branch of government which is strongly linked to the legislative branch.
In this context state bodies and Institutions such as the Supreme Court, the President,
the Attorney general, and the State Comptroller do not play a major policy making role and
thus are beyond the scope of this study. The main institutions in the decision making
mechanism are thus the Knesset and the Cabinet with the executive branch being the stronger
of the two and with most of the powers being in the hands of the Prime Minister. The nature
of these institutions, their composition, functions and powers can be summarized as follows:
1. The Knesset
1.1 The Knesset’s composition According to the Israeli Basic Laws, the Knesset is the
parliament of the state. It consists of one chamber that includes 120 elected members elected
every 4 years in general elections.
Al-ZaytounaCentreforStudies&Consultations,Beirut,Lebanon
15 ____________________________________________________ II. The "Constitutional" Mechanism
Democratic electoral systems around the world vary according to their emphasis on
either the stability of governance or a fair representation of the electorate. The Israeli system
is one which favours the fair representation of its diverse society, over the stability of the
government. The Israeli electoral system is an extreme case of proportional representation as
it considers the entire country a single electoral constituency and uses a low electoral
threshold that allows smaller parties with very small shares of the nationwide vote to have
representation in the Knesset. Perhaps the only comparable electoral system in western
democracies to the Israeli one is that of Netherlands which also uses a single constituency
and a low electoral threshold.5
In the Israeli model of proportional representation Members of the Knesset (MKs) are
not elected individually but within the framework of political parties that compete for the
electorate's votes. Each political party chooses its own Knesset candidates from within the
party and arranges them in the order that it sees fit to create a single electoral list.6
Following the national elections, the 120 Knesset seats are assigned in proportion to
each party's percentage of the total national vote provided that the parties gets votes more
than the electoral threshold which has always been between 1-2%.7
The Knesset is composed of a main plenum and a number of committees. The
plenum, the supreme authority of the house, has two annual sittings that combined make at
least eight months. The two sittings together form a session. Resolutions of the plenum are
taken by a majority of participating MKs, except for cases in which a special majority is
required. The plenum elects the Speaker of the Knesset, who conducts the affairs of the
Knesset, as well as one or more Deputy Speakers. Together, the Speaker and the Deputy
Speakers constitute the Knesset Presidium, which approves the tabling of private Members'
bills and the urgency of Motions for the Agenda.8
The Knesset has 12 permanent committees: The House (Knesset) Committee, The
Finance Committee; The Economics Committee, The Defense and Foreign Affairs
Committee (the most prestigious and sensitive of all), The Interior and Environment
Committee, The Immigration, Absorption and Diaspora Committee, The Education and
Culture Committee, The Constitution, Law, and Justice Committee, The Labour and Social
Affairs Committee, The Public Audit Committee, The science and technology Committee,
and The Advancing the Status of Women Committee.
The factional composition of these committees resembles and reflects that of the
Knesset itself. In addition, the Knesset can establish special committees and committees on
particular matters. It may also elect subcommittees and delegate powers to them and can
establish joint committees for issues concerning more than one committee. Committee
chairpersons are chosen by their members, on the recommendation of the House Committee.
Al-ZaytounaCentreforStudies&Consultations,Beirut,Lebanon
The Process of Israeli Decision Making _________________________________________________ 16
1.2. The Knesset’s powers and functions The main function of the Knesset is to legislate
and revise Laws as necessary. Additional duties include establishing a government, making
policy decisions, reviewing Government activities, and electing the President of the State and
the State Comptroller.
Bills proposed by the government to the Knesset have to first be reviewed by the
Justice Ministry and the Finance ministry to check their legality and financial implications.
They are also circulated to the rest of the Government Ministries for their comments. After
the draft is approved by the government, it can be proposed to the Speaker of the Knesset by
the relevant Minister who should also present an explanation of the law to the Knesset.
The Government is the sponsor of most legislation, but any Member of the Knesset
(MK) can present a bill, known as a "private member's bill", and Knesset Committees can
present bills dealing with the Basic Laws, Laws dealing with the Knesset, elections to the
Knesset, MKs, or the State Comptroller.
The speaker of the Knesset, who is elected in the first session following the general
elections, has the right to reject some of the MKs proposals for topics to be discussed. This
can vary from one speaker to the other; while Reuven Rivlin the speaker from the Likud
(2003-2006) Allowed smaller parties a greater say, Dalia Itzik the speaker from Kadimah
(2006-Present) is known to have exercised her powers, as she blocked more debate topics
proposed by small parties than her predecessor.
In the Knesset, all bills go through three stages before becoming law, beginning with
a first reading, which is a general debate in the plenum. At this stage the bill may be accepted
and referred to the appropriate committee, removed from the Knesset table, or returned to the
Government. If the bill is accepted, it goes to the appropriate committee for the resolution of
details and possibly amendments. The committee then returns the amended bill to the plenum
for a second reading, where the deliberations and voting take place on each section
separately. The bill is the presented in its final form, as adopted in the second reading for the
third and final reading,
If a bill passes, it is signed by the presiding Speaker of the Knesset and is later
published in the Official Gazette, with the signatures of the President, Prime Minister,
Knesset Speaker and the minister responsible for the Law's implementation. Finally, the state
seal is placed on it by the Justice Minister, and the bill becomes Law.
Knesset debates take the form of general debates, motions for the agenda,
parliamentary questions, and motions of no confidence. A general debate is held on bills or
general matters of a political or other nature. While debates on bills conclude with a vote,
debates on general matters may end without voting. A motion for the agenda is a preliminary
debate concerning the inclusion of an issue raised by an MK on the Knesset agenda. A
parliamentary question is asked by an MK of a minister on ministry affairs to draw the
Al-ZaytounaCentreforStudies&Consultations,Beirut,Lebanon
17 ____________________________________________________ II. The "Constitutional" Mechanism
attention of the Government and the public to an issue that, in the presenter's opinion, needs
corrective action. Motions of no confidence are proposals by party factions to remove the
political legitimacy from a government. If successful, they force a government to resign and
to call for early elections.
Committees discuss Government regulations or any matter referred to them by the
plenum. To further their deliberations they invite Government ministers, senior officials, and
experts in the matters being discussed. Committees may require explanation and information
from relevant ministers in any matter within their competence, and the ministers, or persons
appointed by them, must provide the explanation or information requested.
2. The Cabinet
2.1. The Cabinet’s composition The Cabinet is formed after the general elections. The
President9
asks a member of the Knesset (usually the head of the largest party faction in the
Knesset) to attempt to form a government where he will become the Prime Minister. Since no
party has ever received enough Knesset seats to form a Government by itself, all
Governments to date have been based on coalitions of several parties. To form a governing
coalition, the newly-elected Prime Minister has to present a list of ministers, together with an
outline of proposed Government guidelines to the Knesset for Approval. The list and outline
have to presented to the Knesset within 45 days of publication of the election results.
Like the Knesset, the Government usually serves for four years, but its term may be
shortened by the resignation or death/incapacity of the Prime Minister, or a vote of noconfidence
by the Knesset. In the case of a no confidence the Prime Minister and ministers of
an outgoing Government continue their duties until a new Government begins its term.
Most ministers are assigned a portfolio and head a ministry; ministers who function
without portfolio may be called upon to assume responsibility for special projects. The Prime
Minister, who heads the Cabinet, may serve also as a minister with a portfolio. At least half
of the Cabinet must be Knesset members, but all of them must be eligible for Knesset
membership. The Prime Minister, or another minister with Prime Ministerial approval, may
appoint deputy ministers who must also be Knesset members.
The whole Cabinet usually meets at least once a week, normally on Sunday mornings
and typically for 5 hours10
, but additional meetings may be called as needed. There are
currently no limitations on the size of the cabinet or the number of ministers serving.
The Cabinet conducts much of its work through four standing committees dealing
with economic affairs, legislation, foreign affairs and security, and home affairs and services.
Al-ZaytounaCentreforStudies&Consultations,Beirut,Lebanon
The Process of Israeli Decision Making _________________________________________________ 18
The purpose of the committee is to free the cabinet from the details of the largely technical
matters. The committees meet once a week to deals with major issues that relate to the
jurisdiction of more than one ministry. The cabinet may also set up special ad hoc committees
of inquiry to scrutinize issues affecting coalition unity or other urgent questions.11
Some 50
committees have been established but only a few function continuously.
The only committee required by law is the ministerial committee on defense (MCOD)
which was established in 1991. It includes the Prime Minister, the Deputy Prime Minister, the
ministers of defense, the minister of foreign affairs, and the minister of finance. Since the
MCOD membership is seen as prestigious as it deals with the more sensitive security and
political issues, other ministers seek to join it. But while other ministers can join the
committee, its members should not exceed half of the cabinet.12
Attached to the cabinet are two administrative units, the Secretariat of the Cabinet,
and the Prime Minister’s Office. The first unit, the Secretariat of the Cabinet, is formally
there to serve the entire cabinet. Its formal role is to provide secretarial services to the cabinet
and its committees, which includes archiving the cabinet deliberations (which remain
confidential for 40 years, except for the defense committee which remains confidential for 50
years). The Cabinet Secretary, who heads the Secretariat, assists the Prime minister in
preparing the agenda of the cabinet, provides ministers with relevant background information
48 prior to meetings, and provides the cabinet with drafts of decisions on proposed
appointments to make the cabinet meetings more efficient.13
The other administrative unit is the Office of the Prime Minister, which assists the
Prime Minister in his official activities and day to day work. The prime Minister is assisted
by a Director General, a Chief of Bureau, a Foreign Affairs Advisor, a diplomatic advisor, an
economical Advisor, a legal advisor, and the Military Secretary who serves as a liaison with
the military command and the defense ministry. The Office consists of three departments:
follow up, research, information and public affairs. One of its main roles is to scrutinize the
flow of information and issues and to decide on which matters to call to the attention of the
Prime Minister.14
2.2. The Cabinet’s powers and functions The Government, or the Cabinet of ministers, is
the executive authority of the State. Its policymaking powers are very wide, each
Government determines its own working and decision making procedures, and is authorized
to take action on any issue which is not delegated by Law to another authority. The lack of a
written constitution has strengthened the government and the Knesset as it removed the
constitutional restrictions that may hinder their ability to pass laws and thus made the
legislation process smoother. For example, the Knesset passed a legislation which stipulated
that if a law has no budget to implement it for 5 years it ceases becoming a law. In the lack of
Al-ZaytounaCentreforStudies&Consultations,Beirut,Lebanon
19 ____________________________________________________ II. The "Constitutional" Mechanism
a constitution, this paves the way for the government and the Knesset to remove laws using
the annual budget if they have the necessary majority.
The Government is charged with administering internal and foreign affairs, including
the security issues. As head of the Government, the Prime Minister’s lies at the pinnacle of
the decision making mechanism. In addition to chairing the Government meetings, the Prime
Minister is its representative who coordinates its activities. The relationship between the
Prime Minister and the other Ministers is only defined not defined which means that his
authority within it depends on his character and personal political clout.
All deliberations of the cabinet meetings are generally secretive and little is known
about their proceedings. The 1968 Basic Law on the executive branch includes the
prohibition on the publication of cabinet proceedings on foreign or defense issues, or any
other matters that the cabinet declared to be secret. In addition, a mechanism created in 1966
allows the cabinet to declare itself as the "Ministerial Committee on Security Affairs" for
certain debates, making any disclosure of the proceedings into a case of "severe espionage"15
The issues brought up in the weekly meetings are usually those that statutorily require
a cabinet decision, such as proposed legislation and appointments of public officials to
highest ranks of the bureaucracy. National security issues take substantial meeting time but
do not come for vote in the cabinet. Instead they are summarized and reviewed by the Prime
Minister. Similarly sensitive foreign affairs and defense issues are not brought up for
discussion but are reported on as reports afterwards. The reason behind this behaviour is the
fear of leaks to the media in large forums such as the cabinet. The Cabinet is thus held
collectively responsible for issues which are not debated within the cabinet.16
Traditionally, the Prime Minister attempts to control the outcome of decisions by
counting on the support of ministers from his party. Recently, with the weakening of party
discipline, prime ministers have to also rely on other tactics to control decision outcomes.
These tactics include using selected forums of ministerial committees, inner circles, personal
persuasion, political payoffs, and ultimately the threat of resignation.17
The prime Minister also has great control over the Cabinet Secretariat. He even
assigns the Cabinet Secretary political tasks. However, the scope of activities and influence
of the Cabinet Secretary depends primarily on the trust established with the Prime Minister.18
In 1994 the cabinet rules of procedure established seven statutory committees, some
of which have already been established. The committees are Defense, regulation of classified
information, developing towns, privatization, work permits on Jewish holidays,
archaeological excavation, and religious councils.
The prime Minister, who is the most influential over the appointment of ministers to
committees, may participate himself in any committee meeting and even chair it. Public
Al-ZaytounaCentreforStudies&Consultations,Beirut,Lebanon
The Process of Israeli Decision Making _________________________________________________ 20
officials such as the Governor of the Bank of Israel and the Attorney General also attend
cabinet committee meetings on regular basis. Also top officials of the budget division of the
finance ministry attend the ministerial committee meetings when financial implications are
involved.19
3. The relationship between the Cabinet and the Knesset
Under Israeli Law the Cabinet Ministers including the Prime Minister are collectively
accountable to the Knesset for their actions. As the legislative branch of the state, the Knesset
is meant to play a significant role in supervising the work of the government. However, like
many other parliamentary democracies, in spite of this formal control of the legislature over
the executive, in practice, the focus of political power is in the executive which reduces the
legislature to a staging ground. In the Israeli system, the relationship between the Knesset and
the Cabinet is better described as a “balance of terror,” where both the government and the
cabinet has the powers to dismiss the other.20
Theoretically, the Knesset is meant to have supremacy over government. Any Knesset
faction (a minimum of 2 members of Knesset) may submit a motion of no confidence in the
Government. If a motion of no confidence is submitted, the Knesset must vote on it at its first
meeting during the week following the submission. If the no-confidence motion receives a
majority of 61 votes, general elections are called within 60 days. The defeated Government
continues functioning as a caretaker until a new Government is established. No-confidence
votes are also often used by the opposition merely to raise a matter for which no other
procedure is available.
The Knesset may also dismiss the prime minister by failing to adopt the annual budget
within three months of its submission The Knesset may also dissolve itself at any time during
its term, and a new government will have to be formed once a new Knesset is elected. In the
period between a successful no-confidence vote and until a new Knesset is formally
constituted following new elections, full authority remains with the outgoing Knesset as a
caretaker legislative.
However, on the other hand, the Government is also free to act over wide fields
without recourse to the Knesset, as long as it does not infringe any laws or tamper with the
constitutional system. The government has a free hand in making treaties and other
international agreements, where it can negotiate, sign, and ratify a treaty or convention
without brining it at all before the Knesset. This may not be the case only if the fulfilment of
these agreements requires changes in domestic laws, which in this case would have to be
brought before the Knesset.
Al-ZaytounaCentreforStudies&Consultations,Beirut,Lebanon
21 ____________________________________________________ II. The "Constitutional" Mechanism
In addition, the Government has powers over the Knesset through its control of its
coalition parties’ members and their parliamentary factions who constitute the Knesset’s
majority. The government thus have the upper hand in any vote. The Prime Minister also has
the ability to dissolve the parliament at any time during its term ( with the agreement of the
president) and to call for early elections. The government could even pass laws that would
change the relationship between the government and the Knesset, provided that it has
sufficient majority. An example on this took place in the 1999 elections when many of
Knesset legislations, which were introduced earlier to control the size of the government and
the movement between political parties, were changed to cater for the needs of the coalition
under the premiership of Prime Minister Ehud Barak.21
The government also controls the Knesset through its ability to initiate government
bills, pass laws, and its traditional ability to control the Knesset’s internal proceedings. The
Knesset’s provisions allowed the government a “Right of Way” in controlling most of the
Knesset’s time, in putting its views forward before the members, and in expediting its
business in the Knesset. This took place on the expense of members’ initiatives. In addition,
not only were Government bills favoured by the Knesset rules over members’ bills, but the
preliminary debate of a member’s bill was not usually taken without a nod of approval from
the government. In fact, a statement by the government took precedence over another
business, even a no-confidence motion, and often resulted in removing a member’s motion
from the agenda if it happened to be on the same subject.22
However, since 1992, the trend of
government domination of bills was reversed to the favour of private Bills.23
Unlike the U.S. parliamentary system, the Israeli members of Knesset are not as well
staffed and thus their ability to discuss details of policies and budgets are limited.24
As a
result, Knesset members are often at a disadvantage to the Government as they do not have as
much vital information concerning government policy and administration as the government
does, which limits their ability to scrutinize its activities. Knesset members do not receive
explanations or background reviews with government bills when they are submitted to the
Knesset. Even in cases where information is requested by the Knesset, which are normally
not denied, the lack of staff results in the members’ inability to digest the large amounts of
information supplied.25
This has led some to argue that, apart from its control of the budget,
the Knesset has no direct clout as a policy making body, especially in diplomacy and defence
policy.26
Al-ZaytounaCentreforStudies&Consultations,Beirut,Lebanon
22 ____________________________________________________ II. The "Constitutional" Mechanism
4. The Foreign Ministry Staff
As defined by Israeli law, the role of Ministry of Foreign Affairs is to “formulate,
implement and present Israel's foreign policy, and to promote its economic, cultural, and
scientific relations”.27
The foreign Ministry elite staff were traditionally a major part of the
decision making process. For decades the foreign Ministry was where policies were
formulated by the Ministries hierarchical bureaucracy. At least until the mid 1970s the inner
circle of the foreign ministry technical elite, were considered a major decision making
circle.28
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ departments include a media and information
department, Public Affairs Department (also known as Hasbara, or explanation), an
intelligence department, a department of International Cooperation, a department for Jewish
communities, an economic affairs department, and a legal advisor. The ministry’s
bureaucracy is headed, like all other ministries, by a director general who reports directly to
the Minister of Foreign Affairs.
The role of the foreign Ministry has been receding recently with the strengthening of
the role of the cabinet, the Prime Minister, and the military. For reasons that would be
explained later in this study the policy making role of the Foreign Ministry has gradually
weakened and its participation in decision making has greatly reduced. This has left the
Foreign Ministry’s role limited to a promotional role.
In an attempt to improve its policy making powers The Foreign Ministry’s
intelligence department established a new political research division which also functions as a
policy consultant.29
The research division reports to the director general of the Foreign
Ministry and thus is part of the Ministries bureaucracy. However, the policy making
capabilities of this department are limited compared to other research bodies that will be
discussed later in this study.
Al-ZaytounaCentreforStudies&Consultations,Beirut,Lebanon
The Israeli Decision Making Process ____________________________________________________ 23
Endnotes
1
Israel does not have a written constitution. The almost constitutional Basic Laws are used instead. New basic
laws can still be added and the existing ones can be updated - albeit it with an extraordinary majority. The Basic
Laws have no clear provision that other legislations should not contradict them.
2
According to Israel’s proclamation of independence a constituent assembly should have prepared a
constitution by October, 1, 1948. The delay and the eventual decision June 13, 1950 that the constitution is to be
legislated chapter by chapter, resulted primarily from the inability of the different groups that were to make the
Israeli society to agree on the purpose of the state, the state’s identity, and its long term vision. Another factor
was the opposition of David Ben Gurion himself. Source: Orit Rozin “Forming a Collective Identity: The
Debate over the Proposed Constitution, 1948-1950”, Journal of Israeli History 26, no. 2(September 2007): 251 -
27.
3
Michael Brecher. The foreign policy system of Israel: setting, images, process. (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1972), 374.
4
Ibid, 374.
5
Michael Latner and Anthony McGann, “Geographical representation under proportional representation: The
cases of Israel and the Netherlands,” Electoral Studies 24 (2005): 709-734.
6
Any party wishing to participate in the elections must register in the Parties Register. 100 or more citizens of
the State of Israel may register as a party. Source: Israel Government Portal website, Establishing a new party.
7
According to the Basic Law: The Knesset: “The Knesset shall be elected by general, national, direct, equal,
secret and proportional elections, in accordance with the Knesset Elections Law." These legal terms are
implemented as follows: General: On Election Day, voters cast one ballot for a political party to represent them
in the Knesset. Every Israeli citizen aged 18 has the right to vote. Israelis of all ethnic groups and religious
beliefs, including Arab Israelis, participate in the process and for many years, voting percentages have reached
close to 80 percent. National: The entire country constitutes a single electoral constituency. Direct: The Knesset
is elected directly by the voters, not through a body of electors. Equal: All votes cast are equal in weight.
Secret: Elections are by secret ballot. Proportional: The 120 Knesset seats are assigned in proportion to each
party's percentage of the total national vote with the minimum required for a party to win a Knesset seat set at
2% of the total votes cast. Source: Jewish Virtual Library, “The Elections.”
8
Jewish Virtual Library. “The Role of the Knesset Speaker.”
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Politics/speakerroll.html (Accessed: 08.07.2008).
9
The President’s role is largely ceremonial except for his exclusive power to pardon or commute the sentences
of civilians and soldiers.
10
Charles D. Freilich, “National Security Decision-Making in Israel: Processes, Pathologies, and Strengths,”
Middle East Journal 60, no. 4 (Autumn 2006).
11
Helen Chapin Metz, ed. Israel: A Country Study (Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1988), under
“the Cabinet,” http://countrystudies.us/israel/80.htm (Accessed 23.03.2007)
12
Arian, Executive Governance in Israel, 46.
13
Ibid, 49-53.
14
Ibid, 53-59.
15
Asher Arian, Politics in Israel: The Second Republic, (Washington D.C: CQ Press, 2005), 269; and Alan
Dowty, “Israeli Foreign Policy and the Jewish Question,” Middle East Review of International Affairs 3, no. 1
(March 1999).
16
Arian, Executive Governance in Israel, 44-45.
17
Ibid, 44-45.
18
Ibid, 49-53.
Al-ZaytounaCentreforStudies&Consultations,Beirut,Lebanon
24 ____________________________________________________ II. The "Constitutional" Mechanism
19
Ibid, 46-47.
20
Arian, Executive Governance in Israel, 39.
21
Garaysi, Barhoom. “ Altarkeebah Albarlamaniya Tamna’ Seegha Moshtaraka letaghyeerat Fe Nezam Alhokm
Alisraeli (The Parliamentary Composition Prevents a Common Dorm for Changes to the Israeli Government
System),” Almash-had Al-Israeli (The Israeli Scene), 14 November, 2006.
22
Samuel Sager. The Parliamentary System of Israel (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1985),195-205.
23
Anat Maor, “The Legislation in Israel,” Association for Israel Studies’ 22
nd
Conference, May 2006. Calgary,
Canada.
24
Richard C. White, “Congressional limitations and oversight of Executive Decision-Making Power: The
Influence of the Members and the Staff.” in National security policy: the decision-making process. Edited by
Robert L Pfaltzgraff, Jr. and Uri Raanan. (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1984), 241-249
25
Sager. The Parliamentary System of Israel,195-205.
26
Priya Singh, Foreign Policy Making in Israel: Domestic influences (Delhi: Shipra Publications, 2005), 86.
27
Israel Government Portal, “Ministry of Foreign Affairs.”
28
Brecher. The foreign policy system of Israel: setting, images, process, 505.
29
Freilich, National Security Decision-Making in Israel: Processes, Pathologies, and Strengths.
InCitations,PleaseUse:
El-Gendy,Karim,TheProcessofIsraeliDecision-Making:Mechanisms,
ForcesandInfluences(Beirut:Al-ZaytounaCentreforStudiesand
Consultations,2010)
III. Forces and Processes
within the Political System
Al-ZaytounaCentreforStudies&Consultations,Beirut,Lebanon
The Process of Israeli Decision Making _________________________________________________ 26
III. Forces and Processes within the Political System
1. Coalition politics
1.1 Proportional representation, coalition politics, and the Cabinet Perhaps the single
most important structural determinant of Israel’s decision-making mechanism is its
proportional representation electoral system and the consequent need to govern through
coalition-cabinets. This electoral system was historically adopted as a means of incorporating
as many groups as possible under the Zionist organizations’ umbrella -and later on under the
state’s umbrella. However, as result of its use, the diversity of the society was not only
reflected in the Knesset, but amplified.
Compared to other countries, the number of parties contesting the Israeli general
elections is relatively high considering the population size. This resulted in a fragmented
legislature where smaller parties are being represented in the Knesset and no party ever
getting a majority of more than 60 seats to form a Government on its own1
. This system also
allows fringe parties which hold views outside of the mainstream political and public
consensus to have representation in the Knesset. Examples of these are the Haredi religious
parties2
, parties that represent the national religious or limited agenda parties such as Gil,
which represented pensioners in the 2006 elections.3
The leader of the Knesset party faction with most seats is usually asked by the
President to form the Government. He negotiates with other Knesset factions of his choice to
reach a formal agreement for a coalition, which includes outlining the Government
Guidelines and the Government Programme. But even though he chooses the parties to
negotiate with, the electoral system gives smaller parties a disproportionately strong influence
in coalition negotiations. This influence is due to the fact that they get more leverage as tie
breakers, making demands from larger parties in return for joining a coalition.
Coalition negotiations is a nearly all-consuming exercise with plenty of political
maneuvering and political compromises in which all parties are now well versed. But
coalition formation is not only about pragmatic political expediency, it is also shaped by the
ideological positions and the compatibility in the positions of the participating parties towards
different issues.
The coalition agreement between parties in a coalition is binding to all parties, and
parties have a collective responsibility to the coalition in the Knesset. At a minimum,
ministers in the cabinet should support any decision taken by the government, once it has
been taken, both in the Knesset and publicly. All MKs in the coalition must vote with the
Al-ZaytounaCentreforStudies&Consultations,Beirut,Lebanon
27 _______________________________________ III. Forces and Processes within the Political System
government on issues of national defense, foreign policy, the budget, and motions of
censure.4
In addition to the coalition agreement the coalition is controlled by what is known as
the Government Coalition Administration. This body, formed by representatives of the
parties in the collation, is responsible for ensuring that MKs from coalition parties vote in the
Knesset in favour of government bills under what is known as Coalition Commitment. The
coalition commitment is easily checked as most of the Knesset votes are open (originally
using show of hands, now an electronic system is in place) which makes MKs’ votes subject
to scrutiny5
. Knesset Members of the collation also have little room for manoeuvre in
opposing their faction’s general position since they may be dependant on their ministers for
continuation of parliamentary careers or obligated to them for a past preferment in
nominating them for election in the Knesset.6
Such a commitment to vote in favour of the
government is particularly evident in all issues that affect the stability of the coalition and a
Cabinet member may be dismissed for failing to support the government on any matter that is
included in the original coalition agreement. This excludes instances when the minister's
dissenting vote in the Knesset is for reasons of "conscience" which was specifically approved
in advance by the Minister's party.7
It also includes instances when, at the discretion of the
Prime Minister, MKs can vote according to their own independent views in issues which do
not affect the coalition.8
In a way the coalition agreement is similar to the role played by the Chief Whip in the
British model, on which the Israeli system is based, where Members of parliament (MPs)
from the ruling party are forced to vote in their party’s favour in various votes under the
threat of expulsion from the party.
This mechanism automatically provides any government with an automatic
parliamentary majority and accordingly reduces of the powers of the legislative branch to
check the executive branch, thus denying the Knesset a significant oversight role and
transferring some of its powers to the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, which effectively
negating the principle of separation of powers. Some even argue that with the rare exception
of issues of supreme importance and fundamental partisan discord, such as votes on the
Camp David Accords or the Gaza Disengagement Plan, the Knesset’s actual impact on
national security policy decision making is negligible.9
But the fragmented nature of the Knesset, and the governments, and the change in
voter behaviour led to a political and government instability.10
On the political stability
indicator developed by the World Bank, Israel had the lowest political stability of the 36
countries surveyed11
and some argue that Israel has not had a stable government since 1982.
Until the moment of writing this study, Israel has had a total of 32 Governments12
making the
average the life of a Government less than two years. In addition, only 5 of the last 17 general
elections were held in their original date13
and the period between 1995 and 2005 Israel had
Al-ZaytounaCentreforStudies&Consultations,Beirut,Lebanon
The Process of Israeli Decision Making _________________________________________________ 28
seven governments. Moreover, in recent years no government has been to maintain complete
cabinet stability for a full year and in the last 10 years the average rate for the replacement of
a minister has been once every 16 months.14
This instability in coalitions meant that maintaining the coalition often became an end
in itself, and a full-time preoccupation. Thus turning the Cabinet into a forum for ironing out
the differences that divide coalition parties and for reaching livable compromises, rather than
the executive body it is meant to be. This reduced the government’s ability to make difficult
decisions and, as a result, a strategy of delay, paralysis, and incremental, partial solutions
dominated the Cabinet, resulting in policies that are short-term, populist, and sectarian.15
Even in issues of grand strategy; there is a tendency to wait for issues to degenerate into “no
choice” situations that force action and require sudden improvisation.16
It should be noted that the fragmentation of the Israeli political scene is not a new
phenomenon. The Knesset’s fragmentation has been existent since the first Knesset with
between 14 and 33 parties contesting elections17
and between 10 and 15 actually getting
elected. However, this fragmentation has not presented problems in the early years of the
state and its impacts have only been felt after the nature of the political scene has changed.
The Israeli political scene was originally dominated by a single party (Mapai and later
the Alignment) which coincided with the stage of “nation building” between 1948 and the
late 1970s. In 1977 and after the Likud’s victory, the political scene shifted from single
dominant party politics to competitive dual party politics. This dual scene, in turn, changed
during the “electoral reform” period between 1992 and 2001 during which the Prime Minister
was elected directly. During this period the political scene became more sectarian and its
fragmentation was more felt. The emergence of the new Centrist party, Kadimah in 2005
also presents a potential for future change towards a three-party political scene.
During the years of labour dominance, small coalition partners were mostly
compensated with secondary ministerial portfolios. However, after Labour lost its dominance
in the late 1970s, the Knesset’s fragmentation became more problematic as small parties
increased their ministerial and budget payoff demands, and became more aware of their
leverage power, which made the coalition forming process more demanding and complex and
increased the number of ministries. The number of government portfolios obtained by small
parties increased most in the period between 1977 and 1992 when the Knesset was
characterized with having no core dominant party.
In an attempt to reduce the Knesset’s fragmentation the electoral threshold was raised
from 1% to 1.5% after the 13th
Knesset in 1996 and subsequently raised again to 2% by the
16th
Knesset (2003-2006). The aim was to reduce the number of parties in Knesset and hence
improve the stability of the Knesset and the Government. However, according to the Israeli
Democracy Institute the number of parties which contested the elections has not reduced as a
result of this change, and the voters continued to vote for small parties even if their votes
Al-ZaytounaCentreforStudies&Consultations,Beirut,Lebanon
29 _______________________________________ III. Forces and Processes within the Political System
have the potential to be “wasted” if the parties they vote for do not get enough votes to allow
them to get into the Knesset.18
The pattern of voting along social cleavages has continued in
spite of the increase in voting on the basis of a particular issue.19
Knesset fragmentation is compounded by increasing divergence in the ideological
positions of parties in coalitions. Until the Labor Party’s fall from office in 1977, following
29 years of uninterrupted rule, Israel’s coalitions were all centered on a loose alliance
between Labor and the National Religious Party (Mafdal) which took pragmatic stance at the
time regarding most policy issues. Since then, the degree of ideological congruence within
governing coalitions has decreased markedly: Begin’s first Likud–led coalition included the
dovish Democratic Party for Change, while the 1980s were witness to six years of LaborLikud
“National Unity Governments.” The first Shamir coalition included Likud and the
right-wing fringe party Moledet, the Netanyahu coalition included Likud, Mafdal, Shas (a
Sephardi religious party), and Israel Bealiyah (a Russian immigrant party). The Rabin
coalition included Labor and both the dovish left wing Meretz party and Shas. Barak’s
coalition included Labor, Meretz and, initially, Shas, Mafdal, and Israel Bealiyah. Finally,
the three Sharon coalitions have ranged from narrow Likud-Labor Cabinets, to a Likud,
Shinui (a centrist party), and NRP-NU coalition.
This increasingly fragmented party system has weakened the institutional power of
the Knesset and accelerated the concentration of prime Ministerial power, but at the same
time it has considerably impaired the capabilities of the government to govern effectively and
accountably.20
Another result of coalitions is the size of the government. In recent years, and in spite
of recent attempts to curb the increasing number of ministers within the Cabinet, the size of
the Cabinet has increased as the coalition requires a large number of ministerial positions to
satisfy the requirements of each party’s “political stars”. A ratio of one Cabinet portfolio for
every three or four Knesset seats is usually used to determine the Cabinet formation.21
New
ministries were often created for political figures, or they are appointed as Ministers without
Portfolio. Cabinet sizes reached unmanageable numbers between the upper and lower
twenties.22
In coalitions, ministers are appointed primarily on the basis of their party’s and their
own personal political clout, rather than their professional expertise, managerial abilities, or
personal inclination. This includes the Foreign Minister, the finance Minister, and the Justice
Minister. Until the recent appointment of Amir Peretz, the position of Minister of Defense
was an exception to this rule.23
The nature of the coalition government, with its allocation of ministries to different
parties, thus allows the creation of what Charles Freilich describe as a federation of semiautonomous
ministries, with the Prime Minister authority over them particularly limited.
Ministries effectively “belong” to the Minister or party they are headed by, and culture of
Al-ZaytounaCentreforStudies&Consultations,Beirut,Lebanon
The Process of Israeli Decision Making _________________________________________________ 30
“live and let live” prevails in the Cabinet with each minister free to run his or her ministry
with a high degree of autonomy from both the Prime Minister and other ministers.24
Also, as a result of the size of the cabinets and the prestige of the Mini-cabinets, or the
Ministerial Committees on Defense, Political parties within a coalition always insist on being
represented in Mini-cabinets, which has caused them to overgrow as well with an obvious
impact on their secretive nature, thus negating their raison d’etre.
The degree of control of the Prime Minister over the cabinet is often related to his
own political clout.25
The Prime Minister’s ability to lead is primarily a function of his intraand
inter-party political skills and his ability to use the prestige of office to generate support
for his preferred policies.26
1.2 Coalition Politics and decision making Coalition politics together with declining party
discipline have meant that, on more than one occasion, prime ministers have had to rely on
other coalition parties, or even opposition parties, to pass “historic” legislation for which they
were unable to garner their own party’s support. For example, Begin needed the support of
the then-opposition Labor Party to attain Knesset approval for the Camp David Accords,
while Sharon needed Labor and opposition parties to obtain approval for the Gaza
Disengagement Plan.27
Overall, the politicization of the Cabinet has weakened the position of
the Prime Minister in his government.
The partisan nature of the Knesset has also meant that members of the Knesset are
preoccupied with their political activities — which, unlike parliamentary achievements, are
the primary basis of their future Knesset membership and possible promotion to ministerial
positions — and thus have little time to perform their role in checking the power of the
executive.
Similarly, the partisan nature of the Cabinet, the quick turnover of coalitions, and the
fact that future political careers usually have far less to do with how effectively they run their
ministries than with how well they satisfy their party’s constituency, mean that ministers
focus on the immediate electoral ramifications of their actions, rather than on effective
governance. As political figures in their own right, ministers must continually strengthen their
positions and ensure their political futures. With an extraordinarily frenetic 24/7 news cycle,
volatile party politics, and short terms between elections, many ministers’ time must be
devoted to intra-party politics no less than to the affairs of their ministry and of state. The
Defense Minister, and to a lesser extent the Foreign Minister are exceptions to this rule.
Although little in known on the dynamics of and interactions within the cabinet, it is
known that the Cabinet has become a forum for political grandstanding, rather than policy
discussion. Nearly all ministerial statements are made with an eye on media coverage, and
Al-ZaytounaCentreforStudies&Consultations,Beirut,Lebanon
31 _______________________________________ III. Forces and Processes within the Political System
indeed are designed to be leaked immediately.28
The issue of leakage is particularly
interesting especially that all cabinet and ministerial subcommittees deliberations are
supposed to be secret
In such a politicized cabinet, decision and policy issues are always discussed with an
eye on their partisan and domestic political ramifications. This creates an environment where
policy cannot be discussed objectively and were certain options are foreclosed or channeled
into given directions. For example, the decision to kill the multi-billion dollar development
program for the Lavi fighter was made purely on a partisan basis, without regard for the
financial, technological, and operational considerations presented.29
Since the political price of issues increases the more controversial they are,
formulating policy on the major issues of Israel’s existence (for example the future of the
west bank) on which political parties, and Israelis at large, are divided, has become very
difficult and at times can be considered political suicide.30
In addition, the Cabinet lacks an effective Cabinet-level policy staff. With little
preparatory staff work and documentation, even basic data is often unknown to ministers and
Cabinet meetings are devoted largely to a presentation of the situation, rather than to policy
deliberation. Policy proposals are usually presented by the policy advocate- typically the
relevant minister, ministry official, or the Prime Minister- who invariably presents just one
favored option, which the Cabinet can either accept or reject.
Even when policy options are generated within the bureaucracy, differences are often
ironed out prior to the meeting of the Cabinet, which remains unaware of them, or indeed, of
their very consideration. On the other hand the bureaucracy (the ministries, as well as the
defense and security agencies) are often not fully informed of the Cabinet’s agenda and need
for certain information, thus they prepare generic policies and not ones geared towards a
certain agenda. In addition, the absence of policy staff meant that the Cabinet has no
independent capability of assessing the data and options presented. Ministers thus have to
rely on their general knowledge and the information they are able to gather from the press
and from casual conversations, often with interested parties. As a result, intuition, and
preconceptions replace serious consideration.31
If one also considers that ministers in the Cabinet, who are career politicians, are not
experts in their spheres of responsibilities or in management, which raises doubts regarding
the competence of their judgments, one can come out with an image of a dysfunctional
Cabinet in terms of policy formulation and decision making. Furthermore, there is often only
a loose connection between the Cabinet decisions and the allocation of the resources needed
to implement those decisions, which are often made for purely symbolic reasons. It is an open
secret in Israel that a substantial majority of Cabinet decisions is never implemented, and that
they were adopted from the outset with no intention of implementing them. A rough estimate
Al-ZaytounaCentreforStudies&Consultations,Beirut,Lebanon
The Process of Israeli Decision Making _________________________________________________ 32
commonly used in the Israeli bureaucracy is that 70% of Cabinet decisions are not
implemented.32
One example on how the cabinet is no longer where policy is made, is during the
Gaza Disengagement. The Foreign Ministry was almost completely in the dark regarding the
intricacies and negotiating requirements of the Disengagement Plan- formulated by Prime
Minister Ariel Sharon and his advisors- and unable to play a significant role in its
formulation, or even to effectively present it abroad. Even the Ministry of Defense and the
Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) were both brought into the process of disengagement at a
comparatively advanced date.33
Another example on the inability of the Cabinet to deal with complex national
security issues is the annual deliberations on the defense budget. Each year, the Ministry of
Defense and the IDF mount a public relations campaign, which at times borders on scare
tactics, to generate public support for their budget request. This is then followed by Cabinet
meetings, in which the Minister of Defense and IDF present great amounts of data and
assessments, with the aid of the latest technological imagery, to scare and dazzle the
ministers. The ministers, who simply lack the ability to assess the budget demands presented,
and given public opinion, tend to have little desire to question it. The battle between the
Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Finance is often settled in a compromise with the
latter making an arbitrary cut in the defense budget request.34
This compromise is often a
political compromise rather than an assessment of the details of the budget requirements.
2. Parties, ideologies, and programmes
2.1 Background on social structures and ideologies The consequences of coalition politics
are compounded by the ideological nature of the parties in a coalition. Ideology plays a great
part in Israeli politics because of the exceptional degree of ideological fervor that exists in
political life. Although most political parties in Israel subscribe to Zionist ideology (with the
exception of the Anti-Zionist religious parties and the Arab parties), they vary greatly in their
interpretation of Zionism as a natural reflection of the variation in Israeli society. There are
three main sub-ideologies which fall under Zionism; with Labour Zionism (which has social
democrat colors), Revisionist Zionism (which shares some traits with conservatives in
other countries) and Religious Zionism ( which is distinct from non-Zionist religious
parties). The first two ideologies are the most dominant and are currently represented
politically by the Labour Party and the Likud Party.
In addition, the society is also divided ideologically on religious basis. The main
cleavage is between the religious and the secular, with great disagreement between the two
Al-ZaytounaCentreforStudies&Consultations,Beirut,Lebanon
33 _______________________________________ III. Forces and Processes within the Political System
sides over the type of state Israel should become. While the different religious groups
(Zionist and non-Zionist alike) would like to see Israel as a truly Jewish country governed by
Jewish law (the Halachah) and collectively identify themselves as Jews rather than Israelis,
the secular and nationalist Israeli Jews see no role for religion in public life or politics and
tend to identify themselves as Israelis rather than Jews.35
In addition to these general ideological categorizations, the Israeli Jews are also
divided ethnically according to the original countries from which the immigrant Jews came.
Although approximately 68% of Israeli Jews are Sabra (A term used to refer to Israeli-born
and mostly to second or third generation Israelis, and means cactus in Hebrew),36
the society
is deeply divided according to ethnic origins with a small rate of intermarriage between
different ethnicities. The dominant ethnicities are Ashkenazim and Mizrachim (also referred
to as Sephardim). Currently, they are roughly equal in size by vary according to different
estimates. This variation is partly because the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics no longer
classifies Jews according to their ethnic origin in the national census but according to their
place of birth. In addition, the different estimates vary depending on how other Jewish
minorities are classified.
On the Mizrachi side, while the two terms Mizrachim and Sephardim appear to be
used interchangeably with a current tendency to use Mizrachim rather than Sephardim, the
two terms are not identical. The term Mizrachim is an ethnicity term, which means eastern in
Hebrew, in reference to where a number of Jews came from. Sephardim on the other hand is
a religious term that refers to the type of religious practices they follow.37
In that context it
must be noted that there are efforts made by the Sephardi Haredi Party Shas to blur this
distinction in order to allow itself to represent the ethno-religious group of the Sephardim and
the Mizrachim.
On the Ashkenazi side, the Ashkenazi influence is attributed to their role in
establishing the Zionist project since its beginnings prior to the establishment of the state. In
1948 77.7% of the Jews in Palestine were Ashkenazim but further Mizrachi immigration to
Israel has reduced the demographic gap with the Ashkenazi Jews, and at present, the Israeli
Jewish population is roughly half Ashkenazim and half Mizrachim. However, the established
Ashkenazi domination of the political and military establishments remained largely
unchanged. The historical discrimination against Jews of oriental origin, and the cultural
stigma against those who speak the “language of the enemy”, together with the fact that the
Mizrachim have traditionally received second rate education and thus were mostly in blue
collar employment, all of these factors have reduced the chances of the Mizrachim in building
a body of political experience. The Mizrachim do not yet have party to represent them
ethnically, since the Shas party represents the Sephardim religiously and has a religious
manifesto. The ministerial experiences of David Levy and the recent accusations of
incompetence against former Defense Minister Amir Peretz are good examples of the lack of
Al-ZaytounaCentreforStudies&Consultations,Beirut,Lebanon
The Process of Israeli Decision Making _________________________________________________ 34
political experience amongst Mizrachi Jews. In the 17th
Knesset the number of Mizrachi MKs
was 32 representing only 27% of the Knesset seats.
By way of comparison, the Jewish immigrants from Russia who arrived in Israel in
the 1990s, known in Israel as HaRusim (the Russians), had a much easier ride. Their
absorption was much better into the society, they received bilingual training, they received a
higher level of education, and their differences were more tolerated than that of the
Mizrachim. This was partly helped by they European origins and by their claim that they
came to save Zionism and the European nature of the state of Israel.
2.2 Political ideologies Because of the different cleavages in the Israeli society, political
parties’ became a complicated representation of these cleavages. Political Parties in Israel
may primarily represent a political leaning such as the Likud (which represents the Center
Right or the revisionist Zionism ideology) and Labour (which represents the Center Left or
Labour Zionism ideology). Parties could represent a religious (or non-religious) affiliation
such as the Haredi party Shas, or the secular party Shinui. They may also represent the
interests of new immigrants such as Yisrael Ba'aliyah and Yisrael Beytenu which represent
the interests of Israel's Russian immigrants, or represent the interests of certain groups such
as The National Religious Party (Mafdal) which represents the religious settlers.
In short, Israeli political parties do not follow a universal linear or bipolar scale, such
as the one Doves and Hawks scale often used outside of Israel to describe its parties. Instead,
political parties fall into a varying number of categories on a multidimensional scale
depending on the criteria and issues used to define those categories. These issues, which are
understandably interrelated often relate to Israel’s security, can be summarized as follows:
The first issue relates to how to deal with the Palestinian population in the whole of
Historic Palestine. The position of Traditional Labour Zionism, which has been represented
by the Labour Party, has been mostly for separation from the Palestinians, which would
eventually lead to their transfer through economical pressure and denial of work. While this
economic approach has been in line with Herzl’s original vision, it was not sufficient. As a
result, Ben Gurion, as the Labour movement’s leader at the time, had to resort to military
transfers of a large number of the Palestinian population during the 1948 war in what new
Israeli historians refer to as Plan Dalet or Plan D.
On the other hand, Revisionist Zionism, which has long been represented by the
Likud, had a far more ambivalent attitude towards the native Palestinian population. In line
with the vision of its founder Vladimir Jabotinsky and the Greater Israel Ideology, the Likud
would allow Palestinians to remain in the land but would use great power to force them into
submission in an “Iron Wall” arrangement. This approach was influenced by the Labor’s
ideology of transfer particularly within its religious circles.
Al-ZaytounaCentreforStudies&Consultations,Beirut,Lebanon
35 _______________________________________ III. Forces and Processes within the Political System
The debate between the two ideologies re-emerged following the 1967 war when the
perceived demographic threat from Palestinian populations increased following the
annexation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. In this debate, the two ideologies expressed
themselves in the two political positions that dominated the Israeli discourse on the future of
Palestinians within the occupied territories. While Labour advocated f self-determination for
the Palestinians and the establishment of a separate Palestinian state it was not able to carry
out mass expulsions in the current global climate. The likud’s position, on the other hand,
denied any collective political rights for the Palestinians in the occupied territories -Although
some of the extreme hawks were willing to allow the Palestinian Arabs individual political
rights following annexation of the land, and others advocated a population transfer- but was
also unable to implement an “iron wall” solution for fear of being accusing of building an
Apartheid state. The increasing difficulty in carrying out either strategies – transfer, or the
Iron Wall- led to a compromise that took the form of a “creeping occupation” of the West
Bank and the Gaza Strip, which Israel hoped would go largely unnoticed by the west.
More recently, a new ideology of “unilateral Separation” or disengagement has
emerged from amongst the Labour Zionist. This ideology, which appears to be in line with
the original Herzl ideology of separation and Transfer, was also adopted by some members of
the Likud and was much strengthened by the conversion of Ariel Sharon. Sharon’s split from
Likud to establish the Kadimah Party, which included members from both the Labour Party
and the Likud, signaled the emergence of Unilateral Separation as an alternative consensus
ideology.38
The second dimension is the future of the occupied territories. The extreme hawkish
position favors annexation of all territories, while the extreme dovish one advocates a total
Israeli withdrawal. There are two broad in-between positions which relate to the first
dimension. The first, which is closer to the dovish extreme and is associated with the Labour
party, uses the formula of 'territorial compromise' and envisages a partial withdrawal whose
magnitude varies according to an individual's degree of dovishness. The second position,
which is closer to the hawkish extreme, is generally termed the functional approach.
According to this view, Israel should refrain from annexing the territories in dispute but
should retain military control of them while allowing the Arabs living there to run their own
affairs. The extent of autonomy to be allowed to the Arabs living in the territories varies
according to the individual's degree of hawkishness.
A third dimension relates to the establishment of settlements in the territories. Views
on this matter are naturally related to the future of the occupied territories. The school of
territorial compromise regards the location of the new settlements as critical. It favors
settlements only in those security zones destined to stay within Israel's borders following any
political settlement. On the other hand, supporters of the functional approach and extreme
hawkish annexationists do not make a distinction on principle about where settlements are to
Al-ZaytounaCentreforStudies&Consultations,Beirut,Lebanon
The Process of Israeli Decision Making _________________________________________________ 36
be established. However, the functionalists are more selective about the location and timing
of new settlements for purely pragmatic security reasons.
The final, and arguably most important dimension, is the level of threat perception.
This is the most difficult measure to assess in the quest to place the Israeli political leadership
along the continuum. The extreme hawks display a high level of threat perception, accusing
the Arabs of aiming to destroy Israel. In contrast, the extreme doves were convinced that the
Arabs have become reconciled to the existence of the state of Israel. Those in the middle of
the spectrum differentiate among various levels of hostility on the part of the various Arab
actors.39
With the alliance between the Likud with the religious parties, a new general
classification has emerged in which the major political parties were grouped into two main
political camps. The first camp is called Israel A, which describes the Left wing parties and
includes a large proportion of secular, upper class, educated Ashkenazim, who normally vote
for Labour or Meretz. The second camp is Israel B, which describes the Right wing parties
together with the religious parties. It includes the religious, the Sephardim, the less educated,
and the lower-status workers, who normally vote for Likud and the religious parties.40
The accuracy of such simplistic division can be contested in many ways. But perhaps
its main weakness is that it reverts to the overly simplified bipolar model. The argument
behind this classification is that the religious parties and the Right have formed a form of
alliance that is quite distinct from that of the Left. For example, the Israeli right and the
religious parties agree on the notion that “Jewish Blood” is what differentiates Jews from
non-Jews. They both think very little of the blood of non-Jews (for the religious, the blood of
non-Jews has no intrinsic value while for the Likud, it has a limited value). In addition, both
the secular right wing Likud and the religious parties revere the Jewish past, which includes
respect to the religious nature of this past, and they both insist that Jews have a historic right
to an expanded Israel beyond its current borders. The religious heads of the religious parties
also often appeal to the traditionally religious member of the Likud (and Labour for that
matter).41
Both the right and the religious refer to Jewish history and tend to perceive any threat
in light of the historical persecution of the weak Jewish communities throughout the history.
