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Military Capital in the Israeli Hi-Tech Industry
Article  in  Armed Forces & Society · January 2013
DOI: 10.1177/0095327X13499562
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1
Military Capital in the Israeli Hi-Tech Industry
Ori Swed
The University of Texas at Austin
John Sibley Butler
The University of Texas at Austin
Ori Swed (oriswed@utxas.edu) is a PhD Candidate at the Sociology Department at the University of
Texas at Austin. Ori’s research interests are conflict and culture. John Sibley Butler
(John.Butler@mccombs.utexas.edu) is a Professor in Management and Sociology Department at the
University of Texas at Austin. John wrote several books and articles among them are All That We Can
Be: Black Leadership and Racial Integration the Army Way and Immigrant and Minority
Entrepreneurship: The Continuous Rebirth of American Communities.
For any inquiries please contact Swed Ori on oriswed@utxas.edu 512-6239094.
2
Abstract
The unique relations between the Israeli armed forces and the local hi-tech industry have been
identified as a strong explanatory variable for the Israeli hi-tech boom. This article highlights the
role of the military as a socialization institution in those relations. We identify how the
accumulation of “military capital” during military in service contributes to soldiers as veterans
and employees in the hi-tech sector. Military service brings with it professional training, social
ties, and social codes that influence the composition of the hi-tech workforce and hi-tech
industry’s organizational and functional culture. Examination of Israeli hi-tech workers’ profiles
reveals not only a very high proportion of military capital amongst the employees but also an
institutional preference for those who possess it.
3
Introduction
Academic literature on the Israeli hi-tech industry has been traditionally linked to its unique
relations with the Israeli military. The dominant narrative in the literature illustrates the almost
organic relations that facilitate the flow of knowledge, capital, and resources from the military
into the private sector and vice versa. In this narrative the role of the military as agent of
socialization has been neglected. In this paper we would like to strengthen the cultural
explanations for those relations and amalgamate them together in new conceptual frame work.
We argue that what matters most to veterans' contributions to the hi-tech industry is not
the connection between the military and the hi-tech sector but rather the influence of the
IDF (Israeli Defense Forces) as a social institution.
In the mid-90s Israel was a welfare state with a struggling economy and a negligible hi-tech
industry. Few years after, while coping with demanding security issues, Israel has developed into
a technological giant with a sophisticated and innovative hi-tech sector. Today, Israeli hi-tech
companies’ representation in the NASDAQ outstrips economic and technological superpowers
such as Britain, Germany, Japan, and South Korea, and for over a decade now Israel has been
one of the leading start-up hot-beds in the world.
The study of the Israeli hi-tech leap forward received a wide attention in professional and pundit
literatures. Numerous articles in business newspapers exalt the Israeli hi-tech and venture capital
industry bloom. While recognizing the contribution of other variables (e.g., knowledge capital
and financial capital) this boom has been often credited to the IDF’s role as an incubator for
Research and Development (R&D) and advanced technology1
.
4
Despite the wide attention in media and professional literature, relations between the IDF and the
Israeli hi-tech industry have not been thoroughly studied in a scholarly context. Current
literature’s main focus was to answer the question of how did the Israeli hi-tech industry emerge
and evolve? The literature presented three predominant explanations. 1. Cluster formation2
2. the
gradual co-evolution of the industry3
, and 3. the consequences of planned government policy4
.
Historically, the role of the military in the evolution of the hi-tech sector has been identified as
critical5
, and the Israeli case adheres to that model. The military was identified both as a
significant source of knowledge transfer6
and as eager partner7
, or as part of governmental
investment policy8
. The military sub-group that drew most attention in the literature was the elite
technological units. Honig highlighted those units’ veterans’ involvement in venture enterprises9
.
