20
The Prospects for Nuclear Energy
20.1 The Nuclear Debate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 579
20.2 Options for Electricity Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 582
20.3 Possible Expansion of Nuclear Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 589
20.4 Regional Prospects for Nuclear Power Development . . . . . . . . 600
20.5 Issues in Nuclear Decisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 605
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 615
20.1 The Nuclear Debate
20.1.1 Nature of the Debate
Debates about nuclear energy have sometimes appeared to have the aspect of
a religious war, especially in the 1970s and 1980s when an expanding nuclear
enterprise came into conﬂict with a growing antinuclear movement. Nuclear
energy was discussed as if it were intrinsically good or evil, and for many of
the protagonists, it became instinctive to oppose or support it.
That debate has since become more muted. This does not mean that the
basic issues are settled. Rather, it means that less attention is being paid to
nuclear energy. Fossil fuel energy has been plentiful, energy problems are not
at the center of the world’s attention, and nuclear energy is not at the center
of what consideration is given to energy. In discussions of U.S. energy policy,
nuclear power is sometimes just ignored.
However, as discussed in Chapter 1, the world’s heavy dependence on fossil
fuels creates serious problems, and nuclear power can help in addressing them.
So too, at least in principle, can a number of alternatives, but none of these can
be fully counted on to serve as a large-scale source of additional energy. Each
either is too limited in the scope of its potential expansion—as in the case
of hydroelectric power—or lacks the proven ability to provide energy in the
amounts that will be required. Some, particularly wind power, show promise
(see Section 20.2.3), but it is premature to rely on wind or other alternatives
to provide a sure solution. Under these circumstances, nuclear power remains
a contender as a needed contributor to future energy supplies.
579
580 20 The Prospects for Nuclear Energy
Ingredients in the decisions that will be made about the utilization of
nuclear power include the following:
◆ The demand for energy—particularly energy in the form of electricity.
◆ The practicality and the environmental, economic, and national security
implications of the alternative energy sources.
◆ The success that nuclear power has in avoiding reactor accidents, safely
handling nuclear wastes, and reducing reactor construction costs.
◆ Assessments of the relationship between nuclear power and nuclear weapons
and terrorism.
It is impossible to know how these considerations will play out. They raise
technical and economic questions that are, in principle, resolvable. However,
they also involve issues where the answers depend primarily on individual
surmises and values and are perhaps impossible to resolve by “objective”
analysis.
National policies toward nuclear energy evolve in part with advice from
organizations, within and outside government, that study the issues in a somewhat
neutral and technically oriented spirit and in part in response to pressures
from groups and individuals with strong and often unyielding positions
for or against nuclear power. There is also an element of chance in the political
processes by which the policies are ultimately determined. Broadly speaking,
“conservatives” tend to lean to the “pro-nuclear” side, whereas “liberals”—
especially when allied with “greens” as in Germany—tend to lean against it.
Nuclear power is rarely the central issue in elections, and political parties may
gain power for reasons independent of nuclear or other energy considerations.
Nonetheless, the electoral results may have—as an incidental eﬀect—a crucial
impact on energy policy.
Thus, in discussing the prospects of nuclear power, we face two major
sources of uncertainty. We do not know how the alternative energy contenders
will compare on technical, economic, and environmental grounds. We know
even less how public and political attitudes will evolve. There are also diﬀerences
among countries that sometimes have no clear explanation. It is easy to
understand why Norway has no nuclear power while Sweden has employed it
extensively. The answer lies in Norway’s ample hydroelectric resources that
have been providing over 99% of its electricity [1]. However, it is hard to ﬁnd
such straightforward explanations for Italy’s abandoning of nuclear power
while France was emphasizing it, or the diﬀerence between substantially nuclear
Switzerland—which in 2003 referenda voted against giving up nuclear
power—and nuclear-free Austria.
In the remainder of this chapter, we will discuss some of the factors that
will inﬂuence the future development of nuclear power. However, at every
turn, it will be necessary to recognize that there are large uncertainties on
both the technical and political sides.
20.1 The Nuclear Debate 581
20.1.2 Internal Factors Impacting Nuclear Power
The future acceptability of nuclear energy, which we restrict to energy from
nuclear ﬁssion here, will depend, in part, on internal factors—the strengths
and weaknesses of nuclear power itself. Key factors are as follows:
◆ Nuclear accidents. The sine qua non for the acceptance of nuclear power
is a long period of accident-free operation, worldwide. Any major nuclear
accident will heighten fears of nuclear power and each decade of accidentfree
operation helps to alleviate them.
◆ Reactor designs. For nuclear power to be attractive, next-generation reactors
must be manifestly safe and also must be economical to build. These
could be either large evolutionary reactors, of the sort recently built in
France, Japan, and South Korea, or smaller reactors that may be a better
match to markets of modest size.
◆ Waste disposal. The completion of integrated and fully explained waste disposal
plans would encourage people to believe that the problem is “solved.”
In particular, smooth progress with the Yucca Mountain project would
suggest that waste disposal problems are surmountable. However, for a
large expansion of nuclear power, it will be necessary to demonstrate the
ability to handle the wastes from many more years of reactor operation.
◆ Resistance to proliferation and terrorism. For nuclear power to be acceptable,
its facilities must be well protected against terrorists and the nuclear
fuel cycle must be proliferation resistant.
◆ Assessments of radiation hazards. Most professionals believe that public
fears of radiation—and, in particular, radiation from nuclear power—are
out of proportion to the actual risks. A more realistic understanding of
the dangers would, in this view, lessen some of the opposition to nuclear
power.
20.1.3 External Factors Impacting Nuclear Energy
Verdicts on the “internal factors” discussed earlier will be inﬂuenced by perceptions
of need. Here, factors external to nuclear power determine the apparent
need. These include the following:
◆ Energy and electricity demand. Economic expansion and population growth
act to increase the demand for additional energy, including nuclear energy.
Eﬀective conservation measures reduce it.
◆ Limitations on oil and gas resources. The need for alternatives is enhanced
if these resources are seen to be inadequate.
◆ Global climate change. If the increasing concentration of carbon dioxide
in the atmosphere looms large in the public consciousness as an environmental
threat, then the pressures to ﬁnd alternatives to fossil fuels will
intensify. Complicating the equation is the prospect of carbon sequestra-
582 20 The Prospects for Nuclear Energy
tion, which, at least in principle, oﬀers the possibility of “carbon-free”
coal. (We will return brieﬂy to this prospect in Section 20.2.2.)
◆ Renewable energy. The technical and economic feasibility of renewable
sources and assessments of their environmental impacts are critical to judging
the need for nuclear power.
◆ Fusion energy. If the hopes for fusion energy are fulﬁlled, the need for
alternatives will be greatly lessened.
Some of these matters have already been discussed in Chapter 1. Others are
discussed further in subsequent sections of this chapter.
An additional factor, which might be called “external,” is that of government
initiative. In principle, government decisions are shaped by a weighing
of the internal and external factors cited earlier, and by the public’s views
on these issues. The public’s attitude is decisive when the future of nuclear
power becomes a referendum issue. However, a government can sometimes
act on its own, resolving complexity with a decisive action. As alluded to
earlier, the importance of the Green party to the governing coalition led to
a decision to phase out nuclear power in Germany. The U.S. Congress, in
this instance at the urging of the President, took critical action in favor of
the Yucca Mountain project in 2002. These decisions were not inevitable. For
example, a diﬀerent U.S. administration might have put oﬀ indeﬁnitely a decision
on Yucca Mountain. Firm government leadership, obviously in autocratic
states but also in democracies, can play a role in deciding the future of nuclear
power—eﬀectively determining by ﬁat how all the contributing factors should
be balanced.
20.2 Options for Electricity Generation
20.2.1 Need for Additional Generating Capacity
The worldwide demand for electricity will almost certainly increase substantially
in the coming decades. The increase will partly be driven by an expansion
in conventional uses, as world population grows and the underdeveloped
countries strive to raise their presently very low per capita use of electricity.
It may also be driven by the expanded use of electricity in relatively new
applications—such as the production of hydrogen and the desalination of water.
The demand for electricity would also grow if fossil fuels are replaced by
electrical power (from non-fossil-fuel sources) in heating and transportation.1
Successes in conservation may diminish the need for additional electricity
but are unlikely to eliminate it. The amount of electricity that will be
required—or wanted—cannot be projected with any certainty, but it appears
1
This has been contemplated for transportation using hydrogen as an intermediary,
but it could, in part, be done directly, for example with electriﬁed mass
transportation.
20.2 Options for Electricity Generation 583
probable that over the next 50 years, there will be a doubling or tripling
in world electricity demand, with a still greater increase not excluded (see
Section 20.3.1). However, although it is valuable to have a sense of scale, it
is neither important nor possible to pin down an accurate estimate. With
any plausible estimate, it is clear that a great deal of additional generating
capacity will be needed to meet new demand and replace existing equipment.
The potential role of nuclear energy in providing the needed energy is
considered in Section 20.3. As a prelude, in the remainder of this section, we
review brieﬂy the main alternative energy sources—particularly natural gas,
coal with carbon sequestration, and renewable energy. These various sources,
nuclear and non-nuclear, can be viewed either as competing options or as
complementary ones.
20.2.2 Fossil Fuels with Low CO2 Emissions
Natural Gas
The combustion of coal in electricity generation was responsible in 2001 for
about one-third of the U.S. man-made CO2 emissions (see Section 1.2.3).
These emissions would be greatly reduced if natural gas were to be substituted
for coal. There are two gains: (1) The CO2 production using natural gas
is about 56% of the production using coal, at the same thermal energy output
(see Section 1.2.3). (2) Gas-ﬁred combined-cycle combustion turbines can
operate at a thermal eﬃciency of over 50%, compared to a typical eﬃciency
of 33% for coal-ﬁred steam plants today. Therefore, with modern natural gas
plants, the CO2 output per kilowatt-hour is less than 40% of what it is with
standard coal-ﬁred plants.
There are two major diﬃculties with this solution (as previously discussed
in Section 1.2): (1) The carbon dioxide output is reduced but not eliminated,
as it would be with nuclear or renewable sources;2
and (2) the world supply
of natural gas, at moderate prices, may prove to be too limited to sustain the
contemplated expanded uses of natural gas—in particular, its use as a largescale
replacement for coal. Nonetheless, whether or not switching from coal
to natural gas can provide a major long-term solution, it has already been
helpful in some countries. For example, total CO2 emissions in the United
Kingdom have dropped in the past decade largely due to a switch from coal
to North Sea natural gas [2].
Sequestration of Carbon Dioxide
The reduction of carbon dioxide production would be less of a priority were it
possible to sequester the carbon dioxide after it is produced (i.e., to capture
2
It is often pointed out that fossil fuel energy is used in constructing the non-fossilgenerating
facilities. However, at most, this is a small “correction.”