But the irony is that those who make such images are the same people who speak with utmost
confidence about Israel’s power and ability to impose its will on the Middle East. This blend
of fear and exaggerated self confidence is common within the Israel B camp.
Another reason for the affinity between the secular right and the religious Jews is that
the latter is capable of providing “convincing arguments” for Jewish rule overt the land and
for the denial of basic rights to Palestinians, since the secular Jews are too removed from
Jewish religion and Jewish past to able to talk about it competently. Only the religious can
provide them with rationales based on the long history of the relationship between God and
Al-ZaytounaCentreforStudies&Consultations,Beirut,Lebanon
37 _______________________________________ III. Forces and Processes within the Political System
his chosen people.42
It is worth noting that the Israel B camp (the right and the religious
parties) has won sixty or more seats in every election since 1997, except in 1992.43
Furthermore, the left, which longs for normalcy and wants Jews to be a nation like all
other nations, is very different from the Israel B block which is united in its resentment of the
idea of normalcy and its belief that Jews are exceptionally different from all other peoples
and nations.
An example on the effects of the alliance between the Likud (right wing party) and the
Haredim (non-Zionist religious parties) was in the 1996 general elections, when this alliance
was credited for the Netanyahu victory. Haredi rabbis and voters stood solidly behind
Netanyahu, in spite of attempts by Shimon Peres to court Rabbi Ovadia Yoseph. For example
89% the town of Bnei Brak (a largely Haredi town east of Tel Aviv) voted for Netanyahu.44
Naturally, after the elections, Netanyahu formed a coalition with all three Haredi parties.
To demonstrate the differences between parties, this study provides a list and a brief
description of the political parties represented in the Knesset and the initial coalitions formed
following the election of the 16th
Knesset and the 17th
Knesset.45
Following that is a summary
of the political platforms and manifestos of the main political parties on the main issues that
were crucial to the 2006 general election:46
The Process of Israeli Decision Making _________________________________________________ 38
Hebrew Name
English Name ( If
different)
Political orientation Prominent personalities
16th
Knesset
2003
17th
Knesset
2006
Meretz -Yahad Leftist, Zionist, secular
Yossi Beilin, Haim Oron,
Ran Cohen, Zehava Galon
6 5
HaAvoda Labour
Left of Center, Zionist, secular
Amir Peretz, Benjamin Ben
Eliezer, Ami Ayalon
21 19
Shinui
Centrist, Zionist, Capitalist, vehemently opposes the
influence of the religious parties, and the
government support to religious establishments
Tommy Lapid, Avraham
Poraz, Eliezer Zandberg
15 0
Gil Pensioners Party Unannounced, Pensioners rights Rafael Eitan 0 7
Noy Center Right ? David Tal 1 0
Kadimah
Center-Right, Zionist, Populist Ehud Olmert, Tzipi Livni - 29
Likud
Right wing, Zionist, secular, capitalist
Benjamin Netanyahu, Shaul
Mofaz, Silvan Shalom
40 12
HaIkhud HaLeumi National Union (NU) Extreme Right, Zionist Benny Eilon 7 9
Yisrael Beytenu Israel Our
Homeland
Extreme Right, Zionist Avigdor Lieberman Joined NU 11
MafdalMafleget
Dati
Le’umi
National Religious
Party (NRP)
Extreme Right, Religious Zionist, Modern Orthodox
Zevulun Orlev, Nissan
Slomiansky,Shaul Yahalom
6
Joined NU in
NU-NRP
Agudat Yisrael47
Ashkenazi, Orthodox, non-Zionist, (Hawkish)
Yakov Litzman,
Meir Porush
3 6
39 _______________________________________ III. Forces and Processes within the Political System
Hebrew Name
English Name ( If
different)
Political orientation Prominent personalities
16th
Knesset
2003
17th
Knesset
2006
Degel HaTorah Ashkenazi, Orthodox, non-Zionist, (Dovish)
Moshe Gafni
Avraham Ravitz
2
Joined
Agudat
Yisrael in
UTJ
Shas Shomri
Torah
Sephardim
Sephardi, Orthodox, non-Zionist
Nissim Dahan;Yair Peretz,
Shlomo Ben-Izri
11 12
Balad National Democratic
Assembly
Arab party, Anti-Zionist, progressive, seeks to
transform Israel from a state of Jews to a democratic
state with equality for all its citizens
Azmi Bishara, Wasil Taha,
Jamal Zahalka
3 3
Ra'am-Ta'al United Arab List Largest Arab Party in the Knesset, Anti Zionist
includes Islamists
Ibrahim Sarsur, Talab
El-Sana, Ahmad Tibi
2 4
Hadash Communist Party
of Israel
Israel’s communist Party, includes Arabs and Jews,
anti-Zionist
Muhamed Barakeh,
Hana Sweid, Dov Khenin
3 3
The Process of Israeli Decision Making _________________________________________________ 40
Detailed platforms of the major Israeli political parties for the 2006 general elections
Palestinian
Statehood
Peace Process Jerusalem Settlements
Economy and
Employment
Religion and
State
Kadimah
Committed to Road
Map and eventual
creation of a
Palestinian state
Committed to Road
Map, but will
continue on a
unilateral path if
negotiations fail or
are not possible
Jerusalem will serve
as the eternal capital
of Israel
Remove settlements in
certain areas and
maintain settlement
blocks based on Israeli
security needs
Improved budgetary
transparency,
reapportioned
distribution of budgetary
funding. Increased
employment incentives,
improved career
oriented education,
employment of minors
Introduce
legislation
that would
legalize civil
marriage/
burial
Labour
Committed to a
negotiated two-state
solution that
includes a
Palestinian state
Supports renewed
negotiations toward
a two state solution,
while continuing to
fight terror
Jerusalem, with all of
its Jewish
neighbourhoods, will
be Israel’s eternal
capital; willing to cede
parts of the city to
Palestinians under an
agreement
Immediate cessation
of funding for
settlements and
withdrawal from most
of the territories (with
the exception of the
settlement blocks)
Raising minimum wage
and increased social
benefits,
legislate against abusive
manpower agencies,
improved education.
Maintain
religious
status quo
while
separating
religion from
the political
realm
Likud
Concedes that
Palestinian state
may be inevitable,
but ideologically
opposed to its
creation
Willing to negotiate
with PA leadership
which is ‘not
compromised by
terror’
An undivided
Jerusalem will be
Israel’s eternal capital
Israel should
maximize the land it
keeps in any final
settlement and
maintain control of all
settlement blocks and
the Jordan Valley
Reduction of
unemployment and
taxes. Increased
incentives, improved
transportation benefits,
improved child care for
working women
Maintain
Religious
status quo
41 _______________________________________ III. Forces and Processes within the Political System
Palestinian
Statehood
Peace Process Jerusalem Settlements
Economy and
Employment
Religion and
State
Meretz-
Yachad
Advocates the
creation of a
Palestinian state as
a key to the
conflict’s
resolution.
A negotiated
settlement accepted
by all sides based
on party leader
Yossi Beilin’s
‘Geneva Accords’
A divided Jerusalem
will serve as the
capital of both Israel
and a future
Palestinian state
Full withdrawal from
all of the territories
captured in the 1967
Six-Day War
Continued and improved
professional training.
Restrictions on
employment of foreign
workers to increase
opportunities for Israelis
Supports
State
recognition
of non-
Orthodox
conversions
and
patrilineal
descent as
legal source
of Jadishness
NU-- NRP
Opposed to the
creation of a
Palestinian state
based on
ideological and
security rationales
Sees the Palestinian
Authority as nonviable
and Jordan
as the Palestinian
state.
Believes the Arab
residents of West
Bank can be
citizens of JordanPalestine
but not
have to move there
Jerusalem shall remain
Israel’s undivided and
eternal capital
Supports the continued
construction of
communities
throughout the “Land
of Israel” and rejects
unilateral or
negotiated
withdrawals from
existing communities
Reduce economic
disparity, strengthen
periphery and
development towns;
continue policies to
strengthen economic
growth. Increased
minimum wage, tax
incentives for working
mothers
The state
must
maintain and
strengthen its
connection to
Jewish
tradition,
while
maintaining
respect for
the secular
The Process of Israeli Decision Making _________________________________________________ 42
Palestinian
Statehood
Peace Process Jerusalem Settlements
Economy and
Employment
Religion and
State
Shas
Philosophically
opposed, but
willing to consider
under certain
circumstances
Has supported land
for peace
negotiations in the
past, but has
retreated from this
policy in response
to terror
Jerusalem should
remain the undivided
capital of Israel
Supports maintaining
settlement blocks, but
willing to concede
territory if it saves
lives
Increased government
support for the poor and
underclass. Increase
government support for
training programs
Israel should
be ruled by
Jewish values
and laws
Shinui
Supports
establishment of
Palestinian state
Favours
negotiations and
territorial
compromise for
peace yet maintains
a strong security
stance
Jerusalem should
serve as the capital of
Israel and the future
state of Palestine
Major settlement
blocks should be
maintained in final
agreement with
Palestinians
Continue on current path
toward a true market
economy. Improved
government support for
employment
Supports the
complete
separation of
religion and
state
Yisrael
Beytenu
Supports the
creation of a border
drawn to minimize
the number of
Palestinians within
Israel, so Israel can
be Jewish and
democratic
Prefers unilateral
Israel moves to
ensure security
Jerusalem should
remain capital of
Israel
Maximize the number
of settlements to be
included in final
borders of Israel
including a land swap
through re-drawn
borders
Continue toward full
market economy and
privatization of
government held
industries. Increased
support for working
poor and women.
Supports
maintaining
the status quo
with some
allowance for
addressing
critical needs
Al-ZaytounaCentreforStudies&Consultations,Beirut,Lebanon
43 _______________________________________ III. Forces and Processes within the Political System
From the political platform summary above one can see the differences in the
positions of the main parties over the issues of the peace process, the Palestinian statehood,
the future of Jerusalem, the settlements, and the relationship between religion and state.
These differences can often be traced back to their respective ideologies.
One example of this ideological difference is the difference between the Labour Party
and the Likud over the nature of the conflict. For decades there has been, and still is, an
ongoing debate in the policy sphere between two schools of thought. The first school, which
is adopted by the Likud, is call the “war between states” school and it argues that the source
of the Arab-Israeli dispute was the refusal of the Arab states to recognize Israel’s existence
and that peace will only happen if the Arabs change this policy, and that the Palestinian
problem would be solved in the frame work of a peace treaty with Jordan.
The second school, which is adopted by the Labour, is called the “was between
nations” school and it argues that the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is at the heart of the broader
Arab-Israeli conflict, and that to achieve a normal relationship with the Arab states the
Palestinian problem has to be solved first. When the latter view dominated following the first
intifada, especially as it was adopted by the military, this helped tip the balance to take a
policy decision to start a peace process with the goals of resolving “the Palestinian dispute”.48
The strong ideological nature of political parties explains the difficulty that faces the
Prime Minister in creating a coalition of diverse parties. In order to have a stable and
successful coalition the ideological positions of coalition parties should be coordinated, as an
unstable coalition can tie the Prime Minister’s hands or eventually lead to the failing of the
Government.
Ideologies play a important role in policy deliberations. Policy is often discussed in
ideological and partisan terms which exceed their sizes. For example, arguments are often
made on issues of national security that portray them in terms of national survival, even when
in most cases this isn’t really at stake. This is not to mention the ideologically charged issues,
such as the peace process or the future of settlements, where formulating a policy in a
coalition that has different ideological positions can be impossible.49
But on the other side, there are certain issues that are agreed upon across the political
spectrum and are perhaps more influential than the dividing issues. These issues are always
present during any decision making because of the underlying consensus on them within both
the political and public spheres.
The most prominent issue upon which there is consensus amongst all Israel Jews is
the character of state of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state. All Israeli Zionist parties,
including the Left and the “peace camp”, agree on the principle of the unity of the people of
Israel and both the Right and the Left work to retain the purity of the population as a
predominantly Jewish one through methods such as encouraging immigration. This principle
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The Process of Israeli Decision Making _________________________________________________ 44
greatly influences all demographic-related decisions including the absolute rejection by all
Zionist parties of the right of Palestinian refugees to return their homes.
The issue of settlements could also be seen in light of this consensus. While the
Labour party currently opposes the expansionist building of settlements, this should be
understood in terms of its concern for the demographics and the character of Israel as a
Jewish state. Labour currently opposes the expansion of settlements only because it believes
that settlements jeopardises the demographic balance by adding the Palestinian population
within the “territories” to the equation. Labour has, as a result, tactically sacrificed the notion
of the wholeness of the land (Shlemot Ha’aretz),50
which is stressed on by the Likud, in order
to protect another notion; the unity of the people of Israel (Ahadut Ha’Am).51
Another principle on which there is consensus is the existential threat that Israel faces
and the need to ensure the strength of Israeli deterrence, which includes putting a stop to any
form of resistance. This principle, which is present in almost every Israeli decision, strongly
influences the negotiation over the nature of any proposed neighbouring Palestinian state. All
parties which support the establishment of a “Palestinian entity” agree that is should be a
demilitarized state so as not to pose any threat to the security of Israel.
The status of Jerusalem also ranks high on the list of issues on which there is near
consensus as is perhaps evident from the party manifestos summary above. Despite the
positions of the Labour and the Meretz-Yachad parties regarding a divided Jerusalem, a law
passed by the Knesset in 2000 makes it impossible to change the status of any part of
Jerusalem without another Knesset law. Another law is being debated in December 2007 to
make any change to the status of Jerusalem subject to a special (two thirds) majority in the
Knesset.52
Even on the issues of the peace process and the final settlement with the Palestinians,
although there are disagreements over them between the two main parties, Labour and Likud,
a form of consensus is created between the decision makers in either party by the Beilin-Eitan
Agreement which was signed in 1997 - in the wake of the Rabin Assassination - between
Yossi Belien representing Labour at the time, and Michael Eitan who was then representing
Likud as its parliamentary faction leader.
The agreement which aimed to clarify the areas of agreement and disagreement
between the 2 parties regarding future negotiations with the Palestinians on a permanent
settlement, created a framework for the Israeli negotiators in any final settlement negotiations
with the Palestinians.53
The agreement set three principles around which an Israeli national consensus is to be
built; The first principle notes that it has become necessary for Israel-if it seeks to secure the
advantages offered by its presence in the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip-to
"permit" the creation of a Palestinian "entity" of undetermined status. Whether this entity is
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45 _______________________________________ III. Forces and Processes within the Political System
called a state, as Labour’s Beilin was prepared to concede, or an "enlarged autonomy," as the
Likud's Eitan preferred, the fact of extensive Israeli limits on Palestinian sovereign power
remains constant.
The second principle is a demand for continuing Israeli strategic control over
whatever territory is transferred to the Palestinian entity. This demand goes far beyond the
recent negotiations over Israel's right of "hot pursuit" of Palestinian, and highlights the extent
to which Israel views the rapprochement with the Palestinians as a way of preserving, rather
than re-evaluating, its security interests in territories occupied in June 1967.
The third guiding principle concerns the future of settlements anywhere in the
"Western Land of Israel” (The entire historical Palestine), and it follows from the second
principle. The authors declare that the continuing existence of all settlements must be part of
an agreement with the Palestinians. Such an agreement must preserve settler rights not only
to keep Israeli citizenship, but also to maintain their individual and communal ties to Israel.
The preservation of these ties -personal, legal, and territorial- therefore becomes one of the
basic security interests that Israel insists must be preserved.54
The agreement also outlines detailed principles which are to be the basis of
negotiations on the issues of borders, security, the status of the “Palestinian entity” and limits
to its sovereignty, Jerusalem, the refugees, water, and the economy.
As evident from the categorization above, the definitions of Right and Left in Israel
have become more about political positions and less about socio-economical issues.
Commentators often argue that in Israel there is no Left any more, and that all that remains in
the Left is a political position vis-à-vis the Right, with no associated social or economic Left
leaning policies. But even with that limited definition, the political center in Israel is
gradually shifting towards the Right -as a reflection of changed in the Israeli society. Such
changes have meant that positions that in the past were considered extreme Right are now
seen to be Leftist and moderate. A recent Poll by the GeoCartographia Research Institute
shows that 55% of Israelis believe that the Left does not exist anymore, and that the Labour
party can no longer be considered a Leftist party.55
2.3 Internal party politics It should also be noted that political parties themselves should not
be seen as blocs, especially in the case of larger parties such as Labour and Likud. All Israeli
political parties function like western Political parties- with the exception of the Shas, Agudat
Yisrael, Degel HaTorah, and the extreme Right parties.
These parties are generally composed of a Party Convention, which ranges between
one thousand and three thousand members depending on the size of the party and is the
highest party authority, a smaller Central Committee that meets more regularly, and a few
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The Process of Israeli Decision Making _________________________________________________ 46
smaller committees, such as the executive committee, which runs the day-to-day party
activities. These party structures imply a great deal of transparency , but in reality the
decision making within parties is to a great extent controlled by a small group of political
leaders within the party who control the decisions on policies as well as on the choice of
candidates to prominent party and public posts.
Even between these small groups of leaders, differences emerge and power bases are
created within the same party. These rival camps - some of which are remnants of smaller
parties- compete for the leadership of the party and work to push their interpretation of the
party’s founding principles to the front. For example the Labour party currently includes the
Amir Peretz camp (which includes the bloc from the now dissolved Am Ehad party as well as
the Histradrut worker union bloc), the Benjamin Ben-Eliezer camp, and the Arab camps.
2.4 Political programs Ideologies aside, political parties’ programmes are influenced by the
degree of pragmatism of its decision makers, and can be changed for internal political or
tactical reasons, or in response to a change in the Israeli public opinion. Both party ideologies
as well as its social, political, and economical programmes are taken into consideration when
creating a Government coalition.
In terms of decision making there are many examples of pragmatism in public policy.
Ehud Barak’s unilateral withdrew from Lebanon and his willingness to forego almost all
previous Israeli positions at Camp David in 2000, Sharon’s unilateral withdrew from Gaza,
and Olmert’s announcement of his intention of unilaterally withdrawing from the West Bank
are but a few of these examples.56
Another example on pragmatism is the change in the position of different parties
towards the wider conflict with surrounding countries. The Labour party, for example, has for
a long time preferred to follow the periphery doctrine of creating links and alliances with the
non-Arab “outer ring” countries with which Israel had no direct conflict such as Turkey,
Ethiopia, the Shah’s Iran, and a few sub-Saharan governments, as well as with ethnic and
religious minorities, like the Maronites in Lebanon and the Kurds in Iraq. This periphery
doctrine, which was developed by Ben-Gurion and Eliahu Sassoon, was deemed to serve
Israel’s security against the hostile inner ring Arab countries and was implemented by both
the Labour and the Likud.
However, it was never considered a good substitute for a strategy aimed at achieving
peace with Israel’s Arab neighbors. So when the geo-strategic balance of the region changed
- with the establishment of peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan, the initiation of a peace
process, and the changes that took place in periphery countries (Ethiopia and Iran) - a reversal
of policy was needed. It was Rabin and Perez in the early 1990s who adopted such reversal
and who considered post revolutionary Iran as one of Israel primary enemies.57
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47 _______________________________________ III. Forces and Processes within the Political System
But when Likud came to power led by Benjamin Netanyahu in 1996, he tried to
reverse this trend. Not only has he tried to undo the Oslo peace process but he also attempted
to restore the periphery doctrine, and even initiated an extensive discreet program of reaching
out to the Islamic Republic against the advice of the National Intelligence Assessment.58
Although such rapprochement did not bear any fruit because of Iranian lack of interest and
the Labour policy was reinstituted. This incident demonstrates how differences in ideological
convictions regarding the conflict have clear policy consequence.
In terms of internal party politics, the decision by Labour veteran Shimon Perez to
join Ariel Sharon’s newly formed Kadimah Party and Benjamin Netanyahu’s behaviour in
supporting and then opposing Ariel Sharon’s decision to disengage from the Gaza Strip, are
two recent examples of such pragmatism.
Like many political systems around the world, politics in Israel is a vocation
comparable to soviet “apparatchik” model of politicians. As a result career politicians who
have spent most of their lives in political bureaucracies dominate it. As these career
politicians are less likely to change than those who enter politics with fresh ideas, political
conservatism and resistance to change has developed as a result in the political system.59
This
also opened the door for political expediency. It is not uncommon in Israeli Politics to see
political parties making or supporting certain decisions to join government, to stay in
government, or to avoid new general elections which may not be advantageous to that party.60
To avoid losing voters as a result of such a pragmatic approach, ideological reasons are used
as front to such decisions. It is worth noting that most political resignations can be explained
in political terms, and that it is rare that an individual minister would resign on an issue of
principle.61
3. The role of the Prime Minister and top leadership and the personification of
power
3.1 The role of the Prime Minister The Prime Minister, also known as the Premier,62
is the
most powerful political figure in Israel. According to Israeli law, he, or she, is the head of the
executive branch and thus wields executive power. In addition, he has the supreme political
position in the country and represents the apex of the decision making pyramid in Israel.
The Prime Minister’s position in the cabinet is identified by Israeli law, as Primus
inter Pares, or First among equals. He is responsible for the actions of his government. He
has the authority to appoint and dismiss ministers, to set jurisdictional responsibilities of
ministries, and to reorganize their functions and structures. Moreover he has the authority to
appoint the heads of unelected power-sharing institutions such as the governor of the Bank of
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The Process of Israeli Decision Making _________________________________________________ 48
Israel, the Attorney General, and the Director of the Mossad. The Prime Minister,
theoretically at least, has complete authority in making final policy decisions, and is the
ultimate decision maker. He sets the cabinet agendas and controls the pace of events. The
Prime Minister also has immunity from removal in the case of being accused in a court of
law. He only has to resign after a final verdict against him in a legal case.63
The Prime
Minister and one or two senior ministers such as the Defence and Foreign Ministers are often
referred to as the top leadership.
Between the years 1948 and 2008 12 persons (eleven men and one woman) have
served as prime minister. Seven were born in Eastern Europe. And five (Rabin, Netanyahu,
Barak, Sharon, and Olmert) were born in Mandate Palestine except for Netanyahu who was
born in 1949.64
Most of them became prime ministers at a relatively advanced age following
a long political career in party related political work. Most of them were also the heads of
their political parties.65
With the concern for security as high as it is in Israel, a leader’s military background
is one of the most important characteristics to whether he is fit for leadership. Almost all
Israel's governments, to date, possessed military or security experience even if the top
leadership was not occupied by former generals.66
For example, 6 of the last 8 prime
ministers in power since 1974 had distinguished military or security establishment record.67
In addition, Defense ministers- except for Amir Peretz- were either former generals, such as
Moshe Dayan, Ariel Sharon, Shaul Mofaz, Yitzhak Mordechai, and Ezer Weizman, or
individuals with extensive military/security background, such as Shimon Peres, Moshe
Arens, Binyamin Ben-Eliezer, and Yitzhak Shamir. Even those leaders who lacked such
experience such as Menachem Begin compensated for that by surrounding themselves with
experienced people such as Dayan and Weizman.68
Another characteristic of Israeli leaders that emerged recently is attention to obtaining
foreign credentials. According to Israeli Historian Tom Segev, all elites in Israel today are
people who have “an American chapter in their biography”. He asserts that the elite in
economy, academia, science, business, the army, politics, and the media, are people who
studied in the United States.69
3.2 Limitations to the power of the Prime Minister The prime minister is not only entitled
by law to be the ultimate decision maker, but he is also expected to lead and to be decisive.
However, the Prime Ministers powers are limited by number of factors, many of which are
also empowering factors. The prime minister is constrained by the coalition he creates, and
by the coalition agreement between his party and other parties in the coalition. While he leads
the cabinet, he is dependant on the support and the collaboration of ministers and on the
confidence of the Knesset. The Prime Minister is only as strong as he can force his colleagues
to let him be.
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49 _______________________________________ III. Forces and Processes within the Political System
The Prime Minister is also constrained by the limited resources at the disposal of his
office, including a limited budget and limited organizational means, which limits his ability
to singularly affect public policy in spite of its great powers.. His role is also limited by the
collective responsibility of the cabinet, as well as by the limitations of the powers conferred
by law.70
In addition, the Prime Minister has the final say only on issues that reach him. In
Israel, issues of foreign and security policy are the only issues that are regularly brought for
decision to the top leadership, while matters of internal and economic policy are handled by
the proximate decision makers such as ministers and senior administrative office holders. The
top leadership may act as a final court of appeal in internal and economic issues if proximate
decision makers cannot reach an agreement among themselves.71
3.3 Personification of top leadership In recent years, the power of the top leadership in
Israel has significantly increased, with the political weight gradually shifting from the
political platforms of parties to the personality of their leaders competing for the position of
the Prime Minister. Israeli elections are becoming increasingly about the experience, skill,
toughness, and nerve to make decisions of war and peace and to conduct Israel’s relations
with its allies.72
Prime Ministers who have put great emphasis on collegial, collective, and
lengthy decision making processes have been criticized for being indecisive, wavering, and
vague.73
This is partly because large sections of Israeli Jews believe that what they need is a
strong leader. Research has found that as a result of the weak nature of Israeli democracy and
the anti-democratic attitudes held by many within the Israeli population, in times of trauma,
Israelis tend to look for a strong leader who they hope will solve their problems. This position
is confirmed by opinion polls consistently show that around two thirds of Israelis think that
strong leaders are better than debates and laws,74
this figure is high compared to western
democracies where less than third of populations believe that a strong leader is better than
debates and laws. The victory of Rabin in 1992 and the rise of Benjamin Netanyahu to power
in 1996 are good examples on how the role of personality and perceived strength can
sometimes be equal that of ideology and political experience.75
In the 1992 election
campaign, Rabin championed the significance of prime ministerial leadership in governance.
His electoral list was named “The Labour Party Headed by Rabin.”76
These expectations by the public, the media, and other politicians of the Prime
Minister to lead has played a major role in transforming the Prime Minister from a Primus
inter Pares, or a first amongst equal, to a Primus, or a super minister.
This increase in the significance of leaders was accompanied with a general change in
the types of leaders. Throughout its short history Israel’s leaders have changed from a
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The Process of Israeli Decision Making _________________________________________________ 50
generation of ‘historical’ leaders with great experience and popularity, to leaders who are a
result of their political parties’ bureaucratic system but have less popularity and less control
over their own party. This has in turn changed to leaders who have a relatively brief
professional political career before taken office, but often a long illustrious military careers
and a charismatic popularity within the electorate and their parties’ bases. This group is
exemplified by the premiership of Barak and Netanyahu.77
The issue of personification of power has been compounded with the “electoral
reform” law in 1992. The law, which called for the direct elections of the Prime Minister on a
separate ballot, has been implemented in 1996 following the difficulties in forming the
Government in 1984, 1988, and 1990. The law, which was meant to strengthen the executive,
was essentially an attempt to change the Israeli system a unique combination, a parliamentary
system with presidential attributes. It eroded many of the powers of the Knesset over
governance and policy making and concentrated even more powers in the hand of the
executive.
However, the law which strengthened the executive power and the prime minister, has
not helped create stable coalitions, instead as the power of the Prime Minister has increased,
his influence on controlling the majority in the Knesset has declined, especially vis-à-vis the
small parties. The two-ballot vote gave smaller parties more leverage in pressuring the Prime
Minister candidates in return for their support for his candidacy. It allowed the s mall parties
to pressure bigger parties to accommodate their policy preferences not only during coalition
formation bargaining but also during the prime ministerial elections. It also removed the
incentive to vote for large parties within certain sectors (namely voting for a large party
prime minister), which resulted in certain sectors voting for their representing parties in the
Knesset vote and for the large parties’ candidates in the Prime Minister vote. The results were
a further fragmented Knesset which led to the two-ballot vote being abolished following the
2001 elections.78
Nevertheless, this U-turn has not helped in reversing the general trend of
personification, which extended even to local elections, which were reformed to elect a city’s
mayor directly by the public instead of the proportional representation previously adopted.79
The position of the Prime Minister has also been strengthened by the gradual growth
of the Office of the Prime Minister over the years, which has only served in concentrating
more powers in the hand of the Prime Minister.80
Three major policy decisions demonstrate the centrality of the decision making
process around the Prime Minister. These decisions were: Begin’s agreement to start talks
with Egypt In 1977, Peres decision to withdraw from Lebanon in 1984 and his economic
stabilization plan to stop inflation, and Rabin’s decision on the Oslo Accord with the
Palestinian Liberation Organization in 1992. In spite of their differences, in all three cases the
Prime Minister was central to the decisions, which he almost took alone, keeping almost all
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51 _______________________________________ III. Forces and Processes within the Political System
of his cabinet in the dark except for one minister in whom he confided. Begin confided in
Dayan, Peres confided in Modai, and Rabin confided in Peres. In all three cases, the top civil
servants were generally not included in the consultations, but the Prime Ministers made
extensive use of his advisors, Begin with Aharon Barak, Peres with a number of economists,
and Rabin with Singer.81
Another sign on the personification of politics is the increasing role of public opinion
in politics. Prime Ministers are continuously aware of their public opinion standing and
always strive to have high public ratings. When leaders are unable to rise to the public’s
expectations, the public quickly loses confidence in them. Especially that Israelis do not have
a very high opinion of their political leaders in general, compared to their confidence in the
military staff for example.82
This was apparent in the case of Ehud Barak who was
characterized by his preference to ignore his advisors and to take his decisions alone. Such
behaviour has led to loss of trust between him and his party- which saw his behaviour as
arrogant- and subsequently the public. It is believed that this perception together with his
indecisiveness has contributed to his fall in March 2001.
Similarly, in the case of Ehud Olmert, political failures were coupled with a lack of
charisma, and a rise in investigations into corruption cases within his government. As a result
Olmert’s public standing diminished fairly quickly. In February 2007 a Ha’aretz poll showed
that 78% of Israelis are unhappy with leadership, with 32% of them citing corruption and
10% citing selfishness as the reason.
Some Israeli academics perceive personification as a threat to the Israeli political
system which was envisaged to be based on political settlements and inclusion rather than
decisiveness. They see the political system as a 4-level pyramid model with the general
public at its base, supporting the political parties, which in turn support the Knesset
coalitions, and at the top of the pyramid lies the executive body headed by the Prime
Minister. They thus argue that since the democratic values and traditions are not rooted in the
Israeli political system, strengthening the executive power at the top of the pyramid (as in a
presidential system) can lead to alienation of the opposition which would adversely affect the
already fragile and polarised society.83
3.4 Cabinet politicization, improvisation, and decision making In addition to
personification, the Israeli top leadership has other problems. The increasing size and
politicization of the Cabinet and the Mini-Cabinet (the Ministerial Committee on Defense),
together with the Prime Minister’s inability to seek advice from- or confide to- ministers in
the coalition such as the Defense Minister and the Foreign Minister (because they often are
from another party in the coalition or another power base in the party),84
have created a
political culture of maintaining “constructive ambiguity” within the cabinet and avoiding
clearly defined policy objectives for fear of their negative domestic repercussions. This has,
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The Process of Israeli Decision Making _________________________________________________ 52
in turn, created a culture amongst leadership that avoids supporting staff work. Some scholars
such as Charles Freilich even argue that there is a fundamental and conscious decision on the
part of nearly all prime ministers to refrain from systematic staff work, especially work that is
not informed of the Prime Minister’s agenda.85
Leaders have thus tended to downplay the importance of consultation and preparatory
staff work, relying primarily on their personal judgment and relegating senior officials and
advisers to the level of aides.86
Yossi Beilin’s described this culture in a newspaper interview,
upon assuming the position of a cabinet secretary in the Peres government of 1984-1986. He
described how he was “astounded by the lack of any preparation for cabinet meetings. The
preparations are more lacking than anyone from the outside could imagine. The ministers are
no presented with sufficient information enabling their vote to take into account all the
ramifications of these decisions.”87
Such culture of avoiding staff work is compounded with the fact that the Prime
Minister’s Office and the Cabinet both lack the organizational capabilities and the staff
necessary to conduct systematic staff work such as policy assessment and formulation, interministerial
coordination, and implementation follow-up.
In addition, since most Israeli leaders have long political experiences, they have a
long-standing familiarity with the primary national security issues and often have strongly
held positions on how to deal with the different issues that Israel faces. Leaders are also
strongly influenced by their beliefs and perceptions of the world. Michael Brecher argues that
decision makers in foreign policy operate within their psychological dispositions, which
include societal factors such as ideology and tradition that are derived from a cumulative
historical legacy, as well as their personality factors.88
In addition, Israeli leaders are also
inevitably influenced by the culture of strong “can do” leaders -which is celebrated in Israeland
by the lack of checks and balances during policy formulation. This has resulted in an
increased reliance on personal judgment which created a culture of improvisation and crisis
management as an alternative to systematic forethought, planning, and prevention.
In too many areas, trial-and-error decision-making and “fire-fighting” are the norm
and are implemented to a degree unusual in other countries. Policies are tried and abandoned
as events develop, without forethought, systematic analysis, or a basic strategic framework.
Improvisation remains a primary characteristic of Israeli decision making to this day, and
although it is perceived to have achieved success that surpassed expectations, its failures can
be catastrophic to Israel. In spite of its many disadvantages, one advantage of improvisation
is that it allows the decision maker to take action without a clear articulation of objectives and
prior choice between policy options. However, even this advantage can be perceived as a
disadvantage, since the lack of policy options leaves the Prime Minister with less room for
maneuver.
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53 _______________________________________ III. Forces and Processes within the Political System
In recent years, however, Israel’s ability to improvise has decreased, as issues have
become far more complex, requiring lengthy, systematic planning, and implementation, and
as the cost of error has grown and often became unacceptable.89
However, policymaking
remains, to a certain degree, influenced with personal preferences of the Prime Minister and
the top leadership. For example, the then-Defense Minister Sharon decided on the 1982
invasion of Lebanon despite broad opposition from the Cabinet and national security
bureaucracy, as did Barak in deciding on Israel’s unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon 18
years later. It is also understood that Prime ministers Begin, Rabin, Barak, Sharon, and
Olmert all adopted radically new positions on the peace process solely, or almost solely, on
their own understandings and intuitions.90
These three factors, the personalization of leadership, the politicization of the cabinet
and the dominance of improvisation, have led to what has been described as the failure of the
Cabinet as a decision making forum. Prime ministers were forced to formulate policy on their
own in smaller ad hoc groups or forums, with only a few trusted confidantes. For example
Golda Meir had a “Kitchen Cabinet;” Rabin and Peres tended to work things out between
themselves; and during the National Unity Government, Shamir convened a “Premiers’
Forum” (composed of Rabin, Peres, and himself); Sharon had a “ranch forum;” and Olmert
consulted seven ministers which were known as the “Group of Seven”.91
As a result, the Israeli decision making process became not only personalized and
idiosyncratic, but also fluid, informal, and less institutionalized. Prime Ministers for example
tended to have a direct relationship with their Ambassadors to the United States, and although
ambassador should answer to the Foreign Affairs ministry, such direct relationship with the
prime minister allowed them to become associates in the decision making process on foreign
and security policy. This has been the case in the relationship between Ambassador Yitzhak
Rabin with Prime Minister Golda Meir, between Ambassador Moshe Arens and Prime
Minister Yitzhak Shamir, and between Ambassador Itamar Rabinovich and Prime Minister
Yitzhak Rabin.92
Many major decisions were taken without consulting the cabinet. For example,
Sharon decided on the Gaza disengagement plan without consulting the national security
bureaucracy on the options open to him, turning to it only for its input on the best ways to
implement the course he already had decided on. Similarly, Begin went to Camp David in
1978 without the benefit of any preparatory staff work and quashed the one major study
conducted by the IDF prior to the summit. Extensive staff work was conducted at the
bureaucratic level prior to the 1982 War in Lebanon, but was kept from the Cabinet by Begin
and Sharon. Barak made important decisions on the Palestinian, Syrian, and Lebanese fronts
based on his own assessments and preferences.
However, it should be note that during times of crises most decisions taken (69% of
the decisions during the 1967 war, and 55% during the 1973 war) are made in large
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The Process of Israeli Decision Making _________________________________________________ 54
institutional meetings, either the cabinet, the Ministerial Committee on Defense or the
General Staff. Decisions were delegated to the Ministerial Committee on Defense when they
are not as crucial as in the case of the later days of the 1967 wars when it was evident to the
Israelis that the war was won.93
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55 _______________________________________ III. Forces and Processes within the Political System
Endnotes
1
Parties contesting elections have ranged from 14-30, while parties which manage to get elected to the Knesset
have ranged between 10-15 parties. In the 2006 general elections, 30 parties contested the elections, only 12
managed to win seats in the 17th
Knesset.
2
Represented in the 2006 general elections with the Sephardi Haredi party: Shas, and the Ashkenazi Haredi two
party list: Yahadut HaTorah HaMeukhedet (United Torah Judaism).
3
In the 2006 general elections, the new party Gil - Gimla'ey Yisrael LaKneset (Age - pensioners of Israel to the
Knesset) won a surprising 7 seats in the 17th
Knesset.
4
Metz, Israel: A Country Study, under “the Cabinet.”
5
Jewish Virtual Library. “The Knesset.” http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Politics/knesset.html
(Accessed 18.02.2007).
6
Sager. The Parliamentary System of Israel,195-205.
7
Metz, Israel: A Country Study, under “the Cabinet.”
8
Madar Data Bank. “ Edarat Al’e’telaf AlHokomi (Government Coalition Administration.)”
http://databank.madarcenter.org/databank/TopicView.asp?CatID=1&SubID=2&TopicID=28 (Accessed
25.10.2006).
9
Freilich, National Security Decision-Making in Israel: Processes, Pathologies, and Strengths.
10
It is estimated that one third to one half of voters have been known to select a different party from the one
they selected in the previous elections. Source: Asher Arian, Politics in Israel: The Second Republic
(Washington D.C: CQ Press, 2005)
11
Asher Arian et al. The 2007 Israeli democracy index: Auditing Israeli Democracy- Cohesion in a Divided
Society. Israeli Democracy Institute- The Guttman Center. June 2007.
12
Including the Provisional Government of Israel (between 14th
May 1948 – 8th
March 1949), and the
Government formed following the 2006 elections.
13
In Israel’s 60-year history, there have been countless coalition crises. But in only two cases – in 1977 and
1999 – did a Government fall and the opposition take power as a result of a coalition dispute. Such battles
usually result from smaller parties’ attempts to intimidate a prime minister by blackmailing him to achieve
certain goals or else they will “sink the boat”.
14
Barhoom Garaysi, “ Altarkeebah Albarlamaniya Tamna’ Seegha Moshtaraka letaghyeerat Fe Nezam Alhokm
Alisraeli (The Parliamentary Composition Prevents a Common Dorm for Changes to the Israeli Government
System),” Almash-had Al-Israeli (The Israeli Scene), 14 November, 2006.
15
Grinstein, Gidi. “A President Doesn't Guarantee Capacity to Govern.” The Reut Institute, 10 October, 2006.
http://www.reut-institute.org/Publication.aspx?PublicationId=967 (Accessed 17.10.2006).
16
Freilich, National Security Decision-Making in Israel: Processes, Pathologies, and Strengths.
17
The record was set in 1999 when 33 different lists ran for Knesset.
18
Editorial. “ Hawla Raf’e Nesbat AlHasm: Aldawafe’ Walghayat (On Raising the Electoral Threshold, Causes
and Goals)” Almash-had Al-Israeli (The Israeli Scene), 17 April, 2007.
19
Michal Shamir and Asher Arian, “Collective Identity and Electoral Competition in Israel,” The American
Political Science Review 93, no. 2 (June 1999): 265-277.
20
Asher Arian, David Nachmias and Ruth Amir, Executive Governance in Israel. (New York: Palgrave, 2002),
91-94.
21
Metz, Israel: A Country Study, under “the Cabinet.”
Al-ZaytounaCentreforStudies&Consultations,Beirut,Lebanon
The Process of Israeli Decision Making _________________________________________________ 56
22
Freilich, National Security Decision-Making in Israel: Processes, Pathologies, and Strengths.
23
Ibid.
24
Ibid.
25
Yoram Peri, Generals in the Cabinet Room: How the Military Shapes Israeli Policy (Washington D.C: United
States Institute of Peace Press, 2006).
26
Freilich, National Security Decision-Making in Israel: Processes, Pathologies, and Strengths.
27
Ibid.
28
Ibid.
29
Ibid.
30
Ibid.
31
Ibid.
32
Ibid.
33
Ibid.
34
Ibid.
35
Charless S. Liebman and Eliezer Don Yehiya, “ What a Jewish State Means to Israeli Jews” in Comparative
Jewish Politics: Public Life in Israel and the Diaspora, edited by Sam N. Lehman-Wilzig and Bernard Susser
(Israel: Bar-Ilan University Press),105-109.
36
2004 figure. Source: Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics, Jews and others, by origin, continent of birth and
period of immigration. http://www1.cbs.gov.il/shnaton56/st02_24.pdf
37
Ashkenazim: The term was used to describe Jews who derive from northern Europe and who generally follow
the customs originating in medieval German Judaism. It now refers to Jews of northern and eastern European
background (including Russia) with their distinctive liturgical practices or religious and social customs. The
word Ashkenaz means Germany in medieval Hebrew.
Mizrachim: Theterm describes Jews who descended from the Jewish communities of the Middle East. Included
in the Mizrachi category are Jews from the Arab world, as well as other communities including the Gruzim,
Persian Jews, Bukharan Jews, Mountain Jews, Iraqi Jews (including the Baghdadi Jews of India),
Kurdish Jews, and Yemenite Jews among various others. The term Mizrachim comes from “Mizrach” which
means orient/east in Hebrew. Most Mizrachim practice Sephardic Judaism as they were influenced by the
Sephardim who emigrated from Spain to the Ottoman Empire. Most Mizrachim speak Arabic and Judeo-Arabic.
Sephardim: Are those who practice Sephardic Judaism according to the tradition of the Jews who left Spain or
Portugal after the 1492 expulsion and joined the existing Mizrachi Communities in the Arab World. The
beliefs of Sephardic Judaism are basically in accord with those of Orthodox Judaism, though Sephardic
interpretations of Halachah (Jewish Law) are somewhat different than Ashkenazi ones. As a cultural
designation, the term refers to the practices associated with Jews of this region and its related diaspora in the
Balkans and Middle East (especially in Islamic countries). The term comes from the Hebrew term for Spain,
Sephard. Traditionally Sephardim speak Ladino, or Judeo-Spanish.
38
Jonathan Cook. Israel’s Dead End. Al-Ahram Weekly. 26 June 2008. Issue No. 903.
http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2008/903/op1.htm (Accessed 29.06.2008)
39
Efraim Inbar and Giora Goldberg, “Is Israel’s Political Elite Becoming More Hawkish?”
International Journal, no. 45 (Summer 1990).
40
Arian, Politics in Israel: The Second Republic, 261, 269.
41
Shahak, Jewish Fundamentalism in Israel,
42
Ibid, 10-14
43
Arian, Politics in Israel: The Second Republic, 254.
Al-ZaytounaCentreforStudies&Consultations,Beirut,Lebanon
57 _______________________________________ III. Forces and Processes within the Political System
44
Asher Arian, “The Israeli Election for Prime Minister and the Knesset, 1996,” Electoral Studies 15
(November 1996): 570-575.
45
The 16th
Knesset was elected in Jan 2003 and the 17 Knesset was elected in March 2006. Source: Zionism and
Israel - Encyclopaedic Dictionary, Israeli Political System and Parties Definition
46
Israel Votes 2006. “Political Parties & Platforms.” http://www.israelvotes.com/2006/platforms.php
(Accessed 08.08.2007).
47
Agudat Yisrael and Degel HaTorah are Joined together frequently as United Torah Judaism or Yahadut
HaTorah HaMeukhedet.
48
Peri, Generals in the Cabinet Room: How the Military Shapes Israeli Policy,.34.
49
Freilich, National Security Decision-Making in Israel: Processes, Pathologies, and Strengths.
50
The concept of Shlemot Ha’aretz, or wholeness of the land has changed in meaning due to ideological
changes in revisionist Zionist between the 1950s and the 1970s, While it initially meant both sides of the Jordan
river, during the 1970s it has now come to mean the whole land of Israel, or the whole land between the river
and the sea. Source: Nadav G. Shelef, “From “Both Banks of the Jordan” to the “Whole Land of Israel:”
Ideological Change in
Revisionist Zionism,” Israel studies 9, no. 1. (Spring 2004): 125-148.
51
George Kurzom, “What Does the Application of the Right of Return Mean for Israel?” Almash-had Al-Israeli
(The Israeli Scene).
52
Ezra Halevi, “Knesset Advances Jerusalem Protection Law,” Arutz Sheva, 16 December, 2007.
http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/124255 (Accessed: 22.12.2007)
53
Jewish Virtual Library. “The Beilin-Eitan Agreement: National Agreement Regarding the Negotiations on the
Permanent Settlement with the Palestinians.”
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Peace/beilin_eitan.html (Accessed: 08.08.2007).
54
Foundation for Middle East Peace. “The Beilin-Eitan Agreement on Permanent Status and its True
Antecedents.” http://www.fmep.org/reports/vol07/no2/02the_beilin_eitan_agreement_on_permanent_status_and_its_true_antecedents.html
(Accessed 09.06.2007).
55
Editorial. “55% Men alJomhoor Alisraeli Ya’taqedon An Alyasaar Lam Ya’od Qa’eman (55% of Israelis
Believe That the Left no Longer Exists)” 48 Arabs.
http://www.arabs48.com/display.x?cid=6&sid=6&id=53165
56
Freilich, National Security Decision-Making in Israel: Processes, Pathologies, and Strengths.
57
Leon T. Hadar,“Orienting Jerusalem toward Ankara or Cairo? Israel’s New Geostrategic Debate,”
Mediterranean Quarterly 12, no. 3 (2001): 8-30.
58
Trita Parsi, “Iran: the Inflatable Bogey.” Rootless cosmopolitan website,
http://tonykaron.com/2007/10/09/iran-the-inflatable-bogey/ (Accessed: 16.12.2007).
59
Arian, Politics in Israel: The Second Republic, 101.
60
Ibid, 266.
61
Ibid, 269.
62
Premier and Prime Minister are both English naming conventions, whereas the accurate translation of the
Hebrew title “Rosh HaMemshala” is head of the government.
63
Arian, Politics in Israel: The Second Republic, 265.
64
Netanyahu was born in 1949 in Tel Aviv.
65
Arian, Executive Governance in Israel, 35-36.
Al-ZaytounaCentreforStudies&Consultations,Beirut,Lebanon
The Process of Israeli Decision Making _________________________________________________ 58
66
Since 1992 three prime ministers (Yitzhak Rabin, Ehud Barak, and Ariel Sharon), and two Labour party
leaders (Binyamin Ben-Eliezer, and Amram Mitzna), and one Mafdal party leader (Effi Etam), were all former
Military Generals. Source: Mansour, Israel, Daleel ‘Aam, 2004, 136.
67
Prime ministers since 1974 and their highest military/Security positions: Yitzhak Rabin and Ehud Barak were
former Chiefs of Defense Staff, Ariel Sharon was a Major General and a formal Head of IDF's Southern
Command, Shimon Peres was a formal Director General of the Ministry of Defense, Yitzhak Shamir worked for
the Mossad for 10 years, Benjamin Netanyahu served in the elite unit Sayeret Matkal (The reconnaissance unit
of the General Staff)
68
Arian, Politics in Israel: The Second Republic, 333.
69
Institute of International Studies, University of California Berkeley. “Israeli National Identity:
Conversation with Tom Segev,” Conversations with History series. 8 April 2004.
http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/people4/Segev/segev-con0.html (Accessed 12.05.2007).
70
Arian, Politics in Israel: The Second Republic, 36, 49.
71
Ibid, 85.
72
Singh, Foreign Policy Making in Israel: Domestic influences, 85.
73
Arian, Executive Governance in Israel.
74
Dowty, Israeli Foreign Policy and the Jewish Question.
75
Hassan Barari, Israeli Politics and the Middle East Peace Process: 1988-2002. (London: Routledge Curzon,
2004), 77-99.
76
Arian, Executive Governance in Israel, 57.
77
Kameel Mansour and Fawz Abdelhadi, eds, Israel, Daleel ‘Aam, 2004, (Beirut: Institute for Palestinian
Studies, 2004). 35- 37.
78
Arian, Executive Governance in Israel, 35-39.
79
Giora Goldberg, “The Growing Militarization of the Israeli Political System,” Israeli Affairs 12, no. 3 (July
2006): 277-394.
80
Arian, Executive Governance in Israel, 53-59.
81
Ibid 106-125.
82
Peri, Generals in the Cabinet Room: How the Military Shapes Israeli Policy.