Breznitz studied the unintentional fostering of a public space for hi-tech and software innovation
by the IDF. He argued that government investment in the creation of the prestigious military
software center spilled knowledge and manpower over to the private sector, which turned out to
be the keystone of the hi-tech industry10
. This narrative was bolstered by Perman’s description of
the elite technological espionage units’ contribution to the industry as the principal explanatory
variable for the Israeli hi-tech development11
. Honig, Lerner, and Raban emphasize the social
capital transfer between the military and hi-tech companies12
. Senor and Singer’s book named
several factors in the development of the Israeli hi-tech sector, albeit the contribution of the
technological units was accentuated and described as “the equivalent of Harvard, Stanford, and
MIT for the Israeli tech world”13
. Finally, in their description of the history of the Israeli hi-tech
sector, Drori et al’s interview of workers in the industry underscored the elite units’ narrative14
.
In spite of its attention to the relations between the military and hi-tech industry, the literature
omits the social role of the military as a socialization agent. For the most part, it treats the
5
military as a partner, client, or patron of the R&D market. While focusing on technological units,
scholars did address cultural elements related to the socialization role of the military, such as
Honig et al on social networks, Berznitz on technological skills, and Senor and Singer on
cultural capital; yet apart from Senor and Singer, research has focused exclusively on the
technological units. The Israeli hi-tech sector is not comprised merely of the graduates of elite
espionage units. The Israeli hi-tech industry represents about 9% percent of the entire Israeli
work force, an exceptionally high proportion in comparison to global standards. We argue that
the IDF socialization, which we identify as the military capital, defines the demography of the
workers and by proxy their behavior and performances.
We postulate that the military socialization process cultivates new skills (human capital), new
social networks (social capital), and new social norms and codes of behavior (cultural capital).
Those three together are what we identify as military capital. We assert that conscripts absorb the
military capital, or part of it, while in service and ‘export’ it into the civil-sphere where it
converts well, especially in the hi-tech sector.
The Military as Agent of Socialization and the Military Capital
So as to understand the Israeli hi-tech industry performances, it is imperative to comprehend
what the contribution of IDF service to this industry’s employees is prior to their employment
and after. Studies on the role of the IDF in the context of Israeli society have traditionally treated
the IDF as an institute of socialization15
. Azmon and Izraeli describe the military service as a
formative period that contributes to personal status and the decipherment of cultural codes16
. In
his description of the IDF’s evolution, Levy addressed the socialization function as part of the
6
IDF’s roles17
. Tamdor-Shimony follows through that notion as she explains the IDF’s part in the
socialization of the waves of immigrants during the 50s and 60s18
.
Civilian engagement with the IDF starts with mandatory conscription. The initial stage of this
relationship is the passage of the recruit through a socialization process, which transforms a
citizen into a soldier and a professional in the military system. It thus takes high school students
and converts them into infantry soldiers, technicians, gunship pilot, medics, and other
occupations. This official professionalization process is merely the beginning; the process is
more profound and spreads to cultural and social aspects as well. The collection of
characteristics this socialization process produces is what we refer to as the military capital.
To answer the army’s professional needs, novices go through a particular type of filtering and
training. The recruits are categorized according to their physical features, socio-economic
background, health, level of education, among other criteria. Equipped with this information, the
IDF assigns the conscripts to a location or unit according to its needs and their suitability. After
the first liminal phase of basic training where the breaking and reshaping of the recruits into
becoming soldiers takes place, professional training commences.
In their training, conscripts do not only gain a new profession, they gain a new identity. The
process is intrinsic in nature and refers to knowledge, tastes, values and abilities. It refers to the
IDF’s culture which includes several elements, among them the official and unofficial values.
The IDF was formed not merely as armed forces; it was design to be the Israeli Melting Pot19
, a
significant socialization apparatus that would mold a new united society out of the cultural
concoction of its recruits. The melting pot notion ceased to exist with the breakdown of the
republican equation20
and the assumption of the post-modern army model21
. Nevertheless, the
7
socialization mechanism was never abolished, and those who passing through its system were
reeducated and socialized in accordance with the IDF’s culture and dominant political agendas.
Contemporary discussion identifies the IDF as a political arena for inter-cultural conflict22
as all
actors presuppose the IDF’s significance as a socialization instrument that possesses
socialization power in the Israeli context.