584 20 The Prospects for Nuclear Energy
it before it enters the atmosphere and permanently dispose of it in a secure
location). The amounts involved are large. For each GWyr of coal-ﬁred electric
power, there is a release of about 8.5 million tonnes of CO2, or, in the units
that are commonly used, 2.3 million tonnes of carbon. For the year 2002, U.S.
electricity generation from coal amounted to 220 GWyr, corresponding to over
0.5 gigatonnes of C (GtC) and almost 2 Gt of CO2.
One possibility for storing this CO2 is to capture it at the generating plant
and move it in pipelines to locations where it can be pumped underground.
Sam Holloway, of the British Geological Survey, suggested in a review of underground
sequestration that the volume of caverns or mines is insuﬃcient
to handle the amounts of CO2 that are produced, but that there is a larger
capacity in porous sedimentary rocks or “reservoir rocks” [3, p. 149]. The
CO2 can be injected by pumping it into wells drilled in the rock. The CO2
then permeates the rock, where it displaces some of the water that is commonly
present. For deep rocks, this water is usually saline and the formations
are termed saline water aquifers. At high temperatures and pressures (above
31.1◦
C and 72 atm), CO2 becomes a supercritical ﬂuid with a speciﬁc gravity
of 0.2–0.9. This condition can be reached deep underground. Even at the low
end of this range, the density is more than 100 times that of gaseous CO2 (at
standard temperature and pressure), greatly reducing the required storage
volume [3, p. 151].
The total holding capacity of the potential sites for CO2 is not well established.
The global capacity has been estimated by Ted Parson and David
Keith to be approximately 200–500 GtC for depleted oil and gas reservoirs,
100–300 GtC for deep coal beds, and 100–1000 GtC for deep saline aquifers [4].
World CO2 production from fossil fuel combustion is now about 6.6 GtC/yr [2,
p. 234], so the capacity might suﬃce for many years. However, more experience
and study are needed to judge the diﬃculties of large-scale extraction,
transportation, and storage of CO2, as well as to gauge storage capacity.
There is already some experience with both pipeline transport of CO2 and
small-scale sequestration. For example, at the Sleipner West natural gas ﬁeld
in Norwegian North Sea waters, substantial amounts of CO2 are extracted
from the natural gas—which otherwise is mostly methane. This waste CO2
is injected into sandstone below the seabed.3
Holloway concludes that this
formation “appears to be an excellent repository for CO2” [3, p. 156]. However,
it is only receiving 1 million tonnes of CO2 per year, which is about one-eighth
the output from 1 GWyr of coal plant operation.
An alternative to injecting CO2 into the ground is pumping it into the deep
ocean. The natural content of inorganic carbon in the ocean is about 40,000
GtC, primarily in the form of carbonic acid (H2CO3) and bicarbonate and
carbonate ions (HCO−
3 and CO2−
3 ) [5, p. 178]. The injection of several billion
3
This experience illustrates the eﬃcacy of a “carbon tax.” When this sequestering
project was inaugurated in 1996, Norway had a carbon tax of $170/tonne of
carbon and the project was a response to the tax [4].
20.2 Options for Electricity Generation 585
tonnes of CO2 annually would not change the total carbon content of the
ocean appreciably, although the local concentrations will be increased near
the points of injection. The CO2 may be injected from pipelines extending
from the shore or from tankers carrying liquiﬁed CO2 [6, p. 3–4]. Locally, the
water would become more acidic. Further research is needed to explore both
injection techniques and environmental impacts.
It may also be possible to convert the CO2 into a solid, e.g., calcium
bicarbonate [Ca(HCO3)2] or magnesium carbonate (MgCO3). Klaus Lackner
suggests that with this approach, the CO2 would be sequestered “safely and
permanently” in a form that requires less volume than is needed in the other
various burial approaches [7]. Conversion to solid form would, in principle,
make possible the handling of vast amounts of CO2.
Sequestration would be most practical where the source of the CO2 is
localized, as in a power plant. It has the attraction of oﬀering a possible
way to exploit the very large resources of coal that are available and the
possibly large resources of natural gas. However, at best, assuming that it
proves practical, it is a clumsy approach, requiring the handling of enormous
amounts of material. The eventual cost of large-scale carbon sequestration is
not well known, but estimates are in the rough neighborhood of $100/tonne
of carbon, with an apparent uncertainty of more than a factor of 2 [3, 4]. A
cost of $100/tonne corresponds to 2.7/c/kWh for a coal-ﬁred power plant. This
would not be a prohibitive cost if there were no alternatives, but would be a
signiﬁcant penalty in a competitive market.
An adequate evaluation of the potential role of sequestration cannot be
made without further investigation of the economic costs and environmental
impacts, including consideration of the long-term stability of the storage under
normal and abnormal (e.g., an earthquake) conditions. As a step toward
testing the potential of sequestration in the context of electricity generation,
the U.S. Secretary of Energy announced in February 2003 a one-billion-dollar
plan to build a prototype coal-ﬁred plant that would produce hydrogen and
generate 275 MWe of electricity [8]. The plan calls for the sequestering of over
90% of the CO2 produced by the plant. This project was expected to take
about 10 years to design, construct, and evaluate.
20.2.3 Renewable Sources
Overview of Renewable Sources
In principle, renewable energy sources oﬀer an alternative that avoids the CO2
produced by fossil fuels and the radionuclides produced by nuclear power. The
terms “renewable energy” and “solar energy” are sometimes used interchangeably,
but renewable energy includes the nonsolar sources of tidal and geothermal
power. Tidal power ultimately is based on gravitational forces, with the
tides arising from the motions of the Earth and Moon. Geothermal power is
ultimately derived from the decay of long-lived radionuclides in the interior
586 20 The Prospects for Nuclear Energy
of the Earth. These are nonsolar, renewable sources. However, although both
have been used to some extent, especially geothermal power, neither appears
to be a leading candidate for a major expansion.
Solar energy sources are both direct and indirect. Direct sources, in which
sunlight is converted to energy with no intermediary, include photovoltaic
devices, systems for heating ﬂuids with focused light to generate electricity,
and growth of biomass to use as a fuel. Indirect sources include hydroelectric
power, where solar energy evaporates water that eventually returns as
rain, and wind power where solar energy heats the atmosphere to produce air
currents.
Direct Use of Solar Energy
All direct uses of solar energy for electricity generation suﬀer from the “dilute”
nature of the solar source. The average ﬂux of solar energy at the surface of
the Earth is about 200 W/m2
. Thus, it requires about 5 km2
to collect 1 GW
of incident solar energy. The area required for electricity generation depends
on the eﬃciency of conversion from solar energy to electricity.
One potential source of electricity is biomass, used as a fuel in a steam
turbine plant. The main source of biomass now used in electricity generation
is wastes, including wastes from the forest product industry. However, the
amounts of such wastes are limited. A major increase in biomass use for electricity
generation would require dedicated biomass plantations and adequate
supplies of water and fertilizer. As estimated by David Hall and colleagues,
the “practical maximum yields” of biomass in temperate climates corresponds
to an annual average eﬃciency of about 1% for conversion from solar energy
to chemical energy in the plants [9, p. 600]. The thermal eﬃciency for biomass
combustion is unlikely to reach the 33% eﬃciency achieved for coal, and some
of the plantation area must be used for nonproductive purposes such as roads.
Thus, an optimistic estimate—probably unrealistically optimistic—of the area
required for biomass production of electricity is 2000 km2
/GWe. More typical
estimates are roughly a factor of 2 higher, and some are still higher.4
In any
estimate, however, the demands on land and water are high.
Solar photovoltaic power is suitable for use in remote locations, but, at
present, it is too expensive to be a candidate for supplying large amounts
of power to the electric grid. If the cost is eventually reduced to an acceptable
level, the land requirement would be substantial, but much less than for
4
For example, an estimate made by Eric Larson for a large plantation in Brazil
assumes a yield of 1000 dry tonnes of biomass/km2
, 20 GJ/tonne, and a 60%
use of land. This corresponds to 1.2 × 1013
J/km2
of thermal energy per year
or an average electric output of about 0.12 MWe/km2
, which translates to
8000 km2
/GWe [10, p. 579]. In Global Energy Perspectives, projections of future
biomass energy yields of 4–10 toe (tonnes oil equivalent) per hectare are
indicated, corresponding to roughly 2000–6000 km2
/GWe at a 33% thermal conversion
eﬃciency [11, p. 82].
20.2 Options for Electricity Generation 587
biomass. It would depend on the solar ﬂux at the site chosen, the eﬃciency of
the photovoltaic cells and associated electronics, the orientation of the solar
panels with respect to the sun (including possible tracking of the sun), and
the fraction of the land occupied by the panels. If one assumes an overall
module eﬃciency (i.e., for conversion of sunlight to usable electricity) of 10%,
an average solar ﬂux of 250 W/m2
, and a 50% coverage of the ground by the
solar modules, then the area required would be 80 km2
/GWe. This is only
a crude, order-of-magnitude estimate and future systems may be more eﬃcient.
However, this may not be an appropriate way of looking at the matter.
For the near future, solar photovoltaics are most likely to be used in niche
markets, extending down to arrays as small as rooftop modules for individual
homes, rather than in very large arrays. Thus, the area occupied may not be
an immediate concern.
Neither of these direct sources, or other less conspicuous candidates, should
be excluded from consideration, but among renewable sources of electrical
power, they at present appear less promising than wind (see later subsection).
This is reﬂected in the diﬀerences in the rates at which new facilities are being
installed.
Hydroelectric Power
Hydroelectric power is the most important renewable energy source, and it
dominates the renewable contribution to electric power generation. It has
played an important role in many countries, including the United States,
where in the past it accounted for a large share of all electricity generation
(e.g., 32% in 1949 [12]). Some major new hydroelectric dams are still being
developed, notably China’s project on the Yangtze River, which is expected to
provide an annual output of about 10 GWyr. However, the most desirable sites
throughout the world have been exploited and there is an increasing awareness
of the negative impacts of the displacement of people and the interruption of
natural stream ﬂows. In fact, in the United States, it appears that there is
more interest in removing dams that interfere with the migration of ﬁsh than
in building new ones. Hydropower provided 7% of U. S. electricity in 2002, and
although the amounts vary somewhat from year to year with water conditions,
it appears unlikely that hydroelectric capacity will be signiﬁcantly increased
in the United States or that it could make a major contribution to meeting
the world’s need for additional energy sources.
Wind Power
Wind is a rapidly growing source of electricity in some countries, particularly
in Denmark, and the available resource is large. For the OECD as a whole,
wind energy output rose from 0.5 GWyr in 1992 to 3.9 GWyr in 2001, an average
rate of increase of 25% per year [1]. Some studies indicate that the wind
588 20 The Prospects for Nuclear Energy
resources in the United States are adequate to produce more electricity than
is generated today from all sources.5
However, wind still makes only a very
small contribution in most of the world—0.3% of U.S. electricity generation in
2002 and 0.4% of generation in all OECD countries in 2001 (see Table 1.2). Its
exploitation was originally impeded by growing pains in developing reliable
and economically competitive wind turbines, and it still faces some environmental
objections and the problem of the intermittency of a wind-dependent
output.