83
Editorial. “ La Lelnezam Alre’asi Fe Israel: Maqate’ men watheqa Saderah Akheeran ‘An Alma’had Alisraeli
leldemocratia (No to a Presidential System in Israel: Sections from a recent document published by the Israeli
Democracy Institute)” Almash-had Al-Israeli (The Israeli Scene), 12 December, 2006.
84
These points were suggested by the former head of the National Security Council, Giora Eiland at a recent
workshop on the Winograd Report by The Institute for National Security Studies at the University of Tel Aviv
on the 24th
May, 2007. In his remarks he referred to the case of Prime Minster Ehud Olmert vis-à-vis
Defense minister Amir Peretz and foreign minister Tzipi Livni. Source: Editorial. “Waqa’e Yaum Derasy
Hawla Taqreer Winograd: In’ekasat Wa Ab’aad: Ikhfaqat Harb Lobnan Althaniya Akbar Bekatheer Men
Enjazateha (The Proceedings of a One Day Workshop on the Winograd Report: Reactions and aspects: The
Failure of the Second Lebanon War are Much More Than its Accomplishments)” Almash-had Al-Israeli (The
Israeli Scene), 10 July, 2007.
85
Freilich, National Security Decision-Making in Israel: Processes, Pathologies, and Strengths.
86
Ibid.
87
Yehuda Ben Meir, National security decision making: the Israeli case. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986),
69.
Al-ZaytounaCentreforStudies&Consultations,Beirut,Lebanon
59 _______________________________________ III. Forces and Processes within the Political System
88
Michael Brecher, Decisions in Crisis: Israel, 1967 and 1973 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980),
229.
89
Freilich, National Security Decision-Making in Israel: Processes, Pathologies, and Strengths.
90
Ibid
91
Ibid.
92
Singh, Foreign Policy Making in Israel: Domestic influences, 86.
93
Brecher, Decisions in Crisis: Israel, 1967 and 1973, 354.
InCitations,PleaseUse:
El-Gendy,Karim,TheProcessofIsraeliDecision-Making:Mechanisms,
ForcesandInfluences(Beirut:Al-ZaytounaCentreforStudiesand
Consultations,2010)
IV. External Influencing
Factors
Al-ZaytounaCentreforStudies&Consultations,Beirut,Lebanon
The Process of Israeli Decision Making _________________________________________________ 61
IV. External Influencing Factors
1. The influence of the military and security establishment on decision making
1.1 The security concern and the military doctrine It is fair to say that if there is one
influencing factor that dominates all strategic decisions, and is the main concern for Israeli
decision makers and the general public alike, this would be the concern for national security.
The traditional explanation of the security concern in Israel is that it stems from a
combination of several factors; the first of which is the fundamental Zionist notion that Israel
is a safe refuge where Jews can be safe from the threats that endanger their lives in the
diaspora. The second factor is Israel’s unique geostrategic position and its small margin of
error, which are a result of its small population relative to its neighbours, its small geographic
size, and its lack of strategic depth. The security concern is also explained as a result of
Israel’s settler nature vis-à-vis the Palestinian original population, and its history of isolation
within its regional environment against which it has fought 6 wars to date. As a result, Israelis
have a nearly total preoccupation with what they perceive as “a present threat” from their
environment which they perceive as hostile, uncertain, volatile and incomparable to that of
any other country, and thus warrants a special security arrangement.1
The common wisdom is
that these factors have converged to produce a society that continues to see itself as
vulnerable in front what it believes are “existential threats.”
However, according to this explanation one would have expected that the security
concern would have reduced or diminished as a result of the changes in Israel’s geo strategic
position. Namely, Israel’s increasing military might, its success in achieving military
superiority over its neighbours, the existence of peace treaties with some of them, and Israel’s
success in obtaining the military backing of the United States. Since this has clearly not been
the case as security issues continuing to play a major role in Israeli public life, some have
suggested a psychological interpretation arguing that the concern for security was a result of
an insecurity in minds of Israeli Jews, citing statements such as the one made by Israel’s exPrime
Minister Levi Eshkol in the 1960s when he described Israel as "Shimshon der
Nebechdiker" which is Yiddish for "poor Samson", the strong man beset by crippling
insecurity who feared a pogrom round every corner.2
This study will attempt to go beyond this simple interpretation to explain this
contradiction by shedding light on the origin and development of operational and
psychological fundamentals of Israel’s national security doctrine.
Al-ZaytounaCentreforStudies&Consultations,Beirut,Lebanon
62 _______________________________________________________ IV. External Influencing Factors
1.1.1 Operational principles of military doctrine.
Ever since the early 1950s, the traditional Israeli national security doctrine has been based
on a number of operational military fundamentals, which are expressed as follows:
1. There is a massive disproportion between Israeli resources and the Arab national
resources (mainly in terms of territory, manpower and gross national product)
which prevents Israel from ending the conflict by military means, while allowing
the Arabs to potentially do so. Consequently, the only goal of the Israeli Defense
Forces (IDF)3
is to defend the country against an aggressive Arab world.
2. The most fundamental and dangerous threat to Israel's existence is an all-out coordinated
Arab surprise attack. Hence, Israel should always maintain the ability to
defend itself under the conditions of such a worst-case scenario, known as mikreh
ha-kol (the all-out case).
3. To counter the quantitative disadvantage against the large surrounding Arab
countries, Israeli national security doctrine is to rest on three pillars: Deterrence
(through the threat of massive retaliation to any incursion), Strategic Warning (on
any development which might endanger its national existence); and Decisiveness
(the military ability to win a decisive victory if deterrence fails).
A number of operational implications emerged from this doctrine; first, the build-up
of the capability needed to provide a high-quality strategic warning and a quick response
to external threats, which explains why the Military Intelligence branch, the Air Force
and the Navy remain as regular forces while the ground forces are based on reserve
manpower. Secondly, the build-up of a military capability is needed to maintain
operational initiative in the battlefield, which would be able to win a decisive victory
within a short period.4
Thirdly, Israel has adopted the principle of taking the war into its
enemy’s territories and a preference for short wars, due to its need to reduce human and
economic costs to a minimum and to reduce the window for international military and
diplomatic intervention. This has led Israel to adopt offensive maneuver warfare as a
military strategy, which also gave Israel an edge since it advantages better-trained and
equipped militaries such as the IDF over militaries that rely on sheer numbers.5
Fourthly,
Israel has complemented its inherent weaknesses by having a strong alliance with a
superpower, in accordance with David Ben-Gurion’s principle that Israel should always
have at least one great power patron. For the same goal, Israel has also sought to maintain
regional connections.6
Finally, Israel needed to establish its deterrence by building qualitatively and
quantitatively disproportionate military capabilities. In the Israeli case, this meant
building a nation in arms, where every capable man and woman carries out his military
duties, in addition to maintaining a permanent well-armed professional military force.
Al-ZaytounaCentreforStudies&Consultations,Beirut,Lebanon
The Process of Israeli Decision Making _________________________________________________ 63
Israel, according to Yigal Alon (Deputy Prime Minister between1967 and 1974), has
thus adopted the concept of the “Garrison State” as established by American political
scientist Harold Lasswell, but while choosing the garrison state concept clearly appears
to be a direct result of its own security doctrine, it has also served Israel in achieving its
strategic objective in becoming the strongest regional power.
Perhaps the most obvious result of this choice is the compulsory national military
service. All Jewish and Druze men, and Jewish women, over the age of 18 are drafted for
service, although exemptions may be made on religious, physical, or psychological
grounds. Men in the Haredi community may also choose to be exempt while enrolled in
Yeshiva religious schools and all Haredi and religiously observant Females, married
females, and females with children are exempt. It is estimated that around 50% of females
are exempt from serving in the IDF. Male officers serve for 48 months while male
soldiers serve for 36 months. Israeli Females serve in the IDF for only 21 months which
are mostly spent in non combat roles.
In addition to the national military service, most Israelis also do annual reserve
service (known in Hebrew as Milo’eem). Released soldiers may continue serving as
reservists until the age of 54, contributing up to a month's worth of service each year, in
both training and active service. The reserves constitute the backbone of the army's
manpower needs alongside the military service. In fact, it is not rare to find two
generations in the same family serving simultaneously in the army - the son in
compulsory service and the father in reserves. The Reserve service has strengthened the
link between reservists, who often serve in the same unit every year, and has also created
a bond between the different segments of the society acting as a melting pot. The fact that
reservists continue to be subject to military jurisdiction even when not on active duty,7
not only serves to explain the Israeli saying that “Israelis are soldiers on eleven month’s
leave,” but also serves to strengthen the notion of the garrison state in Israel.
In addition, military service seems to be the only way to gain certain benefits; some
jobs are open only to veterans and certain welfare benefits are available only to veterans
and their families. Military service also used to provide a degree of prestige, where some
use their rank or position to enhance their professional and personal status.8
1.1.2 Psychological principles of military doctrine
In addition to the operational fundamentals, the security of Israel was traditionally based
on three main psychological principles:
1. The Primacy of Security
It is the dominant belief in Israel that almost every national problem is a
security problem, or at least involves security aspects. As a result, every major
Al-ZaytounaCentreforStudies&Consultations,Beirut,Lebanon
64 _______________________________________________________ IV. External Influencing Factors
crisis in Israel's early history was seen as a threat to national and personal
survival.9
Such subordination of all private and collective aspects of life to
security demands was typical of the Second Aliyah generation with its prime
proponent being David Ben-Gurion. For Ben-Gurion, immigration, absorption,
and the build-up of settlements were also security issues. His following definition
of security is symptomatic of this dominant belief.
Security means the settlement and peopling of the empty areas in north
and south; the dispersal of population and the establishment of industries
throughout the country; the development of agriculture in all suitable areas;
and the building of an expanding (self-sufficient) economy...Security means
the conquest of the sea and air, and the transformation of Israel into an
important maritime power...Security means economic
independence...Security means the fostering of research and scientific skill
on the highest level in all branches of [science and] technology...Security
means vocational training of a high standard for our youth...And finally,
security means a voluntary effort by the youth and the people in general for
difficult and dangerous tasks in settlement, security and the integration of the
immigrants…10
Similarly, Ben Gurion’s Disciple, Moshe Dayan has once said that “Small
nations do not have a foreign policy. They have a defense policy.”11
2. Resorting to Force as a solution to all Security Problems
While, some sections of the Zionist movement were always aware that
military solutions had their own limitations, other ideological streams tended to
view the use of force as almost the only means to solve all security problems.
3. Self reliance
The principle of self reliance -where states ' tend' to rely on their own military
power -rather than on external guarantees such as peace agreements, defense
pacts, or arms control regime- to ensure their survival, is extremely dominant in
the Israeli national security paradigm. This has often been attributed to the
traumatic history of Jews in the Diaspora including the Nazi Holocaust, which,
according to this understanding, created a siege mentality and a fundamental
mistrust of Gentiles. In addition, Israel’s wars against its neighbors have further
magnified this sense of insecurity. Henry Kissinger once alluded to this principle
when he noted, “Israel's margin of survival is so narrow that its leaders distrust
the great gesture or the stunning diplomatic departure.”12
In terms of military
Al-ZaytounaCentreforStudies&Consultations,Beirut,Lebanon
The Process of Israeli Decision Making _________________________________________________ 65
doctrine, this self-reliance manifests itself in three distinct components: Selfreliance
in manpower, self-reliance in training and doctrine, and self-reliance in
arms.13
1.1.3 Changes to military doctrine
The traditional notion of national security started to change following the peace
initiative by former Egyptian President Sadat and the initiation of the peace process with
the Palestinians and the Jordanians. Israel’s immediate strategic environment since then
came to be perceived as considerably more complex and nuanced especially with the
complex changes in Israel’s external environment. To give an example on how complex
these changes are, one could point to the changes that took place during the period
between 1995 and 2005. Events during that period included the initiation of peace
processes with the Palestinians and Syrians, the second Intifada and the unprecedented
Palestinian attacks inside Israel, the evolution of the Iranian and Iraqi Weapons of Mass
Destruction threats, the first Iraq war, the withdrawal from Lebanon and the development
of a rocket threat from Hezbollah, the Gaza Disengagement plan, and a variety of
domestic developments including the Rabin assassination in 1995, the rapid Cabinet
turnover, the growing size and strength of the settler movement, and the rapid economic
development.
In addition, there has been a change of Israel’s geostrategic environment in the period
since the 1973 war. The change of the balance of threats from conventional war to
unconventional threats, such as low intensity warfare and weapons of mass destruction,
played a major role in changing the focus of military planners from achieving defensible
borders through its control of territory, to achieving defensible borders through peace
treaties that contained strong security guarantees.14
Furthermore, by the 1990s, Israel’s national security environment became more
complex when its interests, and security environment, started to extend beyond its borders
and its “natural” interests in the Middle East, to encompass the entire world. This was
also a result of a number of changes in Israel’s geostrategic position in the world, such as:
• The strategic WMD threats posed by the so-called second- and third-tier confrontation
states (Iran, Iraq, and Libya) which were perceived in Israel as the primary danger to
its security
• The increasing complexity in Israel’s ties with its partners, such as the United States
as well as China and India.
• Israel’s complex relationship with the European Union.
• The collapse of the Soviet Union and Russian Jewish immigration
Al-ZaytounaCentreforStudies&Consultations,Beirut,Lebanon
66 _______________________________________________________ IV. External Influencing Factors
• Israel’s economic development in hi-tech and military industries which created
interest in international economics for a such as the World Trade Organization (WTO)
and Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).15
These changes to Israel’s environment led to changes in its military doctrine that
attempted to respond to the complex nature of its increasingly volatile environment and to
maintain its regional power. They also led to a change in the society’s security ethos that
shape the fundamentals of the military doctrine. One change that took place in the
security ethos is the recognition of the limits of power, which was only internalized by a
section of the political class.16
Nevertheless, the security concern and the fundamental perception of Arab hostility
have persisted. As a result, a large segment of the political spectrum, especially in the
right wing and religious segments, continues to see a very limited range of military or
diplomatic options in dealing with Israel’s neighbors.17
1.1.4 Changes to the military service
In spite of the compulsory nature of the army and its benefits, maintaining the “nation
in arms” nation has not been without its challenges. This was primarily because of two
changes, a demographic change, and a socio-economic change.
The first change is that with the increase in the population of Jewish Israelis to cross
the 5 million mark, especially between the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s, mostly as a result
of the addition of some 800.000 new immigrants from the former Soviet Union, the IDF
was faced with more recruits than it needed.18
Between the mid-1980s and the mid-1990s,
the population of men aged 18-21 rose by more than 25 percent and the potential of
military reservists (aged 22 to 51) rose by almost 59 percent. The potential conscripts
continued to grow by almost 20 percent until the year 2000. This led the IDF began to
examine various possibilities for changing its recruitment policy. But although many
alternatives of “selective reduction” were proposed, most of them compromised the basic
principle of a nation in arms, entailing retreat from the model of a citizen's army and
turning the IDF into a professional military.
In dealing with this issue the IDF chose to deal with it using a number of solutions,
rather than making a decision in principle. In the mid-1990s, it increased to tens of
thousands the number of servicemen women it "lent out" to other civilian bodies, such as
the civil service, Magen David Adom (the equivalent of the Red Cross), and the Society
for the Protection of Nature.
In addition, the IDF decided to adopt elements of selective recruitment and
differential service to deal with the surplus manpower. The IDF decided to make the
principle of compulsory service more flexible by reducing the number of recruits,
Al-ZaytounaCentreforStudies&Consultations,Beirut,Lebanon
The Process of Israeli Decision Making _________________________________________________ 67
extending the differential range of service, and increasing the number who receive early
release. For example, the IDF responded to the requests of religious parties to increase the
number of Yeshiva (religious academy) students who were exempted from military
service, and their number rose from a few thousand after 1971 to over 20,000 in the 1990s
(from 2 percent to more than 7 percent of potential conscripts every year). Similarly, new
immigrants received far-reaching exemption, from complete exemption for immigrants
who arrived after the age of 29 to significant reduction or total cancellation of the six
months period of service for those eligible for the draft, as well as exemption from
reserve service. The basic entrance requirement for recruits was also raised, and the IDF
more easily dispensed with the Service of those who had low psychological profiles
(known as "section 21") or had difficulty in adjusting to military life.19
The second change was the change in motivation to serve in the military amongst
conscripts and amongst reserves. First, there has been a drop in the potential conscripts'
motivation to serve in Combat units, and particularly in unglamorous field units.
According to a report by the head of tile Manpower Branch, in 1996, 44 percent thought
that for Israeli youth "service in combat units is a duty” compared to 64 who gave this
answer in 1989.20
This decrease in the readiness of individuals to volunteer for frontline
units was coupled with a change in the sources of motivation to serve in elite units, which
has moved away from patriotism towards an individual’s desire for self-fulfillment.21
In addition, although military service is still converted into civilian status and a
military career for people corning from relatively low social groups constitutes a ladder
for social mobility. The societal character changes have led to the parallel existence of
different types of ethos, which led to a decline in the significance of military service
especially amongst Ashkenazi Jews.22
While the soldier remained for The role model for
young Israelis since its establishment, a new role model has now appeared in the form of
the high tech entrepreneur, the lawyer or the media celebrity. In addition, whereas in the
past exemption from the military was a cause of social stigma, it is no longer so today.
One indication of this is the fact that the Civil Service Commission decided to stop the
practice of examining the IDF records of candidates for the civil service.23
However, it is still worth noting that the recognition of the need to serve in the IDF is
still quite high amongst young people who are eligible for the draft. In a study conducted
in 1994 by the IDF's behavioral sciences department, 50 percent of the subjects replied
That They "'would volunteer for the full three years of service if the IDF was voluntary,
44 percent replied that they would volunteer for a shorter period, and only 6 percent said
they would not volunteer at all. This rate has been fairly stable since the mid-1980s.24
On the reserves side, this motivational crisis is more severe. Although the growth in
the number of recruits each year should lead to a yearly increase in the number of
reservists available, there is an even larger flow of dropouts from reserve service before
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68 _______________________________________________________ IV. External Influencing Factors
the age of exemption (45 in Combat units, 51 in non-combat units). This is often
attributed to reasons such as health, psychological problems, and sometimes just plain
dodging. A study conducted by the IDF revealed that 50 percent of the reservists up to the
rank of captain replied that if they had the opportunity they would not report for reserve
service,25
this is a large change in attitude considering that a similar study conducted by
the IDF in 1974 found that only 20 percent replied in this way.26
The significance of this
trend cannot be emphasized with the importance of the reserves to the military, and
especially to the army, which relies mostly on reserve manpower.
The IDF preferred to solve this problem by informal arrangements. The commanders
of the reserve units summoned many more soldiers than are actually required and ended
up with the required number. Grade-A units, for example, call up a reserve of 150
percent, and Grade-B unit commanders summon up to 500 percent. In addition, the Chief
of Staff decided in May 1995 to make considerable concessions in the reserve service.
The period of active reserve duty for combat soldiers was shortened and the age limit for
reserve service in combat units was lowered, and the number of “reserve days" was also
cut by approximately 50 percent compared with the mid-1980s.27
As a result of these two changes, the IDF, which Started off in the early 1950s as a
citizen's army, has in the 1990s become a military that forgoes the draft of some quarter
of all the men who are eligible for military service -5 percent of them Israelis living
abroad, 7 percent yeshiva students, about 3 percent exempt for medical reasons, and the
remainder unsuitable in various ways-28
This trend has also continued since the 1990s as
forecasted by the IDF. An internal study carried out by the IDF revealed that only 52% of
Israeli teenagers served in the military in 2008 compared to 59% in 2002.29
These changes in the IDF, which have been seen by some as signs of change from the
nation in arms to a professional army, have been interpreted by some as a process of
normalization (whereby a society that was involved in a prolonged war or a mobilized
society becomes a civil society). However this was not the only interpretation. While
others saw them as a process of democratization, they have also been perceived as a mix
between a process of demilitarization and the formation of a “postwar society” ( where
the military Occupies a smaller place in society, the social investment in it is reduced, the
weight of the military and its influence declines in relation to the civilian society, and
above all, the military ethos is weakened), together with a process of decolonization.30
1.1.5 The security concern and decision-making.
In Terms of decision making, the security concern has led to the development of a
reactive decision making mechanism which relies more on the operational agencies of the
military and security establishment, rather than on the work of those involved in policy
formulation, leading to ad hoc solutions to immediate problems, and short term policy
options that don’t always fit together to constitute a long-term policy. Although this can
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The Process of Israeli Decision Making _________________________________________________ 69
be partly attributed to the fact that many of the problems that Israel faces provide it with a
limited range of options and require clear and immediate short-term decisions in a highly
charged and uncertain atmosphere, nevertheless, Israeli decision making has became
more tactical than strategic as a result of this reactive approach.
This said, there are many exceptions to this interpretation of Israeli decision making
as merely a reaction to changes external security environment. These exceptions include
Rabin’s acceptance of the Oslo process, his willingness to withdraw from the Golan,
Barak’s withdrawal from Lebanon and dramatic proposals at Camp David in 2000,
Sharon’s Gaza Disengagement Plan, and Olmert’s West Bank “consolidation.”31
However, it should be noted that the military doctrine of preemptive wars is not
considered an exception to this approach, because of its reactive nature, even though its
military doctrine is based on striking first.
Nevertheless, Rabin’s acceptance of the Oslo process can be explained by the changes
that took place in military service. Some scholars such as Yoram Peri have argued that the
recognition by Rabin of the change in the reservists' attitude to military service was what
brought him to adopt a historic decision and choose political compromise rather than
following rigid policies, which would increase the probability of future war, on which
there might not be national consensus.32
Likewise, the recognition of the limits of power
has also been seen as the cause that led the government to choose a political solution to
the Arab-Israeli conflict.33
In terms of the domestic political implications of the security concern, it is not
surprising that concerned Israelis have often chosen to elect leaders who have a security
background. It is also not surprising that the two main “buzzwords” used in Israeli
elections since the mid 1990s were Peace and Security (In Hebrew, Shalom v’betachon).
The two words, which appeared in different combinations in different political parties’
slogans, were employed by these parties as an attempt to portray themselves as the ones
that would bring peace but without compromising on security.34
1.2 The status of the military and security establishment within the society The Israeli
Defense Forces are today cherished as the chief symbol of statehood. A proof that Jews can
defend themselves without begging favors. The Military has also become the centerpiece of
Israel's civil religion, the ceremonies, and rituals by which the state legitimizes its
institutions, cements the loyalty of its citizens, and commemorates its history.35
In addition, the mentality of the garrison state (or the nation in arms, as some Israelis
prefer to call it) is an integral part of the Israeli social fabric, as shown by a recent study by
the IDB Group presented at the 2007 Herzliya conference. The study shows that 92% of the
Jewish public in Israel are willing to fight and that readiness to fight ranks first amongst
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70 _______________________________________________________ IV. External Influencing Factors
activities which are most important to patriotism. The same study ranked the military forces
third as a source of pride, below scientific and technological achievements and achievements
in art and sport, in this it comes before Israel’s ethical heritage and the Jewish character.36
In addition, wars have a tendency to strengthen the position of the top brass vis-à-vis
the civilian authorities. In Israel, its successful wars have resulted in the public perception of
the Military as the protector of the state, and in the great public trust that the military
establishment enjoys. Wars have also resulted in the emergence of a group of military figures
with a track record whom the public holds high and respects their military, security and even
political views. Israel’s wars also helped, together with other factors, in creating a militarypolitical
partnership where the military generals have extraordinary clout in the policymaking
process.
The Intifada, on the other hand, has led to the emergence of targeted assassinations as
a new way of combating the resistance in the Gaza Strip and the West bank. The success of
this method, which has relied heavily on intelligence, led to the emergence of the security
services (especially the Israeli General Security Service commonly known as Shabak or Shin
Bet) within the Israeli society as a protector of the state against what it calls “Palestinian
terrorism”.
This perception of the military, however, seems to be directly proportional with the
military’s ability to protect and provide the promised security. The same study presented at
the 2007 Herzliya conference, shows that pride in the defense forces has suffered the greatest
erosion, falling from 88% who said they were very proud of them in 2006 to 64% in 2007.
This was because during the past year and a half the Military has disappointed various
population groups, due to its performance in Lebanon in 2006 as well as the way it was used
in evacuating Jewish settlers during the disengagement from Gaza, a mission that went
beyond its traditional missions as a defensive force against the enemies and was seen by
some as undemocratic.37
1.3 The chain of command and the structure of the military and security establishments
1.3.1 The military forces
According to the Israeli Basic Law: The Military 1976, the Military is subject to the
authority of the Government. The Minister in charge of the Military on behalf of the
Government is the Minister of Defense. The supreme command level in the military, the
Chief of the General Staff - who is the military’s Commander in Chief - is appointed by
and subject to the authority of the civilian Government and is subordinate to the Minister
of Defense (not the Ministry of Defense itself). This very common hierarchy is meant to
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The Process of Israeli Decision Making _________________________________________________ 71
ensure that the civilian authority controls the powers of the military, by keeping it as a
professional body, and curbing its desire for war.
However in the years after the establishment of Israel, the Military establishment
enjoyed a degree of independence given to it by Ben-Gurion. This was evident in the
attendance of the Chief of General Staff in Cabinet and security Cabinet meetings as an
equal and not as a subordinate. Even after the Agranat inquiry following the 1973 war,
when the roles, the powers, and the duties of the Prime Minister, Defense Minister and
Chief of General Staff were clarified and the rules and standards of monitoring where
established between the military and the political spheres,38
the military still continued to
enjoy an overlarge status on the expense of the civilian authority.
The highest authority in the military establishment is the Israeli General Staff headed
by the Chief of General Staff. It is responsible for planning, organizing, training and
supervising the military operation of the Army, the Navy and the Air force (which are
collectively known as the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) and which will be referred to often
as the military).
Together with the chief of General Staff (CGS), the General Staff also comprises the
CGS deputy, the commanders of the Ground Forces, the Navy, and the Air Force, the
Heads of the regional commands (namely the Northern Command, the Central Command,
the Southern Command and the Home Front Command), and the heads of the Operations
Directorate, the Intelligence Directorate (this influential directorate is also known as the
Military Intelligence or Agaf Hamodi'in (Aman)), the Planning and Policy Directorate
(which is also very influential in decision making within the IDF), the Human Resources
Directorate, the Computer Service Directorate, and the Technological and Logistics
Directorate. Those directorates are all branches of the General Staff.
Other military members of the General staff also include: the commander of the
Military Academies, the coordinator of Government activities in the occupied territories,
the IDF Spokesperson, the Military Advocate General, the President of the Military Court
of Appeals, the Financial Advisor to the Chief of Staff, and the Military Secretary of the
Prime Minister. The general staff also includes the following civilian staff: the Directorgeneral
of the Ministry of Defense, the Defense Establishment Comptroller, and the head
of the Administration for the Development of Weapons and the Technological Industry.
(For a complete diagram of the military structure see attached figure)
The core of the Israeli Defense Forces is composed of the forces in active duty, which
currently includes 177,500 personnel, of which 140,000 are reservist. If we include the
rest of the reserve forces that amounts to 429,000, the total number amounts to 606,500
personnel. An advantage that the IDF has is that most of the officers come from the elite
and educated sectors. Females constitute around half of the IDF staff in active duty and
most of them carry out desk jobs.39
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72 _______________________________________________________ IV. External Influencing Factors
1.3.2 The security forces:
In addition to the military forces, the security forces are composed of the Intelligence
services, the Israeli police, the Border Police, the Prison Service, and the Knesset Guard.
The intelligence services include 2 of the 3 Israeli intelligence organisations which
were established by David Ben-Gurion in 1951, namely the General Security Service.40
or Sherut ha-Bitachon ha-Klali (better known with its Hebrew acronyms Shabak or Shin
Bet), and the Institute for Intelligence and Special Tasks ha-Mossad le-Modiin uleTafkidim
Meyuhadim (better known as the Mossad). It can also include in some instances
the intelligence division with in the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
The Shabak is the Israeli counter-intelligence and internal security service. Its work is
mainly within Israel and the territories occupied in 1967. It is believed to have three
operational departments and five support departments. The three operational departments
are:
• The Arab Affairs Department. It is responsible for “antiterrorist” operations,
political subversion, and maintenance of an index on “Arab terrorists”. Shabak
detachments worked with Aman undercover detachments (known as Mist'aravim)
to counter the Intifada uprising. This department has also been active in
countering the military wing of Hamas.
• The Non-Arab Affairs Department. This department concerned itself with all
other countries, including penetrating foreign intelligence services and diplomatic
missions in Israel and interrogating immigrants from the Former Soviet Union and
Eastern Europe.
• The Protective Security Department. It is responsible for protecting Israeli
government buildings and embassies, defense industries, scientific installations,
industrial plants, and the El Al national airline.41
The Mossad (Hebrew for institute) is Israel’s intelligence agency. It has responsibility
for human intelligence collection, counterterrorism, and covert action (including
paramilitary activities, and the facilitation of Aliyah where it is banned). Its focus is on
Arab nations and organizations throughout the world. Mossad agents are active in the
former communist countries, in the West, and at the UN.
The Mossad has a total of eight departments, though some details of the internal
organization of the agency remain obscure. Some of these departments are:
• The Collections Department. It is the largest , with responsibility for espionage
operations, and with offices abroad under both diplomatic and unofficial cover.
The department consists of a number of desks which are responsible for specific
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The Process of Israeli Decision Making _________________________________________________ 73
geographical regions, directing case officers based at "stations" around the world,
and the agents they control.
• The Political Action and Liaison Department conducts political activities and
liaison with friendly foreign intelligence services and with nations with which
Israel does not have normal diplomatic relations. In larger stations, such as Paris,
the Mossad customarily had under embassy cover two regional controllers: one to
serve the Collections Department and the other the Political Action and Liaison
Department.
• The Special Operations Division, also known as Metsada. It conducts highly
sensitive assassination, sabotage, paramilitary, and psychological warfare projects.
• The Physiological warfare Department (Lohamah Psichologit or LAP). It is
responsible for psychological warfare, propaganda and deception operations.
• The Research Department. It is responsible for intelligence production, including
daily situation reports, weekly summaries and detailed monthly reports. The
Department is organized into 15 geographically specialized sections or "desks",
including the U.S., Canada and Western Europe, Latin America, Former Soviet
Union, China, Africa, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Iraq, Jordan, Syria, Saudi
Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Iran. A "nuclear" desk is focused on special
weapons related issues.
• The Technology Department. It is responsible for development of advanced
technologies for support of Mossad operations.42
It has also been publicly reported that in addition to the abovementioned
organizations, an unnamed covert intelligence organization exists whose role is to
coordinate between all the other Israeli intelligence organizations. In addition, one may
also consider the military industries, the strategic study institutes, the retired officers, and
the politicians affiliated with the military all as part of the Military-Industrial complex.
Figure 4 is a diagram that illustrates the structure of the military with emphasis on the
structure of the army’s units.
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78 _______________________________________________________ IV. External Influencing Factors
1.4 The size of the military and its impact on economy and the society The military is not
only one of the most powerful institutions in the Israeli society, it is also the wealthiest. This
is partly because of Israel’s relatively high military spending. In spite of Israel’s relatively
small size, Israel has a very large defense budget. For example, in 2004, Israel’s defense
budget was the 12th
largest in the world.43
But before one goes into the details of the size of
military and its expenditure, it is prudent to clarify the definition of the different measures of
military expenditure. In Israel there are three measures of military spending:
1. The Defense Budget. This refers to the cash outlays of the Ministry of Defense out of
the Central Government budget. It does not include defense expenditures of other
ministries and government agencies or non-governmental bodies. At the same time, it
includes expenditures that do not directly finance the production of defense, at least in
its narrow sense.
2. Defense Consumption. This is a national accounting concept, calculated by Israel’s
Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS). It refers to defense expenditures on an accrual
basis, by allocating expenditures among different ministries according to their
purpose, rather than their administrative, or ministerial, affiliation. In addition to the
Defense Budget, this definition includes security components within the various
ministries.
3. The Total Cost of Defense. This is a broader concept calculated by the CBS on the
basis of the recommendation of a government committee charged with estimating the
full cost of defense to the Israeli economy. Its major additions to the Defense
Consumption are the full economic cost of the mandatory regular and reserve military
personnel and the cost of civilian shelters construction. The Total Cost of Defense is
generally around 25 percent higher than Defense Consumption. The total cost of
defense is not calculated in other countries, and as a result, it cannot be compared
internationally.
Of all three definitions, only the Defense Consumption has been calculated and
published consistently for many years.44
The details of the Defense Budget are all determined
by the defense establishment and the government has no real influence on its allocations.45
In
Knesset, the budget details are not debated and are only shown to 5 MKs who are appointed
by the Defense and Foreign Affairs committee.46
The whole Knesset then approves the total
as part of the Defense Budget.47
There are also reports that the intelligence budget for all the
intelligence agencies is kept secret and is not included in the main budget.
In 2007 the defense budget stood at approximately NIS 34.7 billion ($8.2 billion),48
which constituted about 11.7% of a total budget of NIS 295.4 billion ($70 billion)49
while the
defense consumption rose to NIS 48 billion ($11.3 billion) which was 16% of the total
budget.50
Such a percentage is very high by comparison to western countries’ defense
consumption. In fact this figure is equivalent to the defense consumption of Australia,
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The Process of Israeli Decision Making _________________________________________________ 79
Canada, or Turkey51
, all of whom have larger populations and better infrastructure and
resources.
A number of scholars and commentators argue that the Total Cost of Defense, which
includes the costs of the occupation of the West Bank, Gaza, and the Golan heights, has at
normal times (when there is no war) reached one third of the total budget.52
In terms of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) the Defense Consumption is currently
equivalent to approximately 8% of the GDP, which is very high compared to western
countries which spend an average of 3% of its GDP on defense. This figure includes the $2.4
billion Israel receives from the United States per year in security assistance, which constitute
around 2% of Israel’s GDP. The Total Cost of Defense is estimated to be around 10 % of
GDP.53
To put these military spending figures in perspective, it is estimated that the United
Kingdom, which has a high military expenditure, spent only 5.4% of its $1,174 Billion
budget on defense in 2007.54
It also spent the equivalent of 2.5% of its GDP on defense in
2005.55
Israeli defense expenditures increased dramatically between the mid 1960s and the
mid-1970s as a cumulative result of different factors. These factors were the 1967 Six Day
War, the IDF deployment in the Occupied Territories, the War of Attrition between 1968 and
1970, the development of an arms race with Egypt and Syria, large investments in
fortifications on the Suez Canal front, the 1973 War and a massive post-war military buildup.
By 1975, the Defense Consumption has become five times higher than 10 years earlier and its
share of the GDP had increased from 10 to 32 percent.56
In addition to its share of the budget, the military is also the biggest customer for
everything and anything in Israel and as a result, it plays a dominant role in the Israeli
economy. The military industries are the largest industry sector in Israel and represent around
40% of the Israeli Industries. Israel is also currently the eighth largest arms supplier.57
With
approximately 75% of the total production of Israel’s military industries exported,58
the
military industries’ exports are its third source of hard currency after diamonds and tourism.
There are approximately 150 defense firms in Israel, with combined revenues from arms sales
reaching $4.5 Billion in 2006.59
These firms can be organized into three categories; large
government-owned industries such as Israel Military Industries (one of Israel’s largest
employers), Israel Aerospace Industries, and the Rafael Arms Development Authority, all of
which produce a wide range of conventional arms and advanced defense electronics.60
Together the three produce 69 per cent of Israel’s military revenue.61
The second category
includes the medium size privately-owned industries such as Elbit system- ELOP (one of
Israel’s largest defense electronics and optics integrated systems manufacturers), Tadiran
(which makes tactical radios and communication systems), Elisra Electronic systems, and
ECI Telecom. Finally, the third categories include small privately owned industries
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80 _______________________________________________________ IV. External Influencing Factors
producing a narrow line of defense products.62
Some scholars note that the Arms sales
revenues do not form part of the budget or the Ministry of Finance’s calculations; instead
they are added to the military budget through a special arrangement with the Prime Minister.
Civilian high-tech industries are staffed by a mixture of military or ex-military who
work closely with western military industries. The Military and the universities are intimately
linked too, with joint research projects and an array of scholarships.63
The role of the IDF is not limited to military operations. The army was responsible for
Arab areas within Israel, which were under military rule until 1966, and is responsible for
policing the West Bank (and the Gaza strip before the 2005 disengagement) after 1967. The
Defense Minister is currently the person in charge of the occupied territories.64
The IDF is
also involved in many other activities including building settlements through the Nahal units
(Hebrew acronym for Noar Halutzi Lohem or Fighting Pioneering Youth65
) where the
military/civil service units established military settlements that combined farming with
regional defense in outlying and border areas. After an initial period, these outposts were
turned over to civilian groups and generally became kibbutzim or moshavim. Many of the
Israeli settlements in the Jordan Valley and south of the Negev desert were established by the
Nahal.66
The IDF has also taken an active interest in the education of new immigrants,
especially in the teaching of the Hebrew language. Army instructors were sent to centers of
immigrant absorption, field schools, and other educational institutions. Special army
programs for teenagers from disadvantaged backgrounds combine classroom instruction with
work on an army base. In addition, the military provides education to its soldiers beyond the
professional training required for the effective execution of military objectives. There are
special Hebrew language courses for new immigrants in the army, and disadvantaged Israelis
can acquire basic skills such as reading comprehension and elementary mathematics during
their military service. They also participate in week-long educational seminars which focus
on Jewish history and the history, geography, nature and society of the State of Israel. The
army has educational units located at Yad Vashem (the main Holocaust museum in Israel) and
the Diaspora Museum.67
The military also organizes immigration to Israel, monitors the
media, directs research and development, and keeps strong links with most of the state’s
bodies. This led some commentators to argue that all the other activities are there to serve the
military. Practically no area of Israeli public life is immune from the impact of the military.
Its impact ranges from economic decisions such as industrial infrastructure, natural resource
development, and urban planning, to cultural matters such as religious law and development
of the Hebrew language, to the impacts on education system such as curriculum, and reserve
service coordination.68
By association, the importance the military has strengthened the Ministry of Defense
making it one of the main power centers in Israel. This may explain why prime ministers
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The Process of Israeli Decision Making _________________________________________________ 81
prefer to keep the role of the Defense Minister to themselves in addition to their prime
ministerial role. Ben-Gurion, for example, has retained the position of the Defense Minister
for the 15 years during which he was Prime Minister. Generally prime ministers only
surrender the post of Defense Minister – either to a rival faction leader in their party or to a
leader of another party in their coalition-when they do not have sufficient political power
within their coalition.
1.5 The development of the Military-Industrial complex The military and security
establishments’ influence on decision making is better understood in the light of the existence
of the influential Military- Industrial complex. The complex includes the military, the
security establishments, the military industries, and the military’s political representatives. It
also includes organizations like the Atomic Energy Commission (which is headed by the
Prime Minister), the veterans’ organizations, Civil Defense organizations, and U.S.-based
organizations such as AIPAC which helps bringing U.S. military aids to Israel.
Just as the military has developed - as a result of the settlement nature of the state of
Israel - and formed the backbone for the Zionist project, The Military- Industrial complex,
formed the backbone for its industrial development, and through this complex the political
leaders of Israel have controlled the economic growth bringing it towards capitalization and
more in line with the more established U.S. military-industrial complex.
To explain how the Military – Industrial complex’ has developed we first have to
explain the movement of high- ranking military officers after retirement. As the average age
for military officers’ retirement is in their forties,69
it is rare to see a high ranking officer
going back to normal civilian life. It is common, however, for retired officers, who are mostly
secular Ashkenazi, to occupy key positions in the Military-industrial complex, which can be
roles in the security organisations, in the Ministry of Defense, in the military industries, or in
running banks and other public and private establishments. Retired officers represent around
three quarters of the executives in the various economic activities in Israel. This has created a
situation where certain positions became exclusive to those within the Military-Industrial
complex, leading to possible conflicts of interest between the officers’ jobs at the military and
their potential future jobs in the military industries organizations.70
All of the parliamentary elections in Israel have featured a sizeable number of retired
officers trickling into Knesset, with affiliations across the political spectrum but mainly on
the left. Since 1960, an average of 10 percent of Israel Knesset members have been high
ranking retired officers. In the 2006 general elections, for example, 15 Israeli generals along
with six secret service agents have been elected into the Knesset. In addition, about 20
percent of Cabinet ministers are high ranking reserve offices. Of the three most important
offices, the Prime Minister, the Defense Minister, and the Foreign Minister, at least one
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82 _______________________________________________________ IV. External Influencing Factors
(usually two) has been occupied by a former career officer as in the governments of Ehud
Barak and Ariel Sharon.71
Military service is an important prerequisite for many positions of power and
importance in Israeli life. Chiefs of General Staff have done very well politically. The list
includes Yigael Yadin, Moshe dayan, Yitzhak Rabin, Chaim Bar-Lev, Mota Gur, Ehud
Barak, and Shaul Mofaz. Rabin and Barak also became prime ministers.72
In addition, almost
all Israel's governments, to date, possessed defense, military or political experience even if
key posts were not necessarily manned by former generals. In 2003, only one quarter of those
elected to the Knesset have not served in the IDF, and most of them were Arabs and Haredim
who are exempted.73
It worth noting that since the inception of Israel the secret slogan of
Israeli politicians was "we shall conquer first the security apparatus, and then the Knesset and
government."74
The role of the Military- industrial complex has grown further since the 1967 war
when many people moved between military, political, and industrial organizations. The most
noticeable movement was the movement of military Generals into politics, which increased
during the demobilization periods following the 1948, 1967, and 1973 wars. The majority of
former CGSs have led a political career after retiring from the military, many of whom
became Defense Ministers. In the 1950s the first generation of Officers included Moshe
Dayyan, Yogal Allon, Yigal Yadin, Israel Galilee, and Chaim Herzog. Until 1967 the
majority of reservist and retited officers joined the Labour party. Following the 1967 war,
the number of officers joining the political elite increases sharply but with some joining the
center right, such as Ezer Weisman and Ariel Sharon, and others joining the Center left.75
As
a matter of fact many political parties aim to draw the prominent military leaders to their
parties in a bid to improve their credentials and their chances for getting more votes in the
general elections. Examples on this are Ben-Gurion adding Moshe Dayan to the Mapai Party,
Golda Meir brining Chaim Barlev and Yitzhak Rabin to the Labour Party, and Manachem
Begin bringing Ezer Weizman to the Likud.
This pattern of movement of high- ranking officers has resulted in the leadership in all
three spheres becoming more homogenous, and in the establishment of social elite whose
members think and act similarly, are closely connected, and have similar views on how to
serve the interests of the state. Members of this Military- Industrial complex agree on the
concept of Israel’s national security and on that its interests are best served by the actions of
the Military establishment. As a result of such views, members of the Military- Industrial
complex always work towards increasing Military expenditure, procurement, and
recruitment, increasing arms production, raising the intelligence activities, fighting
“terrorism”, and granting the military establishment independence in setting its own policies.
The existence of such group has not only increased the influence of the military and
security establishments on policy and decision making, and transformed it from that of a
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The Process of Israeli Decision Making _________________________________________________ 83
professional instrumental to a major political player, but it has blurred the boundaries
between the military and civilian spheres.
In political terms, the term “retired officers” refers to those reached one of the three
highest ranks in their military service: Brigadier General, Major General, and lieutenant
General. In political life 23 officers fit this description, 5 of which are from the first rank, and
9 are from each of the last 2 ranks.76
Based on the works of Giora Goldberg, in a study on the militarization of the Israeli
political system, recently published in the Journal of Israeli Affairs, this study presents a
chronological table summarizing the flow of movement of military personnel into politics
including ministers, prime ministers, defense ministers, party leaders and City heads. It also
includes an index of militarization of politics proposed by the abovementioned study.
Position 50s 60s 70s 80s 90s-00s
Ministers
Total: 2
Average
2.4% of
government
Total: 4
Average
10.8% of
government
Total: 8
Average
15.9% of
government
Total: 7
Average
15.3% of
government
Total: 13
Average 15.4%
of government
prime
ministers
(3 of 11
total)
0 0
1
Yitzhak
Rabin
0
3
Yitzhak Rabin
Ehud Barak
Ariel Sharon
Defense
Ministers
(8 of 13
total)
0
1
Moshe
Dayan
2
Moshe
Dayan
Ezer
Weizman
2
Ariel
Sharon
Yitzhak
Rabin
5
Yitzhak Rabin
Yitzhak Mordecai
Ehud Barak
Benjamin
Ben-Eliezer
Shaul Mofaz
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84 _______________________________________________________ IV. External Influencing Factors
Position 50s 60s 70s 80s 90s-00s
Party
leaders
0 0
2
Average
party
control:
18%
Yitzhak
Rabin
Yigal Yadin
Ariel
Sharon
4
Average
party
control:
1.5%
Moshe
Dayan
Ezer
Weizman
Rafael Eitan
Rehavam
Ze’evi
10
Average party
control: 40%
Yitzhak Rabin
Shimon Perez
Ehud Barak
Benjamin Ben-
Eliezer
Amram Mitzna
Ariel Sharon
Efraim Eitam
Rafael Eitan
Rehavam Ze’evi
Avigdor Kahalani
City
heads
0% 0%
20%
Shlomo
Lahat- Tel
Aviv
33%
Shlomo
Lahat- Tel
Aviv
44%
Ron Huldai –Tel
Aviv
Amram Mitzna-
Haifa
Index
/100
0.5/100 7.2/100 30.8/100 26/100 45.7/100
1.6 The Military-Industrial complex’s relation to the political establishment and
decision making According to the Israeli Basic Laws and other Knesset Laws, the military is
meant to be monitored and supervised by the civilian establishment through several bodies;
the first being the government as a whole. The government can appoint or remove the CGS
and the heads of the security forces and it is also entitled to discuss any security issue. The
second body is the ministerial committee for security affairs which is part of the government,
and whose role is to establish the main security policies and guidelines, and to supervise their
implementation. The third and fourth bodies are the Ministry of Defense and the office of the
Prime Minister, which operates as a ministry in its own right, while the fifth body is the
National Security Council.77
The Military is also supervised through the Knesset committee
for Defense and Foreign Affairs, and the new Knesset committee for the military budget.
However, in spite of this formal civilian supervision framework, the defense
establishment, and especially the IDF, remain the most influential player in the national
decision making mechanism forming a partnership with the civilian political leader. The
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The Process of Israeli Decision Making _________________________________________________ 85
political-military partnership has always existed between the political and military spheres,
even before 1948 when the role of the military was played by the Haganah forces. When
Ben-Gurion abolished all the military organizations in 1948 and established a unified military
under the authority of the government and the Knesset, this partnership continued to exist in
order to meet Israel’s two main challenges, the establishment of a political leadership of a
unifying authority, and the construction of a comprehensive national security doctrine to meet
the new nation’s security concerns.78
As such the political-military doctrine in Israel is closer
to the Soviet model than it is to the American one where the military level is completely
subservient to the political level.79
However, in addition to this partnership, Israel, as a nation in arms, lacks integral
boundaries between the military and society, which inevitably led to the militarization of
certain societal spheres and the politicization of the military in other spheres. The
militarization led to a military ideology with the political establishment which was
compounded by the lack of a strong counter-balancing political ideology, while the
politicization of the military led to a reduced autonomy represented in judicial intervention in
operations and investigations, and interventions from soldiers’ parents.80
This permeability between the military and civilian spheres, this has been explained
as a result of the fact that Israeli officers are not removed from the rest of the society.
Officers don’t live in separate military camps but with their families, which prevented the
creation of a “barracks sub-culture”. Officers are fully integrated within civil society,
shopping, recreating, sending children to school and spouses to work, and sharing the feelings
and tribulations of the broader population.81
They also interact at work with reserve
“civilians” carrying out short reserve duties.82
Recently this partnership has evolved as a
result of three main factors; the protracted war, the occupation of the West Bank and the
Gaza Strip and the political crisis that resulted, and the two low-intensity conflicts (the two
Intifadas) between 1987 and 1992, and from 2000 onwards. It is worth noting that some
Israeli scholars such as Asher Arian do not describe the relationship between the military and
the political spheres as a partnership, but see the influence of the military as the best example
of an institutional interest group.83
To give an idea of how the military influences the decision making, one might like to
read the descriptions given by Yoram Peri, an expert on Israeli military-civilian relationship,
of this process. He draws an image of the IDF headquarters at Hakiryah in Tel-Aviv with
dozens and officers and civilians in the Planning and Policy Directorate working on material
to serve the decision makers, while the high ranking officers participate in political forums
where decisions are actually made, working with the Prime Minister’s small team of
confidants and the security Cabinet. He also describes the interactions between members of
these teams during those meetings as informal where personality plays a large role in the
debates and discussion. This relationship doesn’t always suit the civilian leadership as
weakens its positions. For example, the military is not just represented in civilian meetings, it
Al-ZaytounaCentreforStudies&Consultations,Beirut,Lebanon
86 _______________________________________________________ IV. External Influencing Factors
is over-represented. The CGS is always accompanied by a group of senior officers which
shifts the balance of the meeting towards the military positions.84
This influence has long been recognized within all decision making circles in Israel.