The military has long been perceived by the administration as the best instrument for integration
and socialization of immigrants and minorities, and therefore education and socialization of the
Israeli youth were included under the IDF’s mandate23
. The IDF employs the Education and
Youth Corps (EYC) to address the predicaments raised in the meeting between immigrants’
society and a Nation-Army24
. For many, conscription is their first encounter with other parts of
society, and the need for a common ground, values and set of beliefs becomes crucial25
. The
Corps provides the conceptual idea which constructs the new identity and believes the new
conscripts adapt after the liminal phase. Those conceptual ideas, or at least parts of them, travel
through the military system and assimilate in the discourse on all military levels and units26
.
The theoretical frame for this paper focuses on three types of capital bundled together under the
title “military capital”: human capital (professional training), social capital (social ties), and
cultural capital (social codes). Though the military capital is the amalgamation of the three types
of capital, it is centered in the military institution and culture and is thus distinct from other types
of capital in society and literature. The socialization process of the IDF soldiers, which fosters
this capital, translates later to work skills, networks and ethics in the hi-tech industry when those
veterans become employed. In this paper we will refer to human capital in accordance to the
OECD definition as the productive wealth embodied in labor, skills and knowledge. Both social
and cultural capital definitions build on Bourdieu27
.
8
The Profile of the Israeli Hi-Tech Worker
The military capital might convert well into the private market, but how is it related to the hi-tech
industry? What is the representation of the military capital in the hi-tech sector? Examination of
the data from two surveys on the hi-tech sector (ICBS 2007 and Ethosia 2012) and the Israeli
Central Bureau of Statistics (ICBS) data base delineate the profile of the Israeli hi-tech worker.
While the ICBS survey sample encompasses 4,000 respondents from the hi-tech industry,
communication, and teleprocessing industry, the Ethosia survey of 500 respondents focused
exclusively on the three core elements of the hi-tech sector. The result shows a homogenous
industry: the worker is Jewish (95.4%), male (65%), young (75% <40), educated (49%), and a
veteran (90%). It is a homogenous profile that emphasizes the significance of the military capital.
We assert that military capital is the best explanatory variable for this profile.
Regardless of the Israeli mandatory draft, a proportion of 90% veteran in any given sector is rare.
The mandatory draft enlistment proportion tells a more complicated story than we would assume.
Not everyone joins the army; in 2008, a media announcement by the head of IDF’s Personnel
Administration and Planning stated that about 50% of Israeli teenagers are drafted to the army28
.
Table 1. The ratio of not-serving according to distribution of year of birth
Year
of
birth
Sex Reason for exemption Total
Do
not
fit
Medical
exemption
Mental
exemption
Staying
abroad
Torato
Omanuto
Deceased Criminal
record
Married Other
1983 M 2.8% 1.4% 4.9% 4.1% 7.3% 0.0% 1.4% 0.0% 0.1% 22.0%
F 3.9% 0.8% 1.1% 3.6% 27.5% 0.0% 0.0% 1.3% 0.0% 38.4%
1984 M 2.5% 1.4% 5.1% 4.2% 7.6% 0.0% 1.4% 0.0% 0.1% 22.3%
9
F 4.1% 0.9% 1.2% 3.6% 28.5% 0.0% 0.0% 1.3% 0.0% 39.5%
1985 M 2.5% 1.5% 5.2% 4.0% 7.8% 0.1% 1.7% 0.0% 0.1% 23.0%
F 3.7% 0.9% 1.4% 1.4% 28.9% 0.1% 0.0% 1.1% 0.0% 39.8%
Source: Barda, M. (2007). Longitude Data on IDF Conscription. Jerusalem, The Knesset Center of Research and Information.
*The Israeli Arab population is excluded from the data since the mandatory decree does not occur on them.