The power delivered by a wind turbine is proportional to the area swept
out by the turbine and the cube of the wind speed.6
The power varies as
the wind speed varies, sometimes dropping to zero. The capacity factor is the
ratio of the actual output over the year to the output were the turbine to
operate continuously at its rated power. Typical values are in the range of
30% to 40%.
A sense of scale can be obtained by considering a speciﬁc example of
a large turbine that might be placed in the upper Midwest, where there are
extensive areas with favorable wind conditions—in particular, a 1500-kW unit,
with a rotor diameter (i.e., a turbine blade diameter) of 77 m [14]. For this
case, the indicated capacity factor is about 0.38 and the annual output is
about 0.57 MWyr. In the envisaged arrangement, there would be an array
of these turbines with about six turbines per square kilometer.7
To provide 1
GWyr of power each year would require about 1750 turbines, each with blades
extending to about 90 m above the ground and occupying almost 300 km2
in
all.8
Only a small fraction of this area is preempted by the turbine facilities
themselves, and most of it is available for farming or grazing.
Wind power appears to have considerable promise, but until it grows further
it may not be possible to have a good picture of its actual potential or of
possible diﬃculties that might be created by a truly large-scale exploitation
5
For example, a study at the Paciﬁc Northwest Laboratories indicates that with
“moderate exclusions” on the land that can be used, and using winds of “class
4” and higher, the annual potential is about 630 GWyr [13]. This is roughly 40%
more than total U.S. generation in 2002.
6
The so-called power in the wind PW equals the product of the volume of air
passing through the turbine area per second (Av) and the kinetic energy carried
per unit volume (ρv2
/2), where A is the area swept out by the turbines and ρ is
the density of air. (It is assumed that the turbine is properly oriented to face the
wind.) Thus, PW = ρAv3
/2. The power output of the turbine can be expressed
as P = CpPW , where Cp is the coeﬃcient of performance. Its theoretical limit,
known as the Betz limit, is CP = 16/27 = 0.593; actual systems reach about 0.4.
7
The contemplated arrangement would have staggered rows of turbines with a
spacing of 7d within a row and of 4d between rows, where d is the rotor diameter
[15]. Thus, each turbine would require an area of 28d2
, or 0.166 km2
.
8
This estimate corresponds to about 0.11 km2
/MWe of capacity, which falls in the
middle of the range suggested in a recent review article of 0.04–0.32 km2
/MWe [16,
p. 166].
20.3 Possible Expansion of Nuclear Power 589
of wind resources. One obvious problem is that of intermittency. In addition,
there is conﬂict between those who value it as a clean resource and those who
consider it a visual blight, especially in otherwise scenic oﬀ-shore locations,
and too noisy.
20.2.4 Fusion
Fusion energy is, in principle, a long-term alternative to ﬁssion energy and
renewable energy. In the long run, success in developing fusion would have
profound eﬀects on the need for the other options. However, as suggested in
the brief discussion in Section 16.7.1, it is too soon to base energy planning
on any speciﬁc timetable for the successful deployment of fusion, or even to
say with absolute conﬁdence that it will become an important energy source
in a predictable future.
20.3 Possible Expansion of Nuclear Power
20.3.1 Projection of Demand
Demand for Electricity
In planning for electricity growth, the time horizon is on the scale of decades,
and the year 2050 has been selected in some recent publications as a target
date for estimates. Such projections, although highly speculative, are useful
in suggesting the scale of eﬀorts required to meet future demand.
A number of diﬀerent scenarios were analyzed in a joint study by the
World Energy Council (WEC) and the Institute for Applied Systems Analysis
(IIASA). The estimates for world electricity generation in 2050 range from
about 2600 GWyr to 4800 GWyr, corresponding to about 155% to 285%
of the generation in 2000 [11, p. 88]. The higher projection is described as
corresponding to a scenario with “ambitiously high rates of economic growth
and technological progress” [11, p. 7], although its average annual electricity
growth from 2000 to 2050 (2.1%) is well below the rate of the previous 20 years
(3.1%). The lower projection is for an “ecologically driven” scenario with
“incentives to encourage energy producers and consumers to utilize energy
more eﬃciently” [11, p. 9a]. It is described as a “normative” or “prescriptive”
scenario, rather than a predictive one. In the “middle course,” or the case
deemed most likely in this family of scenarios, the electricity generation in
2050 is 3500 GWyr, corresponding to an average annual growth of 1.5% from
2000 to 2050.
The WEC/IIASA scenarios all give growth rates that are more conservative
than those of the U.S. DOE, which projects in its “reference case” an
annual average increase of 2.7% per year in world electricity consumption
from 1999 to 2020 [17, p. 188]. Were this growth rate to continue until 2050,
590 20 The Prospects for Nuclear Energy
it would mean almost a quadrupling of electricity consumption from 2000 to
2050.
These several scenarios suggest that there is likely to be a doubling (1.4%
per year) or tripling (2.2% per year) in global electricity demand from 2000
to 2050, although the increase could be substantially more or somewhat less.
Conservation
Conservation, especially in the form of higher eﬃciency in energy use, can
reduce the demand for electricity. It has already contributed importantly
through the introduction of more eﬃcient lighting, refrigeration, and motors.
Further exploitation of eﬃcient technologies can make major additional
contributions. However, conservation measures are already presumed in the
scenarios discussed above. For example, the WEC/IIASA scenarios assume
for the OECD countries improvements in energy intensity [i.e., decreases in
the ratio of primary energy to Gross Domestic Product (GDP)] averaging
1.1% per year in the two higher growth scenarios and 1.9% per year in the
low-growth case [11, p. 36].9
Demand for Nuclear Power
Given the uncertainties in the world demand for electricity and the even
greater uncertainties in the future acceptance of nuclear power, any estimate
of nuclear power use in 2050 is highly speculative. However, we consider here
several estimates for 2050 that suggest the possible scale of nuclear capacity
and generation if there is to be a “large” expansion of nuclear power:
◆ In the highest of the WEC/IIASA projections discussed earlier, annual
electricity generation in 2050 was projected to be 4800 GWyr. If we arbitrarily
assume that nuclear power provides one-half of this, then annual
nuclear generation would be 2400 GWyr.
◆ William Sailor and colleagues projected an annual nuclear output of 3300
GWyr in a scenario designed to stabilize CO2 emissions at twice the preindustrial
level [18].
◆ Harold Feiveson, in pointing to the proliferation dangers raised by a “robust”
nuclear expansion, took 3000 GWe in 2050 as a benchmark for what
would be necessary to “make a dent in global warming” [19]. At a capacity
factor of 90%, this would mean an annual nuclear output of 2700 GWyr.
For speciﬁcity in the following discussion, we will use the last of these
estimates, which lies between the other two: a nuclear capacity of 3000 GWe
and an output of 2700 GWyr. Of course, a nuclear capacity of anything from
9
Data are reported only for the overall improvement in energy intensity, without
a separate indication for electricity.
20.3 Possible Expansion of Nuclear Power 591
1000 to 5000 GWe would be a major expansion above the present world level
of about 360 GWe.
If nuclear electricity supplies one-half of the total, then electricity generation
from all sources would be at an annual rate of 5400 GWyr. This exceeds
the higher of the WEC/IIASA projections cited earlier, but it would still not
provide lavish electricity supplies. At this rate, world electricity use (for an
assumed population of 9 billion) would be at a per capita rate of 0.6 kWyr/yr
(i.e., consumption at a rate of 0.6 kWe per person). This is approximately
twice the present world rate, two-thirds of the present average OECD rate,
and 40% of the present U.S. rate [1, 2].
For the United States, which already uses electricity at a rate much above
the world average, we will assume that total electricity generation rises in
step with population, from 434 GWyr in 2000 to about 650 GWyr in 2050
(an average increase of 0.8% per year).10
Assuming again a 50% contribution
from nuclear power, this would mean an output of 325 GWyr or a U.S. capacity
of about 360 GWe.
The speculative nature of any such number should be emphasized. The actual
electricity consumption will depend on end-use eﬃciency improvements
and, as suggested earlier, possibly expanded use in a variety of applications,
including electronic equipment, building and industrial heating, mass transportation,
hydrogen production, and desalination of ocean water. If we look
backward and note that U.S. electricity use rose 12-fold from 1950 to 2000
(greatly outstripping the population growth), the 50% rise contemplated here
for the next 50 years is a modest projection. The speciﬁcation of a 50% share
for nuclear power is in no sense a prediction. It does, however, identify a target
to consider in judging what sort of expansion might be achievable.
Possible Additional Applications
The preceding discussions have mentioned the possible expanded use of nuclear
energy in two important applications, namely the production of hydrogen
and the desalinization of seawater. Each addresses limitations in the availability
of a key resource. Hydrogen is a potential substitute for oil in transportation
and desalinization oﬀers a remedy for regional scarcities of water. They
are discussed in the immediately following subsections.
In each application, depending upon the method used, the main energy
input can be in the form of either electricity or heat and can be derived from either
nuclear or non-nuclear sources. The nuclear community has shown considerable
interest in these possibilities, as illustrated, for example, by a meeting
on Nuclear Production of Hydrogen organized by the Nuclear Energy Agency
of the OECD [21] and a report on Introduction to Nuclear Desalinization,
10
A “fairly constant” population growth rate of 0.8% per year for 2001–2025 was
projected in the U.S. DOE’s Annual Energy Outlook 2003 [20, p. 50], and here
we arbitrarily project the same growth rate to 2050.
592 20 The Prospects for Nuclear Energy
A Guidebook published by the International Atomic Energy Agency [22]. If
either application is implemented on a large scale, the demand for electricity
and nuclear energy could be substantially increased.
20.3.2 Production of Hydrogen
Methods of Hydrogen Production
Hydrogen is sometimes referred to as the energy source of the future. This
is a misnomer, or at least misleading. Hydrogen is not a fundamental energy
source, in that there is very little hydrogen on Earth in a pure elemental
form. Most of the hydrogen is trapped in water (H2O) or in hydrocarbons,
and energy must be provided to produce it in elemental form.
Once produced, hydrogen has the advantage of having a very high heat of
combustion per unit mass: 142 megajoules per kilogram (MJ/kg) for molecular
hydrogen (H2) compared to 46 MJ/kg for gasoline and 55.5 MJ/kg for
methane (the main ingredient of natural gas). On the other hand, it has the
disadvantage of being a gas except at extremely low temperatures, with a
density that is one-eighth that of methane (at the same temperature and
pressure) and therefore a lower energy content per unit volume.