Even the military leadership recognizes that the military plays an enlarged role in decision
making. For example, Shlomo Gazit, A former director of military intelligence, a former
coordinator of activities in the occupied territories, and a member of the prestigious Institute
of National Security Studies, claims that the core and focus of Israel’s problem in decision
making lies in “the relationship between the defense establishment and the government”. The
problem according him is that “the defense establishment has the tools for policy planning,
policy evaluation, coherent thinking, and systematic presentation of proposals, yet there is no
alternative mechanism or factor which can present alternative options based, to the same
degree, on systematic analysis and evaluation. Thus, whenever a national security issue
arises, one immediately asks: “what does the general staff suggest- what does the military
intelligence have to say?”85
Similarly, in a recent lecture at the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies (which is now
renamed to the Institute for National Security Studies) on the subject of military civilian
relations in wartime, the former IDF chief of General staff Lt General Moshe Ya’alon
admitted that the military played too dominant a role in political decision making, but he,
nevertheless, expressed his vision for the civil-military relationship as a reciprocal one where
the military is an active partner in the political level. The moderate model he envisages for a
successful political and military interface is one where the political echelon represents the
initiating directive, which is translated by the military into operational alternatives, and in
turn is presented back to political decision makers for their approval.86
Former CGS Ehud
Barak made similar statements in 1994 when he warned the IDF not to “make manipulative
use of the sensitive and central security issue in Israel existence” and not to “dictate to the
government the nature of the political arrangement”. However, the current civilian-military
relationship doesn’t seem to be moving towards this moderate model yet.
In light of the above, this study attempts to identify the ways in which the military
influences the decision making, and the causes behind its ability to exercise such influence
over the civilian leadership. The list below is a summary of these influences and causes:
1. The military and security establishments have a complete control of intelligence that the
political echelon receives. This allows the General Staff‘s Military Intelligence
Directorate (MID) and the other intelligence agencies to exclusively assess the security
situation, which ultimately determines the way in which Israel’s entire political class
perceives the world. The military Intelligence is responsible for the annual National
Intelligence Assessment and is the only intelligence service capable of generating
comprehensive politico-military assessments.87
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The Process of Israeli Decision Making _________________________________________________ 87
In many areas, the IDF is either the sole or primary entity capable of supplying
information, analysis, and policy advice to the Prime Minister and Cabinet, often in
areas extending far beyond the commonly accepted spheres of military competence. No
other institution can compete with the Intelligence, Planning, and Operations Branches’
ability to generate rapid and sophisticated staff work around the clock. Moreover, the
Chief of Staff and other senior officers frequently appear before the Cabinet and act as
senior advisers on defense and foreign policy matters.
The officer who heads the MID is not only responsible for intelligence within the
military, he is also the advisor on intelligence issues to the Prime Minister, the defense
Minister and the Cabinet as a whole. In addition three of the last Directors of Military
Intelligence (Barak, Shahak, and Ya’alon) became Chiefs of General Staff.
2. The military’s domination of strategic planning using its Planning and Policy
Directorate. The IDF Planning and Policy Directorate is a primary player at the Cabinet
level, dealing not only in military planning for the General Staff, but in strategic
political-military planning, geared largely to the needs of the Prime Minister, Minister
of Defense, and the Cabinet.88
As a result, it inevitably transforms the military doctrine
into policies that directly influence the decision making. The General Staff also
provides detailed policies which exceed the military tactics into political policies. Israel
may well be the only country where the military has complete authority over the
strategic and tactical issues.
This happens in spite of the fact that, the military provides the civilian leadership with
only one option which the government can either approve or reject and do nothing. In
addition, the option presented is based on the military’s planning process which is
sometimes described as being based on an extreme worst-case rationalization.89
According to Major general Aharon Yariv, such a monopoly of the military over
planning is the “most conspicuous weakness in the Israeli government system”. Major
General Yisrael Tal also describes the weakening of the government’s status vis-à-vis
the military: “When the government wants to assess situations or, alternatively, to set
policy, it relies on the same source—the IDF General Staff—which it is itself supposed
to oversee, whose recommendations it is supposed to critically analyze, and which it is
supposed to guide”.90
3. The lack of institutional subordination of the military to the civilian government and the
nature of the relationship between the IDF and the Ministry of Defense.91
Instead of the
IDF being subordinate to the Ministry, the relationship between the two is in fact a
complementary one. According to Ben-Gurion’s decision to separate the Ministry of
Defense from the Military, The IDF has authority for all matters of military
organization and force structure, training, doctrine, intelligence, logistics and
procurement plans, personnel, strategic planning, and operations. The Ministry of
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88 _______________________________________________________ IV. External Influencing Factors
Defense, on the other hand, is responsible for the defense budget, arms procurement,
and exports. In reality, the ministry’s role is limited, for the most part, to the
implementation of policies favored by the IDF.92
The structural weaknesses in the machinery of civilian control over the military
establishment stems from a lack of constitutional and legal clarity as to formal aspects
of the system. For example, the IDF is only subordinate to the Defense Minister and not
the Ministry itself. Thus, the ministry does not have the right or the capabilities to
oversee the IDF.
4. The lack of a strong alternative civilian mechanism for the government to assess
military intelligence and policy. This was coupled with the reduced independence of the
Knesset’s prestigious Defense and Foreign affairs committee .The preoccupation of the
committee’s members of with domestic and partisan political activities has also
contributed to its inability to take on the politically unpopular task of challenging the
national security establishment, which has led Knesset officials such as Samuel Sager to
complain that the committee has become a tool to legitimise government policy choices
on controversial issues. In addition, members of the committee often complain that they
do not receive detailed information during briefings by government officials. The
government’s justification to that is that the committee’s members often leak details of
the briefings to the media.93
Moreover, the committee lacks any staff of its own, making
it almost entirely dependent on the national security establishment for information and
thereby further limiting its oversight capabilities.94
In an attempt to resolve this lack of civilian assessment, Israel’s government
established its own version of National Security Council (NSC) in 1999 with the role of
“coordinating, integrative, deliberative, and supervisory body on all matters of national
policy”. The Council operates as an arm of the Prime Minister's Office and reports
directly to him. The head of the NSC is a National Security advisor to the Prime
Minister and one of the NSC’s roles is to make independent recommendations on
national security policy to the Cabinet.95
This Council, however, has been sidelined
since its inception, and its advices are often not taken into account. It is sufficient to say
that six people have served as the NSC heads since its establishment by the government
and most of them complained about the absence of powers and the lack of partnership
in the decision making process.96
As a result, most NSC heads, who served an average
of one year, have ended their terms feeling they were unable to fulfil their duties under
the existing circumstances.97
A number of studies on the role of NSC have also been critical of its lack of
contribution to decision making. A study by the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies
(Now the Institute of National Security Studies (INSS)) entitled: Whom Does the
Council Advise?, describes the current security decision making mechanism as one that
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The Process of Israeli Decision Making _________________________________________________ 89
takes place on 4 levels. The first level is the Prime Minister, followed by the ministerial
security committee (with the Defense Minister having a prominent role within it). The
third level is the Prime Minister’s office and especially the Director General of the
Prime Minister’s Office, and the Prime Minister’s political, socio-economic, and
military secretary (the last being the link to the military and security establishment as a
member of the General Staff), while the fourth and final level is the National Security
Council which only takes the role of an assistant in the decision making.98
Another
study has noted the small number of staff in the council as a factor in the demotion of
the council to a largely inconsequential position.99
Furthermore, a report by the State
Comptroller Micha Lindenstrauss on the National Security Council suggests that the
role of the NSC, which is meant to have a global, comprehensive and systematic vision,
has been taken by the Military secretary of the Prime Minister, who in reality is the
General staff’s representative in the Prime Minister’s office.100
In 2008, and following the Winograd report on the 2006 war on Lebanon, the
National Security Council (NSC) was renamed to the National Security Staff (NSS),
and role of its chief was expanded to include handling all matters of foreign affairs and
defense seen by the prime minister. The NSS chief will also receive information
updates from every state body and will be invited to every cabinet meeting that deals
with matters of foreign affairs and defense, and to every committee meeting involving
the heads of the secret services.
5. The unified large structure of the military, which makes it more powerful as it
represents a united front in front of often-divided cabinets. The military and security
establishments have also grown in recent decades in terms of size, organizational
complexity, and process sophistication. New organizational structures have also been
added, and existing ones greatly expanded. Staff work within agencies has improved
markedly, along with intensive usage of information technology capabilities and
increasing levels of professionalism. For example, the IDF Planning Branch became a
primary player in the IDF and at the Cabinet level; the intelligence community as a
whole grew greatly in size and capabilities and the Mossad, the Shin Bet, and the
Foreign Ministry intelligence department, each established new research divisions; and
the Ministry of Defense’s politico-military policy planning branch were established.
The military and the military-related industries also employ a disproportionate share
of the national labor force. Thus making the defense establishment as a whole, a major
economic force.101
6. The political crisis and the loss of political consensus following the 1967 war. Since
then the divide between the right and the left made it impossible for either side to
achieve a majority vote and the military moved in to fill the vacuum. For example the
inability of all Israeli governments to create a clear military policy towards resolving
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90 _______________________________________________________ IV. External Influencing Factors
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, particularly evading the territorial question, has left the
whole issue to the IDF to resolve. The IDF devised maps for the agreements it desires,
thus dictating policies to the civilian leadership. It was not the government policy that
guided the military, but the military’s interests that controlled the design of any political
plan.
Some commentators also argue that the lack of a strong civil authority creates a
vacuum for military leaders – with or without political ambition- to step into, and the
lack of a clear strategic political policy creates a vacuum for ad hoc policies to fill. In a
recent workshop at the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies to assess the 2006 Lebanon
war, the past chairman of the NSC Giora Eiland pointed to the lack of study and
planning in the decision making mechanism. He also noted that the last 4 governments
with which he has worked have been preoccupied with ongoing security issues with
nobody to deal with the strategic issues or to present alternative political and military
views to the government.102
7. The military’s influence was also strengthened by its involvement in diplomacy. Over
the years, many of the diplomatic contacts with Arab and other states have been
conducted by the IDF, thus providing it with a leading role in foreign policy. Beginning
with the Armistice Agreements of 1949, the IDF played a major role in all of the peace
talks, including the Camp David Accords of 1978, as well as the talks with the
Palestinians, Syrians, and Jordanians since the 1990s. Military cooperation has also
been an important means of fostering relations with foreign countries.103
8. The military’s control over the West Bank (and previously the Gaza strip), and its
responsibility for the civil administration in these areas. This has provided it with
primary influence over an entire range of issues related to the territories, many of a
purely civilian and particularly sensitive character.104
9. The two Intifadas. The protracted low-intensity conflicts, especially since 2000, have
forced the IDF to revise its strategic doctrines -which were established to deal with
regular military forces- to deal with the new challenges. The military acquired
responsibilities of civilian nature including policing and pacification activities for which
it was neither built nor trained. The “counterrevolutionary” warfare against the Intifadas
is by definition a political warfare which forced the IDF to develop a military doctrine
that includes political elements.
This only served to draw the Military and Security establishments’ leaders further into
the domestic political arena as their roles shifted from the domain of operational tactics
to that of strategic and defense policy.105
In addition, the protracted low intensity
conflict also required a decision making process which is continuously reliant on
knowledge and systematic staff work, that can only be provided by the IDF. The
political civilian control has thus been weakened vis-à-vis the military, which gained a
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The Process of Israeli Decision Making _________________________________________________ 91
significant advantage in generating the required knowledge for managing the violent
confrontation.106
According to Major General (ret.) Shlomo Gazit, The first Intifada
completed the process of turning the CGS into a dominant force in the occupied
territories and from this point on the head of the Central Command has become actively
in charge of the settlements in the territories.
10. The existence of the Ministry of Defense’s political-military directorate which serves as
an official link between the military and the political levels.
11. IDF Doctrines and its Operational Control, which can create constraints for political
leaders. This includes Israel’s first-strike preemptive doctrine and the broad discretion
given to officers. Even at relatively low levels, military commanders are given room for
maneuver, which may create situations that were no preferred by the civilian
leadership.107
12. The fact that virtually all ministers have served in the IDF, as conscripts and reservists,
and many are former senior officers strengthens the military view, and the influence of
the military-industrial complex, even within the civilian establishment.
13. The military’s control over the media allows it to shape decision making through its
influence over public discourse and public opinion. It also makes benefit of the public
respect it enjoys in comparison to the public low confidence in the politicians.108
The
military almost has a complete monopoly over the supply of information to media outlet
and thus has the capacity to manipulate journalists and the media. The army controls
press censorship through the office of the Military Censor. According to the agreement
between the IDF and the media representatives, all media outlets agree to abide by the
orders of the censor in order to be able to operate in Israel. Reporters are expected to
censor themselves and not report any of the forbidden material.
The Military Censor, a unit in the Directorate of Military Intelligence, is to inform the
media of which issues require its approval. The list of such issues is subject to ongoing
change, but always includes issues related to national security and military.109
The
military censor has wide powers to publish an order that no material can be published;
and it even has the powers to close a newspaper or shut down a station.110
The Defence
Regulations dealing with censorship have been backed up by other laws designed to
reinforce secrecy such as the Israel Penal Revision Law (1957), which included broad
definitions of matters to be classified, and even penalized the unauthorized disclosure of
official information that was not classified.
In addition, Most of the Military correspondents serve in the reserves in the press
liaison unit in the office of the IDF spokesperson, as well as members of the editorial
boards of their respective newspapers. They are also organized in a separate unit within
the Israeli Press Association.111
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92 _______________________________________________________ IV. External Influencing Factors
However, it should be noted that recently a more active press and increased exposure
to foreign mass media have led to a loosening of censorship restriction.112
In addition,
Israeli journalists have adopted the tactic of passing sensitive material on to foreign
outlets and then reprinting it after it is published abroad - which is a perfectly legal
practice.113
In addition to censorship, the military operates its own radio station, staffed by well
known Israeli broadcasters as well as soldiers in regular service. Israel's Galei Zahal
(IDF Waves) has a large civilian audience. The IDF also publishes a popular weekly as
well as a more in-depth monthly magazine, and the IDF Spokesman’s office provides
information on army and security related issues.114
Based on these factors and causes, scholars such as Yoram Peri have argued that the
military has become a de-facto decision maker.115
This military influence is understandable,
and even expected, during wartime. For example it is documented that during the 1967 and
1973 wars, members of the military elite met alone with the Prime Minister and the Defense
Minister more frequently than did any other group, and that in 1973 these meetings were
almost as often as Prime minister’s meetings with all other Israeli groups combined.116
A
more recent example was on the eve of the Lebanon war in the summer of 2006 when the
military option was discussed in the Cabinet for less than three hours, and the decision to go
to war against Lebanon was not countered by any well-reasoned diplomatic alternative.
However, there have been incidents when the military’s participated in the decision
making in “peace time.” Examples on this participation include the incident in 1975 when
members of the Gush Emunim founded the first illegal outpost117
in the West Bank. Prime
Minister Rabin, who initially saw this as a challenge to the government, demanded that the
Chief of General Staff Mordechai Gur disperse the settlers. But Gur objected on the grounds
that doing so either would require the use of force which is likely lead to bloodshed, or would
result in soldiers refusing to follow their orders.
Rabin yielded to his view and the settlers’ position was strengthened. The incident was
considered a watershed moment, establishing an important precedent for future Jewish
settlements in the occupied territories. It exposed the government’s weakness and made clear
to the settlers that through the use of force they would be able to impose their own will on the
government. If the military has played a neutral instrumental role, such a precedent may not
have been established.118
It is worth noting that the military’s recommendations are not always the most
“militaristic”. There are occasions when the military played a “moderating” role calling for
peace negotiations and withdrawals while it was the politicians who opposed it. It was the
IDF in the late 1980s that decided that it would be in Israel’s advantage to engage in a peace
process. The late Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin included the military, not only as an
implementer of the peace process but as a major policy making and negotiating partner.
Al-ZaytounaCentreforStudies&Consultations,Beirut,Lebanon
The Process of Israeli Decision Making _________________________________________________ 93
Likewise the military played a restraining and moderating role during the premiership of
Benjamin Netanyahu, largely because its pragmatic world outlook was indirect contrast to
Netanyahu’s government’s ideological stance. During 1997 the IDF top brass have more
than once rejected suggestions for aggressive action against the Palestinians that were
initiated by the political level, and especially by the Prime Minister. This confrontation
reached its climax during the 1999 elections when tens of retired generals joined opposition
parties and formed new ones with one aim; to topple down Netanyahu's government, which
they did, bring to power a the former Chief of General Staff Ehud Barak.119
However, as result of the failure of the Camp David summit in 2000 and in response to
the second Intifada, the IDF has abolished its peace drive, formulated an unyielding hard line
policy, and changed its security doctrine towards the Palestinian uprising.120
2. The role of consultants and think tanks and its influence on decision making:
2.1 Official consultants The previous chapter discussed the over-enlarged role that the
military plays as a consultant to decision makers and especially to leaders with non-military
backgrounds. For these purposes the military uses its research and assessment centers, which
are part of its intelligence apparatus, as consultants. The e civilian government also has at its
disposal a limited research capability attached to some of its ministries. The most important
official research centers are:
• The Mossad’s research department, which is responsible for intelligence
production, including daily situation reports, weekly summaries and detailed monthly
reports. It is organized into 15 specialized sections that each deal with a geographical
area. 121
• The Military Intelligence Department’s (MID’s) research department, which is
very influential within the Military Intelligence, and carries out its own national
security assessments. It may be sufficient to say that the Director of Military
Intelligence and the head of its research unit present their latest intelligence
assessment to the Prime Minister, the Defence Minister, and other policy makers on
their weekly meeting. The most important publication of the MID’s research
department, the annual National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), is also presented to the
Cabinet as well as the Knesset’s Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee. In addition,
the MID’s research department issues a compilation of reports, daily assessments,
weekly summaries, and white papers.
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94 _______________________________________________________ IV. External Influencing Factors
Reports and estimates presented by the MID and its research department, such
as the NIE, often exceed their scope of identifying and estimating threats against the
state and warning against surprise attacks. Instead they provide policy
recommendations to policy makers122
These assessments are widely respected in
Israel even though they occasionally contradict with the Mossad’s assessments.123
The
clout of the MID’s research department means that the NIE has the upper hand in
those disagreements.
The degree of influence of the MID’s research department is perhaps best
exemplified by the public debate between the Head of the MID Amos Malka and the
Head of the MID’s research department Amos Gilad- who is effectively No. 2 at the
MID- over Gilad’s manipulation of intelligence assessment during the 2000 Camp
David negotiations. Malka has Accused Gilad of influencing the MID’s assessment of
Arafat's intentions by portraying him as being against peace. As a result of this
alleged manipulation, the MID’s pre-negotiations assessment thus stated that Arafat
was willing to negotiate but that his list of demands was stringent and almost
completely inflexible. Gilad was also accused of propagating the idea that there is no
Palestinian peace partner, which has remained for a very long time after the Camp
David Negotiations.124
• Foreign Ministry’s research division, which is the only other influential
governmental consultant not affiliated with military. Although this research division
was established in an attempt to counterbalance the role played by the two research
departments described above, its capabilities are still limited compared to theirs.
2.2 Independent consultants and advisors Official consultants aside, this study will look at
the role of other independent and semi-independent consultants that participate in shaping
decisions through their specialist professional research and advice to the government. The
study starts from the premise that neither the Prime Minister nor the Cabinet have significant
policy-making machinery at their disposal at the cabinet level and are thus in need for
advisors. The Prime Minister’s advisors, which include a Chief of Bureau, a Foreign Affairs
Advisor, a diplomatic advisor, an economical Advisor, a legal advisor, and the Military
Secretary, serve more as aides, responsible primarily for the Prime Minister’s day-to-day
needs and certainly lacking the capacity to conduct systematic policy formulation and
coordination.125
Prime Minister chose to rely on their advisors and aids prior to the
establishment of the National Security Council Office, and even after the establishment of the
National Security Council, the prime ministers who were in office since its establishment
(Barak, Sharon, and Olmert), have chosen to continue relying on their traditional advisers and
processes.
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The Process of Israeli Decision Making _________________________________________________ 95
Consultants outside of the policy making mechanism include individual consultants
such as advisors and aides, as well as institutional consultants such study centers affiliated
with universities and independent think tanks. Consultants support policy by providing policy
options and identifying their advantages, disadvantages, and possible consequences. Their
work can vary from academic research to policy support to the decision makers.
2.2.1 Advisors and aides
Advisors to the Prime Minister are appointed to consult on policy issues that the
Prime Minister took special interest in. They are appointed either on the basis of their
expertise and professional experience, or for other political consideration. Advisors who
are appointed on the basis of their specialized expertise tend to serve longer and often
remained in office under different prime ministers and different coalitions. These
included advisors on security issues, anti-terrorism, and the Arab population inside Israel.
Advisors on most other policy areas are often close political affiliates of the Prime
Minister, and often serve shorter terms. For example upon becoming Prime Minister,
Benjamin Netanyahu appointed 20 advisors compared to 8 advisors in the previous
governments. Many of these advisors played political roles serving as quasi-ministers.126
Likewise, Prime Minister Sharon relied on his advisor Dov Weisglass who became
the primary player and the de facto National Security Adviser, leaving the Foreign Affairs
Adviser, Military Secretary, and National Security Adviser to compete for influence in
secondary areas. During the disengagement process and the building of the separation
barrier, Sharon depended mostly on Weisglass as well as the geography Professor Arnon
Soffer, also known as the "intellectual father of the disengagement plan." Professor Soffer
is known for being a demographic prophet who considers that the "Palestinian womb is a
biological weapon.”127
Similarly, Olmert’s senior advisers, Yoram Turbovich and Shalom Turjeman (his
diplomatic aide), were assigned tasks as important as conducting peace negotiations with
Syria.
In addition, all three of Netanyahu, Barak, and Sharon relied on their private lawyers,
who were long-term acquaintances, for sensitive tasks, in some cases appointing them to
senior staff positions
Individual advisors and consultants are also employed for domestic political purposes.
Israeli leaders’ awareness of the increase in the role of personality on politics led them to
use public relations advisors to help them make the decisions that would serve their
political positions domestically. Ariel Sharon, for example, hired Reuven Adler, who has
the reputation of being a public relations expert as well as being a member of the Jewish
Agency’s Board of Governors, before the 2001 elections. Adler is often credited for
helping Sharon win the elections by portraying him not as a hardliner but as the only
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candidate capable of achieving peace. After he was elected Prime Minister, Sharon
continued using Adler’s advice. It was reported that Sharon did nothing without
consulting Adler, who essentially became Sharon right hand man.128
After Sharon's
demise and Olmert's ascension to power, Adler took on two new clients: Tzippi Livni and
Ehud Barak, while Ehud Olmert, who did not get along well with Adler, hired the former
Barak strategist Tal Zilberstein as his chief adviser.
The prime Minister could also make benefit of the advice of or any person who is not
in public office,
For example, during the 2006 Lebanon war, the Prime Minster Ehud Olmert consulted
with 4 advisors and took their advice regarding launching a ground operation in the last
days of the war. Two of these advisors were retired high ranking officers, the third was a
military strategic advisor and the fourth was a pollster. None of these four held public
office at the time this consultation took place.129
2.2.2 Consultants and think tanks
In addition to individual consultants and advisors, Israel has a number of independent
think tanks. According to a study recently published by the Jerusalem Institute for Israel
Studies, there are more than 20 study centers in Israel that are recognized as true think
tanks and which are players in the political scene.( This excludes consultations with
international study centers and organizations in ally countries, and mainly in the United
States).130
Although some of the think tanks were established as early as 1945, Israel has
generally witnessed an increase in their numbers in the last few years since the start of the
peace process, as universities and private American donors played a major role in funding
the establishment of new think tanks.
Since the main role of think tanks is to support the decision makers, the clout and
success of any given think tank depends primarily on its ability to influence the policies
of the government or other decision makers who hold official positions. The most
prestigious of all think tanks are the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies (now known as
The Institute for National Security Studies) and the Herzliya Annual Policy Conference.
But while, individual think tanks vary in the subjects of their research, their main focus
continues to be strategic issues such as national security, political settlement issues, issues
related to the Palestinian citizens of Israel, and socio-economic issues.
Below is a list of the think tanks most relevant to policy formulation and decision
making:131
• The Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) - Tel Aviv University:132
Perhaps the most prestigious think tank in Israel is The Institute for National Security
Studies which now includes The Jaffee Center for strategic studies (JCSS). The
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The Process of Israeli Decision Making _________________________________________________ 97
center, which was established in 1977 at the initiative of Tel Aviv University, sees its
mission as carrying out research at the highest academic level on issues related to
Israel's national security, and on Middle East regional and international security
affairs. The center also aims to contribute to the public debate and governmental
deliberation on issues that are – or should be – at the top of Israel's national security
agenda. Its main study topics are issues related to Israel's national security, Israel's
defense, world Jewry, Middle East regional and international security affairs, and
socioeconomic issues.
The center addresses the strategic community in Israel and abroad with its research;
Israeli policymakers, decision making echelons, strategic planners, opinion-makers
and the general public.
The center is funded by a trust fund established by members of the Jewish
communities of the United States. JCSS sought to ensure for itself the financial
independence necessary for its research and other activities. The center is governed
by an international and an Israeli Board of Trustees.
The Center has 24 high profile researchers, many of whom are retired officers with
leading careers in Policy and Planning, and Intelligence Directorates. The center
publishes the results of its research as books journal articles, special reports, annuals,
and memoranda. It also publishes the annual Middle East Military Balance provides
broad assessments of major strategic developments in the Middle East as well as data
on military, economic, and demographic conditions in all states of the region. Its
publications are in English and Hebrew and are well received in Israel and abroad.
• The Herzliya Interdisciplinary Center (IDC):133
The Herzliya Interdisciplinary
Center is a private non-for-profit academic institution, which considers itself to be an
elite establishment. It receives no subsidies from the national budget which they argue
is why they have complete academic and administrative freedom.
The center’s goal is to prepare Israel’s future leadership, through providing the
highest level of support to leaders in business, politics, technology, and space
sciences. There 3000 students’ strong center has 7 colleges including the Lauder
School of Government, Diplomacy, and Strategy which prepares graduates to take
leading positions in the public and private sectors. The center also includes the
International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT). ICT is an independent
think tank providing expertise in terrorism, counter-terrorism, homeland security,
threat vulnerability and risk assessment, intelligence analysis and national security
and defense policy
The Herzliya Interdisciplinary Center also includes The Institute for Policy and
Strategy which organizes the annual Herzliya Conference on the Balance of Israel’s
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98 _______________________________________________________ IV. External Influencing Factors
National Strength and Security. The institute, which was part of the Lauder School of
Government, Diplomacy and Strategy, was established in 2000 with the goal of
supporting the shaping of national policy on the issues crucial to the state such as
national security, foreign policy, the military, strategy, intelligence, governance, the
Jewish people, the economy, science and technology, infrastructures, resources and
the environment, as well as social and educational issues. It is is led by a mix of
professors and retired officers.
The Herzliya Conference has become a major event in Israel politics and has
quickly become a summit for Israeli leadership and the who-is-who in every field. The
Institute for Policy and Strategy also prides itself that Israeli governments have often
adopted the conferences reports as official policies.
• Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies (IASPS)134
: The IASPS was
established in 1984 with the goal of reducing the socialist regime in Israel with the
support of the American aid. The institute aimed to link the economical issues such as
market reform to the geopolitical ones such as missile defense systems, and to
promote neoconservative liberal economy values in Israel.
The Jerusalem based institute, which also has a Washington bureau, worked to train
a generation of Israeli economic experts and political analysts. It also assisted
members of Knesset in economic research, and assisted in developing economic
reform policies. Researchers in the institute spend a month in the Washington bureau
as part of their activities, during which they work as research assistants to
congressmen.
The institute is best known for the report it produced to the then-Prime Minister
Benjamin Netanyahu, entitled: “A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the
Realm”. The report which was seen as a U.S.-Israel neoconservative manifesto
proposed a new approach to solving Israel's security problems in the Middle East
with an emphasis on "Western values", but was criticized for advocating an
aggressive new policy and advancing right-wing Zionism. The study group which
produced the report was headed by Richard Perle and included well know
neoconservative figures such as Douglas Feith, and David Wurmser. This report
was an exceptional case in the interference of neoconservative elements in the Israeli
policies. The institute has been in decline since late 2002.
• The Floersheimer Institute for Policy Studies-The Hebrew University in
Jerusalem:135
The Floersheimer Institute for Policy Studies aims to research
fundamental processes taking place in the multicultural Israeli society, to analyze the
long-term implications of these processes and to propose alternative strategies of
action. It is a not-for-profit organization and since 2007 it has been based at the
Institute of Urban and Regional Studies of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. The
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The Process of Israeli Decision Making _________________________________________________ 99
institute focuses on three main issues; the relationship between Jews and Arabs in
Israel, the relationship between religion, society and state, and the relationship
between Society, Space and Governance.
• The Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies (JIIS):136
The Jerusalem Institute for
Israel Studies is an independent not for profit academic institute working on policy
research in the fields of economic, social, and environmental policy, with a focus on
Jerusalem. The institute, which was established in 1978, focuses on applied research
and on providing various publications to the decisions makers. It also provides forums
for discussion to assist decision makers, and carries out study assessments of policy
alternatives.
The Jerusalem Institute is known for its right wing stance. It has 4 main research
strings; Studies on Jerusalem, conflict management with Palestinians, environment
related policies, social and economic policies.
The institute prides itself for having been successful in affecting government
policies in the following policy issues: changes in the route of the security fence
around Jerusalem, the disengagement from Gaza and its impacts on Israel, the Shift
from conflict resolution to conflict management in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
between 2000-2004, the environmental quality and the uniqueness of Jerusalem, The
Dead Sea, and the planning of the historic basin of Jerusalem.
• The Reut Institute:137
The Reut institute is a newly established think tank based in
Tel-Aviv. It describes itself as an innovative non-partisan not-for-profit policy group
designed to provide real-time long-term strategic decision-support to the Government
of Israel. It supplies its services exclusively to the Government of Israel, and since it
is supported by private donors it does so free of charge.
It focuses on decision support services to the government more than research. The
institute claims to specialize in areas that the decision makers are not aware of. Its
current focus areas are national security and socio-economics growth, with the goal of
bringing Israel to be amongst the top 15 countries economically. It also plans to
expand its work into areas concerning the Jewish world and decision-making
processes. The institute is currently being perceived by the establishment and
international media as one of the best decision support think tanks in Israel.
• Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace-The Hebrew
University in Jerusalem:138
The Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the
Advancement of Peace is dedicated to fostering peace and advancing cooperation in
the Middle East and around the world through research and informative events.
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100 _______________________________________________________ IV. External Influencing Factors
Founded in 1965, the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of
Peace enjoyed the personal support of former United States President Harry S.
Truman. Although part of the Hebrew University and located on the Mount Scopus
campus, the Institute has its own Board of Trustees and an Academic Committee that
determines its overall policies and research programs.
The Institute supports major studies on the history, politics, and social development
of the non-Western world, with particular emphasis on the Middle East. It has five
regional research units; Africa, Asia, Balkan, Latin America, and the Middle East. It
also includes the Minerva Center for Human Rights and the Modernization and
Comparative Civilizations Unit. As an institute for the advancement of peace, the
Truman Institute initiates joint projects to parallel major international political
activities on conflict resolution and on the struggle to uphold the principles of human
rights, as defined by the UN Charter in both the international and local spheres. Each
year the Truman Institute hosts a number of Visiting Fellows. The Truman Institute
was the first in Israel to host Palestinian scholars for long-term visits.
• The Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations–The Hebrew University
in Jerusalem:139
The Leonard Davis Institute of the Hebrew University is an academic
research institute devoted to the study of international affairs. The institute aims to
deepen the understanding of international relations by various means including the
promotion of research, the publication of research papers, and organizing workshops,
conferences and seminars.
The Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations, which was established in
1972 at the Mount Scopus campus of The Hebrew University Jerusalem, is by its
nature and statutes an interdisciplinary body, though formally anchored in the Faculty
of Social Sciences. It plans its programs in accordance with three broad aims:
1. to promote research in the theory of international relations, adopting a broad
perspective that draws on a variety of disciplines.
2. To present the universal themes of international politics to the Israeli
public, thereby enhancing the national discourse on these matters.
3. To put the Institute's expertise and consulting capability at the service of national
institutions conducting the security and foreign affairs of Israel.
The Leonard Davis Institute serves as a center where researchers from the
International Relations, Political Science, and related departments at the Hebrew
University, as well as at other Israeli universities and academic centers, can develop
and coordinate research programs. The Institute's programs aim at deepening the
understanding of Israel's foreign relations and diplomacy, Middle Eastern affairs, as
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The Process of Israeli Decision Making _________________________________________________ 101
well as international politics. This embraces, particularly, the critical choices that Israel
faces as part of the international community in domains such as international political
economy, human rights, global security, and conflict resolution. The Institute's
publications appear in English and Hebrew.
• The National Security Studies Center-The University of Haifa:140
The center, which
was established at the University of Haifa in 2000, describes its self as a promoter of
multidisciplinary studies in the field of national security and serves as a platform for
research, publication and public debate for scholars of diverse academic orientation
who find a common interest in the modern perception of national security. The
institute has four main goals: research of the highest academic standard,
interdisciplinary connection of the various aspects of national security, assistance in
policy formulation, and advance of public debate.
• The Van Leer Jerusalem Institute:141
The Van Leer Jerusalem Institute is a center
for the interdisciplinary study and discussion of issues related to philosophy, civil
society, culture and identity, and education. The Institute gives expression to the wide
range of opinions in Israel, and aims to enhance ethnic and cultural understanding,
improve social tensions, empower civil society players, and promote democratic
values.
• Taub Center for Social Policy Studies in Israel:142
The Taub Center is a nonpartisan,
not-for-profit institution with two main goals; supporting social policies, and
enriching the public debate on social issues in Israel.
• The Ariel Center for Policy Research (ACPR):143
The Ariel Center for Policy
Research was established in 1997 as an independent not-for-profit organization. Its
aim is to carry out local and international debates on all security policies, especially
the ones which resulted from the post-Oslo ‘peace process’. The center is working
towards establishing a “strategic plan for the state of Israel” which is to be presented
to the decision makers and the public. The center’s website features a message from
the ex-Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir which implies that the centre has a right wing
stance from the peace process and aims to influence the post-Oslo process through
providing alternative policies.
• The Israel Democracy Institute (IDI):144
The Israel Democracy Institute describes
itself as an independent, non-partisan think tank. It was founded in 1991 for the
purpose of assisting in planning policies, as well as reforms to government, public
administration, and democratic institutions and values which are still in their
formative stages.
Its research mainly addresses legal and constitutional issues that serve its stated
goals: encouraging structural, political, and economic reforms, becoming a source of
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102 _______________________________________________________ IV. External Influencing Factors
information and comparative studies for the Knesset and the government, becoming
an advisory body to the decision maker and the public, and finally encouraging public
debate of issues on the national agenda. It also encourages studies that focus on
resolving conflicts in the Middle East, and has programs that study alternatives to
achieve peace between Israelis and Palestinians proposing ideas such as the Middle
East Common Market.
The prestigious Guttman center, which specializes in public opinion surveys on
social issues, is part of the IDI and is known for having the largest record on public
opinion since the establishment of the state.
• Israel/Palestine Center for Research and Information (IPCRI):145
The center,
founded in Jerusalem in 1988, claims to be the only joint Palestinian-Israeli public
policy think-tank in the world. It is devoted to developing practical solutions for the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Center is independent and is headed by a joint
Palestinian/Israeli management.
The IPCRI deals with the main issues in the Israeli-Arab conflict - issues which two
sides are unable to resolve such as:
The nature of the final status agreement that the two sides must reach, The borders
between the two entities, the question of Jerusalem, the Israeli settlements in the West
Bank, guaranteeing security of Israeli and Palestinian citizens against violence by
opponents of the peace process on both sides, stimulating the economic development
of the Palestinian territories in a way beneficial to both sides, resolving the issue of
water, and educating the two traumatized nations toward peaceful coexistence.
• Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research- Tel Aviv University::146
Tami
Steinmetz Center’s was established, according its website, with the purpose of
promoting systematic research and thinking on issues connected with peacemaking
processes and conflict resolution.
The center, which was established in 1992, is part of Tel-Aviv University. Its main
goals are to conduct periodic surveys that gauge trends in Israeli public opinion as the
political process progresses, and to keep a database on Israeli-Palestinian cooperation
in particular and Israeli-Arab cooperation in general.
• Chaim Herzog Institute for Media Politics and Society-Tel Aviv University:147
The
Chaim Herzog Institute for Media Politics and Society was established in October
2002, as part of the Faculty of Social Sciences in Tel-Aviv University. The Institute,
named after the sixth president of the State of Israel, Chaim Herzog, was established
with the aim of conducting academic research into the reciprocal links, connections
and influences between the news media, society and politics. Its goals are to serve as a
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The Process of Israeli Decision Making _________________________________________________ 103
meeting ground for academics, researchers, journalists, producers, social critics and
policy makers who share an awareness of the increasing social significance of the
contemporary news media to society and culture, and who seek to understand it and
enhance its quality.
• The Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies:148
The Moshe
Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies is an interdisciplinary research
center devoted to the study of the modern history and current affairs of the Middle
East and Africa. The Center is part of the School of History and the Lester and Sally
Entin Faculty of Humanities at Tel Aviv University (from which it obtains its
funding in addition to trusts and donations). The center claims to be the oldest and
largest institution of its kind in Israel, and that it has brought scholarly objectivity to
the analysis of political subjects through research, publications, conferences,
documentary collections, and public service. It also claims to be unbiased and that it
does not take positions or recommend policies. It declared goal is to inform the
academic community, policy makers, journalists, and the general public about the
complexities of the Middle East, and so advance peace through understanding.
• The Peres Center for Peace:149
The Peres Center was established by the ex-Prime
Minister and current president Shimon Peres in 1996. The declared goal for the center
is to implement Peres’s vision of the “New middle east” where all countries in the
region work towards establishing peace through socio-economic cooperation and
“people-to-people interaction”. The center presents itself as a non-partisan nongovernmental
organization, which they claim allows it to work in parallel to the
political processes in the region.
The center’s main activities are to design and facilitate tangible peace building
projects that address its interests, utilizing cross-border, regional and international
partnerships to bring these initiatives to fruition.
• The Yitzhak Rabin Center:150
The Rabin center was established to commemorate
the late Prime Minister and Chief of General Staff Yitzhak Rabin, and to draw lessons
from his assassination, its circumstances and implications.
The Center combines socio-educational activity, documentation, and
commemoration, and operates in all sectors of Israeli society, in order to perpetuate
the memory of Yitzhak Rabin and his assassination, and to infuse the values of
democracy in the Israeli society.
• The Maurice Falk Institute for Economic Research in Israel- The Hebrew
University in Jerusalem:151
The institute is an independent not-for-profit organization
whose purpose is to encourage economic research, with particular emphasis on the
economy of Israel. The Institute was founded in January 1964 as the successor of the
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104 _______________________________________________________ IV. External Influencing Factors
Falk Project for Economic Research in Israel. The general administration of the
Institute is the responsibility of the Board of Trustees, originally nominated by the
Hebrew University of Jerusalem, in consultation with the Maurice and Laura Falk
Foundation of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.
In addition to the abovementioned think tanks there are other study centers in Israel
which do not qualify as think tanks but which are worth mentioning such as:
• The Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs (JCPA):152
which focuses on policy
research and education serving Israel and the Jewish people. Its current focus is the
need to present Israel's case in the wake of the Second Intifada since 2000, and the
return of anti-Semitism in the post-Holocaust period.
• The Adva Center:153
which conducts policy analysis, advocacy work, and public
outreach to inform policy makers and the general public in Israel and abroad about
equity and social justice issues in Israeli society.
• The Israeli Institute for Economic and Social Research (IIESR):154
which
specializes in economic and social research on issues relating to Israel's public
agenda.
• Myers-JDC-Brookdale Institute:155
which claims to be the premier center for
applied social research serving Israel and the Jewish world. It seeks to improve the
effectiveness of social services by developing and disseminating knowledge of social
needs as well as the effectiveness of programs intended to meet those needs.
• The Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies (BESA):156
which provides policyoriented
research on matters of strategy, security, and peace in the Middle East, and in
particular the national security and foreign policy of Israel.
• The Jewish-Arab Center- The University of Haifa:157
whose goals are to encourage
and support equitable coexistence between Jewish and Palestinian Arab citizens of
Israel.
3. The Influence of interest groups on decision making:
Israel is awash with political groups that aim to advance their agendas and interests
forward. But as a result of Israel multi faceted cleavages, these interest groups are difficult to
categorize on a linear spectrum. They can be Right wing religious organizations such as the
Yesha Council representing the interests of the religious Israeli settlers, or left wing such as
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The Process of Israeli Decision Making _________________________________________________ 105
the Histadrut workers union. They can also be religious groups, such as the Haredim, or part
of the agriculture lobby such as the Kibbutz and the Moshav movements. Interest groups also
include peace groups, such as Gush Shalom (Peace Bloc) and Shalom Achshav (Peace Now),
which aim to sway the Israeli public opinion and the decision makers to the direction of
achieving a “just peace” based on the “land for peace” principles.
But because of the centralized bureaucratic nature of the political system, there are
only a few points of access to lobby the decision makers. As a result these interest groups
have limited options to influence policy from outside. Ideally they would have to influence
the group of Knesset parties that represent the government coalition, or the key individuals
within those parties who can bring issues to the agenda. Alternatively they can influence the
civil servants high in the government ministry which deals with the issue. There is no benefit
in influencing influencing individual members of the Knesset as they have no power of their
own.158
In response, interest groups that seek to get most returns for the least efforts, choose
to become either institutional, a formal organization such as a military, or to be associated
with a political party.159
In some cases the leaders of the interest groups are also members of
party institutions such as the leaders of the Kibbutz or Moshav movements whose interests
seek to define the actions and policies of the Labour party.160
Some interest groups, especially
the religious ones, exercise large scale social, economical, and settlement activities, through
educational networks, medical and social care, economic projects, and settlement
organizations which they control or influence. Occasionally these groups also use their
affiliated party’s political influence to secure funding for their activities. The most extreme
example of such is the Sephardi Haredi group represented by the Shas Party.
Independent interest groups, that is groups that are neither institutional or party
affiliated, that attempt to influence policy are generally short lived, easily contained by the
government, and generally unsuccessful. The large number of demonstrations and petitions in
Israel is no indication of their effectiveness in bringing a change in policy. In most cases they
are only effective when there are the appropriate political and diplomatic conditions, and
most importantly the political will by the leadership.
For example, the legislation to annex the Golan Heights, which was advocated for
through public campaigning and a petition signed by hundreds of thousands of Israeli, was
only legislated when the right conditions and the political will existed for the legislation.161
Interest groups also have other challenges; most of the issues they advocate are either
already studied debated, researched, or discussed by the government or by public or semi
public agencies. This limits the interest groups which are unable to present new issues, and
creates a favourable condition for the government to maintain its policies.162
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106 _______________________________________________________ IV. External Influencing Factors
This part of the study aims to discuss some of these interest groups, highlighting their
ideological backgrounds, explaining their internal structures, and attempting to determine
how they shape Israeli decision making. Much attention is given to the religious groups
which are divided into two groups; the Haredim and the Datim Le’umim. On the other hand,
the Agricultural interest groups of the Kibbutzim and Moshavim together with the peace camp
are largely ignored in this study because of their much-reduced influence on decision
making.163
3.1 The Influence of the Haredim (The Non-Zionist Ultra Orthodox)
3.1.1 Background on the Israeli religious spectrum
Religion is a central issue in Israeli political life, partly because of the broad
consensus amongst Jews that Israel should be a Jewish state- regardless of their
disagreement on the definition of what a Jewish state is. In public life conflict only arises
regarding the degree to which legislation and civil life in Israel should reflect the norms
and decisions of established religious authorities.164
Thus, in order to better understand
the significance of the Haredim one should understand the nature of the religious
spectrum of the Israeli Society, which ranges from the religious Jews who want to see
Israel as a truly Jewish country in the religious sense, to the secular Jews (the Hilonim)
who see no role for religion in public life. This spectrum, which is often referred to in a
bipolar way, is more nuanced than the way it is often portrayed as a split between the
religious and the secular Jews.
There are two main religious groups in Israel, namely the Haredim, and the religious
nationalist, the Datim Le’umim. Together they constitute one end of the religiosity
spectrum with a population of around 17-25% of Israeli Jews, depending on the survey
used (split as 5-8% Haredim and 12-17% Datim Le’umim).165
The Haredim, whose name
literally means those who tremble from the fear of God, are generally non-Zionist
religious Jews who fully abide by the religious laws of Orthodox Judaism (The
Halachah) and who dedicate most of their lives to the study of the Talmud. The Haredim
are perceived as the most adherent in their observance to commandments of Judaism,
even more so than the Datim Le’umim. The Datim Le’umim, whose name means the
Religious Nationalist, are also observant Jews, yet they are also ideologically a religious
Zionists group. They are also known simply as the Datim (Hebrew for religious) 166
Perhaps not surprisingly, the religious groups, especially the Haredim, strongly
disagree with secular life and are not afraid to express this in their own press. This has
reached a degree that they described the life of the secular Jews as garbage and even
called on the seculars to take their corrupt lifestyle and leave the country.167
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The Process of Israeli Decision Making _________________________________________________ 107
Next on the scale of religiosity come the Masortim,168
or Traditional Jews. They
describe themselves as Jews but they do not abide by the more difficult commandments
of Orthodox Judaism. They are prepared to modify Jewish practices required by the
Halachah in those cases where they believe it to be personally necessary or attractive to
do so. A recent poll shows that among traditional Jews, 67 percent go to synagogue
regularly, 87 percent light Shabbat candles every Friday, and 94 percent keep kosher.169
Since they vary in their degree of practicing Judaism, Traditional Jews fill a wide
spectrum in this classification. As a result, establishing the size of this group becomes a
difficult task. A survey by the Guttman institute in 2000, estimated them to be around
35% of Israelis.170
This group, which until recently constituted a majority amongst Israeli
Jews, has long acted as a force of moderation between the extremes of Israeli society.
On the other side of the spectrum lie the fourth and last group of Israeli Jews, the non
religious or the secular Jews (referred to in Hebrew as the Hilonim). Although their
beliefs are secular, their practices, on the other hand, may be quite similar to those of
many traditionalists. The only difference is that they maintain those practices for family
and national reasons rather than religious ones. In fact, of the 48 % of Israeli Jews who
describe themselves as non-religious in the Guttman survey above, only 22% describe
themselves as totally non observant.171
According to recent poll quoted above, 38 percent
of secular Jews living in Israel keep kosher food often or at all times (50 percent of Israeli
Jews don't keep kosher at all times),and 36 percent of Israeli families that define
themselves as secular light Shabbat candles.172
Secular Jews are equally difficult to estimate because of the difficulty in
differentiating Secular Jews from Traditional Jews. They thus are often wrongly put
together in a large 75-83% category to differentiate them from the religious groups of the
Haredim and the Datim Le’umim.
Almost all the elites in Israeli society cultural, intellectual, political and economic
are found within the secular group which is overwhelmingly Ashkenazi.173
Some of the
seculars are hostile to the two first religious groups, describing them as a danger to the
society, and occasionally accuse them of living in a different time than the one “Modern
Israel” is living in.
Between June 1999 and January 2000, the Guttman Center of the Israel Democracy
Institute carried out a comprehensive study of Jewish religious behavior in Israel and of
how Israeli Jews define their own identity. The study found that the lifestyles, values, and
identity of most Israeli Jews reflect a profusion of efforts to maintain a bond to Jewish
tradition, on the one hand, and maximum freedom of choice, on the other. The result of
this mix is a fairly broad Israeli-Jewish consensus that reflects a commitment to Jewish
identity, Jewish culture, and Jewish continuity, but does not accept halakhah—rabbinical
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108 _______________________________________________________ IV. External Influencing Factors
law—as a system of binding imperatives. It also found a polarizing trend represented by
an increase in proportion of the Haredi and non religious groups.
3.1.2 Background on the Haredim
Of all the political powers within the Israeli society, the Haredi Jews174
are perhaps
the least understood outside of Israel. This is perhaps because of their declared nonZionist
(and often anti-Zionist) nature, and the lack of literature in languages other than
Hebrew that explains their ideologies. Their distinct traditional appearance and customs
may have also resulted in more literature that deals with their folkloristic aspects rather
than the details of their ideologies and how they influence the Israeli policies.175
This lack of sufficient studies of the Haredim outside of Israel is unfortunate given
they the increase in the influence of religion on the society. The Haredim have been part
of almost every government coalition since their surprise electoral success in 1988 and
their subsequent coalition with Yitzhak Shamir’s Likud. Their success throughout the
1990s, has at various times, put them in a position to be able to dictate to the rest of the
Israeli society. The Haredim are also the fastest growing Jewish community in Israel with
a birth rate approximately three times as fast as the rest of the Jewish population. This
growing community, which currently stands at about 800,000 people, has provided the
Haredi leaders with a growing power base.176
In this study the Characteristics of the Haredim will be explained in context by
putting them in contrast to the rest of Israelis, and especially to the Datim Le’umim who
are also discussed under a separate heading.
All Haredim are followers of Orthodox Judaism, which means that they are not
followers of either Reform Judaism or Conservative Judaism, the two forms of Judaism
that emerged, and are dominant, amongst American Jewry. The Datim Le’umim, who also
follow Orthodox Judaism are followers of a movement within Orthodox Judaism, called
modern orthodoxy, also known as the Mizrachi movement, which attempts to reconcile
religious observance with the modern world.177
The differences between the Non-Zionist Haredim and most Zionist Israeli Jews
(religious and secular) over Zionism are complex. The Haredim agree with the Zionists
over the notion that anti-semitism is an eternal quality common to all non-Jews. However,
they disagree with the Zionist on many other issues.