Table 1 indicates that exemptions are given according to the army’s criteria and discretion. The
exemption categories are suitability, physical and mental health reasons, criminal record, death,
staying abroad or Torato Omanuto (‫אומנותו‬ ‫,)תורתו‬ which is the title for religious studies
exemption. It also illustrates that about 40% of the female candidates for conscript in any given
year are exempt. These data do not include the Israeli Arab population, that comprises about
20% of the general population and are automatically exempt apart from few volunteering
minority groups. Also, the data do not include conscripts who immigrate or who were not drafted
in their scheduled year. According to this data, over 50% of the 2008 age cohorts did not enlist
due to exemption or other reasons.
We can see that about 50% of the entire population is subjected to the IDF socialization system.
Yet the numbers in the general population are higher since the table applies to the 2008
conscription cohort alone and ignores former cohorts. For over two decades, the numbers have
been declining, due to numerous reasons, thus the figures need to be adjusted. ICBS surveys
reveal that the percentages of citizens with IDF service history are closer to 60%29
of the general
population.
Representation of 60% veterans in the general population does not explain the 90% veterans in
the hi-tech sector. Furthermore, the workers’ young age (75% <40) reduces those numbers even
more since it refers to later cohorts with lower levels of enrollment. A more detailed dissection
10
of the military background of the worker shows that about 60% of the workers served in combat
or technological units (Figure 1). Those two types of units, which incorporate merely 20% of the
general IDF servicemen, demonstrate very high representation in the industry. Units with central
roles in the IDF operations enjoy higher military capital than others, as the military invests in
them additional resources and effort. Research conducted on entrepreneurship and military
background by Honig et al divulges that 85.4% of the entrepreneurs are veterans. In addition, a
significant number of the entrepreneurs served in excess of the mandatory three years, and, in
over half of the startups at least one of the entrepreneurs was an officer, both are indicators for
high level of military capital30
.
Populations that do not participate in the IDF service are practically not represented in the
industry. Only 3% of salaried employees in the hi-tech industry are Israeli Arabs31
. For the
11
Haredim, the ultra-religious population that exempt from service, the figures are even less
significant and stand on 2.4%32
. Those who do participate, like the Haredim startup company
IME, were frequently educated abroad and not in Israel33
. The two sub-groups together
comprised about 30% of the general population and are represented in most economy’s divisions,
yet they are nearly excluded from the hi-tech industry.
The hi-tech environment is traditionally considered as masculine bastion where women are
welcome mostly as surrogate men34
, yet female representation in Israeli industry (35%)
considered exceptionally high (for comparison in the US hi-tech industry it is about 25%)35
.
Examination of the profile’s data reveals that the majority of female employees possess military
capital. It is an extremely high representation of military capital since the female conscriptions
percentages in the general population estimated as 30%. It can be that possessing this capital
12
opens the industry’s door for women36
. This corresponds with Frenkel’s study on the Israeli
female hi-tech workers’ success, not only with answering the masculine demands of the industry
but also to reshape them into a new model of hi-tech worker37
.
The Ethosia survey divided the industry to three major components: Big Israeli companies,
Startups, and International companies’ R&D centers (Figure 2). The distribution of military
capital among the workers population shows that it is higher in big Israeli companies and
startups and lower in International centers. We would assume that international centers would be
more flexible in their screening process and would value the military capital less in comparison
to their Israeli colleagues, explaining the increase of about 4% in the representation of nonveteran
employees.
Comparison between the two groups with high levels of military capital, veterans of combat and
technological units, shows that combat unit veterans rely more on military capital than their
counterparts. We can assume that technological unit veterans mostly depend on their human
capital in job placement. This assumption is consistent with these data as technological unit
veteran representation in positions that permit the maximization of their human capital or
building on strong personal ties, such as startups, is the highest38
. For combat unit veterans we
see a reverse trend of non-veterans. In the big Israeli hi-tech companies that enjoy a setting with
high levels of military capital, their representation is the highest. In startups that are Israeli and
have high levels of military capital, their representation is lower due to the emphasis on
technological skill and the social network of technological unit veterans. In international
companies, where the military capital is less valued, their representation has declined while those
of non-veteran increase.