Hydrogen is now used in large amounts in the chemical industry [e.g.,
in the production of ammonia (NH3) and in oil reﬁning] [23, p. 232]. Its
most interesting large-scale prospective use is as an automotive fuel (see the
following subsection). The main means of producing hydrogen today is the
steam reforming of methane. In this process, steam (H2O) and methane (CH4)
combine to form carbon monoxide (CO) and hydrogen (H2), and the carbon
monoxide combines with water to form carbon dioxide and more hydrogen.
The net reaction is
CH4 + 2H2O → CO2 + 4H2.
Any process based on fossil fuels has the disadvantage of producing CO2,
although this environmental liability, in principle, could be addressed by sequestering
the CO2.
The simplest alternative to producing hydrogen from methane (or coal) is
electrolysis of water, a process in which the water is dissociated into hydrogen
and oxygen. Although practical, this method is relatively expensive in energy.
The eﬃciency of electrolysis systems is indicated by Joan Ogden to be about
70–85% [23]. If electricity for electrolysis is generated at, say, 40% eﬃciency,
this corresponds to a system eﬃciency of about 30% in going from the original
fuel to hydrogen.
Greater eﬃciency is provided by a wide range of thermochemical cycles
that use water as the only feedstock and produce hydrogen and oxygen as the
end products. They consume less energy than electrolysis for the same hydrogen
output. One possible thermochemical cycle is the I–S process which uses
sulfuric acid (H2SO4) and hydrogen iodide (HI) in a cycle in which each nei-
20.3 Possible Expansion of Nuclear Power 593
ther is ultimately consumed and in which the net reaction is just the breakup
of water into hydrogen and oxygen (see, e.g., Ref. [21]):
H2O → H2 + (1/2)O2.
The I–S cycle is not the only possible choice, but it appears to now be a
favored one.11
One limitation is that it requires a temperature of at least
800◦
C and operates more eﬃciently at still higher temperatures.
One of the Generation IV reactors now under consideration is particularly
intended for the production of hydrogen: the Very-High-Temperature-Reactor
(VHTR) (see Section 16.6.2). The estimated production capacity of a 600MWt
plant is over 2 million normal m3
per day [25, p. 54].12
This is equivalent
to roughly 26 million MJ per day or 300 MW in the form of hydrogen fuel,
corresponding to a 50% eﬃciency for the conversion of the reactor’s thermal
energy.
When there is a poor overlap between the time the electricity is produced
and the time when it is needed, hydrogen production can help to address
the mismatch. Thus, for nuclear reactors, which are most eﬀectively used as
base-load sources that always run at peak capacity, the output could be used
for hydrogen production (probably by electrolysis for most reactors) when
the demand is low—typically at night. Renewable sources such as wind and
solar photovoltaic power are inherently intermittent. Again, hydrogen can be
produced when there is excess output. The hydrogen then serves as an energy
storage medium, for use in electricity generation or for other purposes.
The DOE included in its FY2004 budget proposal, issued in January 2003,
$4 million to inaugurate a new Nuclear Hydrogen Initiative, intended to study
the use of nuclear energy to produce hydrogen. A focus will be R&D on thermochemical
cycles at high temperatures [26, p. 87–89]. If this program moves
forward, it may lead to the construction of a VHTR at the Idaho National Engineering
and Environmental Laboratory. In undertaking this initiative, the
DOE is not abandoning the investigation of other approaches to hydrogen production.
It is a much smaller initial commitment than the coal-based initiative
announced in February 2003 (see Section 20.2.2). There are also possibilities
for producing hydrogen using renewable energy sources. Therefore, although
nuclear power may be used in the future to produce hydrogen, there are many
competitors. If nuclear power is used, it may be to provide heat rather than
electricity.
Hydrogen as a Fuel
A major attraction of hydrogen as a fuel is its cleanliness: Combustion of
hydrogen leaves no “waste product” other than water (H2O). As such, it has
11
An earlier review (1976) listed nine such cycles, although it did not include the
I–S cycle [24, p. 287].
12
1 normal m3
(Nm3
) has a mass of 0.090 kg and a combustion energy of 12.8 MJ.
594 20 The Prospects for Nuclear Energy
been urged as an automotive fuel in vehicles powered by hydrogen fuel cells,
as well as a source of electricity or heat for the home (see, e.g., Ref. [27]).
The use in cars has attracted particular interest. If hydrogen could replace
gasoline as the fuel to drive cars, it would both reduce the world’s dependence
on petroleum and eliminate cars as a source of pollution.
The enthusiasm shown by the federal government for the “FreedomCAR”
initiative to develop vehicles powered by fuel cells led to the formation of a
committee within the American Physical Society (APS) to “examine what is
reality and what is unsupported optimism” [28]. The study concluded that
for the initiative to be successful, it will be necessary to have large reductions
in the costs of fuel cells and to solve the problem of hydrogen storage on
vehicles. For storage, it suggested the most likely method will be compressed
gas, at perhaps a pressure of 700 atm, although other methods may also prove
practical.
One of the concerns that the report addressed, if only brieﬂy, is that of
safety. It cited a number of tests that suggested that “H2 is, if anything, safer
than gasoline or jet fuel” [28, p. 21]. Hydrogen is helped in this regard by
its lightness, which causes it to dissipate quickly if released. Part of hydrogen’s
bad reputation derives from the Hindenburg accident in 1937, when the
hydrogen-ﬁlled German dirigible was destroyed in a spectacular ﬁre as it was
about to land at the beginning of a visit to the United States (in New Jersey).
Recent studies appear to clear hydrogen of the blame for the ﬁre and instead
implicate an “extremely ﬂammable” paint used on the dirigible’s skin.
The end-use energy eﬃciency of the hydrogen fuel cell is more than twice
that of a gasoline-driven car. The APS study indicated that a hypothesized
hydrogen fuel cell vehicle would use energy at a rate equivalent to 82 miles
per gallon (mpg) of gasoline, whereas the rate with a gasoline engine (in the
“probable” case) would be 38 mpg—presumably with other changes in the
car’s design to improve its “mileage.” This is an increase in end-use eﬃciency.
If the energy eﬃciency of hydrogen production is 30%, as it might be with
electrolysis, the hydrogen advantage disappears when gauged in terms of primary
energy input. However, the use of hydrogen is not motivated by the
prospect of eﬃciency gains. It is motivated by the desire to replace oil as a
primary energy input. If the hydrogen is made from natural gas rather than
nuclear power—as is likely to continue to be the case for at least the near
future—there would be a reduction in primary energy use, at the expense of
some CO2 emissions (albeit less than with a gasoline engine) and a possible
strain on natural gas supplies.
Gasoline consumption at the rate of 82 mpg corresponds to an end-use
energy of 1.60 MJ per mile.13
Providing electricity to produce hydrogen for
motor vehicles would require a substantial increase in generating capacity.
Total motor gasoline demand in the United States is about 8.7 million barrels
per day, corresponding to an energy of about 17 EJ per year [12, p. 152].
Considering the hypothesized “82-mpg” hydrogen car rather than today’s av-
13
The heat content of gasoline is 5.21 MBTU per barrel or 131 MJ/gallon [29].
20.3 Possible Expansion of Nuclear Power 595
erage 22-mpg car, the energy requirement is reduced to about 4.7 EJ in the
form of hydrogen. An annual electrical input of about 200 GWyr would be
needed to produce this hydrogen by electrolysis at an electricity-to-hydrogen
energy conversion eﬃciency of 75%. For comparison, one can note that total
U.S. petroleum product use in 2002 averaged 19.3 million barrels per day and
electricity generation totaled 438 GWyr. Thus, the substitution (using electrolysis)
would involve a reduction in petroleum consumption of about 45%
and an increase in electricity generation of about 45%. If the electricity is provided
by nuclear reactors it would be necessary to more than triple the present
nuclear capacity. If a thermochemical cycle is used instead of electrolysis, the
demand for nuclear energy would be somewhat reduced.
For this hypothetical scenario to materialize, it will be necessary not only
to solve problems of fuel cell costs and hydrogen storage but also to develop
economical and reliable cars to use the fuel cells and to develop a distribution
infrastructure analogous to that provided by present-day gasoline ﬁlling stations.
Some test hydrogen fuel cell vehicles have been built [30, p. 316] and a
number of long-distance pipelines have been in use for several decades carrying
hydrogen at high pressure [23, p. 248], but establishing such an infrastructure
would be a formidable challenge.
Despite the seeming attractiveness of this hydrogen scenario as a project
for the future, for the near term the most eﬀective way to reduce gasoline
consumption is to build vehicles that are more fuel eﬃcient than those in the
present automobile and truck ﬂeet (for example, by reducing weight and using
hybrid gasoline–electric engines). Replacing the present passenger car ﬂeet
with 45-mpg cars, without changing fuels, would cut gasoline consumption in
half. However, for the long run, if it can be achieved, the ultimate rewards of
a hydrogen-based program to displace gasoline would be great—whether the
hydrogen is produced with nuclear or renewable sources.
An even more ambitious hydrogen scenario has been envisaged by
Chauncey Starr, who has suggested a “Continental SuperGrid” that would
make possible an energy economy based on hydrogen and nuclear energy [31].
In this picture, nuclear plants would be used to produce electricity and hydrogen.
Both would be transmitted throughout the country in pipes that would
carry liquid hydrogen in an inner pipe and electricity in a surrounding superconductor.
The liquid hydrogen would both cool the superconductor and
serve as a fuel when extracted from the pipeline system. This version of a
hydrogen economy is put forth as a project for the 21st century, not for the
next decade or two. Nonetheless, work today on suitable nuclear reactors and
on superconducting cables would help to test the practicality of the concept
and, to the extent it is practical, to help launch it.
20.3.3 Desalination of Seawater
Many parts of the world are faced with water shortages, as populations and
standards of living rise and groundwater resources are depleted. Desalination
of seawater oﬀers a solution that is being increasingly employed. An IAEA
596 20 The Prospects for Nuclear Energy
document published in 2000 reported that in 1997 there were about 12,500 desalination
plants in the world operating or under construction, with capacities
ranging from the very small to over 400,000 m3
per day [22, Section 2.4].14
Total world capacity was given as 23 million m3
per day. There is steady
growth in this output, and a capacity of about 38 million m3
per day for 2010
has been projected in another IAEA paper [32]. Even this output, however,
would be less than 0.5% of total world water withdrawal, so desalination is
still of local rather than global importance [33, p. 374]. The largest facilities
are in Saudi Arabia, but plants exist in many other countries, including the
United States.
The main techniques for desalination are distillation, which requires mostly
heat energy, and reverse osmosis, which requires mostly electrical energy to
drive pumps. Reverse osmosis is the least costly approach. The production
of 1 m3
of water in large-scale reverse-osmosis plants is estimated to cost
about $1 and require about 6 kWh of electricity [22, pp. 64 and 154–155].
To get a sense of scale as to the implications of these costs, we can consider
a hypothetical example given in a summary of IAEA nuclear desalination
studies [34]. A 300-MWe plant (which would generate 6.1 million kWh per
day at an 85% capacity factor) would be used to supply 1 million m3
of water
per day to a population of 3–4 million people. This corresponds to a per capita
supply of about 0.3 m3
(80 gal) per day or a little over 100 m3
per year, at a
cost of about $100 per person per year.