The first issue of disagreement is the Zionists’ goal of concentrating Jews and
establishing a state in Palestine, since this goal contradicts with the Haredi interpretation
of the Talmud and its commentaries. In the Haredi view, Zionism calls upon humans to
do what only God and the messiah could do, since in traditional Judaism, the return to the
land of Israel was inseparable from the messianic redemption of the people of Israel.
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The Process of Israeli Decision Making _________________________________________________ 109
Thus, returning to the land and creating a state before the return of the Masheeh (Hebrew
for Messiah) would amount to defying God's will and would only postpone the real
redemption and the real ingathering of Jews from the exile.178
The Haredim do not
attribute any holiness to Israel and do not consider it to be the beginning of redemption.179
In fact, to Haredim who live in Israel, Israel is only another diaspora. For example, the
Haredi parties, unlike the rest of the Israeli Parties, do not end or begin their conventions
with the singing of the national anthem "Hatikva.” instead they recite Jewish prayers.
Israeli Haredim also retain strong links with other Haredi Jews in other countries
especially the United States.
Many of the Datim Le’umim, on the other hand, believe that the redemption is not a
messianic act o be carried by god, but is an immediate imperative for every living Jew.
They believe that the messianic age has started already, and that the redemption has
started with the establishment of the state of Israel and that it will soon be complete with
the imminent coming of the Masheeh. The dispute between the two main religious
ideologies is theologically centered upon the issue of whether Jews are living in normal
times as the Haredim believe, or in the period of the beginning of redemption, as the
Datim Le’umim believe.180
Another difference is that the Haredim insist on separating themselves from the
Gentile (non-Jewish) society, as well as from Jews who do not follow the religious law as
strictly as they do. The aim of Haredi practices has, and still is, to preserve the Jewish
way of life, as it existed prior to modern times.181
In contrast, the Datim Le’umim, in spite
of their strict observance of Jewish religious law, have devised ways to participate in
modern society and have made compromises with modernity, both in the diaspora and in
Israel, since the 1920s split between the two groups.
One aspect of the lack of Haredi participation in the society is that most male
Haredim who join a Yeshiva (a religious school) get a deferment from the 3-year military
service, and after the expiry of this deferment, they either get a complete exemption or
simply join the reserves after a brief training period. In any case, they are disqualified
from serving in any dangerous or even unpleasant capacities. All Haredi women, unlike
other Jewish Israeli women who serve two years, are completely excluded from military
conscription.182
On the other hand, the Datim Le’umim serve in the military in one of two
arrangements that combines Talmudic studies with military service.
As a result many secular Jews complain that the Haredim do not share the burdens
imposed upon society equally with other Israeli Jews. In response the Haredim argue that
all victories as well as defeats of the Israeli army are due to God's intervention and that
without doubt God takes into consideration the numbers, the progress in study, and the
commitment of those Jews who engage in Talmudic study. The Haredim cite numerous
passages in the Talmud and in subsequent Talmudic literature that are emphatic on this
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110 _______________________________________________________ IV. External Influencing Factors
point. Traditional Israeli Jews support the Haredim and the cited sacred Jewish writings
on this point.183
The Haredim, like many of the traditionally religious Jews, prohibit their women from
playing even insignificant roles in politics or public activities in which they may appear
as leading males, not to mention that many of them are kept illiterate by the command of
the rabbis.184
The Datim Le’umim, on the other hand, would not hesitate to admit women
in their political parties and even to positions of authority.185
A rivalry between these two religious ideologies exists over who has the most
influence and power. Both ideologies have gained and lost ground in recent history
following domestic societal and geopolitical changes. It is well known in Israel that
hatred between the secular Jews can never match the hatred between the religious groups
themselves.186
This animosity often surfaces when Rabbis on both sides attack the
ideologies of the other group.
3.1.3 Power structures of the Haredim
The Haredim themselves are also divided internally. Their divisions are such that
some scholars such as Israel Shahak and Norton Metzvinskly argue that if it was not for
the division of the Haredim and especially their rabbis, the influence of the Haredim and
the ‘Haredi-fication’ of the Israeli society might have been much stronger.187
The Haredim are divided into two main categories according to the religious practices
of both the Ashkenazim and the Sephardim. This ethnic division is relatively recent in the
Haredi community. Until not too long ago, the Mizrachi Haredim were part of the
Ashkenazi Haredim education system, but discrimination by the Ashkenazim against
Sephardim and differences in religious practices between the two branches of Judaism
caused the Sephardim to split politically. This process created a rift between the two
groups that continues to get worse. Currently Shas is the only political party that
represents the Sephardi Haredim (as well as claiming to be the only available
representative of wider Mizrachi Jews).
On the Ashkenazi side, the Ashkenazi Haredim are split further into two categories;
the Hasidim, or the Hasidic Jews (themselves divided into different dynasties/sects), and
the non-Hasidic Haredim, also known as the Lithuanian Haredim (because of their
Lithuanian theological origins). The differences between these two sub-categories are
theological but the parties representing them, Agudat Yisrael and Degel HaTorah,
respectively, often join each other in a united electoral list called United Torah Judaism
(Yahadut haTorah HaMeukhedet) in order to reach the 2% electoral threshold.
The two parties representing Ashkenazi Haredim are often differentiated politically on
the basis of their attitude to the Arab- Israeli conflict. Agudat Yisrael is often referred to
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The Process of Israeli Decision Making _________________________________________________ 111
as right wing Hawkish party, while Degel HaTorah is referred to as a Dovish party. On
the Sepahrdi side, Shas party’s head, Rabbi Ovadia Yoseph, , who has advocated peace
negotiations while at the same time being an advocate of strengthening the settlements, is
seen by some as being somewhere between the Agudat Yisrael and the Zionist Mafdal,
thus questioning the predominant assumption that they are a non-Zionist party.188
Such a distinction and classification is inaccurate as it lacks an understanding of the
basic ideologies of the Judeo-centric Haredim. According to Israel Shahak, the Haredi
thought is based on the notion that Jews and non Jews are poles apart, and all Haredi
Jews share one point of departure which is that non Jews want to kill and destroy the Jew.
How they react to this is where the Haredim differ. The Degel HaTorah party led by
Rabbi Shach believes that since communication with non-Jews is impossible, the best
way is not to provoke non-Jews by not reminding them of their (the Jews’) existence. On
the other hand, the spiritual leader for one of the Dynasties/sects of the Agudat Yisrael
party, Rebbe Menachem Shneerson (The Lubovitcher Rebbe),189
believes that Jews must
be strong so that non-Jews would not destroy them. The leader of the Sephardi Shas,
Rabbi Ovadia Yoseph, appears to have a stronger position that the two of them. Yoseph
publicly declares that Jews, when sufficiently powerful, have a religious obligation to
expel all non- Jews from the country and destroy all Christian churches. He argued in a
Haredi newspaper article in 1989 that since Israel is too weak to demolish all the
Christian churches in the Holy Land (even though they are places of idolatry, in his
view), it is also too weak to retain all the conquered territories. He thus advocates that
Israel makes territorial concessions to avert war in which Jewish life could be lost.
According to this explanation it is clear that the differences between a “Haredi Dove” and
a “Haredi Hawk” are not that great, and that they are more tactical than ideological.190
Rabbi Yoseph’s comments in 1989 ( which were supported by Rabbi Shach at the
time) which supported withdrawal from territories occupied in 1967 was perceived by the
western media as a sign of peace when in fact, if they are understood in context of their
ideologies, their views would constitute one part of the Hawkish heart of Israeli politics.
Rabbi Yoseph, who is known for his fierce and sharp rhetoric and his curses and illwishes
to political leaders that he hates, would almost certainly have favored a permanent
occupation of all the territories if he were convinced that this would not provoke Arabs to
harm Jews, and that no Jewish life would be lost in the process.
In terms of their power structures, all three Haredi parties have no internal democratic
process, as is the case with other Israel parties. The heads of their political parties are
subordinate to the religious heads of their Haredi groups.
The Agudat Yisrael faction takes its directions from the Hasidic rebbes of Ger,
Vizhnitz, Boston, and Sadigura who exert much influence in the daily lives of their
followers, the Hasidim. The Belz rebbe, a prominent political and religious figure in his
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112 _______________________________________________________ IV. External Influencing Factors
own right, is also closely involved in Agudat policy-making, though inter-party politics
resulted in Belz failing to get any of their representatives into a high position on the
combined Yahadut HaTorah list in the 2006 Knesset elections.
Degel HaTorah is headed by Rabbi Yosef Shalom Eliashiv and Rabbi Aharon
Shteinman. Policy decisions are also weighed and decided by a Moetzes Gedolei
HaTorah, or a Council of Torah Sages. This council is made up of experienced communal
rabbis who are mostly senior and elderly heads of Yeshivot,191
and all of them are very
learned in Talmud, devoted to Halachah (Jewish law), and guided by their knowledge
and application of the classical "Code of Jewish Law", the Shulkhan Arukh.
Shas’ principal spiritual leader is the renowned authority of Halachah Rabbi Ovadia
Yoseph, and like Degel HaTorah, Shas also has its own council of Torah Sages, but in
practice, Rabbi Ovadia Yoseph has complete control of all the Shas MKs. The Israeli
government's refusal to extend Rabbi Yoseph's term as Sephardi Chief Rabbi had been
one of the main reasons for the Shas party's establishment. The extended power of Shas
into the wider Mizrachi, or oriental, community and the lack of other secular
representation of the Mizrachim can be related to the fact that the majority of Mizrachi
Jews remained traditionalists and retain belief in the “magical powers of Rabbis and holy
men”. Although Mizrachi Jews are prepared to criticize a politician, they would rarely
criticize a Rabbi in public. Almost all Mizrachi politicians, including the black panthers
of the 1970s, commonly bow to kiss the hands of their Rabbis in public.192
One note to be made on the Hassidic Haredim is that they are strongly influenced by
the teachings of the Cabbala which emphasises on the cosmic differences between Jews
and non-Jews, more so than the Halachah (The Jewish law). One of the principles of
Cabbala is that Souls of Non-Jews are evil and that they are an earthly embodiment of
Satan. In addition, the Cabbala also teaches that a Satanic soul ( non-Jewish soul) cannot
be transformed into a divine soul (Jewish soul) by mere persuasion.193
The late "Lubovitcher Rebbe," Rebbe Menachem Mendel Schneerson, who headed
the Chabad movement and wielded great influence among many religious Jews in Israel
as well as in the United States, was reported to have said in a recording published in
1965194
that there is a difference in the Halachah’s attitude about the bodies of non- Jews
and the bodies of Jews, and that an even greater difference exists in regards to the soul.
Two contrary types of souls exist; the non- Jewish soul, which comes from the satanic
sphere, and the Jewish soul, which stems from holiness. He also stated that the general
difference between Jews and non- Jews is that a Jew was not created as a means for some
other purpose; he himself is the purpose, since the substance of all divine emanations was
created only to serve the Jews.” Rabbi Ginsburgh, one of the Lubovitcher sect’s leading
authorities was also quoted sating that “There is something infinitely more holy and
unique about Jewish life than non-Jewish life”.195
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The Process of Israeli Decision Making _________________________________________________ 113
3.1.4 Influence of the Haredim
The Haredi influence in the state started with the establishment of the state when Ben
Gurion reached an agreement, on the eve of his declaration of establishment of the state,
to maintain the status quo that existed with regard to religious jurisdiction. This meant
that matters of personal status would continue to be directed by the Orthodox Chief
Rabbinate. Since then, Jewish marriage, divorce and other issues continued to be
performed according to strict Jewish law. In 1953, an act of Knesset placed all Jews in
Israel under the jurisdiction of the rabbinic court for issues of personal status. Christian
and Muslim religious councils or courts also continued to determine issues of personal
status based on their own religious law.
The new state, under pressure from the Haredim, also established a number of
principles for the public observance of Jewish law. On the Jewish Sabbath stores, offices,
and public transportation are shut down. All food served by government institutions,
including the military, abides by the Jewish dietary laws. A Ministry of Religion was
established with departments for Jewish, Christian, Muslim, and Druze affairs. The
ministry oversaw and subsidized places of worship. The department for Jewish affairs –
obviously the largest- was charged with building synagogue, religious courts, and
yeshivas (Religious schools), It also provides religious services for new immigrants, and
supervises the dietary laws.196
To observers the Haredi attitude towards the state may seem contradictory. While the
Haredim do not serve in the military, and publicly denounce Zionism, they still
participate in the governments of Israel. The reason behind this is that after the de facto
creation of the Israel, each Haredi group charted its own way in how to deal with the
state.
While some Haredi groups chose an anti-Zionist stance and to publicly oppose the
state, such as the Satmar Chasidic sect, Edah Hacharedis, and the smaller group Naturei
Karta, others chose a more pragmatic approach in dealing with Israel such as the
Lithuanian Haredim and most Chasidic sects such as Ger, Belz, vizhnitz, and ChabadLubavich.
Ger, Belz and Vizhnitz together established the Agudat Yisrael, which initially
had an anti-zionist position but has changed to a pragmatic non-Zionist position,
accepting Israel as a refuge for the survivors of European Jewry. Similarly, ChabadLubavich
started with an anti-Zionist position but has settled for a non-Zionist position,
supporting the state in protecting the Jewish community living in it.
Haredis who join the government only do so to ensure the retention of the Jewish
nature of their communities and protect their rights in the state, rather than because of a
true subscription to the Zionist ideology. This is perhaps the reason some of the
Ashkenazi Haredi Rabbis forbid their followers from becoming ministers in any
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114 _______________________________________________________ IV. External Influencing Factors
government and only allows the Haredi politicians to become deputy ministers, even
though they carry out all the functions of a Minister.
Although the majority of Jewish Israelis see the Haredim and their leaders as fringe,
in recent years, the political influence of the Haredim has seen an increase, as they played
a role as a main coalition partner with the party that forms the government. Because they
have no political interest in the government, they are very flexible in coalition
negotiations, which make them a good political partner. Shas and Yahadut haTorah only
insist on implementing their social and welfare agendas through public funding and
budget before they join any government coalition. The common wisdom is that the
increase in the influence of Haredim is because the main political parties of Labour and
Likud need the Haredim – who combined constitute the third bloc after Labour and Likudin
government coalitions, thus they provide them with the privileges they request,
including funding their education system, and provide assitsnace with in passing
legislations to support other demands they make. However, some scholars argue that this
realpolitik explanation based on pragmatic political convenience is not a sufficient as it
does not take into account the special affinity of all religious parties and secular right
wing parties.
The increasing influence of the Haredim since the 1990s has also been largely
attributed to their great attention to the religious education of their children. In Israel’s
two-track education system, the Haredi children only learn Talmudic studies, and do not
get any secular education. It is estimated that currently one out of every four children in
Israel does not receive any secular education.197
The Haredim acquired direct influence
over several school networks, and indirectly influenced others, and thus managed to
spread their influence on an increasing segment of younger generation Israelis in other
non-Haredi schools.198
Their attempts to restore traditional Jewish religious education,
which was generously subsidized by the state, especially in poorer towns resulted in a
new generation of believers who adhere to their worldview communities of Israel.
The Haredim also established many social networks within their communities
providing inducements such as hot meals to people in poorer localities. Shas for example
spends most if its money in building its network of institutions and in training members
who would enable the party to maximize its control of the public. Adults between 40 and
50 were encouraged to leave their professions or give up their businesses in order to
enroll in their institutions and study sacred subjects with guaranteed remuneration. The
remuneration, which was effectively salaries for studying, was low, but numerous
individuals considered the life of study preferable to their persisting to do low rate work
or to maintain their decaying businesses. But the recruits did more than study Talmud.
They were required to do political work for Shas. These recruits soon constituted Shas'
political cadre, which has been and remains instrumental in turning Haredi
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The Process of Israeli Decision Making _________________________________________________ 115
neighborhoods into electoral constituencies under almost any conceivable
circumstances.199
The Haredim benefit greatly from the state’s financial support and work hard to keep
it going, the Ashkenazi Haredi political parties in particular have concentrated primarily
on obtaining funding for their communities. For example, between 1988 and 1990 Peres
and Shamir supported the demand of the Haredi parties for funding, which was known as
the “special money” grants. These grants were made through a voluntary association
formed to remain under the real control of a Haredi Knesset member or his friends. The
ministry of finance made grants from the state budget to such associations, most often
based on flimsy purpose statements and with no control exerted over expenditures. These
special money grants were finally withdrawn, but only when the resultant corruption that
took place in their use reached an unprecedented scale.
Since the Haredi political ideology is to have the state of Israel organize its public life
in accordance with the Halachah (the Jewish religious law), these Haredi parties
concentrate on enforcing strict conformity to their interpretation of Jewish religious law
in public life. This manifests itself in issues such as observance of Shabbat, conversion to
Judaism, defining who is a Jew, control of marriage and divorce, kosher dietary laws,
cultivating the land, and the desecration of the dead by archaeologists. Issues of economic
and political nature usually follow on the Haredi list of priorities.200
Even these issues are
always seen in a purely religious manner that is rooted in Judaism such as protection of
Jewish lives.
The Haredim have managed to secure a series of laws and administrative rulings that
have gone in the direction desired by them. For example, the Knesset has passed
legislations such as:201
1. The 1953 law establishing sole jurisdiction to the orthodox rabbinical courts regarding
marriage and divorce among Jews.
2. The 1951 law making the Jewish Sabbath an official day of rest for Jews.
3. The 1962 law prohibiting the raising of pigs in Israel except in areas where there is a
Christian population.
They also put a great emphasis on preserving the religious symbols of the state, and
are supported on this matter by many Israeli Jews. At times, the Haredim appear to bring
up religious issues when the coalition which they are in appears to be in danger. In other
cases the issues are raised as a result of competition amongst different religious parties
and factions.202
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116 _______________________________________________________ IV. External Influencing Factors
Perhaps the most interesting example on the importance of the religious symbols to
the Haredim and their ability to use their political power is the incident of the Education
Minister Shulamit Aloni from the Meretz party being photographed eating non-Kosher
meat in an Arab restaurant in Nazareth in 1992. This incident, which may seem
insignificant was deemed a violation of the religious symbol of the ritual purity of food
and resulted in protests by all religious political parties against what they termed a
“profanation of Judaism”. The traditionally religious members of the Knesset from the
Labour party followed the religious parties, which forced the Prime Minister Yitzhak
Rabin to support those accusations against Aloni. However, this was not the end of the
incident. Shas also threatened to leave the Rabin coalition forcing Rabin to summon the
leaders of Meretz on four separate occasions to convey to them the complaints about
Aloni made by Rabbi Ovadia Yoseph. Rabin also forced Aloni to apologize publicly in an
open letter to Rabbi Yoseph.
Political reasons are always blamed for the big parties’ submission to the religious
parties’ demands. For example, in spite of their secular background, Peres and Netanyahu
regarded Rabbi Yoseph as an important political figure and often courted him openly. In
the case of the Aloni incident, the Labor Party and its non-traditionalist sympathizers
argued that concessions to the demands of the Haredim were necessary to ensure Shas’
backing for the peace process.203
The fact that issue of religious symbols is minor may explain why the large parties
concede them to the Haredim in return for their backing on bigger issues. Yet, it remains
a testament to their ability to mobilize their power base effectively.
The Haredim choice of coalition is not always based on who provides them with the
financial support they need, but is also based on ideologies and religious beliefs. In the
mid-1970s the Lubovitcher Rebbe decided that the Labor Party was too moderate and
thereafter shifted his movement 's political support sometimes to Likud and sometimes to
a religious party. Ariel Sharon was the Rebbe's favorite Israeli senior politician. From the
June 1967 war until his death the Lubovitcher Rebbe always supported Israeli wars and
opposed any retreat. In 1974, he strongly opposed the Israeli withdrawal from the Suez
area, conquered in the October 1973 war, and promised Israel divine favors if it persisted
in occupying that land. After his death thousands of his Israeli followers, who continued
to hold the views expressed in the above quoted passage, played an important role in
Netanyahu's election victory by demonstrating at many crossroad junctions before the
election day, and chanting the slogan: "Netanyahu is good for the Jews". Although they
subsequently criticized Netanyahu strongly for meeting with Arafat, signing the Hebron
agreement, and agreeing to a second withdrawal, the Rebbe's followers continued their
overall preference for the Netanyahu government.204
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The Process of Israeli Decision Making _________________________________________________ 117
The Haredim also have an economical influence. According to the economist Momi
Dahan, from the School of Public Policy at Hebrew University, some 60 percent of
Haredi men do not work regular jobs, preferring religious study instead. In addition, most
Haredi families are the largest amongst Israeli Jews with six or seven children. As a result
more than 50 % of Haredim live below the poverty line and get state allowances (mostly
child benefits and unemployment benefits), compared with a mere 15% of the rest of the
population.205
These state allowances and the support that the Haredim get from the
government are major issues in the Israeli economy, which is gradually changing from a
social economy into a liberal capitalist economy, but is unable to considerably cut state
allowances to the Haredim for political reasons.
For example, after Netanyahu’s success in the general elections, which was greatly
supported by the Haredim as explained above, his attempts to carry out economic reforms
towards an American style market economy were hampered by his commitment to
continue funding the Haredi community institutions. His attempts to balance the needs of
his voters with his economic reforms -together with a budget crisis in 1999- eventually
led to the failure of his 1999 budget, which together with the disagreement over the Wye
River Accord, forced Netanyahu to call early elections.
More recently, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert agreed to provide the Haredi school
sector with funding equivalent to that of the state school system, with no obligation on
them to incorporate secular schools’ core curriculum subjects into religious education as
demanded by secular Jews.206
It is needless to say that this funding to ensure the
Haredim’s backing has serious economic consequences on the budget.
The Haredim’s increasing electoral leverage also allows them to advance their
agendas. They use the coalition agreements to make demands that serve their interests and
strengthen their political positions not just economically but also politically. The Agudat
Yisrael party has once demanded that the Netanyahu government should make no
territory concessions to the Palestinians. More recently, Shas has threatened to withdraw
from Olmert’s coalition if the latter discusses Jerusalem in any peace negotiations. In the
Knesset, the Haredi MKs have made requests to pass laws to curb Christian missionaries,
and lobbied against the Supreme Court, which does not rule according to the Halachah.
The Haredim also influence public policy by their exclusion from military
conscription. While this has remained a minor concern at the establishment of the state,
the growth of the Haredim compared to the rest of the population is gradually making it a
bigger, which is evident in the increase of public, and media discourse on the topic. The
Haredim currently account for more than 10% of draft-age Israeli Jews, but by 2019, the
government forecasts they will constitute almost 25%.207
This would mean that the
military could lose a quarter of its potential conscripts.
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118 _______________________________________________________ IV. External Influencing Factors
Finally, the Haredim influence Israeli decision making indirectly through religious
ideas. The Israeli foreign policy, although usually conceived and conducted by secular
Jews, has to date displayed an essence derived in part from the Jewish religious past. For
example following the 1967 war Israeli governmental leaders with almost full support of
Israeli Jews believed that the Arabs were incapable of harming Israel and therefore
refused to make any concessions. This was exactly the position of the Ashkenazi
Haredim.208
Only after suffering grievous losses in Jewish lives in the October 1973 war,
and fearing another war, did the government of the state of Israel - again with almost the
full support of Israeli Jews - agree to return the Sinai to Egypt. The same process took
place in Lebanon when guerilla warfare, conducted by the Lebanese in 1984 and 1985,
resulted in consistent Israeli casualties. It appears that the Zionist movement, which
underwent a partial secularization, has kept many of the basic Jewish religious principles,
and that Rabbi Yoseph, David Ben Gurion, Ariel Sharon, and all major Israeli politicians
appear to share a common ground in policy making.209
3.2 The influence of the Religious National Movement and Gush Emunim
3.2.1 Background on the Datim Le’umim, the National Religious Party (Mafdal), Gush
Emunim, and the Yesha Council
Perhaps one of the most important interest groups in Israel politics is the Datim
Le’umim religious group,210
and its most prominent political manifestations, the Mafdal
and Gush Emunim.211
The Dati Le’umi movement is as old as secular Zionism. The emergence of the
Zionist movement aroused considerable enthusiasm among many Orthodox Jews who
participated in the First Zionist Congress in Basel in 1897 when Zionism was declared a
political movement. By the Fifth Zionist Congress in 1901, when the World Zionist
Organization (WZO) was established, the secular orientation of the Zionist movement
became clear to Orthodox Jews, who reacted in two very different ways. while a small
group of orthodox Jews left the WZO, the majority remained and formed a separate
political faction within the WZO called Merkaz Ruhani, or spiritual center, which is
usually referred to as the Mizrachi Movement.212
In 1911, a group of the Mizrachi
movement broke off and joined the orthodox Jews who have left earlier to form the
Agudat Yisrael party, which had a strong anti-Zionist ideology.213
However, the Mizrachi Movement at the time was motivated by a purely pragmatic
approach that was concerned more about saving the Jewish body rather than saving the
Jewish soul by redemption. This is best illustrated by Mizrachi Support of British
proposal of Uganda for the location of the Jewish colony in 1903. In the 1920s, the
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Mizrachi Movement joined the general Zionist grouping in the WZO known as the
Ezrahim.
However, this ideological position changed due to the work of Rabbi Abraham Isaac
Kook, known as Rabbi Kook the elder, who was the first Ashkenazi Chief Rabbi of
Palestine. According to Shlomo Avineri, he was the first orthodox figure to make a
systematic attempt to integrate the centrality of the Land of Israel in religious tradition
into a reinterpretation of the political activity of Zionism.214
As a result of his work to blend orthodoxy and modern Jewish nationalism in the
1920s, he is considered to be the founder of the religious Zionist ideology, which known
as Dati leumi (religious national). The ideology he created constituted a change of course
for the Mizrachi movement from pragmatic Zionism to messianic Zionism where Zionism
became part of the gradual messianic redemption of the Jewish people. The Dati Le’umi
ideology was further developed afterwards by Rabbi Kook’s son and successor Rabbi
Tzvi Yehuda Kook, known as Rabbi Kook the younger.215
Rabbi Kook the elder’s success in nationalizing religion in the period between 1920
and 1948 has shifted the position of the Mizrachi movement from pragmatic Zionism into
messianic Zionism. The Mizrachi movement positions thus changed from a pragmatic
position that accepted the Ugandan option to one that advocated full Jewish sovereignty
in the “land of Israel.”
After the establishment of the state, the Datim Le’umim216
continued playing a role in
the Zionist movement. They have contributed greatly to the Israeli state, military, and
society. The fact that the religious-Zionist parties participated in every Israeli government
between 1948 and 1992 is enough testament to their partnership in the state. In addition,
by becoming full partners in the Zionist project, they have also marginalized the nonZionist
Haredim.217
The two pre-state Mizrachi movements formed two parties, The Mizrachi, and
HaPo’el HaMizrachi. These parties -which united after 1955 to to create the current
representative party, the National Religious Party (NRP) or the Mafdal-218
became the
constant coalition partner of the dominant Mapai party – the ancestor of today’s Labour
Party - during the period between 1948 and 1977. During this period, which is often
termed the historic league, the Mizrachi – and the Mafdal after it- have adopted pragmatic
foreign policies, conceding the national security, foreign affairs, and economic policies to
Mapai in exchange for Mapai’s concessions on religious issues.219
But this change back to pragmatism, which calculates the human and consequences
of each decision, was short lived. Following the perceived “miracle” of the six-day war of
1967 and the occupation of the remainder of historic Palestine, The messianic Zionist
ideology notion was further strengthened within the Mafdal. What many Jews saw as an
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120 _______________________________________________________ IV. External Influencing Factors
unexpected victory awakened the dormant messianic dimension of the Datim Le’umim
who saw the victory as another sign that the redemption is indeed underway.220
A strong messianic Zionist faction thus emerged from within the Mafdal, influenced
by the teachings of Rabbi Kook the elder, and the rabbis who graduated from Rabbi Tzvi
Yehuda Kook’s yeshiva in Jerusalem, Merkaz Harav, or the Center of the Rabbi,
established a Jewish sect with a well- defined political plan. They were the younger
generation of Mafdal leaders and constituted its new religious elite who became later
known as the Youth Circle (or the Tze’irim). Mafdal thus experienced a third change in
the form of a dramatic return towards territorial hawkishness.221
The acquisition of land has also strengthened the Revisionist Zionist position whose
goal of controlling the whole “land of Israel” in its biblical borders was its most important
goal. This position, which was championed by the Herut Party, which merged into Likud
in 1973, implied that the return any of this land to the Arabs would be to defy God's plan
for the redemption of the Jewish people. The religious aspect to Revisionist Zionism
together with a generational change in both Mafdal and Mapai paved the way for a
coalition between Mafdal and Herut’s successor, the Likud, when it assumed power in
1977.222
Concerned about their constituency, and about asserting their identity as Dati leumi,
the Tze’irim decide to formulate a new strategy characterized by a new nationalistic
foreign policy. They took the lead on the issue of settlements, first lending their resources
to the Movement for the Whole Land of Israel, a mostly revisionist Zionist movement,
which had the goal of assimilating all the land acquired in the 1967 war,223
and later on
focusing their support on the new movement of Gush Emunim (or the bloc of the
faithful).
In early 1974, Tze’irim founded Gush Emunim as a faction within the Mafdal,
triggered by the territorial concessions made by the Israel government in Sinai in 1974
and conviction that God’s masterplan was already underway. Months later, Gush
Emunim’s formal political ties with the Mafdal were cut as a result of splits within the
party regarding supporting unauthorized settlements. However, ideological and material
support systems between the Madfal Yeshivot educational system and Gush Emunim
remained solid.224
The members and supporters of the Gush Emunim, who represent around 6-7% of
Israeli Jews,225
are the most messianic segment of the Datim Le’umim. They conform
strictly in their daily lives to what they believe are the laws of God, and they advocate the
creation of a society based on those laws, but their political activities have been directed
toward settling and retaining the land won in 1967.226
Since its establishment, the Gush
Emunim movement has played a role in the construction of most settlements in the West
Bank, through its settler arm Amana. After the death of Rabbi Kook the younger, the
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spiritual leadership of Gush Emunim became centered in a semi - secret rabbinical
council, known as the Gush Emunim Rabbinical Council, selected from among the most
outstanding disciples of Rabbi Kook the younger.
The emergence of Gush Emunim influenced, and was influence by, changes in Israeli
government policy towards the settlements. From the end of the 1967 war until 1974,
Moshe Dayan, as Defense Minister, determined Israeli settlement policy. He did not
allow the establishment of Jewish settlement in the bulk of the territories occupied in
1967. The only exception he made was to allow a tiny group of Jewish settlers to live near
Hebron. Dayan wanted to envelop the densely inhabited parts of the West Bank and Gaza
by creating a settlement zone in the almost uninhabited Jordan Valley and northern Sinai
(the Yamit area). Dayan also promised not to confiscate village lands in order to preserve
the Israeli alliance with the feudal notables who were in firm control of the villages
(although not of the larger towns), and he mostly kept his promise.
By 1974, and through 1975, the newly established Gush Emunim demonstrated its
strength by organizing enormous demonstrations opposing the Dayan promise. In this
atmosphere Peres, who became Defense Minister after Dayan in 1974 in the first Rabin
government (1974- 77), initiated a new policy which he called "functional compromise"
and for which he acquired Gush Emunim support. According to this policy, all the land
inside the West Bank and the Gaza Strip that was not being used by the inhabitants could
be confiscated for the exclusive use of the Jews.
At first, Prime Minister Rabin opposed this policy, but Peres supported Gush Emunim
and planned a strategy to combat Rabin's opposition. Gush Emunim organized a mass
rallies and after lengthy negotiations, a compromise settlement that favored Gush Emunim
was reached. Their members were allowed to settle in what is now the settlement of
Kedumim. In 1976, with the help of Peres, Gush Emunim founded the settlement of Ofra
as a temporary work camp and the settlement Shilo as a temporary archaeological camp.
Gush Emunim also pursued similar policies and initiated settlement beginnings in the
Gaza Strip. Rabin’s acceptance of Gush Emunim’s settlements was seen as a sign of
acknowledgement of Gush Emunim as a significant interest group.227
Following the 1977 Likud victory and the election of Menachem Begin as Prime
Minister, a "holy alliance" of the religious Gush Emunim and successive secular Israeli
governments occurred. The Likud permitted the launching of a number of Jewish
settlements beyond the borders of the Green Line, and gave Gush Emunim the active
support of government departments, the army, and the WZO, which recognized it as an
official settlement movement and allocated it considerable funds for settlement
activities.228
Since then this alliance has remained in place and the settlement movement
has continued to grow.229
It is currently estimated that a majority of the Israeli society, as
represented by Knesset members, supports retaining all settlements in one form or
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122 _______________________________________________________ IV. External Influencing Factors
another.230
In early 1999, less than 20 members of the Knesset out of 120 opposed
retaining the settlements. These 20 included the Arab Knesset members.
After having achieved settlement policy successes, the Gush Emunim rabbis cleverly
conducted a number of political intrigues and were able to achieve domination of the
Mafdal in spite of the severing of formal political ties. From the mid- 1980s the Mafdal
has followed the ideological lead of Gush Emunim.231
Yesha has also created affiliations
between Gush Emunim settlements and the Labor party, the Mafdal, and Herut party’s
Betar youth movement.232
Representing the religious settler movement in the West Bank is the council for the
settlements known as the Yesha council. The Yesha council represents the elected heads
of the settlement councils in addition to settler leaders, and is often considered to be a
successor body for Gush Emunim. The Yesha council deals primarily with practical
matters, such as the utilization of land and water, relations with Israeli military authorities
and, if necessary, mobilizing political pressure on the government.
In 2006, the Mafdal joined the right wing pro-settlements National Union party
(HaIkhud HaLeumi)233
under one electoral list called NRP-NU or Mafdal- HaIkhud
HaLeumi in order to reach the 2% electoral threshold. Together they obtained 9 Knesset
Seats.
3.2.2 The Dati Le’umi Messianic Ideology
Contrary to the Haredim, the Dati Le’umi ideology is a religious Zionist ideology that
asserts that redemption of the Jewish people has already started and that the establishment
of the state of Israel is the first stage in this redemption. But unlike the secular Zionists,
who wanted to make the Jews a nation like all other nations, Gush Emunim reject this
notion of normality especially when sought by copying non-Jews applying non- Jewish
standards that are in their eyes satanic. The Gush Emunim argument is that Jews are not
and cannot be a normal people. Their eternal uniqueness is the result of the covenant God
made with them at Mount Sinai.234
The Gush Emunim’s messianic ideology assumes the imminent coming of the
Masheeh (The Messiah), and asserts that the Jews, aided by God, will thereafter triumph
over the non-Jews and rule over them forever. Followers of this ideology believe that all
current political developments will either help bring this about sooner or will postpone it.
Jewish sins, and most particularly the lack of faith, can postpone the coming of the
Messiah. But this delay will not be of long duration, because even the worst sins of the
Jews cannot alter the course of redemption, Sins can nevertheless increase the sufferings
of Jews prior to the redemption. The Datim Le’umim believe that the two world wars, the
Holocaust, and other calamitous events of modem history are examples of such
suffering.235
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The ideological consequence to such believes is that all the Jewish rulings that are
allowed during the messianic age are applicable today according to the followers of this
ideology, for example the Halachah permits Jews to rob non- Jews in those locales
wherein Jews are stronger than non- Jews, but it strictly reserved the consequence
consequences, for the messianic age. Gush Emunim dispenses with such traditional
precautions by claiming that Jews, at least those in Israel and the Occupied Territories,
are already living in the beginning of the messianic age. This is stated by one of Gush
Emunim’s leaders, Rabbi Aviner, who was quoted saying: “While God requires other
normal nations to abide by abstract codes of justice and righteousness; such laws do not
apply to Jews".236
According to the Halachah, the murder of a Jew, particularly when committed by a
non-Jew, is the worst possible crime. But the Gush Emunim Rabbis believe that a Jews
who kill Arabs should not be punished. They also help such Jews who are punished by
Israel's secular courts. One of their leaders, Rabbi Israel Ariel, stated that “A Jew who
killed a non- Jew is exempt from human judgment and has not violated the [religious]
prohibition of murder". Similarly in 2004, Rabbi Lior, the head of the Council of Rabbis
of Judea and Samaria, ruled that the Israel Defense Forces was allowed to kill innocent
people.237
This religious ruling should be remembered whenever the demand is voiced in
Israel that all non-Jewish residents of the Jewish state should be dealt with according to
Halachah regulations.238
The Datim Le’umim, Like the Hasidim, are also greatly, influenced by the teachings
of the Jewish mysticism of Cabbala, albeit with a difference interpretation. The disciples
of Rabbi Kook continue to make policy decisions based upon their belief in certain
innovative elements of ideology that are derived from their distinct interpretation of the
Cabbala.
One aspect of the belief in Cabbala is that the Datim Le’umim in general, and Gush
Emunim in particular, believe in the sacredness and uniqueness of the Jewish life and
Jewish Blood, and that they are much higher than those of a non Jew.239
Rabbi Yehuda
Amital, an outstanding Gush Emunim Leader who was appointed as a Minister without
portfolio between 1995-1996 by Prime Minister Peres (who also described him as a
moderate) wrote a published article which argued that the 1973 war was not directed
against Egyptians, Syrians and/or all Arabs but against all non- Jews. In his article
entitled” The Significance of the Yom Kippur War” he said:
The war broke out against the background of the revival of the kingdom of Israel,
which in its metaphysical status is evidence of the decline of the spirit of defilement
in the Western world ... The Gentiles are fighting for their mere survival as Gentiles,
as the ritually unclean. Iniquity is fighting its battle for survival. It knows that in the
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124 _______________________________________________________ IV. External Influencing Factors
wars of God there will not be a place for Satan, for the spirit of defilement, or for the
remains of Western culture, the proponents of which are, as it were, secular Jews.
Gush Emunim’s interpretation of the Cabbala also influences their ideologies
regarding the land. They believe that not just humans can be redeemed but all conceivable
material objects, ranging from tanks to money, can be redeemed if touched or possessed
by Jews, especially messianic Jews. They apply this doctrine to the conflict arguing that
what appears to be confiscation of Arab- owned land for subsequent settlement by Jews is
in reality not an act of stealing but one of sanctification. According to Rabbi Shmaryahu
Arieli, one of the followers of the two rabbis Kook, the 1967 war was a "metaphysical
transformation" where the land is redeemed by being transferred from the satanic to the
divine sphere.240
This ruling implies that any withdrawal from the land would mean
restoring Satan’s sovereignty over it. This was confirmed by Rabbis Aviner and Shlomo
Goren who ruled that Judaism forbids granting even a small amount of autonomy to the
Palestinians.241
An example on such ideological influence is their influence on Israel’s expansionist
policies. In line with the Biblical promise in Deuteronomy 11:24: “Every place on which
the sole of your foot treads shall be yours; our border shall be from the wilderness, from
the river Euphrates, to the western sea"', the followers of the two Rabbis Kook viewed
Lebanon as being “delivered” from the power of Satan with its inhabitants being killed in
the process.242
For Gush Emunim the Sinai and present - day Lebanon are parts of this
Jewish land and must be “liberated” by Israel. Rabbi Ariel published an atlas that
designated all lands that were Jewish and needed to be “liberated”. This included all areas
west and south of the Euphrates River extending through present - day Kuwait.243
Another aspect of their interpretation of the Cabbala is that while the Bible anticipated
only a single Messiah, The Cabbala anticipated two Messiahs who will differ in character.
The first Messiah, a militant figure called "son of Joseph," will prepare the material
preconditions for redemption. The second Messiah will be a spiritual "son of David" who
will redeem the world by spectacular miracles. But although the cabbalistic conception is
that the two Messiahs will be individuals, Rabbi Kook the elder altered this idea by
advocating that the first Messiah will be a collective group of people. Rabbi Kook
identified his own group of followers as the collective "son of Joseph". Thus Gush
Emunim leaders, following the teaching of Rabbi Kook the elder, continue to perceive
their rabbis and perhaps all followers as well, as the collective incarnation of at least one
and perhaps the two Messiahs.
Gush Emunim members believe that this idea should not be revealed to the uninitiated
public until the right time. They believe that their sect cannot err because of its infallible
divine guidance. As a result and by virtue of exclusive access to the total and only truth,
Gush Emunim supporters believe that they are more important than the remainder of the
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Jewish people. They also believed that they are entitled to use violence to keep the rest of
the Jewish people, which has been corrupted by the satanic western culture, from straying
out of the ordained path.
Another impact of the belief in cabbala is the believe that the power of Satan and of
his earthly manifestation, the non- Jews, can at times only be broken by irrational action.
Gush Emunim thus founded settlements on the exact days of United States’ Secretary of
States James Baker's recurrent arrivals in Israel. This was not merely to demonstrate their
power but also as part of a mystical design to break the power of Satan and “its American
incarnation”.
The Gush Emunim’s attitude towards Palestinians, whom they always refer to as
"Arabs living in Israel", is also ideologically driven. Rabbis Kook, Aviner and Ariel
viewed the Arabs living in Israel as thieves. They based their view upon the premise that
all land in Israel was and remained Jewish and that all property found thereon thus
belonged to Jews.244
The Gush Emunim rabbis, politicians, and ideological popularizers
have routinely compared Palestinians to the ancient Canaanites, whose extermination or
expulsion by the ancient Israelites was, according to the Bible, predestined by a divine
design.
In an article in Kivunim, the unofficial publication of the world Zionist organization,
in 1984, Mordechai Nisan, a lecturer at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, wrote on the
subject, relying upon the works of Moshe Ben-Maimonides the famous Rabbi and Jewish
Philosopher of the Middle Ages. In his article Nisan says that a non- Jew permitted to
reside in the land of Israel "must accept paying a tax and suffering the humiliation of
servitude”. Nisan demanded that a non-Jew "be held down and not [be allowed to] raise
his head against Jews." He also demanded that a non-Jew must not be appointed to any
office or position of power over Jews and that if non-Jews refuse to live a life of
inferiority, then this signals their rebellion and the unavoidable necessity of Jewish
warfare against their very presence in the land of Israel."245
This ideological background explains why Gush Emunim, from its inception, wanted
to expel as many Palestinians as possible. The Intifadas have only allowed Gush Emunim
spokespeople to disguise their real demand for total expulsion by arguing that expulsion
is warranted by "security needs".246
According to the teachings of Rabbi Kook, the Datim Le’umim believe that the only
way to sanctify the Israeli society is by getting actively involved in the society and in
exerting political influence. As a result the have taken many measures to ensure such
involvement in the wider society. For example, they dress like secular Jews and only
distinguish themselves outwardly by wearing skullcaps. They also introduced portions of
secular teaching into their schools curricula. In addition, not only have they permitted
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126 _______________________________________________________ IV. External Influencing Factors
their people to enroll in Israeli secular universities, but they also established the
religiously oriented Bar- Ilan University.247
They also tried to promote their public image in Israel by presenting themselves to the
public as successors of the Zionist pioneers of the 1920s and 1930s, who are still
cherished in the Jewish national memory and lauded in Israeli education. One of the ways
in which they do that is that they continue to emulate the dress and mannerisms of the
early pioneer by dressing in the Israel secular clothing fashion of the 1950s. The almost
exclusively Ashkenazi background of both the early pioneers and the Gush Emunim
settlers and Rabbis also helped this emulation.
The doctrine of sanctity, attributed by the two Rabbis (Kook the elder and the
younger) to almost every Zionist enterprise, contributed even more to the widespread
public sympathy for and support of Gush Emunim. For example, the state’s Chief Rabbi is
always chosen from the leadership of the religious Zionism movement,248
The Mafdal has
also dominated the Ministry of Religious Affairs, the chief Rabbinate, the rabbinical
courts, and religious council. This ongoing historical cooperation was helped by the fact
that religious Zionism was in many ways compatible with Secular Zionism as it drew
upon some its basic themes, notably the idea that the goal of Zionism is to create a “new
Jew” who will never submit to oppression. Rabbi Kook the younger, together with other
Gush Emunim leaders, went further by defining "the State of Israel as the kingdom of
Israel, and the kingdom of Israel as the kingdom of heaven on earth”.249
Gush Emunim have also won broad public sympathy in Israeli Jewish society because
of their attitude towards army service, which contrasts sharply with the societal
antagonism directed against the Haredim for their exemption from military service.250
According to the teachings of Rabbi Kook, each Jew has a religious duty to fight and to
train to fight. The Datim Le’umim members have faithfully followed this teaching. Many
Gush Emunim members have been and still are officers of the Israeli army's select units
and their proportion in such units has continually increased. The Gush Emunim religious
school students are known for their excellent combat qualities, their high motivation to
fight, their relatively high casualty rate during the Lebanon war, and their willingness to
beat up Palestinians during the Intifada.
3.2.3 The significance and structure of the Yesha Council.
Gush Emunim activists live in a homogeneous West Bank society that they control.
This society is mostly protected against "contamination" by detested secular ideologies,
especially those that stem from Western culture and have been to some extent influenced
the secular part of Israeli Jewish society. To the Gush Emunim group, the religious
settlements have more than one meaning; first, they are citadels of the messianic
ideology. As homogeneous settlements are also models and potential nuclei of the new
religious society that they want to build. They also believe that the settlements have the
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potential to influence the Israeli society as a whole, since they believe that by
encountering the holy parts of the land, the hearts of the Jewish masses would be united
with the heart of the land.251
On the local and regional level, Israeli settlements in the West Bank are organized in
the same way as communities inside Israel: individual settlements elect representatives to
run their local affairs and to represent them in the 24 local and regional settlement
councils. Most of these elected officials are focused on the daily lives of their
communities and constituents while others are well-known personalities, long-identified
as leaders of the settlements enterprise and the “Greater Israel” ideology. Theoretically,
on the national level, and as result of the Israeli proportional representation electoral
system, the settlements as geographic entities are not represented in the Knesset, except
as far as in parties that represent their ideologies.
But in reality, on the national level the settlements differ from other communities in
Israel is in the existence of an additional body between these two levels, comprised of the
elected heads of the 24 settlement councils in the West Bank, plus 5-10 additional visible
or influential leaders of the settlement movement. These individuals sit together in the
Council of Settlements of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza, better known as the Yesha
Council.252
The Yesha Council thus draws its power from being able to lobby the
government as a bloc and not as individual settlements.
The Yesha Council operates as a de facto government of the settlers, dealing with
both internal affairs of the settlements and external affairs (i.e., relations both with the
government of Israel and the international community). The council extracts a “tax” from
the regional councils with which it funds activities for the benefit of the settlements. As a
quasi-government, the Yesha Council assumes the functions of various ministries within
the settlements including (but not limited to) Planning and Construction, Defense and
security programs for settlements and on the roads, Foreign Affairs including fundraising
and public relations, and National Security.
By virtue of the way the Yesha Council is organized and run, the religious nationalist
bloc maintains control of the Council, and members of that bloc remain the most visible
leaders of the settlers today. These leaders are drawn mainly from four different groups:
Regional Council heads: As elected community leaders, Regional Council heads
have in many ways the strongest claim to leadership. Among the most influential of
these are the heads of Binyamin, Shomron, Gush Etzion, and Mount Hebron and the
former head of the Gaza Shore Regional Council.
Settlers in the Knesset: Settlers who are elected to the Knesset are, by definition,
prominent figures in the settlement leadership. They include Uri Ariel (from Kfar
Adumim, representing the National Union), Nissan Slomiansky (from Elkana,
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128 _______________________________________________________ IV. External Influencing Factors
representing the Mafdal) Arye Eldad (from Kfar Adumim, representing the National
Union), Avigdor Liberman (from Nokdim, representing the Yisrael Beitenu party), and
Benny Elon (from Beit El, representing the National Union).
Popular leaders and activists: These are people who for decades have been
associated with the leadership of the settlement movement. They include Israel Harel
(founder and former chairman of the Yesha Council), Haggai Segal, and Uri Elitzur.
Rabbis: Important settler rabbis today include – but are by no means limited to –
former MK Rabbi Haim Druckman one of the spiritual leaders of the Bnei Akiva
youth movement,253
Rabbi Eliezer Waldman the Gush Emunim spiritual, Rabbi
Shlomo Aviner, Rabbi, Rabbi Dov Lior, and Rabbi Zalman Melamed.
Again in theory, the heads of all of the West Bank settlement councils come together
in the Yesha Council to decide on policy and make decisions. But in reality, the Council
is controlled by a handful of its strongest members, including the Regional Council heads
of Shomron, Benjamin, Gush Etzion and Mt. Hebron. In addition, one of the “extra”
members of the Council, Zeev Hever, who is the general director of Amana (the
settlement arm of the Gush Emunim), plays a critical role in the council. This core group
of leaders, who are all committed to the traditional religious-nationalist ideology of
Greater Israel, is the engine driving most of the political positions and tactics adopted by
the Yesha Council.
In addition, important decisions taken by the Yesha Council are coordinated with the
settlers’ political allies in the Knesset who are all members of the Mafdal as well as the
blessing of the committee of Rabbis of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza.254
3.2.4 The influence of the Yesha Council and Gush Emunim
Since the outset of the settlement enterprise, one of the great ironies has been that
while the settlers have often pursued policies that were at odds with the policies of the
government of Israel (or were even illegal according to Israeli law), much of the
financing for their activities has come, directly and indirectly, from the government
itself. This remains true today, with the Yesha Council drawing a substantial portion of
the funding for its various activities from the budgets of regional settlement councils.