13
The effect of education on job attainment in the industry is limited. According to the ICBS
survey, only 49% of the industry workers have any kind of academic degree39
. The significance
of education, measured via the percentages of advanced degrees, shows that in big Israeli hi-tech
companies, where the levels of military capital are high, education is less valuable in comparison
to military capital (Figure 2). Examination of advanced degrees among the three groups (with the
exclusion of non-technical professions) augments the trend. The percentage in big Israeli
companies declines to 23% while in the two other cases it remains the same. This notion is also
supported with the examination of the Israeli-Arabs and Haredim with relevant academic
education representation in the industry. In other words, these data are inconsistent with the
dominant narrative on the correlation between education and job attainment. Education seems to
be less a predictor for job attainment in the Israeli hi-tech than military capital.
Military Capital in Action
Military service has been considered as a valuable element in the process of nation-building40
that connects and commits individuals to the country’s ethos41
. The nation’s profit from this
relation is obvious yet what about those who enrolled? Do they gain something out of this
arrangement? Literature on the effect of military service on veterans’ life course suggests diverse
and sometime contradicting answers. For some, military service hinders mobility and damages
job attainment; it presents negative, or at best mixed, correlation with income42
. On the other
hand, others find a positive correlation, identifying a “veteran premium”43
. In the Israeli case, in
particular in the hi-tech industry, military service shows positive impact.
The data presented demonstrate high proportion of employees with military capital in the hi-tech
industry. It seems that the most significant feature of the military capital is its convertibility- “the
14
ability of groups to convert the power they acquire within, and owing to, military service into
valuable social positions in the civilian sphere”44
. This convertibility comes in many levels and
forms and certainly does not have to reproduce the exact status individual enjoyed inside the
military sphere. ICBS data support that claim as veterans’ representation in white-collar
professions is significantly higher than those who did not serve or served in national service.
Human Capital. Though it may seem natural that civilian employers will prefer veterans with
professional skill and experience suitable to their needs, the market does not necessarily responds
that way. Would you hire an individual without a degree to run your business as junior manager
if his/her only qualifications are being an officer in the military? The market needs to appreciate
the experience in order for it to be converted. It is common to see in hi-tech job ads in the Israeli
media under requirements “degree in computer science or a graduate of a technological unit”. In
some cases the IDF profession is the only requirement. For those employers converting cyber
espionage and warfare into IT services seems reasonable. In Drori et al a manager in the industry
explains that “I consciously decided that the first batch of employees would come from my
military unit…. we recruited every person who had served in the unit regardless of the
expertise….The people from the unit are not only talented, but they learn fast, can master various
technologies, and are loyal. They think in terms of production and effectiveness”. This strategy
does not always work: in another interview, a start-up founder complains that “Their
(technological units veterans) relative advantage in a start-up became a liability when we became
a more established, larger firm”45
.
As an expanding market with growing demands for some of the unique skills that IDF
experience provides, the hi-tech industry is one of the great beneficiaries of this convertibility46
.
Experts in optics, aviation, communication, security, software, and hardware, fields of expertise
15
which are prevalent in the army, were able to continue their work in the private market47
. This
was confirmed in Honig et al study that shows the over representation of veterans of the military
R&D and technological units in startups and the hi-tech industry48
.
Breznitz refers to the IDF’s professionalization process as more than an assembly line for new
professionals. He views it also as a latent function of market innovation. He argues that the IDF
is “…a mechanism for producing highly-trained professionals...” and moreover, it functions
“…as a source of new technologies via various spin-offs, but also as one of the main nodes in the
national innovation system that diffuses information, spurs collective learning, and creates
standards for the whole industry”49
. Thanks to its advanced R&D, the IDF is de facto the
playground for new technologies and innovations. Training period varies from one occupation to
another, however, right after the training phase, the fresh specialist expected to perform in actual
field, sometime as the only expert in the area. The extent of responsibility and resources
delegated to those professionals are extensive and further contribute to their professionalization
by gaining experience they could not acquire in equivalent position in the private market50
.