For comparison, it may be noted that the average annual per capita consumption
of water for household purposes in the 1980s was estimated to be
about 260 m3
in the United States, 94 m3
in Europe, and 30 m3
in China
[33, Table H1]. Household use of water is small compared to the use in industry
and agriculture, and to provide the full water needs of a country, the
household use numbers should be multiplied by a factor that typically would
be between 5 and 20.
At these rates of water use and cost, desalination provides an expensive
way to obtain water, but—as seen by its growing use—not a prohibitively
expensive one. It would be “aﬀordable” in the United States in regions of
water shortages, especially if the high prices led to reductions in the use
rates. Total U.S. water use is about 2000 m3
per year per person (mostly for
agriculture), or about 6 × 1011
m3
for the entire country. If 10% of this water
were to be eventually supplied by desalination—to take an arbitrary number
for purposes of illustration—this would require about 40 GWyr of electrical
energy. This would be a signiﬁcant increment to electricity demand, but still
a modest one compared to potential other sources of increased electricity use.
Worldwide, there may be something of a mismatch at present between
nuclear power and desalination. The need for desalination is now greatest in
countries of the Middle East, where oil and gas are unusually plentiful, and
in underdeveloped regions, where nuclear generation would probably not be
14
1 cubic meter = 264 U.S. gallons.
20.3 Possible Expansion of Nuclear Power 597
aﬀordable and where the amount of water locally needed is small compared
to the potential output using nuclear power. However, it is not necessary to
think in terms of large, dedicated nuclear reactors providing electricity for
desalination alone. The waste heat from nuclear (or other) power plants could
be used for distillation processes. Alternatively, for reverse osmosis, electricity
could be obtained as part of the output of a general-purpose plant.
Some speciﬁcally nuclear desalination facilities have been in operation and
others are being undertaken. The largest facility was in Kazakhstan, where
some of the power from a 135-MWe breeder reactor (since shut down) was
used to produce 80,000 m3
of potable water per day [35]. A demonstration
desalination facility is being installed at a heavy water reactor at Kalpakkam,
India that will produce 6300 m3
per day [32]. In Japan, desalination facilities
supply fresh water for use at 10 reactors in amounts of 1000–3000 m3
per
day [35]. In a diﬀerent variant, the possibility has been explored by Russia
and China of small reactors for desalination that would be mounted on barges
and which could presumably be moved where needed [22, p. 46].
To date, desalination has made only a relatively small contribution to
water supplies, and the nuclear energy desalination projects are to be viewed
more as demonstrations of feasibility than as signiﬁcant producers. For the
longer run, however, desalination is likely to be more extensively exploited as
a means of providing fresh water. Adequate energy resources are the key to
making this possible, and nuclear energy could provide part of this energy in
some countries.
20.3.4 Possible Diﬃculties in Nuclear Expansion
The Pace of Reactor Construction
An expansion to 3000 GWe of nuclear capacity in 2050 may seem a very
ambitious goal, especially when at present there is little reactor construction in
the world. For a future world population of 9 billion people, the hypothesized
per capita nuclear output would correspond to about 40% that of France in
2000. Most of the French increase in nuclear generation occurred in a 20-year
period starting in about 1977. It should be possible for the world to achieve
less than one-half the present French per capita nuclear output in twice the
time (say, from 2010 to 2050), given the conviction that the goal is desirable
and if adequate resources are dedicated to the task.
The comparison to France can also be considered in terms of the size of the
economies involved, rather than population. World Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) in the year 2020 is estimated to reach about 60 trillion dollars (in 1997
U.S. dollars) and the 1990 French GDP was 1.3 trillion dollars [17, Table A3].
This would make the world economy almost 50 times the size of the French
economy, each taken somewhere in the middle of expansion. A target of 3000
GWe of nuclear capacity is 48 times the present French nuclear capacity of 63
GWe. Thus, the suggested world expansion is about the same as the French
598 20 The Prospects for Nuclear Energy
expansion, if normalized to the size of the respective economies. It would
appear achievable in 40 years, which is twice the time of the French expansion.
In the above discussion, it was hypothesized that U.S. nuclear capacity
might be about 360 GWe in 2050. This would mean an average addition of
about 9 GWe of new capacity per year for 40 years—a plausible target for
a revived nuclear industry.15
It may be too conservative a target, given that
it is based on a projected rate of rise in electricity consumption of less than
1% per year, or too high a target in that it assumes the nuclear fraction of
electricity generation rises from 20% to 50% of the total. However, it provides
a sense of scale.
Uranium Resources
An immediate concern in contemplating such an expansion is the uranium
supply. World uranium resources were estimated in Section 9.5.2 to be about
20 million tonnes, enough for 100,000 GWyr of reactor operation for present
reactors. This would suﬃce to sustain a linear buildup to 2700 GWyr in 2050
and roughly another 15 years of continued operation. However, it would make
little sense to bring reactors on line in 2050 that would run out of fuel in
2065.
The hypothesized expansion could be sustained, however, if greater land
resources of uranium are found at acceptable costs, if it proves practical
to extract uranium from seawater, if thorium resources are exploited, or if
fuel cycles are adopted that make more eﬀective use of uranium. The most
uranium-eﬃcient fuel cycle is the breeder cycle. The prospect of breeders elicits
enthusiasm in some circles, because it oﬀers a virtually unlimited energy
source. It raises concern in others, because it may allow more ready access
to plutonium for nuclear weapons. A decision on breeder reactors could be
deferred for a long period of time, even if a substantial nuclear expansion begins
(see Section 9.5.4). However, ultimately it is an important, high stakes
decision.
Nuclear Wastes
The nuclear waste problem can be considered in the context of the U.S. experience.
The Yucca Mountain repository has a planned capacity of 70,000 metric
tons of heavy metal (MTHM). Typical spent fuel output is now about 30
MTHM/GWyr. The contemplated expansion to an annual 325 GWyr would
mean, were there no changes in reactor performance, a U.S. spent fuel output
of about 10,000 MTHM per year. Thus, one Yucca Mountain scale repository
would be needed every 7 years. However, future reactors may have twice the
15
We assume that all of today’s reactors would reach the end of their operating
lifetimes by 2050.
20.3 Possible Expansion of Nuclear Power 599
burnup, in which case the mass of spent fuel would be halved.16
In that case,
the radioactivity and heat output per unit mass will increase and it may be
desirable to have a longer period of predisposal cooling, either in on-site dry
storage casks or at centralized oﬀ-site facilities.
Depending on the size of the nuclear expansion and the fuel burnup
achieved, a future expansion in the United States might require one “Yucca
Mountain” every 5 to 20 years—if we continue with a once-through fuel cycle.
The actual Yucca Mountain project pays for itself, through the 0.1/c/kWh fee
paid by the reactor operators. Therefore, this would be economically aﬀordable.
Finding geologically satisfactory sites may be possible, given the large
array of plausible sites under consideration before expediency led to the selection
of Yucca Mountain. However, the large amount of spent fuel in an
open fuel cycle creates incentives to use fuel cycles that reduce the amount
of fuel and particularly the amounts of actinides that require disposal. Burning
the actinides in fast reactors, as discussed brieﬂy in Section 9.4.3 and
Section 16.6.1, would reduce the magnitude of the waste disposal problem.
The global problem is similar, but on a larger scale. It may be desirable
to internationalize waste disposal, with countries that have large and geologically
suitable areas accepting wastes from other countries. An upsurge in the
world use of nuclear energy might also eventually motivate a reconsideration
of subseabed disposal (see Section 11.3.2). However, any of these approaches
would have to overcome strong and perhaps insuperable opposition, unless
the expansion in nuclear energy use is accompanied by a substantial change
in public attitudes toward waste disposal hazards.
Weapons Proliferation
The most serious objection to nuclear power, in the view of many technical
people, is its link to the spread of nuclear weapons, either to additional countries
or to terrorists, as was discussed at some length in Section 18.3. A large
worldwide expansion could increase proliferation risks, because the greater
the number of countries with nuclear power, the greater the number of actual
or latent proliferators (see, e.g, Ref. [19]). For example, more countries could
assert the need for uranium-enrichment facilities, ostensibly for low-enriched
uranium for civilian reactors but potentially easing the path to high-enriched
uranium for weapons. An expansion could also increase the risk of plutonium
diversion or theft by encouraging the reprocessing of spent fuel and the use
of breeder reactors.
These risks can be reduced by the adoption of appropriate technical and
institutional measures. With a large nuclear expansion, the task of inspection
and monitoring would be more demanding. However, a greater economic stake
16
Here, we are considering once-through fuel cycles only. Some of the Generation
IV reactors have much greater burnups, and in most cases, recycling the fuel is
integral to the planning.
600 20 The Prospects for Nuclear Energy
in nuclear power might make the world community more willing to give the
IAEA the resources and authority that are needed to make it an eﬀective
monitor.
20.4 Regional Prospects for Nuclear Power Development
20.4.1 World Picture
There is no substantial expansion of nuclear power underway at this time
outside Asia (see Chapter 2). Many countries in Europe could undertake a
program of nuclear reactor construction, but most lack the political impulse.
Exceptions include Finland and, if announced plans materialize, Russia. The
Finnish program will perforce be small, perhaps restricted to a single reactor,
whereas the Russian program potentially could be much larger. The signiﬁcance
of the Finnish reactor will be one of example; its impact on the world
economy will be small.
Little use of nuclear power is being made in Africa and it does not appear
that most African countries are in a position to undertake a substantial
nuclear program. However, one of the more highly touted of the new reactors—
the Pebble Bed Modular Reactor—is being developed in South Africa, with
ambitions for a world market. This appears to be something of an anomaly,
and for the near future South Africa is likely to be a nuclear exception in a
largely non-nuclear continent. In the western hemisphere, Canada has been
the one country other than the United States with a substantial nuclear program,
including vigorous eﬀorts to compete in the world market for nuclear
reactors.
20.4.2 United States
The Decline in U.S. Leadership
The United States was the world pioneer in nuclear energy and, by virtue
of the size of its economy, is still the world leader in total nuclear power
generation. However, it is not the leader either in the fraction of electricity
that comes from nuclear power, or in rate of growth. The U.S. share of world
nuclear generation was 50% in 1975 [36] but had dropped to 30% by 2002, and
U.S. DOE projections suggest that this share will continue to slip [17, p. 186].
Light water reactors of U.S. design provided the model initially followed by
most countries, including France and Japan, but many countries now have
strong reactor design and construction capabilities of their own.