These are funds provided by the government of Israel to meet the municipal needs of the
settlements, which are then transferred to the Yesha Council by the regional councils. The
use of government funds against the government was most ironic when the Yesha
Council organized and financed a campaign opposing the government’s 2005
disengagement plan by the then then-Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s.255
But this irony could be explained by explaining the role of the settlements in
controlling the occupied territories. These settlements and their ideological and historical
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The Process of Israeli Decision Making _________________________________________________ 129
importance served as an excuse for the military presence and road movement control
measures in these areas. The real goal of the military presence and control measures was
not to provide security for the settlements, but it had a more strategic goal. The overall
Israel strategy of control of the occupied territories after Oslo, which was labelled
“control from the outside”, relied on settlements as the foci of Israel’s military power in
the territories. The system of controlled roads and bypass roads which sliced the occupied
territories into small enclaves relied on the settlements as pivots of the road grid. This
form of control allows the military to dominate the territories with minor expenditure of
forces.256
But in order to do that settlements were needed in remote and isolated places that
most Israelis would consider “unnatural” to live in (compared to the “greater Jerusalem”
settlements, for example, which are considered “natural” to live in). Israeli governments
thus relied on the ideologically dedicated Gush Emunim for creating settlements deep into
the west bank and in Gaza. The isolated settlement of Netzarim in the middle of the Gaza
strip (now evacuated) was a good example on this strategy. Nahum Barnea, a well known
Israeli commentator, used it to explain the role of settlements saying that “if Netzarim has
not existed, it would have been invented.”257
The strategic importance of the settlers to
the Israeli government and the military was apparent in 1995 when the labour government
refused to remove the Hebron settlers following the Baruch Goldstein Massacre.
Interestingly, this refusal was mostly based on the opposition of heads of all the Israeli
security services.258
This strategic importance of settlements may explain why the Yesha Council is
informally supported by many segments of the establishment, from the Prime Minister to
the utility companies, such as the water, electricity and sewage companies. But far from
being passive tools in this arrangement, the settlers also had a major role in influencing
the decision makers in matters that relate to their interests. For example, it has been
argued that the refusal of Prime Ministers Rabin, Peres and Netanyahu to advocate the
evacuation of a single Jewish settlement was primarily due to the influence of Gush
Emunim.259
Yesha Council’s strength as a lobby has thus stemmed from both its strategic
importance of the settlers, as well as its access to authority and its ability to interact
directly with decision-makers to make sure that its views are taken into consideration
during any discussions that impact the settlers’ interests.
In a recent study conducted by researcher Anat Roth of the Israel Democracy
Institute, entitled “The Secret of its Strength: The Yesha Council and its Campaign
against the Security Fence and the Disengagement Plan,” Roth enumerated some of the
main factors that have helped the Yesha Council solidify its political strength. These
include several observations about the Yesha Council:
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130 _______________________________________________________ IV. External Influencing Factors
1. As holders of official offices recognized by the government (i.e. heads of the local
or regional councils) and responsible for relations with the government, Yesha
Council members have direct access to the levers of power and decision-making at
virtually every level in the Israeli government.
2. Yesha Council members control large sums of money (mainly diverted from funds
provided by the government to local and regional settlement councils).
3. The Yesha Council has an ability to mobilize and organize mass numbers of
activists that is unparalleled in any other sector or by any other group in Israel.
4. The settlers in general enjoy the sympathy of a large part of the Jewish Israeli
public, reflecting the settlers’ success at defining themselves as representing “genuine
Zionism,” in the sense of settling the land and confronting the Palestinians.
5. The government has (until the summer 2005 disengagement from Gaza)
consistently failed to seriously rein in the settlers, as it lacked the unity, strength, and
political will necessary to take any sort of meaningful action against them, even in the
face of the most provocative actions; for example, during the early days of the Madrid
process, when the settlers greeted each visit of then-U.S. Secretary of State Baker to
Israel with the establishment of a new settlement, much to the chagrin of the
government of Israel.260
6. The Yesha Council enjoyed, for many of the reasons above, a clear asymmetry of
strength relative to its opponents. While enjoying the veneer of respectability that
comes from official positions and access to official power and privilege, settlers and
their supporters have portrayed those who oppose them as naïve, foolish, suicidal,
anti-Zionist, and pro-Palestinian. They have also made it clear that a high cost will be
extracted from any political leader who attempts to hurt them (which is perhaps why
the first Israeli leader to successfully confront the settlers, Ariel Sharon, came not
from the Left, but from the pro-settler Right).
7. The Gush Emunim is endowed with a territorial base of its own, and is replete with
dedicated followers who can expertly handle weapons and execute military
operations.261
The ways in which the general Datim Le’umim movement influence the decision
making mechanism in Israel were summarized in an article by Ran Edelist in the Israeli
newspaper Yerushalaim. In his article, which was published in 1996 under the title “First
We Shall Conquer the Supreme Court and Then the General Staff,” Edelist argues that the
Datim Le’umim’s institutions have prepared four approaches for the battle to control the
“land of Israel”, these 4 approached are Settlements, Financial Support, Education, and
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The Process of Israeli Decision Making _________________________________________________ 131
promotion of their men into the military with the goal of dominating a future General
Staff.
3.2.4.1 Political influence
Gush Emunim's influence upon political leaders of varying political persuasions has
always been significant.262
Its influence varies from its current strong alliance with the
Likud to its very little influence on members of the leftist secular Meretz Party, whom
they perceive as spiritually rotten,263
and accuse of polluting Zionism by blending
communism into it.264
Gush Emunim also enjoys great support amongst the general Israeli population as well
as the support of Orthodox Jews in the diaspora. It is estimated that about one-half of
Israel’s Jewish population supports Gush Emunim265
. For example, in 1996, the Dati
Le’umi youth group Bnei Akiva was the largest youth group in Israel according to a
survey by the Ministry of Education. Bnei Akiva registered 28% of youth group members,
compared to 23% to Labour related youth groups.266
Gush Emunim rabbis and lay leaders
are also perceived by many Israeli Jews as being endowed with dedication, a sense of
mission, moral superiority, strict honesty in financial affairs, and a sense of their own
certitude. Some compare this characterization that of the Hamas leaders in the Palestinian
society.267
Many Oriental Jews, although unwilling to join, have continued to support Gush
Emunim. The Likud constituency has to date consistently supported Gush Emunim, and
the Labor Party supported Gush Emunim until the end of the 1970s. It may be sufficient
to say that with the exception of a few years in the 1990s, the Mafdal, the largest Dati
Le’umi party, has always been a coalition partner.268
The Labour Party- and the Mapai
party before it- has enjoyed a “historical partnership” with the Mafdal for years,269
and
has only changed its position regarding the Mafdal recently. The rift between the Labor
party and the Mafdal took place as the latter moved towards the right, which coincided
with the Likud electoral win in 1977. This was manifested in the Mafdal’s opposition to
the peace treaty with Egypt and its demands that Lebanon be annexed 'as a part of the
Jewish ancestral heritage.’ The rift also increased after the breakout of the first intifada
when the costs of continuing the occupation became unwarranted in the eyes of the
Labour party.270
Another way in which the Yesha Council influences the decision making is its
extremely close ties with officials across the political and military echelons and. For
example Gush Emunim retains close unofficial links the Mafdal as well as the small right
wing Tehiya party and factions in the Herut wing of Likud party.271
They also maintain
close ties with the Israeli military, and “cooperate” with the military on matters that range
from construction and settlement expansion to the daily activities of the IDF, forcing the
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132 _______________________________________________________ IV. External Influencing Factors
IDF to divert vital resources and endanger soldiers in order to protect the settlers who
may undertake deliberately provocative and illegal activities.272
For example the committee of Rabbis of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza began developing
their own intelligence network, which quickly became extensive, using information
gathered from religious or otherwise sympathetic officers of the military's high command.
It is claimed than one of their informants General Moshe Bar Kochba, a member of the
General Staff, who informed the rabbis regularly and in advance about the plans for army
operations in the occupied territories. In response, the military decided to regularize those
relations and to inform the rabbis officially about its operations hoping that by doing so
they might convince them to cooperate with the military.273
These strong relations led to the impression that, insofar as day-to-day activities
within the West Bank are concerned, both the government and IDF have largely co-opted
to serve the interests of the settlers. In addition, in 2005, the Sasson Report on
settlements formally confirmed that for years, elements of the Israeli government have
not only turned a blind eye to settler transgressions but also actively colluded in them.274
3.2.4.2 Military influence
The Datim Le’umim also recognized the importance of the military in Israeli politics,
and when Gush Emunim appeared, its lay leaders and especially its rabbis began
educating and inspiring young Datim Le’umim to adopt the military profession as a
religious duty, to join the combat and elite units of the army and to become officers.
According to an army colonel they constitute up to 40 percent of the combat officers,
around 15 percent of the combat support officers, and 10 percent of the staff officers.275
Young Datim Le’umim are dedicated, disciplined, and efficient soldiers, ready to sacrifice
their lives for their country if necessary. This penetration of the military has enhanced the
image and importance of the Datim Le’umim in Israeli society and provided some of its
followers with good careers.276
In addition, it is well known in Israel that those who serve
in the combat and/or elite units or as pilots enjoy tremendous social prestige when they
leave the service and often are able to exert political influence.277
There are two unique schemes devised for young Datim Le’umim to serve in and
penetrate the combat and elite units. The first scheme, which is known as Hesder
Yeshivot, or arrangement religious schools,278
was formulated as an arrangement, not
governed by law, between two independent parties: the Israeli Ministry of Defense and
the rabbinical heads of the Datim Le’umim’s Hesder Yeshivot religious schools.
According to this five-year arrangement, the Hesder Yeshivot students receive a special
kind of draft service. They are not inducted into the army in the normal way, and unlike
normal conscripts, they do not serve continuously for three years in units assigned by the
army according to its needs. Instead, they are inducted into the army as groups and serve
in their own homogeneous groups, accompanied by their rabbis who are responsible for
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The Process of Israeli Decision Making _________________________________________________ 133
and watch over the students' "religious purity." In total, they serve for three six- month
periods instead of the normal 3 years. After each period of army service, the Hesder
Yeshivot students leave the army for a six- month period of Talmudic study in a yeshiva.
The major reason for the continuation of this arrangement, however, is the excellent
military quality and record of the Hesder Yeshivot students, whose performance and
dedication are far above the military average.279
Soldiers in Hesder Yeshivot units, known
as Nachal Haredi, distinguished themselves during the suppression of the Intifada; they
were noted for their cruelty to Palestinians, and were from many perspectives much more
severe than the Israeli army average. The homogeneous composition of Hesder Yeshivot
groups of soldiers is another reason for the continuation of the special arrangement. When
the army commanding officers have wanted to inflict especially cruel punishment upon
Palestinians or others, they have most often relied upon and used religious soldiers. In
other groups, consisting of soldiers with different political views, some members might
object to illegal cruelty and even inform media people of its use. In Hesder Yeshivot units
the religious soldiers, who are generally crueler than most secular Jews, will not object to
the orders.
The other scheme is known as Mekhinot Toraniyot Kedam Tzevaiyot, or pre-military
torah academies. This scheme is now the main scheme of organized penetration by Datim
Le’umim into the Israeli army. Through this scheme the young men, usually eighteen
years of age, who enter religious pre-military academies are given draft deferments for
one or one and one-half years of study and ‘spiritual fortification’. Afterwards, they serve
for three years in ordinary combat or elite unit (i.e. not in homogeneous groups). The
teachers in these academies are for the most part not rabbis but rather retired officers who
possess some Talmudic knowledge. Only a small amount of the teaching is devoted to
military subjects and training in hiking and endurance. Most of the teaching and study
time is devoted to those parts of the Talmud and other religious literature that inspire
dedication to the land of Israel and to other values favored by Gush Emunim. These premilitary
academies, which are based in the Occupied Territories, have been subsidized by
the army to some extent, but the major part of the support money has come from private
donors. Most graduates of these pre- military academies serve their full three-year terms.
Some serve for a much longer time and become career officers.280
Together these two schemes currently turn out around 1,200 recruits a year. The
number of Dati Leumi recruits into the IDF has seen a 40 percent increase in over the past
five years and was accompanied by a reduction in the number of secular Ashkenazi
conscripts, who traditionally constituted the backbone of the military, especially in
combat units.281
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134 _______________________________________________________ IV. External Influencing Factors
3.2.4.3 Ideological influence
In addition to their strong influence on the Israeli government on all matters related to
settlements and their success in obtaining funding to finance their enterprises, Gush
Emunim also attempts to influence the foreign policy of the state through its ideologies
and world outlook. Gush Emunim’s influence on Israeli policies is often apparent where
official government’s policies on certain matters clearly reflect the Gush Emunim’s
ideological position.
For example, Israeli governments under both Labor and Likud leadership has refused
to free Palestinian prisoners "with Jewish blood on their hands" but have not hesitated to
free prisoners with non- Jewish blood on their hands, such as those who killed other
Palestinians. The religious difference between Jewish blood and non-Jewish blood is
known to most Israelis but is rarely mentioned in discussions about Israel’s policies.
Gush Emunim’s ideology, which stipulates that Arab hostility towards the Jews is
inherent and theological in nature, has also influenced certain segments of the Israeli
political scene who in tuen influence official policy. It is needless to say that the
conclusion such ideology is tha the Arab- Israeli conflict cannot be resolved politically.
This influence was demonstrated in a quote of the prominent Gush Emunim leader and
former Knesset member, Eliezer Waldman, who reportedly stated in a public conference
that "'Arab hostility springs, like all anti - Semitism, from the world's [resistance] to be
saved [by the Jews]".282
Gush Emunim’s position towards the peace process, in which Israel would have to
withdraw from territories it occupies, is expectedly hostile. However, the rationale behind
this hostility is very different from other settlers who also resist such peace process.
While secular Golan Heights settlers claimed that the Labour/Meretz peace policies in the
1990s were mistaken because peace with Syria could be reached on Israeli terms, Gush
Emunim claimed that "the Washington negotiations with the PLO amount to nothing else
than a dialogue of human beings with a herd of ravenous wolves, aiming solely at turning
the entire land of Israel into the entire land of the Arabs".283
This hostile attitude towards
the Oslo process is perhaps best explained by a quote of an article by Rabbi Ariel in
which he states: "Historic Zionism has reached its end in bankruptcy ... The real Zionism,
the holy one with profound roots, exists only where the really religious Jews are living; in
the mountains of Judea and the valleys of Samaria". Rabbi Dreyfus was also quoted
attacking the Jews who engaged in the peace process saying: “The Jews who lead us into
that sin no longer deserve any divine protection. We must fight those who separated
themselves from the true Israel. They have declared a war against us, the bearers of the
word of God.” The last statement was representative of the thinking of most religious
settlers before Rabin’s assassination.
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The Process of Israeli Decision Making _________________________________________________ 135
In addition, Gush Emunim also continues to encourage Israeli authorities to deal
cruelly with Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.284
Gush Emunim have, for
example, issued Halachic rulings that a non-Jewish child can be punished like an adult
for disturbing the peace if a Jew judges that he is not short on wisdom. In addition, a nonJewish
child intended to commit murder, for example, by throwing a stone at a passing
car should be considered a "persecutor of the Jews" and should be killed. Citing Rabbi
Moshe Ben Maimonides as his authority, Rabbi Aviner ruled that killing the non- Jewish
child in this instance is necessary to save Jewish life. Rabbi Aviner also said that is
mandatory to inflict the death penalty upon Arabs who throw stones and for other reasons
if it is believed that the world will thereby be improved. The punishments, mentioned
here, should be invoked if the authorities believe that such punishment will deter other
wicked people.285
This background may help explain some incidents during the
Palestinian Intifadas in which IDF soldier’s operations were seen by the outside world as
disproportionate to stone-throwing Palestinian children.
Another example of ideological influence was during the time of the Israeli invasion
of Lebanon, when the military rabbinate in Israel, clearly influenced by the ideas of the
two Rabbis Abraham Kook and Tzvi Kook urged all Israeli soldiers to follow in the
footsteps of Joshua and to re-establish his divinely ordained conquest of the land of Israel.
This exhortation of conquest included extermination of non- Jewish inhabitants. The
military rabbinate also published a map of Lebanon in which the names of Lebanese
towns had been changed to the names of cities found in the Book of Joshua. Beirut, for
example, was changed to Be'erot. The map designated Lebanon as land belonging to the
ancient northern tribes of Israel, Asher and Naphtali.
Gush Emunim also continued to advocate other extreme hawkish policies and by
fiercely opposing Sharon's 1982 alliance with the Lebanese Falangists, who were
Christians and therefore considered to be idolaters. Gush Emunim's position in 1982 was
that Jews in their battles and conquests should only rely upon God's help even in spite of
the fact that the use of the Falangists as a proxy army preserves Jewish blood. Any
alliances with non- Jews could incur God's wrath and lead to His withholding of help.
Nevertheless, such ideas regarding alliances were not adopted, as they were, even for
extreme Labor Party hawks, unacceptable.286
3.2.5 Challenges for Gush Emunim
The Yesha council is facing many challenges both internally and externally. The
partnership between the Datim Le’umim and the state was threatened with the Oslo
process and the discussions of the future of the settlements, following the Rabin
assassination, and during the process of Disengagement from Gaza.
The disengagement from Gaza was particularly traumatic to some members of the
Datim Le’umim as it was against many of the things that the movement believes in
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136 _______________________________________________________ IV. External Influencing Factors
regarding how Zionism is part of the gradual messianic redemption of the Jewish people.
Some even feel betrayed by the state. A Peace Now survey of residents of 120 settlements
following the disengagement found that among religious settlers, 52% felt less Israeli
after the disengagement, compared to 23% of secular settlers.287
Many of the Gush
Emunim changed their traditional prayer for the state of Israel on Sabbath and religious
holidays to a prayer that the state would be “guided”. The very foundations of religious
Zionism -and especially its historic alliance with secular Zionism and wholehearted
acceptance of the State of Israel- have been shaken, and the the National religious
movement’s relationship with the Israeli establishment has hit a downturn.
On the other side, there were fears during the Gaza disengagement process that the
Datim Le’umim in the army might refuse to carry out government orders for Israeli
withdrawals from parts of the occupied territories and for the removal of Jewish
settlements. Some commentators even mentioned civil war. Obviously, none of this
happened but these comments reflect a concern regarding the state of the alliance between
religious Zionism and secular Zionism. These concerns were backed up by studies that
show that for the religious youth, an instruction by a rabbi has an equal and sometimes
superior value than that from a commander. These concerns have surfaced before,
following the Rabin assassination.288
On the other hand, other studies carried out after the disengagement attribute the lack
of dissent by the Datim Le’umim in the army to their concern with minimizing the impact
of military norms on their own introspective world-such as preserving their distinctive
identities in a military environment, reconciling military service with studying sacred
texts, avoiding unnecessarily desecration of the Sabbath, and harmonizing military life
with the observance of traditional laws of modesty. The author argues that such concerns
are greater than being universally committed to exerting an influence on the entire IDF.289
The Yesha council also has challenges in terms of its representation of the settlers,
with the rise of the Haredim settlers, and the “quality of life settlers” on the expense of
the Nationalist-Religious ones. The Council is also facing challenges to its leadership
from within the settler movements and its relevance has been called into question
following its failures in stopping the disengagement process and the building of the West
Bank Barrier. These challenges, and the changing demographics of the settlers in the west
bank, are reflected in recent voting patterns. While the settlers traditionally voted for the
Mafdal, the national Union party, and sometimes for other religious parties, the 2006
results show that The NU-NRP joint list only attracted about 30% of the vote in the West
Bank, which includes religious and non-religious settlements. This was a sign of an
increasing diversity in the settler community in the west bank, and a weakness in the
Gush Emunim and Mafdal’s power base in the West Bank.290
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The Process of Israeli Decision Making _________________________________________________ 137
Ironically, the collapse of the Oslo process has also adversely affected the religious
settlers in their attempt to penetrate the Israeli military. Since then, the Israeli society
became less mobilized against what it believed to be an outside threat, and thus provided
the religious settlers with less room to penetrate major institutions such as the military
and to influence long- term policy.
3.3 The Histadrut labour union Another major interest group in Israel influencing the
formulation of public is the influential and politically powerful Histadrut labour union.291
The Histadrut is the largest voluntary organization in Israel. It was founded in 1920 as a trade
union, although it did was much more than that in the period prior to establishment of the
state in 1948. The Histadrut (Hebrew for federation, and short for Hahistadrut Haklalt shel
Haovadim b’eretz Yisrael, The general federation of labourers in the land of Israel) wields an
enormous influence in the government’s wage policy and labour legislation. It is also
influential in political, social, and cultural realms.
Although the ideology of the organization represented the interests of the workers, in
reality the Histadrut represented the interests of the Labour party. Since its establishment,
different labour parties have controlled the Histadrut, at least until 1994, and have greatly
benefited from it. Members of the Histadrut constituted a considerable proportion of the
Labour party membership, that controlling the Histadrut was a major political goal for
politicians who to aim to control the Labour party. When in government, Labour had the
ability to coordinate government and Histadrut work. For example it could easily handle
wage negotiations with workers. The relationship between the Labour party and the Histadrut
is such, that it is reported that one of the main reasons for Labour to join the National Unity
Government in 1988 was the opportunity for Peres, as Finance Minister and chairman of the
Knesset's Finance Committee, to bail out the Histadrut, as well as the kibbutzim, and the
Moshavim, which were billions of dollars in debt.292
Since the establishment of the state, the Histadrut has become the second strongest
force in economic and social policy after the government as it claimed more than 1.8 Million
members, but after its reorganization in 1994, its membership was reduced to 700,000
members. Nevertheless, this large number ensured that remains a force to be considered in
relevant decisions.293
Unlike all labour unions around the world, which are often associated with socialist
parties (either directly or indirectly), the Histadrut is made up of workers who elect their
governing officers from competing parties. These were traditionally workers parties or parties
that accept social values, but since 1965, the full spectrum of parties that competes in the
Knesset elections also competes in the Histadrut elections, making those elections an
important stage for in the Knesset elections.
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138 _______________________________________________________ IV. External Influencing Factors
Labour’s reliance on the Histadrut increased after the party’s decline in the 1988
elections, as it tried to use the Histadrut to regain political power. Paradoxically as the
Histadrut became more important to the Labour party’s future, the role of its leaders
diminished. Finally, after the 1994 reforms the labour lost control of the Histadrut and thus
lost some of its powers. Some labour losses in elections were blamed on the lack of
organizational support which was previously provided by the Histadrut. Although the role of
the Histadrut is in decline, it still plays a role as a force of opposition when the Likud is in
power. The Histadrut and its leadership were strengthened as a result of the 1977, 1996, and
2003 Likud victories.
4. The relationship with the Unites States and its impact on decision making:
4.1 Background
The United States has given Israel- how can I tell it to this body? The United
States has given Israel, apart from political and military support, munificent and
magnificent assistance in the economic sphere. With America’s help, Israel has
grown tot be a powerful, modern state… I Know I speak for every Israeli and every
Jew throughout the world when I say to you today, ‘Thank you, people of America’
Benjamin Netanyahu in a speech to a Joint Session of Congress294
From a comparative perspective, the United States and Israel may well have
the most extraordinary tie in international politics
Daniel Pipes and Mitchell Bard in the Middle East Quarterly295
The United States is Israel’s current sponsor and its main ally. However, this relationship
is far from static, and a good understanding of its nature can shed light on how this can affect
the decision making mechanism within the Israeli establishment, and on whether the
relationship affects the sovereignty of the decisions made by it.
Well before its establishment as a state; Israel was envisaged – or at least portrayed itselfas
an outpost for western civilization (Europe at the time) in the middle of the Muslim world.
This idea was clearly outlined by Theodore Herzl in his book Der Judenstaat (The Jewish
State) which became the cornerstone of Zionism ideology. In his 1896 book Herzl wrote
describing his vision of a future Jewish state:
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The Process of Israeli Decision Making _________________________________________________ 139
There [in Palestine] we shall be a sector of the wall of Europe against Asia,
we shall serve as the outpost of civilization against barbarism.
After the establishment of the state in 1948, Israel continued to portray itself as a
vanguard of Western civilization, as an outpost that protects the west’s interests in the region.
In an article by Gershom Shocken, editor and publisher of Ha’aretz, in 1951 he outlined what
some see as Israel’s mission statement. He wrote:
Strengthening Israel helps the Western powers maintain equilibrium and
stability in the Middle East. Israel is to become the watchdog. There is no fear that
Israel will undertake any aggressive policy towards the Arab states when this would
explicitly contradict the wishes of the U.S. and Britain. But if for any reasons the
Western powers should sometimes wish to close their eyes, Israel could be relied
upon to punish one or several neighbouring states whose discourtesy to the west went
beyond the boundaries of the permissible.296
In addition, Israel’s security needs also necessitated maintaining a strategic
relationship with an outside military power. Israeli leaders since Ben Gurion have been aware
that Israel could never be completely self-sufficient. As a small state with limited resource,
Israel simply could not afford to allow itself to become isolated during wartime. BenGurion’s
principle that Israel should always have at least one great power patron, has
remained a cardinal principle of Israel’s national security doctrine.297
This alliance with a
superpower took the form of an alliance with the Soviet Union during the late 1940s, with
France in the 1950s, and with the United States since 1967.298
The United States’ policy towards Israel following its establishment in 1948 was a
policy of support for the creation of a Jewish homeland. This support, which was driven by
sympathy and guilt for not doing enough to save Jews during the Holocaust, took the form of
financial aid to Israel -which exceeded the aid given to any other country- as well as political
support to Israel in the United Nations.
This support, however, had its limits, as the United States clearly identified the
differences between its national interests and those of Israel, a position which allowed the
U.S. to balance competing interests in the region, and to play a reasonably balanced
mediating role in Middle East conflicts. This could partially explain the United States’ Role
in the Suez war, when it forced the UK, France and Israel to retreat when they attacked Egypt
in 1956.
This attitude towards Israel changed during President Johnson’s administration between
1964 and 1967, and especially after Israel’s overwhelming military victory in the 1967 war.
The U.S. – which adopted a policy of using proxies to secure its interests in the developing
world after the Vietnam War - started seeing Israel as a small, yet mighty, asset in the region.
From this point on, the U.S. and Israel developed their strategic cooperation and intensified
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140 _______________________________________________________ IV. External Influencing Factors
their military, intelligence, and economic cooperation, which inevitably brought their policies
closer. A published U.S. State department document demonstrates the United States’
recognition of Israel’s capacity to represent its interests following the 1967 war. It reads:
Israel has probably done more for the US in the Middle East in relation to money
and effort invested than any of our so-called allies and friends elsewhere around the
world since the Second World War. Here the Israelis won the war, single-handedly,
have taken us off the hook, and have served our interests as well as theirs.299
In addition to the role Israel played as a “Western pillar” in the face of a Soviet
incursion into the Middle East and in the face of the threat that the U.S. saw in the Egyptian
President Gamal Abdel Nasser, there are other factors that helped in establishing this strategic
relationship such as the loss of Iran as a strategic U.S. ally in the region following the Islamic
revolution in 1979, The rise of fundamentalist and evangelical churches that call for
unconditional support for Israel, followed by the rise of the right-wing Likud to power in
1977 with its Revisionist Zionism ideology, and policies of annexing Arab land and
accelerating settlement construction. The last two factors together helped start an ideological
connection on the grassroots level which has continued to grow.
Although Israeli American relationships have started warming up by the late 1950s, it
was only in 1967 that it saw a dramatic improvement. In the ten years following the 1967 war
U.S. aid to Israel has shifted from loans to essentially direct grants, with the bulk of it
consisting of military assistance.300
This was aided with the signing of over 100 agreements
and memoranda between the U.S. and Israel especially during the second Reagan
administration. These agreements include many agricultural, economic, educational, health,
scientific, technical, security, and defense agreements.301
Israel was also the first country to
conclude a Free Trade Agreement with the U.S. which was implemented in 1985. In 1989
Israel was granted a "major non-NATO ally" status which gave it access to expanded
weapons systems and opportunities to bid on U.S. defense contracts.
Israel is also linked to the U.S. defense establishments through a diverse array of
formal agreements and informal links. For example, a memorandum of understanding signed
between the U.S. and Israel in 1981 led to the establishment of a Joint Security Assistance
Planning Group, and a Joint Political Military Group, which meet regularly to review Israel’s
aid requests and to coordinate military plans, joint exercises, and logistical arrangements.
Likewise, the two intelligence organizations are joined up by two dozen intelligence sharing
arrangements like the Joint Anti Terrorism Working Group which was established in 1996.302
Most recently, in 2007 Israel signed a homeland-security cooperation agreement with the
United States to promote anti-terrorism cooperation through technology and science. Any
perceived changes in the U.S.-Israeli relationship between different U.S. administrations and
Israeli governments should be seen in the context of this established formal relationship.
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The Process of Israeli Decision Making _________________________________________________ 141
In addition, Israel continues to receive an annual aid of $3 billion per year in
economic and military grants, which is around one sixth of America’s direct foreign
assistance budget and around 2 percent of Israel’s GDP. The terms on which Israel gets this
aid has led politicians such as Representative Lee Hamilton to argue that the aid to Israel
substantially exceeded the popularly quoted figures to more than $4.3 billion. In addition
Israel receives U.S. loan guarantees which permit Israel to borrow money from commercial
banks at lower interest rate thereby saving millions in interest payments.303
Israel also received supplemental aid packages such as the $1.2 bullion provided to
support the implementation of the Wye Agreement, and the additional $1 billion in foreign
military financing aid to help prepare for the war with Iraq in 2003. In addition, the United
States has also provided Israel with nearly $3 billion to develop weapon such as the Lavi
aircraft, the Merkava tank and the Hetz (Arrow) missile system. Such projects are often
portrayed as joint research and development efforts but the U.S. never needs these weapons
and never intends to use them. Furthermore, Israel also receives U.S. surplus military
equipment beyond the limits imposed by United States Law.304
Israel also receives financial support from wealthy Jewish organizations and
individuals through a strong fund-raising mechanism. It also receives political support from
the active Israel lobby, which was established in 1967, and from major media conglomerates.
In addition it receives financial support from the bosses of trade unions and the heads of
pension funds, in the form of their unions’ pension funds invested in Israel Bonds.305
Some analysts such as Stephen Zunes argue that the large amounts of U.S. aid to the
Israeli government have not been as beneficial to Israel as many would suspect, since most of
the economic assistance has gone primarily to finance non-productive sectors such as
settlements and the military, as well as to finance loan repayments to American banks. Each
fiscal year since 1974, approximately $1 billion of Israel's $1.2 billion in Economic Support
Funds has been used to cover the interest and principal due on previous U.S. loans that were
made primarily to finance arms purchases from the United States. While this argument has
some merit, it can still be argued that has Israel not obtained this aid, its ability in paying
those loans would have been reduced.
These analysts also argue that the military aid is in fact simply a credit line to
American arms manufacturers and actually ends up costing Israel two to three times that
amount in training, staffing and maintenance, procurement of spare parts, and other related
expenditures. The overall impact is thus an increase in Israeli economic and military
dependency on the United States and a drain in Israel's fragile economy, taking money away
from Israel's once-generous social welfare system.306
This is a result of a U.S. law that
requires that U.S. military aid is spent this way. However, it must be noted here that Israel is
the only country that is allowed to spend 25% of its military aid in developing its own
military industry, which benefits from the economy of scale allowed by the direction of such
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142 _______________________________________________________ IV. External Influencing Factors
funds.307
Nevertheless, Israel’s military and economic dependency has increased after the
1973 war as the United States was accorded a greater strategic importance in Israel, and
especially in the 1980s when Israel took a decision to rely on the U.S. in the production of its
aircrafts and Navy vessels to allows it to develop arms industry which produced an enormous
array of arms. This economic dependency went hand in hand with Israel’s diplomatic
dependency as it became more diplomatically isolated following the oil embargo.308
In addition to the financial and military support Israel receives from the U.S.
government, it also benefits from the United States’ consistent diplomatic and political
support. Between 1972 and 2006, Washington Vetoed forty two UN Security Council
Resolutions, which is greater than the combined total of all the vetoes casted by all the other
Security Council members for the same period. In addition, in 2002, U.S. ambassador to the
UN John Negroponte reportedly told a closed meeting of the Security Council that the United
States would henceforth veto any resolution condemning Israel that did no simultaneously
condemn terrorism in general and specifically mention Islamic Jihad, Hamas, and the AlAqsa
martyrs brigade by name.309
The United States also routinely backs Israel in the UN
general assembly whenever it passes a resolution, which is non-binding and largely symbolic,
condemning Israel’s behaviour or calling for action on behalf of the Palestinians.
As many scholars have become interested in the U.S.-Israeli relationship, they have
disagreed in explaining it. Some have seen it as a dependency model of client-patron, where
Israel has become a true client state serving the United States strategic interest in the
region,310
while others believe that both countries are benefiting in this reciprocal
relationship, and that mutual cooperation in state-of-the-art arms development, as well as
counter-terror and counter-proliferation efforts, has raised the relationship from simple
dependency to higher levels.311
This view is also supported by the occasional decisions by
Israeli leaders that do not consider the United States strategic interests in the region. Thus, a
debate emerged between scholars and commentators on the effect this relationship has on
policy making and decision making in both countries.
The first school of thought’s argument suggest that U.S. controls Israel which acts as
its proxy, holders of this opinion believe that Israel is a U.S. strategic asset, and that U.S.
support is simply payment for services rendered by what can be described as “a U.S. base,
with regional expertise”. The argument also sees the support of the American Jewish
population as a factor in this relationship.
Promoters of this argument, who include Professor Naom Chomsky, Professor
Norman Finklestein, and others on the left, cite incidents where they believe U.S. policy
influenced Israeli policy. The most recent incidents being the U.S. objection to any retaliation
against the Iraqi Scud missiles in the 1990 gulf war or any overt intervention in the 2003 gulf
war, the U.S. insistence on the continuance of the Lebanon war in 2006, and the U.S. veto to
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The Process of Israeli Decision Making _________________________________________________ 143
Israeli Arms sales to countries such as Venezuela and China312
which the U.S. perceive as
strategic threats.
They back their argument with statements like the one made by President Reagan’s in
1981. He was reported to have made the following comments justifying the United States’
support for Israel:
With a combat experienced military, Israel is a force in the Middle East that
actually is a benefit to us. If there were not Israel with that force, we’d have to supply
that with our own, so this isn’t just altruism on out part.313
The second school of thought’s argument, on the other hand is based on the idea that
the U.S. support of Israel does not serve U.S. foreign interests. This argument suggests that
the original model of Israel as a proxy has been replaced with one where Israel leads the
United States through its lobby’s control of the congress, the administrations, the mass media
corporations, and Democratic Party donors.
Promoters of this argument, who include Professor John Mearsheimer, Professor
Stephen Walt, and Professor James Petras, believe the Israel lobby works to define and shape
the U.S. national interests in Israel’s favour. Instead of the client state model they see an
entanglement between 2 independent players with the lobby’s function to essentially sustain
and manipulate the entanglement.
They note incidents where Israel policy was different from that of the U.S. such as
their position regarding withdrawal from the occupied territories following the 1967 war.
Although the U.S. has pushed for a peace settlement where land could be used as leverage,
Israel seemed more interested in holding onto the land. It is needless to say that Israel’s view
has prevailed in this issue. They also cite Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 1982 which dragged
the U.S. into a disastrous intervention, and the defiance of Ariel Sharon to President George
Bush’s demands for withdrawal from his 2002 invasion of the West Bank.
They also back their argument with comments such as those made by the previous Prime
Minister Ariel Sharon during a Cabinet meeting in 2001. In response to calls by Shimon
Peres for Sharon to heed to the American requests for ceasefire Sharon was reported by
Radio Kol Yisrael to have said:
Every time we do something you tell me Americans will do this and will do
that. I want to tell you something very clear: do not worry about American pressure
on Israel, we, the Jewish people control America, and the Americans know it.314
More recent examples cited by promoters of the second argument are in relation to
what they believe is the Israel Lobby’s contribution in Pushing the U.S. into war and in
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144 _______________________________________________________ IV. External Influencing Factors
making a confrontation against Iran on behalf of Israel on top of the United States’ list of
priorities.
4.2 Impact on decision making In terms of Israeli decision making, it is fair to say that
Israeli decisions are always made with the American position in mind. As Israel’s main ally,
American positions regarding particular policies are always identified before a decision is
made and policies are often discussed between Americans and Israelis on many levels before
they are put to action. Close cooperation especially on strategic and security issues is well in
place and ranges from policy discussions in think tanks to tactical cooperation between
military personnel. Indeed, information and policy exchanges with the U.S. are so extensive
that, on many issues, U.S. policy-making policies capabilities are often seen as an extension
of Israel’s capabilities.315
To assist this cooperation, the Israel lobby works very hard to
smooth any disagreements, by portraying Israeli interests as American interest and by
providing a common policy platform.
However, this simple model does not explain the intricacies and contradictions of
American and Israeli decisions. While one would expect that Israeli policies would be in line
with American ones, policies adopted by the Israeli decision makers have not always towed
the American line in spite of the ongoing cooperation. For example, Israel has continued to
refuse to halt settlement building in spite of the United States’ clear policy against
settlements. Israel has bombed the Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981without prior US approval, It
has also annexed the Jerusalem and Golan in 1982 and 1981, invaded Lebanon in 1982, and
rejected Reagan’s plan for peace in 1981.
There have been a number of interpretations of this Israeli behaviour. The first
interpretation is a historical one that argues that in many ways, Israel's attitude toward the
United States is rooted in the communal traditions of the shtetl (the small, East European
Jewish township). This view argues that Israeli decision makers interpret relations with the
great powers on the analogy of relations between the vulnerable Jewish communities of
Poland and Russia, and the local ruler or prince (in Yiddish, poritz). This relationship was
historically fraught with ambiguity. On the one hand, the Jews, as an alien minority,
demonized by the Gospels and Christian doctrine as Christ-killers, were utterly beholden to
the prince. Their well-being rested on his good will. On the other hand, should he choose to
withdraw his protection, complete disaster loomed. As a result, the poritz was both benefactor
and potential tormentor at the same time. The persistence of this model in dealing with
powerful outsiders helps to explain the ambivalence of Israeli attitudes and policies towards
the United States. At one time Israel is compliant accomplice, for instance, in the Iran-Contra
affair, while at other times, Israel was a suspicious rival, as in the case of Jonathan Pollard, an
American Jew working as a Navy analyst who was imprisoned in 1987, on charges of spying
for Israel.
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The Process of Israeli Decision Making _________________________________________________ 145
According to this interpretation, acclamation of the United States by Israel as "our
greatest ally" is accompanied by expressions of resentment, such as Prime Minister
Menachem Begin's December 1981 outburst to U.S. ambassador Samuel Lewis: "We are not
a banana republic!" Even such a low-key figure as Gad Ya’acobi, formerly economics
minister and now ambassador to the United Nations, bitterly complained about American
economic advice at the very moment Israel was receiving $3 billion dollars in aid: "The High
Commissioner sent us a note from Washington and gave us a negative term report!"
Sometimes one hears from Israel the prideful independent Jew-as-Zionist, but just as often
one hears the shtetl rabbi supplicating before the poritz.316
A less simplistic alternative interpretation to these policy contradictions is a political
one which argues that Israeli decisions strongly depend on the positions of Israeli decision
makers toward the United States. Moving from right to left on the Israeli political spectrum,
there are four identifiable positions on the relations with the United States executive and
particularly regarding the peace process: Ultra-nationalism, Conservatism, Realism, and
Progressivism.
These approaches are distinguishable by their underlying attitudes toward two main
issues: the value of maintaining control over the Occupied Territories captured in 1967, and
the relative value of the United States as a factor in Israeli security. Given consistent United
States executive support for the ‘land for peace’ principle as the basis for an Arab-Israeli
peace deal, the stronger Israel’s attachment to the 1967 territories, the less likely there can be
a coordinated Israeli-American policy toward the peace process. In addition, and as a result of
the security implications of any territorial concessions, the more the United States is seen as a
central factor in Israeli security, the greater the likelihood that Israeli leaders will actively
seek the United States’ involvement in the peace process as a means of tying it into Israel's
security network. This centrality to Israeli security increases the chances Israel will make
concessions in peace negotiations, as they would be necessary to retain American support.317
A. Ultra-nationalism
Ultra-nationalism is represented by parties on the right of the Likud Party such as the
National Religious Party (Mafdal), the far-right parties of Techiya, Tzomet, Moledet, and
the National Union (Ha-Ichud Ha-Luemi). It also includes right wing segments within the
Likud party itself. The most important ultra-nationalist policymakers were former prime
ministers Menachem Begin, Yitzhak Shamir, and Ariel Sharon, as well as former Chief of
General Staff and former minister Rafael Eitan.318
The main ideology of these parties- namely the integrity of the land of Israel (Shlemot
Ha’aretz) – is in direct clash with the ‘land for peace’ formula, which the Americans have
long adopted, but this clash is less prominent when it comes to making concessions
outside of the borders of Eretz Yisrael. As advocates for self –reliance ultra-nationalists
also fear the implications of the increasing dependence on the United States, which they
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146 _______________________________________________________ IV. External Influencing Factors
see as weakening Israeli deterrence. They believe that Israel could consolidate its grip
over the West Bank and Gaza without damaging its relationship with the United States
because it had the support of powerful pro-Israel forces in Washington and was the
dominant power in the territories. Ultra-nationalism also tends to oppose American
involvement in the peace process and expects the Americans not to interfere in Israel’s
attempts to gradually incorporate the West Bank and Gaza into Israel.
One Example on Ultra-nationalism policies was after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon
in 1982 when Reagan proposed a peace plan that called for territorial concessions by
Israel. Begin’s response to the Reagan Peace Plan was to inform the Knesset: “We have
no reason to get on our knees.” Further, on September 5, the cabinet approved the
immediate establishment of three new settlements in the territories, in defiance of the
Reagan Plan’s call for a settlement freeze. Other examples include Begin’s applying
Israeli law to annex the Golan Heights without consulting the United States, and Yitzhak
Shamir’s confrontation with George HW Bush in 1992, when he refused to freeze
settlements construction in return for loan guarantees Israel has requested.
But inspite of Begin’s reluctant participation in the Madrid conference can be
explained by his statement just after he left office: “I would have carried on autonomy
talks for ten years. Meanwhile we would have reached half a million Jews in Judea and
Samaria,”319
Ariel Sharon’s disengagement from Gaza in 2005 could be seen as a signal
of his deviation from this ideology, which was confirmed by his split from the Likud to
form the new Kadima party.
B. Conservatism
Conservatism is represented by the pragmatic wing of the Likud known for its
pragmatism. Leading conservative figures include former Prime Minister Benjamin
Netanyahu, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, former foreign and defense minister Moshe
Arens, former ambassador to the United States Zalman Shoval, and former finance
minister Dan Meridor.320
Like Ultra-nationalism, Conservatism ideology also assumes that Israel should keep
the territories occupied in 1967together with the settlements. However, since the
beginning of the first intifada, it has adopted a predominantly realpolitik approach to
foreign policy. Netanyahu was the first to publicly abandon the Likud’s long-time support
for autonomy by embracing the concept of territorial compromise. He also talked about
accepting a demilitarized Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza with limited
sovereignty. This position allowed conservatives to cooperate with the United States in a
manner that the ultra-nationalists could not.
Although conservatives recognize the pivotal role that could be played by the United
States, they voice doubts about its commitment. They see the role of the United States in
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The Process of Israeli Decision Making _________________________________________________ 147
the peace process as that of a facilitator, and seek to minimize the role of the American
administration in it.321
Following the Jerusalem clashes in 1996, Netanyahu changed his position on limiting
the United States role in negotiation, and saw its involvement in negotiations as crucial to
preventing the collapse of the peace process, which he feared would result in Israel’s
isolation and alienation from the United States. Working with allies in the Congress to
limit American pressure, negotiations eventually led to the Wye agreement. However,
Keeping one eye on the next election, and fearing that his concessions may limit his
chances of reelection, he not only froze the implementation of the agreement but also
broke pledges to the United States by dramatically increasing government support for
settlement activity.322
C. Realism
Realism is represented by a segment of the labor party. The most important realist
was the late Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, a former ambassador to the United States and
army chief of staff. Other important realists include former Prime Minister Ehud Barak,
former chief of staff and former minister Amnon Lipkin-Shahak, former deputy chief of
general staff and deputy defense minister Matan Vilnai, and former civil governor of the
territories and former Deputy Defense Minister Efraim Sneh.323
Realism, also known as realpolitik or pragmatism, has been rooted in the political
culture of state building with its strong security emphasis. It was promoted by David Ben
Gurion and the Labor party in the early years of the state and is strongly associated with
the military’s modus operandi. Realists were mostly an elite group of army officers that
was appointed to high positions in the Labor party after leaving the military. This small
group enjoyed great strength within the Labor party, which felt it could not get elected on
its dovish platform without the presence of high-ranking army officers to give the party
credibility.
Realists such as Rabin recognized ever since the 1950s the need to reorient Israeli
foreign policy from Europe to the United States, and continued to see the United States as
a cornerstone of Israeli strategy toward the peace process. In addition, their position on
the occupied territories depends on its importance in enhancing Israel’s security and
providing strategic depth with no nationalistic concern for the territories like that of the
conservatives. Rabin viewed some settlements as having security value and others as
“political” and, hence, of negligible value. Furthermore, to realists, there is no better
security guarantee than to tie the security of Israel to the United States. In fact, Rabin
believed that Israel’s security was “inextricably linked to the United States.”324
Thus, realists’ flexible position on surrendering land for peace to enhance Israel’s
security, and their belief in the importance of the United States to Israel security made
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148 _______________________________________________________ IV. External Influencing Factors
them the most compatible group in Israeli politics with the American position.325
Rabin,
and other realists, believed that the role of the United States in the peace process was
indispensable, and hence coordination with the United States was central to the realists’
foreign policy. He also believed that a deal with the Arabs should be accompanied by
some material benefits from the United States. Realists also continued to push for a closer
strategic cooperation with the United States and for an acceptance of the American
position on every issue that does not affect the security of Israel directly. According to
Realists, the United States utility has many aspects such as: financial aid, Weapons
supply, diplomatic aid in the United Nations, facilitating contact with Jews in countries
with no diplomatic relations with Israel, and deterring the former Soviet Union.326
Nevertheless, realists still preferred to distance the United States from the detailed
bargaining, at least until the latter stages, due to the American tendency to “split the
difference” between the parties. For example, upon his election, Barak sought to lower
the profile of the United States in the negotiations as well as the role of the CIA in
judging whether the Palestinians were fulfilling their security commitments under the
1998 Wye Agreement.327
In terms of military cooperation, Rabin always argued against a defense pact with the
United States for fear that it would restrain Israel’s tactical room for maneuver and, by
putting American lives at risk for Israel, possibly undermine American support for Israel
in the long-run.
D. Progressivism
Progressivism is represented by the Meretz Party as well the leftist circles within the
Labour party. Leading progressives include Former Prime Minister Shimon Peres, Oslo
architect Yossi Beilin, Israel’s Oslo chief negotiator in 1993 and current Center party MK
Uri Savir, former foreign minister Shlomo Ben-Ami, and current Minister Haim Ramon.
Although the progressives have gained growing influence within the Labor party since the
end of the 1980s, labor’s electoral reliance on realists such as Ehud Barak has weakened
their influence over foreign policy.328
Progressives believe that security could not be achieved without peace, and that it
could not be attained through military power alone. They believed peace could be
achieved by allowing Palestinians self-determination, and through the creation of a
regional framework for economic cooperation. For the Progressives the whole Land of
Israel is neither a core value nor a great security value. In fact, Jewish settlements were
generally considered a security burden because they inhibited the possibility of reaching a
peace agreement with the Palestinians. Progressives also argued that Israel must make
territorial concessions for idealistic reasons, because continued rule over another people
and ensuing human rights abuses threaten the Jewish and democratic character of the
state.329
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The Process of Israeli Decision Making _________________________________________________ 149
Progressives viewed the American role primarily as a supplier of funds necessarily for
this regional economic cooperation to take place, by rewarding those who are willing to
proceed with peace. In addition, they downplayed the importance of the American role in
Israel’s national security, and thus saw the role of the United States in the peace process
as less significant.
For example, Yossi Beilin, started the second track Oslo negotiations with the
Palestinians despite the fact that Washington was sponsoring the Washington talks. In
fact, the Oslo negotiations were initiated and reached by both sides without the
knowledge of the Clinton Administration. Progressives often, however, seek American
involvement in order to overcome some procedural problems and to help sell any
agreement to the Israeli public.
In terms of military cooperation, and unlike the position of the realists, Progressives
were in favour of a defense pact with the United States. Peres saw the United States as
“the glue” that would hold together a multilateral security pact that would serve not as a
defense against a common enemy but rather as an intra-regional security system.
In light of this classification, it becomes obvious why national unity governments display
a degree of immobility in terms of foreign policy and the peace process. It becomes difficult
for members of a national unity government to reach a unified position regarding the peace
process. For example, during the unity government between 1984 and 1990, Israel
simultaneously pursued two different foreign policies.