Social Capital refers to the combined position of an individual on the grid of the IDF’s social
network along with the relative importance of this position and the individual’s qualities. This
corresponds with Bourdieu’s definition and bears the actual or potential resources the network
possesses. The position of a soldier on the military grid can potentially yield hundreds of ties on
various levels, professionally or socially related. The better the connection and the individual’s
influence on the grid, the more actual or potential resources, i.e. social capital, he possess.
Though the core of the social network consists of the IDF service immediate social network, the
network has expansion potential based on existing military capital. It is common that the IDF
16
service camaraderie traverses to the civil-sphere, usually in the shape of civil organizations.
Official societies, forums, and groups founded by veterans act as social hubs linking different
generations and transcending the confinement of immediate army comradeship.
Another option for network expansion is the military reserve service. The service is mandatory,
yet according to the IDF Manpower Directorate, the annual participation percentages are less
than 50% in the relevant population51
. In spite of that, the army reserve service provides a
significant expansion of the network since it is a duplication of the regular service and its social
network, operating in cooperation with the regular army and on the same grids. It also operates
as unofficial link between the private sector and military as employers and employees exploit
this network for job recruitment or knowledge exchange52
.
Social network’ effectiveness can be measure not only by its size but also by its quality. A
considerable body of literature points to the positive correlation between strong social ties and
job attainment or increased wages53
. The social network gained in the course of the IDF service
connects individuals from diverse localities, socio-economic backgrounds, and ethnicities54
. The
network’s diversity offers accesses and opportunities in fields which are usually out of reach55
.
Association between military service and personal relations is considered strong among Israelis.
Over 70% of the general population believes military service contributes to personal
connections. ICBS survey’s database shows that over 68% of the population believes that IDF
service increases the chances of being hired. Those two stances dominate among non-veterans as
well. This strong connection exploited by the hi-tech sector that launches recurring referral
programs among their employees as means of recruitment56
.
17
The network provides job opportunities and entrance to sectors, groups and markets. Though
other organizations provide the same support, probably the most organized and influential group
is the 8200 association. The name 8200 become hallmark since its graduates were the local hitech
and venture capital industry vanguards. In comparison to other military veterans, 8200
graduates’ military capital convertibility is among the highest. Currently their network includes
private internet social network and annual networking conventions which serves as recruiting
events or “Networking Events” where the presence of the leading hi-tech businesses and
companies is noticeable57
.
Cultural Capital. The IDF has long been a principal producer of cultural capital. It played a
crucial part in the design of the hegemonic model image of the Pioneer, during the Israeli
settlement period. IDF Soldier became synonym with the ideal of the Tzabar, the Israeli native58
.
Several studies indicated the IDF’s role as socialization agent in the integration process of the
Israeli adolescence into the Israeli society, building their sense of maturation and casting their
gender identities and definitions59
.
The military culture translates to the general Israeli discourse and culture and its implications can
be identified in the hi-tech context. Senor and Singer described cultural characteristics such as
Chutzpah, spirit of improvisation, and creativity, all military cultivated characteristics associated
today with the Israeli entrepreneurial culture or capital predominates the hi-tech sector60
. In her
study on masculine and feminine identities in the industry, Frenkel highlighted the role of the
embodied cultural capital that buttresses the masculine environment with military jargon and
work norms61
. The significance of the military cultural capital in its institutional and embodied
forms is also evident in Drori et al interviews62
.
18
As functional and bureaucratic institution, the IDF cultivate several behavioral traits it find
useful. Some of these traits are embedded in the formal educational system (The IDF Spirit).
Others are unwritten and tacitly encouraged by the IDF’s culture and environment. Thus,
aggressiveness, which labels the individual as an ‘Alpha Dog’ or ‘Go Getter’- all positive labels,
receives encouragement in the IDF setting63
.