This is not to say that nuclear power is unimportant in the United States or
that the technical capabilities of the industry are gone, but the United States
is losing the clear primacy it once had, and the size of the nuclear industry and
of the university programs that educate future nuclear engineers have both
diminished. One assessment of the impending situation was given about 10
20.4 Regional Prospects for Nuclear Power Development 601
years ago by an American participant at an international nuclear conference
held in the United States in 1993, who suggested that the conference might
be remembered as marking the passing of the “mantle” of nuclear power
leadership from the United States to France and Japan [37]. This trend does
not seem to have been reversed in the following decade, although the United
States has taken a signiﬁcant initiative with respect to new reactor designs
in launching the Near-Term Deployment and Generation IV programs, which
are now international in scope (see Section 16.2).
Projections for Future Growth
The long-standing uncertainty about the future of nuclear power in the United
States is illustrated by alternative DOE projections made in 1993 for the
growth of nuclear power up to the year 2030 [38, p. 9]. Three scenarios from
these projections are presented in Figure 20.1: (1) a “no new orders” scenario,
in which nuclear capacity decreases as existing reactors are phased out; (2)
a “lower reference” case in which there is a cautious resumption of nuclear
expansion; and (3) an “upper reference” case that assumes a vigorous economy
and use of nuclear power and coal for new generation. U.S. nuclear capacity
in the year 2030 was projected to be 5 GWe, 119 GWe, and 168 GWe in the
three scenarios, respectively.
0
50
100
150
200
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040
NETCAPACITY(GWe)
YEAR
No New
Orders
Lower
Reference
Upper
Reference
Fig. 20.1. Projected United States nuclear power capacity (in net GWe) for 1995–
2030 in three 1993 DOE scenarios, together with actual capacity in prior years
(1973–1992).
602 20 The Prospects for Nuclear Energy
These projections have stood up reasonably well for the ﬁrst 10 years since
they were made, with their anticipation of little change before 2005. Beyond
that, the spate of license extension applications (see Section 2.4.5) makes the
“no new orders” estimate look unlikely, while a pessimistic or “lower reference”
projection made today would not show the increase of Figure 20.1. The rapid
increase shown in the “upper reference” projection appears achievable, as
would an even greater increase, but the actual future for the United States
remains a matter of public and industry choice.
The stated policy of the U.S. DOE is to encourage nuclear growth. More
speciﬁcally, the Roadmap (discussed in Section 16.2.3) seeks an order by private
industry for a new reactor by 2005, with the goal of deploying it by 2010.
This is intended by the DOE to be the ﬁrst stage in a revival of nuclear power
in the United States, to be followed by the construction and deployment of
Generation IV reactors by 2030. On the other hand, the DOE’s Energy Information
Administration projected in early 2003 that no new nuclear plants will
be put into operation by 2025 “because natural gas and coal-ﬁred units are
projected to be more economical” [20, p. 70]. The validity of this assessment
may in large measure depend on measures taken by the DOE itself.
Institutional Issues
Some observers, including most advocates of nuclear power, believe that the
crucial issues in the United States are more institutional than technical or
even economic. The division of authority and initiative among many levels of
government has made it diﬃcult to adopt and implement policies that would
permit rapid development of nuclear power (or even its prompt curtailment).
Important roles are played by the president, Congress, the courts, and a host
of federal agencies, including the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Department
of Energy, and the Environmental Protection Agency. There is also
a confusing division of powers between the federal government, the states,
and, in some cases, individual cities or counties. With many opportunities for
de facto vetoes, smooth progress in any direction requires a strong consensus.
This does not now exist with respect to nuclear power, and existing public
opposition remains a problem for the nuclear industry.
One step has been taken to reduce institutional diﬃculties, namely the
streamlining of the licensing process so that once a plant is approved, the
only remaining requirement, in terms of NRC procedures, will be the meeting
of the original speciﬁcations. This change is reﬂected in new regulations, but
it will not be known if this process will indeed be smooth until it is tested with
an actual license application. The DOE has indicated an interest in helping
to cover the costs of the ﬁrst attempt of this sort.
Even if the public and institutional climate are supportive at the time
a reactor is ordered, potential purchasers of nuclear reactors remain fearful
that changes in the policies of the federal or state governments could make it
diﬃcult to put the reactor into operation when it is completed. The precedent
20.4 Regional Prospects for Nuclear Power Development 603
of the Shoreham reactor in New York is not forgotten (see Section 2.4.1).
Hence, a prudent utility is likely to be hesitant about ordering a large nuclear
reactor. The hesitancy might be somewhat less for smaller reactors, especially
modular reactors, because the investment is less and the lead time between
an order and reactor operation is expected to be shorter. Even so, problems
remain if only because the economies of modular reactors are not realized
until a sizable number of them have been ordered and deployed.
It is not clear whether the measures being considered by the DOE and
Congress to encourage nuclear power will suﬃce to overcome industry hesitation.
Thus, Larry Foulke, in outlining what would be needed to reduce
uncertainties (see Section 19.4.2), warned:
The DOE’s expectation that industry will lead in the introduction of
new nuclear technologies is not valid. This means that the DOE is
the logical leader in the development and demonstration of advanced
reactor schemes with the necessary ﬁnancial support. [39, p. 38]
In short, nuclear power in the United States may face diﬃculties without
federal measures to aid prospective purchasers of reactors in meeting some of
the costs and risks of being pioneers in a nuclear revival.17
20.4.3 Asia
In Asia, three countries obtain a substantial fraction of their electricity from
nuclear power and continue to build new reactors: Japan, South Korea and
Taiwan. In each of these countries, there is some degree of tension between
energy planners who would like to build nuclear plants and nuclear opponents
who have had some success in slowing expansion eﬀorts. One success of the
opponents has been in Taiwan, where the two reactors listed as being under
construction have had an on-and-oﬀ (and now, apparently, on) history as
political power has shifted.
The construction programs in India and China are large compared to what
is going on elsewhere in the world (see Table 2.5), but both countries are
starting from a small base and the currently committed expansion is small
compared to the overall energy needs of India and China. It is not clear that
they will be able to obtain the capital needed for an expansion that will have a
substantial impact on their energy economies. China may be the largest question
mark. Although its present program is still small for a country of its size,
this could change. China’s economy is growing rapidly and its heavy use of
coal is contributing to serious pollution. With a centralized government, there
could be a decision to undertake a major nuclear expansion, given continued
economic growth and increased access to the necessary capital resources. As
a sign of considerable ﬂexibility in this program, of eight reactors under con-
17
The U.S. Senate took steps in this direction in June 2003, but the ultimate legislative
outcome was not settled during 2003.
604 20 The Prospects for Nuclear Energy
struction in China at the end of 2001, two reactors were coming from each of
four suppliers divided among France, Canada, Russia, and China [40].18
The two remaining Asian countries with reactors that have been under
construction are Iran and North Korea. These reactors are intertwined with
weapons proliferation issues, as discussed in Chapter 18. In the case of North
Korea, the reactors were proposed as an antiproliferation measure, to induce
North Korea to forego the use of reactors that would lend themselves to the
production of weapons-grade plutonium. In the case of Iran, the power reactor
is widely viewed as a proliferation threat, with Iran’s nominally civilian nuclear
program suspected of being a cover for developing a weapons program.
At present, Asia is just beginning to catch up with the United States and
Europe in the scale of use of nuclear power.19
However, it may soon take
the lead. This was predicted by Dr. Kunihiko Uematsu, a Japanese scientist
serving as Director-General of the Nuclear Energy Agency of the OECD,
who described in 1993 an expansive future for nuclear power in Asia. Citing
the existing programs in Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and China and the planning
and studies then underway in Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines, he
suggested:
. . .nuclear power generation in this region will soon reach the level of
the OECD’s European and North American regions. This is a striking
example of the general shift in the world’s energy pattern from
the traditionally developed countries of the OECD to other parts of
the world. . .with the increasing importance of nuclear power in this
part of the world, the future development of this energy source
may no longer be spearheaded by the traditionally developed
countries of Europe and North America. [41, p. 20]
Boldface, as shown, was used in the published paper, indicating the signiﬁcance
the author attached to the point being made.
A more whimsical statement of the anticipated Asian leadership was made
in 2002 by Dr. Chang Kun Lee, a commissioner of South Korea’s Atomic Energy
Commission and then the current chairman of the International Nuclear
Societies Council:
As far as power reactor deployment is concerned, the advanced nations
bounded out of the starting line and hopped sprightly along at
the pace of a rabbit while we Asian countries plodded along at the
slow crawl of the turtle. At the moment, however, the Western nuclear
rabbit is taking a nap under a roadside tree (hung with limp moratorium
banners) while the Asian nuclear turtle is still toddling along on
the road carrying the nuclear seed.
18
Four of these reactors were connected to the electricity grid in 2002.
19
Gross generation in 2002 was 58 GWyr in Asia, 92 GWyr in the United States,
and 105 GWyr in Western Europe [29].
20.5 Issues in Nuclear Decisions 605
You could say that Asia is keeping alive a “nuclear technology shelter,”
keeping the ﬂame burning. . .these former students of nuclear
technology in Asia will be ready to pay back their previous teachers
in the West with state-of-the-art technical know-how and new or next
generation hardwares. [42]
It is possible to question the applicability of the “turtle–rabbit” analogy. It
is also possible that Asian countries will go through the same sequence experienced
by Western countries—early enthusiasm followed by strong and often
paralyzing public opposition. Nonetheless, the implications of his talk are
clear, that, at least for the moment, the “mantle” of nuclear leadership has
passed to Asia.
20.5 Issues in Nuclear Decisions
20.5.1 Categories of Issues
Resolvable Issues
Contentious as nuclear disagreements are, some of the key issues are basically
technical, and, in principle, conscientious people can eventually reach a
common understanding. In particular, there are strong disagreements as to
the safety of nuclear reactors and nuclear waste disposal, but it is possible to
localize the points of disagreement and, with enough study and patience, it
should be possible to resolve them. If one chooses to be optimistic, one can
look forward to an eventual convergence of views or at least to the reaching
of a consensus that, even if short of unanimity, provides objective policy
guidance.
Even the question of the eﬀects of low levels of radiation can be discussed
quantitatively, despite its being sometimes considered as beyond the reach
of scientiﬁc analysis. Upper limits can be put on the possible rate of cancer
fatalities, and one can look forward to the day when a better understanding of
the underlying biological mechanisms or more comprehensive epidemiological
studies can shed light on the validity of the linearity hypothesis, the possible
existence of a threshold for radiation damage, and the reality of hormesis (see
Chapter 4).
More Intractable Issues
If those were the only sorts of issues involved, the nuclear policy debate would
be less diﬃcult, notwithstanding the skepticism with which many people react
to the conclusions of “expert” consensus. However, there are two nontechnical
issues that cannot be authoritatively decided but that raise profound questions
concerning nuclear power. These are the issues of weapons proliferation and of
606 20 The Prospects for Nuclear Energy
deﬁning what might be called—for want of a better description—a “desirable
society.” In the former case, any conclusions are largely a matter of political
guesswork. In the latter case, they involve personal philosophical or aesthetic
viewpoints—with no good way to resolve diﬀerences. A dominant position
may emerge on each of these issues, but, in the end, the positions may not
amount to more than people voting their instincts. (These issues are discussed
further in the next two subsections.)