It should be noted that in recent years, disagreements between the U.S. and Israel became
less common, this is partly because the U.S. has, for a long period, supported a policy of
encouraging Israeli elite to come and study in Israel. This has helped create an
“Americanized” Israeli leadership in which can work more effectively with American
administrations. This can also be explained by the improvement in the relationship between
the United States and Israel has also seen an upturn during the George W. Bush’s two
administrations, which was coupled with a growth of the grassroots movement within the
Christian Right led by Christian Zionists who support Israel to help bring along a fulfilment
of their theological prophecies. But on the other hand, direct intervention of the U.S. in the
Middle East since the first gulf war made the regional role of Israel rather unclear and has led
to some differences between American and Israeli interests in countries like Iraq, Iran, Syria,
and Lebanon. In addition, the Bush administration did not seem to adopt the
Neoconservatives ideological policies regarding the settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict – as outlined in the Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies’ Clean
Break document- and have chosen–in rhetoric at least - to support the route of a peace
process.
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150 _______________________________________________________ IV. External Influencing Factors
5. Relationship with Jewish communities outside of Israel and its impact on
decision making:
5.1 The Jewish community’s structure and the Israel lobby The Jewish community in the
United States is by far the most influential Jewish community outside of Israel, with
reportedly more Jews in the United States than in Israel.330
In political terms the U.S. Jewish
community is most famous for being a host to the very powerful Israel Lobby. The Israel
lobby has been recently defined in a study by John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt as “a
loose coalition of individuals and organizations that actively works to shape the United
States’ foreign policy in a pro-Israel direction.”331
This study recognizes the importance of
this definition in differentiating between the American Jewish community and the Israel
Lobby which constitutes from Jewish and non-Jewish individuals and organizations.
However, as it aims to explain the political role played by the Israel lobby in light of the
wider Jewish community context whose grassroots organizations often provide the lobby
with essential support, such a distinction would be made but not emphasized.
The Jewish community in the United States includes tens of Jewish organizations
which play different roles. Jewish organizations in any North American city that has a Jewish
community often organize themselves under a federation with the purpose of encouraging
community development, fundraising, and community relations. A Federation includes
Jewish social agencies, volunteer programs, educational bodies, and related organization.
These federations are then united under the United Jewish Communities (UJC), which thus
became the largest Jewish organization. UJC is a fundraising umbrella organization, which
represents 155 local Jewish federations across North America. The UJC also represents 360
independent non-federated Jewish communities.
The UJC was formed after the merger of the Council of Jewish Federations (CJF)
which was an umbrella organization of federations and organizations,332
with the main
fundraising organizations; United Jewish Appeal (UJA), which was the main fundraiser
responsible for collecting donations from Jews via their local federations, and with the United
Israel Appeal (UIA)333
which was responsible for the distribution and of the funds that are
used in Israel.334
After the merger the United Jewish Communities (UJC) became the largest
Jewish organization in the United States.
The Jewish community also includes single issue organizations such as the successful
lobby organization the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) that functions as
a political action Committee and thus gets directly involved in the political process, the AntiDefamation
League (ADL) which fights anti-semitism, the Jewish council for public affairs
which coordinates public policy (JCPA), the right wing American Jewish Committee (AJC),
the left wing American Jewish Congress, Hadassah, the women’s Zionist organization, and
the umbrella organization known as the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish
Organizations (CPMJO) which coordinates 51 national Jewish organizations.335
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The Process of Israeli Decision Making _________________________________________________ 151
Some of these organizations have a clear lobbying mission, others are less so. While
the UJC has a wider reach and a much bigger budget much of the media attention is given to
the lobbying organization AIPAC and the ADL, because of their clear political nature. It
should be noted that while not all Jewish organizations are part of the lobby politically, but
most of them do support Israel at least financially through the federation system.
In addition to the Jewish organizations, a substantial part of the Israel lobby is formed
by prominent Evangelical Christian Zionist individuals and organizations, who believe that
Israel’s rebirth is a part of the Biblical prophecy of end times. The most prominent of these
organizations is Christians United for Israel (CUFI) which was established in 2006 and acts
as an umbrella organization. The Mearsheimer and Walt study also includes some high
ranking non-Jewish neoconservative as part of the lobby.
Studies on the Israel lobby often include policy think tanks as part of the lobby since
they publicize and push for an Israeli-U.S. Alliance, such as the very influential Washington
Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP), the Middle East Media Research institute (MEMRI),
The Hudson Institute, and the American Enterprise Institute (AEI).336
It is worth noting that the Israeli lobby is often referred to as the strongest lobby in
Washington. For example, AIPAC often brags to being the strongest and the most important
organization affecting America's relationship with Israel, citing many prominent U.S.
politicians and lobby leaders.337
Some scholars such as Raymond Cohen, argue that while
more effective lobbies conduct their business away from the public gaze, AIPAC claims are
essentially an attempt to maximize its influence by exaggerating their powers and perhaps by
tapping into the age-old myths of Jewish power.338
In spite of the polarization of the Jewish community in the unites states (a polarization
that matches that of Israeli Jews),339
the key Jewish organizations in the Jewish community
are run by right wing hardliners who have a record of supporting almost every decision taken
by the Israeli governments and are known for supporting the expansionist policies of the
Likud Party, including its hostility to the Oslo Peace Process. This right wing leaning, which
stands at odds with the mostly liberal Jewish community, was a natural consequence of the
process that brought those hardliners to head those organizations in the first place.
Following its electoral victory in 1977, the Begin’s Likud revolution started looking
for like-minded traditionalist within the American Jewish community to help maintain close
cooperation with the American administration in spite of the incompatibility between the
United States’ and the Likud’s policies on the occupied territories. Likud then helped these
right wing pro-Israel activists rise to positions of leadership, and later on assigned them the
Hasbarah project (Hebrew for explanation), where they would explain to the American
public and Congress why Israel was unable to withdraw from the Occupied Territories, and
lobby the American public and Congress against territorial compromise.
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152 _______________________________________________________ IV. External Influencing Factors
The return of the Labour party to power with Rabin in 1992, with its declared policy
of territorial compromise that was compatible with the United States’ position, was naturally
accompanied with the abolition of the Hasbarah department which was no longer needed.
Shimon Peres, who as foreign minister abolished the department, was quoted as saying: “if
you have a good policy you don’t need Hasbarah, and if you have a bad policy, Hasbarah
will not help.”340
But Labour did not change the right wing leadership of the U.S. Jewish
organizations to a more moderate one since the moderates feared they would be accused of
being pro-Arab if they took a pro peace positions, and were worried that the Likud may return
back to power and punish them.341
In addition, American Jews are extremely reluctant to publicly criticize Israel or to air
divisions within their ranks before the larger American society, and Jewish communities in
general tend to suppress dissent within them. Thus, those who are alienated by the
conservative nature of the Jewish leadership do not seem to care enough to protest against it.
Together these factors helped in strengthening the hard-line positions of the leaders of
the American Jewish organizations which constitute the lobby,342
which does not reflect those
of the Jewish community. The hard line stance of the leadership of Jewish organizations has
prevailed on issues such as the occupation, the settlements, the two state solutions, and
establishing a Palestinian state.343
Outside of the United States, the only substantial Jewish community is the European
one. Although the European Jewish community is not as powerful as its American
counterpart, it shares many of its characteristics. There are recent attempts to create a panEuropean
Jewish organization following the EU accession of 10 new member states in 2004.
It is worth noting that following the 2006 Lebanon war there has been an increase in
the number of voices and new movements within the Jewish communities in the United
States344
, the United Kingdom345
, Canada346
, and Australia347
which called for a debate on
Israel and the degree representation of the traditionally right wing community leaders, who
are always supportive of every Israeli action. Their positions range from being pro-Israel propeace
to being against the occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza strip. This may be a
sign of the loosening of the stronghold the community’s leaders on Jewish voice in
communities outside of the United States.
This study will not attempt to analyze the works of the lobby and its influence on the
United States policy making. Instead, it will focus on the relationship between the Lobby
(and the wider Jewish community in the diaspora) and Israel, and how this relationship
influences the Israeli decision making mechanism.
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The Process of Israeli Decision Making _________________________________________________ 153
5.2 Jewish communities and Israel: The formal mechanism The most obvious manner in
which Jewish communities in the U.S. publicly support Israel is through their financial
support. The current estimation is that Israel receives around $2 billion annually in private
donations from American citizens, roughly half of which in direct payments and half via the
purchase of State of Israel bonds through the Development Corporation for Israel.348
These
private donations to Israel are tax deductible as a result of a special clause in the U.S.-Israel
income tax treaty.349
This financial support takes place through a formal relationship between Israel and the
Diaspora Jews, which is established by two Jewish organizations that liaise between Israel
and the diaspora. These organizations are the World Zionist Organization (WZO) and its
operational arm the Jewish Agency for Israel (JAFI). A 1952 Israeli law, which determined
the status of the two organizations, and a 1954 Accord between the Israeli government and
the Jewish organizations in the United States, authorized the Zionist movement and JAFI to
function as the formal representatives of the Diaspora in Israel, and of Israel in the Diaspora.
In reality, they function as the providers of assistance to Israel in the spheres of development,
settlement, immigration and its absorption, and coordination with Jewish organizations
abroad.350
A third organization, the Jewish People Policy Planning Institute, can be added to
these two groups. The global Jewish think tank, established by the Jewish Agency, is
responsible for studying issues of primary concern to the Jewish community world wide with
the state of Israel at the core of this community.
The World Zionist Organization (WZO) is the main vehicle through which Israel
disseminates its message to Jews around the world, and through its elected councils and
assemblies it is also the vehicle though which the Diaspora Jews are formally entitled to
voice their views to Israel. It is appointed by the World Zionist Congress (WZC) every 4
years. It is composed of roughly equal representatives of Israel, The U.S. Jewry, and the
World Jewry.
The Jewish Agency for Israel (JAFI), on the other hand, is more concerned with
“nation-building” tasks inside Israel such as land reclamation, building settlements, and
settling Jewish immigrants. It is the largest private social service provider in Israel. It is also
considered to be the largest Jewish institution in the world with a budget that stood at half a
billion dollars in the 1990s.351
Because of disputes with assertive Diaspora Jewish leaders who were active in the
Zionist movement, Ben-Gurion and his colleagues preferred to cooperate with JAFI rather
than with the Zionist Movement. As a result, funds raised by the Diaspora Jews are
transferred to Israel through the Jewish Agency, with the Zionist Movement getting its share
through the Agency.352
Recently, the role played by JAFI’s settlement department has been
assigned to a new settlement division at the WZO in order to retain the U.S. tax-exempt
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154 _______________________________________________________ IV. External Influencing Factors
nature of donations to JAFI by keeping it out from any involvement in the occupied
territories. However, on the ground this has had very little impact with the same individuals
and processes remaining unchanged.353
JAFI’s budget comes from federated fund raising campaigns around the world, but
primarily from North America through the work of the UJA , which is currently part of the
United Jewish Communities (UJC), which represents 800,000 Jewish households that
contribute to the federated campaigns. It is through these funds that the Federation System
makes itself a partner in the management of a broad range of these institutions.
To demonstrate the scale of funds raised as well as the commitment of the federation
leaders, one incident should be mentioned. In 1991 the leaders of the Jewish federations met
to discuss changes to the new immigrants welfare program they which they run through
donations. The proposed plan was to change it from providing different services to
immigrants, to providing cash (grants and loans) with which the new Russian immigrants to
Israel could purchase individual services on the open market. To do so each local federation
would be responsible for its ‘fair share’ of a $900 Million package, and would as a result
have to put up their community assets as collateral against the loans which the immigrants
would be drawing on Israeli banks. In spite of the risk associated with such move to
community assets and family businesses, the plan went ahead and the funds were provided to
the new Russian Jewish immigrants.354
The flow of financial donations from U.S. Jewry to Israel can be summarized in the
following steps:
1. Money is collected during annual local federation fundraising campaigns. Previously
it was collected from general members of the community, but now mostly via major
donations from wealthier members of the community. It is estimated that 0.5% of all
donors give around 50% of the donations.355
2. Each local federation then determines how much of its money should be kept in the
United States for national Jewish projects and how much should be send “overseas”.
The “overseas” portion of the donations, most of which goes to Israel, is then passed
on by the United Jewish Appeal (UJA), which is part of UJC, to the United Israel
Appeal (UIA), also known as Keren Hayesod, and is also part of UJC.
3. UIA then distributes the funds raised, together with U.S. grant funds it secures, to the
Jewish Agency for Israel (JAFI) and the American Jewish Joint Distribution
Committee, which is a WJC Affiliate.
4. The Jewish Agency for Israel and the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee
use the money in Israel projects. The Jewish Agency for Israel uses funds in projects
of land reclamation, building settlements, and settling Jewish immigrants, while the
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The Process of Israeli Decision Making _________________________________________________ 155
American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee uses its funds in providing social
services assistance to the most vulnerable communities such as the children-at-risk,
struggling immigrant populations, the elderly and the disabled.356
According to Israeli
Journalist and Historian, Tom Segev, the UJC donations constitute a sizeable segment
of Israel’s GNP.357
5.3 Jewish communities and Israel: A one way or two way relationship?
5.3.1 Alternative interpretations
There have been many attempts to interpret the role played by the Jewish
communities in the diaspora vis-à-vis the state of Israel.
One interpretation is that Diaspora Jews have a strong identification with the state of
Israel and see it as their duty to protect it. Commentators such as Goldberg argue that the
establishment of the state gave Judaism a renewed strength and meaning, and that instead
of weakening the diaspora –as many have expected due to emigration to Israel- instead it
strengthened it. Thus, celebrating Israel became a central theme in many aspects of
Jewish life in the diaspora, and many Diaspora Jews see supporting Israel as an essential
and integral part of what defines them as Jews.358
Another interpretation of the Jewish community in the United States is a historical
one. Its advocates compare the role of the Jewish community to that of the Shtetl’s
traditional intermediary, or shtadlan. The shtadlan who might be a well-connected,
assimilated Jew or a well-disposed gentile, has been of great value to the larger Jewish
community in the Shtetl as he often interceded on behalf of the Jews to the local ruler or
prince. Interestingly, the Hebrew word for a lobby is shdulah, from the same root as
shtadlan.359
A third interpretation is one that compares the role of Israel to the Jewish community
in the diaspora to that of an insurance policy. This interpretation is based on the notion
that Israel is the only truly safe place for Jews. Diaspora Jews thus find it prudent to
invest in Israel so that if anti-semitism returns in the host countries, they can always seek
safety in Israel. Jewish contributions to Israel are thus seen as payments into an insurance
policy.
A fourth interpretation is that American Jews feel a need for partnership with Israelis
only when the latter are suffering, and that the only reason American Jews continue to
support Israel during “peace times” is the concern that if they don’t do it themselves, it
would be very difficult to request financial aid to Israel from the United States
administration.
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156 _______________________________________________________ IV. External Influencing Factors
But neither of these interpretations seems to provide a sufficient understanding of the
complex nature of the relation between Israel and the Diaspora. A deeper historical
examination of the Israel-Diaspora relations not only reveals a relationship that has been
less than consistent, but also that a degree of rivalry and friction between Israel and the
Diaspora Jews (especially the large and powerful American Jewish community) over the
leadership of the Jewish people, has often shaped this relationship.
5.3.2 Historical survey of relationship
According to Israeli Historians, the establishment of Israel in 1948 made the diaspora
redundant to those who subscribed to classical Zionist doctrine. The first period—from
1948 to the late 1960s—was characterized by an ideological negation of Diaspora life
(Shlilat Hagolah).360
The Zionist ideology, based on the idea that Israel is the homeland
for all the world’s Jews, considered all Jews who did not make Aliyah (immigration, or
literally ascendance) to Israel less than those who have done so.361
Israelis saw the birth
of the state of Israel as one of the central facts of modern Jewish history. To Jews in Israel
a Jewish life became to live in a Jewish country, thus to them, a Jewish life in the
diaspora is incomprehensible. Israelis also believed that the life in “exile” is doomed with
the threat of anti-semitism from one side and the danger of assimilation into the
communities they live in from the others.362
An example on the notion of Israel’s primacy over the Jewish communities worldwide
is Ben-Gurion’s remarks in his address to the Zionist Actions Committee in 1942, in his
statement the then-chairman of the Jewish Agency observed:
"New Zealand and Australia are the young offspring of England. While the English
government cannot obligate them to take its advice, the English in New Zealand and
Australia, and presumably the English in Canada, look toward England and do as England
does. However lame the comparison; I can also see this applying to Eretz Yisrael. The
heart of American Zionism can be seen in Eretz Yisrael.”363
This ideological position was supported by the results of the1956 and 1967 Wars, but
has gradually dissipated since the mid 1970s, especially because of the results of the 1973
War. Until the 1973 War, most Israeli senior politicians, the “professional Zionists,” and
the majority of the Israelis not only negated Jewish life in the Diaspora, but also argued
that Israel was the nation’s epicenter. They emphasized that the establishment of a nation
state for Jews has normalized the situation for all Jews.
But in spite of this strong ideological position, political and material needs led Israeli
leaders to compromise on their Zionist attitudes towards the Diaspora, and the linkages
that existed between the Yishuv and the Diaspora were retained.364
Although Israelis were
no longer able to understand Diaspora Jews in the wider context of a Jewish life, they
recognized and appreciated their political and financial support.
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The Process of Israeli Decision Making _________________________________________________ 157
On the Diaspora side, the Jewish community in the United Stated did not give much
attention to Israel in terms of political support when it was first established and the
financial support was limited initially. The initial reactions of the majority of the
organized Jewish Diaspora to the Israeli victory in the 1948 War and to the establishment
of the state were qualified and hesitant, with differences emerging in the diaspora
between Zionist and non Zionist Jews who did not want to see Israel interfering in their
affairs. Support increased after the 1956 War and particularly after Israeli military success
in the 1967 War. Some scholars such as Norman Finkelstein argue that it was only when
Israel’s position was strengthened in 1967, that the Diaspora started getting interested in
Israel, and that it was only then that their financial support increased.
Finkelstein advocates this view in his book “The Holocaust Industry” where he
describes the changes that took place within the Jewish community following the 1967.
He argues that as a direct result of Israel becoming the United States' strategic asset in the
Middle East, it has become safe to be pro-Israel in the United States, and thus American
Jewry, Jewish intellectuals and so forth, become fanatical towards the State of Israel,
when until 1967 there were only two public Jewish intellectuals who are publicly
identified as supporting Israel, Hannah Arendt and Noam Chomsky.”365
A compromise was thus reached between Israel and the Diaspora. This compromise
was strengthened with the increasing autonomy of diaspora communities,366
and the
beginning of Israeli acceptance to the Jewish community life in the U.S., as an alternative
to life in the Jewish state in terms of Jewish integration in the modern world.367
A recent
survey by the World Union for Progressive Judaism (a Reform Judaism organisation)
showed that 60 percent of Israelis have an “ongoing connection” with Diaspora Jews.
Diaspora Jews confidence thus grew and they occasionally demand to have a bigger
role in the decision making within the Israeli establishment. There have even also been
requests to allow some of the Diaspora Jews the right to vote in the Israeli general
elections under the premise of being Israeli expatriates. On that, the survey carried out by
the World Union for Progressive Judaism showed that 73 percent of Israelis believe Israel
should take the views of Diaspora Jews into account.
5.3.3 Challenges to Israeli- Diaspora relations
This compromise reached between Israel and the Diaspora also had its fair share of
challenges. A number of changes have taken place on the Diaspora side that reflected a
negative change in Diaspora Jews attitude towards Israel. These changes included a
decline in the campaign revenues and in the percentage of the revenues that are sent to
Israel. This percentage has dropped from 75% of revenues to 66% just after the 1973 war,
to 40% in 1995, and to 25% today.368
In addition, there has been a sharp decline in the
number of Jewish tourists to Israel, and a gradual increase in the number of Diaspora
Jews who became skeptical about Israel’s centrality.369
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158 _______________________________________________________ IV. External Influencing Factors
These negative changes in the relationship between the Israel and the American
diaspora have been attributed by a number of Jewish scholar to the clashes between
American Jewish leaders with one another and with Israeli government officials over a
number of issues, including the definition of a Jew for immigration to Israel, recognition
of non-Orthodox conversion and marriage rites, the Jonathan Pollard spy case, Jewish
settlements in the territories conquered by Israel in 1967, and Israeli responses to the
Palestinian intifada.370
In addition to these clashes, transformations in the Israeli political
scene, such as the rise of the right wing and the peace process, together with the turning
of each of Israel and the Diaspora to deal with its problems and challenges facing, have
both played a role in the negative changes. One of the most obvious consequences of
these changes was a reduction in mutual expectations between the two.371
In addition, the Liaison between Israeli officials and American Jewish leaders, which
is meant to maximize their influence on the United States government, has witnessed
changed in dynamics between the leaders on either side. During the first 25 years of the
establishment of the state, the European born Israelis communicated easily with the
American Jews who also immigrated to the United States from Europe. But during the
subsequent years Israeli leaders (who became more Israeli rather than European) and
American Jewish community leader (who became more American) have lost this
common language and Israelis faced the challenge of leading an American Jewish
community which they fundamentally did not understand.
Furthermore, Israel and the diaspora occasionally have disputes which appear to
reflect a power struggle. The most prominent manifestation of rivalry and power struggle
between Israel and the U.S. Jewry was in 1988 when the Israeli Government led by the
Likud Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir wanted to create a coalition with a group of Haredi
parties, who requested that the Law of return would be amended as a condition for joining
the coalition. The amendment they requested, which was labelled the “who is a Jew” bill,
proposed that those who are converted to Judaism have to be converted by an Orthodox
rabbinate in order to be allowed immigration into Israel as Jews. This bill, whose
consequences were a little more than symbolic, was directed at the Reform Judaism, and
the Conservative Judaism movements in the United States whose conversion processes
are deemed to be lax by the Orthodox.
As a result the bill was met a very strong rejection from the U.S. Jewry, of whom a
majority is conservative and Reform Jews, that it almost resembled a declaration of war.
Leaders of nearly every non-Orthodox Jewish body in America began mobilizing. A
majority of the members of the Presidents Conference demanded that the bill is to be
abolished. They also called for a reform to the Israeli electoral system to eliminate the
bargaining power of the Haredi parties. The Council of Jewish Federations’ (CFJ) general
assembly on that year voted for a full scale campaign to stop Yitzhak Shamir from going
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The Process of Israeli Decision Making _________________________________________________ 159
ahead with this deal, delegations were sent to Israel to meet with every Israeli law maker,
Letters and petitions were prepared and advertisement was published in Israeli press.
Over four weeks plane load after plane load of American Jews flew to Israel including
the top leaders of the CFJ, the United Jewish Appeal (UJA), The National Community
Relations Advisory Council (NCRAC),372
AIPAC, the American Jewish Council, the
American Jewish congress, B’nai B’rith, Hadassah, and the Reform and Conservative
movements. Some local federations even voted to hold the “overseas” portion of their
financial contributions until the amendment was abolished. The protests in the U.S. and
Israel appeared to have got the results they wanted. Shamir tore up the coalition
agreement and entered into a national unity agreement with Shimon Peres.
While some insiders such as Dan Merridor believed Shamir staged this to get a better
position in a national unity coalition with Peres which he wanted from the outset to face
outside pressure, and although there has not been any equally significant incidents since
then. This watershed moment was a demonstration of the clout of the Jewish community
and their ability to influence Israeli policy.373
5.3.4 Israeli positions regarding the Diaspora and its influence on decision making
As for the Israeli side, one can notice one main contradiction in the relation between
Israel and the Diaspora. While Israel expects the Diaspora to provide it with Aliyah
(emigration), money, and political and diplomatic support, it has invested its own
resources in ensuring the continuity of Jewish communities abroad, in assisting
communities in crises, and in rescuing Jews in distress around the world.374
This is
evident in the call for massive Jewish immigration to Israel, made, for example, by prime
minister Ariel Sharon, which stands in contrast to modest support for Jewish education in
the Diaspora—a policy that has been implemented by the same Sharon government.375
This contradiction could be explained by shedding light the different positions Israelis
have towards Diaspora Jews and their lobbying structures.
There are two main positions in Israel regarding the worldwide Jewry; the position of
labour and the position of the Likud. While the Likud believes in worldwide Jewish
solidarity, Labour believes that Israel is strong enough and doesn’t really need the
diaspora’s help to establish state to state relationship with the United States. It also
believed that Israel shouldn’t really lead the American Jews, and that American Jews
would follow Israel’s lead more or less automatically since their support for Israel is
purely out of admiration (a conviction that eventually turned out not to be entirely true).
In addition, these two approaches coincide with the two most significant Israeli
approaches toward the role of Congress and the pro- Israel lobby in the peace process.
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160 _______________________________________________________ IV. External Influencing Factors
Labor’s support for “land for peace” has generally made it easier for it to work with
the U.S. executive on the peace process, and thus saw little need for lobbying and
Hasbarah as discussed earlier. Labor government regarded the pro-Israel lobby as
superfluous and downgraded its relationship with AIPAC. Rabin, who was very critical of
its aggressive lobbying, and thought it would lead to unnecessary confrontation with the
American Administration supported limiting AIPAC’s role in Labour’s peace strategy,
and some key progressives even went so far as to label AIPAC an “extreme right-wing”
group with a negative impact both on the peace process and Israeli security. Former
deputy foreign minister Yossi Beilin explained this relationship when he was quoted as
saying:
Labor’s coming to power pulls the rug from under AIPAC. We want U.S.
involvement in the peace process; their agenda was to keep the Americans out. We
want peace based on compromise, and their agenda was to explain why compromise
was impossible.376
Likud, on the hand, have recognized since the early 1980s that their hawkish
positions, which are often in clash with American policy, need support by its allies in the
Congress and the pro-Israel lobby. During the 1980s, the Likud attained American
support not only for Israel but also for the Likud’s positions among conservative
politicians, Christian fundamentalist groups, key figures in the media and important
groups within the American Jewish community. In addition, the Likud strategy
particularly benefited from the increased power of the AIPAC.
For example, Israeli Likud activists worked with American Jewish groups and key
congressional Republicans to reduce U.S. pressure on Israel when it deployed its troops in
the west bank in 1998. They also worked together to stop the flow of American aid to the
Palestinian Authority.377
Generally speaking, the establishment of new direct channels of communication
between Israel and American administrations since Rabin’s first government has led
many Israeli prime ministers of the right and the left (such as Begin, Rabin, Netanyahu,
Barak, and Sharon) to feel less need for Jewish mediation.
Since the 1980s, Israel concluded that it would be able to pursue its own economic
and political interests without the massive support and mediation of the Diaspora leaders
and professionals.378
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The Process of Israeli Decision Making _________________________________________________ 161
Endnotes
1
Freilich, National Security Decision-Making in Israel: Processes, Pathologies, and Strengths.
2
Ian Black. “Not David but Samson,” The Guardian, Book reviews, 11 February, 2006
http://books.guardian.co.uk/review/story/0,,1706250,00.html (Accessed 15.02.2008).
3
Known in Hebrew as Tzva Haganah Le’yisrael, ( and often referred to in with its acronym: T’sahal)
4
Uri Bar-Joseph, “Towards a Paradigm Shift in Israel’s National Security Conception,” In Israel: The First
Hundred Years, Vol. II: From War to Peace?, edited by Efraim Karsh (London: Frank Cass, 2000), 100.
5
David Rodman,” Israel's National Security Doctrine: An Appraisal of the Past and a Vision of the Future”
Israel Affairs 9, no. 4 (June 2003): 115-140
6
Ibid.
7
Jonathan Kaplan, “The Role of the Military in Israel.” The Jewish Agency for Israel Website, Jewish Zionist
Education.
http://www.jewishagency.org/JewishAgency/English/.../Society/9)The+Role+of+the+Military+in+Israel.htm
(Accessed 02.06.2008).
8
Jonathan Kaplan, “The Role of the Military in Israel.” The Jewish Agency for Israel Website, Jewish Zionist
Education.
http://www.jewishagency.org/JewishAgency/English/.../Society/9)The+Role+of+the+Military+in+Israel.htm
(Accessed 02.06.2008).
9
Dowty, Israeli Foreign Policy and the Jewish Question.
10
David Ben-Gurion, "Israel's Security and Her International Position before and after the Sinai Campaign,"
Israel Government Year-Book 5720 (1959-1960), pp. 22-24,. Quoted in Michael Brecher, The foreign policy
system of Israel: setting, images, process. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972), 267.
11
Yoram Peri, Between Battles and Ballots, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 20.
12
Uri Bar-Joseph, “Towards a Paradigm Shift in Israel’s National Security Conception,” In Israel: The First
Hundred Years, Vol. II: From War to Peace?, edited by Efraim Karsh (London: Frank Cass, 2000), 104-108.
13
Rodman, Israel's National Security Doctrine: An Appraisal of the Past and a Vision of the Future.
14
Ibid.
15
Freilich, National Security Decision-Making in Israel: Processes, Pathologies, and Strengths.
16
Yoram Peri, “Civil Military Relations in Israel in Crisis.” In Military, State, and Society in Israel. Edited by
Maman, Daniel, Ben-Ari, Eyal, and Rosenhek, Zeev. (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2001),109.
17
Freilich, National Security Decision-Making in Israel: Processes, Pathologies, and Strengths.
18
Rodman, Israel's National Security Doctrine: An Appraisal of the Past and a Vision of the Future.
19
Yoram Peri, “Civil Military Relations in Israel in Crisis.” In Military, State, and Society in Israel. Edited by
Maman, Daniel, Ben-Ari, Eyal, and Rosenhek, Zeev. (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2001),122-
128.
20
Reported in Yediot Achronot, 23 October 1996. Source: Ibid, 126.
21
Uri Bar-Joseph, “Towards a Paradigm Shift in Israel’s National Security Conception,” In Israel: The First
Hundred Years, Vol. II: From War to Peace?, edited by Efraim Karsh (London: Frank Cass, 2000), 111.
22
Yoram Peri, “Civil Military Relations in Israel in Crisis.” In Military, State, and Society in Israel, 128.
23
Ibid, 109-125.
24
Ibid, 125-126.
25
Reported in Ha’aretz. 12 September 1996. Source: Ibid, 126-127.
26
Reported in Yediot Achronot, 17 October 1997. Source: Ibid, 126-127.
Al-ZaytounaCentreforStudies&Consultations,Beirut,Lebanon
162 _______________________________________________________ IV. External Influencing Factors
27
Ibid, 125-128.
28
Ibid, 124-125.
29
These figures include Arab in Israel and Haredim, who are normally exempt from mandatory service. Source:
Moran Zelikovich.” IDF: 50% of Israeli teens do not enlist.” Yediot Achronot. 1 July 2008.
http://www.ynetnews.com/Ext/Comp/ArticleLayout/CdaArticlePrintPreview/1,2506,L-3562596,00.html
(Accessed: 03.07.2008)
30
Yoram Peri, “Civil Military Relations in Israel in Crisis.” In Military, State, and Society in Israel, 107.
31
Ibid.
32
Ibid, 128.
33
Ibid, 109.
34
Arian, Politics in Israel: The Second Republic, 260
35
Raymond Cohen, “Israel's Starry-Eyed Foreign Policy” The Middle East Quarterly 1, no. 2 (June 1994).
36
Other activities surveyed included living in Israel, voting in elections, flying the Israeli flag, establishing a
new village, respecting the Jewish tradition, contributing to social organizations, demonstrating against policy,
and buying Israeli products. Source: IDB Group, The. “Patriotism and National Strength in Israel after the
Lebanon War,” Working paper presented at the 7th
Herzliya Conference at The Institute for Policy and
Strategy. http://www.herzliyaconference.org/Eng/_Uploads/1856patriotismeng(4).pdf (Accessed
09.06.2007)
37
Ibid.
38
Editorial. “ Gaysh Aldawla Am Dawlat AlGaysh: Hawla Moraqabat Almostawa Alseyasi Lelmostawa
Al’askary (The State’s Army or the Army’s State: On the Supervision of the Military level by the Political
Level).” Almash-had Al-Israeli (The Israeli Scene), 15 May, 2007.
39
Kameel Mansour and Fawz Abdelhadi, eds, Israel, Daleel ‘Aam, 2004, 502.
40
The Shabak is also known in English as the Israel Security Agency.
41
Federation of American Scientists. “Intelligence Resource Program, Israel Security Service Sherut haBitachon
ha-Klali (Shabak).” http://www.fas.org/irp/world/israel/shin_bet/ (Accessed 28.10.2006).
42
Federation of American Scientists. “Intelligence resource program, The Institute for Intelligence and Special
Tasks ha-Mossad le-Modiin ule-Tafkidim Meyuhadim.” http://www.fas.org/irp/world/israel/mossad/
(Accessed 28.10.2006).
43
Zalman F. Shiffer, “The Debate Over the Defense Budget in Israel,” Israel studies 12, no. 1.
44
Ibid.
45
Yehuda Ben Meir, National security decision making: the Israeli case. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986),
90.
46
Barhoom Garaysi. “Mezaneyat Israel Lel’aam Alqadem 76 Million Dollar (Israel’s Next Year’s Budget is $76
Billion),” Almash-had Al-Israeli (The Israeli Scene), 16 October, 2007.
47
Arian, Politics in Israel: The Second Republic, 335
48
NIS is short for New Israeli Sheqel.
49
Katz, Yakoov. “IDF: Prospect for Conflict up in 2007,” The Jerusalem Post, 11 January, 2007.
http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull&cid=1167467702702
(Accessed 23.07.2007).
50
The Defense Consumption has reduced from 20% in 1987. Source: Yoram Peri, “Civil Military Relations in
Israel in Crisis.” In Military, State, and Society in Israel, 114.
51
Editorial. “ Itesa’ Aljadal Halwla Almezaneya Al’askaria Fe Israel (The Debate Widens on the Security
Budget in Israel).” Almash-had Al-Israeli (The Israeli Scene), 26 June, 2007.
Al-ZaytounaCentreforStudies&Consultations,Beirut,Lebanon
The Process of Israeli Decision Making _________________________________________________ 163
52
Please see: Yehuda Ben Meir, National security decision making: the Israeli case. (Boulder, CO: Westview
Press, 1986), 90; Netanel Lorch, “The Israel Defense Forces.” Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Facts%20About%20Israel/State/The%20Israel%20Defense%20Forces (Accessed:
28.07.2007); and Editorial. “ Itesa’ Aljadal Halwla Almezaneya Al’askaria Fe Isra’el,” Almash-had Al-Israeli,
26 June, 2007.
53
US Department of State. “Background Note: Israel”. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3581.htm ( Accessed:
23.07.2007).
54
Her Majesty’s Treasury, UK budget report 2007. London: Her majesty’s Stationary Office, 2007.
55
CIA World Fact Book. “Military Expenditures - Percent of GDP.”
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2034rank.html (Accessed:
28.07.2007)
56
Zalman F. Shiffer, “The Debate Over the Defense Budget in Israel,” Israel studies 12, no. 1.
57
John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy. (New York: Farrar,
Straus and Giroux, 2007),27.
58
Campaign Against Arms Trade. “Arming the Occupation; Israel and the Arms Trade.”
http://www.caat.org.uk/publications/countries/israel-1002.pdf (Accessed 08.08.2007).
59
Alon Ben-David, “Israel's Arms Sales Soar to Hit Record in 2006,” Jane’s Defense Weekly. 10 January, 2007.
http://www.plasansasa.com/pdf/JDW-Jan-5.pdf (Accessed 24.07.2007).
60
Hanan Sher, “Facets of the Israeli Economy- The Defense Industry.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFAArchive/2000_2009/2002/6/Facets%20of%20the%20Israeli%20Economy%20The%20Defense%20Industr
(Accessed: 21.12.2006).
61
Campaign Against Arms Trade. “Arming the Occupation; Israel and the Arms Trade.”
62
Singh, Foreign Policy Making in Israel: Domestic influences,
63
Yitzhak Laor, You are Terrorists, We are Virtuous, London review of Books 28, no. 16 (17 August, 2006).
http://www.lrb.co.uk/v28/n16/print/laor01_.html (Accessed: 01.09.2006).
64
Shahak, Jewish Fundamentalism in Israel, p. 55
65
Nahal also is the name of one of the infantry regiments, alongside the Golani Brigade, Givati Brigade,
Paratroopers Brigade, and others.
66
Jonathan Kaplan, “The Role of the Military in Israel.” The Jewish Agency for Israel Website, Jewish Zionist
Education.
67
Ibid.
68
Arian, Politics in Israel: The Second Republic, 324, 327
69
Evelyn Gordon, “Where is All the Money Going?” The Jerusalem Post, 8 September, 2006.
http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1154526020810&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull
(Accessed 23.07.2007).
70
The heads of the Mossad, the Borders Police, the Civil Guard, the civil administration in the occupied
territory, the airports and ports administrations, and similar positions are all retired officers. The same pattern
appears in the heads of Government corporations which are deemed fundamental to security, such as the
electricity, water, oil refineries, the El-Al airline, together with the military industries and advanced
technological industries.
Source: Kameel Mansour and Fawz Abdelhadi, eds, Israel, Daleel ‘Aam, 2004, 53- 58.
71
Peri, Generals in the Cabinet Room: How the Military Shapes Israeli Policy.
72
Arian, Politics in Israel: The Second Republic, 333
73
Ibid. 326.
Al-ZaytounaCentreforStudies&Consultations,Beirut,Lebanon
164 _______________________________________________________ IV. External Influencing Factors
74
Shahak, Jewish Fundamentalism in Israel. 93.
75
Singh, Foreign Policy Making in Israel: Domestic influences, 124.
76
Goldberg, “The Growing Militarization of the Israeli Political System,” Israeli Affairs.
77
Aviezer Yaari, “National Security Council, Civilian Supervision of the Army in Israel,” Memoranda of Jaffee
Center for Strategic Studies, no. 72 (October 2004). http://www.tau.ac.il/jcss/memoranda/memo72.pdf . Arabic
Translation obtained from http://almash-had.madarcenter.org/almash-had/printtemp.asp?articalid=2436
78
See: Peri, Generals in the Cabinet Room: How the Military Shapes Israeli Policy; and Moshe Lissak. “The
Civilian Components of Israel’s Security Doctrine: The Evolution of Civil-Military Relations in the First
Decade.” In Israel: the first decade of independence. Edited by S. Ilan Troen and Noah Lucas. (Albany, NY:
State University of New York Press, 1995): 575-591.
79
Uri Ra’anan, “Contrasting Views of the Role of Strategic (Politico-Military) Doctrine: Soviet and Western
Approaches” in National security policy: the decision-making process, edited by Robert L.Pfaltzgraff, Jr. and
Uri Raanan. (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1984).
80
Yoram Peri, “Civil Military Relations in Israel in Crisis.” In Military, State, and Society in Israel, 114-115.
81
Freilich, National Security Decision-Making in Israel: Processes, Pathologies, and Strengths.
82
Peri, Generals in the Cabinet Room: How the Military Shapes Israeli Policy.
83
Arian, Politics in Israel: The Second Republic, 324, 327
84
Peri, Generals in the Cabinet Room: How the Military Shapes Israeli Policy.
85
Yehuda Ben Meir, National security decision making: the Israeli case. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986),
85.
86
Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, “Israel’s Civil-Military Relations in Wartime,” JCSS bulletin, no. 31
(September 2005), http://www.tau.ac.il/jcss/bulletin/bulletin31.pdf (Accessed 02.09.2006).
87
Freilich, National Security Decision-Making in Israel: Processes, Pathologies, and Strengths.
88
Ibid.
89
Stieglitz, Meir, Information Clearing House, Israel on the Brink,
90
Peri, Generals in the Cabinet Room: How the Military Shapes Israeli Policy.
91
Arian, Politics in Israel: The Second Republic, 329
92
Freilich, National Security Decision-Making in Israel: Processes, Pathologies, and Strengths.
93
Singh, Foreign Policy Making in Israel: Domestic influences, 86.
94
Freilich, National Security Decision-Making in Israel: Processes, Pathologies, and Strengths.
95
Jewish Virtual Library. “Israel Establishes National Security Council.”
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Politics/nsc.html (Accessed: 24.10.2006).
96
Shahar Ilan, “Knesset approves expanding powers of national security chief” Ha’aretz, 29 July 2008.
97
Ronny Sofer, “Top NSC Officials Step Down,” Yedioth Achronot, 9 October, 2007.
http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3447868,00.html (Accessed: 10.06.2008).
98
Aviezer Yaari, “Whom Does the Council Advise? A New Model for the National Security Council,”
Memoranda of Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, no. 85 (September 2006).
http://www.tau.ac.il/jcss/memoranda/memo85.pdf . Arabic Excerpt obtained from Arabs 48 Newspaper,
http://www.arabs48.com/display.x?cid=19&sid=165&id=40841
99
Freilich, National Security Decision-Making in Israel: Processes, Pathologies, and Strengths.
100
Aluf Benn, “State Comptroller Recommends Upgrading National Security Council.” Ha’aretz, 28
September, 2006. http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/768140.html (Accessed 23.12.2006).
Al-ZaytounaCentreforStudies&Consultations,Beirut,Lebanon
The Process of Israeli Decision Making _________________________________________________ 165
101
Ibid.
102
Almash-had Al-Israeli, Round One Against Iran.
103
Freilich, National Security Decision-Making in Israel: Processes, Pathologies, and Strengths.
104
Ibid.
105
Peri, Generals in the Cabinet Room: How the Military Shapes Israeli Policy.
106
Kobi Michael “Military Knowledge and Weak Civilian Control in the Reality of Low Intensity Conflict: The
Israeli Case,” Israel Studies 12, no. 1 (Spring 2007): 28-52.
107
Freilich, National Security Decision-Making in Israel: Processes, Pathologies, and Strengths.
108
Peri, Generals in the Cabinet Room: How the Military Shapes Israeli Policy.
109
Yehiel Limor, “The Printed Media: Israel's Newspapers,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Facts%20About%20Israel/Culture/The%20Printed%20Media-%20Israels%20Newspapers
(Accessed 07.10.2007); and Editorial, “Censorship by Israel: How It's Carried Out,” New
York Times, 29 June, 1982.
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C0CE3DD123BF93AA15755C0A964948260 (Accessed
07.10.2007).
110
Brian Montopoli, “News Out of Israel Filtered Through Military Censor.”Public Eye. CBS News, 20 July,
2006. http://www.cbsnews.com/blogs/2006/07/20/publiceye/entry1822256.shtml (Accessed: 31.10.2006).
111
Moshe Lissak. “The Civilian Components of Israel’s Security Doctrine: The Evolution of Civil-Military
Relations in the First Decade.” In Israel: the first decade of independence. Edited by S. Ilan Troen and Noah
Lucas. (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1995), 585-586.
112
Jonathan Kaplan, “The Role of the Military in Israel.” The Jewish Agency for Israel Website, Jewish Zionist
Education.
113
Goldberg, “The Growing Militarization of the Israeli Political System,” Israeli Affairs.
114
Jonathan Kaplan, “The Role of the Military in Israel.” The Jewish Agency for Israel Website, Jewish Zionist
Education.
115
Peri, Yoram, The Washington Post, Israel's Broken Process, Decision-Making on National Security Must Be
Fixed.
116
Brecher, Decisions in Crisis: Israel, 1967 and 1973, 353.
117
Illegal outposts are small new settlements illegal according to Israel Law.
According to international law, all settlements and outposts are Illegal. The Geneva Conventions (Protocol I)
(1977), article 85(4a) defines the occupying forces importing their own population into the occupied territories
as a "grave breach" of international law.
118
Peri, Generals in the Cabinet Room: How the Military Shapes Israeli Policy.
119
Yoram Peri, “Civil Military Relations in Israel in Crisis.” In Military, State, and Society in Israel, 121-122.
120
Peri, Generals in the Cabinet Room: How the Military Shapes Israeli Policy.
121
Federation of American Scientists, Intelligence resource program, The Institute for Intelligence and Special
Tasks ha-Mossad le-Modiin ule-Tafkidim Meyuhadim.
122
Peri, Generals in the Cabinet Room: How the Military Shapes Israeli Policy, 50-51
123
A recent disagreement between the two intelligence bodies went public when following the 2006 Lebanon
war, they presented to Prime Minister Ehud Olmert contradicting assessments regarding the intentions of the
Syrian regime and whether their signals about peace are genuine. The MID research department was of the
opinion that Syrian signals are genuine, while the Mossad believed that the Syrian overtures should not be taken
seriously. Source: G. Alon, A. Harel, and A. Benn, ” MI and Mossad disagree over Assad's intentions,”
Ha’aretz, 26 December, 2006. http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/805497.html (Accessed 30.03.2008).
Al-ZaytounaCentreforStudies&Consultations,Beirut,Lebanon
166 _______________________________________________________ IV. External Influencing Factors
124
Uri Avnery, “Israel’s Intelligence Scandal,” Counter Punch, 21 June, 2004.
http://www.counterpunch.org/avnery06212004.html (Accessed 30.03.2008); and Dan Margalit, “Unnecessary
Excitement on the Left,” Jewish Toronto News, http://www.jewishtoronto.net/page.html?ArticleID=66748
(Accessed 30.04.2008).
125
Freilich, National Security Decision-Making in Israel: Processes, Pathologies, and Strengths.
126
Asher Arian, et al. Executive Governance in Israel, ( New York: Palgrave, 2002), 58-59.
127
Arnon Soffer is a professor of geography/demography at Haifa University. In addition to advising Prime
Minister Sharon, He also is an advisor to the army's top brass and is the head of research for the IDF’s National
Defense College. Source: Paul De Rooij, “The Voices of Sharon's Little Helpers,” Counter Punch, 9 December,
2004. http://www.counterpunch.org/rooij12092004.html (Accessed: 05.03.2008).
128
Matt Rees, “The Man Who Turned Sharon into a Softie,” Time Magazine, 15 May, 2005
http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,1061523,00.html (Accessed 31.05.2008).
129
Aluf Benn,“Final Lebanon Push Decided After PM Met Informal Team.” Ha’aretz, 25 May, 2007.
130
P. Izemkank-Kane, “On Knowledge & Policy- The Role of Think-Tanks in Israel and Other Countries,” The
Jerusalem Center for Israel Studies, 2004.. Translation from Hebrew provided by the Journal of Palestinian
studies 64 (Autumn 2005).
131
Information about think tanks and study centers is obtained from self descriptions on think tanks’ websites
as well as from descriptions by independent guides. Sources include:
Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Links to International Affairs & Security Studies
Israeli democracy Institute: Think Tanks in Israel
World Conference on Religion and Peace, Think Tanks, Israel
National Institute for research advancement, Link to Think Tanks and Other Policy Research Resources, Israel
Jewish Finder, Israel: Israel Think Tanks/Institutes
132
The institute’s website: http://www.inss.org.il/
133
The center’s website: https://www.idc.ac.il/eng/default.asp
134
The institute’s website: http://www.iasps.org/index.php
135
The institute’s website: http://www.fips.org.il/Site/p_home/home_en.asp
136
The institute’s website: http://www.jiis.org.il/
137
The institute’s website: http://www.reut-institute.org/
138
The Institute’s Website: http://truman.huji.ac.il/
139
The Institute’s Website: http://davis.huji.ac.il/
140
The center’s website: http://nssc.haifa.ac.il/
141
The institute’s website: http://www.vanleer.org.il/default_e.asp
142
The Center’s website: http://www.taubcenter.org.il/
143
The center’s website: http://www.acpr.org.il/
144
The institute’s website: http://www.idi.org.il/english/
145
The center’s website: http://www.ipcri.org/
146
The center’s website: http://www.tau.ac.il/peace/
147
The institute’s website: http://www.tau.ac.il/institutes/herzog/
148
The center’s website: http://www.dayan.org/
149
The center’s website: http://www.peres-center.org/
150
The center’s website: http://center.rabincenter.org.il/english/Pages/default.aspx
Al-ZaytounaCentreforStudies&Consultations,Beirut,Lebanon
The Process of Israeli Decision Making _________________________________________________ 167
151
The institute’s website: http://pluto.mscc.huji.ac.il/~msfalkin/home-1.htm
152
The center’s website: http://www.jcpa.org/
153
The center’s website: http://www.adva.org/default.asp?lang=en
154
The institute’s website: http://www.iiesr.org.il/default.asp?langid=1
155
The institute’s website: http://brookdale-en.pionet.com/default.asp
156
The center’s website: http://www.biu.ac.il/Besa/index.html
157
The center’s website: http://jac.haifa.ac.il/
158
Arian, Politics in Israel: The Second Republic, 317.
159
Ibid. 318, 320.
160
Ibid. 319.
161
Ibid. 318.
162
Ibid. 317.
163
After the 1949 and the 1951 elections there were 36 Members of the Knesset from the Kibbutz and Moshav
movements., while in 2003 there were only nine members from the Kibbutzim and Moshavim. Source: Arian,
Politics in Israel: The Second Republic, 341-342. The influence of the peace camp was also reduced greatly
since the fall of 2000. Source: Efraim Davidi, “Protest Amid Confusion: Israel's Peace Camp in the Uprising's
First Month,” Middle East Report, no. 217 (Winter 2000): 36-39.