As mentioned, the official body responsible for socialization in the IDF is the EYC. The
principal set of ideas it conveys is the IDF Spirit, a set of values it considers as the core of IDF
soldiers behavior and example. The IDF spokesman describes it as: “the identity card of the IDF
values, which should stand as the foundation of all of the activities of every IDF soldier”64
. This
set of values does not conclude with abstract notions strengthening the sense of belonging such
as “Defending the state” or “Love the homeland” but has raised the banner for practical notions
such as “Tenacity of purpose in performing missions and drive to victory/success”,
“Professionalism”, “Sense of Vocation”, or “Responsibility”; all utilitarian concepts that enhance
the individual performances in any given setting, military or private. Full internalization of this
code coincides with the ideal type of the employee; one that is responsible, diligent, and credible.
Those traits do not translate exclusively into the hi-tech sector yet the high proportion of military
capital in the industry indicates on the prevalence of this discourse.
The other set of values embedded in the IDF soldiers is the tacit behavior and rules encouraged
by the environment. Those traits were discussed in Senor and Singer as entrepreneurial capital.
For instance, improvisation valued as a problem solving skill in a resource poor and uncertain
environment and therefore cultivated by the IDF system; yet it is not part of the official IDF
code. The unique IDF structure of nation-army, which is more informal than professional
19
armies65
, allows individuals to find the set of values suit them and utilize it in their immediate
setting.
The cycle that reproduces the high convertibility of the military capital starts with middle
management. Many ex-generals are incorporated in management positions of major companies66
.
ICBS statistics shows that 87.4% of the manager population in the Israeli market comprises of
veterans. Since company managers are veteran officers, they design the company environment
in their image; “In the firm, we use our army model”67
. Knowingly or unknowingly, they prefer
to recruit employees who possess high levels of military capital since it is their dominant cultural
perspective68
. The company operates on the same values and codes as the IDF is with the proper
adjustments to the civil-sphere. Managers will ask for “tenacity of purpose in performing
missions” and workers accept the tone and perform accordingly.
Conclusion
In a society where the cultural and social role the military is significant, notwithstanding it will
influence the demographics and culture of the local hi-tech industry. This paper continues the
dominant research narrative on the relations between the IDF and the hi-tech sector while
connecting it to the literature on the IDF as socialization institution.
Examination of the relation of the three forms of capital, mediated by military culture, with the
hi-tech sector underlines their contribution to the identity, culture and skills of the hi-tech
employees and industry. The three are interconnected and therefore referring to them as military
capital seems proper. The high proportions of military capital in the hi-tech industry come to
effect in three ways: 1. Reproduction of the military capital in the industry, 2. a link to military
20
resources and knowledge, and 3. importing the military organizational and practical culture into
the industry.
The prevalence of the military capital in the hi-tech industry produces a homogenous cluster that
trumps education and gender boundaries and even challenges the notion of technological units’
dominance in the industry. It is a unique model of veteran reintegration. In most countries
veteran reintegration in the job market considered a challenge managed by the state69
. In the US,
the phenomenon of homeless veterans precipitated the assignment of a federal task force that its
role is to deal with the challenges of reintegration. Literature on the topic examined physical and
mental health issues, social ties, combat experience, age and others as explanatory variables for
reintegration’s difficulties70
. The Israeli case presents a different model of reintegration where
military service perceived as advantage. The state entices veterans, which it identifies as strong
population, into professions it views essential yet unpopular by offering monitory benefits. These
relations correspond with the social role of the IDF in the Israeli context and the mandatory draft.
There are reasons to believe that a cluster of military capital ease reintegration and allow veteran
to fulfill their potential, yet future study on this correlation is required.
This paper raises questions on the nature and effect of the military capital. What is the
measurable contribution of the military capital in the industry? Is it favored in other sectors? Is
the Israeli model exportable? The model of military as significant socialization agent is relevant
to South Korea and Switzerland as well. Both countries have introduced a mandatory draft and
there is a reason to believe military service plays similar societal role. Future study that will
compare the three countries’ hi-tech sector and connections with local military may explain the
nature of these relations from a new angle.
21
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