Perceptions of Need
Overhanging all of these considerations is the question of need. Logically or
not, the perception of the dangers of nuclear power correlates with the perception
of the need for it, including judgments as to the promise of the alternatives.
Of course, considerations of danger and need are appropriately linked
when a cost–beneﬁt analysis is being made—even an informal one. They are
not appropriately linked when an estimate is being made of the absolute risk.
It is therefore important to guard against having extraneous views on the
desirability of nuclear power inﬂuence assessments on technical issues—for
example, estimates of radiation eﬀects, reactor accident probabilities, and the
eﬀectiveness of the various barriers at the planned Yucca Mountain repository.
20.5.2 Proliferation Risks and Nuclear Power
Some of the detailed issues bearing on the connection between nuclear power
and proliferation of nuclear weapons have been discussed in Chapter 18 and
earlier in this chapter. Two contrasting assessments can be made as to the
nature of this connection. In one view, any country with nuclear power has a
headstart as a potential proliferator. Whether or not it has nuclear weapons
at the moment, possession of nuclear power makes its path to nuclear weapons
easier—in terms of both professional expertise and the procurement of materials
and equipment. Further, it will have more soft targets for terrorist theft.
The way to reduce this threat is to phase out nuclear power. It would also
be desirable to eliminate the nuclear weapons in the countries that already
have them, but, even if this cannot be accomplished immediately, a phasing
out of nuclear power would reduce the number of potential proliferators. Just
stopping the expansion of nuclear power to new countries would avoid adding
additional potential proliferators.
An opposing view is that it is too late to adopt this strategy. The argument
for phasing out nuclear power is tantamount to an argument that it
would be better had nuclear ﬁssion been impossible. However, by now the genie
is irrevocably out of the bottle. Thirty-one countries have nuclear power,
2 countries without nuclear power have nuclear weapons (Israel and North
Korea),20
and over 20 additional countries have research reactors [43]. Even if
20
The North Korean case is ambiguous, in that it is not certain that it has actual
weapons.
20.5 Issues in Nuclear Decisions 607
all countries gave up their equipment, the technical knowledge would remain,
and a country could at any time try to develop nuclear weapons in secret.
Further, a decision to phase out nuclear power would be on a country-bycountry
basis. It would presumably be led by the most “socially responsible”
countries, but with no assurance that the less “socially responsible” countries
would follow suit. A preferable course, in this view, would be for the “responsible”
countries to provide leadership in the use of nuclear power and use
their inﬂuence to establish fuel cycles that reduce proliferation risks and to
strengthen international mechanisms to uncover and discourage proliferation
eﬀorts.
An additional argument advanced for nuclear power is that it can help
to reduce the need for oil and the likelihood of military conﬂicts over oil,
including potential nuclear conﬂicts. Thus, even if nuclear power increases the
opportunities for developing weapons, it reduces the incentive to use them.
Each of these two overall views has a degree of plausibility, but their implications
are contradictory. The choice between them cannot be determined by
an orderly, analytic decision-making process, because no matter how the assessments
are ﬂeshed out, they appear in essence to only be educated guesses.
No amount of new data would establish which assessment—or guess—is the
more realistic.
20.5.3 Nuclear Power and a Desirable Society
Feelings About Material Development
Attitudes toward nuclear power are also inﬂuenced by aesthetic or philosophical
positions on the nature of a desirable world. Is it better for us (i.e., humans)
and the planet to have copious energy supplies or is it preferable for energy
limitations to restrain unbridled material development? Individual answers to
this rather vague question appear to inﬂuence the frame of reference in which
people view energy issues.
We live with a mix of conﬂicting attitudes toward technology. On the one
hand, we embrace many of the conveniences and applaud some of its fruits
(e.g., in medicine and in reducing the drudgery of household chores). On the
other hand, at least some people see attractions in a life that is less dependent
on and encumbered by mechanical and electrical devices. Also, as we become
more dependent on modern technology, we lose some of our sense of control.
It is no longer possible for the average “handy” person to ﬁx a car in case of a
breakdown, which may or may not be outweighed by the decreased frequency
of breakdowns.
Electricity is at the heart of modernization, and the discomfort that critics
may have about its impact has been suggested by Amory Lovins:
In an electrical world, your lifetime comes not from an understandable
neighborhood technology run by people you know who are at
608 20 The Prospects for Nuclear Energy
your own social level, but rather from an alien, remote, and perhaps
humiliatingly uncontrollable technology run by a faraway, bureaucratized,
technical elite who have probably never heard of you. Decisions
about who shall have how much energy at what price also become
centralized. . . .[44, p. 55]
Whatever unease people may feel about electricity—and for electricity itself
the unease appears to be less general than Lovins suggests—the concern is
intensiﬁed for nuclear power. It is indeed a remote technology, with reactor
development having become an international enterprise carried out by a small
“technical elite” in the employ of large companies. The nuclear industry tries
to put a human face upon itself, but it has a diﬃcult task.
Since Lovins wrote those words, the idea of “globalization” has entered
the popular culture. Nuclear power can be considered as the epitome of an
enterprise controlled by very large corporations with international scope. It
oﬀers the world a somewhat uniform product that is expensive to install,
diﬃcult to understand, and dominated by highly industrialized countries. The
concept of globalization and the objections to it are not well codiﬁed, but it
is easy to expect that those who have a general distaste for globalization will
have a special dislike for nuclear power.
Human Population and Impact
An underlying matter that—consciously or not—may ﬁgure in the nuclear
debate is our feeling as to the desirability of satisfying the energy demands of
a world population that was 2.5 billion in 1950, was 6 billion at the beginning
of the 21st century, and appears headed to 9 billion or more in 2050. Nuclear
power is pointed to as an aid in meeting these demands. However, some may
take that as a curse instead of a blessing. It raises the question of the size
of the population that we would welcome. A quotation from John Stuart
Mill, written in 1848 when England and the world were much less densely
populated, is pertinent today. As quoted by Joel Cohen in How Many People
Can the Earth Support?, Mill contended:
A population may be too crowded, though all be amply supplied with
food and raiment. It is not good for man to be kept perforce at all
times in the presence of his species. . . . Solitude, in the sense of being
often alone, is essential to any depth of meditation or of character;
and solitude in the presence of natural beauty and grandeur, is the
cradle of thoughts and aspirations which are not only good for the
individual, but which society could ill do without. [45, p. 397]
This attitude resonates strongly today, at least among the prosperous.
Considerations of the world’s possible population are sometimes couched
in terms of the “carrying capacity of the Earth.” As discussed by Cohen in
the book cited earlier, the carrying capacity depends not only on the mate-
20.5 Issues in Nuclear Decisions 609
rial resources—such as land, water, and energy—but also on the degree of
crowding that we are willing to tolerate. By providing more ample material
resources, nuclear energy can help to sustain a larger population. This is one
of the common arguments for nuclear energy—it will enable the world to adequately
support more people. However, this can also be taken as an argument
against nuclear power.
One can juxtapose the image of a densely populated world that makes
extensive use of nuclear energy with one that relies exclusively on renewable
energy. Carrying capacity estimates based on energy considerations were made
in 1994 by David Pimentel and collaborators [46] and by Paul Ehrlich and
collaborators [47]. Each group concluded that an optimal global population for
a sustainable future is under 2 billion. The argument is made most explicitly
in the Pimentel paper. The authors envisage a world in which fossil fuels have
been exhausted and solar energy is the only sustainable energy source. They
take 35 quads of primary solar energy as the maximum that could be captured
each year in the United States. Assuming that the present average per capita
U.S. energy consumption is halved through conservation, the 35 quads would
suﬃce for a population of about 200 million. For the world as a whole, the
total available energy in this picture would be about 200 quads. If the world
per capita energy consumption were to converge to the new U.S. average, this
would support a population of somewhat over 1 billion, which Pimentel et al.
interpret as meaning that “1 to 2 billion people could be supported living in
relative prosperity.”21
One need not accept the details of this argument, including the maximum
energy assumed for solar energy and the assumed absence of any nonrenewable
energy sources. Nonetheless, it suggests alternatives of a densely populated,
energy-rich world with nuclear power or a sparsely populated, energy-poor
world without it. If energy limitations were accompanied by a shrinking of
the world population to 2 billion without social upheavals and deep poverty,
this might be a benign scenario. However, it is hard to envisage a peaceful
transition of this sort on a quick enough time scale to be germane to the
anticipated future energy problems.
Somewhat akin to the concern about excessive population is the concern
about mankind’s impact on the environment. At a time when cold fusion
was being cited as a potentially unlimited source of energy, Albert Bartlett
suggested that “if an abundant source of low-cost energy could be found it
may be the worst thing that has ever happened to the human race” [49]. The
speciﬁcally cited danger was the temperature rise accompanying untrammeled
expansion of energy consumption, but a broader concern in this argument is
that if mankind has unlimited options, the options may be exercised in ways
that would severely damage the environment.
The overall argument, although perhaps between debaters passing in the
night, is between those who most fear that without nuclear power there will
21
This section, and some of the neighboring sections, are closely based on Ref. [48].
610 20 The Prospects for Nuclear Energy
not be enough energy to support the world’s population at an “adequate”
level and those who most fear the encouragement of population growth and
the resulting damage to the environment and the quality of individual lives.
This is a second issue that deﬁes “objective” debate.
20.5.4 The Road to Decisions
One Path or Many
A variety of solutions to the world’s energy problems are on the table, and
each has its enthusiasts and detractors. In the background, and complementing
all of the solutions, is conservation. Reduction of wasteful or ineﬃcient uses
of energy can substantially reduce the demand for energy. However, at any
plausible degree of conservation, world energy consumption will rise—and even
without a rise in consumption, replacing present fossil fuel use is desirable.
The options for the required energy supply and their attractions when viewed
optimistically, include the following:
1. Coal and carbon sequestration. The world’s coal resources are large and
widely distributed. With carbon sequestration, they can be used cleanly,
assuming that more tractable emissions such as sulfur dioxide are also
eliminated.
2. Fusion. Fusion energy, if it can be mastered, represents an ultimate solution,
as an almost unlimited resource with few negative impacts.
3. Natural gas. The resources of unconventional natural gas may be very
great, and the pollution from natural gas is small compared to that from
coal (without sequestration).
4. Nuclear energy. Energy from nuclear ﬁssion is already a major carbon-free
electricity provider and, with new fuel cycles, could provide energy for
the indeﬁnite future, assuming that waste disposal and other contentious
issues are resolved.
5. Renewable energy. The solar energy falling upon the Earth far exceeds
any possible needs. Its capture, if achievable despite the diluteness of the
source, would provide clean energy in perpetuity.