164
Arian, Politics in Israel: The Second Republic, 349
165
Shlomit Levy et al, A Portrait of Israeli Jewry: Beliefs, Observances, and Values among
Israeli Jews 2000. Highlights from an In-Depth Study Conducted by the Guttman Center of
the Israel Democracy Institute for the AVI CHAI Foundation, 2000; and Daniel J. Elazar,
“How religious are Israeli Jews?” Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs
http://www.jcpa.org/dje/articles2/howrelisr.htm (Accessed 29.12.2007)
166
Encyclopaedia Britannica Online. “Fundamentalism.”
http://www.britannica.com/eb/article252665/fundamentalism (Accessed 17.12.2007).
167
Shahak, Jewish Fundamentalism in Israel, 33-34
168
This term should not be confused with the Masorti Movement, the name of the Conservative Movement in
Judaism.
169
Editorial. “Poll: 40% of secular Jews keep kosher,” Yediot Achronot, Israel Jewish Scene, 26 May, 2008.
http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3547740,00.html (Accessed 28.05.2008).
170
Shlomit Levy et al, A Portrait of Israeli Jewry: Beliefs, Observances, and Values among Israeli Jews 2000.
Highlights from an In-Depth Study Conducted by the Guttman Center of the Israel Democracy Institute for the
AVI CHAI Foundation, 2000.
171
Ibid.
172
Editorial. “Poll: 40% of secular Jews keep kosher,” Yediot Achronot.
173
Daniel J. Elazar, “How religious are Israeli Jews?” Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs
http://www.jcpa.org/dje/articles2/howrelisr.htm (Accessed 29.12.2007)
174
Haredi: Hebrew for a person who trembles (from the fear of God). Plural, Haredim
175
Shahak, Jewish Fundamentalism in Israel.
176
Steven Erlanger, “A Modern Marketplace for Israel’s Ultra-Orthodox,” New York Times, 2 November, 2007.
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/02/world/middleeast/02orthodox.html (Accessed: 14.11.2007).
Al-ZaytounaCentreforStudies&Consultations,Beirut,Lebanon
168 _______________________________________________________ IV. External Influencing Factors
177
Short for Merkaz Ruhani or Religious Center, and is not to be confused with the name used to describe Jews
of Oriental origins.
178
In a famous Talmudic Passage in Tractate Ketubot, p. 111, God is said to have imposed three oaths on the
Jews. Two of which contradict tenets of Zionism. The first oath is that Jews should not rebel against non-Jews.
Secondly, as a group, Jews should not massively emigrate to Palestine before the coming of the Messiah. The
third oath is that Jews should not pray too strongly for the coming of the Messiah,, so as not to bring him before
his appointed time.
179
Reiser, The politics of leverage: the National Religious Party of Israel and its influence on foreign policy, 16.
180
Shahak, Jewish Fundamentalism in Israel, 19
181
Ibid, 17
182
Ibid. 29.
183
Ibid. 30.
184
Ibid. 155.
185
Ibid. 8, 38.
186
Ibid. 50.
187
Ibid. 17, 53.
188
Aaron Willis, “Redefining Religious Zionism: Shas' Ethno-Politics,” Israel Studies Bulletin 8, no. 1 (Fall
1992)
189
Rebbe is the Yiddish language version of the Hebrew Word Rabbi.
190
Shahak, Jewish Fundamentalism in Israel, 15.
191
Yeshiva is a religious school. Plural, Yeshivot.
192
Shahak, Jewish Fundamentalism in Israel, 48
193
Ibid. 62
194
Ibid. 60
195
Ibid. 62
196
Anti Defamation League website, The Conversion Crisis: The Current Debate on Religion, State and
Conversion in Israel.
197
Isi Leibler, “Retreat From Reason,” The Jerusalem Post, 25 September, 2007.
http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1189411476484&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull
(Accesses 28.12.2007).
198
Shahak, Jewish Fundamentalism in Israel, 24.
199
Ibid, 51.
200
Arian, Politics in Israel: The Second Republic, 348.
201
Ibid, 358.
202
Ibid, 318.
203
Shahak, Jewish Fundamentalism in Israel, 34-37
204
Ibid. 61.
205
Steven Erlanger, “A Modern Marketplace for Israel’s Ultra-Orthodox,” New York Times.
206
Isi Leibler, “Retreat From Reason,” The Jerusalem Post.
207
Tim Franks, “Israel's Other Demographic Challenge,” BBC News, 3 September, 2007.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/6970195.stm (Accessed 24.12.2007).
Al-ZaytounaCentreforStudies&Consultations,Beirut,Lebanon
The Process of Israeli Decision Making _________________________________________________ 169
208
Encyclopaedia Britannica Online. “Fundamentalism..”
209
Shahak, Jewish Fundamentalism in Israel, 22.
210
Dati Le’umi: Hebrew for Religious National. Plural, Datim Le’umim
211
Gush Emunim: Hebrew for Bloc of the Faithful
212
Mizrachi is short for Merkaz Ruhani or Religious center and is not to be confused with the term for Oriental
Jews.
213
Reiser, The politics of leverage: the National Religious Party of Israel and its influence on foreign policy, 8-
9.
214
Ibid, 11-13.
215
Shahak, Jewish Fundamentalism in Israel, 55.
216
The Datim Le’umim are also often collectively referred to as the Kippot Srugot (knitted skullcaps) in contrast
with Kippot Shkhorot ( Black skullcaps) which are worn by the Haredi community
217
Isi Leibler, “Retreat From Reason,” The Jerusalem Post.
218
Mafdal, is a Hebrew acronym for Miflaga Datit Leumit.
219
Reiser, The politics of leverage: the National Religious Party of Israel and its influence on foreign policy, 19.
220
Ibid, 34-49.
221
Metz, Israel: A Country Study, under “Gush Emunim,” http://countrystudies.us/israel/102.htm (Accessed
30.12.2007); and Reiser, The politics of leverage : the National Religious Party of Israel and its influence on
foreign policy, 48.
222
Ibid, 34-49.
223
Ibid, 34-38.
224
Ibid, 48.
225
Shahak, Jewish Fundamentalism in Israel, 94.
226
Encyclopaedia Britannica Online. “Fundamentalism..”
227
Reiser, The politics of leverage : the National Religious Party of Israel and its influence on foreign policy,
49.
228
Metz, Israel: A Country Study, under “Gush Emunim.”
229
Shahak, Jewish Fundamentalism in Israel, 55-56.
230
Ibid. 78.
231
Ibid, 56-57.
232
Metz, Israel: A Country Study, under “Gush Emunim.”
233
The National Union (NU) is also known as the HaIkhud HaLeumi.
234
Shahak, Jewish Fundamentalism in Israel, 71.
235
Ibid. 65.
236
Ibid. 71.
237
Gideon Levy. “Heads to the Right.” Ha’aretz. 9 March 2008.
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/962041.html (Accessed 09.03.2008).
238
Shahak, Jewish Fundamentalism in Israel, 71.
239
Ibid, 60, 70.
240
Ibid. 67.
Al-ZaytounaCentreforStudies&Consultations,Beirut,Lebanon
170 _______________________________________________________ IV. External Influencing Factors
241
Ibid. 75.
242
Ibid. 55.
243
Ibid. 72.
244
Ibid, 72.
245
Ibid. 73.
246
Ibid. 73
247
Ibid. 68
248
The Mafdal’s control of these institutions has recently weakened, as the Haredim demanded their share in
them.
249
Shahak, Jewish Fundamentalism in Israel, 69.
250
Ibid. 68.
251
Ibid. 78.
252
Yesha is an acronym for Judea, Samaria, and Gaza, and the word Yesha also means “salvation” in Hebrew.
Although all Israeli settlements in Gaza were dismantled in summer 2005, the Council has retained the acronym
253
The Datim Le’umim are also sometimes referred to as the Bnei Akiva groups.
254
Dror Etkes, Dror and Lara Friedman, “Who Leads the Settlers?” Peace Now, Settlements in Focus reports.
http://www.peacenow.org.il/site/en/peace.asp?pi=62&docid=1840&pos=8 (Accessed 22.06.2007). Dror Etkes,
Dror and Lara Friedman, “Challenges to the Settler Leadership.” Peace Now, Settlements in Focus reports.
http://www.peacenow.org.il/site/en/peace.asp?pi=62&docid=1864&pos=7 (Accessed 22.06.2007); and Shahak,
Jewish Fundamentalism in Israel, 65, 75.
255
Dror Etkes, Dror and Lara Friedman, “Who Leads the Settlers?” Peace Now. Dror Etkes, Dror and Lara
Friedman, “Challenges to the Settler Leadership.” Peace Now.
256
Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov, “Peace Policy as Domestic and Foreign Policy: The Israeli Case” In Peace making
in a divided society: Israel after Rabin, edited by Sasson Sofer, (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2001), 29.
257
Dror Etkes, Dror and Lara Friedman, “Who Leads the Settlers?” Peace Now. Dror Etkes, Dror and Lara
Friedman, “Challenges to the Settler Leadership.” Peace Now.
258
Shahak, Jewish Fundamentalism in Israel, 79-83.
259
Dror Etkes, Dror and Lara Friedman, “Who Leads the Settlers?” Peace Now. Dror Etkes, Dror and Lara
Friedman, “Challenges to the Settler Leadership.” Peace Now.
260
Dror Etkes, Dror and Lara Friedman, “Who Leads the Settlers?” Peace Now. Dror Etkes, Dror and Lara
Friedman, “Challenges to the Settler Leadership.” Peace Now.
261
Shahak, Jewish Fundamentalism in Israel, 83.
262
Shahak, Jewish Fundamentalism in Israel, 72.
263
Ibid. 74.
264
Ibid. 88.
265
Ibid. 159.
266
Arian, Politics in Israel: The Second Republic, 153.
267
Shahak, Jewish Fundamentalism in Israel. 83.
268
Arian, Politics in Israel: The Second Republic, 152
269
Ibid, 151.
270
Shahak, Jewish Fundamentalism in Israel, 84.
Al-ZaytounaCentreforStudies&Consultations,Beirut,Lebanon
The Process of Israeli Decision Making _________________________________________________ 171
271
Metz, Israel: A Country Study, under “Gush Emunim.”
272
Dror Etkes, Dror and Lara Friedman, “Who Leads the Settlers?” Peace Now. Dror Etkes, Dror and Lara
Friedman, “Challenges to the Settler Leadership.” Peace Now.
273
Shahak, Jewish Fundamentalism in Israel, 85.
274
Peace Now website. “Summary of the Sasson's Report.”
http://www.peacenow.org.il/site/en/peace.asp?pi=61&fld=343&docid=1454 (Accessed 17.12.2007).
275
Steven Erlanger, “Israeli Army, a National Melting Pot, Faces New Challenges in Training Officers,” New
York Times, 31 December, 2007.
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/31/world/middleeast/31israel.html?pagewanted=print (Accessed:
02.01.2008).
276
Shahak, Jewish Fundamentalism in Israel, 89.
277
Ibid, 90.
278
Yeshiva is a religious school, plural Yeshivot.
279
Shahak, Jewish Fundamentalism in Israel, 91.
280
Ibid. 92.
281
Yagil Levy, Edna Lomsky-Feder, and Noa Harel. “ From “Obligatory Militarism” to “Contractual
Militarism”:Competing Models of Citizenship,” Israel Studies 12, no. 1 (Spring 2007): 127-148; and Erlanger,
“Israeli Army, a National Melting Pot, Faces New Challenges in Training Officers,” New York Times
282
Shahak, Jewish Fundamentalism in Israel, 72.
283
Ibid. 75.
284
Ibid. 72.
285
Ibid. 76-77.
286
Ibid, 69.
287
Shragai, Nadav. “For Religious Zionists, the First Independence Day after Disengagement Poses an
Ideological Dilemma” Ha’aretz, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/711298.html (Accessed 30.12.2006).
288
Shahak, Jewish Fundamentalism in Israel, 90.
289
Stuart A. Cohen, “Tensions between Military Service and Jewish Orthodoxy in Israel: Implications Imagined
and Real” Israel Studies 12, no. 1 (Spring 2007): 103-126.
290
Dror Etkes, Dror and Lara Friedman, “Who Leads the Settlers?” Peace Now. Dror Etkes, Dror and Lara
Friedman, “Challenges to the Settler Leadership.” Peace Now.
291
officially named: Hahistadrut Haklalit shel Haovdim B'eretz Yisrael, The General Federation of Labourers in
the Land of Israel.
292
The Histadrut is distinct from the two agricultural lobbies, the kibbutzim and moshavim , whose aims are to
gain financial benefits and subsidies from the Government. Both lobbies are currently in decline; and Metz,
Israel: A Country Study, under “Interest Groups,” http://countrystudies.us/israel/104.htm (Accessed
23.12.2007).
293
Arian, Politics in Israel: The Second Republic, 336.
294
Speech made on 10 July 1996. Source: Benjamin Netanyahu’s website
www.netanyahu.org/joinsesofusc.html (Accessed 07.07.2008)
295
Mitchell G. Bard and Daniel Pipes, How Special is the U.S.-Israel Relationship? Middle East Quarterly 4,
no. 2 (June 1997)
296
Gershom Shocken,.Ha’aretz newspaper, 30 September,1951. Cited by A. Bober, The Other Israel. New
York: Anchor books, 1972, 16-17.
Al-ZaytounaCentreforStudies&Consultations,Beirut,Lebanon
172 _______________________________________________________ IV. External Influencing Factors
297
David Rodman, Israel's National Security Doctrine: An Appraisal of the Past and a Vision of the Future
298
Hadar,“Orienting Jerusalem toward Ankara or Cairo? Israel’s New Geostrategic Debate,” Mediterranean
Quarterly.
299
John Rose. The Myths of Zionism.( London: Pluto Press, 2004), 157.
300
Mearsheimer and Walt, The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy, 26.
301
Jewish Virtual Library. “Formal US-Israel Agreements.” http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/USIsrael/MOUs.html
(Accessed 22.12.2007).
302
Mearsheimer and Walt, The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy, 31-34.
303
Mearsheimer and Walt, The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy ,25-30
304
Ibid ,27-32
305
James Petras, The Power of Israel in the United States. (Atlanta, GA: Clarity press, 2006),39.
306
Stephen Zunes, “The Strategic Function of US Aid to Israel,” Middle East Policy 4, no. 4 (October 1996).
307
Mearsheimer and Walt, The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy, 27.
308
Barari, Israeli Politics and the Middle East Peace Process: 1988-2002, 102.
309
Mearsheimer and Walt, The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy ,40.
310
Stephen J. Green, Taking Sides: America’s Secret Relations with a Militant Israel: 1948-67.(New York:
William Morrow, 1984) Arabic Edition. Beirut: Institute for Palestinian Studies, 1984), 216-227
311
Freilich, National Security Decision-Making in Israel: Processes, Pathologies, and Strengths.
312
Mounzer Sleiman, “Will US Keep Letting Israel Sell Arms?” Aljazeera English, 7 July, 2005.
http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/23A0A815-7FD2-4482-A20A-09DDF72D8A5E.htm (Accessed
02.07.2005).
313
Naseer, H. Aruri, Dishonest Broker: The US Role in Israel and Palestine,(Cambridge: South End Press,
2003),39.
314
IAP News. “Sharon to Peres: "Don't worry about American pressure; we control America",” Washington
Report on Middle East Affairs, The Israel Press. 3 October, 2001. http://www.wrmea.com/html/newsitem_s.htm
(Accessed 30.03.2007).
315
Freilich, National Security Decision-Making in Israel: Processes, Pathologies, and Strengths.
316
Raymond Cohen, “Israel's Starry-Eyed Foreign Policy” The Middle East Quarterly 1, no. 2 (June 1994).
317
Jonathan Rynhold, “Israeli-American relations and the Peace Process,” Middle East Review of International
Affairs 4, no. 2 (June 2000).
318
Ibid.
319
Ibid; and Barari, Israeli Politics and the Middle East Peace Process: 1988-2002, 103.
320
Rynhold, “Israeli-American relations and the Peace Process,” Middle East Review of International Affairs
321
Barari, Israeli Politics and the Middle East Peace Process: 1988-2002, 103.
322
Rynhold, “Israeli-American relations and the Peace Process,” Middle East Review of International Affairs.
323
Ibid.
324
David Horowitz, ed. Yitzhak Rabin, Soldier of Peace. (London: Peter Halban, 1996), 47, Quoted in Barari,
Israeli Politics and the Middle East Peace Process: 1988-2002, 105.
325
Rynhold, “Israeli-American relations and the Peace Process,” Middle East Review of International Affairs
326
Barari, Israeli Politics and the Middle East Peace Process: 1988-2002, 105-106.
327
Rynhold, “Israeli-American relations and the Peace Process,” Middle East Review of International Affairs.
Al-ZaytounaCentreforStudies&Consultations,Beirut,Lebanon
The Process of Israeli Decision Making _________________________________________________ 173
328
Ibid.
329
Ibid.
330
In 2005 the number of Jews in the United States was 5,914,682 compared to the number of Jews in Israel
which was 5,021,506. Source: Jewish Virtual Library. “The Jewish Population of the World.”
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Judaism/jewpop.html (Accessed 07.05.2006).
331
J. J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, “The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy,” Harvard University,
John F. Kennedy School of Government, Faculty Research Working Paper Series, Working Paper Number:
RWP06-011. http://ksgnotes1.harvard.edu/Research/wpaper.nsf/rwp/RWP06-011/$File/rwp_06_011_walt.pdf
(Accessed 01.06.2006)
332
United Jewish communities, “An Introduction into the Jewish Federation System.”
http://www.ujc.org/onlinelearning/flash/interface.html (Accessed 22.12.2007).
333
J. J. Goldberg, Jewish Power, Inside the American Jewish Establishment. (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley
Publishing, 1996).
334
United Jewish Communities. “United Israel Appeal.” http://www.ujc.org/page.html?ArticleID=40599
(Accessed 22.12.2007).
335
Janice J. Terry, US Foreign Policy in the Middle East, The role of Lobbies and Special Interest Groups.(
London: Pluto Press, 2005), 70.
336
Ibid, 70.
337
Mearsheimer and Walt, The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy, 14.
338
Cohen, Israel’s Starry-Eyed Foreign Policy.
339
Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov, “Peace Policy as Domestic and Foreign Policy: The Israeli Case” In Peace making
in a divided society: Israel after Rabin, edited by Sasson Sofer, 22.
340
Barari, Israeli Politics and the Middle East Peace Process: 1988-2002, 107.
341
United Jewish Communities. “United Israel Appeal.”
342
J. J. Goldberg, Jewish Power, Inside the American Jewish Establishment.. 347.
343
In the 1990s 78% of Jewish Americans thought Israel should freeze Jewish settlements, and 79 Supported a
demilitarized state. Source: Terry, Janice J. 2005. p. 69; and Janice J. Terry, US Foreign Policy in the Middle
East, The role of Lobbies and Special Interest Groups, 69.
344
Max Deveson, “US Jewish Lobby Gains New Voice,” BBC News, 16, April, 2008.
http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7349371.stm (accessed
17.04.2008).
345
Brian Klug, “Who Speaks for Jews in Britain?” The Guardian, Comment is free, 05 February, 2007.
http://commentisfree.guardian.co.uk/brian_klug/2007/02/hold_jewish_voices.html (Accessed 08.04.2007).
346
Jews for a Just Peace. “Alliance of Concerned Jewish Canadians Condemns Creation of pro-Israel Caucus.”
http://www.jewsforajustpeace.com/pages/news/parl.html (Accessed 08.03.2007).
347
Ben Cubby, “Jewish Coalition Calls for Open Debate on Palestine,” The Sydney Morning Herald, 6 March,
2007. http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2007/03/05/1172943356185.html (Accessed 24.03.2007).
348
Clyde R Mark, Congressional Research Service, Israel: U.S. Foreign Assistance, Washington: The Library
of Congress, 2002.
349
Mearsheimer and Walt, The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy, 29.
350
Gabriel Sheffer, “Is the Jewish Diaspora Unique? Reflections on the Diaspora’s Current Situation.” Israel
studies 10, no. 1 ( Spring 2005).
351
J. J. Goldberg, Jewish Power, Inside the American Jewish Establishment.
352
Sheffer, Is the Jewish Diaspora Unique? Reflections on the Diaspora’s Current Situation.
Al-ZaytounaCentreforStudies&Consultations,Beirut,Lebanon
174 _______________________________________________________ IV. External Influencing Factors
353
Mearsheimer and Walt, The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy, 30.
354
J. J. Goldberg, Jewish Power, Inside the American Jewish Establishment
355
Sheffer, Is the Jewish Diaspora Unique? Reflections on the Diaspora’s Current Situation.
356
American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee. “Who Are We.” http://www.jdc.org/who_mission.html
(Accessed 22.10.2007).
357
J. J. Goldberg, Jewish Power, Inside the American Jewish Establishment., 361.
358
Ibid.. 342.
359
Cohen, Israel’s Starry-Eyed Foreign Policy.
360
Ibid.
361
Institute of International Studies, University of California Berkeley. “Israeli National Identity:
Conversation with Tom Segev,” Conversations with History series.
362
A recent poll carried out by the Jewish Agency demonstrates that the vast majority of Israeli Jews (76%) feel
safer living as Jews in Israel than in Diaspora. Source: Shlomo Shamir. “Poll: 76% of Israelis feel safer living as
Jews in Israel than in Diaspora.” Ha’aretz. 1 July 2008.
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/objects/pages/PrintArticleEn.jhtml?itemNo=997638 ( Accessed: 03.07.2008)
363
The transcript of this meeting is in the Central Zionist Archive in Jerusalem.
Source: Zohar Segev, “An Ongoing Tug-of-War,” Ha’aretz, Book review, 7 December, 2006.
http://www.jewishagency.org/JewishAgency/English/Home/About/Press+Room/Jewish+Agency+In+The+New
s/2006/5/dec7haar.htm (Accessed: 10.05.2007).
364
Ernest Stock. “Philanthropy and Politics: Modes of Interaction between Israel and the Diaspora.” In Israel:
the first decade of independence. Edited by S. Ilan Troen and Noah Lucas. (Albany, NY: State University of
New York Press, 1995). 699-711.
365
Norman Finkelstein, The Holocaust Industry: Reflections on the Exploitation of Jewish Suffering. (London:
Verso books, 2001). Under chapter 1: Capitalizing the Holocaust.
366
Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov, “Peace Policy as Domestic and Foreign Policy: The Israeli Case” In Peace making
in a divided society: Israel after Rabin, edited by Sasson Sofer, 21.
367
This was perhaps coupled with the resurge in Jewish identity within Israel on the expense of the national
identity
368
Sheffer, Is the Jewish Diaspora Unique? Reflections on the Diaspora’s Current Situation
369
Ibid.
370
Theodore Sasson, Charles Kadushin, and Leonard Saxe, Steinhardt Social Research Institute, American
Jewish Attachment to Israel: An Assessment of the “Distancing” Hypothesis. Brandeis University, February
2008
371
Sheffer, Is the Jewish Diaspora Unique? Reflections on the Diaspora’s Current Situation.
372
The National Community Relations Advisory Council (NCRAC) is now known as the Jewish Council for
Public Affairs (JCPA).
373
J. J. Goldberg, Jewish Power, Inside the American Jewish Establishment.
374
A recent survey by the World Union for Progressive Judaism showed that 47 percent of Israelis believe Israel
must help Jews in distress no matter what.
375
Gabriel Sheffer, “Is the Jewish Diaspora Unique? Reflections on the Diaspora’s Current Situation.”
376
Rynhold, “Israeli-American relations and the Peace Process,” Middle East Review of International Affairs.
377
Ibid.
378
Gabriel Sheffer, “Is the Jewish Diaspora Unique? Reflections on the Diaspora’s Current Situation.”
InCitations,PleaseUse:
El-Gendy,Karim,TheProcessofIsraeliDecision-Making:Mechanisms,
ForcesandInfluences(Beirut:Al-ZaytounaCentreforStudiesand
Consultations,2010)
V. Decision Making in the
Cabinet: A Case Study
Al-ZaytounaCentreforStudies&Consultations,Beirut,Lebanon
The Process of Israeli Decision Making ________________________________________________ 176
V. Decision Making in the Cabinet: A Case Study
To demonstrate the dynamics of foreign decision making in times of crisis, this study will
discuss the decision making process before and during the three-month long Israeli deep penetration
bombing of Egypt in 1970, which marked the end of the War of Attrition. Comparisons will also be
drawn with the 2006 Lebanon war to demonstrate common trends.
The decision-making process started with the option of military strikes deep into Egypt
surfacing within the IDF’s General Staff. The emergence of this option followed the delivery of new
Phantom F-4 aircrafts from the United States to the Israeli Air Force (IAF), which allowed the latter
the necessary capability to carry out the deep bombings. The option was then recommended to the
cabinet, which represented a wide coalition that included the Labour party -led by Prime Minister
Golda Meir,-the Mafdal, the right wing part Gahal, and the left wing Mapam party. The deliberations
within the cabinet revolved around four issues: Could the raids be carried out at an acceptable price?
What purpose would they serve? What would be the American position? and how would the Soviet
Union react?
The first question was the easiest, as the military experts unequivocally advised the cabinet on
the capabilities of the IAF to carry the operation with few risks and costs.
The second question however was more difficult to answer. The stated objectives were to
reduce the Egyptian military pressure by bombing its bases in the rear; to end the Attrition War and
compel Egypt to a ceasefire agreement; and to deter the Egyptians from launching a full-scale war. In
addition, there were other less-articulated political and psychological objectives such as breaking
Egyptian morale and creating a credibility gap between Nasser and the Egyptian people, which could
bringing about the downfall of his regime. These objectives were not prioritized or ranked in any
order.
The cabinet’s assessment of the United States’ position was highly influenced by an
assessment by the then-Israeli ambassador in Washington Yitzhak Rabin. Rabin’s assessment was
reportedly based on a hint from an American official during a cocktail party in Washington, which
may have implied the United States’ tacit support of the bombing. Rabin, who wanted to cement
Israel’s relationship with United States and to project an image of Israel as a as strong in order to
obtain more weapons, believed that this was green light from the Americans.1
His hawkish position
towards bombing Egypt was so strong that, in spite of requests by some ministers for further
verification of the American position, he helped tip the balance of the cabinet in favor of the hawks.
The last issue discussed by the cabinet was that of reaction of the Soviet Union. Dayan’s
memoirs reveal the existence of two schools of thought within the cabinet on that issue. While the
Al-ZaytounaCentreforStudies&Consultations,Beirut,Lebanon
177 _________________________________________ V. Decision Making in the Cabinet: A Case Study
majority of the cabinet saw that the Soviet Union faced political and technological constraints that
prevent it from intervening directly on the Egyptian side, a minority that included Dayan believed that
such optimistic view was not based on a realistic appraisal but rather on wishful thinking. This
minority also believed that Egypt was so central to Russia’s global policy that it was unlikely that they
would allow the Nasser regime to collapse. Eventually, no consensus was achieved between the two
views and the majority view was accepted as a basis of the policy.
The decision to bomb was taken and during the first weeks of the military air raids, there were
signs of considerable success in achieving military objectives, such as causing substantial damage to
the Egyptian military and the reduction of Egyptian attacks. However, the military pressure failed to
achieve any of its political or psychological objectives such as undermining the Egyptian morale,
toppling the Nasser regime, or forcing Nasser to return to the ceasefire. Instead, Egyptians rallied
around Nasser who chose to continue the war of attrition with the assistance of the Soviet Union. The
intervention of the Russians providing, air defenses, and personnel eventually neutralized the Israeli
Air Force, strengthened Egypt’s air defenses, and deprived the Israeli Air Force from its ability to
launch preemptive strikes on Egypt which paved the Egyptian's way to the October War in 1973. A
cease-fire initiative, sponsored by the United States, which turned out to be against the military
strikes, eventually paved the way for a ceasefire.2
The briefly discussed decision making process demonstrated many of the issues discussed earlier
in this study:
1. The lack of a coherent policy and clear prioritized objectives of the decision. This remains to
be an issue within both the political and military echelon. The lack of strategic thinking and
planning and clear campaign objectives were two of the causes named in the Winograd
Commission report for the failures during the 2006 Lebanon war.3
2. The lack of serious research or exploration of available options other than the airstrikes. The
process by which bombing became an option was not determined by a complex set of
calculations, but simply by military’s recommendations. These recommendations were based
on the military’s ability to perform the operation, and the operation advantage from raising
the level of violence.Once the military option was submitted to the cabinet, it became the sole
focus of attention and was to be either accepted or rejected. The implications of the lack of
alternatives was the lack any political flexibility once the military operations started. The
operations continued to increase the military pressure until the Nasser would agree to
terminate the War of Attrition and resume the ceasefire.
This failure to explore options was partly because of the lack of professional staff
work and the lack of adequate information received by the ministers, which left them relying
on their general knowledge, casual conversations, and even hearsay. The prime example on
the lack of information was the importance accorded to the alleged hint given by the
American official to Rabin.
Al-ZaytounaCentreforStudies&Consultations,Beirut,Lebanon
The Process of Israeli Decision Making ________________________________________________ 178
Both the lack of flexibility and the lack of staff work were also noted in the Winograd
Commission report as causes for the failures in the 2006 Lebanon war. In addition, the
manner in which the military option was proposed and agreed on in 2006 by the military
bears resemblance to that in which it became the sole option in 1970, albeit the decision
making time in 2006 was much shorter.4
But according to some scholars such as Michael Brecher, this lack of alternatives was
not the case in 1967, where they argue that careful evaluation of alternatives and an
estimation of the costs and benefits of their consequences took place even during the stressful
pre-crisis period and before the decision to pre-empt was taken. According to Brecher, the
decision to carry out a pre-emptive strike was taken because it had the highest expected
returns. They argue that such an examination of costs and benefits was not just limited to
military aspects but also to international, economic and human aspects, and that no premature
decisions were taken on issues such as the old city, taking the Golan height, or the extent of
advance into Sinai. In addition they also argue that a process of estimation and revision took
place in 1967 and that a capacity to learn was demonstrated by civilian and military leaders.5
Brecher also argue that even during the crises of the 1973 war the stress did no lead to
deterioration in the calculation of alternatives.
However, other scholars such as Yehuda Ben Meir, argue that in that incident the
“waiting period” was mostly a result of hesitation and lack of self confidence rather than a
process of weighing political and military options.6
3. The lack of adequate evaluation of the bombing consequences, in terms of their benefits and
their costs. While the anticipated benefits were in the minds of the decision makers, there was
little attention given to the potential costs. Israeli decision makers overlooked that Nasser had
the option of getting Russian support. They also failed to see that by forcing the Soviet Union
to choose between intervening effectively or admitting their inability to protect Egypt, they
invited the physical intervention of the Soviet Union in the conflict. This was against one of
the cardinal tenets of Israel’s military, laid down by Ben-Gurion, that the IDF must never ,
under any circumstances risk a direct confrontation with the army of a great power.
4. The failure to consider issues across different dimensions, such as considering tradeoffs
between the military and diplomatic consequences of the military option.
5. The lack of a long term planning perspective, and the reactionary nature of the cabinet’s
planning process. Prime Minister Meir defended this tendency for short term policy,
justifying it as a necessity considering the threats that Israel faces.
6. The tendency to overestimate the probability of preferred outcomes or, in other words, the
dominance of affect over calculation. Examples on this tendency are the cabinet’s views on
the possibility of toppling the Nasser regime, its assumptions about the American position,
and its assumption of the Russian reaction.7
Al-ZaytounaCentreforStudies&Consultations,Beirut,Lebanon
179 _________________________________________ V. Decision Making in the Cabinet: A Case Study
Endnotes
1
Barari, Israeli Politics and the Middle East Peace Process: 1988-2002, 105.
2
Avi Shlaim and Raymond Tanter, “Decision Process, Choice and Consequence: Israel Deep penetration
bombing in Egypt, 1970”. In Arab Israeli Relations: A Collection of Contending Perspectives and Recent
Research, edited by Ian S. Lustick, (Hamden, Conn: Garland Publishing, 1994), 281-314.
3
“English Summary of the Winograd Commission Report,” New York Times, 30 January, 2008.
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/30/world/middleeast/31winograd-web.html (Accessed 05.06.2008).
4
Ibid.
5
Brecher, Decisions in Crisis: Israel, 1967 and 1973, 359; and Janice Gross Stein, and Raymond Tanter,
Rational decision-making : Israel's security choices, 1967.( Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 1980).
309-322.
6
Yehuda Ben Meir, National security decision making: the Israeli case. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press,
1986),74.
7
Avi Shlaim and Raymond Tanter, “Decision Process, Choice and Consequence: Israel Deep penetration
bombing in Egypt, 1970”. In Arab Israeli Relations: A Collection of Contending Perspectives and Recent
Research, edited by Ian S. Lustick, 281-314.
InCitations,PleaseUse:
El-Gendy,Karim,TheProcessofIsraeliDecision-Making:Mechanisms,
ForcesandInfluences(Beirut:Al-ZaytounaCentreforStudiesand
Consultations,2010)
VI. Conclusion and the
Decision Making
Characteristics
Al-ZaytounaCentreforStudies&Consultations,Beirut,Lebanon
The Process of Israeli Decision Making _________________________________________ 181
VI. Conclusions and the Decision Making Characteristics
By way of conclusion, this chapter will attempt to list the main characteristics of the
Israeli decision making process. These characteristics would be grouped under two headings;
the first is pragmatism versus ideology, and the second is strengths and weaknesses.
1. Pragmatism vs. ideology
One of main characteristics of Israeli decision making is its mix between ideology
and Realpolitik (also known as realism or political pragmatism).1
Some scholars such as
Raymond Cohen have noted this duality and the fine balance Israeli decision makers often
keep between the different political factors, external forces, and environmental constraints on
one side, and political ideologies on the other.
Examples on policy pragmatism include the Israeli decision makers’ exploitation of it
environment for opportunities of cooperation, however partial or informal. Israelis explored
avenue such as arms, intelligence, aid, oil, military assistance, and war to achieve a number of
their objectives. As a result of this policy, candidates for mutually beneficial working
relationships included anyone who possessed some conceivable common interest with the
Jewish state. This included the Hashemite house of Jordan; the "outer tier" of non-Arab states
(Turkey, Iran, and Ethiopia) according the concept of “my enemy’s enemy is my friend”. It
also included France as it was embroiled in a war in Algeria, a Federal Republic of Germany
eager for legitimacy following the Second World War, the emerging states of Africa and
Asia, Kurds, Maronites, and other disaffected or minority Muslim groups.2
Similarly, Israel tried a number of political positioning. It explored a nonaligned
status only to discard it in favor of a “free world” position as it sought to gain the U.S.
alliance which was embroiled in Korea and the cold war. Later, this position was strengthened
with Israeli rhetoric, which became staunchly anticommunist, thus skillfully mobilizing
friends in Washington by presenting Israel as a bulwark against communism and a valuable
strategic asset in the cold war. More recently, this rhetoric was replaced with a new rhetorical
basis for strategic cooperation with the United States, which presented it as a cooperation
against fundamentalist Islam.3
The Israeli tradition of pragmatism in foreign policy was established by Chaim
Weizmann before the establishment of the state and was then adopted by Ben Gurion and
Moshe Sharett who together with politicians such as Reuven Shiloah, Abba Eban, Walter
Eytan, Gideon Rafael, and others, proved capable of playing the game of flexible, nonideological
international politics In the face of international pressures.
Al-ZaytounaCentreforStudies&Consultations,Beirut,Lebanon
182 ___________________________ VI. Conclusions and the Decision Making Characteristics
But while these means and positionings indicate a realist decision making process,
Israel and the Zionist movement before it have adopted a number of unrealistic political
decisions that contradicted with this realpolitik approach. These decisions included:4
- The choice of Ottoman Palestine as the future site of the Jewish national home, even
though this meant transplanting an essentially European population into the heart of the
Muslim world.
- The declaration of the State of Israel in May 1948, despite the near certainty that it
would touch off a war in which Jews would be a minority on the battlefield.
- The declaration of the Law of Return, which allowed Jews from everywhere to
immigrate to Israel, despite the lack of state resources to deal with massive and diverse
immigration.
- The declaration of Jerusalem as the capital of the state, despite its strategic vulnerability
and its ambiguous legal status.
- The willingness, through years of strong international criticism and ostracism, to insist
that territories acquired in the 1967 war only be returned in exchange for full peace.
- The Israeli governments’ assumption of responsibility for the welfare of Jews
worldwide, irrespective of their formal citizenships, which makes the national interest of the
state not limited to the sustenance and survival of its own immediate citizens, but bound up
with the interests of Jews everywhere, whether or not they intend one day to live in Israel.
This particular decision is not just a marked deviation from classic realism; but us
counterproductive in Realpolitik terms.
These unrealistic decisions can only be explained as a result of the political ideology
of Zionism. This ideology is, in turn, influenced with the Jewish narrative, which centers
around the divinely ordained mission of a chosen people (the descendants of Abraham, Isaac,
and Jacob who acquired a favored, unmediated relationship with the creator of the universe).
As a result of this covenant, these people have dedicated themselves to the service of God,
which obliges them to preserve their separate identity from the “non-chosen” people. Thus
according to Jewish tradition, history is an unending struggle between the chosen and
everybody else in a narrative of good and evil. At the culmination of history the chosen
people, dispersed and chastened because of divine displeasure, are destined to gather in its
scattered fragments from among the nations of the world and to return redeemed to its
original divinely promised homeland.
The Zionist narrative, which in spite of its secular outlook is much influenced by the
above narrative, is thus based on the following ideologies:5
- Israel belongs to the entire Jewish people.
Al-ZaytounaCentreforStudies&Consultations,Beirut,Lebanon
The Process of Israeli Decision Making _________________________________________ 183
- The State of Israel is not just a legal and administrative entity catering to the interests
of its resident citizens but a vehicle in the historical service of the entire Jewish
people most of whom are in fact citizens of other states.
- The "ingathering of the exiles" via making Aliyah to the Holy Land.
In addition, Israeli leaders have inherited an entire vocabulary and set of metaphors
from Biblical sources to describe its relations with "the nations." Even the Hebrew word for
nations, goyim, carries connotations of fear and suspicion. Statements such as "The goyim
were always against us," "Esau hates Jacob,""a people that dwells alone," and, more
generally, "the entire world's against us" are all seen as timeless truths defining the Israeli
predicament. This world view stands in stark opposition to the realpolitik assumption that
yesterday's enemy is tomorrow's potential friend.6
It is thus fair to say that Israel’s foreign relations, and the Zionist movement before it,
have mostly conformed political ideologies with respect to goals, rather than to any doctrine
of realism. However, in terms of the ways and means of Israel's diplomacy, they are mostly
dominated by realism.7
2. Strengths and Weaknesses
In addition to the duality between Pragmatism and Ideology in Israeli decision
making, the different factors, influences and processes described in earlier chapters, as well as
other general characteristics, can be categorized into a set of strengths and weaknesses.8
These strengths and weaknesses are summarized below with special emphasis given to the
decision making process in times of crises.
It should be noted that some Israeli Scholars such as Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov argue
that external and domestic forces have different influences on decision making depending on
the timing and context of the decision being considered. While external rather than domestic
factors were responsible for initiating conflict reduction or resolution, the role of the domestic
factors increased during negotiations.
9
2.1 The mechanism’s weaknesses
2.1.1 The domination of a short-term perspective
Perceived or actual threats facing Israel led to a nearly total preoccupation with
security, which led to short-term policies and solutions to immediate problems as well as
responsive an unplanned actions. This lack of long-range planning, together with the lack
of a clear definition of the goals and aims of national security policy, led to a tendency
towards:
Al-ZaytounaCentreforStudies&Consultations,Beirut,Lebanon
184 ___________________________ VI. Conclusions and the Decision Making Characteristics
A. Reactive decision making that responds to the immediate events in its external
environment without consideration of consequences.
B. A decision making process that is mostly concerned with the “here and now” and
with limited attention to the future.
C. Dominance of a culture of improvisation and crisis management.
D. Postponement of non-essential decisions, and dealing with pressing issues. As a result,
when non-essential issues become urgent they are decided upon without time for an indepth
study.
2.1.2 The politicization of the decision making mechanism
The nature of the proportional representation system and the influence of coalition
politics, together with strong ideological commitments led to an extremely politicized and
emotionally charged decision making mechanism. This politicization, which often came
at the expense of strategic interests, has led to:
A. Dominance of domestic political considerations in policy planning.
B. Ministerial emphasis on personal standings in parties and political careers more than
governance.
C. Maintaining the coalition becoming a goal rather than a mean.
D. A preference to avoid clearly defined policy objectives and to maintain “constructive
ambiguity.”
E. A strategy tactic-alization, in which each issue is considered separately in a cumulative
way.
F. Avoidance of supporting staff work and the general suspicion of experts.
2.1.3 The deterioration of governmental capabilities
The size of the Cabinet, coalition politics, the disintegration of the Cabinet to
independent ministries, and the fact that Cabinet ministers are professional politicians, all
led to the Cabinet’s inability to function as a policy-making forum. This failure in the
cabinet, together with the weakening of the authority of the Prime Minister’s office, and
the pressure, which the system is under, due to lack of sufficient experienced staff, all led
to:
A. The Prime Minister’s tendency to establish his own small policy formulation forum.
Al-ZaytounaCentreforStudies&Consultations,Beirut,Lebanon
The Process of Israeli Decision Making _________________________________________ 185
B. The lack of systematically formulated policy. On most issues, there are quite simply no
Israeli policies, and ministries and agencies often expressing conflicting policies relying
on their own estimates of what they believe the policy to be.10
C. The Prime ministers’ preference to keep their freedom of maneuver over the benefits
of systematic policy formulation.11
2.1.4 The lack of an institutional decision making mechanism
The internal processes and the structural characteristics of the system such as the lack
of systematic staff work at the highest levels, and the fear of leaks, created a condition
where power is dependent on the leader and the issue discussed, and where the decision
making mechanism is comparatively fluid, informal, and un-institutional. This led to:
A. Highly idiosyncratic and personalized decision making.
B. A reliance on expertise and confidence, and lack of sufficient checks and balances.
C. The dominance of oral and personal communications between different levels.
D. A disconnection between highly developed information gathering mechanisms and
Policy Planning formulating / decision making mechanisms.
E. Insufficient coordination between government agencies, especially because of fear of
leaks and domestic political issues.
F. The prime ministers refraining from necessary consultation and coordination, and his
tendency to overlap assignments and lines of authority.
2.1.5 The dominance of the military-industrial complex.
A. Strong influence over decision making because of its monopoly over intelligence and
policy planning.
B. A structural weaknesses in the machinery of civilian control over the military
establishment.
C. The lack of a strong alternative mechanism for the assessment of military intelligence
and policy by the civilian authority, in spite of the presence of the National Security
Council.
2.1.6 The static nature of the political elite
As an establishment dominated by those to whom politics is a vocation, The Israeli
establishment tends to be static and conservative, compared to a system dominated by
Al-ZaytounaCentreforStudies&Consultations,Beirut,Lebanon
186 ___________________________ VI. Conclusions and the Decision Making Characteristics
politicians who are not in politics for gain. In the latter case, the chances are higher in
generating new political ideas and directions.12
2.1.7 Reliance on past experiences in times of crises:
Israeli Decision makers are psychologically prone to reliance on past experiences as a
guide to coping with current threats to their basic values. Their reliance on the past is
exacerbated by a feeling of achievement and success manifested in what they see as their
ability to overcome so many obstacles and threats throughout the years.
This reliance creates a great conceptual rigidity to understanding the threats. In
addition, although decision makers keep an open mind to information inputs that may
change the existing conception, their decisions are still based on basic assumptions which
were accepted n the past but never reassessed in light of the new information.13
2.1.8 The limited approach to problems
Each problem is dealt with individually, with an eye on specific and immediate goals,
with no overall view. Israel has no equivalent of the British “white paper” or the
American “Posture Statements”. In fact, the only place where policy papers are prepared
is the IDF planning branch.
2.2 The mechanism’s strengths
While many of the weaknesses above have led many scholars and commentators to
argue that Israel, at its summit, has no organized and systematic decision making process,14
there are many strengths of the system, which should be noted for contributing to its oftensuccessful
decisions.
2.2.1 Common values.
The existence of a shared commitment to a few fundamental principles, have forced a
certain degree of discipline on the system which may keep bureaucratic battles from
reaching the extremes often found in other countries
A. Concern for security and the ‘existential threats” that face Israel
B. Consensus over the Zionist ideology
C. The preservation of Israel as a democratic and Jewish state, which naturally includes
for example automatically determines the policy towards the right of return to the
Palestinian refugees.
Al-ZaytounaCentreforStudies&Consultations,Beirut,Lebanon
The Process of Israeli Decision Making _________________________________________ 187
2.2.2 Small tightly knit establishment
In Israel’s small establishment, most officials come to know each other personally.
This facilitated the development of a “common language” and a common understanding
of many issues Israel faces. It also creates a level of personal and professional intimacy
and makes it easier to identify those who are responsible and capable of dealing with a
particular issue.
2.2.3 Ease of communication
The small establishment also enables ease and speed of communications through
informal, personal ties, which are independent of the hierarchy.
2.2.4 Rapidity and flexibility
The un-institutionalized, informal, and improvisational nature of the Israeli decision
making, gives it the ability to change gears, regroup, rethink, and rapidly adapt to
changing circumstances in its environment.
2.2.5 Dynamic and Pragmatic Decision making on national security issues
Although government policy is often highly charged ideologically or politically,
especially on issues as the future of the West Bank or the defense budget, the military and
security establishment itself takes a distinctly pragmatic approach viewing issues from an
analytical problem-solving perspective. This is also a primary characteristic of much of
the political leadership. Numerous Israeli leaders have demonstrated an ability to
radically change their existing policies, even those based on long and deeply held
ideological convictions or strategic outlooks when either necessity or opportunity
warranted.15
2.2.6 The strong political-Military relations
The Israeli Civil-military borders are highly porous, with most officers retiring at
relatively young ages. This porosity continues to facilitate the flow of new ideas from the
military, and helps in reducing the danger of long-established mindsets.
2.2.7 Transparency
Israel is analyzed by both its domestic and the international media possibly more than
any other nation. As a result, press coverage serves as a primary means of gauging
reaction to policy. Israel is also scrutinized by its own judicial system. Some argue that on
the long run such exposure strengthens and immunizes the decision makers.
Al-ZaytounaCentreforStudies&Consultations,Beirut,Lebanon
188 ___________________________ VI. Conclusions and the Decision Making Characteristics
2.2.8 Responding to a complex environment under stress
Scholars such as Michael Brecher argue that Israeli decision makers demonstrated n
accurate awareness of their complex environments with no exaggeration or minimization
during the 1967 war, and that in spite of the increased stress that they experienced in the
first few days of the 1973 war, it did not impair this awareness too drastically, even
though it has affected individual performance.16
2.2.9 Consultation
The continuous contact with the international community at all levels exposes the
mechanism to an ongoing exchange of ideas, feedback, and constraints. Exchanges with
friendly governments, or individual leaders and officials, especially in the United States,
can often serve as an important input into the Israeli decision making mechanism and
feedback serve as a “reality check.” For policies formulated and decision being
considered.
2.2.10 Democracy
Many Israelis argue that one of the most important strengths of Israeli decision
making mechanism is that Israel enjoys the benefits of a healthy and vibrant democracy
(at least amongst Israeli Jews), in which media, political, social, and public criticisms put
pressure on politicians to act in the best interest of the Jewish public.
2.2.11 Operational Professional excellence
In spite of the failures at the leadership level, Israel has a number of spheres of
excellence such as the defense establishment, which has an orderly, systematic decision
making mechanism and where a focused effort is made to utilize the information
available to generate appropriate policy options. There are spheres of excellence within
the defense establishment (especially the air force), the intelligence community, and
various other units. This, however, is operational excellence, not Cabinet level policy-
making.
2.2.12 Motivation and quality people
Israelis believe that even if the decision making mechanism itself is faulty, this is at
least partly overcome by the quality of the people involved in it, who are often committed
to a common goal, motivated with a sense of extreme, even existential threat, and believe
in the righteousness of their cause. Long years of familiarity and expertise on the issues of
national security have helped overcome the lack of sufficient staff support and the faulty
mechanism.17
Al-ZaytounaCentreforStudies&Consultations,Beirut,Lebanon
The Process of Israeli Decision Making _________________________________________ 189
Endnotes
1
The Realpolitik approach is often referred to in the United States as Realism.
2
Cohen, Israel’s Starry-Eyed Foreign Policy.
3
Ibid.
4
Ibid
5
Ibid.
6
Ibid.
7
Ibid.
8
This classification is based on Freilich, National Security Decision-Making in Israel: Processes,
Pathologies, and Strengths, as well as Ben Meir, National security decision making: the Israeli case,
67-71, 92-94.
9
Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov, “Peace Policy as Domestic and Foreign Policy: The Israeli Case” In Peace
making in a divided society: Israel after Rabin, edited by Sasson Sofer, 29.
10
Freilich, National Security Decision-Making in Israel: Processes, Pathologies, and Strengths.
11
Ibid.
12
Arian, Politics in Israel: The Second Republic, 101.
13
Brecher, Decisions in Crisis: Israel, 1967 and 1973, 344-345. And Ben Meir, National security
decision making: the Israeli case, 67-71
14
Yehuda Ben Meir, National security decision making: the Israeli case. (Boulder, CO: Westview
Press, 1986), 67-71.
15
Freilich, National Security Decision-Making in Israel: Processes, Pathologies, and Strengths.
16
Brecher, Decisions in Crisis: Israel, 1967 and 1973, 345-347
17
Freilich, National Security Decision-Making in Israel: Processes, Pathologies, and Strengths.
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