However, there are powerful reasons to question these optimistic assessments
and the degree to which we can rely on the listed options. In most cases,
they involve a tremendous buildup of technologies whose practicality and impacts
have not been tested on a large scale. This caution applies to carbon
sequestration, fusion, extraction of natural gas from unconventional sources
or of uranium from seawater, and each of the expandable forms of renewable
energy.22
The most tested of these options, nuclear power, is also the one that
elicits the most fears and opposition.
22
Here, we are assuming that hydroelectric power and the use of biomass for electricity
generation have only limited potential for expansion.
20.5 Issues in Nuclear Decisions 611
A choice among the options can be made in either a decisive or exploratory
fashion. A decisive choice would be to now pick the winner, or winners, and
abandon the others. An exploratory choice would be to pursue all plausible
options, until their comparative merits are clearer. The case for a single
path was made forcefully by Lovins in Soft Energy Paths. He argued that attempting
to pursue several paths simultaneously would be a distraction and
impede implementing the proper one—a mix of conservation and renewable
energy [44]. The case for multiple paths reduces to the maxims of not putting
all of one’s eggs in one basket or of hedging one’s bets. The argument is reﬂected
picturesquely in the advice: “When you come to a fork in the road,
take it.”23
If one thinks of a person in a car, the advice is intentionally absurd.
However, for an army traversing unfamiliar terrain, it can make sense
to explore multiple roads.
Even in the exploratory approach, de facto decisions are made by the pace
at which eﬀorts are invested in one option or another. A minimal investment
is to “keep the option open.” Sometimes, in recent years, the dispute over
nuclear power has been reduced to one between those who want to phase it
out and those who favor keeping the option alive—either because they foresee
the day when the need will be recognized or because they are truly undecided
about the eventual need. In the United States, the federal policy in recent
years has been to keep the option open and, more recently, to encourage it,
but to make only relatively minor investments in it.
Diﬀerences Among Countries
Although all countries are impacted by some of the same economic factors
and resource pressures, it is not to be expected that they will all reach the
same decisions. The diﬀerences in the nuclear policies of diﬀerent countries
can arise from basic aspects of their physical environment or from the political
and economic character of their societies.
In terms of its environment, Japan is in a particularly diﬃcult situation. It
is poor in fossil fuel resources and it has a population density that is roughly
12 times that of the United States, limiting its options for use of renewable
energy.24
For Japan, nuclear power oﬀers a path to partial energy independence
that cannot be obtained in any other way. In contrast, the United States
and Canada are much richer in fossil fuels and have large areas that could, in
principle, be used for renewable energy. Thus, they are not under the same
pressures as Japan.
23
This advice is attributed to Yogi Berra, the American baseball player and putative
source of many pithy phrases.
24
Japan, in 2001, obtained 59% of its electricity from fossil fuels, 31% from nuclear
power, 8% from hydroelectric power, and 2% from biomass and other renewable
sources [1].
612 20 The Prospects for Nuclear Energy
The eﬀects of diﬀerences in physical circumstances are illustrated by the
previously mentioned example of Norway and Sweden, which in many ways
are similar in attitudes and sociology. Sweden, with somewhat limited hydroelectric
resources, has reluctantly continued to use nuclear power for roughly
40% of its electricity, despite the planned shutdown. Norway, in contrast, uses
its abundant hydroelectric power to provide virtually all of its electricity and
has no nuclear power. Its per capita electricity consumption is 50% greater
than that of Sweden [1].
Diﬀerences in political mood, in economic opportunities, and in national
institutions can also play an important role. The more legal and political avenues
nuclear opponents have for contesting nuclear development, the more
diﬃcult it is to proceed with nuclear power. As several commentators have
pointed out, the diﬃculties are greater in a country with a federal government
than in a country where decisions are made by a centralized national
government (e.g., Ref. [41]). A federal government oﬀers many opportunities
to raise objections, and the objections are put forth in an atmosphere in which
local concerns can take precedence over national priorities. The United States
is quite vulnerable in this regard, with important prerogatives held by the
states and with a system of checks and balances within the federal govern-
ment.
It is to be expected that diﬀerences in their objective situations and institutions,
as well as possibly transient diﬀerences in popular attitudes, will
continue to lead countries to diﬀering choices. Thus, even were the United
States to abandon nuclear power, there is no reason to expect that Japan
and France would follow suit. Other countries (e.g., China and India), may
wish to accelerate their use of nuclear power, but be held back by a lack of
capital. In the end—despite globally common technology, fuel markets, and
environmental concerns—decisions on energy policy will be largely national
decisions.
Constituencies For and Against Nuclear Power
In reaching a national decision as to the future of nuclear power, the role of
a constituency is important. At present, there is a determined and eﬀective
constituency against nuclear power, including most environmental organiza-
tions.25
There has been the image of a comparably active and determined
constituency for nuclear power, namely the nuclear industry. However, with
the decrease of nuclear reactor construction, the nuclear industry has shrunk,
and this has not been a valid image for some years. To be sure, there is continuing
activity in the operation and improvement of existing power plants
and in the completion of a few others, plus some prospect of possible future
reactors. This sustains interest on the part of both utilities and manufactur-
25
Here, we will focus on the United States, but the general points have broader
applicability.
20.5 Issues in Nuclear Decisions 613
ers. But the total scale of development is relatively small, and the utilities in
countries like the United States are more interested in trouble-free operation
of existing reactors than in building new ones. At present, there is no powerful
and vocal constituency for the further development of nuclear power.26
There are, however, two potential enlarged constituencies: the technical
community and the environmental community. For the most part, engineering
and scientiﬁc organizations and their members support nuclear power, and if
energy issues become pressing, there might be a greater sense of urgency in
this support.
However, the emotional drive behind any position in the nuclear controversy
is heightened when there are important environmental concerns. At
present, the “environmental movement” is largely opposed to nuclear power,
although with diﬀerent degrees of ﬁnality in the opposition. The movement is
not monolithic and there are many strands. From a somewhat extreme standpoint,
the fundamental diﬃculty with nuclear power, or any technology that
facilitates increased use of energy, is that it increases the potential impact of
humans upon the natural environment—impacts that are likely, in this view,
to be undesirable. Those who share this fear will always oppose nuclear power.
Other parts of the environmental movement would welcome a truly clean
energy source to replace fossil fuels. Over the next years, some environmentalists
might turn to nuclear power in preference to fossil fuel combustion, if
they conclude these are the actual alternatives. If such a revisionist view of
environmental priorities takes hold, it could provide the impetus for a nuclear
revival that may not come from industry or government initiatives alone.27
20.5.5 Predictions and their Uncertainty
Summary of Factors Impacting Nuclear Power
As discussed earlier, the factors that will determine whether nuclear power
moves ahead or regresses include the following:
◆ The safety record of existing reactors, the progress of the Yucca Mountain
repository, and the perceived safety of next-generation reactors.
◆ The level of concern about global climate change, oil or natural gas shortages,
and the world’s dependence on Persian Gulf oil.
◆ The perceived prospects of renewable energy, carbon sequestration, and
fusion.
26
However, if the federal government is sympathetic, the inﬂuence of any constituency
is ampliﬁed, as was the case for conservation during the Carter presidency
in the United States and may be the case for nuclear power during the
present Bush administration.
27
Author’s note: This thought appears also in the 1996 edition; since then, I have
become aware of an organization Environmentalists for Nuclear Energy (EFN),
based in France, that has been founded by Bruno Comby [50].
614 20 The Prospects for Nuclear Energy
◆ Judgments as to the extent to which nuclear power contributes to or detracts
from national and world security.
◆ Attitudes toward technology, globalization, and growth.
◆ The economic competitiveness of nuclear power and the nature of government
intervention (e.g., tax credits or carbon taxes).
◆ The orientation of individual governments as they evaluate the issues and
their vigor in facilitating the adoption of one or more of the competing
technologies.
Given this array of factors—many involving highly controversial or ambiguous
questions—it is not possible to know how the balance of forces will aﬀect
nuclear power’s evolution over the next few decades. Presently, construction
of new reactors is conﬁned largely to Asian countries, but there are renewed
government expressions of interest in the United States and Russia. Although
there is no hint that sudden changes are in the oﬃng, there is no assurance
that any industrialized country, wherever it now lies in the spectrum, will
maintain its present energy policies over prolonged time periods—whether
the changes are in the direction of phasing out nuclear power, expanding its
use, or adopting it for the ﬁrst time.
There are no absolute barriers to a return to a rapid growth in nuclear
power. There are nuclear suppliers in North America, Europe, and Asia who
are eager to build the reactors if the demand develops. The question is not
whether a major expansion of nuclear power is possible, but whether it is
desirable. Predicting what will appear to be desirable 10 years hence, or even
5 years hence, is very problematic, especially if the predictions attempt to
embrace all countries.
A Past Failure of Prediction
It is interesting to look back almost 30 years and examine the prescience of
predictions made then. Conveniently for this purpose, a conference was held in
Paris in 1975, with the complacent title Nuclear Energy Maturity. The underlying
premise of the conference was that nuclear power had arrived, and that it
remained to consider how to proceed so that nuclear power could “. . .represent
a long-term-solution, that is for thousands of years rather than the few decades
set by the uranium supply required by the ‘proven’ reactors” [51, p. x].
This long-term issue was addressed in a panel on the Role of Breeders.
One speaker gave projections for future generation in the “Western World”
(for this purpose, much the same as the OECD countries). In a variety of
scenarios, western capacity was projected to be 700–1000 GWe in 1990 and
2000–4000 GWe in 2005 [51, p. 328]. In actuality, total world capacity was
only 320 GWe in 1990 and there is no possibility that it will reach even 500
GWe by 2005.
These were not atypically optimistic projections. Similar projections were
presented by other speakers [51, pp. 319 and 322]. There was at least one
References 615
dissenting voice [51, p. 324], but it seems to have been a voice in the wilderness.
There was a clear consensus that the world was moving into a period of very
substantial nuclear expansion.
The failure of this prediction carries two cautionary reminders:
◆ Looking into the recent past does not enable one to see the future. There
is a possibility that we are repeating this mistake today, in taking nuclear
power’s sluggishness of recent years as an indicator of future sluggishness.
◆ The proponents of a newly evolving technology can have an unduly enthusiastic
picture of future prospects and may underestimate the diﬃculties.
That was true for nuclear power in 1975. It could be true for some of the
emerging technologies today.
Competing Considerations
In the end, policies on nuclear power will depend on judgments of the relative
risks of using it or of trying to do without it. With it, we may face risks of
radioactive contamination from reactor accidents or waste disposal. Without
it, we may face increased risks from climate change and energy shortages. In
both cases, there are risks of nuclear bomb manufacture and use. Conclusions
as to the magnitude of these risks and how they balance are likely to vary
from country to country, given diﬀerent national circumstances and internal
political forces. Depending on the conclusions reached, nuclear power could
shrink over the next several decades and remain important in only a few
countries, or it could expand substantially in much of the world.
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